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Diebold Threatens Wary Voting Clerk

An anonymous reader writes "From the Salt Lake Tribune: a wary county clerk called in BlackBoxVoting.org to test the integrity of Diebold voting fraud machines, part of a recent $27 million statewide purchase (to make sure that only the "Right" candidates win). Diebold goon says machines are now jinxed and it may cost up to $40,000 to fly in a company witch-doctor to make sure there were no warranty violations. Since EVERY SINGLE VOTER who uses these machines is a potential hacker looking to alter election results, why is Diebold so concerned? "

116 of 632 comments (clear)

  1. Huh? by bradgoodman · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Is it me - or did that post make no sense...

    1. Re:Huh? by eln · · Score: 5, Funny

      I think need to editorialize in the form of a righteously indignant rant overtook the poster and short-circuited his brain.

      Next time, maybe he should try just pasting the first paragraph of the article like everyone else does.

    2. Re:Huh? by JordanL · · Score: 3, Funny

      No, it isn't just you... the guy sounded like he was the Dukakis campaign manager.

    3. Re:Huh? by MrTester · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Thank God. It isnt just me.
      I reread the thing 4 times assuming that I was missing something.

    4. Re:Huh? by jdeluise · · Score: 3, Funny

      The editors are just trying to get us to actually RTFA. Did it work for you?

    5. Re:Huh? by EvilEddie · · Score: 4, Insightful

      It made sense.....it was just incredibly biased.....even for slashdot.

    6. Re:Huh? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

      It's not just you. I had problems with the awkward sentence construction, the all-cap screaming, as well as the words "goon," "witch doctors." Once I put on my Cmdr Taco screening filter, however, it all made sense.

    7. Re:Huh? by 91degrees · · Score: 4, Funny
      No. It's written in a peculiar dialect. Let me translate.
      Diebold has sold voting machines to Utah. Diebold is evil. They want to bully a poor innocent election clerk. Anything they do is eeeevil and their only aim in life is to subjugate democracy so that the evil Republicans win. They want to take away our democracy!!!11!!! The CIA is SPYING on us. And the president is a LIZARD!! A LIZZZARD I tell YoU. HE's frOm anOTHeR diMesSsniOPn and Thjhey're TAking away My Brain.
      Hope that clears it up for you.
  2. what does it matter? by celardore · · Score: 2, Insightful

    With such an effective president-deciding method as the 'Good Old Boys' network, who needs Diebold anyway?

    1. Re:what does it matter? by VJ42 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Or perhaps you should go back to pecnil, paper and a sealed box, like we still use over here in the UK. I trust that system much more that I'd ever trust a voting machine.

      --
      If I have nothing to hide, you have no reason to search me
    2. Re:what does it matter? by swillden · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Or perhaps you should go back to pecnil, paper and a sealed box, like we still use over here in the UK. I trust that system much more that I'd ever trust a voting machine.

      The difference is that in the US we vote on many more offices. My ballot generally includes some forty or fifty choices. It's easy enough to mark such a ballot with a pencil, but it gets difficult to count them, so some automation is useful. Further, a well-designed touch screen user interface is accessible to people with vision and motor skill deficiencies that would exclude them from voting with a paper ballot. Finally, a well-designed touch screen UI is less error-prone.

      So, there are good reasons to use machines, but there aren even better reasons *not* to use purely electronic tallies as the final results.

      Voting machines should print human-readable paper ballots, verifiable by the voter, that can also be counted by machine, and those ballots should be put in a locked metal box and then counted under supervision of all the major political parties to produce the official tallies.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    3. Re:what does it matter? by plague3106 · · Score: 2, Informative

      Not sure if you honestly don't understand the post or not, but there are 40 to 50 items on which to vote. So some questions will be for filling various offices (like school boards) others will be laws or a way to give those in office an idea how people stand on the issue.

      For example, besides electing a new mayor, we voted on what is to be done with a vacant building on the waterfront, whether to keep floride in the city water system, etc.

    4. Re:what does it matter? by hotdiggitydawg · · Score: 2, Insightful

      There was a ballot paper in an Australian election a few years ago that was not much smaller than a decent-sized tablecloth. I forget how many options were on it but from memory it was a few hundred-odd.

      The problem here is that voting machines present a potential single point of failure. The manual system works so well simply because it is such a pain in the arse. To defraud an election you need to "overwrite" a very large number of paper ballots, or bribe a significant number of returning officers... all risky options. Remove the need for human verification at the finest granularity and replace them with machines, and it just gets easier.

      I like your siggestion because it brings the benefits of a UI but still requires manual verification by the voter, but I would still argue that manual counting is necessary to some degree.

    5. Re:what does it matter? by swillden · · Score: 4, Informative

      o you've never heard of having a different voting slip for each actual office position then... and putting the marked slips in the correct boxes makes things easier at the counting places as well

      We'd need at least 30 boxes. That's just impractical. Come to that, it's better to put everything on one paper ballot and then figure out how to count (which is what has been done for many, many years).

      You have to remember how governments are structured in the US. City, County, State and Federal governments are all separate, and we vote for offices for each. Within each government, executive, legislative and judicial branches are separate, and we vote for people in most of them. On top of that are ballot initiatives at the city, county and state level.

      Whether or not having so many choices actually improves democracy is an open question, but this is the system we have, and the voting approach must work with it.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    6. Re:what does it matter? by tetranz · · Score: 2, Funny

      The US and UK are very different places.

      Just look at one of today's headlines on CNN

      As I write this, there is a video item on the front page titled:

      "Electrified fanny packs shock unruly students"

      I'd be surprised to see that on the BBC. :-)

    7. Re:what does it matter? by alva_edison · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Let's face it, most people couldn't figure out how to work a computerized automatic bowling score-keeping system, much less something that actually required thought.

      Have you ever used an automatic bowling score-keeping system? Most have a UIs that are among the worst designs I've ever seen. Much of this is to try and prevent people from changing scores. Standard Functions people might want to do (like add a person to the current game) become 15-minute sessions of button mashing trying to get the machine to let you do it. If voting machines are half as complicated as one of these scoring machines, I fear for those states/counties intending on using them.

      --
      He effected a bored affect.
    8. Re:what does it matter? by Kreigaffe · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Mechanical voting machines are FAR, FAR better than electronic. They're not subject to the whims of some cord plugged into a wall. You flip a bunch of little levers. You verify them before you pull the big lever. When you're done you've got a little card punched out. You look at it and can make sure it's all correct. Which it will be, because pieces of metal in the back of that voting machine aren't going to suddenly change. There's no BSoD when you're dealing with a simple machine. Touch screens are FICKLE. Think about how dirty that screen would get! They don't work great when they're caked full of gunk, and have been punched thousands of times. But hey, some idiots voted for Pat Buchanon because they were too stupid to read a ballot and figure out how to vote, so ZOMG WE MUST DO SOMETHING!

      --
      ... still waiting for this free-as-in-beer free beer I keep hearing about. :|
    9. Re:what does it matter? by swillden · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I would still argue that manual counting is necessary to some degree.

      I agree. My ideal system would provide:

      • Unofficial, immediate results based on the purely electronic tallies from the machines. Sor for any races but the closest, we'd know who won by the time we go to bed on election night.
      • Official, but challengeable, results a day or two later from machine counting of the paper ballots, with randomly-sampled verification that what the machine is counting agrees with what a human reads on the ballot.
      • When candidates demand it, full hand recounts for specific races.
      • All ballots and ballot-counting machines are made available to the press or any other party (under appropriate supervision) after the official results are reported.

      In addition, all stages of the election, collection and counting processes should be done under the supervision of representatives of the major parties as well as any individuals who care to be involved.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    10. Re:what does it matter? by Karl+Cocknozzle · · Score: 2, Insightful
      So why not have a seperate ballot paper for each office\question, we do this when local, elections collide with Europian ones for example. They are then sorted and counted. sure it'll take a little longer, but waiting a week instead of a nite so you can have a better system isn't much of a price to pay.
      ...because that would lead to a 50-page ballot which would be totally unmanagable for the voter or the people counting. With that many pages, they'd be lucky to finish counting the ballots before the next election began.
      --
      Who did what now?
    11. Re:what does it matter? by the+chao+goes+mu · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Or register hundred of dead people, or hundred of non-existent people, or simply have people vote under assumed names. Or contest ballots. Or send in invalid absentee ballots. Or... well, the list goes on and on.
      Check out the history of any large US city, there is over a century of experience in quite easily manipulating elections using "fraud-resistant" paper ballots.

      --
      Boys from the City. Not yet caught by the Whirlwind of Progress. Feed soda pop to the thirsty pigs.
    12. Re:what does it matter? by doormat · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Voting machines should print human-readable paper ballots, verifiable by the voter, that can also be counted by machine, and those ballots should be put in a locked metal box and then counted under supervision of all the major political parties to produce the official tallies.

      Nevada is one of the few states that has a voter verified paper trail. While the voting machines aren't as secure as our slot machines, it seems to be quite apt for Americans to care more about their money than democracy.

      --
      The Doormat

      If you're not outraged, then you're not paying attention.
    13. Re:what does it matter? by Monoliath · · Score: 2, Interesting

      "Voting machines should print human-readable paper ballots, verifiable by the voter, that can also be counted by machine, and those ballots should be put in a locked metal box and then counted under supervision of all the major political parties to produce the official tallies."

      I think this is the perfect solution to all of this electronic black box voting nonsense. I can't believe Diebold wasn't forced to implement this feature into all of the electronic voting machines produced. How could such a simple paper trail / objective proof mechanism be overlooked?

      When I ask myself questions like that, and realize that there is no excuse for their not to be, I can't help but believe something is definitely going on behind the scenes with the software that tallies the votes.

      There is no reason for this not to be mandatory on all existing machines, no reason what so ever.

    14. Re:what does it matter? by lgw · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Voter fraud with paper ballots traditionally occurs as a ballot box is being transported from where the votes were cast to where they will be counted, by simply substituting a different box along the way. On a small scale (say a county election), this sort of tampering is easier than electronic vote fraud because it's low tech: all you need is a few dishonest people in the right places.

      Electronic vote fraud is harder, in that it requires some understanding of technology, but it scales better, and it's easy to imagine changing state-wide results. But then, electronic vote counting is just a silly idea in the first place. Use all the touch screens and voter-assisting technology to print a paper ballot, which can then be dropped in a box. This is not difficult.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
  3. obvious problem here by John+Harrison · · Score: 4, Insightful

    If someone looking at the machines causes them to be compromised then how on earth can you put them in voting booths when hundreds of people will have physical access to them in a private setting? If you depend on completely restricting access to the machines then you've already lost, haven't you? I applaud the clerk for taking this stand. The very idea that the machines can't be inspected by a third party shows just how fragile such systems are. If they were truely secure it wouldn't matter who looked at them or how.

    1. Re:obvious problem here by djmurdoch · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Presumably the worry is that the degree of access given to the Black Box Voting inspectors is greater than a voter would have. Did they spend several hours taking the machine apart? Did they put it back together properly? A clerk might have noticed this happening on voting day.

      Of course, this raises the question: if the machine could be compromised in a few hours of hacking, are all the other machines stored securely enough that this couldn't have happened to them, too?

    2. Re:obvious problem here by rossifer · · Score: 5, Insightful
      The very idea that the machines can't be inspected by a third party shows just how fragile such systems are.

      In my opinion, at least as important is the belief that the proper group to see if the machines are compromised is the manufacturer.

      "We've decided we are going have Diebold come and go through these machines and see if they are compromised," [Comissioner Ira Hatch] said

      If the machines can't be verified as uncompromised on voting day by an election staffer at a voting location multiple times throughout the day, that's a huge problem. For the voting commission to accept Diebold's line that "That's the way it is." is simply unconscionable.

      Slot machines in Nevada can be checked against any number of parameters to make sure that 1) hardware has not been added or replaced, 2) the software has not been altered (from the registered version on file with the NGC) and 3) the settings for the software match the casino's payout statements. The casino can do these checks, the NGC can do these checks, interested public parties can do these checks (with the cooperation of either the casino or the NGC).

      Shouldn't we expect at least as much from the recordkeepers of democracy as we expect from a gambling house?

      Regards,
      Ross
    3. Re:obvious problem here by Jerf · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Presumably the worry is that the degree of access given to the Black Box Voting inspectors is greater than a voter would have. Did they spend several hours taking the machine apart? Did they put it back together properly? A clerk might have noticed this happening on voting day.

      But they should be given that much access. An attacker is unlikely to just be "A Voter". These sorts of things are often, if not usually, inside jobs. An attacker should be assumed to have volunteered to manage the vote (which I gather is easy to do since few people want to do it) and should be assumed to be able to spend hours with a machine, probably in the comfort of their own home, and with access to any number of helpful resources, including the full resources of the local political party apparatus or the mafia. That last one's no joke, either.

      I'm not very worried about "A Voter", I'm worried about the entire system.

      In Diebold's defense, any machine handed over to an investigator should not be trusted again, for the very same reasons. However, Diebold should allow any customer to randomly select a voting system to subject to any arbitrary analysis, and replace it at no (extra) charge.

    4. Re:obvious problem here by fermion · · Score: 2, Insightful
      But not greater than the access of election officials. Election material should be clearly tamper resistant and evident, and if the machine is compromised, should fail to function.

      The problem is this. In paper voting I am given a ballot to mark, and then put it in a locked box. If all is set up correctly, the lock can only be opened with many people watching, and it will be evident if the lock has been opened or changed.

      What Diebold appears to be saying, and what makes the snide comments of the poster somewhat appropriate, is that these machines can be tampered with and the only way to detect it is by bringing in a specialist to spend huge amounts of time analyzing the system.

      In fact, if the system were secure, any tampering should be immidiately evident to any reasonable person looking at it. Any changes in code should be immidiately visible, at least though a permanant change log. Any changes in hardware should equally be immidiately apparrent. Diebold is not only saying the machines are not secure, but there is no adaquate audit trail to prove that the machines have been properly used.

      --
      "She's a scientist and a lesbian. She's not going to let it slide." Orphan Black
    5. Re:obvious problem here by moonsammy · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Does anyone know if Ira Hatch of Utah is related to Orrin Hatch of Utah? I tried finding out via google or wikipedia but came up blank. If so I can certainly understand why he would feel that Diebold is the best outfit for the job, given the company's notorious Republican-friendly past statements.

    6. Re:obvious problem here by curunir · · Score: 3, Insightful

      To be honest, election officials are not the type of insider I'd be most worried about. How do we know that there isn't some uber-complicated escape key sequence which drops the voter into an interface which shows them all the votes that have already been cast and allows them to modify those results. Given that voting booths basically guarantee complete privacy, we'd have no way of knowing. If all we have to verify the results is that the total number recorded is equal to the total number of people who voted, it would be trivial to modify those results. The whole concept of a voting machine whose design and code is not open to the public makes it way too easy to compromise election results.

      In Diebold's defense, Black Box Voting should have videotaped their investigation of the machine including keeping logs of every keystroke the entered into any interface. At a minimum, it would have shown their belief that everything relating to voting should be handled with no possible deception, but it also would have allowed Diebold to verify the integrity of the machines remotely and would give them important information about how someone determined to compromise the security of a voting machine would go about doing so.

      --
      "Don't blame me, I voted for Kodos!"
    7. Re:obvious problem here by Coryoth · · Score: 2, Informative

      Paper elections have been forged before. Why should we believe that a forgeable system makes an insecure system secure?

      I think it's a question of redundant systems which can be independently verified. What would I like to see in an electronic voting system? I would like machines with a published hardware design, open source code according to full published formal requirements with a formal specification, published correctness proofs, and verification of the code against the specification, backed up by a redundant system of paper reciepts (turned in at the voting centre).

      Sure, that sounds like a lot of trouble, but if ever there was a situation where all the open specifications, formal theorem proving and code verification were worth the cost and effort surely voting would be it. It provides a number of independent ways to verfiy that things are behaving correctly.

      Jedidiah.

  4. Answer by daveschroeder · · Score: 3, Informative

    Since EVERY SINGLE VOTER who uses these machines is a potential hacker looking to alter election results, why is Diebold so concerned?

    Because EVERY SINGLE VOTER isn't allowed a level of access to the machines to presumably perform an audit or otherwise tamper with and/or view the inner workings of the machines.

    The solution is quite simple:

    - Have a permanent, voter verifiable, auditable, and recountable paper trail (a feature Diebold and ES&S both offer)

    - Have an open source system (which actually isn't at all required if the above condition is met)

    1. Re:Answer by 'nother+poster · · Score: 2, Informative

      - Have a permanent, voter verifiable, auditable, and recountable paper trail (a feature Diebold and ES&S both offer)

      Sorry, but according to Diebolds web site...

      All ballots cast using the AccuVote-TSX are immediately encrypted and stored in multiple locations within the voting station to provide secure system redundancy. Non-volatile memory is used to ensure election results are securely protected. At the end of the voting period, the integral thermal printer within each AccuVote-TSX can print election totals for the specific voting station.

      Notice the At the end of the voting period? They do not offer individual paper audits/confirmations of the votes cast.

    2. Re:Answer by daveschroeder · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Sorry, but Diebold has had accessory equipment to add a paper trail at the voting station for at least 18 months. Diebold, like many large contract vendors, doesn't list all of their specific products and components on the web site and instead talks about the systems from a general standpoint.

      All three major electronic voting manufacturers already have the ability to add permanent, individual voter-verified paper audit trails to their products. Don't believe people who make it seem like companies like Diebold are resisting. They aren't. They'll build - and sell - whatever municipalities will buy.

      The roadblock, as it turns out, is often local election boards. First, the new paper verification systems NEED to go through the government certification process - remember, it's the e-voting watchdogs who are chastising non-certified patches/updates being put into place; the paper audit systems need to go through the same certification process. Further, many municipalities can't understand why they should be forcing paper audit trails; after all, they think, they are just getting away from paper ballots - why should they be arguing for paper ballots (and all the headaches that go along with them, ON TOP of the headaches they already have from learning to deal with e-voting), when they just got away from it?

    3. Re:Answer by daveschroeder · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Yes, because as historical elections have shown, paper ballots are tamper-proof. No one has ever been known to rig or steal an election when a paper trail existed.

      So, damned if you do, damned if you don't?

      The fact is, a paper trail ensures nothing. It can be falsified, albeit with somewhat more difficulty than purely electronic records. Diebold's primary concern shouldn't be a random voter physically tampering with a machine, it should be the people charged with operating and safeguarding the machine. They have access, and as they're working an election, they almost certainly have strong personal political views that could motivate a "correction" of the results.

      *Nothing* is ever guaranteed. The key is to arrive at a system that can be ensured to have at least some semblance of accuracy.

      But the local county election officials have been the ones running our elections forever, and that hasn't changed. If you're arguing they should prevent tampering with the machines, including *inviting* tampering from third parties (such as was the case here), I'm 100% in agreement.

    4. Re:Answer by the_demiurge · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The problem with the electronic voting machines is that they can be tampered with ahead of time, without even accessing the machine during or after election day.

      A hack to disreguard 3% of the votes for a particular canidate could be set up weeks before, and maybe from the voting machine company themselves (via a 'security hotfix' or something).

      A method to have a simultaniously generated and voter verified paper trail does not ensure anything, but it's sure better than having just an excel spreadsheet be the final ground truth of voting records.

  5. Our election process is broken. by FatSean · · Score: 2, Insightful

    And I don't mean just gerrymandering.

    I feel kinda sick...is Diebold gonna get away with this?

    Is this a case for the ACLU?

    --
    Blar.
  6. At least you're not showing an bias. by hal2814 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Witch doctors? Jinxes? I read the entire linked article and didn't see any of that. What I did see was that Diebold wants to make sure the machines still work after a 3rd party possibly tinkered with them. I'd certainly be concerned if I sent a machine out into the wild, a 3rd party took a look at it, and now it may not be functioning properly. Diebold may be a little over the top here, but their concern is certainly warranted.

    1. Re:At least you're not showing an bias. by gEvil+(beta) · · Score: 3, Interesting

      So you're basically saying that the machines should not be used in a private setting without someone from Diebold checking them after each use to make sure they're still okay? If the machines were truly secure, they should be able to leave them on a street corner for a week and know that they'd be fine when they came to pick them up.

      --
      This guy's the limit!
    2. Re:At least you're not showing an bias. by hal2814 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      No, what I'm saying is that I left the machine with a voting official who has some sort of administrative access to the machine. That administrator gave a third party company with no official material on the inner workings of the machine that administrator access to run some unknown tests on the machine and now they're claiming the machine may be broken dur to a memory error. I'd certainly be suspicious of what that 3rd party did to the machine. However, unlike Diebold, I would probably approach that third party directly to ask them what tests they've run and even provide them with an environment where they could reproduce their testing procedure before I went crying to the press about it.

    3. Re:At least you're not showing an bias. by blofeld42 · · Score: 2, Insightful
      Indeed--the article says
      By the end of the Monday meeting, Diebold engineers convinced the county commissioners the discrepancies in the machines' memory are the result of testing and of additional printing fonts.

      A third party modifies the software configuration of the machines? I'd certainly hope that Diebold would audit the machines after that.

    4. Re:At least you're not showing an bias. by forkazoo · · Score: 2, Interesting
      I'd certainly be concerned if I sent a machine out into the wild, a 3rd party took a look at it, and now it may not be functioning properly. Diebold may be a little over the top here, but their concern is certainly warranted.


      Now... This is $40,000 just to see if the machines are still under warranty. Think about that. Now, I don't deny that it doesn't make sense to have a doublecheck after an unsupervised audit. But, isn't that part of the point of the warranty?

      And, as for Witch Doctors and Jinxes... No, the article didn't use those terms. But, Diebold clearly takes the stance that only they are qualified to work with the voodoo in the machines. Anybody else would just break it. If unsupervised access to the voting machines is so bad, why should Diebold get it? IMHO, it should be illegal for the voting machine repair guys to work for the same company as the voting machine salesmen. The salesmen should have to open up the specs so that the government can have whoever they trust double check the machines, rather than relying on the fact that "Only Diebold Is Qualified To Make Unsupervised (Changes | Audits To The Voting Machines."
    5. Re:At least you're not showing an bias. by bfizzle · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I hope that even the election offical access isn't enough to skew the results from any voting machine. If a political offical is able to just log in a make whatever changes they damn well please... I rather just keep my hanging chads thank you.

    6. Re:At least you're not showing an bias. by ErikZ · · Score: 3, Funny
      ...but the moment someone pokes fun at your precious business establishment then you go drier than a dead crab's reproductive canal.


      Is...that dry?

      I mean, don't crabs live underwater? I suppose, technically, dead crabs don't live underwater. But they do sit there, you know, underwater.

      Which is wet.
      --
      Democrats or Republicans. They are both taking us to the same place and they are not afraid of us anymore.
    7. Re:At least you're not showing an bias. by tillerman35 · · Score: 2, Funny

      I think he means after they're dead. Maybe he should have added "that's not in the water after it dies" or "in a really really dry place." I agree, though. Just after it dies the reproductive tract is probably still sort of wet, from sitting in the water all the time. Or at least part of the time. I had a hermit crab once. Actually, my kid had a hermit crab. But I bought it. In fact, I bought it several times. Every time one would die, I'd go buy another one and tell him that his crab had "changed shells." Which in retrospect was an excellent chance to find out whether or not a dead crab's reproductive tract is really dry. But alas, opportunity, like a dead hermit crab, and curiously enough unlike the postman never knocks twice. Although the postman doesn't actually knock. He rings. Twice, actually. Unless you don't have a doorbell, in which case I suppose he might knock. And by knock, you have to consider that when knocking on a door you really knock more than once per "knocking event." Take "Shave-and-a-haircut...two-bits." That's seven knocks, but you're really only asking for entry once, right? So if the door didn't have a doorbell, per se, and the postman did shave-and-a-etc twice, that would be fourteen distinct knocks or seven opportunities if you count it that way. Either way, it's more knocks than you can shake a dead crab at, as I always say.

  7. What I would like to know... by parasonic · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Why does Diebold design these machines in such a way that they *CAN* be hacked? I think that involving an Operating System and software in the design of such a machine is a critical error. As a computer engineer, I realize that overcomplicating things can lead to errors. DSP's can make hardware extremely cheap, but there are places where analog circuits are cheaper and more realiable! Why hasn't Diebold designed a hardwired electronic circuit or a mechanical system with failsafes such that the machine can't be hacked, and the wrong candidate will not be selected if the machine fails? There are so many places where their current design can and will go wrong. I believe that it's time for these loonies (or preferrably someone else who has more sense) to come up with a more rudimentary and failsafe design!

    1. Re:What I would like to know... by swillden · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Why hasn't Diebold designed a hardwired electronic circuit or a mechanical system with failsafes such that the machine can't be hacked, and the wrong candidate will not be selected if the machine fails?

      Even better, use whatever kind of unsecure computer platform you want for the voting system, but have it print out a piece of paper with the voter's choices.

      That way the voter can see how they voted, and it's not necessary for them even to trust a simple hardwired system which, obviously, is still beyond the understanding of most of the population. Most people aren't EEs.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    2. Re:What I would like to know... by starm_ · · Score: 3, Insightful

      The fact that using a printed balot as a paper trail is such an obvious solution and the fact that printed recieps are so easy to implement is what makes the chosen convoluted, hackable, no-recount alternative so suspicious. What honest and experienced company would chose anything but the easy and elegant solution of a printout considering that it is already implemented on every ATM and all cash registers if not because they want to open the possibility to election fraud?

      No amount of tweaking will make the system secure. There is always a weak link. Even if the company had the best intentions in the world, how can they be certain that a lone partisan coder wouldn't sneak a line of code within what I'm sure are millions of lines? This could be done at any point in the chain of programs that handle the votes; from the user interface, to the final tally, through the individual machine databases, the talying computer, the flash memory files etc. etc. etc. I have plenty programming experience and I can tell you that it would be very easy to implement this "bug" so that it happened ONLY on the day of the election so that previous and following tests would show no bias.

      Consider,

      If you were a company and you were designing a voting machine you would have two options:

      1)Hire an expensive team of developers responsible for surveying all the code components of your system to make sure each and everyone one of them are 100% secure and bug free. A feat that no leading software company (say MS) has succeeded in doing for their own software even after decades and millions of man-hours of debugging and re-engineering.

      Or, 2) add a small printer similar or identical to the ones used for printing lotto tickets or even those good old receipt printers that are part of *every* cash register. These receips would then be hand veryfied by each voter and then put in a ballot box for future verification and recounts.

      Which option do you think is less expensive? What rational is there for a company to chose option one?

    3. Re:What I would like to know... by swillden · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Diebold shouldn't be worried about voters. They should be worried about volunteers who have access to the system. In that case, it's just as trivial for one of the volunteers to hack the system, and also print out fake paper trails as well.

      No, the old ways are the best ways here, and they're adequate. A locked metal box with a slot in the top, where voters drop their ballots under the watchful eyes of multiple volunteers who are not only dedicated to the integrity of the process, but represent different political parties as well, is almost foolproof. In my area, when the polls close, the volunteers (all four of them) seal the box with tamper-evident tape and then sign their names over it. Then the box is transported by guards, accompanied by party reps and stored securely until the counting.

      You don't want a paper trail. You want an auditable system. Your instincts tell you that paper is auditable. I don't agree.

      I'm a professional security architect; I design and build high-security systems for a living, including designing and implement cryptographic protocols for all sorts of high-security systems. Regardless of what my instincts may or may not tell me, my experience and expertise tells me that bits are not trustworthy. I know just how hard it is to build an electronic system that is truly tight. All electronic security must build, in theory, on some known-good starting point, but with an election system there really isn't any such place to begin.

      Actually, there is almost never any such place to begin. The real world doesn't provide those sorts of certainties. In security system design the way we address that issue is by spreading the risk; ensuring that the only way the system could be compromised is through the collusion of multiple parties who have good reasons not to collude. This applies to the designers of the system as well as its owners, operators and users.

      Whether with paper in boxes or bits in whatever medium, to secure an election you *have* to provide detailed oversight by all interested parties at every stage. Using complex technology serves no purpose other than to artificially limit the number of people who are capable of understanding and verifying the steps. In contrast, given a paper solution, anyone who wants to can understand each step of the process by which ballots make it from voter to counter.

      The safer thing to do is reassure the public by explaining the process.

      Absolutely. And the safest thing to do is reassure the public by designing a process they can all understand, and then explaining that.

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      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    4. Re:What I would like to know... by swillden · · Score: 3, Insightful

      What's "adequate"? Only "minor" voter fraud? Once every few elections? It's not like paper ballots haven't been forged before. They have. It's happened.

      Sure. On a small scale, it will probably always happen. But that's better than making it possible for one person to modify *all* the votes. Much, much better.

      Banks don't rely on four guys carrying a locked box of money when they transfer money.

      Nope. They rely on 3DES encryption using a ZMK (zone master key) which was exchanged cryptographically separated into three pieces and delivered via three separate couriers to three separate executives at the remote bank, who assembled it in a key ceremony into a crypto box.

      Which means, if you didn't catch it, that the three execs can collude, obtain the key and compromise all subsequent transfers. Or, alternatively, the three people on the sending end who obtained the key parts and mailed them.

      *Every* real-world security system relies ultimately on people, and people are the weak link. The only protection you have is to spread the risk. Paper ballots allow the risk to be spread more easily and more widely than purely electronic systems.

      Don't get me wrong: I love cryptography. I think it's so cool that I've spent a good chunk of my life working with it. But electronic security is really hard because you have so little to count on, and elections are even worse. The stakes are much higher than just about anything in the commercial world, and no one is truly neutral.

      But the biggest reason that the techniques applied to banking and other commercial systems don't work is that elections simply cannot be fully auditable. If the three execs above colluded, compromised the key and then started performing fraudulent transactions it would be caught because bank transactions are fully auditable. The origin and destination of every transaction is traceable, and is verified by both sender and recipient (well, some people are lazy, but that's the theory). That sort of auditability is impossible with election systems because of the requirement that votes be anonymous. Since the ultimate originator of the vote *MUST* have no way to verify that his or her individual vote was properly traced throughout the system, we can't apply the same auditing techniques.

      Votes have to be aggregated into anonymous lots, then collected together and tallied. With electronic vote represntations, all of that must, perforce, happen invisibly. Sure, we can try applying digital signatures, but those are only as strong as the signing process, the key management process and the systems that apply the signing. There are holes there you can drive a 747 through given people in the right place. And there are *lots* of "right" places.

      With paper, on the other hand, lots of independent eyes can be applied at each step. With enough of them, the process is easy to make foolproof. The first, most dangerous, aggregation step is from the voter to the first collection receptacle. If it's done electronically, you have to ensure that the voting machine is guaranteed to be untamperable by anyone. That's VERY, VERY hard. With a paper ballot, on the other hand, the voter him/herself solves that problem, and watchers ensure that the voter doesn't stuff any extra votes in.

      I'll put it this way: If you really think you can design an electronic voting system that is secure in the sense of making large-scale manipulations impossible, write up a detailed design and publish it. If you really do it, you'll immediately build yourself a reputation in the security industry because you'll have proven wrong, for example, the members of the National Committee for Voting Integrity, an organization of computer security experts including such people as David Chaum, Avi Rubin, Bruce Schneier, etc. Plus lots of others. In fact, pretty much every serious computer security expert on the planet has come out against pure electronic voting schemes, so you'll have raised yourself in

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      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  8. Why indeed . . . . by failure-man · · Score: 2, Insightful

    "Since EVERY SINGLE VOTER who uses these machines is a potential hacker looking to alter election results, why is Diebold so concerned?"

    Did you sleep through ALL of yor cynicism classes? Diebold is throwing a fit to discourage anyone from snooping around in the guts of their voting machines.
     
    Someone might, y'know, find something. . . . . . . .

  9. Why are they concerned? by Tackhead · · Score: 4, Funny
    > Since EVERY SINGLE VOTER who uses these machines is a potential hacker looking to alter election results, why is Diebold so concerned?

    Because if every single voter gets to hack the election results, then it's be a fair election. Duh!

    January 20, 2009: President Stallman took the oath of office today, after the GNU/ESR ticket (GNU's Not United-states!) narrowly beat the Gates/Ballmer team campaign in an election that stunned the ruling Demopublican coalition...

  10. Troubling, indeed by Captain+Sarcastic · · Score: 4, Insightful

    According to Diebold, the polling machines are suspect, and it'll cost $40,000 to verify everything.

    On the one hand - what if Diebold is purely running a bluff? Then the election board is going to have to pay $40,000 for Diebold to send in someone who will attach some alligator clips somewhere, run something that flashes lights, and generally run some dog and pony show before deciding whether its in their interest to declare the polling machines as sabotaged, just damaged, or just fine.

    On the other hand - what if Diebold is honest? Then the election board is going to have to pay $40,000 for Deibold to send in someone who will attach some alligator clips somewhere run something that flashes lights, and generally run some dog and pony show before deciding whether the machines are in fact sabotaged, just damaged, or just fine.

    Whether Diebold is bona fide or not, they are likely to claim trade secret privilege to hide the actual workings of their machine or their testing mechanisms... and again, if they're telling the truth, then they would claim that, and if they're not, then their claim would be hard to challenge.

    So the fundamental question is this: do you trust Diebold?

    --
    Strike while the irony is hot! -- The Freethinker
    1. Re:Troubling, indeed by ikejam · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Hmm. i always thouhgt the fundamental question was : Shoud you have to trust Diebold?

    2. Re:Troubling, indeed by jc42 · · Score: 2, Informative

      So the solution is obvious: every Diebold electronic voting machine is to be guarded by a member of that state's National Guard, with orders to kill anyone who attempts to touch the machine.

      It wouldn't help. Google for "voting machine infrared port", which gets about 800,000 hits right now. It seems that at least some Diebold machines come with an IR port. This makes it possible for someone with a laptop or handheld to connect to the machine from across the room. No actual physical contact is needed.

      Actually, I wonder why they do this. An IR port uses an externally-visible "antenna". With wi-fi the port can be internal, without anything visible to give away its presence. And it wouldn't need line-of-sight access, either, so it would be a lot harder to detect.

      Preventing on-the-fly tampering with electronic voting equipment could be rather difficult.

      --
      Those who do study history are doomed to stand helplessly by while everyone else repeats it.
  11. Suddenly I don't feel bad my stories are rejected by loggia · · Score: 5, Funny

    I guess I forgot to run them through Babelfish a few times?

  12. Shouldn't voting machines be regulated? by amightywind · · Score: 2, Informative

    I have worked in the regulated fields of avionics and medical devices. You would think that federal and state governments would have regulations governing exhaustive testing of electronic voting machines against requirements to avoid conflicts like this. What is a secretary of state's job but to prevent pissing matches like this? I don't blame Diebold for not wanting some 3rd party yahoo breaking seals on their machines. But they can't point to a documented, legitimate qualification process to allay their customer's valid concerns. This is lousy engineering of the kind that pervades traditional IT.

    --
    an ill wind that blows no good
    1. Re:Shouldn't voting machines be regulated? by tkrotchko · · Score: 4, Interesting

      "I don't blame Diebold for not wanting some 3rd party yahoo breaking seals on their machines."

      Well, I understand what you're saying. But they're not Diebold's machines any more than this PC is not Microsoft's PC. That's an important distinction.

      "But they can't point to a documented, legitimate qualification process to allay their customer's valid concerns."

      Exactly right. Moreover, they have no *re-certification* process. Think about what will happen to these machines. The election is over. They are taken to the county warehouse. You pull them out 1 year later. How do I certify they haven't been tampered with? Some seal on the door??????? Or do you have to pay a special technician to come out for 3-4 weeks per machine to cerify each machine?

      "This is lousy engineering of the kind that pervades traditional IT"

      Perhaps. But Diebold seems to figure out how to do it right when banks insist they do it right, but here they chose not to do it that way. Curious? Sure seems it.

      --
      You were mistaken. Which is odd, since memory shouldn't be a problem for you
    2. Re:Shouldn't voting machines be regulated? by JimBobJoe · · Score: 2, Interesting

      But Diebold seems to figure out how to do it right when banks insist they do it right

      As time has gone on, and the more I get to know the industry, I'm not convinced that banks are all that sophisticated with IT security issues.

  13. Money more important than a fair vote? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Man Diebold looks slimier and slimier every passing week, but I'm more disturbed by Joe Demma's, Salt Lake's chief elections officer, response to Bruce Funk's actions. Granted, Funk acted by going around Demma by calling in Black Box Voting to check the Diebold machines, when presumably Demma is supposed to be responsible for that (just my guess as he's the chief elections officer).

    However, Demma seems more incensed at Funk because he may cost the state $40,000 for Diebold's astronomical recertification fee. He doesn't seem to be worried that people might not trust these machines. He doesn't seem to care that a state officer was worried enough to call in a non-profit third party to verify the integrity of these machines. I mean, these things could possibly affect the outcome of a vote, the foundation for a democratic republic! But instead of worrying about these machines he's clearly more upset about the $40,000 and Funk not talking to him about his concerns regarding the voting machines.

    And of COURSE Diebold is going to tell you the machines are fine and fair. Sheesh, they want to make money don't they?

    Isn't it great that chief elections officers have their priorities straight?

    Give me a ballot sheet and a pencil any day over these closed, proprietary black box machines.

  14. Slashdot bias by CosmeticLobotamy · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I know Slashdot has leanings certain ways on certain issues, and I'm fine with that, but we've just officially completed the smooth transition into a 15-year-old's blog.

    Christ, this is sad to see.

  15. Now, before anyone by AnonymousPrick · · Score: 2, Interesting

    mods the parent as "Troll", consider this, both Bush and Gore were both members of the "Skulls" when they were at Yale. The point, both of the nominees for President where of the same socio-economic class. I don't want to delve into any class war crap, I'm just saying that I've never seen, let's say, a college professor or someone who's not a millionaire or from a family that devotes it's legacy to political life - like the Kennedys or the Bushes - getting nomiated by the major politcal parties. And even if they did, they're treated as crackpots. Every election year, our new media profiles some guy who's running for president on some wacky platform or they're running to make a statement, like "Make pot legal!"

    --
    Saturday is April 1. Slashdot will be shut down. Sorry for the inconvenience.
  16. The system is ingenious by danpsmith · · Score: 3, Insightful

    First what they do is print confusing ballads in florida to turn people against paper ballets and create an outrage at typical means of voting, then offer a very simple touch screen way of voting without a paper trail. Congratulations, even the symbolic act of picking between the two puppets is on its way out.

    --
    Judges and senates have been bought for gold; Esteem and love were never to be sold.
    1. Re:The system is ingenious by 91degrees · · Score: 2, Funny

      No. You're confusing ballads with ballets. I've never seen anyone dance ballet to a ballad, but I'm sure it s an artisitic delight.

  17. Here's the right answer by tkrotchko · · Score: 4, Insightful

    "Then the election board is going to have to pay $40,000 for Deibold to send in someone who will attach some alligator clips somewhere run something that flashes lights, and generally run some dog and pony show before deciding whether the machines are in fact sabotaged, just damaged, or just fine."

    Here's where this particular lie is exposed:

    1) How can a single voting machine even cost $40K? I want to see the parts breakdown on *that*.

    2) Wouldn't you want all the machines recertified before each election? I mean, if they're sitting in warehouse someplace between elections, who knows who poked at them? So each machine costs $40K to use every election?

    3) And if this is all T&M, lets assume a generous hourly rate of $250/hour and the guy is staying in a $500 a night hotel. That means this takes about 3 full weeks to certify a machine!

    Does anybody understand the implications of Diebold claiming $40K worth of damages here?

    --
    You were mistaken. Which is odd, since memory shouldn't be a problem for you
  18. If I were him, I would bail. by blcamp · · Score: 2, Interesting


    The county clerk should just get out. He's already finished. The state has already gotten into bed with Diebold, and the clerk has already tainted himself in the eyes of the state by calling in the activists.

    Even if he right about the machines (and I believe he is)... the Powers That Be have already made their mind up about the issue.

    The only ones now that can change things are the voters themselves, and that's a very tall order. We can barely get a 50% turnout to vote for president... how the hell can we get enough people out to call for a change to voting devices? And then, overcome the government's (and Diebold's) spin?

    --
    The problem with socialism is that they always run out of other people's money. - Margaret Thatcher
  19. It's also a CONFESSION by NigelJohnstone · · Score: 5, Insightful

    "On the other hand - what if Diebold is honest? "

    On the third hand, it is a clear confession from Diebold that third parties can't accurately verify their voting machines and that their voting machines can be rigged.

    So any county that thinks it is verifying that the machine isn't rigged by runnig pre-ballot checks is wrong.
    They can point to this statement and say "IT ISN'T ENOUGH THAT WE VERIFY IT, BECAUSE DIEBOLD ADMITS THEY CAN BE RIGGED IN WAYS ONLY IT CAN DETECT".

  20. Well, I think he got it almost right by hey! · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Yes, a third party should examine the machines.

    However, it should be a disinterested third party, not an advocacy group. No matter how well meaning and ethical the people in the group are, they can nonetheless be painted as enemies of the vendor.

    What should be done is to have a professional firm that specializes in computer security audit the machines and provide a report on whether the machines are secure; if not whether and how they can be suecured. And provided the machines can be secured, what policies and procedures are needed to operate them so that fraud can be discouraged and detected.

    This is just like having an independent financial auditor come in and look at your books and your financial control procedures.

    --
    Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
    1. Re:Well, I think he got it almost right by swillden · · Score: 2, Informative

      I think the State Election Commision should hire and independent consultant.

      And how do you know the consultant isn't in on the attempt to rig the election? Or the State Election Commission?

      An election system should be designed so that no one person or group of people have to be trusted with the results of the election as a whole. The process needs to be open and public, and simple enough that anyone with a brain and interest can satisfy themselves that the thing is reasonably secure.

      Except there's no way to do that with electronic voting systems.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  21. Forget the Diebold bashing... by the_real_bto · · Score: 2, Informative

    Why is everyone so hung up on: "Why aren't these machines inpenetrable to all sorts of physical attacks?"

    Who cares how physically secure the machines are or aren't? Even if the machines were tamper proof (which they should be), who cares? The real problem here is that we have a closed vote counting and verification process. That is unacceptable.

    Elections and the vote counting process should be completely and utterly transparent. I trust no machine to count votes. If we use any kind of machine, it should be verified by random human recounts.

    This is not the kind of problem for a clever or slick solution. The only sane solution, IMHO, is to apply the KISS principle. Keep it Simple Stupid.

  22. One-sided article by SamShazaam · · Score: 2, Insightful

    This would appear to be a very one-sided article. There is no detail or statement from blackboxvoting about what was actually done. Only a statement from Diebold about what they think was done. It does seem that the Diebold machine is weak if there is no way to restore to default level without a specialist flying in for $40K. Diebold should learn a few things about customer relations. It is really bad PR if a county official quits rather than certify an election using your machine.

  23. From TFA by Ravenscall · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Joe Demma, chief of staff for Lt. Gov. Gary Herbert, the state's chief elections officer, was plainly incensed with Funk for allowing Black Box to probe the machines.
          "The problem is that instead of asking us or Diebold, Bruce Funk allowed a third party to put the warranty in jeopardy,"


    So let me get this straight.

    Election commissioner notices an irregularity in the memory of some voting machines, from whom the owner of the manufacturing company has very clear partisan leanings.

    Election commissioner calls in a third party to run testing on the machines.

    Now, I do not see a problem with third parties running audits on the machines used to count my votes. In fact, I want as MANY third parties running tests on thes to insure thier accuracy, as the fate of myself, my family, mmy state, and my country will be affected by what this machine spits out.

    However, here we have third party verification being spun by Diebold as being a VERY BAD THING.

    Whatever happened to transparency in government and in democratic processes? Is it not one of the core values of America?

    --
    You say you want a revolution....
  24. couple points of info by frankie · · Score: 4, Informative
    The article blurb here is low on detail and high on gasoline, so here's some tidbits:
    1. Emery County is majority Republican in both population and voting.
    2. Bruce Funk was not skeptical of the machines until after inspecting them.
    3. He was, however, a bit worried that the state expected local officials to be responsible for all problems, but mandated the use of these machines.
    4. He then noticed that supposedly identical & pristine machines had widely differing amounts of free memory.
    5. Rather than go to the state or to Diebold, he called Black Box Voting.
    6. It's really doubtful that (as Diebold claims) font differences could eat up 20MB.
    1. Re:couple points of info by Maximum+Prophet · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Font differences could eat up 20MB without a whole lot of problem, but the real question is why were there any differences at all?
      Once a given configuration is tested and certified, it should be frozen and cloned. The machines should run tripwire before every election to insure they are all at this frozen state.

      --
      All ideas^H^H^H^H^Hprocesses in this post are Patent Pending. (as well as the process of patenting all postings)
  25. Levers of Power by Doc+Ruby · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Clint Curtis, the Diebold programmer who says politicians paid him to rig voting machines in Florida, is running for Congress. If what he says he can do is true, who would have the guts to run against him? Alternately, since he was fired and the voting machine company has a grudge, how can he possibly win?

    --

    --
    make install -not war

  26. Bs with a bit of truth by smooth+wombat · · Score: 3, Insightful
    By the end of the Monday meeting, Diebold engineers convinced the county commissioners the discrepancies in the machines' memory are the result of testing and of additional printing fonts.

    "The problem is that instead of asking us or Diebold, Bruce Funk allowed a third party to put the warranty in jeopardy," Demma said in a telephone interview from Emery County. "If I sound frustrated, it's because I am frustrated. We don't know what they did to the machines. If Bruce would have just asked, we could have saved this forty grand."

    First the BS part. If every machine is identical and every machine went through the same testing procedure then there shouldn't be ANY discrepancies in the machines memory. This is presuming that before the elections only that data necessary to perform the tabulation are on the systems. This is total BS to say that the discrepancies are the results of fonts.

    As far as the $40,000 to 'fix' whatever is wrong with them, how does anyone know what needs to be fixed if Diebold doesn't allow anyone to test the machines? How does anyone know that Diebold won't surrepticiously make changes which could alter the outcome of an election by performing this fix?

    Now for the truth part. By allowing a third party to examine the machines without notifying anyone, Funk did go a bit overboard. This is not to say that he went beyond his mandate to protect the integrity of the voting process. He should be commended for making sure all the i's are dotted and t's crossed before allowing votes to be cast.

    However, by not informing the commissioners of his desire to have a third-party examine the machines for flaws or outright corruption, he has invalidated any findings by Black Box since it is true no one knows what they did or did not do.

    The correct process would have been to tell the commissioners of his desire for a third-party review and if they objected or if Diebold objected, he could have explained his reasonings why he wanted another set of eyes to check things out (which is pretty much what was said in the article). If they refused the request he would have a much more firm standing to say whether or not the machines will do what the manufacturer claims they will do since by not allowing the examination it would appear that they, either the commissioners or Dieblod (or both), have something to hide.

    As it stands now he's shot himself in the foot because he went behind everyones back and secretly had someone else examine the machines.

    What is truly interesting is that the commissioners don't appear to be interested in what Black Box found but are more concerned that they'll have to shell out $40,000. That doesn't sound like the people are too interested in ensuring that the machines will work correctly but are more concerned about bean counting.

    If Funk does resign I hope he vehemently and vociferously expresses his doubts as to the capabilities of these machines and insist that people use absentee ballots to vote. He should make the rounds on tv so he can clearly explain why he has his doubts so the people can understand what is going on.

    --
    We will bankrupt ourselves in the vain search for absolute security. -- Dwight D. Eisenhower
  27. The Machine shouln't matter.... by bradgoodman · · Score: 2, Informative

    There was a very popular book (I believe now out of print - published in 1994 - "Applied Cryptography".) In it - it had a very good example of "secure voting". (I believe this concept has been published/discussed outside of this text - sorry to those who might have came up with it.) To try to summarize (removing cryptographic references where possible) - everyone gets a "ticket" saying they voted - and everyone gets a (separate, non-trackable) "ticket" saying *what* they voted for. Lists of both "tickets" are made public. Anyone and everyone can verify that their vote was cast and recorded properly. The point here - is that the the security in the system isn't in the machine, but rather in the system. Wouldn't that make more sense??

  28. Class Act by Doc+Ruby · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Both Clinton (D) and Nixon (R) were born poor, and made their political careers on their wits. Neither made any significant money outside their political careers, except books published after they left office. Even though they became rich by politics, they came from a disadvantaged underclass, exploiting America's class mobility to get power.

    There's lots of class war in America, where capitalism is rigged to preserve its best opportunities for rich families. But the president themself is more of a pawn in that war than an emblem of it.

    --

    --
    make install -not war

    1. Re:Class Act by Doc+Ruby · · Score: 3, Insightful

      I generally agree with you. But Nixon's crimes (for which he was not impeached before he preemptively resigned) were "comparatively minor" compared only with Bush Jr's crimes. Nixon had completely subverted the government with many crimes, culminating in the coverup of the Watergate breakin. Even the breakin was a serious crime: CIA agents (like Gordon Liddy) and gangsters (like his "Cubans") teaming up to rob Democratic Party offices of strategic documents during a presidential election campaign? That's pretty serious, even compared to Nixon's Vietnam escalation and covert expansion into nearby countries, and the rest of his imperial transgressions. Clinton lying on TV about a blowjob is "comparatively minor" in any regard, but Nixon was a menace.

      I note, in agreement with your points, that Nixon's Republican Party saw him resign without penalty for his crimes rather than even get impeached. While Clinton was impeached, and tried (and acquitted) in the Senate. The Republicans are much more of the "old boy network" than are the Democrats, so the comparative experiences are consistent.

      However, I didn't post about the old boy network. I posted about whether presidents can come from classes lower than Bush's bluebloods, or even Reagan's millionaires. Clinton and Nixon prove that they can. And, as you point out, just being president isn't enough for privileged criminal immunity. That takes the kind of class that Bush was born into: lying us into war, destroying the Treasury, trashing the Constitution, stealing elections, dividing the country, elevating religious establishments to official status, spying on Americans, letting Osama go and neglecting the invaded Afghanistan to fester... Those are exactly the crimes impeachment is reserved for. And the only reason Bush isn't hanging on a traitor's gallows is because of his class privilege.

      --

      --
      make install -not war

    2. Re:Class Act by demachina · · Score: 3, Insightful

      I think its possible that things have changed in recent years and it is more likely the establishment is now seeking to manipulate elections more heavily than they did in the 70's-90's. It should be noted the Kennedy-Nixon election was manipulated by a rich establishment player, Joe Kennedy, to keep the Nixon out of office.

      "But the president themself is more of a pawn in that war than an emblem of it."

      I would say they are both a pawn AND an emblem of it. There aren't many politicians in this country that are going to get elected without backing from the established powers. It does happen but the established powers normally seek to prevent it and remedy it when it happens, Jimmy Carter being the best recent example of a President the establishment abhored, and worked really hard to replace with an establishment favorites, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Carter was elected by popular revulsion at establishment corruption in the Nixon administration and it happened against the will of the establishment.

      As I recall one tool the establishment used to get rid of Carter was to manipulate the Iranian hostage crisis, probably including bribing Iran with arms if they would hold the American embassy hostages until after Carter lost the election, and then release them more or less the day Reagan took office giving his Presidency a HUGE and undeserved boost.

      Clinton's election was also an abberation. As you recall it happened in part because a rogue element, Ross Perot, entered the picture and altered the election out of establishment control. Were it not for him George H.W. Bush might have stayed in power and the Clintons would be a footnote in history.

      Three cardinal sins by the Clintons that made the establishment hate them were the attempt to socialize healthcare which turned a powerful establishment lobby against them, cutting defense spending which turned the most powerful lobby in the U.S. against them, and not being friendly to big energy for the trifecta. As a result the establishment sought to destroy Clinton's presidency for eight years, with scandal charges and impeachment. They failed but they did manage to severely injure the Democratic party and laid the foundation for 2000.

      It is my speculation that in the wake of Carter and Clinton the established powers have probably adopted a more aggressive stance in insuring the outcome they want in presidential, congressional elections including:

      - For example, serious and pervasive electoral chicanery in Florida which is the ultimate swing state for more than 8 years.

      - Manipulation of the Democratic primaries to, for example, destroy a populist rogue in Dean, and replace him with an incompetent establishment candidate in Kerry so they were insured a win in 2004. Howard Dean smacked in every respect of another Carter to the establishment, he nearly won and the establishment intervened just in the nick of time and shredded him through advertising campaigns and electoral manipulation through the corprate controlled news networks.

      The established powers do have a problem though. If your average Joe decides they like some populist candidate the establishmen hates, and they can't brainwash them out of it through the media they are screwed.

      The one and only solution is you put in place a voting system that can be manipulated to insure the "correct" outcome. You don't have to manipulate it a lot in an electoral college, you just have to be able to swing a small number of votes in a few key states. You can write off the possibility as conspiracy theory and paranoia, but it is a simple fact that elections have been manipulated for as long as there have been elections. The U.S. is not immune to it. The Kennedy-Nixon election was manipulated, so was Bush-Gore in Florida. Its highly likely it was manipulated again in 2004. Black box electronic voting just make it WAY easier to do and a lot harder to detect.

      The establishment, the Bush administration in particular, is constantly singing prai

      --
      @de_machina
    3. Re:Class Act by bm17 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      My theory is that information technology has advanced to a stage where polling can accurately predict election outcomes. As such, I think we are seeing narrower and narrower elections because any given partisan issue which gives one side an advantage will be coopted by the other side. We no longer have politician who stand for issues; they pick their issues to maximize their votes. Now that election science has progressed to such a state and we have closer and closer elections, there is that much more temptation to tamper with the election. In other words, a smaller and less detectable amout of tampering now has a much bigger payoff. As we saw in Florida in 2000, a very small "error" could decide the entire race.

  29. What the hell Taco?!?! by sgant · · Score: 3, Funny

    Are you even suppose to be submitting stories? Where's Zonk? Is Zonk on the phone? Get him in here....

    I just picture Taco in a bathrobe and slippers shuffling into "Slashdot Central" when Zonk and the others are out of the room and sitting down and submitting articles until they come back in, slap his hand and lead him back to his room to up his medications.

    Put down the submit key! PUT IT DOWN!

    --

    "Leo Fender was in a 'state of grace' when he designed the Stratocaster." -- Paul Reed Smith
    1. Re:What the hell Taco?!?! by Senzei · · Score: 2, Funny
      I just picture Taco in a bathrobe and slippers shuffling into "Slashdot Central" when Zonk and the others are out of the room and sitting down and submitting articles until they come back in, slap his hand and lead him back to his room to up his medications.

      I think you misspelled world of warcraft.

      --
      Slashdot: Where anecdotes and generalizations can be freely substituted for facts, logic, or intelligence
  30. Some more information about the testing... by no+haters · · Score: 4, Informative

    Over at blackboxvoting.org they have some more information about what tests were actually run on the machines, what they found, and what diebold's official response was. Apparently, BBV did not actually do the tests themselves, they arranged for 3rd party security experts to go in and do the analysis.

    Here's the link:

    http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth .cgi?file=/1954/19743.html

    It's on black box voting's website, so obviously it will be biased, but at least it gives more detail than the gloss-over provided by the tribune.

  31. Diebold vs Vegas? by xipho · · Score: 3, Insightful

    So in vegas there are these things called "slot machines". You put quarters in and get big money back. They are regulated. Its very hard to tamper with them. You'd think that voting by machine, which some might say is slightly more important, might be at least as equally highly regulated. This of course doesn't mean that its a good idea or that there still wouldn't be problems, just to say there are systems where machines (mostly those that track money) do a pretty good job.

    --

    only infrmatn esentil to understandn mst b tranmitd
  32. I'll take some of that action! by FirstTimeCaller · · Score: 3, Insightful

    $40K to re-image a drive and maybe poke around to make sure no key logging hardware is in place (although a lot of good that will do with a touch screen)? Sounds like easy money to me.

    --
    Wanted: witty unique signature. Must be willing to relocate.
  33. US gets voting it deserves by cdrguru · · Score: 2, Insightful
    In the US the requirements for voting are insane.
    • Results 15 minutes (or less) after polls close.
    • Absolute minimum of paid workers - nobody wants to do it. No unpaid "volunteers". Staff mostly comes from civil service positions where they work for a week every two years but have to be on city/county payroll as full time civil service positions.
    • All voting is at least county level, sometimes finer. I voted last week and there were three different ballots for a single precinct. Magnify this by the number of precincts nationwide - over 50,000 maybe more.

    Comparing this to other countries is pointless - nobody has as fine-grained voting, absurd expectations from the news-watching population and "zero participation". No purely paper system can keep up any longer, not because of "hanging chads" but because the news media will release "results" (real or made up) as soon as they can. Any delay for counting - by non-existent "volunteers" - is reported as potential fraud by the news media.

    Sure, some kind of countable paper might be nice, but it leads to silly things. If you sit five people down to count marks on 100,000 pieces of paper you will not get one result. At best, you will get two or three. And, it is not repeatable. We have had close elections recently that have gone through several recounts only to still be decided by one party giving up. I believe it was most recently the Govenor of Washington that was decided this way because the results were less than 1,000 votes different and each count produced different results, with a different winner.

    I know paper isn't the answer.

    As to the reasonablness of the $40K fee, it is real simple. Diebold is being asked to recertify the machines and they can charge anything they want. Government contracts like this always result in signficant charges like this because there is no option. It is stupid and naive to assume the fee would be anything like time-and-materials for a couple of real workers. There is also virtually unlimited liability if it is done wrong or not done at all. Compare this to recertifying a heart-lung machine for a hospital and consider that it would only be one person dead if it was wrong.

  34. Use a simpler system! by dkaimal · · Score: 2, Interesting

    As has been discussed so many times on /. most of the problems with the Diebold stems from the unneccessary complexity of the system

    Other systems in use like the Indian Electronic Voting Machines or EVMs, offer all of the functional features with a much higher level of security and accessibility and for a price that is very easy on the taxpayers. For a very interesting comparison look at http://techaos.blogspot.com/2004/05/indian-evm-com pared-with-diebold.html

    --
    Can I borrow your sig?
  35. Re:Diebold earned bias, but it's partly ATM protoc by buysse · · Score: 4, Insightful
    When you use a Diebold ATM, it prints a paper trail inside the box, and gives you a printed receipt with a transaction number that can be matched to both the internal database and to the paper trail inside. If the printer inside jams, it stops accepting transactions. Detailed information about the inner workings and software are shared with the banks, and all transactions are registered in real-time with a central system (nearly instantaneous over ISDN or similar connection).

    When was the last time your bank "forgot" that you took money from an ATM? Do you ever hear of problems like that? No? Why does it happen with a vote?

    I've become far more cynical about the process as every recount that's happened has had discrepancies. New, uncertified code is loaded on the machines the day before the election. The code is not available for examination by third parties (yet, a slot machine is.)

    Why were exit polls so much more accurate in the days of paper ballots? I find it unlikely that the methodology has gotten that much worse, especially considering that similar districts in the same election have varying margins of error that correlate to the voting system in use at the polling location.

    --
    -30-
  36. administrative access by jtamplin · · Score: 2, Insightful
    If the administrative access that the voting official has could ever be used to corrupt the election process, then it is already broken regardless of whether that official gives access to a third party.

    Besides, there should some verification test that can be run independently on the machine to verify it is working as intended, which would not require $40k and a plane trip to use. Clearly, as stated in the article, Diebold is wanting to make this person an example so no other election official will let anyone else take a look at the machine.

  37. It is a serious problem. by Irvu · · Score: 4, Informative

    In answer to the poster's question Diebold is behaving this way because the machines are not secure nor can they be. Anyone who gets a close look at them can see that. Diebold, like ES&S, and Sequoia is opting to muscle in and abuse people rather than admit that no machine is perfect and try to make them as good as possible.

    The companies have done similar things in other states. In Florida All 3 have refused to sell any systems to Volusia County. The county's Election Director Ion Sancho was the one who allowed his systems to be tested for security and discovered the "Hrusti Hack" namely whereby the machines will load arbitrary code stored on their memory cards and execute them. Such a hack makes it trivial to change ballots, erase totals, etc. It has since been shown that systems by Sequoia Inc. are vulnerable to the same hack.

    Volusia county is also the county that caused Al Gore to initially declare defeat in 2000. During election night Al Gore was leading Bush with a comfortable margin. At 10om someone uploaded a card that reported -16,022 votes for Al Gore and 10,000 for some socialist canidate all from a precinct with 600 voters.

    This card passed all of Diebold's stringent "safety checks" (whatever the hell they were) and changed the statewide totals putting Gore well behind Bush. Gore declared defeat. After that the county discovered the errors and reset the system claiming that the new totals were correct. Nevertheles the fact remains that the card got in, was loaded, and threw off a U.S. Presidential election.

    Now the companys won't sell to Volusia and are telling the state and the feds that it's Sancho's fault because he wants to test the systems for security. Florida's Governor Jeb Bush (brother of shrub) has also personally blamed Sancho for putting the state behind.

    Meanwhile the Department of Justice is threatening to sue the state or withold funds because the county has not bought new systems even though noone will sell said systems to them. The idea being, apparently, that he should just sell out the elections.

    At the end of the day the collusion and bullying going o by the companies, by the U.S. Government over HAVA (written by Bob Ney former congressmen for Diebold and now a leading figure in the Abramoff corruption investigation) and by frightened state governments is insane. At the end of the day the only losers will be the American People, of all stripes.

    1. Re:It is a serious problem. by dch24 · · Score: 2, Informative
      This is huge. I would really like to learn more about what happened in Floriday. Can you give me some sources to read?

      Thanks!

  38. Re:Sounds Reasonable by Omaze · · Score: 2, Insightful

    You're promoting what I would call a "Wizard of Oz" mentality. Never, ever, ever look behind the curtain because the truth may be more suprising than the threat.

    WTF? Do you really live in a world with such a sucker mentality? Perhaps your ivory tower is so high that you don't need to worry about it? "Don't worry, this works exactly the way I say it does, don't ask questions, just trust me..." is the most alarming thing you'll ever hear. If that statement doesn't fire up your suspicion circuits then, I have to say, you are ripe for the picking by every con-man in the world.

    --
    The government itself is not stealing your liberties. Their new programs are enabling criminals who will.
  39. anymore info? by hurfy · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Other than the slight bias in the posting.....at least one of the tagging keywords is biased ;)

    How many machines is this? They mention $40k, is that to check 4 machines or 40,000 machines. Makes a slight difference in whether the charge is reasonable. Can certainly see diebold point here, i wouldn't certify the machines when you let someone tinker with em.

    It said he was suspicious of the memory, so he can see if anything changes between the original, after blackbox, and after double checking by diebold i hope :) Nothing better change between ANY of those ;)

    Our $900 point of sale terminal prints a receipt, don't get why this is sooo hard to get voting terminals to do it when they cost $27,000,000 / x. Then a test run would be simple and not require any tinkering it seems.

    What do you do when you don't trust either side?

  40. It's Uncertifiable by NigelJohnstone · · Score: 4, Insightful

    If it can't be independently verified then it is uncertifable.

    The claim in previous elections is that it CAN be verified by running a trial ballot on the machines before the election. This is clearly false, since Diebold now asserts that this test will not detect this 'tinkering' you speak of.

    Which means that any Diebold 'tinkering' cannot be detected either. Which means the machines can't be certified as accurate.

  41. FAA Software Vetting Processes by pstav · · Score: 2

    You know, everyday about 100,000 people place their lives in the trust of software 'black boxes' on planes and not a peep from the newly political geeks.

    You gonna have to trust somebody, sometime.

    The bigger issue is how the votes are going to be tallyed? Hook them all up to the 'net so we get faster returns. Oh goodie...

    -ps

    1. Re:FAA Software Vetting Processes by Mr.+Bad+Example · · Score: 2, Insightful

      > You know, everyday about 100,000 people place their lives
      > in the trust of software 'black boxes' on planes and not a
      > peep from the newly political geeks.

      That's because the black boxes in planes are there to record what happens if something fucks up. The Diebold voting machines, on the other hand, are there to fuck something up and not record it.

  42. Why Deibold, and not these guys? by homebrewmike · · Score: 2, Informative

    http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/

    Government has to be transparent. If it isn't? Draw your own conclusions.

    It's a little embarrasing that the "Bringer of Democracy" can't even be trusted to roll out a fair voting system.

  43. County Clerk != Voting Clerk by ishmalius · · Score: 3, Informative

    Just a short civics refresher: A voting clerk is usually a retired little old lady volunteering to watch a polling station. A county clerk is a prominent elected official. Depending on the laws of the state, the county clerk likely has more than sufficient legal powers to call the election procedures into question. The summary makes the person sound like a poor downtrodden powerless gnome being bullied by an evil corporation. Maybe the story should tilt just a little bit in the other direction. But, still, more power to anyone who fights this questionable product.

  44. Re:40 votes per ballot is primitive by masklinn · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I am not american, but don't you think that this kind of things are stupid? I mean when there is an election I'm supposed to think about my choices extensively, to be as sure as possible, and to be able to vote reliably. How can I efficiently error check 15 choices, let alone think every one of them thoroughly?

    --
    "The way we can tell it's C# instead of Haskell is because it's nine lines instead of two." -- wadler
  45. how can he possibly win? by Dareth · · Score: 2, Funny

    how can he possibly win?

    That just depends on how good of a coder he is and how well he hid his backdoors now doesn't it?

    Unless he spent all his time just rigging it once, not to be able to do it when he wanted. Maybe he put some cool eastereggs in and in 2008 Fidel Castro will win in Florida!

    --

    I only look human.
    My mother is a halfling and my dad is an ogre, so that makes me an Ogreling
    1. Re:how can he possibly win? by stinerman · · Score: 3, Interesting

      All jests aside, I think its going to take someone hacking the machine to display some incredible result for people to get excited about this issue. I'm thinking someone needs to hack machines in a small, safe D or R state -- perhaps Wyoming or DC. Just imagine if John McCain won DC or Hilary Clinton won Wyoming ... both with over 90% of the vote. That'd raise some eyebrows and, more importantly, not affect the end result of the election, assuming 3 EVs wouldn't change the balance.

      Any takers?

  46. It's NEVADA! by Bob+Cat+-+NYMPHS · · Score: 3, Funny

    The $40k is for the booze and the hookers. The techs will have to gamble with their own money, though.

  47. Re:Stupid by Conare · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Here is the link to the article mentioned in parent.

    http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth .cgi?file=/1954/19743.html

    Also, Blackbox did NOT conduct the audit. They recommended two security companies to the COUNTY clerk who hired them in line with his purview to conduct an independent audit. BTW, this is not some random clerk as one poster suggested. County Clerk is an elected office in my county.

    Also, there were apparently 3 versions of the voting machine delivered (So which one is the validated one?)

    Also, the delivered machines had been marked as having failed acceptance testing BY DIEBOLD.

    Also, the memory discrepancy cannot be accounted for by Diebold's font explanation.

    Also, apparently Diebold is running around replacing motherboards on other delivered systems.

    Question: Why aren't we throwing bricks yet? This is way worse then bad French labor laws.

    Note to the literal minded: I am not actually advocating that anyone engage in violent rioting, however a good loud peaceful protest is definitely in order. And I am not one to protest frivolously (see sig)

    --
    Stop Continental Drift! Reunite Gondwanaland!
  48. You wouldn't need analog. by jd · · Score: 2, Interesting
    You'd just need a tamper-proof electronic design. EPROMs (not EEPROMs, or Flash RAM, just regular non-reprogrammable EPROMs) would be pretty good for this. You write the code onto the EPROM, burn it with a UV, and then it cannot be altered. You then solder the EPROM onto the board, so replacement by someone with access to the electronics is impossible.


    No sane designer would allow anything to be loaded onto such a machine after construction time. If you need to replace the code, you should replace the motherboard entirely. That is the only guaranteed way of ensuring that the software and hardware fully match up.


    Ideally, such machines should have either no Operating System at all, or have a very minimal hardware abstraction layer. OSKit would almost be overkill. The reason being that you don't want to multitask, memory management can all be static (as all structures are of fixed size and number), drivers will be minimal and linear, the system will be fixed in design, and you don't need any kind of system library.


    None of this is rocket science. No, correction - a lot of rocket computers are built along similar sorts of ideas, as they need to be robust, fast, efficient and secure.

    --
    It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
  49. Are you aware of the test in Florida? by VP · · Score: 3, Informative

    Black Box Voting demonstrated in Florida that whoever has access to the flash memory card, used to keep track of the votes can determine the results of the voting on that machine: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/1559 5.html?1141791589. No tinkering with the machine is necessary.

    I would say even the submitter's point of view is not biased enough - Diebold should get a corporation death penalty for even agreeing to provide voting machines without paper trail. This is such no-brainer, that no amount of outrage is sufficient.

  50. Re:Diebold earned bias, but it's partly ATM protoc by pthisis · · Score: 2, Informative
    If the printer inside jams, it stops accepting transactions.

    Well, I've never seen one jam; but I've seen them run out of paper plenty of times and keep right on running transactions.


    I doubt you've seen this with the internal printer. Remember the parent said: "When you use a Diebold ATM, it prints a paper trail inside the box, and gives you a printed receipt with a transaction number that can be matched to both the internal database and to the paper trail inside. If the printer inside jams, it stops accepting transactions."

    ATMs will continue running if the external receipt printer jams/runs out of paper/etc. But they stop accepting transactions if the internal printer (that prints the internal paper audit trail) jams.
    --
    rage, rage against the dying of the light
  51. Re:Voting or gambling by zippthorne · · Score: 2, Informative

    Actually, the answer to your question is, "yes."

    Of course, you have to know about it a couple of months in advance, so an "absentee" ballot can be sent to you, but there is no requirement that you actually go anywhere to get one. They are offered to shut-ins for instance.

    --
    Can you be Even More Awesome?!
  52. A case of too many cooks, maybe? by Anonymous+Brave+Guy · · Score: 2, Interesting
    For example, besides electing a new mayor, we voted on what is to be done with a vacant building on the waterfront, whether to keep floride in the city water system, etc.

    I suspect this is part of the problem.

    I've long held the view that the most effective way to get a reasonably democratic political system is to have the electorate vote on exactly two things: deciding the Big Issues (constitutional changes and the like) directly; and electing the representatives who will decide on the Little Issues for them.

    My own experience, from running a medium-sized, not-for-profit organisation, is that few people have the time to fully research every choice that the management must make, even if they have the inclination. If you rely too much on mass voting, you get well-intentioned people actually voting against their best interests through lack of understanding, failure to see the big picture and appreciate the wider or longer-term implications of their vote, etc. Thus you can't make all the detailed little decisions by consultation with the entire electorate, or even in a big committee; it ceases to represent the best interests of the electorate beyond a certain point.

    What does work, IME, is:

    1. creating a basic framework (in national politics, that's your constitution, basic legal processes, etc.) within which a given administration will work
    2. electing representatives who you think will act most in alignment with your personal preferences on lesser issues
    3. letting them get on with representing you.
    Naturally, such representatives may still consult their electorate on any given issue, and any given voter may contact their representative to express a view on any given subject. A representative who fails to consult adequately when it is appropriate risks not being re-elected, so as long as your terms of office are of reasonable duration, there is relatively low risk of abuse. You can also have a safeguard where if a sufficiently large number of voters want to vote on a particular subject, they can force a vote with or without the consent of their representatives.

    This removes entirely the need for routine voting on minor issues like how to use a building or what to put in water. I suspect that almost all such issues are best left to be decided by representatives with the time to investigate the implications properly anyway. Joe Public just won't know in a lot of cases, and the voting will essentially be a random number generator with a small bias due to people who actually do understand any given decision.

    The only remaining question then becomes how big is big enough to vote on separately, and what structure of representatives will you use: do you elect just the national legislature, or local officials too; do you elect major public offices like the heads of public services or just the political guys?

    Once you've sorted that out, hopefully you never have more than a handful of people to elect at once. Have your voting machine tally up the voter's choice for each decision/election electronically, but have it also print separate, human-readable slips, on different paper colours for different decisions, and have the voter put these slips in matching colour-coded boxes. Bingo, you get instant results from the machines when voting closes, but you have an easy manual verification of the count if it's close and/or challenged.

    --
    If you disagree, post your argument. (-1, Overrated) isn't your personal censorship tool for views you don't like.
  53. Re:What you're missing... by ewhac · · Score: 4, Insightful
    What everyone is missing is that this clerk allowed unauthorized access to the machine, regardless of the intent. He went beyond the scope of his responsibility and did not follow the chain of command.

    No, we're not missing that at all. It seems evident that the Chain of Command was either dazzled, baffled, or bribed into accepting these faulty machines from an ethically deficient corporation, and the only way the integrity of the voting process could be preserved was to solicit an independent examination into the machines' trustworthiness.

    That the Chain of Command is now throwing a hissy fit about "warranty violations" serves only to illustrate that they are paying attention to the wrong things. Of course you independently test the machines. When you're dealing with something this important, you never believe the four-color glossies; you acquire your own facts and test stuff.

    Schwab

  54. I took apart an ES&S touchscreen voting machi by goombah99 · · Score: 3, Informative

    I went to a demo-day for voting machines. When I got to the voting booth no one could see what I was doing. So I flipped over the machine, and removed the back panel. I yanked out the voting flash cards. put them in my pocket. Then I took them back out of my pocket and put them back into the machine. This was all done while two vendors stood 3 feet away watching just me. their was no curtain either, just the carol enclosure was sufficient to obsure their view.
    Not making this up.

    I noticed that the next time they cam to town thie newer model which has a paper logger attached no longer fit in the voting carol, So it was mounted on a stand and this would have been slightly harder to flip upside down. On the otherhand if I were a poll worker this would not have been a problem. The places where the tags and seals attach is easily defeated since you can snap out the plastic hinges.

    The point here is not that you fould not make one with a better design but that they chose not to. Just as diebold chose to use interpreted code on the ballot configuration cards that has the authority to re-write the vote files.

    SO it's not that you cannot make a secure system--eventually--but that there isn't even the slightest effort to attend to some mac-truck size holes. they know they are their and they prefer to hide them in propriatary obfuscation not secure them. These are not people we can just trust because they seem nice. You have every right to be 100% skeptical because every time someone looks hard we find they are not fixed right.

    --
    Some drink at the fountain of knowledge. Others just gargle.
  55. Pick the right tool for the job by kimvette · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Computers are over-used. Why the hell do we need computer-operated toasters (yes, the good ol' simple toaster is often microprocessor-assisted)? Computers are overkill for deciding how light or dark your toast should be.

    Likewise, computers are probably the wrong tool for voting. Accountability is removed, we've now put elections at risk of hardware crashes, software hacks, network mishaps, and so forth. Not only that, if the system IS hacked, how does one find that vote I cast against Hillary in the 2008 election? Are votes in hacked disgregarded in districts where the system has been tampered with (bad), or is the final result delayed until another election can be scheduled on a brand-new system (not quite as bad, but still bad?), or on paper (which takes us back to where we were in 2004)?

    Computers are great tools (I wouldn't be on /, if I didn't think so) but I think we over-use them. Modern society treats the computer as the one-size-fits-all BFH. Computers are possibly the worst solution for elections because:

      - If networked, can be tampered with remotely, so no amount of police officers guarding over the machines can prevent against crackers
      - If wireless, can be interfered with very easily
      - Unless hardened, a highly-directional antenna with a moderate-power transmitter can interfere with the box's operation
      - Where is the paper trail in the event of the above?
      - Paper ballots can be counted under the supervision of both major parties and independents. Not possible with electronically-cast votes.
      - If an exploit at the voting console is discovered, what can prevent ballot stuffing? With paper ballots, it's easy; if you drop more than one ballot in, at minimum you will be disallowed from dropping it in the box. Best scanario, you get arrested and charged with a federal crime for being such a dumbass.

    In a republic where the representatives are elected democratically, abandoning the paper ballot is folly. Even with the pain of Florida elections arising because a handful of idiots cannot follow very clear arrows and directions, the paper ballot is the very best tool for electing officials. The election is documented with physical evidence, very easily supervised, and tampering is very easily discovered immediately and the idiots responsible being held responsible with very little investigation required.

    Leave electronic voting technology up to surveys, unofficial NON-BINDING referenda (e.g., a referendum put forth for representatives to gather official majority public opinion), and the private sector.

    Heck, even in IT, computers are not always the best solution for tracking all data or accomplishing all tasks.

    --
    The Christian Right is Neither (Christian nor right). See: Matthew 23, Matthew 25, Ezekiel 16:48-50
  56. He's not paranoid ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Who posts this drivel? I read it twice... and the only conclusion I see is "anonymous reader" who posted it will eventually end up going "postal" on the steps of Diebold's corporate headquarters. And CMDR Taco, for letting that stuff go through? Ridiculous. No wonder /. is dying.

  57. Why not ask Diebold. by Irvu · · Score: 2, Informative

    Their internal e-mails (now leaked) confirm what I said:
    http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0310/S00211.htm

  58. Actually, this is a mild case.... by happyslayer · · Score: 2, Insightful

    A broad outline of what happened to our state (and my county, Scioto County) because of Diebold machines is here. http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19/20 05/1593

    The article talks about memory cards and their problems, but there were about a dozen or more other problems with the setup, even disregarding the possibility of hacking.

    Diebold has sold voting machines to Utah. Diebold is evil. They want to bully a poor innocent election clerk.

    Funny as it sounds, that's exactly how it went here in my local county, and I was involved in the contracting process (A losing battle...word from "on high" was that you either choose Diebold or get no money from the state.) I pushed for another company because the Diebold submission was a load of technical crap.

    And, best of all, nothing I've seen or read about since then (North Carolina, anyone?) has done anything to change my mind.

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  59. Re:Historically inaccurate by swillden · · Score: 2, Informative

    They even tried to move the 'voting' to a back room. You can't believe that was a good system?

    Yes, I do believe that is a good system.

    The difference between the situation you describe and a purely electronic solution is that in the latter you'd have no idea there were any manipulations going on.

    The manual system is creaky and requires lots of oversight, lots of debate, lots of ongoing scrutiny, but at least it's *visible* (note that they tried to move to the back room, but failed).

    Untill we get ID requirements to vote the machine and count error will remain much smaller then the registration error (or as they said in Chicago, 'Vote early and often').

    Agreed that registration is a bigger issue. I don't think ID requirements are the problem -- at least in my state (Utah) you already have to present valid, current, government-issued ID in order to vote. The regisration issue (here, at least) isn't so much a problem of excessive voting, but of excluding people, preventing them from registering and therefore voting.

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