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Mac OS X Maximum Security
It really didn't concern me until one day when I was checking the logs on my Mac OS X box while developing a web app and discovered dozens of entries from all over the globe probing my box to see if it was an insecure IIS server. I then decided I needed to pay attention to security alerts and the help of a book like Macintosh OS X Maximum Security to help me understand and fix any holes.
The Good
The book is divided into four sections. Part 1 is about learning to think about security, covering such topics as physical security and protection from your users and bad guys. Part II, 'Vulnerabilities and Exposures,' covers the various sorts of attack such as password attacks, trojans and worms, sniffers and spoofing. Part III, 'Specific Mac OS X Resources and How To Secure Them,' covers just that, the various servers such as FTP, mail, Apache and SSH and how to go about making them safe. The final part covers attack prevention, detection, reaction and recovery with topics such as firewalls, alarm systems, logs and disaster planning.
Macintosh OS X Maximum Security is a large, extremely comprehensive volume. For the average person who wants to protect a small home network the information it provides is probably overkill. To make matters worse, the style is fairly verbose, particularly in the first section. Of course, if you want to secure a company network then you may need to know all the information -- and so all this background material is useful, if only so you can reach the right level of paranoia and suspicion.
The book is not a 'recipe' book that tells you "take these steps and you will have a secure machine"; rather it takes you through the possible holes and how to fix them. This approach seems much better for security, since it teaches you a respect for the places you have to open up and a methodical approach to doing so that will hopefully carry over beyond the specifics addressed. Any recipe is bound to have flaws since the operating system and the services are all changing, I'm hoping the methods and style this book have imparted to me will last beyond any changes.
The book also deals well with all the Macintosh-specific stuff, informing you well about such topics as Rendezvous, Apple Remote Desktop, using NetInfo and the like. One aspect that isn't well covered is Airport; securing an 802.11 network is barely touched on.
The Bad
The information provided in all areas of the book is quite detailed, and includes many links to further places to look for more (and more recent) information. Once again, for a book in an ever-changing field like security, this is a huge benefit. I would have appreciated some sort of a small website devoted to the book with the links mentioned gathered together and perhaps some notes on how things may have changed since the book's publication. Unfortunately the Sams Publishing site has a broken link to the book and while the authors say "we are creating a security section for the www.macosxunleashed.com website," no such section exists as I was writing this review. Frankly I am disappointed at this, I think with a book on this sort of topic it behooves either the publisher or author to provide a place for errata, discussion and notes. The best you can do is go to Amazon where you can see the Table of Contents and one chapter. [Ed. Note: The site's errata section is currently up and running.]
My only real complaint with the book itself is the huge size, and the long-winded nature of some of the material. I found the first two sections in particular almost tedious and definitely lecturing in tone. I would have rated this book higher if the editors at Sams had taken a large red pencil to slabs of the first section. Overall, I'd say that while not a 'must buy,' this book will have to do till I find something better, and I expect to loan my copy to several friends.
You can purchase Mac OS X Maximum Security from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Any UNIX admins messed around wit OS X?
How secure is it, how secure can it be?
I've read a few articles describing certain features that it has (ease of use and gee-whiz stuff) that sounded to me like a potential vulnerability.
It seemed that a lot of these things were enabled by default and wide open.
I seriously hope this isn't the case. Apple's better than that, right?
I'm not trolling, i'm asking sincerely. With all the "OS X IS UNIX(tm)!!!" fanfare loudly touted in the press, i'd hate to see a major outbreak of compromised OSX machines to blacken the name of all things *nix.
Bottom line: If you're on the internet, paying attention to security is mandatory. Regardless of platform.
do() || do_not();
We need more of these. And more people to read them. How about Outlook Maximum Security?
.. when I think of OS X "Maximum Security", I can help but to think of the translucent plastic jail cell they kept Magneto in.
From the origial post:
It really didn't concern me until one day when I was checking the logs on my Mac OS X box while developing a web app and discovered dozens of entries from all over the globe probing my box to see if it was an insecure IIS server.
I think that pretty much sums it up - IIS can easily be insecure, just like the rest of the Windows world. But why does that mean that the Mac's web server (Apache) should be a cause for concern?
I've been using OS X for about a year and a half, and I don't see how a "Mac specific" book on security is worth the cash outlay. Sure, there are pretty UI widgets to interface with things like Apache, ipfw, the ftp server, etc., and a how-to book might be useful for a novice. But I don't see why a book like this will distinguish itself given that most of the real security info is way more Unix-centric that it is Mac-centric.
From what I recall, most of the OS X system defaults were set to reasonable, fairly secure settings, unlike Windows where a basic install will leave a zillion services running on your machine, all of which are listening to the outside world, exposing some heinous portion of the OS to components that have no right messing with it in the first place.
and discovered dozens of entries from all over the globe probing my box to see if it was an insecure IIS server.
Maybe they were looking for a secure IIS server. Ripley's "Believe it or not" is starting production again, maybe they needed material?
First off your right the windowing enviroment is not KDE or GNOME, its designed with a OS 9 and prior user in mind. BUT it doesnt preclude the use of X apps since you can infact run X apps no problem with X11 which is a free download FROM APPLE!!!! Panther will actually have this built in BTW.
Second unless you have been living under a rock Darwin has a huge thriving open community and has full access to a lot of the OS from Apple.
Third Mach is neXt NOT Apple, yes owned by Steve, but the true story on how they came to use is is actually a really interesting read and has more to do with the man who created OS X than it does anything Apple told the team to do (Apple had their own kernal that was trashed by the guy)
And everything in netinfo is able to be done in terminal so dont open your mouth unless you know what the hell your talking about.
And of course they locked users in.... THEY ARE A HARDWARE COMPANY NOT A SOFTWARE COMPANY!!!! I hate when people miss the fact that Apple supports its self on hardware, NOT software. Why the hell do you think they killed off the clones, they where losing money big time to the point of going under.
"Slashdot, where telling the truth is overrated but lying is insightful."
X11 is not a modern windows system. and its not approriate to the apple model either with all its hidden text file tweaks. In use its pretty good but quartz is much better it would appear (I only can observe the finished product not the nuts and bolts).
as for mach-O they have laready proven their worth in the seemless portability of next code across multiple platforms and cpu. ELF was not as mature as it is now when NeXT was derived from BSD, so its not a evil conspiracy but a rational choice they made to free themselves to make a seemless platform without having to keep it compatible with a hodgepodge of non standard ELF binaries. why should apple abandon a proven success now.
Some drink at the fountain of knowledge. Others just gargle.
When I received one box back from servicing today, a botched update completed itself upon booting, and a warning came up that a particular video driver file may be compromising the OS's security, did I want to fix and use, not use, or just use it? Nice. All I have to do is run software update. I want more of that caution built in, but as things stand, keep it up Cupertino.
Damn those pesky terrorists
I think OS X is fairly secure because it's easy to secure.
Apple releases security updates fairly quickly, and their Software Update system makes them available and easy to install for the average user. If I recall correctly, Mac OS X defaults to checking for updates weekly. Installation of updates may require an administrator password, but other than that it's as simple as a couple of clicks.
With my FreeBSD system, I subscribe to freebsd-security-notifications to keep abreast of updates. Knowing when updates are available and knowing how to apply them is probably beyond the average user's ability.
--
the strongest word is still the word "free"
Sure, this guy is a troll. But these are legitimate criticisms, with at least a grain of truth to them anyway. I especially hate the poorly documented NetInfo, and I'd like to add that it is impossible to cross-compile with OS X as a target, due mostly to their unconventional binary format. Very trollish tone, I'll admit, but we should all remember that OS X is set up as a closed system from many perspectives. I recall another fellow who was moderated as a troll for criticizing the iTunes music store as being evidence of Jobs desire to turn the computer into a digital shopping mall.
And I suppose the rebuttal is that hey, Apple is a company, and their goal is to make money, so all this is ok. Well, unfortunately I do not regard 'making money any way you can' as the highest and noblest pursuit of humanity. If Microsoft is any evidence, maybe the problem in the software industry is that being nice does not work to make money. Still, I am less than pleased with Apple taking exclusionary steps towards the freedom of their users. I like the way Aqua looks, and I have no problem with it, but NetInfo? What is the purpose of NetInfo? It certainly isn't an improvement, and actually has some fairly serious security problems, in that any user with shell access can view the entire database with nidump, including passwords of any other user.
As for the binary formats and cross-compilation issues, Apple's attitude is that if you want to develop for OS X, better have an OS X system! I think their business is being hurt a lot by being built around the need to sell their proprietary hardware.
> they don't even use X at all!
What Apple is providing is an Apple-original window system that is graphics model agnostic, as well as a vector drawing system that maps very well to PDF, which is a sort of PostScript without the non-graphical operators. This is packaged under the name 'Quartz' for easy reference by Marketing types.
The window system is designed to support both buffered (like an offscreen PixMap) and unbuffered windows, and is graphics model agnostic, working equally well with QuickDraw, OpenGL, the Quartz drawing engine, X11, and third party solutions, and managing window geometry for the Classic, Carbon, and Cocoa environments. The server portion is a hybridization of screen arbiter and compositor models (and if that's all Geek to you, don't worry about it).
The Quartz drawing engine supports drawing primitives similar to the graphics primitives that might be found in the DPSClient single-operator primitives library for X and NeXTSTEP. There are no math and flow control primitives, as these can be done more efficiently in the native
compiled code. There are no DPS or PS wrappers, as this optimization for server-side graphics is not needed in the Quartz client-side graphics model.
The operations provide imaging and path construction and filling operations as well as some interesting other bits that map well into the direction that 2D drawing is headed. (See Longhorn, or the X raster projects.) The drawing engine can output to rasters (like a window!), as well as PS and PDF streams to feed printers. The Mac OS X printing system takes advantage of the capabilities of Quartz to support all sorts of printers, and make the life of printer driver developers much, much easier.
Things we'd need to add/extend in X Window software (protocol+server+manager+fonts+...):
1) Extend font server and services to vend outlines and antialiased masks, support more font types, handle font subsetting.
2) Extend drawing primitives to include PS-like path operations.
3) Add dithering and phase controls.
4) Add ColorSync support for drawing and imaging operations, display calibration
5) Add broad alpha channel support and Porter-Duff compositing, both for drawing in a window and for interactions between windows.
6) Add support for general affine transforms of windows
7) Add support for mesh-warps of windows
8) Make sure that OpenGL and special video playback hardware support is integrated, and behaves well with all above changes.
9) We find that we typically stream 200 Mb/sec of commands and textures for interactive OpenGL use, so transport efficiency could be an issue.
So, yes, it looks like we can use X for Quartz. All we need do is define extensions for and upgrade the font server, add dithering with phase controls to the X marking engine, add a transparency model to X imaging with Porter-Duff compositing support, make sure GLX gets in, upgrade the window buffering to include transparency, mesh warps, and really good resampling, and maybe augment the transport layer a bit.
Ummm... There doesn't appear to be much code left from the original X server in the drawing path or windowing machinery, and it doesn't appear that apps relying on these extensions can work with any other X server. Just what did we gain from this?
Oh, yeah. My mom can run an xterm session on her desktop now without downloading the Apple X11 package, a shareware X server or buying a software package.
Been there, evaluated that.
I've read a few articles describing certain features that it has (ease of use and gee-whiz stuff) that sounded to me like a potential vulnerability.
/desktop/ system. Ill bet that OS X Server is a hell of a lot more secure out-of-the-box, but as far as desktop usability goes, I doubt its half the system plain X is. Security and usabilty are a hard balance to strike (believe me, just setting up a sandboxed guest account for Windows idiots who fsck things up while keeping my account carte blanche is challenge enough), and I dont think Apple really has the time to make sure X is really secure, or X Server is really usable as a desktop OS.
It seemed that a lot of these things were enabled by default and wide open.
Of course they are, OS X is primarily a
That said, everybody does need to keep some level of control over their systems - I keep all my "sensitive" data double-encrypted (AES disk images are so handy), keep my ports controlled, check my logs, dont use telnet or allow anon FTP, yadda yadda. Of course, Im more computer-savvy (or OS X savvy at least) than most, maybe if you or some other admins can dink around a little and write a little script or app that asks you what services and features you want, then locks down the box accordingly..
(Oh, BTW, a lot of the gee-whiz features arent as vulnerble as they sound - the Keychain, for example, uses strong encryption and only allows access by a single service. Yes, it unlocks when you login, but if somebody has your login password, you have bigger things to worry about. Of course, you need to be careful what apps you allow access to the keychain, but its not inherently insecure.)
Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored. - Aldous Huxley
Forget this book. Use OS9 for a secure server NOT OSX! Its 100% secure according to the massive BugTraq (SecurityFocus) exploit database.
:
Thats why many universities, and military websites used mac OS9. OS9 has never had an exploit, while OSX has had at least over 35 or so documented exploits.
It is a concrete fact that that no MacOS based webserver has ever been hacked into in the history of the internet.
The MacOS running WebStar and other webservers as has never been exploited or defaced, and are are unbreakable based on ample historical evidence.
In fact in the entire SecurityFocus (BugTraq) database history there has never been a Mac (classic Mac OS) exploited over the internet remotely. Scan it yourself, though I believe an uncommon 3rd party mac product from 1995 or so had one exploit.
I am not talking about FreeBSD derived MacOS X (which already had a more than a 35 exploits and potential exploits in BugTraq) I am talking about current Mac OS 9.x and earlier which are highly sophisticated abstract-OS models.
Why is is hack proof? These reasons
1> No command shell. No shell means no way to hook or intercept the flow of control with many various shell oriented tricks found in Unix or NT. Apple uses an object model for procces to process communication that is heavily typed and "pipe-less"
2> No Root user. All mac developers know their code is always running at root. Not hing is higher (except undocumented microkernel stufff where you pass Gary Davidians birthday into certain registers and make a special call). By always being root there is no false sense of security, and programming is done carefully.
3> Pascal strings. ANSI C Strings are the number one way people exploit Linux and Wintel boxes. The mac avoids C strings historically in most of all of its OS. In fact even its roms originally used Pascal strings. As you know pascal strings are faster than C (because they have the length delimiter in the front and do not have to endlessly hunt for NULL), but the side effect is less buffer exploits. Individual 3rd party products may use C stings and bind to ANSI libraries, but many do not. In case you are not aware of what a "pascal string" is, it usually has no null byte terminator.
4> Macs running Webstar have ability to only run CGI placed in correct directory location and correctly file "typed" (not mere file name extension). File types on Macs are not easily settable by users, expecially remotely. Apache as you know has had many problems in earlier years preventing wayward execution.
5> Macs never run code ever merely based on how a file is named. ".exe" suffixes mean nothing! For example the file type is 4 characters of user-invisible attributes, along with many other invisible attributes, but these 4 bytes cannot be set by most tool oriented utilities that work with data files. For example file copy utilities preserve launchable file-types, but JPEG MPEG HTML TXT etc oriented tools are physically incapable by designof creating an executable file. The file type is not set to executable for hte hackers needs. In fact its even more secure than that. A mac cannot run a program unless it has TWO files. The second file is an invisible file associated with the data fork file and is called a resource fork. EVERY mac program has a resource fork file containing launch information. It needs to be present. Typically JPEG, HTML, MPEG, TXT, ZIP, C, etc are merely data files and lack resource fork files, and even if the y had them they would lack launch information. but the best part is that mac web programs and server tools do not create files with resource forks usually. TOTAL security.
4> Stack return address positioned in s afer location than some intel OSes. Buffer exploits take advantage of loser programmers lack of string length checking and clobber the return address to run thier exploit code instead. The Mac compilers usually place return address in front or out of context of where the b
Apple has a Security Technology Brief which is a somewhat simplified but comprehensive overview of the hardware and software security features of Macs and Mac OS X.
a /w ww.apple.com/macosx/pdfs/Security_TB.pdf
http://a368.g.akamai.net/7/368/51/edcf434107944
True, nothing is totally secure, but MacOS <= 9.x was pretty secure. Simply because it had no services. For a long time, macs were relatively uncommon on the internet. No exposure, no risk. Even when they did come online, mac had no exploitable command shell. The closest thing would be AppleScript, and i never heard of any exploits for it. Part of it may be the fact that you have to construct and manipulate objects, not just hand some command line text off to a shell, part of it due to the fact that exploit code on PowerPCs is a lot harder to write than for x86 (or 68K for that matter).
For years, mac viruses numbered in the in the tens while viruses for Windows numbered in the thousands. It was just harder to write good mac viruses, the barrier to entry was higher. In fact, there were so few viruses, the only needed anti-virus code was developed and maintainmed by a single person (go stomping foot!!).
Now that MacOS has entered the 90s (protected memory, an actual VM, preemptive multitasking) by using a descendent of the 70s (UNIX) a wakeup call for some folks is needed. The chance for work exploits is there (the apache worm) but they'll be insulated somewhat by the fact people will target x86 first, and that Apple has been fairly good about security updates.
The information provided in all areas of the book is quite detailed, and includes many links to further places to look for more (and more recent) information
Yes, that is quite bad. How dare they provide information in a book. They should have buried it all in a HOWTO with the wrong name on an obscure website.
and discovered dozens of entries from all over the globe probing my box to see if it was an insecure IIS server
Actually the real reason Apple is not selling OS X on x86 (and Apple does in fact have this) is THEY SELL HARDWARE!!!
Why kill your hardware sales buy selling your OS on a cheaper platform?
OS X on x86 is a failsafe hardware manufacturing exit strategy. Nothing more.
Political correctness is the newest form of slavery.
This valuable post in a larger form was recently downrated a flame by a linux zealot so I repost it here in verycondensed form with nothing but DATA and Informative post info. There is no reason to moderate down informative posts. To not be termed a "flame" I request that no one reply to my post. therefore it is not a troll by the DEFINITION of "troll".
:
It is a concrete fact that that no MacOS based webserver has ever been hacked into in the history of the internet.
The MacOS running WebStar and other webservers as has never been exploited or defaced, and are are unbreakable based on ample historical evidence.
In fact in the entire SecurityFocus (BugTraq) database history there has never been a Mac (classic Mac OS) exploited over the internet remotely. Scan it yourself, though I believe an uncommon 3rd party mac product from 1995 or so had one exploit.
I am not talking about FreeBSD derived MacOS X (which already had a more than a 35 exploits and potential exploits in BugTraq) I am talking about current Mac OS 9.x and earlier which are highly sophisticated abstract-OS models.
Why is is hack proof? These reasons
1> No command shell. No shell means no way to hook or intercept the flow of control with many various shell oriented tricks found in Unix or NT. Apple uses an object model for procces to process communication that is heavily typed and "pipe-less"
2> No Root user. All mac developers know their code is always running at root. Not hing is higher (except undocumented microkernel stufff where you pass Gary Davidians birthday into certain registers and make a special call). By always being root there is no false sense of security, and programming is done carefully.
3> Pascal strings. ANSI C Strings are the number one way people exploit Linux and Wintel boxes. The mac avoids C strings historically in most of all of its OS. In fact even its roms originally used Pascal strings. As you know pascal strings are faster than C (because they have the length delimiter in the front and do not have to endlessly hunt for NULL), but the side effect is less buffer exploits. Individual 3rd party products may use C stings and bind to ANSI libraries, but many do not. In case you are not aware of what a "pascal string" is, it usually has no null byte terminator.
4> Macs running Webstar have ability to only run CGI placed in correct directory location and correctly file "typed" (not mere file name extension). File types on Macs are not easily settable by users, expecially remotely. Apache as you know has had many problems in earlier years preventing wayward execution.
5> Macs never run code ever merely based on how a file is named. ".exe" suffixes mean nothing! For example the file type is 4 characters of user-invisible attributes, along with many other invisible attributes, but these 4 bytes cannot be set by most tool oriented utilities that work with data files. For example file copy utilities preserve launchable file-types, but JPEG MPEG HTML TXT etc oriented tools are physically incapable by designof creating an executable file. The file type is not set to executable for hte hackers needs. In fact its even more secure than that. A mac cannot run a program unless it has TWO files. The second file is an invisible file associated with the data fork file and is called a resource fork. EVERY mac program has a resource fork file containing launch information. It needs to be present. Typically JPEG, HTML, MPEG, TXT, ZIP, C, etc are merely data files and lack resource fork files, and even if the y had them they would lack launch information. but the best part is that mac web programs and server tools do not create files with resource forks usually. TOTAL security.
4> Stack return address positioned in s afer location than some intel OSes. Buffer exploits take advantage of loser programmers lack of string length checking and clobber the return address to run thier exploit code instead. The Mac compilers usually place ret
I've been thinking of picking up this book, specifically because it is geared towards Mac OS X, although i am not overall very fond of the maximum security series.
Anyone else looking for some good OS X secuity books shoudl chech out the latest edition of Practical Unix and Internet Security published by O'Reilly. I have the second edition, and its a great book, and the third edition specifically mentions OS X and solaris, in addition to the standard *BSD unix and Linux information.
Look out honey cause I'm usin' technology
Ain't got time to make no apologies
[shadyserver: ~] shady% apropos netinfo
n ge" line of thought, NetInfo is a very powerful tool.
netinfo(3) - library routines for NetInfo calls
netinfod(8) - NetInfo daemon
nibindd(8) - NetInfo binder
nicl(1) - NetInfo command line utility
nidomain(8) - NetInfo domain utility
nidump(8) - extract text or flat-file-format data from NetInfo
nifind(1) - find a directory in the NetInfo hierarchy
nigrep(1) - search for a regular expression in the NetInfo hierarchy
niload(8) - load text or flat-file-format data into NetInfo
nireport(1) - print tables from the NetInfo hierarchy
niutil(1) - NetInfo utility
NetInfo is not really analogous to the windows registry. if you want to compare it to something in the windows world, a better comparison would be active directory.
NetInfo is basically a directory services manager, and is used for managing users, groups, machines, etc etc. It had read/write ability with LDAP v3, and read only ability for LDAP v2. It can also read its configuration from the standard bsd flat files, using the niload utility. You can even dump your netinfo configuration for printers, users, hosts and such to a standard bsd flat file using the nidump util.
But the best part of NetInfo is that it can integrate almsot seamlessly with an active directory domain, and get all its users and policy from your windows active directory server. once you get beyond the "its proprietary/i-dont-understand-it/im-scared-of-cha
For more refence, the great book "Mac OS X for Unix Geeks" has a whole chapter devoted to netinfo, what it is, and how it works. The Mac Dev center also recently published two articles on netinfo, and integrating it with Active Directory. Part 1 and Part 2
Look out honey cause I'm usin' technology
Ain't got time to make no apologies
2> No Root user. All mac developers know their code is always running at root. Not hing is higher (except undocumented microkernel stufff where you pass Gary Davidians birthday into certain registers and make a special call). By always being root there is no false sense of security, and programming is done carefully.
And all 98 developers know their code runs as root. Has that helped?
I think their business is being hurt a lot by being built around the need to sell their proprietary hardware.
So, their business of selling hardware is being hurt by their need to sell hardware? No wonder they're always beleaguered.
R: That voice. Where have I heard that voice before? B: In about 365 other episodes. But I don't know who it is either.
There was an AppleScript worm. I suppose you could call it 'the applescript worm'. Of course, it required a Microsoft mailer to propogate.
My God, it's Full of Source!
OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
Russell
"It's not that Macs are immune to attack, it's just that there are far less people writing exploits to attack Mac systems."
I sure wish I had a better memory... Last spring, a study was published on this exact claim.
Turns out that even when volume weighting adjustments are considered, Macs ARE more secure than Windows (as was Unix/Linux).
It's time to put this myth to bed.
--Richard
Apple Remote Desktop uses UDP which can't be tunneled thru SSH. I understand Timbuktu can be tunneled thru SSH (it uses TCP), and I know for certain VNC can be tunneled thru SSH (that's what I have set up on my home OSX server now).
--
A little nonsense now and then is cherished by the wisest men. -Willy Wonka
Sure, this guy is a troll. But these are legitimate criticisms, with at least a grain of truth to them anyway.
A grain of truth perhaps, but no more.
Firstly, quartz is a low level graphic driver, it creates no more problems for running X than NVidea's closed source X driver for Linux, and even sits in the same place between the user and the OS, nor does it create any more moral dilemmas.
As for the binary format, Mach-O is not a proprietary binary format that is exclusive to Apple, but to the old variant of Mach that NeXT chose to base NeXTSTEP on. It was not deliberately made to break BSD compatibility, as the BSD Unix variant that was used in conjunction with the Mach microkernel as the basis of NeXTSTEP certainly did not support ELF binaries.
It's ridiculous to claim that "Apple has moved most configuration info into a proprietary database called netinfo" For starters, Netinfo is not a configuration repository like the Windows registry, but a distributed database which allows centralised management of the resources contained in it. In addition the entire source code to netinfo is available from Apple.
Most configuration files - such as those for applications, are contained in XML configuration files, something which other operating systems would do well to learn from.
Nothing is perfect, but I'd prefer people criticizing OS X and Apple to be able to cite facts rather than FUD.
Why is the terminal not able to send PgUp and PgDn? why can dock items not have static labels? why are we not able to control the appearance of the OS beyond skins? why does the OS not support DPI scaling throughout despite being fully based on scalable graphics? why does it still crash if unceremoniously disconnected from SMB shares? Why not license the OpenStep environment for other platforms?
The only legitimate concern raised by the author of the original parent comment in my opinion is that so much of the OS is still closed source, and I'm loathe to complain about that fact because Apple still lead all other commercial Unix vendors in the openness of their base OS.
http://uptime.netcraft.com/up/graph?site=www.army. mil ...is just one of many large SECURE classic MacOS distributed servers.
:
Except for the fact that it's not
The site www.army.mil is running 4D_WebSTAR_S/5.3.0 (MacOS X) on MacOSX.
Don't become a regular here -- you will become retarded.