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Microsoft Attempts to Secure IIS
billmaly writes: "Yahoo has this article about trying to make IIS more secure. Among steps is to have it install in its most secure state, putting the onus on sysadmins to remove it from that state. It looks like Microsoft may be trying to do the right thing from a security standpoint, at least on paper."
Sounds like a good thing to me.
There marketing material pointing out holes in Apache mostly focused on Tomcat the java app server, PHP etc. But these don't come installed by default, where was with IIS, you install just about everything by default.
Apparently every copy of Windows XP/2000 is now shipping with a pair of scissors, to be used to "secure" the ethernet connection of IIS servers.
- A.P.
"Remember when the U.S. had a drug problem, and then we declared a War On Drugs, and now you can't buy drugs anymore?"
because 78,417 Nimda hits are more than enough for me!
Admittedly, IIS does run certain scripts and perform certain functions as a "nobody" user. But most of the recent exploits were able to get an immediate "root shell" because the services being exploited did run as SYSTEM. And unless Microsoft is willing to address that problem, admins who need to enable many services and don't keep up on patches will still get rooted on a regular basis.
-sting3r
Download source code for Apache. Tweak the headers to say "IIS" instead of "Apache". Brag about their speedy team of coders.
Open the source. Put it up for peer review. Fix the holes. I'm not saying that they should hand out the source for their whole OS, but when they have had as many debacles with one piece of software it might actually help them out quite a bit.
I refuse to install products that require IIS as well. A software provider of ours makes an ultra nice business mining product that can be nicely web enabled. I told them that I would purchase it as soon as they supported a web server that didn't have a new security flaw or bug discovered every week.
Well from the looks of it sound like they're doing all the right things. Just too bad for most of us who've been seeing "GET /default.ida?XXXX..." and "GET /scripts/root.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0" 404" in our apache logs, its can't come soon enough...
KidA
"Karma can only be portioned out by the cosmos." -Homer Simpson
So, like what are they going to do?
Step 1: Install IIS
Step 2: Uninstall IIS
--JLockard - "Some mornings, it's just not worth chewing through the leather straps." - Emo Phillips
They will fix the problem in the next upgrade.
This will mean that IIS Sysadmins will actually have to think...! Now I know there are a lot of intelligent Sysadmins out there running IIS, but if you've come across the people I have in the industry, you'll know that there a lot of people who aren't very tech savvy running servers.
How about with this, an increase in the Microsoft Certification program?
===> An eye for an eye makes everyone blind - MG
It's nice that they will ATTEMPT to make it install more securely by default. What are they going to do to help secure all the existing installations from the current (and future) gaping holes?
As pointed out in this CNET article, while forcing the maximum secure version and forcing uses to install all patches is a good step in the right direction, the fact that IIS has been patched so many times implies that to really improve the security of it, it needs to be rewritten from scratch, particularly since it is a closed source application and thus does not have the same QA that open source software might have.
"Pinky, you've left the lens cap of your mind on again." - P&TB
"I can see my house from here!" - ST:
The paper is here.
It's more involved than you might think. If you are a sysadmin, this might be important for your job security.
This is not a change in the fundamental technology. They don't seem to indicate that IIS itself will change, only that the default settings will yield more secure servers. This is only one type of security issue. What about all of the others?
Another thing to consider is that they are not doing this to be kind, gentle, or nice. They are doing it to shore up their marketing of Hailstorm, Passport, and so forth. This is not a response to "what the users want" or they would have done this ages ago. It is a marketing ploy. It is the right thing to do, but it is a marketing ploy. Managers, CIOs, CEOs, and so forth will be able to sleep better at night.
How to Download YouTube Videos
It would be great to have everything disabled by default, and would be a major help for security. (That's how OpenBSD have been able to go four years without a hole in the default install...there's not much enabled in the default install). I just don't think that the average M$ shop wants to take the time involved for an average admin to get a secure-by-default product working, or pay the top dollars needed to get an admin savvy enough to already know how to do this.
"Weapons should be hardy rather than decorative" - Miyamoto Musashi
I think that goes for OS's too
Microsoft's idea of making their products more secure is making it harder to copy... Seriously, if they'd spend as much time worrying about actual security as they do preventing and prosecuting piracy, it'd be more secure than Fort Knox.
1. Place unopened IIS software in bank vault.
:)
2. Close and lock vault door.
3. Eat paper on which vault lock combination is stored.
Oh, you actually wanted to use the software?
*sigh* I probably shouldn't rag on Microsoft: they needed to do this a long time ago. But in so many ways they've hoisted themselves by their own petard: by touting how easy their software is to use, by implication they've convinced businesses and technicians that they don't need much training on how to use it. Locking down IIS is one step: making sure that IIS admins know how to properly use it is another and I have yet to see any emphasis placed on education and training by Microsoft or any of its apologists.
Note: having one's connection refused by Slashdot when attempting to post a comment is just plain rude. On the other hand, the wonder isn't how well the bear dances, it's that the bear dances at all.
With the Gartner group sending letters to all their customers RECOMMENDING they remove IIS as "an unacceptable security risk" based on the TCO of IIS rapidly exceeding the cost of the hardware, the OS and THE SUPPORT STAFF. When a nationally recognized consulting firm that supports 400 of the top 500 firms , and one that HAS BEEN PRO M$ up to this point, or at least VERY neutral, suddenly starts advocating ABANDONING your investment you know you have BIG PROBLEMS. I personally think this is TOO LITTLE TOO LATE. Why was the product not shipped like this in the first place ???
errr....umm...*whooosh* *whoosh* Is this thing on ?
work is more difficult than installing it and just having it work right away because all the features you need (...and all the ones you don't) are already activated.
It would be great to have everything disabled by default, and would be a major help for security. (That's how OpenBSD have been able to go four years without a hole in the default install...there's not much enabled in the default install). I just don't think that the average M$ shop wants to take the time involved for an average admin to get a secure-by-default product working, or pay the top dollars needed to get an admin savvy enough to already know how to do this.
"Weapons should be hardy rather than decorative" - Miyamoto Musashi
I think that goes for OS's too
Reading this article I smell a goat, as they say. It smacks too much of a good initiative that will be exploited. Like the recenly announced toolkit to get your system checked for vulnerabilities and fixed free (see here ). If you try to actually have it sent to you and go thru a few screens you see that you need Passport (a.k.a. "all your passwords are belong to us!") in order to have them send you a CD by snail-mail. What does a physical CD have to do with an evil service, you ask? Did I mention that the CD might be useful/coveted? Has anyone found a similar hitch with this (e.g., putting the settings in such a way that a central M$ database will check the appropriateness of all your info "to make sure it's secure", oh and to make sure you don't use it for anything that disparages M$, hotmail, MSN, etc).
I had to test some java code being developed by (company) for a newly released (product) and needed a web server. The usual test platform server had just been taken down by nimda (ie not 3 hours earlier). Fortunately for my productivity log, an extremely capable app called Apache exists for WinNT and in under 30 minutes I had it up and running (including denying every host under the sun that was sending those annoying GET requests for /winnt/system32/cmd.exe).
:-)
The entire dev team working on the java code would have just taken the afternoon off, had I not casually mentioned the existance of my humble Pentium Pro 200 running Apache.
This caught the attention of my boss who wondered why our group was able to continue working, while many others were outside playing basketball waiting for the Admins to finish the virus updates. Who knows . . . we may shift away from simple IIS servers (for a java service on a server you don't need some big IIS machine).
From a security stand point, This little server did a good job of fending off every virus attack (a few hundred every hour). I believe two additional simple IIS servers have been temporarily changed to Apache since they don't have a need for any other service. Who knows what will be their ultimate fate. But right now they are doing their job and don't need to be updated. This may affect the purchasing policy for one or two machines here. Not a huge step towards non-M$ product use, but I am encouraged none the less.
robi
Just read on cnet where Ray Noorda of Novell used to call the guys at Msft Bill "Pearly" Gates who promises you the heavens while Steve "The Embalmer" prepares the body for burial.
try { do() || do_not(); } catch (JediException err) { yoda(err); }
This just reminded me of a particular Daily Victim.
"In a fit of rage I went over the deep end and cut our apartment's DSL connection!"
I would think that Microsoft would want to get out of their leadership position in enabling virus attacks and making them so painful, but I guess that's why I'm not President of the Windows Division. I don't think the industry wants to be driven too much further down that path, though - alternate web serving platforms are more like where Microsoft is driving their customers.
Well, that will be a first.
Your right to not believe: Americans United for Separation of Church and
They most certainly don't have a history of being pro-Microsoft. All their TCO stuff is directed at proving desktops are really expensive and we should all go back to big iron.
Gartner recommends whatever it's clients pay it to recommend.
Never install a peice of software as Administrator, use poweruser or something less.
If it doesnt install as that user, dont install it. Its obvious that that app was not designed with security in mind.
----- Whats wrong with this picture? http://www.revoh.org:1234/whatswrong
Remember the first time you installed Apache?
It was secure by default because you had to learn what the heck you were doing, and a fair bit about the structure of your hard drive before you could get it running.
Now IIS is catching up, having learned what happens when you appeal to the lowest common denominator. This is very good news, because it means IIS will no longer be administrated by people who haven't a clue. It's not that IIS is inherently insecure, but that it's inherently run by people who don't know how to secure it.
Apache appeals to a different crowd, and is more secure by nature for that reason...
information is immaterial
If you don't feel like hurting good quality cables, alternatively you can use the scissors to cut out every instance of the word "secure" from the IIS documentation, and run the software.
They have to drive forward the industry? They are playing catchup. They are implimenting security features that have been in Apache for years at this stage, and setting defaults that should have been set at day one. It's typical of Microsoft to try and fix things up once they have totally broken, then try to sell it as a feature, and to try and say "Look what good things we've done in combating this problem", when all along there should never have been a problem in the first place.
The rest of this comment is from the NTBugTraq newsgroup:
Microsoft have today announced a suite of initiatives intended to address the issues their customers face from the threat of Worms and other malcode like Nimda and Code Red.
About time.
I've been assured that substantial resources have been allocated to this new effort, but one has to wonder just who was consulted in coming up with what this program involves (if you were, drop me a line.)
Announced today was the "Microsoft Security Tool Kit";
Click here
This "Greatest Hits" CD or network download contains all of the things you should already have;
- - Latest Service Packs for OS, IIS, and IE.
- - Security Checklists for NT, W2K, and IIS.
- - A W2K-SP2 Deployment guide (the Update.msi section is worth reading if you have an Active Directory environment and use Group Policies)
- - An NT 4.0-SP6a Deployment guide for SMS.
- - IE Deployment guides.
- - Several individual Hotfixes required for NT 4.0 Terminal Server (even though they are included in the NT 4.0 SRP) - - IIS Lockdown Tool
- - URLScan
- - HFNetchk
- - Critical Update Notification 3.0 (only applies to W98/W2K according to the referenced KB article)
- - QChain
There's a difference between the download and the CD. According to the announcement page, "It (CD) includes automation scripts to quickly install all the security hotfixes recommended in the kit.", but the CD may take from 3 to 6 weeks to arrive.
I was told there would also be a "Bootstrap Client for Windows Update" within this package somewhere, but if its just the Critical Update Notification 3.0 tool then its not a "Bootstrap Client" in the sense I thought it was.
While there are additional things planned, the biggest thing missing at this stage is a re-release of the NT 4.0 Option Kit CD which contains;
1. Patched version of IIS 4.0 (one that's not vulnerable out of the box)
2. Patched versions of MDAC
3. Modifications to the samples to eliminate RDS
4. Modified default installation that doesn't install in a way known to be exploitable
5. Modified Setup program that doesn't re-install removed script mappings and other components after the user has manually removed them (since that's what many people have done to protect themselves)
In addition, what is desperately needed is some way to do the following;
a) Probe your internal network to identify IIS installations (this can be done with HFNetchk, but working with its output is no fun) /scripts, tightening
permissions, etc...
b) Completely remove the IIS installation on command (remotely!), or render it stopped
c) Query the IIS installation and alter it, removing RDS keys, updating MDAC, patching it, disabling
d) Report results in a comprehensive fashion
I don't know about the rest of you, but many people have thousands of IIS boxes to deal with. While Microsoft does sell SMS, if you used Ghost to distribute your installations it hardly seems reasonable for MS to expect you to purchase SMS to secure what you thought was a reasonable installation.
If you have more than 1000 hosts under your control, send me your suggestions for the best product/method used to get patches and service packs out.
Given that this whole initiative, supported at the highest levels in Microsoft, is designed in response to Worms that required the touching of every machine in your organization, the first thing out the door should've been something that made that problem less onerous.
There are plans in the works (for Q2-2002) for an internal version of Windows Update. I've been calling for this with Microsoft for eons now, and while its great they have finally been hit with the clue-bat it seems ridiculous that its going to be 6 months plus before we see it. Such a tool would allow Network Administrators to rely on the client's Windows Update component to provide fixes (fixes decided on by the Network Administrator). In addition, a new feature in that client (still some 3 months out) allowing it to be setup to allow automatic updates (a push mechanism), would give you a way to push out a fix quickly to all clients.
Again, about time!
Also coming out of all of this was news that Windows 2000 SP3 is not likely to ship this year.
Cheers, Russ - Surgeon General of TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor
"I thought I had an Appetite for Destruction, when all I really wanted was a club sandwich."
These are the guys who have still be unable to figure out that the Buffer Overflow, etc. patches are available to them on Windows Update--or that almost all the new exploits would be fixed by getting Service Pack 2.
Um, I think you've completely missed the point. First off, not all patches are available from WindowsUpdate. In fact, precious few are. Most of the updates from WindowsUpdate apply to IE, not IIS. Second, there are a large number of exploits that have appeared since SP2 shipped. I have personally installed nearly two dozen Post-SP2 hotfixes to one server. I average between 8 and 10 post-SP2 hotfixes per server.
Mind you, actually keeping up-to-date on hotfixes actually became possible with the release of HFNETCHK. Before then, it was virtually impossible for any normal sysadmin to keep up with all of Microsoft's patches and apply only the ones they were supposed to. Also, before the release of QCHAIN, it was a horrible and time-consuming process to apply hotfixes to a server, even when you knew which ones to apply, because each hotfix wanted its own reboot to complete and you couldn't just apply them all and then reboot once.
I actually use WindowsUpdate, HFNETCHK and MPSA to check and make sure I catch all possible vulnerabilities. I've found that it's not uncommon for each one to catch something the others did not.
Even with the three tools I listed above, properly securing IIS (or any MS server) is still a royal pain. The damn things come preconfigured with their flies completely unzipped. MS's IIS Lockdown Tool won't even run if you've already taken some steps on your own to manually lock down IIS, and even if it does run, it doesn't turn off the "../" parent directory functionality that's enabled by default. You still have to go into IIS Admin and turn that damn thing off manually.
Let's not pick on IIS admins unfairly. Many of them prefer Linux and use it at home, but have to use IIS at work because that's been mandated. Debian makes it easy to stay patched and does a half decent job of implementing default security, but MS leaves everything wide open by default, makes it damn difficult to lock any system down effectively, installs unnecessary services by default (and won't even let you uninstall some of them) and has a half-assed mechanism for rolling hotfixes and patches out to customers.
Microsoft needs something like Symantec's LiveUpdate, which allows sysadmins to roll out tested updates to internal users on their own schedules, without physically touching every system on their networks. Yes, there are IIS admins out there who are jackasses, but there are plenty of overworked sysadmins out there who'd love to properly secure IIS, if only it weren't damn near impossible.
In other news, Microsoft's hardware division announced a plan to make water flow uphill.
You might be interested in EROS - the Extremely Reliable Operating System, which takes permissions resolution to its logical extreme: the capability system. If something only needs access to one directory and one port, that's all you give it.
Very interesting project.
A paperclip comes up and asks you, "Would you like to have the server start? Would you like to allow connections from outside 127.0.0.1? Would you like to run scripts? Would you like to be able to access files not residing on the read only floppy? Would you like to have all comments automatically read by Outlook?"
This whole IIS thing is only a Microsoft problem by coincidence. Any piece of software can have security holes, so the key to reducing their effect is timely application of patches. That appears to be the main thrust of MS's "securing IIS" effort.
Unfortunately, almost nobody makes it easy to get security patches. Debian does the best job, from an admin's point-of-view--just "apt-get update && apt-get upgrade" when there's a security announcement, and you can even put this into a cron job. MS doesn't do too badly, with "Windows Update". Solaris stinks--Sun seems to go out of their way to hide security patches from visitors to their website. I don't have much experience with other platforms--there may be better systems than Debian's, but I haven't seen them.
That's "Mr. Soulless Automaton" to you, Bub.
Uhm I heard from a web developer for middleware systems that uses IIS that IIS 6.0 is going to run in kernel memory. Maybe this is a bad thing? Executing ASP code in kernel memory? Just.... maybe?
Thank God. Since MS usually tries to do the wrong thing, on purpose. Now they are doing the right thing on paper.
I'm not really sure how this will help. Having a server off by default will not make it harder to break into once the server has been turned on. Not only that, the problem's exploited by worms and script kiddies are all known, sometimes months and even years in advance of an attack. If MS were truely serious, they would exstablish an independant body to certify MSCEs, make it so that the certification is much more difficult than it is now, and only provide support to customers who have certified personal on staff. On top of this, MS should guarantee backward compatibility of ALL software installed on a system after a security update is applied (within a given product version) so that admins won't be terrified to install updates.
Burn Hollywood Burn
In other news today, Satan said to be interested in joining US Figure Skating Team. "Yes, this is a serious bid; we've already started training now!", said the Dark One, executing a perfect double axel over what was once the Ninth Plane of Hell.
I really think that this is a good thing. It might actually help reduce the number of script kiddie type attacks over all - because it will actually force people to learn that you DON'T leave the admin site running and you DON'T use the default web site to run YOUR site from, etc, etc... Let's face it - if your PHB's force you to use it (cough, cough) than you should at least know how.
It really is about time they did this, heck the way the install is now - it almost hacks itself!!
FreeBSD: Nothing runs like a daemon with a pitch fork.
By intending to secure IIS, Microsoft is doing the right thing. Unix freaks are laughing at Microsoft freaks because of code red & co. But the point is that flaws in any system is bad for the whole internet. People don't trust internet any more, they don't want to give their credit card number any more, etc. When every host on the internet will be pretty secure, e-commerce may do a real come-back.
The problem with this annouce is that Microsoft will start from the existing IIS product and try to secure it.
Securing something that wasn't initially coded with security in mind is very tricky. Flaws always pass on.
Have a look at bind or sendmail. They are very old servers. They are widely used. Many companies and individual people hardly audited the code. So what? A new flaw was still discovered in sendmail last week, and bind always was one of the favorite toy for kiddies.
On the other hand, software like djbdns and postfix were started later. They were started from scratch with the knowledge of all common security flaws their ancestor had. The result is that they are very secure. More than old software that was audited by hundreds of skilled people.
So while Microsoft's initiative is in the right direction, they won't get a secure product in any case. Just because they didn't rewrite it from scratch.
{{.sig}}
If M$ is sincere, this is of course welcome news.
The problem is that M$ have a history of promising "initiatives" of this nature, then never following through once the smoke has cleared a bit.
And that's assuming it isn't just pure FUD, as in this lovely example.
sPh
"You are running Outlook 97 or Outlook 98. You should consider upgrading to the latest version of Outlook to ensure you have the most recent product and security enhancements."
Hmm. Is this telling me that there are no patches available, and my only choice is to pay cash money and upgrade to Outlook 2000?
Yeah, it provides useful information, but it still feels like they're trying to shaft me.
-grendel drago
Laws do not persuade just because they threaten. --Seneca
This is the article to which you are referring, I think
Denver Isuzu Suzuki
While I easily see your point, it doesn't solve the fact that most IIS admins are complete morons for leaving the systems unpatched to this point.
My point about Windows Update is that ALL of these recent high-prifile attacks have had Windows Update patches for MONTHS. Service Pack 2 blocks almost all of them as well.
I have seen entire tech department that were knocked out by Code Red. Then Code Red II. Then Nimda. Yet, as a "casual" IIS user, I was never hit AT ALL. These patches have been obviously available for MONTHS. And even after Code Red, IIS admins STILL couldn't figure out to patch a hole that has about 4 OBVIOUS places to get the patch from. Let's review.
1) Windows Update
2) Service Pack 2
3) MPSA
4) Any of the virus scanner's homepages which linked to patches after Code Red, Code Red II, and Nimda.
If IIS admins can't even patch the obvious stuff like that, there is really little hope.
As you say "Many of them prefer Linux and use it at home, but have to use IIS at work because that's been mandated."...they are the PROBLEM, not Microsoft. HFNETCHK is easily available, and if Linux users are too lazy to learn how to admin the system that they're PAID to admin, they deserve what they get. I don't care if you don't like Windows, if it's YOUR JOB to be a IIS admin, you sure as heck better learn how to do it RIGHT.
I'm sure modders are gonna hate me for saying that, but I don't care at all if you don't like the system. If it's your job, it's your job. I hate Oracle, but that doesn't mean I don't use it *right* when I have to. Is it my first choice? No. Am I gonna be a slack-ass about it just because of sour grapes if I have to you it? No.
-Jayde
P.S. Disabling Parent Paths is not a big deal if you secure the rest of you system. In fact, I doubt you would find any professional IIS web server which has Parent Paths disabled, as it has terrible effects on most ASP code. It's stupid for server-side code to be forced to code paths based on the root "./" instead of relitive paths "../" as server directory structure could easily change at any time.
What's a sig?
Windows Update has covered patches for every major exploit in the last 6 months. They have been phasing in server patches for quite some time now.
At least 50% of the "Critical Update Pacakages" I have seen are IIS or Server based.
-Jayde
What's a sig?
Just move the messagebox telling you to reboot, out of the way and install the next patch.
:(
I tried that once and it resulted in an unbootable system.
In the spirit of hfnetxchk.exe there is now a tool to apply multiple hotfixes without rebooting, qchain.exe
To use this, you write a
Or at least that's the theory. The hotfixes I was working with didn't all honor the "no reboot" switch. I don't have the list handy (I've since been laid off and don't have access to the network directory with the
The really keen thing to do, for desktops anyway, is to use hfnetchk to identify machines needing hotfixes, a script to customize the
Veteran, Bermuda Triangle Expeditionary Force, 1992-1951
But look at it this way, if I put a stamp and an address on a thousand dollar bill and then put it in a mailbox, would you actually blame a poor postal worker for nicking it?
If I park a brand new Jaguar X-Type with the engine running and the door ajar in (insert local 'bad' neighbourhood here) would you not blame me for having to walk home?
If I build and sell you a house in that same 'hood, with no locks on the doors and big neon signs outside that says "FREE MONEY AND DRUGS (PLEASE DO MY WIFE ON THE WAY OUT)" would you not be slightly upset with me?
If I code a 'open ports' (someone at MS misheard 'open source') software, bully everyone into paying top dollars for it and then leave them hanging in the cold breeze when all the juniors at Scriptkiddie U exploits its shortcomings, would you not blame me?
Sure, the admins are to blame because they didn't have the guts to tell their PHBs to get a decent platform instead and the PHBs are to blame because they didn't know better than to listen to MS' marketspeak and FUDmachine (no one have ever been fired for buying MS - WELL IT'S ABOUT TIME THEY WERE!) and the scriptkiddes are to blame for walking right in, with no formal invitation.
How more inviting can you get? You install a webserver that one of the largets software publishers on this planet has honed and polished for over five years and the default mode of installation is set to "I_RUN_IIS,_COME_FUCK_ME!"
If you buy a Windows 2000 Server CD today with IIS included, it will not contain a single patch released in the last year and a half. Not one. Not even SP1. MS can not even be bothered to patch the software they are manufacturing right now, it's still the same CD image they released over a year ago. What if you bought a new Ford and it had Bridgestone tires plus a hand-written note in the glove compartment that said "Please change the tires, they are unsafe". Ralph Nader would be at Ford's throat like a pitbull on speed. MS gets away with it, time and time again.
Money for nothing, pix for free
When a (h)(cr)acker writes a virus/worm that cracks into servers and provides root access without actually doing any damage, what they are doing is letting the world know how easy it is to do so.
Bear in mind that there are lots of folks out there (thieves, terrorists, enemy governments) who would (and presumably do) break into servers and steal credit card numbers and/or sensitive corporate/government info, without telling anyone!!
If the "virus authors" weren't constantly exploiting these simple security holes, the greater public would never know they were there, because the real "bad guys" always try to go unnoticed.
Dear Microsoft,
Thank you for your recent ammouncement that (someday) you will secure IIS.
Enclosed please find a blank, signed check.
When a more secure IIS is ready, please fill in the amount on the check, deposit it, and then ship me the new IIS. I'm patient. I'll wait until it's ready.
I know you're working very hard and that the benefit of end users is the number one concern of Microsoft.
Your loyal lackey,
MCSE guy.
Those who would give up liberty in exchange for security and DRM should switch to Microsoft Palladium!
The interesting thing is: they're not the leaders. Not in Web servers. You saw the Netcraft survey results a few days ago. Apache 60% or so, IIS holds about half that. Half.
Excellent spin, to imply that the reason for all the vicious attacks is market leadership. But they don't have it, and that isn't the reason.
Libertarianism is rich wolves and poor sheep playing gambler's ruin for dinner.
The article hints at this, but I think that Microsoft needs to not only secure their default install for future products but make security part of their MCSE core training/testing requirements. I think they need to make a separate MCSE core test that focuses on security.
Comment removed based on user account deletion
I have just released my tool which can be used to generate reports about these worms by examining your Apache logs. Very configurable, lots of options, written in Java, released under the GPL.
Please check it out at http://www.websoup.net/wormscan/. I'm looking forward to some feedback.
You can accomplish anything you set your mind to. The impossible just takes a little longer.
What about mergers, business parterships, extranets and other results of a dynamic business environment? What if you find yourself happing to open the application to others? Sure, the first few are easy, change the firewall rules. But what if their servers get infected with the next worm du juor?
And please tell me what is IIS's intrinsic advantage in delivering dynamic application content to desktops?
Bleh!
I wanted to post this but you were ahead of me. And it's not just a problem with IIS -- most (all?) NT "services" run as LocalSystem, which actually has even more privileges than Administrator.
Bugs and security holes are inevitable in any software, but their impact is different. Any buffer overflow in IIS is disasterous, whereas a buffer overflow in Apache will have a very limited damage. To 0wn a Unix box running Apache you need two security holes: first a hole in Apache to get unprivileged access, then another hole elsewhere that lets you get root. This is considerably harder and a lot more unlikely than a simple buffer overflow in the web server.
On top of that there is a huge problem with file system permissions. Both Unix and NT have the ability to restrict access to files. The difference is that a default installation of NT has all file permissions set to Everyone:Full Control(*). (That's like making every file and directory 777)! You have to manually lock it down! If the file system permissions are not used, running IIS as an unprivileged user won't help.
Contrast this with Unix. Even if a hole in Apache is exploited, you won't even be able to overwrite the web pages (unless another hole is used to gain root access, see above).
(*) I understand the default file permissions have been improved somewhat in windows 2000. Could somebody in the know give more details? Oh, and what's the deal with IIS running partially in the kernel? is it true or has it been debunked?
In all fairness, Unix has had its problems with root-running daemons. BIND was the latest exploit. Since then BIND guys have learned their lesson -- version 9 no longer runs as root. Will Microsoft learn? After so many years of beeing plagued with security holes, not bloody likely.
___
If you think big enough, you'll never have to do it.
Bleh!
Now, they may not make the most defect-free software (that phrase is so not even grammatically correct, but phuk it), but they make "Good Enough" software (most times they do, there have been exceptions, like PowerPoint 98 for the Mac, don't even get me started!) - software that is good enough for the majority of users/majority of the market.
It's a case of limited returns. They could spend a lot more effort to try and track down (nearly) all the bugs, and fix (nearly) all of them, but the software would be another year late, and have cost them another year of n number of full-time people working on the product, with little to no real improvement for the end user.
Since most users wouldn't notice the difference, why on eath should they spend the extra time and money? If users will buy Office XP and live with it, defects and all, why should they spend the extra time and effort for nearly neglible results?
Now in the case of IIS, there's a lot of rhetoric about "ooh, the sysadmins should be doing their jobs", "MS should be sued", "MS should rewrite/opensource IIS", "Switch to Apache"... yadda yadda yadda. Some people use this software for company critical operations. That's their choice. Simple case is: if you use the tool, you should understand how to use it correctly.
Remember teaching your Mom how to use Word? or Outlook? Remember when she really screwed something up and couldn't find that recipe she sent Martha Stewart? After you rolled your eyes and sat down at the keyboard, you fixed the problem. Why? How? Are you a genius? No. You are a sophisticated, experienced user. Mom isn't. IMHO the same logic applies. If you are going to use the tool, understand how to use it correctly. Otherwise stop bitching and moaning about it.
I feel better now.
"Content's a bitch."
Interview about the "Secure Windows Initiative"
Alright. I'm sure this will get a lot of MCSE's all huffy but too bad... it's not about you anyway.
The biggest selling point for Microsoft crap is in how easy it is. It's also its biggest problem. Sure it's easy to set things up when, at install time, everything (especially the stuff the installer doesn't yet know about) is turned on by default! It is precisely this selling point that has created this problem.
You know, most people put their dangerous tools behind some level of inconvenience to prevent accidents. I have no doubt that Microsoft never intended this to happen... yet it has... I don't know how many releases of Windows had to come out before warnings about having file shares open when connected to the internet started to appear. So file shares are dangerous but exposing IIS (+addons) aren't?
A comment made by one user/admin noted that IIS by itself is not vulnerable that it is all the useless addins that make it so. Most of these addins aren't even used by the casual user. The casual user doesn't even use IIS! And that is the crux of the CodeRed problem in general. Microsoft has put dangerous tools into the hands of people who don't know how to use them so they can make more money. It's as simple as that. Microsoft is responsible for the problem and they should take appropriate measures.
By making it "too easy" people are making themselves vulnerable without their knowledge. It's out. It's too late. The best they can do is issue a RECALL on IIS and everything that comes bundled with IIS. Issuing advisories that people aren't reading and patches that people aren't downloading isn't going to get people's attention.
If they are truly interested in solving the problem, they will have to swallow their pride and make it very public that they wish to RECALL IIS! Then people will sit up and take notice and do the things they need to do.
Recalls are embarassing. They will not want to do it. But for the good of the internet, they should. Okay, I hear the laughing... they aren't interested in the public good.
What is IIS anyway? Internet Infection System?
Let me disagree. No one has the obligation to bring motivation to their job. If you are given mediocre tools, if your recomendations about the best solution for the problem are ignored, if managers trust their own marketing-based opinions more than your technical experience, then nobody can demand that you dedicate more than the barest minumum effort to your activities. If it's your job, it's your job, sure, but there's a matter of dedication, of loving what you do, that makes all the difference.
The bottom line is, IIS is insecure. Fixing the blame on the sysadmins won't solve that problem. Letting the sysadmins pick the system they feel more confortable with may be the first step in a true solution.
If any idiot can administer a Windows server, any idiot will.
- I don't need to go outside, my CRT tan'll do me just fine.
Job Interview:
Boss: Hi, we're looking for a Windows 2000 Server systemadmin.
Person: Yeah, I can do that. Look at my spiffy resume.
Boss: OK, you're hired.
On the Job:
Person: Just FYI, Windows 2000 Server sucks. You should be using Linux.
Boss: We hired you to be a Windows 2000 Server admin. We use Windows 2000 Server. We probably have lots of reasons for using it.
Person: OK, whatever. I'll just sit around and do a half-ass job because you won't change to Linux even though Linux is better. I don't care that you're paying me a lot to be a Windows 2000 Server admin, why should I have to keep up on things? Never mind that if I were running a Linux system, I'd be happy as a clam and patching like mad...not with Windows...maybe if I SUCK, I can blame it on Microsoft and get them to change to Linux.
SORRY. That's not how things work. If you got hired to be a Windows 2000 Server sysadmin, you DAMN WELL better do your job. If you have a problem with that, go get a job as a LINUX ADMIN, and stop proliferating security holes by your own laziness.
People nowdays...feh. Things are not always how you want, and bitching and moaning doesn't help. Do you job, or quit. If you can't do your job right, quit.
Don't complain that Microsoft is the cause of all your troubles when there are Windows admins all over that have little the no trouble simply because they actually know what they're doing. Being a Linux geek doesn't make you cut out to be a Windows admin if you don't know how to admin a Windows box.
-Jayde
What's a sig?
By default, IIS runs as a special account IUSR_machinename on the internet. For intranets it will often run with the end user's credentials. Of course you can create any service account to run IIS if you're worried about a dictionary attack on the IUSR_machinename account.
/bin), move files like the command and scripting shells into it, and allowing only Administrators and System to access it (similar to moving that junk to /sbin)
In fact, one of microsoft's Security recommendations is to make a special folder in system32 (pseudo-equivilant of
The problem is that even a low priviledge account falls under the "Everybody" group, which has a wide latitude by default.
It also doesn't help that some shops are too cheap to shell out $300 for the W2K Resource Kit or a TechNet Subscription. Then maybe people would also stop complaining about the lack of MS documentation.
Trolls throughout history:
Jonathan Swift
A company whose main selling point is ease of use is bound to attract lazy people to manage its products. If the average Windows 2000 sysadmin is lazy and careless, while the average Unix sysadmin is careful and meticulous, whose fault is it?
As I mentioned, fixing the blame will not solve the problem. From an outsider point of view, the whole company is a black box. The customer doesn't know and doesn't care if the sysadmin is doing his job. All the customer sees is results. So, when managers hire people, they shouldn't just consider that Windows administrators can be hired for less than Unix administrators; they should think about the overall result: will a system composed by hardware+software+people work better with a Windows or with a Unix software component?
As a once and future system administrator, I have to agree with you.
As a manager, a business person, and a general human being who likes to communicate, I submit this humble question: is there a little bit of medieval guild-ism in statements of this nature? A desire to _keep_ things difficult, keep the cauldrons bubbling, keep the flap of the shamen's tent closed, so that only the guild of "clueful sysadmins" can perform amazing feats such as (gasp!) building a web site
Just asking.
sPh
I manage lots of workstations and several servers in a state agency. We use Dameware for remote information collection and control.
In the past we used SMS but it was waaay too slow, especially across some of our 56k lines. Dameware is a wonderful product. There may be some way to script it's use as well. I was provided with the product by the department, so I don't know what the licensing issues are, but it looks like it's around $200.00 or less for download and is available for a 30 day free trial.
I really endorse this product. Hope the info helps.
War is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength. - George Orwell or George Bush?
What are you suggesting? That the recent Code Red plagues are because of malevolent Linux zealots pretending to be Windows admins? Give me a break! Would you also claim that the BIND disasters on UNIX were a result of undercover Windows zealots trying to undermine UNIX? This smacks far too much of conspiracy nonsense for my tastes.
The most likely explanation is that most people are lazy and/or incompetent. There is significantly more demand for quality administrators - UNIX or NT - than there are people to supply. As a result the salaries are inflated and this has attracted the unskilled and incompetent get-rich-quick crowd. This is almost certainly the REAL reason for the incompetently and poorly administered boxen out there.
Now if you want to discuss the relative merits of Windows vs UNIX in terms of security, then come back down to Earth and stop spouting conspiracy nonsense. There are REAL arguments that can be made about the security design of Windows vs UNIX, and some of them are interesting (although admittedly most are not). I personally think that Windows attracts the lazy and the incompetent administrators more-so than UNIX, but maybe you disgree!?
The problem is that parent paths aren't automatically blocked from going any higher than \InetPub\Webroot, which to me is a huge security hole. Yes, properly-secured NTFS ACLs on the filesystem will prevent any real damage from occurring, but NT and Win2k default to EVERYONE|Full Control on all filesystems, both at the NTFS ACL level and at the share level.
Look, if it were possible to just fix your server once and then not have to go back and fix the same flaw again (and again and again...), more NT systems would be properly patched, but Microsoft seems to have gone out of its way to hose NT 4.0 customers. Win2k does finally let you patch your install folders with updates from the service packs, but NT doesn't let you do that, and there's no good reason for that. Any time you add or remove a service in NT, you end up putting the install CD in. The second you do that, you have to re-run your service pack and reapply all of your hotfixes.
IIS 4.0 is the current version of IIS for NT 4.0. Let's say you decide you want to build an Outlook Web Access server for your organization and your company hasn't moved to Win2k Server yet, so you use NT 4.0. How do you get IIS 4.0 on that server? You use the Microsoft Option Pack 1 for NT 4.0. Guess what? That thing installs an insecure version of MDAC, an unpatched version of IIS and a host of other crap you may or may not want (such as the MS transaction server and indexing). All of it is incredibly old and almost all of it has to be patched and repatched the second you install it.
So, here's how you build your server: You install NT 4.0 and apply the latest service pack (SP6a because SP6 had heinous bugs). You install IE 4.0 or newer. Then, if you're smart, you install a version of MDAC (2.5 or newer) that sets proper registry security and is reasonably recent and free of its own security holes. Then you install the Option Pack so you can have IIS 4.0 and which insists on trying to install MDAC 1.5--be sure to deselect RDS because that's a huge security hole that Russian hackers use to steal credit card numbers. Now, you're ready to install Outlook Web Access. Think you're finished? Ha! Not even close. Next, you run HFNETCHK to find the enormous list of hotfixes you've got to download and apply. Each hotfix is in a different place on Microsoft's website, and there isn't a convenient tool you can use to just go and download the patches you need and store them in conveniently-labeled folders. Then, you download QCHAIN so you can apply those patches without having to reboot after each one. If you're smart, you'll use WindowsUpdate and MPSA to make sure you're not missing anything.
By the time you've finished with this minimum effort, you've spent no less than four or five hours just installing NT, IIS and the hotfixes, not to mention the hour or two it takes to install and configure OWA. Now, at this point, all you have is a product that's reasonably free of serious buffer overflow security flaws. You still don't have a product that's actually remotely secure. Now, you have to go and fix all of MS's idiotically optimistic NTFS permissions and find and disable any unnecessary services. Maybe you run MS's IIS Lockdown tool, which removes the IISamples folder and a few other obvious things.
By now, you've probably spent at least 8-12 hours building this server, patching the holes and fixing the default security settings.
So, you've patched the living hell out of the server and it's ready to go. You're immune to attacks, right? Almost certainly not. New holes are found in IIS every week and keeping on top of them is a huge job even if you have no other job responsibilities. Add to that the fact that any time somebody adds or removes a service from NT, you have to reapply the latest service pack and all the hotfixes (in order) and then reboot, and you've got yourself a nightmare.
Let me be clear.
There are enormous numbers of jackasses running IIS who can't figure out how to toast bread. However, there are plenty of overworked sysadmins who're only trying to keep their damn networks running who find it nearly impossible to keep their IIS servers patched and locked down because Microsoft makes it so damn difficult.
Yes, matters get a little better when you're running Windows 2k server, but things don't turn into a panacea just because you can patch your install media and some hotfixes don't require reboots. Microsoft still releases at least two or three patches for Win2k and/or IIS every month (sometimes they release that many in a week). They still automatically set file and share privileges too optimistically. They still install dozens of unnecessary services by default. They still force you to have unnecessary applications installed by default that you can't remove without pliers and a blowtorch (OutlookExpress). In short, they still don't take security maintenance seriously and until they do, it'll be tough for even conscientious admins to keep up. Newbies, idiots and lazy bastards won't have a hope.
So which user does it run as again? How does a running process magically switch the user it runs as? Oh right it doesn't! IIS runs as LocalSystem. As AC pointed out, it uses "impersonation" to run *scripts* as another user (this is eqivalent to sudo). Repeat: it runs *scripts* as whatever user; IIS itself runs as LocalSystem.
In fact, one of microsoft's Security recommendations is to make a special folder in system32 (pseudo-equivilant of /bin), move files like the command and scripting shells into it, and allowing only Administrators and System to access it (similar to moving that junk to /sbin)
This is the dumbest thing I have ever heard. It's like making bash and perl executable by root only. This prevents you from running scripts as non-root (or non-Administrator), and does exactly zero to improve security: if you got in through an IIS hole, you already are Administrator so you can do whatever you damn want.
Of course you can create any service account to run IIS if you're worried about a dictionary attack on the IUSR_machinename account.
Wait, all these special (service-only) accounts have passwords? So you can log in as say LocalSystem or IUSR_watever if you guess it? Then NT security is an even bigger joke than I thought! (and that's saying much). (And before you post another dumb response, here is a clue: on Unix special accounts like bin, httpd, nobody, etc. have no passwords so you cannot log in with that user name no matter what password you type, but processes can still run as bin, httpd, or nobody).
___
If you think big enough, you'll never have to do it.
I have personally seen service patches and hot fixes blue screen servers. I have a fear of installing Microsoft "fixes" on systems that are functioning - will they cause a blue screen when the inevitable reboot is required? Will they break an API my "turnkey" vendor relied on?
I have two choices:
I can pro-actively install the service packs and hot fixes, causing (at best) some downtime or (at worst) an extended period of downtime thanks to unexpected side effects. If I am pro-active about fixes, I am viewed by departmental managers and users outside of IT as a bad guy, someone who is here to wreck their server. Oh, and don't tell me to test it before I apply it... you can install the same service pack on 50 boxes and only have it blue screen on one. I've SEEN this occur, so it is always a roll of the dice.
Choice #2 is to wait until the virus/trojan/whatever hits this department. Then I am the good guy for coming to the rescue.
What would YOU do?! I'd especially like to hear from seasoned sysadmins in both Microsoft and Unix camps - what approach do you take?
-hj
UGH! You are so friggin' clueless!
It's not about keeping things difficult.
TCP/IP & SECURITY are not difficult! Common sense is not difficult. Dilligence is not difficult.
Letting any Yahoo! that can Ctrl X & Crtl V run a complex system is idiotic. I doubt the original intent of the MCSE was to train people to pass a test! I assume they atually meant to test a person. Then once the test was passed the passer would take a position with an experienced Sys Admin who could "finish" their training. An apprenticeship... guild-like enough for you?
Cram learning a bunch of hooey like "remote installs" and other Marketing Crap hasn't produced any Sys Admins yet.
I'm not one of those people who assumes MCSE = Dimwit but if you hire an MCSE fresh out of school and expect an expert it is YOU who are the dimwit. And you should expect bad things to follow.
The OP has a valid point, marketing has sold the "Zero Administration" line, but truth be told it don't work, won't work, can't work and until people stop trying to make it work Nimda's will disrupt business everytime they come out.
This
Granted rights!
Makes that "old" implicit rights look pretty damn silly doesn't it?
Now if we can just figure out a way to make it so no applications have implicit rights (like a root user) but granted rights (like a user) we'd be OK.
So when is WINiX coming out?
This
The real problem isn't that the service starts as LocalSystem - even Apache starts off as root (it has to when it binds to port 80). What makes things so difficult under NT is there is no effective way to permanently and irrevokably drop privileges from a process while maintaining the ability to 'su' to another user if someone presents a username/password pair.
Even when IIS is running as a 'nobody' user, unless you have explicitly configured your script/application to run in a separate process then you'll find that a simple 'RevertToSelf()' call will grant you back all the privs that were dropped. On the flip side, without being LocalSystem you can't call 'LogonUser()' or 'CreateProcessAsUser()' from a username/password pair so you end up with catch 22.
If I'm wrong, please shoot me down in flames...
Fear: When you see B8 00 4C CD 21 and know what it means
Wow, glad to see IRC politics have made it to slashdot too.
:D
"Remember when the U.S. had a drug problem, and then we declared a War On Drugs, and now you can't buy drugs anymore?"
Ummm...
/httpd/perl/ (A cgi-bin directory...BIG NO NO!!!) in their default install of their enhanced server (I forget what they call it).
My default install of Apache on Redhat and Mandrake both have ALL KINDS of unnecessary shit running. Mandrake 7.2 even gave browse rights to
Luckily I was smart enough to go in and disable everything I didn't need, but why was that the default behavior in the first place? If you need mod_perl, or PHP, or ASP, or Server stats, or directory listings...you should know how to enable that stuff on your own. It shouldn't be part of the default config.
Our father which art in Redmond, Bill be thy name. .NET come. Thy will be done, in earth, as it is in Redmond.
Thy
Give us this day our daily executable.
And forgive us our syntax errors, as we forgive thy crashes
And lead us not into subscription-based services, but deliver us from blue-screens: For thine is the marketplace, and the patents, and the shares, for ever, Amen.
The Resource Kit and Technet subscriptions aren't fixes (fixes are free), so your rant is unfounded. These items contain wads of documentation, best practices and other useful tools for a sysadmin and are well worth the money spent.
Fear: When you see B8 00 4C CD 21 and know what it means
So which user does it run as again? How does a running process magically switch the user it runs as? Oh right it doesn't! IIS runs as LocalSystem. As AC pointed out, it uses "impersonation" to run *scripts* as another user (this is eqivalent to sudo). Repeat: it runs *scripts* as whatever user; IIS itself runs as LocalSystem.
;-P
Depending on how you configure it, it can have a secondary process spawned as a separate 'nobody' user that handles the requests. This lowers performance but (obviously) increases security. You can assign different users for different virtual directories.
Wait, all these special (service-only) accounts have passwords? So you can log in as say LocalSystem or IUSR_watever if you guess it?
Nope - they don't have permission for interactive or network login, only service login. Yes, they do have passwords (which IIS changes periodically). There is no such thing as an account on NT being allowed to switch user to another account unless it knows the password (ie 'su'/setuid() without passwords is impossible, even as LocalSystem), just as giving ownership of an object is impossible. And before you post another dumb response, here's a clue: on NT accounts have much finer grained permissions than on (standard) Unix - you would do well to look at them.
Fear: When you see B8 00 4C CD 21 and know what it means
Does IIS start 10 processes, each as a different user? Or does it actually mean that it will still run as LocalSystem and use "impersonation" to run *scripts* as different users, the way it already does?
This isn't quite true. IIS 5 can already be configured to run different virtual directories and sites as different users. It maintains the single listener running as LocalSystem, but farms each request to a separate process running as the specified user. You can easily verify this using the task manager to show which user owns which process - you'll see a few svchost.exe's running as the different web users.
In other words, IIS already has this option so I'm wondering exactly what they are going to add?
Fear: When you see B8 00 4C CD 21 and know what it means
From the article: IIS, which is used to run Web sites, is sold separately and comes bundled with Windows 2000 [...] and Windows NT.
Is sold seperately AND comes bundled? And here I was thinking that Yahoo! was just the name of the website, not a description of their writers. IIS is NOT sold seperately - period. BTW, what asshole would buy a product that comes bundled with the OS that the product requires? Duh...
Black holes are where God divided by zero
Personally I make sure that I can recover the system if it all goes wrong. Backups if necessary, splitting the mirror if it has mirrored system disks, that sort of thing. Reboot beforehand too, to get the machine in a known state.
To add to your comments, it's also all about TCO (Total Cost of Ownership) and the amount of money that a company is willing to spend on resources. With the rash of virus attacks lately, it's more than one full-time job to keep track of security updates and keep the server farm updated. The suits have a really hard time dedicated whole persons to one single task like this, so usually an admin is running around like chicken without a head trying to get those hotfixes done along with all of the other tasks that management seems to feel are more important.
If we go back to Gartner's original article, they never said "Apache is more secure than IIS" or anything like that. They simply indicated that right now, IIS is being exploited more than Apache and other rivals. Total Cost of Ownership can probably be reduced by considering an alternative to IIS because your admins won't be spending all of their time trying to keep one step ahead of the virus writers. Maybe in the future, people will try harder to break into Apache and it will become a bigger liability than IIS. But right now, that isn't the case.
GreyPoopon
--
Why is it I can write insightful comments but can't come up with a clever signature?
Many times, that Senior VP can write his own name down because he refused to provide the budget that IT said it needed in order to maintain an secure and functioning environment. The "budget games" that most corporations play are absolutely idiotic. The IT department now has to intentionally inflate its budget estimate so that when the VP asks them to slim it down, they can at least afford a modicum of what they need to in order to stay running. If companies would invest properly and wisely in their IT resources, they'd probably find that "emergency money" needs would drop by more than the original investment.
GreyPoopon
--
Why is it I can write insightful comments but can't come up with a clever signature?
heres to hoping that there are some folks left at
the following comment was posted by MS employee Joshua Allen at his weblog
The IIS Plan - This interview with Brian Valentine sums up the main action plan for addressing IIS concerns. The quote that sums up his attitude best is "When we look back in a few years, we will see this as one of the critical inflection points in our company's growth."
Here are my notes, detailing the parts of the plan I found interesting:
Two initiatives for customers:
Get Secure:
Stay Secure:
Internal Efforts (Not Customer-Facing):
Public:
So the way I see it, we will be successful to the degree that we:
- Assure that no customer ever again finds it difficult, confusing, or time-consuming to keep their system secure.
- Improve security going out the door so that fewer patches are required (IMO, this wouldn't have made a difference in any of the recent worms, but is still a good goal for countering potential future threats). The goal here is to be the platform with fewest known vulnerabilities that need to be patched, using any metric you care to apply.
- Be a lot more proactive in contacting, encouraging, and helping customers keep their systems secure.
And of course, huge progress in fighting worms could be made by getting the router vendors, OS vendors, and other infrastructure vendors to all work together, and hopefully that happens too.It also doesn't help that some shops are too cheap to shell out $300 for the W2K Resource Kit or a TechNet Subscription. Then maybe people would also stop complaining about the lack of MS documentation.
"Too cheap"?!? They've had to spend for NT (4 or 5) in the first place! Maybe it's MS who is too cheap to include basic admin tools with their 'server' products in the first place.
As someone else pointed out, TCO becomes more of an issue. Why the hell should I have to pay $300 for the privilege of being able to run 'kill.exe' to stop runaway processes (which seem to happen to me more under Windows than other systems).
Haven't checked 2000 so it MAY be part of that, but for YEARS, every time I used NT4, I had to go find the stupid resource kit to get kill.exe and other 'bonus' admin tools.
So on top of the $1000+ for the OS, I need to spend hundreds extra to stop runaway processes caused by a faulty OS in the first place.
TCO.
creation science book
Very eloquent response.
sPh
Remember the first time you installed Apache?
It was secure by default because you had to learn what the heck you were doing,
What ARE you talking about? Aside from those who are CLI impaired, httpd.conf (for typical tasks) is just as easy as the IIS MMC. After having 3 years of experience with IIS (from IIS3.0... yuck), and NONE with Apache, one of our boxes at work required Apache to be installed. This was, of course, after our layoffs and we laid off our only full time linux guy. Everyone else (incuding myself) was mainly Windows. So, we needed to config an apache box to host over 1,000 domain names, and we needed our web application (running Cold Fusion on Windows) to automagically create the domain/website in both Bind and Apache. It litterally took me about a DAY to write a couple of perl scripts (this is with MINIMAL experience with Perl as well!) that built the zone file for bind, updated the named.boot, and updated the httpd.conf.
I had to do something similar for IIS once, and it took 3 times as much VBScript since I had to traverse "ADSI". The code runs slow, and it took about a week to complete (and I have experience dealing with the IIS Metabase). (aside... Thankfully, all of the Microsoft.NET config is in well formed XML. It's not in the registry, and not in some proprietary format that requires knowledge of a clumsy API).
Apache is easy for certain setups. Personally, I still like IIS (hold the security holes) for non-static sites. I could go on regarding IIS vs Apache - that's another discussion altogether. I just don't think you have to have much of a clue to use Apache, and you can have the same idiot admins screw up an Apache config as you can an IIS config.
There is no longer anything that can be done with computers that is nontrivial and clearly legal. -- Paul Phillips
Maybe an "extreme" analogy is in order.
Think of IIS as a gun. When handled improperly, it endangers the internet and its users.
An obvious problem with the analogy is that most people probably know if they own a gun. Much of the infected usership doesn't even know they are running IIS, let alone that they are infected and spreading.
Okay, I can't think of a good analogy that really fits. But the point I'm trying to get at is that Microsoft should be careful about putting too much in the hands of the people who don't know what they are doing.
Convenience is cool! No doubt about it. I love convenience. But you know? Slurpees are convenient... most of the time you don't even have to wait for the cashier to serve them up. But if IIS and Slurpees were similar, then it would be like giving hundreds of people a brain freeze because you were stupid enough to drink yours too fast! It's just wrong.
I have to note that Microsoft's own servers have been infected. Microsoft is going to have an advantage over every other company, they can get advanced access to the patches & their effects. They can get priortized access to tech support. If Microsoft is having problems keeping up, then what chance has the average admin got?
I am not necessarily disagreeing. Indeed, a fairly common occurance is for Joe Homeowner to decide he needs to "upgrade" from a Black & Decker drill to a Milwaukee Hole Hawg (now that such tools are available at homeowner hells). He takes it home, rips into some solid wood, and the drill breaks his wrist when he hits a nail. No question who is at fault there.
But my observation is more along the lines of, why does it have to be so hard? Joe Businessman doesn't need a license or a "security administrator" to print up and distribute some brochures. He may need a license, but doesn't need much help, to put up a small billboard. At least in the US (at least for the moment), he doesn't need a "secure firewall" to publish a small newspaper.
So why should all this rigamarole be necessary for a small busines to publish a small web site? Is there any incentive for the people in the admin and security industries to keep things complex?
Personally, if this stuff keeps up, I expect that within two years either (a) most businesses will abandon the Internet (b) draconian government controls, including licenses and strict liability for Internet pipes.
sPh
If BMW made a car where all you had to do was yank on the driver's door really hard (whether locked or not), then put any key in the ignition and drive away, then BMW's would get stolen like crazy, and everyone would be screaming at BMW for such shoddy workmanship.
Should the thieves still get thrown in jail for stealing a car? Of course they should. Should virus authors and script kiddies still get punished? Of course they should.
But the manufacturer of such insecure, dodgy products should get some/most of the blame for this. And can you really get upset with the BMW owner who is tired of taking his car into the shop once a week to have new locks installed again and again because their basic design is so poor?
I think not.
That analogy is so ridiculous that it's practically a Troll (unless you actually did mean it as a Troll).
/ etc.
No one died from Nimda/Code Red I & II/Sircam/ILOVEYOU/Melissa/Kournikova/etc/etc/etc
And I wasn't implying that the people who write these things shouldn't be punished; they should. If I have a crappy lock on my front door and someone twists the handle and the lock breaks and they come in my house, it's still breaking and entering.
But if over 90% of the houses have one brand of lock, and houses are continually broken into (whether anyone takes anything or not), don't you think people would get a little upset at the lock maker? Sure, those people breaking in are still crooks who should be thrown in jail, but doesn't the lock maker have some of the responsibility here, especially when they continually crow about how secure their locks are and you can put your trust in them, and why not use their locks for every last thing you need to put a lock on? (Hailstorm/Passport anyone?)