FAA Pushes Air Traffic Control Systems Into Service
An anonymous reader points us to this AP story about the FAA forcing new air traffic control systems into service, over the objections of technicians and air traffic controllers. The Transportation Department's Inspector General notes that many critical bugs remain unfixed. We reviewed a book that discussed the lessons to be learned from software engineering projects; and we had a recent story about Great Britain having all sorts of problems with their new air traffic control software.
Roll it out into production and patch it later. Only full production testing will find all the bugs.
Don't they remember the disaster when the ATC shut down a few years back? It's not like this thing is a web browser.
There should be a moratorium on the use of the apostrophe.
Max V.
NeXTMail/MIME Mail welcome
Yeah, the controllers are pissed off because they based the new system on one of those bad ATC games with flashy graphics. It now runs on a Windows 98 machine and crashes every 1024 planes
This comment does not represent the views or opinions of the user.
Even a buggy air-traffic control system is better than the one they have now. Every 3 days or so, the radar screens drop horizontal so that air traffic controllers can keep track of their dots while the computer goes down and then comes back up.
This is not a pretty sight. Each ATC can have 30+ planes on their screen, and when the computer goes down, they screen drops horizontal, the ATC whips out little flags with numbers on them and keeps them on top of the now anonymous dots.
So I think ANY improvement is a good thing.
On the blacker side: The bugs themselves could be a good thing. Maybe one of these "bugs" will misreport the location of things like the Sears Tower, or the Capitol Building and a hijacked plane will slam into "Al's Meats and More" instead of the intended target.... (yes, I'm still REALLY angry about the Pentagon/WTC/Penn. terrorist attacks)
The Dopester
"Yes, I'm a Karma Whore, but I'm doing it to pay my way through school."
Not much specifics. Basically says the union hates it and the FAA and Raytheon say it's OK. It lists a few problems, but doesn't say if it could be the result of user error. We all know how users always say the system crashed when it's really their mistake. I'm not saying it's good to go for production, but it could be another time when the union is afraid that it will automate too well and result in people's jobs being lost.
Amtrak
Greyhound
Hertz
-- Knowing too much can get you killed, but knowing who knows too much can make you rich.
Except when by web browser crashes, it doesn't slam me into the ground in a firey mass of twisted, molten metal.
Seriously, I thought design philosophies such as the CMM level 5 (used on the space shuttle design), should prevent things like this from happening. I'm sure it's safe to fly, but stories like this don't inspire me to full confidence.
there are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots
My internship with Raytheon was actually doing development work for this project. Although they were still behind schedule then, what they did have up and running at the time sure looked a hell of a lot better than the old system.
On a side note, I talked with someone from the FAA about the old system and the hackability of it. I was told that they deemed the US ATC system virtually hack-proof for the simple fact that the hardware was so antiquated that anyone wanting to do malicious damage either wouldn't know how, or it would be such an arduous and tedious task that they'd eventually give up!
Even Open Source will suck hard if you deploy immature software. This sounds more like a case of bad management and premature deployment than any fault of their platform.
Sorry, I'm not sure this can be turned into a pro-Linux thing. Of course, with my luck, you might just be trolling playfully.
"Old man yells at systemd"
It's the classic disaster scenario: the designers/programmers know it's hosed, the management forces them to ship anyway.
You Have Been Warned.
Hexayurt - open source refugee shelter,
Only problem is that the problems aren't OS related, but application related. And the article doesn't say what system they run it on. Could already be Linux. Or it could be another UNIX, or NT/2000 or a mainframe on the backend.
I hate to suggest getting the courts involved because things seem to get bogged down there. Can the technicians - or better yet the public sue to block the FAA from using the new system? According to the article the FAA invoked their "emergency powers" to force the new system in place in Syracuse against the inspectors and certifiers' recomendations. This sounds like a horrible mess waiting to happen. Besides, if we grant the FAA emergency power - they might get crazy and build a death star! Ok, all kidding aside - I wonder if the public can sue to block the use of the new system until it actually passes tests and inspections. Anyone? Is this possible?????
Have a Happy.
That's ridiculous. Open Source software, as good as it may be, will not be used for mission-critical applications such as air traffic control in the foreseeable future, because there is little or no accountability.
Think about it: the software fails, two planes crash into each other. Who's respsonsible? There is no direct line of accountability.
People who are versed in such matters, including FAA technicians and ATC's, have expressed strong concerns that this system is ready.
They aren't serious enough to (a.) refuse to follow the order to install it, or (b.) refuse to report to work if it is installed. So, if there's ever a disaster directly caused by the known flaws in this system, they're part of the same conspiracy. Whoever made this decision should have done so with the understanding that if they're wrong, they might be held accountable for more than just negligence.
But, people want that paycheck more than they want to protect human lives. So pilots won't be refusing to fly, ATC's won't be halting takeoffs, and FAA managers won't be yelling fire.
If these people really cared, we'd be seeing empty skies like Sept 12th.
So either the systems aren't all that bad, or the people who have the power to stop the madness immediately are chickenshits.
Let's start in Syracuse. Why didn't these "FAA technicians" put their money where their mouth is, and throw their wooden shoes into the machinery? Because they didn't, they should be the first people to answer for any accident that comes from this flawed system. They capitualted, didn't they?
-fb Everything not expressly forbidden is now mandatory.
...or if it has more or less than existing systems (and workflows).
It's: "Is there a net decrease in aircraft safety during movements?"
If not, then it's not necessarily an issue.
I read an article about a year ago (I wish I could find it now) that talked about radar systems at smaller airports.
Two systems had been developed, one by some guy who worked at such a smaller airport, and one was developed by someone like Raytheon Co.
The system was basically this: The smaller airport would be fed the radar system from a nearby large airport. So if you were flying into Bowman Field, in Louisville, KY, they would be getting fed the signal from Louisville International Airport (SDF). It allowed smaller airports to have the technology of larger airports without having to expend as much money to get it.
The gentlemen who had developed his sytem basically used existing wiring coming from the larger airport and simply sent the signal across that. He hooked up a screen, and had a perfectly good signal. The FAA went on to ask him (he was an FAA employee already) to develop the technology for wide-spread deployment, which he did.
Along comes Raytheon Co. (or whomever the company was) and decides that is a lucritive contract to get. The company comes up with a system costing about ten times as much and about 80% as effective.
Who does the FAA end up going with? Let me answer the question this way: The FAA emplyee did not contribute to any campaigns.
- (c) 2018 Hank Zimmerman
Such a troll....
Imagine: the buggy (and needless to say proprietary) flight control software is installed. Two months later, plane crashes are at an all time high. The FAA is in an uproar, the media is clamoring for a solution, America is in turmoil.
I'm just not seeing this happen. First of all, the old systems sucked just as bad, and they're keeping them around for backups. Secondly, the biggest danger here is mid-air collisions, and modern aircraft have at least good enough proximity alarms to avoid a problem. I would be more worried about smaller private craft than commercial airliners.
What's that? It's the phone. Who is it? Someone named Linux Torvalds...says he has a solution to our problems.
Wrong. This is serious life or death stuff. Even with real time extensions and a VM that doesn't change every 30 days, Linux is neither designed nor intended to handle high load real time situations. Open source software just simply isn't hardened enough to do anything approaching the complexity of a major air traffic control system.
Don't get me wrong - Linux is a good operating system, and its fun as hell to use and hack on, but a good engineer knows that there is a right tool for every job, and Linux just isn't a legimate choice for a high priority real time system like the ATC.
Do you have Linux and a DotPal? Click here now!
Avweb has also had some interesting articles about England's experiement with new ATC systems.
sPh
This gives a whole new meaning to Blue Screen of Death..
Raytheon Canada has developed Canadian Automated Air Traffic System (CAATS) and Military Automated Air Traffic System (MAATS) for a Nav canada contract and are currently selling it to other countries as well. The software works really well (I have seen it firsthand). It was developed in Richmond, BC.
The problem with STARS is they have to introduce a whole new way of doing everything. I saw a neat discovery channel thing on it and they showed the simulated testing. (It failed certain parts of the testing by the way.)
Here's my gripe. The air traffic control system has been sucking the big one since the 80s (or even before that.) Old technology layered with even older technology. Every other year dateline or 60 minutes does a story on how much it all sucks. Alright, so what's the solution?
Well, according to the contracting some new whiz bang solution that is the end all of be all. So where are we, a couple billion down the hole for the a POS.
What needed to happen is not a total whiz bang solution. It needed to start with a system that emulated everything that the current system did using current technology. Something modular (so you could add new features later on) and something that could scale to meet larger needs. Oh, and something that could have been rolled a good ten years ago.
But noooo, that's too simple, and doesn't put a couple billion into the contractors pocket. Of course the ass clowns in congress are just as much to blame as they approved this.
bull.
who is accountable if Windows crashes? no one, thats who.
at least woth OS, you can have developer look at the code, address issues. If your talking about getting an existing operating system and using it, you can begin your testing process sooner, and cheaper.
OTOH you can write the code from scratch, and open it up.
With OS you can have a team, assign resposibilities, and have someone in charge of the OS who will be hel accountable. You can not do that with a 3rd party closed spource product, especially from a company the size of MS.
The Kruger Dunning explains most post on
There's something amusing about that line of reasoning: open source can't be used, not because it's necessarily inferior to closed source but because if something goes wrong we won't be able to blame anyone...
...anyway, you're confusing open source with anonymous development. Open source simply means that the source is available for modification if necessary. If you keep track of who makes what mods, then you could track a mistake either to the original author or to someone who screwed up some code in their revision of the software.
STOP MISUSING APOSTROPHES, YOU MORONS!!!
Dear Sir/Ma'am,
We at the FAA are very sorry for the loss of your husband/wife/child aboard AA/United/whoever flight number 123. Their death, and the deaths of all 206 other passengers and crew was caused by a minor glitch in the software used to keep track of all commercial jets in the air. You will be relieved to know that this glitch has been fixed, and is available as a patch to the local air traffic control center.
Thank you for your continued trust in the airline industry!
Signed,
FAA Bigwig
--------
I'd rather the software WORK before I trust my life with it, thank you very much.
Whoever stated that signature sizes should be limited to one hundred and twenty characters can just go ahead and kiss my
I'll try not to stray offtopic here.
In the past, I've flown alot for business. I enjoy flying, actually, even in some of the cramped up economy spaces.
Before 9/11, I wasn't overly concerned about our planes running into things. The skyes are awfully big up there, and cities, aside from the obvious ones like NY and LA, are pretty easy to miss or avoid with all the land between them.
And as I think about it, the one thing that takes away my fears about a plane running into something, is that guy in the very front seat of the bus. Y'see, I know several pilots, and none of them are foolish enough to believe the ATC, when they're looking out the front of the plane and see a building comming at them quickly.
These are men and women who have, (proportedly), been highly trained and qualified to get us from point A to point B, safely. And I know most, if hopefully not all of them are smart enough to make good decisions when what they see doesn't match what the ATC is telling them.
In the same vein, there are men and women, who hopefully have good training and good instincts about being ATC's, that when a bug comes up, they're smarter than it is, and will make decisions that avoid the loss of life and property.
Sometimes, alas, you must trust the User to do the right thing. And in this case, we get Trained Users to do the job. Let them do their job.
Awk! Pieces of eight. Pieces of eight. Pieces of seven... ERROR: General Protection Fault. [Paroty Error.]
Of course, the air traffic controller's union is upset about this. Most air traffic controllers have a very short career (burn-out) and don't want to have to learn a new way of doing things.
-- quote
According to the article the FAA invoked their "emergency powers" to force the new system in place in Syracuse against the inspectors and certifiers' recomendations. This sounds like a horrible mess waiting to happen.
--
Well, I work in a building right in line with the SYR main runway. I can tell how lined up a plane is by what section of the parking lot they fly over (we are talking a 20 car lot.) The planes are so close I can see which ones need to be repainted or washed.
So far...I'm still alive, that's a good sign. Also, recently I have seen some planes lining up with the runway much closer than before, I wonder if that means the controllers can handle the traffic better? That would be a good sign for if the system as a whole if it is rolled out in other places.
Anyway, when the system in SYR has problems, I'll be either the first...or last...to notify slashdot.
-Pete
Soccer Goal Plans
Please read:
The ATC / Control Tower is never responsible for controlling the aircraft, nor actually guiding aircraft between hills/etc. Even in a busy place like the San Francisco Bay, the ATC advises of traffic and coordinates inbound and outbound traffic lanes to keep traffic well spaced. ATC typical instructions, even with hills very nearby (1nm) usually consist of a destination landmark or vector, and an altitude.
Not to rant or anything, but from what I understand, the current system is incredibly out of date. It is important, not only to update the ATC gear, but that the FAA institude a complete overhaul of avionics. It is now possible with less than $1000 of gear to have in-flight collision detectors based on GPS, but this is uncommon on private aircraft costing $100k+.
Just my 2 cents.
I wonder if they're pushing it through because the new software has some nice government supplied code to send the Air Force a fax in the case of a dangerously misdirected plane. If the system does that, then the use of the emergency powers act would be justified because the new system provides "critical homeland security" - not that they'll tell us about it or anything.
One bug later, and your plane is reported as speeding towards the Sears tower and you're shot down by a fighter craft.
Maybe the state's highest function is to grind out insoluble problems. (Zelazny, Hall of Mirrors)
(four months later)
Dear Sir/Ma'am,
We at the FAA are very sorry for the loss of your husband/wife/child aboard AA/United/whoever flight number 987. The software glitch that caused their death has been identified as a previously occuring error, and a patch has been available for four months, but due to sysadmin laziness, was not installed, despite being easily available from our locked supply cabinet (which we have lost the keys for) at the bottom of a missing stairwell in the third subbasement of FAA headquarters.
It's much more likely that something will be misreported to a regular (not hijacked) flight. You might dislike Sears Towers, but misreporting its location is not a solution.
Although I wouldn't want to minimize the impact of problems at our radar control facilities, it should be noted that there are procedures for dealing with this sort of thing.
Traffic flow procedures, and FAR's allow for all kinds of flexibility here. Controllers can stack airplanes up in holding patterns while they sort out priorities. Traffic that the primary airports couldn't handle could be sent to reliever airports. Enroute traffic could be sent to alternate airports, etc. In an emergency, the FARs even allow a pilot to deviate from the regs to the extent necessary to safely complete the flight. In other words, if it was an emergency, the Captain could break his flight plan and head for the nearest suitable runway.
The dangerous time is the time between the failure, and the full blown utilization of alternate methods. Even this, however, is helped by separation standards, standard arrival and departure routes, TCAS, etc.
In other words, they won't just fall out of the sky. If I were an airline Captain, and I found myself in a situation where the destination airport's radar was out, and I felt nervous about the safety of that airport's traffic environment, I'd start by asking for an ammended clearance to some alternate destination. If that didn't work, I might just declare an emergency and divert myself.
Contrary to what you see in Die Hard movies, the system is pretty flexible, and the people who use it are intelligent and capable.
Hot Damn! It's the Soggy Bottom Boys!
We need a new way of conducting business. If you used off the shelf components and standard programming environments I cannot possibly imagine how you could spend 1.7 billion and under deliver. I imagine that Raytheon decided that in order to enrich the corporate coffers they needs some proprietary hardware and weird development environments noone but Raytheon employees are familiar with.
It's a shame really. Yes, this a complex problem, but it's just not a billion dollar problem. The issue is that the government's been asking the wrong people to solve it.
What they should have done is approached some small to midsized software design shops and asked them for initial estimates and designs. Give the top 10 of those $1 million each to flesh out the design and prototype it.
Then take the pick of the litter and run with it. I betcha the end result would work better and cost less than the POS raytheon delivered.
-josh
IT'S MICROSOFT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER!!
Wonder what incidents the security holes in this wonderful flying elephant are...
Linux is dead.
LU
I am a private pilot. Even if ATC completely shut down aircraft would not start falling out of the sky. Airplanes are flown by pilots who are trained to operate the aircraft completely independently from air traffic control.
Think of air-traffic control as stop-lights for automobiles; when the stop lights go down, do traffic accidents start happening? No, you just get a little less efficient traffic flow (in some cases it gets more efficent...). Drivers know how to take turns just like they do at stop signs.
Analagously, pilots know how to take turns and fly safe just like they do at 90% of the airports in the world that don't have 24x7 air traffic control.
If the street lights start malfunctioning and giving wacky signals, the hazard of accidents might go up, but would not neccessariy lead to catastrophe.
The ananology for aicraft is even stronger: if an ATC controller went mad and decided to purposefully cause an accident, he probably would not succeed since he would have to fool two pilots who are trained to be wary of ATCs command and to overrride them when they are in error.
Bottom line: airplanes are flown by pilots, not traffic controllers, so breathe easy.
Nonsense. The FAA can always hire a government contractor, such as IBM or Lockheed, to maintain the system, whether it is open source or not, GPL or not, etc. In the case where two planes crash into each other, the contractor bears responsibility. In the open source case, it doesn't even matter if the contractor doesn't own the code. You can always hire a third party to maintain the project and to be the fall guy.
Finding God in a Dog
Usually, the connection is not hardwired, but transmitted from one site to another. I'm an IT Manager at a regional airport, and that's the system we use. We have a large Air Force base only 10 minutes away, and they got expensive upgrades before we did, so they basically just transmit their ATC data on over to us via microwave. This is not unusual. This kind of resource sharing is pretty common between military and civilian installations. We have have an Air National Guard squadron here as well, and we also share resources with them (firefighting in particular). It just makes more sense that way.
As for the new ATC system, I think any kind of mission critical system should be Unix based. As much as I like Linux, I'd still feel better with a QNX type system that goes down perhaps once a year or so. You have to wonder what the procurement people are thinking sometimes.....
Life is hard, and the world is cruel
The strips are used as a backup for the computer ATC system. The only reason controllers get good at using them is because the old system went down so often. Some of the older centers still use vacuum tubes! Yeesh!
Whoever stated that signature sizes should be limited to one hundred and twenty characters can just go ahead and kiss my
This system simply provides location and identification information to airplanes operating under ATC. The system tells the controller where the aircraft is, the aircraft transponder tells the controller who the aircraft is, and the controller then issues instructions to the pilot, who is then responsible for executing those instructions. The hijackers of september 11 flew those planes into the towers and Pentagon by visual navigation (at least for the last few miles...they may have used the GPS system to navigate to NYC or DC).
In short, the ATC system had nothing to do with those airplanes flying into buildings. The only way your blacker side situation would work would be to have a malicious person operating as the controller, and IFR conditions so a non-hijacker pilot couldn't see where he's going.
"You done taken a wrong turn."
-Bill McKinney, in Deliverance
Yeah, I realized that after the post... see my reply to my reply... Thanks though. Stupid of me, really, considering I have my VFR ticket, but not my IFR ticket...
;)
Exit, stage left..
The Dopester
"Yes, I'm a Karma Whore, but I'm doing it to pay my way through school."
Believe nothing -- Buddha
And I've heard that STARS has bugs that Raytheon says they cannot fix, and yet they want more money to "fix bugs"?
Fat chance they'll win ERAM.
In the future, I would want to not be isolated from my friends in the Space Station.
Baseline magazine, a periodical dedicated to IT management, covered the new FAA STARS system from an IT project management point of view in a recent issue.
You can view the case study on-line, or download the PDF file.
I found it to be a very good in-depth article delving into many of the issues surrounding such a massive IT project.
Well, a VFR ticket is more than I have at the moment. I can understand saying or doing things in the heat of the moment...as long as you don't do it in the cockpit, we'll all be fine ;-)
Ultimately, I think this system is going to make pilots more vigilant. I've heard so many anecdotes about controllers causing near-misses (my uncle almost got creamed by a commuter plane while flying his warrior) that I think this may be a good thing.
"You done taken a wrong turn."
-Bill McKinney, in Deliverance
To put things in perspective, Westheimer is the third busiest public-use airport in Oklahoma, losing only to OKC-Will Rogers and Tulsa World. There is high-density student training at Westheimer, and operations often exceed 1000/day. Traffic ranges from Cessna 150's to Beech Barons to Citation X's to T-38's, with a smattering of helicopters thrown in the keep things interesting. The airport is served by several instrument approaches, including a localizer, and is scheduled to get an ILS in a couple of years; an ILS allows traffic to descend to 200' above ground before breaking out of the clouds. In spite of this, Westheimer does not warrant radar.
Short answer here is that yes, Joe Blow's system may be cheaper, and may work well enough for a VFR tower like Bowman or Westheimer, but you need a lot more for any environment that actually needs radar.
--Dave Buckles, CP-ASMEL, Instrument Airplane, CFI (double-I checkride on Monday! Woo-hoo!)
"Make it ten--I am only a poor corrupt official."
--Captain Louis Renault (Claude Rains), Casablanca
The AvWeb article cited above (which is written by Don Brown, Facility Safety Representative at ZTL) also talks about FAA wanting to do away with primary radar altogether. Fucking morons. There are still plenty of airplanes flying around with no electrical systems, which means no transponders.
Unlimited growth == Cancer.
(Before I get started with my critique of the article and my take on the STARS issue, for those of you more interested in the fact that Sun/Solaris is at the heart of STARS, skip to the bottom of the page)
I've been an Air Traffic Control Radar Tech for the better part of 20 years and, after watching/reading years worth of inaccurate FAA Technology reporting (such as this CNN piece) I'm convinced that aviation journalists are, for the most part, clueless about the technology that they report on. Combine ignorance of that calibre with the natural alarmist tendencies of journalists and editors seeking incresed circulation/viewership and you end up with pieces like this one. Alternatively, and even more unpalatable, it might just be that all journalists are mere dilettantes, and actually have the barest grasp of the issues about which they write. Perhaps, as radar/air traffic control is my field of expertise, I'm only accutely aware of their shortcomings in that field, whereas they may be just as ignorant in many, or all, others. I hope that's not the case, but reporting that's as slipshod as this makes one wonder.... The fourth estate is just as prone to error and exaggeration as the other three.
Obviously, there are problems with STARS, just as the DOT IG report describes. There are problems with ALL new major FAA systems. I've been involved with the ASR-11 program, off and on, for several years now. The ASR-11 is a short range (airport) radar that, like STARS, is a Raytheon product and is currently undergoing a variety of tests to assess it's suitability for inclusion into the Air Traffic Control system. The STARS and ASR-11 sagas have similarites: both have been undergoing testing and some forms of development for years. A portion of the agony involved in equipment acceptance is rooted in the diverging interests of the vendor and the FAA. The vendor claims that the system will perform in such and such a manner, and it's up to the FAA to verify that their claim is accurate. If the claim cannot be verified, then a fix must be proposed, then agreed upon, then implemented, and then verified. Of course, the vendor and the FAA will interpret various aspects of the contract differently, and therefore problem resolution can, and apparently often does, involve disputes about funding: who pays for the resolution? does the FAA cough up more cash or does the vendor eat the cost? I don't use the word 'agony' as hyperbole: it most certaily is agonising for both the vendor and the FAA. However, don't be too quick to blame beuracrats. The FAA is attempting to walk a very fine line: save costs where possible, and therefore give the taxpayer better bang for the buck, while ensuring that the system in question is as safe, and reliable, as possible. Of course, altruism isn't the only motivating factor: I imagine that Congressional oversight certainly helps, particularly when it comes to bang-for-the-buck considerations. However, I genuinely believe that engineering/testing personel, system maintainers, and air traffic controllers are supremely interested in the safety of the flying public, and act accordingly.
Now on to a critique of the CNN piece:
"The only STARS system now in use, in El Paso, Texas, has been plagued with problems, according to.....the Professional Airways Systems Specialists, the union that represents the FAA employees who certify and maintain air traffic control equipment."
My experience with the ASR-11 project has convinced me that the Technician's Union, Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS), doesn't give much of a shit about truly relevant equipment funtionality issues. I don't doubt that their assessment of STARS suffers from the same self-interested myopia. As I've heard it told, a Union's involvement in an early round of STARS testing turned into a fiasco, and a potentially significant opportunity was squandered. I've also heard that the union has learned a bit from the experience and that, perhaps, future Union involvement in STARS testing will be more productive. I have direct knowledge of some ridiculous Union demands vis-a-vis the ASR-11.
Unions are a more than a mild source of irritation to me, for a variety of reasons the reader could likely care less about. However, there is one aspect of unions that is crucial to this and other stories involving unions: a union, even one which whose membership comprises a fraction of the 'baragining unit' employees (those who could be in the union if they chose to be) is the sole representative of that group of employees and management looks to the union for all things to do with the employees, and seeks union write-off of all employee-related matters. Journalists follow the same pattern: they spout whatever line the union gives them as if the union actually, rather than technically, spoke for all the employees. If you follow aviation reporting you will see this proven true time and time again.
An aside: my opinion of the Union has nothing to do with my opinion of the average FAA technician. Anyone that's been exposed to unions understands that the official union position often bears no resemblance to the employee's position. FAA technicians are highly trained and, generally, highly motivated, and appreciate the serious nature of their profession.
"The old system remained in place as a backup, because "tower managers stated controllers were not comfortable relying solely on STARS,"....
Now this really turns my stomach....the fact that the 'old system' remains in place is somehow condemnation of the new system (STARS). Of course the old system remains in place as a backup: it would be grossly negligent to uneccesarily remove it while testing on the new system continues. What's so stomach-churning is that this hypocritical journalist, who obviously has a minimal grasp of the complexity of FAA equipment and the air traffic control system, would very likely be the among the first to accuse the FAA of negligence if the 'old system' was uneccesarily discarded and a failure of the new system resulted in crashed planes and mangled bodies. Look, the FAA KNOWS that, while the 'old system' is technically, well, OLD, it's tried and true and, therefore, safe. Obviously they're going to want to retain it as a backup, especially considering the birth pangs that STARS is experiencing. Keep in mind that STARS is not merely a new hardware backbone: it's a completely new interface as well, so it's new to both Air Traffic Controllers and Maintenance personel. Air Traffic Controllers take their responsibility to the flying public VERY seriously, and they're almost always, if not always, going to err on the side of caution. Any one that flies should appreciate this fact.
"Union vice president Tom Brantley said the radar doesn't always work, and it may require several minutes before controllers realize the problem. In addition, he said, the system has failed several diagnostic tests."
I don't know what the hell this means: STARS isn't a radar, of course, so I assume that he must be referring to the radar/s that feed the STARS. I have heard that there is an issue with lag under certain unique and rare circumstances. Those issues will most certainy be resolved prior to acceptance, or at least examined for validity. More to the point, this sentance is a perfect example of a cursory treatment of a very complex matter by someone that obviously has no idea what he's talking about (I mean the journalist, not the Union VP). It's confusing and meaningless, rather than informative and clarifying. Sloppy reporting, at best.
Now, back to a subject perhaps more interesting to the average geek: STARS systems are based on Sun/Solaris boxes, and LOTS of them. STARS, and other imminent and existing FAA systems, such as the ASR-11 (an airport/short-range radar), the WSP (Weather System Processor), all use Sun boxes. I believe that, between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the FAA there are going to be hundreds of STARS, and a couple of hundred ASR-11s, and over the next 5 to 15 years many hundreds, if not thousands, of technicians will receive various forms of Unix training. For several years the FAA has offered a three-week instructor-led Unix course and, I believe, requires this course as a prerequisite for those technicians who will be taking the STARS and ASR-11 Maintenance courses, among others. The course is based on Redhat and PCs, rather then Ultra or Sunblade and Solaris, which is a bit of a sore spot with me, as it would obviously be advantageous for the tech to know about OBP abd other Sparc/Solaris-unique issues. However, the FAA has systems that use other flavors of Unix (AIX and/or HP-UX) so it might not be ideal to use Sparc/Solaris alone, but I can't help but think that it would be better than using Redhat/PC. Anyway, perhaps I'll write a bit more about this and try to post it one day, to see what others here think...
Getting back on track, the perceptive reader will have already realized that the training of hundreds/thousands of military and FAA technicians in the ways of Unix will be good for the Unix community. I can use myself as an example: I've been working with the ASR-11 program for three years: my first contact with Unix was three years ago at the Raytheon ASR-11 school. Now I use a laptop running Redhat (previoulsy Solaris x86, but couldn't get the darn NIC to work), an Ultra 5 and a Sparc 5 on my desk/s at work, and at home I've two PCs with two drive-racks per PC, and swap between RedHat, Solaris x86, and XP. The FAA has also been generous enough to spring for a Sunkey memebership for me and I'm going to be doing as much training as possible this year. I'll have a go at the Sun SysAdmin tests later this year and then top it all of with the Sun Network Admin test. I'd then like to move into a part-time job with some local business that uses Sun boxes. I've discussed the possiblity with various classmates in the Sun courses I've taken, and apparently, and understandably, there's little demand for part-time network administrators. however, I'll settle for less: I'd really like the opportunity to hone my skills in the private sector, just to see how far my interest and talents might take me (perhaps out of civil sevice altogether and into the private sector full time? a fantasy perhaps, but one I occasionally indulge in).
To sum-up: the fallout from the implementation of these new systems will result in an even more widespread interest in Unix, and an enlarged geek contingent.
For more information, here's the memo as a pdf or text from the the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation.
For some background into why this may be happening, consider the following: FAA Administrator Jane Garvey was a champion of the STARS program. She is about to leave the post, and may want to be able to claim some success before she goes. Also, th philadelphia TRACON is nearing its capacity and needs to be upgraded in the immediate future. There are two ways to go for the upgrade: One is to put in STARS, and the other is to install Common ARTS, a competing system. If they can't put STARS on in the immediate future, practical necessity will force them to install Common ARTS instead. If they put the money into installing Common ARTS now, they'll have a hell of a time justifying switching over to STARS later, because there'll be no need. Thus, Raytheon and Garvey and other STARS proponents are in a now-or-never situation to get STARS in, by hook or by crook, unless they want the work to go to a competitor and make them look bad.
NOTE: This is my own opinion, written on my own time, and I DO NOT speak for my employer (one of the companies involved).
As an airline employee, I strongly encourage you to buy a Business Class ticket if you can't appreciate the comfort of sleeping in the shoulders of complete strangers.
If you get a discounted ticket for the Cattle car, er...Economy Class, you cant really complain about it, because you get what you pay for.
Disclaimer: I do work for an airline, however this post is supposed to be ironically funny, and not taken seriously... besides, if I learned to put up with the average gringo Coach passenger, so can you!
No sig for the moment.
When you say the "old system" your're probably talking about ARTS IIIA, which is about 30 years old, using period displays like FDADs and the like. Of course Raytheon's $1.7Bn 2002 system is better than Sperry/Univac's 1970 system.
The proper question isn't how STARS compares with what their competitors did 30 years ago, it's how STARS compares with what their competitors are doing now. Specifically, STARS most direct competitor is Common ARTS, which is a the current system from Lockheed Martin. In my biased opinion (I work on it) Common ARTS has comparable functionality to STARS, and it actually passes safety tests! Oh yeah, and Common ARTS has been installed at 139 sites, on time, within budget. STARS is more than 4 years behind schedule, 800 million dollars over budget, and still has 258 critical system trouble reports outstanding.
Standard disclaimer: I am speaking for myself, on my own time, and not my employer.