Slashdot Mirror
Windows Wireless Networking Flaw Identified
An anonymous reader writes "Washingtonpost.com is reporting from the 2nd annual Shmoocon hacker conference about the release of a previously undocumented vulnerability in Windows. The flaw takes advantage of a feature on Windows laptops that have wireless cards built-in. Security researcher Mark Loveless found that Windows laptops which cannot find a wireless connection are configured to broadcast the name of the last SSID they associated with. They assign themselves an ad-hoc 'link local' (think 169.254.x.x.) address, and an attacker can configure his machine to broadcast an SSID of the same name. Thus, the attacker associates with that 'network' and communicates directly with the victim's machine. The funny part from the Post blog entry is that Microsoft helped author the RFC for link local."
Are there ever class action lawsuites filed over large scale vunerabilities like this?
LINUX ONLINE POKER: Linux Poker
I wonder how many "undocumented" flaws made into US-CERT vul. list.
"Don't let fools fool you. They are the clever ones."
I think I will go test this out on my parents...
There goes my mobile botnet...
Also, many laptops have a button you can push that disables the built-in wireless feature until you hit that button again. Turning off the wireless connection when you are not using it also prevents this from being a problem.
Best advice in the article...
This is very interesting. I had feared a situation like this for a long time and have always regarded the "Centrino" laptops as a problem for corporate security. But, to be fair, I have not seen this behavior as yet. Having managed dozenes of laptops I have yet to see one assign a link local address. They always pop-up and ask if you want to connect to a detected Access Point(AP) but, telling them NO ends it there.
Have I been blind or is there a bit more involved in this attack?
FTA
First of all, if you are running any kind of network firewall -- including the firewall that comes built in to Windows XP -- you won't have to worry about some stranger connecting to your laptop. In fact, I had to shut down my firewall for both of us to successfully conduct our test.
its one of those "if you have no firewall and ignore all the alerts and warnings and have filesharing enabled and have a wifi card set to auto DHCP and an attacker is targeting you specifically" flaws
yawn, seems like much ado over nothing, you have more chance dropping and breaking your laptop than you have of being exploited by this "flaw" and if you goto Starbucks (and support their disgusting business model) you deserve everything you get
What if the laptop's last SSID required WEP or WPA (and has it configured in a profile)? Will it still connect if _less_ security is required?
ZEN is a prime number in base-36
Does anyone actually secure their wireless network? I actually have the problem that, on startup, my computer connects to my neighbour's wireless network instead of my own!
Czech language for absolute beginners
O.K. Folks, if you program your Linux laptop to connect to an ad-hoc network and broadcast SSIDs, this behaviour is going to occur on Linux too.
This isn't just an MS Windows flaw . . . it is a flaw in the way that the administrators (users) manage the machines.
I wish you all would quit pointing fingers. This isn't some kind of new thing.
Another Networking Flaw? Dam, i mean the first 74 were completely predictable, but i have to say this one caught me completely off guard. You win this round malicious hackers *shakes fist into air*.
Mike
I heart the RIAA & MPAA, im sure its mutual...
This is old info and has been known for a while. Anyone having used Kismet or some other sniffer at a public place has see this.
Loveless then created an ad hoc network with the same name, and told his computer to go ahead and connect to "hackme." Viola!
Violin! Cello!
Seriously, though, TFA doesn't seem to say quite the same thing as the summary. The demonstration the reporter saw involved him setting up an ad-hoc network, and then the security researcher was able to connect to it. Err... that's how it's supposed to work.
The article then goes on to assume that this will happen when you connect to access points and then leave them, but you don't usually set up an ad hoc network for that process. Has he just got something wrong? Missed a step out or something? Is there a URL for a technical level article on this flaw?
Should you at a later date happen to open up your laptop in the vicinity of another Windows user who also had recently gotten online at Starbucks, those two machines may connect to each other without any obvious notification to either user
You mean other than the big speech bubble thing popping up and saying "Wireless Network Connection now connected to T-MOBILE"?
This is a common security problem: useless or rarely used functionality. As I've said before, functionality sells whereas security doesn't. Spend a million dollars on functionality and you (hopefully) get a product that can sell for more money. Spend a million dollars on security and you have almost nothing tangiable to show for it.
Before this article, I didn't even know that "link local" thing existed. I guessing that this is probably quite representive of the Slashdot crew. The question is, then, is why on earth is it on by default and why is it even there in the first place?
This is not just a Microsoft issue, this is an issue that applies to nearly every computing project. I was recently playing with Knoppix and two things struck me:
My parents got a new HP computer a month or so ago and I've just gotten round to doing a proper security shake-down on the XP box. I was surprised to find the Python runtime on the computer. Most of you would say, so what? Or perhaps, even applaud HP for doing this. From a security perspective, I think it's downright silly. What possible use could my parents have for the Python runtime? Absoutely none. They'll be running Open Office, Gmail and Itunes to the cows come home so all this does is opens another vector for attack. Don't install stuff on computers that your customers will likely never need.
Of all the pieces of software out there at the moment, Windows XP is the most frustrating. In terms of security, XP should completly out-class Linux/Unix in every metric of measurement. Instead, it's the most disease ridden piece of shit ever concieved by humanity. It's a shame because it could have set a really high standard for everybody in the industry but through a choice of poor defaults they condemed their own product to be a liability to CTOs everywhere. If they'd had some sense, they would have choosen defaults like this:
I haven't got any figures on how many viruses/malware this configuration would stop but I imagine it's somewhere in the region of 99%. If Microsoft had taken the time to consider the platform in a more paranoid sense they could have produced a product of barn-storming quality. Instead, they listened to the marketing people and we all know what result that lead to.
Simon
I mean, I know windows security is bad, but is it really considered a compromise to simply be on the same network as the attacker's machine?
I am trolling
What we have here is that, in addition to doing this, Windows is also offering to set up an ad-hoc (i.e. computer-to-computer) network on the link-local subnet with the same SSID as that of the last network the laptop connected to. I wonder what the rationale for doing this could have been. It seems to me that a machine should not offer to set up an ad-hoc network unless specifically directed to do so by the user. When such a network is set up then it is appropriate to use link-local addressing to auto-configure the interface.
Viola! His machine was assigned a different 169.254.x.x address...
Good to see that technology journalists are so enthusiastic about orchestra instruments.
This guy's the limit!
I guess being "loveless" gave "Mark Loveless" all the time in world, aih? Heh, poor nerd..
Oh, wait...
Mod points are a dangerous tool. Abuse them wisely.
Yes. Windows trusts the network. Think Active Directory. If you can trick a Windows machine into thinking you are on its network, it will happily let you be its partner (or maybe even its server) on that network. Though you probably can't trick it into being an AD client right off, you can find out all kinds of things about it, such as any shares it has open.
This vulnerability is an enabler, rather than a gaping hole.
What I hate is Windows' inability to route on multiple network cards. If a user is on a wireless link and they go somewhere where they plug in, Windows still thinks the wireless card is the active connection. It's been that way for years, going back to modem-PPP connections.
Also, if you have both a wired connection and a wireless (or modem) connection and leave the wired network (connecting over wireless (or modem)), Windows can't find IP addresses that are on the wired subnet. If you have a web server on a network at work, you can't connect there over the wireless/modem link. You have to disable the wired network connection, and then it works. What a design!Raise your children as if you were teaching them to raise your grandchildren, because you are.
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb; en-us;811427&Product=winxp
Basically -- trust pappy Microsoft that disabling broadcast of your SSID is 100% useless for keeping out knowledgeable, mal-intentioned people (instead of acknowledging it's partially useful for keeping out random neighbors) and re-configure your access point to broadcast its SSID to the world.
Or create a whole new batch to ensure job security...
...another week... another security "feature"...
...and once again from the richest man in the world...
I would hardly call this a vulnerability. You're certainly no more vulnerable if someone exploits this little "feature" than you are at any other time you're
connected to a network.
This is such a complete non-issue, it's like a freaking joke. Read the article - all a hacker might gain some this vulnerability is the ability to connect to your computer, as if it was still on a wireless network, after you've moved outside the range of an access point. Big deal. But the author and "discoverer" both talk about it like this is a remote root exploit or something. At one point, the author includes this little gem: "As Loveless pointed out, this "feature" of Windows actually behaves somewhat like a virus." Virus, my ass.
What's with all the foaming-at-the-mouth hype about these minor little things lately? It's counterproductive - going beserk over every slight issue that might, in some fantastic combination of circumstances be a security problem, takes away attention from flaws that actually matter.
This space intentionally left blank.
This explains why we get a lot of laptops broadcasting our AP names on campus. What makes it annoying is that XP defaults to connect to the first available network it finds with the name you have given it. You can check off a box that says something to the effect of "ignore ad-hoc networks" but how many users do you know that would have any idea that is the reason their wireless card "isn't working"?
My house has glass doors and windows (not Microsoft).
If someone really wanted to steal my stolen music, they could easily take my whole computer and stereo while I'm at work. More risky if caught, because I'd fuck their world up. But its certainly easier than breaking into my Mac via the network. And more profitable because they either get a nice computer, or can sell it for at least $1k.
"The funny part from the Post blog entry is that Microsoft helped author the RFC for link local."
I really don't see how MS helping to author a usefull RFC is funny, or even relevant. What's funny is that someone at MS somehow thought it would be a good idea to open up a system to the entire world, since its clearly a thinking flaw as opposed to the usual QA flaw.
Speaking of thinking flaws, how about this one: If a laptop running XP has a wired and wireless connections going, XP asks the user if they want to share their connection. User clicks 'yes'. XP bridges wired and wireless for them. XP also broadcasts on both sides that it will be a gateway for other systems running XP (via netbios-over-ip, IIRC). Those systems get on board, and make that computer their default gateway.
Then the computer 'sharing' its connection, and all its 'victims' are suddenly very slow. There never seemed to be a straightforward way to prevent the other XP computers from making the dual-connected XP system their default gateway. If you manually change the default gateway on the victim systems, they just switch back to the dual-connected XP box. I don't know if XP still does this, but talk about stupid.
Seriously, who the hell thinks this kind of thing up? Do they have brain stem storming sessions or something?
"We are all geniuses when we dream"
- E.M. Cioran
I have to agree that it would be easier to steal my whole laptop and probaly more profitable. My only concern if you break into my laptop, either via networking stupidity on my account or that you are really talented, is that please just copy what ever usless porn or emulators you want. But dont destroy anything!!! I dont keep sensetive material on my portable systems. So who cares!
i have heard of an even worse vulnerabelity! if you hack yuor micthorwave oven to have teh door open it will JAM MY 80211 packets!!?!!?!!?!?!?!!?!
Also risk of cooking!
tell steve gibson of GRC he will save us
TO BUY A NEW CAR WOULD MAKE YOU SEXUALLY ATTRACTIVE.
I'm not sure if this will help your exact situation, but you could try going to the network connections box, then the advanced menu, then click on advanced settings. In there, you can change the preferred order of your networks. I've used this at work, as the laptops are set by default to use the wireless connection first, but if the wireless connection is flakey, the computer gives many network errors. Setting the wired connection as a higher priority fixes a lot of problems. The only time I've had problems switching between is if it is in the middle of a file transfer during the switch.
warning: This post is likely to contain gobs of dripping sarcasm. Consume at your own risk.
EULA is pretty shaky at best. This could happen, if someone took the "patented software" angle and used it. When the government added the right to patent software it seems to me that it then put it into the tangible products category, somethinhg that didn't exist before when all they had was copyright. AFAIK no lawyer has tried this angle yet to sue them for failing to provide a reasonable warranty like other tangible products offered in the US for sale or lease-to-use. There are certainly enough people who might join in, as well as businesses who have suffered direct financial harm and expense from MS software being not suitable for purpose. Would it be hard to do this? Yes. Impossible? No, it could be done and I think there's better than a fair chance of winning, perhaps starting in local courts and working your way up. Even though MS is big, only one lawyer can actually stand up and talk at one time once you get to court. Other big business cartels have finally had to eat it in the past, once someone called them on shady practice, and despite a lot of folks saying in advance that you can't fight the 800 lb gorilla, etc. It used to be a few decades ago-just for one instance-you had a hard time getting anything from any large insurance company, despite an obvious clear cut case, now it's quite common, and insurance companies are still around. It used to be common for big businesses to just dump whatever crap they wanted to in streams, now it is highly illegal and many of them have been fined and now must jump through hoops to avoid this. it took lawsuits and eventual law changesd, but it happened, and I remember when it was first starting and people said you "couldn't fight them" and it was "impossible". Now we have the EPA and standards. I remember working on such issues way back then. It takes commitment and some courage and some heavy skull sweat, but it can happen.
People have short memories it seems.
It's doable. If such a case got off the ground and had an advertising campaign to get individuals and businesses to join-again common practice today with various class action suits, it could happen. You might get a million people responding eventually, and it would help if at least one large corporation that WASN'T in the software business would join in, some corp that has gotten nailed over and over again and had to shell out a lot of money to try and fix what shouldn't be broken in the first place. Remember, the DOJ suit was entirely non-focused on useability, it was an anti trust suit, not a flawed products suit. I also think you could take the angle that using a "not my fault" EULA is a RICO attempt at actual fraud once a lot of money changes hands.
Like someone mentioned before, the actual demonstration invovled somthign that appears as legit as it should be. Someone set up a ad-hoc network, it worked. The third person supposedly trying to join the 'hackme' network could have obviously detected the ssid if it was boradcast, and seing an unsecured network would have just tried to join in. nothing to see here dammit. Has anyone demonstrated that windows starts an ad-hoc network, unless specifically set up by the user? this looks, worst case (also not demonstrated i think), more like a case of if someone sets up an ad-hoc network for some reason, and does not disable it, he next time it will still be there. I could be wrong, but the article albeit detailed is not particularly convincing.
is any more of a threat than one on an Infrastructure?
...Unless you've configged your laptop to always assume it will be constrained behind a NAT, exposed to a subnet of trusted hosts only. Yeah, right.
Packets are packets. This article should have been titled, "DANGER: WiFi at Hotels and Starbucks are safe, ad-hocs are not."
help me i've cloned myself and can't remember which one I am
Anyone who has worked with a decent wireless scanning tool has probably seen this. We saw it while using Airmagnet Surveyor to baseline a site. We kept seeing an SSID being broadcast even though we were in a location where nothing could have been in range and there weren't any detectable wireless devices on site. It turned out to be our own laptops broadcasting the SSID from the hotel we were staying at.
FWIW, once again SP2 users are not affected by this. The on-by-default firewall stops it, TFA clearly states they had to turn it off first to get it to work.
So what if your computer automatically sets up an IP that doesn't clash, and then sets up adhoc wireless networking with the previous SSID _if_ you have your wlan interface on?
How is that a flaw? That's a _feature_ in many cases. Especially if you really want to share files and you don't have a WAP.
From the article: "First of all, if you are running any kind of network firewall -- including the firewall that comes built in to Windows XP -- you won't have to worry about some stranger connecting to your laptop. In fact, I had to shut down my firewall for both of us to successfully conduct our test. "
Doh.
If you actually care about security you'd already know that wireless networking is a lot less secure than wired networking.
To "wise guys" trying to connect to other peoples stuff. You yourself could be exploited if you connect to any untrusted wireless LAN and try using the internet or connecting to "open" shares[1]. There's so much that can be done to _you_ that it's not funny.
What are you going to do if your computer gets "owned" or fubared after you open a share that's called "Do Not Open" or something like that?
People who think they are smart and connect to "open" wireless LANs run by "stupid" people should also assume the possibility that someone can sniff, hijack and fake their traffic.
If turns out those "stupid" people aren't that stupid and are evil, your usernames and passwords could be taken, or your data. Or you could be victim of a MITM attack. What you see may not be the real thing.
Even if they aren't actively hostile, they could log your activities too and I doubt they are under the same limitations/restrictions as ISPs.
The company I work for provides systems that make it _easy_ for people to get connected to the internet and do their stuff - they don't have to fool around with their internet or browser settings.
Malicious folk can do the sort of stuff we do and more for nefarious purposes.
[1] You're running windows and you think you're smart to open some "stupid" person's unsecured shared folder? Well you better make sure you've set your My Computer and Local Intranet security settings to something safe[2]. And it's probably best to turn off "view as a webpage" and all that junk...
Whatever O/S you are using, you better be fully patched when you expose yourself to an untrusted network. I believe many modern Linux distros have file managers that generate image previews, and there was an image library bug not so long ago.
[2] See: http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=315933 and http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=182569
The XP firewall trusts nothing on the local network except filesharing. Well this isn't very venurable either. In the default state, simple file sharing, XP simply has nothing shared by default. You need to activate a shared folder, and it doesn't provide access to anything important. If a user manually enables advanced filesharing, the administrative shares then work, but you need a password. Accounts with no password aren't usable to get at them.
As for the AD thing, it's clear you are confused. Windows doesn't just magically partner with servers, it's not like a domain controller jsut says "hey join up" and it does. Windows only "partners" with machines that have accounts with the same credentials. So if you have two computers both with the same username/password logged in, they can access each other, since the first thing windows tries it to use the current user's credentials (if that doesn't work, it asks you for proper credentials).
However for all that, you still need to turn on advanced filesharing, or have manually opened up a simple share. It just doesn't share anything in the default state and there's jack you can do about it.
I encountered this when XP was new and got really confused. I'd only ever used it in an AD environment at work, where the shares are all advanced by domain policy. So I had two system that were non-domain systems, and I wanted to get files form one to the other, both had the same admin user name and password. I did the Windows 2000 thing and connected to \\computer\c$ that's the admin share for the c drive, gets to all the files. Windows said no, and gave me an odd dialogue that just wanted a password, no username, and it wouldn't take the password. I went back and forth for like 10 minutes before I finally found out about simple filesharing. Turning that off made it work like I expected.
So in it's default config, there's nothing particularly dangerous about being able to pretend you are on the same network as a system. The filesharing port will be open, but there's nothing you can do with it.
In the end, the "victims" computer is simply connected on a network with the attacker. That is all. It's the same vulnerability as if you're on a normal network. This time, you just don't realize that you're on a network.
If you're running windows firewall, I think you'll be all right. Unless you have other security problems already, this won't hurt you at all.
This is no news. Just because it is done by a local network doesn't make it interesting. For instance, the same thing can be done with devices seeking an access point. If you don't know this already, be informed that 'regular' PCs can be used as an access point with the proper drivers and OS. The Fake AP problem really hasn't been exploited to the extent it could be. As far as I know -- maybe in some places, it has.
Congratulations!
Not only is ZEN a prime number in base-36, but so is DOH.
Program Intellivision!
Instead of concentrating on identifying/fixing bugs in Windows, wouldn't it give us more returns if we were concentrating on identifying/fixing bugs in FOSS?
The Wireless Zero Configuration service (WZC) Ad-Hoc vulneribility is a very old one. I knew about this for a long time before this article came out. There is also a vulneribility that will allow you to acquire the wireless keys on WZC. The program wzcook.exe which is part of aircrack will give you the keys for the wireless networks that are stored by the WZC.
Right. No need to worry. Until you start thinking about the big picture. It's not just this one flaw that's worth worrying about, it's the combination of Windows' security flaws that are the problem.
You're sitting in your local coffee shop and someone is there listening for signals... they connect to your machine, install an vbscript that runs periodically and attempts delivery of a payload to any machines available on whatever network you connect to. Or perhaps one that simply puts an e-mail in your outbound Outlook queue to anyone in your address book.
Yeah, no need to worry at all.
Although I can think of many areas in which XP can outclass Unix/Linux, security is not even remotely one of them.
I do agree with the rest of your argument (default settings being so insecure), but that statement above is so preposterous
I could not let it go by unchallenged.
Here's how to fix this on Windows:
Start->Control Panel->Network Connections->Double Click on your Wireless Connection->Properties->Wireless Networks->Advanced->Choose "Access point (infrastructure) networks only. Click the Close button then Click OK all the way back. Done.
After reading several of the comments, we should just trump our previous definition of "vulnerability".
If you have a computer and it's power is *ON*, it's vulnerable to something.
Next week I will show that even a computer in which it's power is *OFF* is vulnerable to the 8lb sledge hack.
FLR
It also explains why things go so badly wrong at conferences.
All it takes is one laptop to suddenly go out of range of the AP and it becomes an adhoc network *with the same name as the conference network*. Then laptops that are in range and dont have "connect to ad-hoc networks" disabled, also start binding to that node, as suddenly there is a choice between the real and ad-hoc network, both with same fucking name.
This isnt a security risk, any more than running unencrypted protocols over a WLAN in the first place, but it just makes the windows laptop experience that much worse for everyone involved, at least those who dont know that turning off ad-hoc networking makes sense. Maybe now a fear of a security vulnerability will help people to do that.
And lets be ruthless: if it gives windows users a worse experience than apple or, say, ubuntu laptop owners, well, serves them right. (My laptop is actually running winXP; it is my last non-vmware windows image. I keep in in DOS-land as it runs those apps I need at work (Exchange, MSWord), and it helps test that the apps I write do actually work on XP as well as unix. But I could do the latter with vmware-based testing, so maybe this is the year to migrate to a good linux laptop distro.
It does not give a detailed level of signal strength, it is limited to 1-5 bars.
It will drop the connection far more often than manufacturer's utilities. In other words, don't bother playing online games on it.
The window isn't resizable. When did Microsoft think this was a good idea?*
Security passcodes have to be entered twice. That's terrible when the passcode is 10+ characters, and you can't see what you've typed in either.
It won't re-enable at times for no appearant reason. * Anyone know a way to force apps to be resizable?
Where does it say in RFC 3927 that a machine should automatically create ad-hoc wireless networks based on its last known SSID? It doesn't. People are confusing the issue. This "security flaw" has nothing to do with RFC 3927. Regarding Chris Wysopal's comments, Mac OS X does implement RFC 3927, however, Mac OS X does not automatically create ad-hoc wireless networks. That's why Mac OS X doesn't have this flaw, while Windows does.
( Comment from TFA, Posted by: Snoop | Jan 15, 2006 3:11:37 PM )
Whoever modded this offtopic is a moron.
The sad thing about the people who most often get "0wned" is that even when informed of the security problem, they might be likely to undo the fix...
I can picture a scenario like this:
1. Jon Idiot uses unsecure AP without a firewall...
2. Mad Hatter informs Jon of problem and instructions on how to fix.
(two weeks later)
3. Jon's laptop cannot connect to internet through AP (cause: poor signal, network card not inserted, cable modem/dsl outtage, etc)
4. Knowing the last thing that changed occured in step #2, Jon reverses actions of step #2 (factory reset of router)
(meanwhile, cable modem/dsl starts working again -- a very short outage)
5. After completing #4, Jon sees Internet working on his laptop... feels problem has been solved.
If some type of network problem occurs, many users will first DISABLE their firewall to see if it helps... And since such an action does not visibly "break" anything, they can easily forget to re-enable it... (unless that stupid thing in XP reminds them)
Well, virtually all wireless cards **ARE** going to be configured using DHCP... Even users with wifi in their home are going to be (most often) using a wireless router (which uses dhcp).
And who says the attacker must be a human? The default DHCP IP address used by a Windows hosts is easy to spot... Seems likely someone will write an automated scanning tool -- and someone else will package it with a botnet virus. All it takes is one infected exec reading his Outlook mail in an airport to infect hundreds.... In this manner, computer viruses could spread (mainly wirelessly) in a way very similar to air-borne biological viruses.
And don't Windows XP-Firewall permissions work at the "Interface Level" versus the network configuration level??? Which means if a lazy Joe Schmo uses filesharing at work/home/etc (wireless), he will probably always leave it enabled in the firewall!!!! At home/work this **might** be okay but in a public wifi network, this would be disasterous.
I'm curious as to how many slashdotters have bothered to set-up VPNs to allow controlled access to unsafe resources (as opposed to 'host address'-based firewall configuration). Even if your firewall only allows filesharing from your work's internal private IP block, it would be easy for a tool to start trying IP addresses from the private IP blocks). And how many wireless routers operate with a default like 192.168.0.0/24 ???
You've commited a crime, at least under UK law, so I hope you're in the UK.
Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act (1990) defines unauthorised actions that are intended to secure computers as a crime:
"1.--(1) A person is guilty of an offence if--
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer;"
Not to mention you're also an ass.
My Machine: 'Cool. Can I connect to you?'
Machine X: 'Sure. Here, use this IP number.'
My Machine: 'Nifty. Thanks.'
Connecting to an open wireless network is definitely legit. You asked permission and got it. Using the 'house' metaphor, it's as if I come up to your mansion, knock at the door, and get let in by the butler, who has been instructed to let in anybody who asks.
What I proceed to do with the connection is another matter. For instance, having connected I might proceed to download mp3s over your connection. You pay by the megabyte, or perhaps you have a monthly usage limit? Then this costs you money. This is the equivalent of coming up to your mansion, being let in by the friendly butler, and proceeding to nick all your silverware...
Real Daleks don't climb stairs - they level the building.