Microsoft Attempts to Secure IIS

billmaly writes: "Yahoo has this article about trying to make IIS more secure. Among steps is to have it install in its most secure state, putting the onus on sysadmins to remove it from that state. It looks like Microsoft may be trying to do the right thing from a security standpoint, at least on paper."

Comments

Power of Gartner

[augustz]

Sounds like a good thing to me.

There marketing material pointing out holes in Apache mostly focused on Tomcat the java app server, PHP etc. But these don't come installed by default, where was with IIS, you install just about everything by default.

Hmm...

[Wakko Warner]

Apparently every copy of Windows XP/2000 is now shipping with a pair of scissors, to be used to "secure" the ethernet connection of IIS servers.

- A.P.

I hope they succeed

[drodver]

because 78,417 Nimda hits are more than enough for me!

A problem of "least privilege"

[sting3r]

The root of IIS's troubles is not exploitability of particular services. It is the fact that much of the IIS server code runs as SYSTEM, which is the same as "root" under UNIX - an all-powerful user. Years ago, the developers of NCSA httpd and Apache learned to make their products usable by non-root users. Currently, Apache only needs root privileges to bind to port 80 - then it completely relinquishes them. That is the way it should be and that would make 0wning an IIS box many times more difficult - because using an "ordinary user" account to get SYSTEM access on NT is a lot more difficult than on UNIX because NT doesn't have setuid bits.

Admittedly, IIS does run certain scripts and perform certain functions as a "nobody" user. But most of the recent exploits were able to get an immediate "root shell" because the services being exploited did run as SYSTEM. And unless Microsoft is willing to address that problem, admins who need to enable many services and don't keep up on patches will still get rooted on a regular basis.

-sting3r

Microsoft's new strategy

[Anonymous Coward]

Download source code for Apache. Tweak the headers to say "IIS" instead of "Apache". Brag about their speedy team of coders.

IIS Secure?

[zarathustra93]

Open the source. Put it up for peer review. Fix the holes. I'm not saying that they should hand out the source for their whole OS, but when they have had as many debacles with one piece of software it might actually help them out quite a bit.

I refuse to install products that require IIS as well. A software provider of ours makes an ultra nice business mining product that can be nicely web enabled. I told them that I would purchase it as soon as they supported a web server that didn't have a new security flaw or bug discovered every week.

this is a good first step, but..

[Masem]

As pointed out in this CNET article, while forcing the maximum secure version and forcing uses to install all patches is a good step in the right direction, the fact that IIS has been patched so many times implies that to really improve the security of it, it needs to be rewritten from scratch, particularly since it is a closed source application and thus does not have the same QA that open source software might have.

Re:this is a good first step, but..

[corky6921]

Personally, I would think that rewriting from scratch would make IIS more dangerous. At least Microsoft is plugging the security holes. I would think that rewriting it from scratch might cause more new exploits, whereas fixing the old version makes it more secure with every revision.

This article, on the other hand, shows that Microsoft is trying hard to actually make its product better, instead of just saying "Here it is. New version. Use it or be forever left behind..." like they did with Office XP. I think this goes to show what a company in a non-monopoly position will do to succeed. (No one has a monopoly in web servers, and Microsoft isn't even the leader...)

This is a good thing, and it's the right choice for Microsoft. Please don't call for a rewrite, or in two years we'll all be complaining about the root exploits discovered in the new IIS...

Re:this is a good first step, but..

[dillon_rinker]

I would think that rewriting it from scratch might cause more new exploits
Yes. That's why sendmail and bind are the paragons of security they are today. From-scratch attempts to replace them are riddled with holes that make IIS look like a pinprick.

Re:this is a good first step, but..

[tshak]

Well, they're just repeating the Gartner report. Many of us closer to the issue agree that what needs a complete rewrite is ISAPI.DLL. This is not nearly as big of a task as rewriting IIS!

A paper on handling IIS in a secure manner:

[Nindalf]

The paper is here.

It's more involved than you might think. If you are a sysadmin, this might be important for your job security.

No Real Change & Marketing Ploy

[webword]

This is not a change in the fundamental technology. They don't seem to indicate that IIS itself will change, only that the default settings will yield more secure servers. This is only one type of security issue. What about all of the others?

Another thing to consider is that they are not doing this to be kind, gentle, or nice. They are doing it to shore up their marketing of Hailstorm, Passport, and so forth. This is not a response to "what the users want" or they would have done this ages ago. It is a marketing ploy. It is the right thing to do, but it is a marketing ploy. Managers, CIOs, CEOs, and so forth will be able to sleep better at night.

Re:No Real Change & Marketing Ploy

[tshak]

No this isn't. Microsoft has always tried to make everything so easy, that they just install and enable everything so you can do anything with minimal work. They're finally realising the implications. There IS a fundamental change in their strategy - shipped locked down instead of opened up. Yes, I've already mentioned (as others) that ISAPI.DLL needs to be rewritten as it's obviously got some serious security flaws. However, if IIS doesn't have tons of insecurely executable scripts installed and activated by default it lessons the issue dramatically.

it will never be accepted

[evenprime]

If they do they do this, they will alienate their consumer base. Many Microsoft customers tend to choose their products because of ease of use. Taking something that is insecure and knowing how much to open up to get your applications to work is more difficult than installing it and just having it work right away because all the features you need (...and all the ones you don't) are already activated.

It would be great to have everything disabled by default, and would be a major help for security. (That's how OpenBSD have been able to go four years without a hole in the default install...there's not much enabled in the default install). I just don't think that the average M$ shop wants to take the time involved for an average admin to get a secure-by-default product working, or pay the top dollars needed to get an admin savvy enough to already know how to do this.

Re:it will never be accepted

[Darth RadaR]

It would be interesting if MS does set IIS as "locked down by default". Then we can really find out which MCSEs have a clue and which ones are just good at taking exams.

Like they had any choice ?

[Archfeld]

With the Gartner group sending letters to all their customers RECOMMENDING they remove IIS as "an unacceptable security risk" based on the TCO of IIS rapidly exceeding the cost of the hardware, the OS and THE SUPPORT STAFF. When a nationally recognized consulting firm that supports 400 of the top 500 firms , and one that HAS BEEN PRO M$ up to this point, or at least VERY neutral, suddenly starts advocating ABANDONING your investment you know you have BIG PROBLEMS. I personally think this is TOO LITTLE TOO LATE. Why was the product not shipped like this in the first place ???

Uneducated Opinion :-)

[robi2106]

I had to test some java code being developed by (company) for a newly released (product) and needed a web server. The usual test platform server had just been taken down by nimda (ie not 3 hours earlier). Fortunately for my productivity log, an extremely capable app called Apache exists for WinNT and in under 30 minutes I had it up and running (including denying every host under the sun that was sending those annoying GET requests for /winnt/system32/cmd.exe).

The entire dev team working on the java code would have just taken the afternoon off, had I not casually mentioned the existance of my humble Pentium Pro 200 running Apache. :-)

This caught the attention of my boss who wondered why our group was able to continue working, while many others were outside playing basketball waiting for the Admins to finish the virus updates. Who knows . . . we may shift away from simple IIS servers (for a java service on a server you don't need some big IIS machine).

From a security stand point, This little server did a good job of fending off every virus attack (a few hundred every hour). I believe two additional simple IIS servers have been temporarily changed to Apache since they don't have a need for any other service. Who knows what will be their ultimate fate. But right now they are doing their job and don't need to be updated. This may affect the purchasing policy for one or two machines here. Not a huge step towards non-M$ product use, but I am encouraged none the less.

robi

fun quotes

[ethereal]

``With the virus attacks of late and the numbers of those and how vicious those attacks have been ... it's incumbent on Microsoft, being in the leadership position we're in, to help drive forward the industry in this area,'' Brian Valentine, senior vice president of the Windows Division at Microsoft, said in an interview.

I would think that Microsoft would want to get out of their leadership position in enabling virus attacks and making them so painful, but I guess that's why I'm not President of the Windows Division. I don't think the industry wants to be driven too much further down that path, though - alternate web serving platforms are more like where Microsoft is driving their customers.

``We can't just sit back and think about Microsoft,'' said Valentine, who is leading Microsoft's new security task force.

Well, that will be a first.

Gartner has never been Pro-Microsoft

[sheldon]

They most certainly don't have a history of being pro-Microsoft. All their TCO stuff is directed at proving desktops are really expensive and we should all go back to big iron.

Gartner recommends whatever it's clients pay it to recommend.

This is the default condition of Apache, you know

[Water Paradox]

Remember the first time you installed Apache?

It was secure by default because you had to learn what the heck you were doing, and a fair bit about the structure of your hard drive before you could get it running.

Now IIS is catching up, having learned what happens when you appeal to the lowest common denominator. This is very good news, because it means IIS will no longer be administrated by people who haven't a clue. It's not that IIS is inherently insecure, but that it's inherently run by people who don't know how to secure it.

Apache appeals to a different crowd, and is more secure by nature for that reason...

MS released another tool today

[CmdrMightyTaco]

In a related topic, MS released another tool set today to help admins secure their boxen...

The rest of this comment is from the NTBugTraq newsgroup:

Microsoft have today announced a suite of initiatives intended to address the issues their customers face from the threat of Worms and other malcode like Nimda and Code Red.

About time.

I've been assured that substantial resources have been allocated to this new effort, but one has to wonder just who was consulted in coming up with what this program involves (if you were, drop me a line.)

Announced today was the "Microsoft Security Tool Kit";

Click here

This "Greatest Hits" CD or network download contains all of the things you should already have;

- - Latest Service Packs for OS, IIS, and IE.
- - Security Checklists for NT, W2K, and IIS.
- - A W2K-SP2 Deployment guide (the Update.msi section is worth reading if you have an Active Directory environment and use Group Policies)
- - An NT 4.0-SP6a Deployment guide for SMS.
- - IE Deployment guides.
- - Several individual Hotfixes required for NT 4.0 Terminal Server (even though they are included in the NT 4.0 SRP) - - IIS Lockdown Tool
- - URLScan
- - HFNetchk
- - Critical Update Notification 3.0 (only applies to W98/W2K according to the referenced KB article)
- - QChain

There's a difference between the download and the CD. According to the announcement page, "It (CD) includes automation scripts to quickly install all the security hotfixes recommended in the kit.", but the CD may take from 3 to 6 weeks to arrive.

I was told there would also be a "Bootstrap Client for Windows Update" within this package somewhere, but if its just the Critical Update Notification 3.0 tool then its not a "Bootstrap Client" in the sense I thought it was.

While there are additional things planned, the biggest thing missing at this stage is a re-release of the NT 4.0 Option Kit CD which contains;

1. Patched version of IIS 4.0 (one that's not vulnerable out of the box)
2. Patched versions of MDAC
3. Modifications to the samples to eliminate RDS
4. Modified default installation that doesn't install in a way known to be exploitable
5. Modified Setup program that doesn't re-install removed script mappings and other components after the user has manually removed them (since that's what many people have done to protect themselves)

In addition, what is desperately needed is some way to do the following;

a) Probe your internal network to identify IIS installations (this can be done with HFNetchk, but working with its output is no fun)
b) Completely remove the IIS installation on command (remotely!), or render it stopped
c) Query the IIS installation and alter it, removing RDS keys, updating MDAC, patching it, disabling /scripts, tightening permissions, etc...
d) Report results in a comprehensive fashion

I don't know about the rest of you, but many people have thousands of IIS boxes to deal with. While Microsoft does sell SMS, if you used Ghost to distribute your installations it hardly seems reasonable for MS to expect you to purchase SMS to secure what you thought was a reasonable installation.

If you have more than 1000 hosts under your control, send me your suggestions for the best product/method used to get patches and service packs out.

Given that this whole initiative, supported at the highest levels in Microsoft, is designed in response to Worms that required the touching of every machine in your organization, the first thing out the door should've been something that made that problem less onerous.

There are plans in the works (for Q2-2002) for an internal version of Windows Update. I've been calling for this with Microsoft for eons now, and while its great they have finally been hit with the clue-bat it seems ridiculous that its going to be 6 months plus before we see it. Such a tool would allow Network Administrators to rely on the client's Windows Update component to provide fixes (fixes decided on by the Network Administrator). In addition, a new feature in that client (still some 3 months out) allowing it to be setup to allow automatic updates (a push mechanism), would give you a way to push out a fix quickly to all clients.

Again, about time!

Also coming out of all of this was news that Windows 2000 SP3 is not likely to ship this year.

Cheers, Russ - Surgeon General of TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor

Re:Heh, relying on IIS admins?

[McSpew]

These are the guys who have still be unable to figure out that the Buffer Overflow, etc. patches are available to them on Windows Update--or that almost all the new exploits would be fixed by getting Service Pack 2.

Um, I think you've completely missed the point. First off, not all patches are available from WindowsUpdate. In fact, precious few are. Most of the updates from WindowsUpdate apply to IE, not IIS. Second, there are a large number of exploits that have appeared since SP2 shipped. I have personally installed nearly two dozen Post-SP2 hotfixes to one server. I average between 8 and 10 post-SP2 hotfixes per server.

Mind you, actually keeping up-to-date on hotfixes actually became possible with the release of HFNETCHK. Before then, it was virtually impossible for any normal sysadmin to keep up with all of Microsoft's patches and apply only the ones they were supposed to. Also, before the release of QCHAIN, it was a horrible and time-consuming process to apply hotfixes to a server, even when you knew which ones to apply, because each hotfix wanted its own reboot to complete and you couldn't just apply them all and then reboot once.

I actually use WindowsUpdate, HFNETCHK and MPSA to check and make sure I catch all possible vulnerabilities. I've found that it's not uncommon for each one to catch something the others did not.

Even with the three tools I listed above, properly securing IIS (or any MS server) is still a royal pain. The damn things come preconfigured with their flies completely unzipped. MS's IIS Lockdown Tool won't even run if you've already taken some steps on your own to manually lock down IIS, and even if it does run, it doesn't turn off the "../" parent directory functionality that's enabled by default. You still have to go into IIS Admin and turn that damn thing off manually.

Let's not pick on IIS admins unfairly. Many of them prefer Linux and use it at home, but have to use IIS at work because that's been mandated. Debian makes it easy to stay patched and does a half decent job of implementing default security, but MS leaves everything wide open by default, makes it damn difficult to lock any system down effectively, installs unnecessary services by default (and won't even let you uninstall some of them) and has a half-assed mechanism for rolling hotfixes and patches out to customers.

Microsoft needs something like Symantec's LiveUpdate, which allows sysadmins to roll out tested updates to internal users on their own schedules, without physically touching every system on their networks. Yes, there are IIS admins out there who are jackasses, but there are plenty of overworked sysadmins out there who'd love to properly secure IIS, if only it weren't damn near impossible.

New

[mlknowle]

In other news, Microsoft's hardware division announced a plan to make water flow uphill.

Wondering what the new settings will be...

[blogan]

A paperclip comes up and asks you, "Would you like to have the server start? Would you like to allow connections from outside 127.0.0.1? Would you like to run scripts? Would you like to be able to access files not residing on the read only floppy? Would you like to have all comments automatically read by Outlook?"

sarcasm?

[Anonymous Coward]

"It looks like Microsoft may be trying to do the right thing from a security standpoint, at least on paper."

Thank God. Since MS usually tries to do the wrong thing, on purpose. Now they are doing the right thing on paper.

Re:What is this?

[Tackhead]

> "It looks like Microsoft may be trying to do the right thing from a security standpoint"

In other news today, Satan said to be interested in joining US Figure Skating Team. "Yes, this is a serious bid; we've already started training now!", said the Dark One, executing a perfect double axel over what was once the Ninth Plane of Hell.

Heh, relying on MS not to shill you?

[Grendel Drago]

"You are running Outlook 97 or Outlook 98. You should consider upgrading to the latest version of Outlook to ensure you have the most recent product and security enhancements."

Hmm. Is this telling me that there are no patches available, and my only choice is to pay cash money and upgrade to Outlook 2000?

Yeah, it provides useful information, but it still feels like they're trying to shaft me.

-grendel drago

Re:Heh, relying on IIS admins?

[Jayde Stargunner]

While I easily see your point, it doesn't solve the fact that most IIS admins are complete morons for leaving the systems unpatched to this point.

My point about Windows Update is that ALL of these recent high-prifile attacks have had Windows Update patches for MONTHS. Service Pack 2 blocks almost all of them as well.

I have seen entire tech department that were knocked out by Code Red. Then Code Red II. Then Nimda. Yet, as a "casual" IIS user, I was never hit AT ALL. These patches have been obviously available for MONTHS. And even after Code Red, IIS admins STILL couldn't figure out to patch a hole that has about 4 OBVIOUS places to get the patch from. Let's review.

1) Windows Update
2) Service Pack 2
3) MPSA
4) Any of the virus scanner's homepages which linked to patches after Code Red, Code Red II, and Nimda.

If IIS admins can't even patch the obvious stuff like that, there is really little hope.

As you say "Many of them prefer Linux and use it at home, but have to use IIS at work because that's been mandated."...they are the PROBLEM, not Microsoft. HFNETCHK is easily available, and if Linux users are too lazy to learn how to admin the system that they're PAID to admin, they deserve what they get. I don't care if you don't like Windows, if it's YOUR JOB to be a IIS admin, you sure as heck better learn how to do it RIGHT.

I'm sure modders are gonna hate me for saying that, but I don't care at all if you don't like the system. If it's your job, it's your job. I hate Oracle, but that doesn't mean I don't use it *right* when I have to. Is it my first choice? No. Am I gonna be a slack-ass about it just because of sour grapes if I have to you it? No.

-Jayde

P.S. Disabling Parent Paths is not a big deal if you secure the rest of you system. In fact, I doubt you would find any professional IIS web server which has Parent Paths disabled, as it has terrible effects on most ASP code. It's stupid for server-side code to be forced to code paths based on the root "./" instead of relitive paths "../" as server directory structure could easily change at any time.

Re:I don't get it.

[PatJensen]

Before you go shooting on the MCSE bandwagon, you need to realize that Windows 2000 has been out for over a year now. There are less then a few thousand MCSEs, as former Windows NT 4.0 MCSEs are finding the tests to be MUCH harder then before. After December, once the NT 4.0 MCSEs have expired and they no longer hold their certification, it will go further in eliminating watered down MCSEs.

Microsoft has done an excellent job at reducing the amount of excess water in their certifications with the new rounds of exams. I've taken and passed my Windows 2000 MCSE (after my Solaris SCNA and Cisco CCNA certifications) and I found the design exams to be especially challenging. To pass the new Windows 2000 tests, you MUST have experience with deploying their products or you WILL fail.

Cut Microsoft some slack in their certification department. They've came a long way in establishing a well-known industry standard and now they are "fine-tuning" it to ensure that its worth stays intact. As someone who has gone through the process, it holds a lot of value to myself and my clients and customers.

On a side note, pick up a Solaris book at Barnes and Noble and read it for two days. You can pass it without almost no experience, other then knowing run levels and where rc files are located.

-Pat

Re:Heh, relying on IIS admins?

[Maserati]

If you do that, you run a (small but real) risk of a versioning problem with DLLS touched by more than one hotfix. This can result in early patches being overwritten by later patches, which leads to live vulnerabilities on machines you thought were secure.

In the spirit of hfnetxchk.exe there is now a tool to apply multiple hotfixes without rebooting, qchain.exe

To use this, you write a .bat file to apply the hotfixies from the command line with the "no reboot" switch. Them qchain.exe does the cleanup and ensures that the right files end up installed before rebooting once.

Or at least that's the theory. The hotfixes I was working with didn't all honor the "no reboot" switch. I don't have the list handy (I've since been laid off and don't have access to the network directory with the .bat file I was working on), but I had a roughly 40% fail rate. Your mileage may vary.

The really keen thing to do, for desktops anyway, is to use hfnetchk to identify machines needing hotfixes, a script to customize the .bat file for qchain.exe, and SMS to push the file into a login profile managed by Active Directory. This wouldn't be too great for servers, since you don't want random reboots, but much of the deployment can be automated - just keep the reboots within your existing maintenance schedule. For bonus points, have every patch logged to your maintenance log (you do keep one, right ?).

Re:you guys are incredible

[richie2000]

Sure, to an extent.

But look at it this way, if I put a stamp and an address on a thousand dollar bill and then put it in a mailbox, would you actually blame a poor postal worker for nicking it?

If I park a brand new Jaguar X-Type with the engine running and the door ajar in (insert local 'bad' neighbourhood here) would you not blame me for having to walk home?

If I build and sell you a house in that same 'hood, with no locks on the doors and big neon signs outside that says "FREE MONEY AND DRUGS (PLEASE DO MY WIFE ON THE WAY OUT)" would you not be slightly upset with me?

If I code a 'open ports' (someone at MS misheard 'open source') software, bully everyone into paying top dollars for it and then leave them hanging in the cold breeze when all the juniors at Scriptkiddie U exploits its shortcomings, would you not blame me?

Sure, the admins are to blame because they didn't have the guts to tell their PHBs to get a decent platform instead and the PHBs are to blame because they didn't know better than to listen to MS' marketspeak and FUDmachine (no one have ever been fired for buying MS - WELL IT'S ABOUT TIME THEY WERE!) and the scriptkiddes are to blame for walking right in, with no formal invitation.

How more inviting can you get? You install a webserver that one of the largets software publishers on this planet has honed and polished for over five years and the default mode of installation is set to "I_RUN_IIS,_COME_FUCK_ME!"

If you buy a Windows 2000 Server CD today with IIS included, it will not contain a single patch released in the last year and a half. Not one. Not even SP1. MS can not even be bothered to patch the software they are manufacturing right now, it's still the same CD image they released over a year ago. What if you bought a new Ford and it had Bridgestone tires plus a hand-written note in the glove compartment that said "Please change the tires, they are unsafe". Ralph Nader would be at Ford's throat like a pitbull on speed. MS gets away with it, time and time again.

The Blame Game

[matty]

When a (h)(cr)acker writes a virus/worm that cracks into servers and provides root access without actually doing any damage, what they are doing is letting the world know how easy it is to do so.

Bear in mind that there are lots of folks out there (thieves, terrorists, enemy governments) who would (and presumably do) break into servers and steal credit card numbers and/or sensitive corporate/government info, without telling anyone!!

If the "virus authors" weren't constantly exploiting these simple security holes, the greater public would never know they were there, because the real "bad guys" always try to go unnoticed.

Comment removed

[account_deleted]

Comment removed based on user account deletion

Re:IIS 6.0

[rabtech]

The new HTTP.SYS driver runs in kernel-space, and can respond to static content requests with very little processing or overhead, pulling the data directly from the cache.

Assuming that HTTP.SYS can't handle it, the request is passed on to a user-space process.

There is a lot more to it than just that. Much of the core code has been rewritten, and is buffer-checked among other things.

Re:Sounds good... [Blatant plug]

[JediTrainer]

I have just released my tool which can be used to generate reports about these worms by examining your Apache logs. Very configurable, lots of options, written in Java, released under the GPL.

Please check it out at http://www.websoup.net/wormscan/. I'm looking forward to some feedback.

Bingo!

[RelliK]

I wanted to post this but you were ahead of me. And it's not just a problem with IIS -- most (all?) NT "services" run as LocalSystem, which actually has even more privileges than Administrator.

Bugs and security holes are inevitable in any software, but their impact is different. Any buffer overflow in IIS is disasterous, whereas a buffer overflow in Apache will have a very limited damage. To 0wn a Unix box running Apache you need two security holes: first a hole in Apache to get unprivileged access, then another hole elsewhere that lets you get root. This is considerably harder and a lot more unlikely than a simple buffer overflow in the web server.

On top of that there is a huge problem with file system permissions. Both Unix and NT have the ability to restrict access to files. The difference is that a default installation of NT has all file permissions set to Everyone:Full Control(*). (That's like making every file and directory 777)! You have to manually lock it down! If the file system permissions are not used, running IIS as an unprivileged user won't help.

Contrast this with Unix. Even if a hole in Apache is exploited, you won't even be able to overwrite the web pages (unless another hole is used to gain root access, see above).

(*) I understand the default file permissions have been improved somewhat in windows 2000. Could somebody in the know give more details? Oh, and what's the deal with IIS running partially in the kernel? is it true or has it been debunked?

In all fairness, Unix has had its problems with root-running daemons. BIND was the latest exploit. Since then BIND guys have learned their lesson -- version 9 no longer runs as root. Will Microsoft learn? After so many years of beeing plagued with security holes, not bloody likely.

Re:Bingo!

[rabtech]

In the next version of IIS6, there will be a kernel HTTP driver that can respond to static requests by serving directing from the cache. The input code has been rewritten, and is buffer checked among other things. HTTP doesn't do any processing at all... it just sees if the incoming URL matches a file already listed in the cache. If not, the request is bumped to user-space.

Secondly, each website under IIS6 can run as a different user. So if you host 10 websites, each one can run as a separate user account, each with different security permissions.

Lastly, yes 2000 gives you better file security out of the box. There are still some things that should be fine-tuned, but definitely not Full:Everyone.

With the .NET Server betas, they seem to be getting more fine-grained on that stuff.

"Sysadmins"?? What a joke!

[erroneus]

Alright. I'm sure this will get a lot of MCSE's all huffy but too bad... it's not about you anyway.

The biggest selling point for Microsoft crap is in how easy it is. It's also its biggest problem. Sure it's easy to set things up when, at install time, everything (especially the stuff the installer doesn't yet know about) is turned on by default! It is precisely this selling point that has created this problem.

You know, most people put their dangerous tools behind some level of inconvenience to prevent accidents. I have no doubt that Microsoft never intended this to happen... yet it has... I don't know how many releases of Windows had to come out before warnings about having file shares open when connected to the internet started to appear. So file shares are dangerous but exposing IIS (+addons) aren't?

A comment made by one user/admin noted that IIS by itself is not vulnerable that it is all the useless addins that make it so. Most of these addins aren't even used by the casual user. The casual user doesn't even use IIS! And that is the crux of the CodeRed problem in general. Microsoft has put dangerous tools into the hands of people who don't know how to use them so they can make more money. It's as simple as that. Microsoft is responsible for the problem and they should take appropriate measures.

By making it "too easy" people are making themselves vulnerable without their knowledge. It's out. It's too late. The best they can do is issue a RECALL on IIS and everything that comes bundled with IIS. Issuing advisories that people aren't reading and patches that people aren't downloading isn't going to get people's attention.

If they are truly interested in solving the problem, they will have to swallow their pride and make it very public that they wish to RECALL IIS! Then people will sit up and take notice and do the things they need to do.

Recalls are embarassing. They will not want to do it. But for the good of the internet, they should. Okay, I hear the laughing... they aren't interested in the public good.

What is IIS anyway? Internet Infection System?

Re:Might be of help for 1000's of machines

[r2ravens]

I manage lots of workstations and several servers in a state agency. We use Dameware for remote information collection and control.

In the past we used SMS but it was waaay too slow, especially across some of our 56k lines. Dameware is a wonderful product. There may be some way to script it's use as well. I was provided with the product by the department, so I don't know what the licensing issues are, but it looks like it's around $200.00 or less for download and is available for a 30 day free trial.

I really endorse this product. Hope the info helps.

Re:Heh, relying on IIS admins?

[McSpew]

The problem is that parent paths aren't automatically blocked from going any higher than \InetPub\Webroot, which to me is a huge security hole. Yes, properly-secured NTFS ACLs on the filesystem will prevent any real damage from occurring, but NT and Win2k default to EVERYONE|Full Control on all filesystems, both at the NTFS ACL level and at the share level.

Look, if it were possible to just fix your server once and then not have to go back and fix the same flaw again (and again and again...), more NT systems would be properly patched, but Microsoft seems to have gone out of its way to hose NT 4.0 customers. Win2k does finally let you patch your install folders with updates from the service packs, but NT doesn't let you do that, and there's no good reason for that. Any time you add or remove a service in NT, you end up putting the install CD in. The second you do that, you have to re-run your service pack and reapply all of your hotfixes.

IIS 4.0 is the current version of IIS for NT 4.0. Let's say you decide you want to build an Outlook Web Access server for your organization and your company hasn't moved to Win2k Server yet, so you use NT 4.0. How do you get IIS 4.0 on that server? You use the Microsoft Option Pack 1 for NT 4.0. Guess what? That thing installs an insecure version of MDAC, an unpatched version of IIS and a host of other crap you may or may not want (such as the MS transaction server and indexing). All of it is incredibly old and almost all of it has to be patched and repatched the second you install it.

So, here's how you build your server: You install NT 4.0 and apply the latest service pack (SP6a because SP6 had heinous bugs). You install IE 4.0 or newer. Then, if you're smart, you install a version of MDAC (2.5 or newer) that sets proper registry security and is reasonably recent and free of its own security holes. Then you install the Option Pack so you can have IIS 4.0 and which insists on trying to install MDAC 1.5--be sure to deselect RDS because that's a huge security hole that Russian hackers use to steal credit card numbers. Now, you're ready to install Outlook Web Access. Think you're finished? Ha! Not even close. Next, you run HFNETCHK to find the enormous list of hotfixes you've got to download and apply. Each hotfix is in a different place on Microsoft's website, and there isn't a convenient tool you can use to just go and download the patches you need and store them in conveniently-labeled folders. Then, you download QCHAIN so you can apply those patches without having to reboot after each one. If you're smart, you'll use WindowsUpdate and MPSA to make sure you're not missing anything.

By the time you've finished with this minimum effort, you've spent no less than four or five hours just installing NT, IIS and the hotfixes, not to mention the hour or two it takes to install and configure OWA. Now, at this point, all you have is a product that's reasonably free of serious buffer overflow security flaws. You still don't have a product that's actually remotely secure. Now, you have to go and fix all of MS's idiotically optimistic NTFS permissions and find and disable any unnecessary services. Maybe you run MS's IIS Lockdown tool, which removes the IISamples folder and a few other obvious things.

By now, you've probably spent at least 8-12 hours building this server, patching the holes and fixing the default security settings.

So, you've patched the living hell out of the server and it's ready to go. You're immune to attacks, right? Almost certainly not. New holes are found in IIS every week and keeping on top of them is a huge job even if you have no other job responsibilities. Add to that the fact that any time somebody adds or removes a service from NT, you have to reapply the latest service pack and all the hotfixes (in order) and then reboot, and you've got yourself a nightmare.

Let me be clear.

There are enormous numbers of jackasses running IIS who can't figure out how to toast bread. However, there are plenty of overworked sysadmins who're only trying to keep their damn networks running who find it nearly impossible to keep their IIS servers patched and locked down because Microsoft makes it so damn difficult.

Yes, matters get a little better when you're running Windows 2k server, but things don't turn into a panacea just because you can patch your install media and some hotfixes don't require reboots. Microsoft still releases at least two or three patches for Win2k and/or IIS every month (sometimes they release that many in a week). They still automatically set file and share privileges too optimistically. They still install dozens of unnecessary services by default. They still force you to have unnecessary applications installed by default that you can't remove without pliers and a blowtorch (OutlookExpress). In short, they still don't take security maintenance seriously and until they do, it'll be tough for even conscientious admins to keep up. Newbies, idiots and lazy bastards won't have a hope.

Re:Heh, relying on IIS admins?

[hurricanej]

Here's something I'd like to hear the arm-chair sysadmins address.

I have personally seen service patches and hot fixes blue screen servers. I have a fear of installing Microsoft "fixes" on systems that are functioning - will they cause a blue screen when the inevitable reboot is required? Will they break an API my "turnkey" vendor relied on?

I have two choices:

I can pro-actively install the service packs and hot fixes, causing (at best) some downtime or (at worst) an extended period of downtime thanks to unexpected side effects. If I am pro-active about fixes, I am viewed by departmental managers and users outside of IT as a bad guy, someone who is here to wreck their server. Oh, and don't tell me to test it before I apply it... you can install the same service pack on 50 boxes and only have it blue screen on one. I've SEEN this occur, so it is always a roll of the dice.

Choice #2 is to wait until the virus/trojan/whatever hits this department. Then I am the good guy for coming to the rescue.

What would YOU do?! I'd especially like to hear from seasoned sysadmins in both Microsoft and Unix camps - what approach do you take?

-hj

Comments from a Microsoft employee

[Thalinor]

of course i know the /. crowd wants to remain clueless and would never acknowledge that MS is doing something good. it would spoil their immature bashing fun.

heres to hoping that there are some folks left at /. that actually have a clue about these issues.

the following comment was posted by MS employee Joshua Allen at his weblog

The IIS Plan - This interview with Brian Valentine sums up the main action plan for addressing IIS concerns. The quote that sums up his attitude best is "When we look back in a few years, we will see this as one of the critical inflection points in our company's growth."

Here are my notes, detailing the parts of the plan I found interesting:

Two initiatives for customers:
Get Secure:

• All virus-related PSS calls for all customers (not just enterprise) are now free. 1-866-PC-SAFETY.
• Premiere Support and Microsoft's Consulting Service as of today are offering a Security Assessment Service for large enterprises; this service may be for fee (at discretion of local offices), but will not be profit-driven, and will eat significant costs where customer situation warrants).
• Regularly updated Security Toolkit will be distributed. Each will include all known patches and tools, and a one-click "make my system secure." First toolkit mailed and web-distributed on October 15. As of tomorrow, the tools should be available to MS Employees to hand out to customers. All of the tools are fully supported, and are made to run on NT4, Windows 2000, and Windows XP. This is not "resource kit" or loose collection of unsupported tools. Localized versions come later, since getting tools available quickly is top priority.
• New set of additional security tools will RTM in December.
• Toolkit will not be perfect starting Oct. 14; will make continual improvements based on feedback.

Stay Secure:

• Mid 2002 availability of federated Windows Update for enterprises. This lets enterprises run their own windows update service under their own control.
• Feb 2002, Provide version of windows update that can be configured to accept and install updates with zero user intervention.
• Make security bulletins simpler and integrated with update technology so an IT administrator can simply approve a security patch and have it automatically be pushed to the whole enterprise.
• Security patches will now contain absolute minimum fix; no QFE, etc. stuff lumped in.

Internal Efforts (Not Customer-Facing):

• (Historically) Windows 2000: Hired a bunch of people to do penetration analysis and code analysis, and placed unprotected servers on the net to let hackers attempt cracking it. Built and used automated code analysis tools to detect some common security bugs.
• Windows XP: Code analysis tools have been improved to detect many more types of security bugs, and continued increases in investment in security analysis.
• Currently BrianV organizing a full pass review of how security is handled in all groups to look for deficiencies.

Public:

• BrianV con-called with 1000+ CIOs and other IT people to get feedback and comment; has handed out his e-mail to everyone.
• Any customer should be able to call that phone number above (or contact any Microsoft employee) and get the one-click "make my system secure" tool kit for no charge.
• BrianV will be point-person working with competitors, government agencies, etc. on industry-wide solutions. "We think that some of these problems require industry-wide solutions, but we realize that it is incumbent upon us to drive solutions". Brian will take a more visible role in driving these solutions.

So the way I see it, we will be successful to the degree that we:

• Assure that no customer ever again finds it difficult, confusing, or time-consuming to keep their system secure.
• Improve security going out the door so that fewer patches are required (IMO, this wouldn't have made a difference in any of the recent worms, but is still a good goal for countering potential future threats). The goal here is to be the platform with fewest known vulnerabilities that need to be patched, using any metric you care to apply.
• Be a lot more proactive in contacting, encouraging, and helping customers keep their systems secure.

And of course, huge progress in fighting worms could be made by getting the router vendors, OS vendors, and other infrastructure vendors to all work together, and hopefully that happens too.