Slashdot Mirror
Hackers Clone E-Passport
mrops writes "I guess the skeptical Slashdot community always knew that e-passports are a big waste of time and money; now German security consultants have been able to successfully clone e-passports, even onto building access cards. FTA: 'The whole passport design is totally brain damaged,' Grunwald says. 'From my point of view all of these RFID passports are a huge waste of money. They're not increasing security at all.'"
But this unfortunately is not going to stop the governments from wasting money on them.
I just renewed my passport, hoping to get in before the "biometric" passports became mandatory in the UK (Not that there's actually *any* biometric data on them), but sadly I've ended up with a RFID chip embedded in the back page of my new one.
The booklet that comes with it helpfully suggests ways to damage the chip, such as microwaving it, but doing so will render the passport useless, unfortunately. Anyone know where I can get a good tinfoil wallet from?
Of course, that won't stop the mad bombers with their IEDs from detonating their bombs in the presense of an ePassport. The video from TFA shows yet another weakness in this crappily designed (i.e. vendor driven) system.
John
Now if we could only enabled these RFID passports to download XML via SOAP on a Web 2.0 platform with XmlHttpRequest, Ruby on Rails would finally take off.
Execute? [Y/N] _
Now I can go make my own without all the hassle!
While the headline sounds scary, when you examine it closer, this isn't really surprising. The ability to copy the passport is not the issue here. The key point of the technology was to have the issuing government digitally sign the information contained in the passport. This means that a forger cannot simply tip-ex out the name and and put in a new one ;-)
The article did not mention if the German passport contains bio-metric data. i.e. a digital copy of the photo.
This combined with a digital signature of the photo would make the system very secure indeed.
The passport inspector simply scans the data and compares the photo to the person standing before him.
I don't see how this "hack" compromises the security of the system, except in cases where the inspecting authority misuses or misunderstands the basis of security in the system.
There are only 10 types of people in the world. Those who understand binary and those who don't!
Our money.
So he cloned a passport. As in, a verbatim copy with the same name, date of birth, etc. He explicitly says that he _can't_ (at the moment) change his name, date of birth, etc, because of the hashes.
So his grand achievement is... what? That that a fellow called John Smith could thus make a fake passport that still says John Smith?
Ah yes, so he could clone someone else's chip, if he can steal their passport, and place it on his own passport. Except now he has a passport that says John Smith and a chip that says Jane Doe. As he himself acknowledges it, it will work only if someone at the border/airport/whatever would just swipe the thing over a reader, but not bother actually reading it. And, oh, if also their scanner is broken and doesn't also read the "John Smith" printed in OCR letters on the real pass.
It sounds like some clever hack, but frankly, then what's the improvement over just stealing a passport and using it as it is? If the condition of passing for Jane Doe instead of John Smith is hoping that they'll just swipe it over the reader and not actually look at it, then simply a stolen passport would work just as well and with far less of a hassle.
So, basically, this is just someone's verbal masturbation, rather than some clever hack.
A polar bear is a cartesian bear after a coordinate transform.
Safe from surreptitious cloning? Big deal. You routinely hand over your passport at hotels, etc... while in Europe.
you mean data can be copied? Holy fuck! Stop the presses and halt the manufacturing this is clearly useless because data can be copied. Seriously why is this a big deal? Was it any real suprise that data could be cloned? The purpose at least as far as I understand it is an additional measure of security, not the only measure. Yes, if you only go off the chip, you're screwed, but hey, that's why you don't only go off the chip. No one is saying this will stop forgeries, just that it will make it more difficult. It's one more thing that needs to be done and done right which means it's one more way to possibly catch a forgery. Surely no one thinks the new coloring on new money is going to stop forgery but it will hopefuly make it more difficult and time consuming. Is the coloring worthless because forgery can still happen?
T Money
World Domination with a plastic spoon since 1984
After reading this article, the RFID thing isn't nearly as bad as I thought.
1) They aren't eliminating the physical passports. So all the physical protections (watermarking) still apply.
2) They are shielding the passports so they can't be remotely read.
3) You need to send a cryptographic key which makes it even more difficult to read remotely (although I don't understand how this works).
4) They are hard to tamper with because of the hashes (assuming they are good hashes, this is comparable to watermarks).
Having said that, I'm not sure why the RFID thing is even useful. A bar code would be simpler, although no more or less tamper proof. And there are existing machines which can read passports by scanning them and OCRing. They are very reliable since passports use high-quality printed text with the characters in known fonts and positions.
It doesn't give away a lot, it doesn't have to. A passport must be inspectable by anyone so the spec on how to read it must be pretty much public. There is an (optional) electronic signature mechanism, but this predicates an international public key infrastructure. The bank where I work has enough problems getting one of those together, let alone an international organisation. PKI is very hard. Google for references on this.
Key compromise means that all issues documents are then compromised. Can you imagine a country recalling all its passports?
See my journal, I write things there
Let's just say that the same applies then to forging a digitally signed document:
1. copy the document
2. figure out how to change it while hashing to the same digital signature
3. ???
4. profit
Yes, but see, step 1 is a non-achievement there. Step 2 is the real issue. _That_ what digital signatures really prevent. Seeing some idiot come up and say "ha ha, digital signatures are useless, because I just copied a CD that had a digitally signed file on it" would just tell me that the poor idiot is completely clueless and doesn't even know what he's talking about. It wasn't step 1 that was supposed to be made harder by those signatures, it was step 2 all along. Wake me up when you achieve that.
Same applies here.
Copying a RFID chip verbatim is a non-issue and non-achievement. It's like copying a floppy or a CD. _Of_ _course_ it can be copied, and only a complete ignoramus would make that their grand achievement.
Wake me up when you can actually change the data. And for that matter when the plan is less retarded than hoping that noone will look in the pass _and_ that they'll let you scan a building pass together with / instead of the passport. It's such a "cunning" plan that only Baldrick of Black Adder fame could honestly think it "cunning".
A polar bear is a cartesian bear after a coordinate transform.
Don't German security consultants also specialize in building super-bunkers for Islamic terror states like Iran?
And now they've compromised the future US passport as well?
3 words to describe this -
state sponsored terrorism.
I know you are humorous. But you are insightful in your humor. See how easy it is to put something against anyone in the "war on terror" ? Now in three sentences, that is far-fetching, but if it was released day after day in news report, I am confident you could turn the majority of US opinion against any country in the world.
The Wise adapts himself to the world. The Fool adapts the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the Fool.
In order to be "secure" against fakery a passport, or any document should:
1) Have an digital signature of all the data, or at least a signature of a strong one-way hash.
2) Have a means to verify the signature, and that the signer's key hasn't been repudiated.
3) Have a means to verify the hash is legit, i.e. rehash the data on the spot.
4) Have a means to verify the data in question matches the printed version of the document, e.g. a computer screen that shows the digitized picture and the other data that should be on the printed document. A human, or perhaps a computer, can then compare that with the actual document.
Steps 1, 2, and 3 are at the heart of any digitally-signature-validation scheme. Step #4 will detect misuse, as someone using a cloned passport will "look" the same as someone using a stolen-but-legitimate one to the checker.
An alternative, where bandwidth is available, is to have the document-issuing authority validate the document: Upload the document to the authority, and have it send back a "valid" or "not valid" response. This is essentially what happens with credit cards: the name, card #, and expiration date are passed on to the bank or the bank's agent, and the merchant gets back a code saying "card is valid," "card not valid," or one of several other codes such as "card reported stolen/missing."
There are still 2 problems with this approach:
1) The identical twin or look-alike problem.
2) Privacy issues if passport data is compromised.
The twin problem is mitigated by the digitized version of the handwritten signature, a fingerprint, notation of scars, or other items which look-alikes are less likely to share. Privacy issues are in principle no more than they are today with stolen passports, ASSUMING no information that is not on the printed passport finds its way to the embedded electronic data. However, electronic data is much easier to deliver to fraudsters than paper data, and passport theives aren't likely to spend the time typing or scanning in data from a paper passport. The best cure for this is to encrypt the data.
RFID is not required for a secure document. All RFID does is make the data easier to read, which is good for those who want to read the passports without contact them, be they freind or foe. Hmm, maybe someone should invent an RFID tag with an "on" switch.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
An insecure, RFID-driven passport is the perfect thing for making it too dangerous for Americans to travel safely abroad. If an American had one of these in Lebanon, Hezbollah could walk through a public place with a RFID reader and discretely find some good targets of hostage-taking opportunity. It'd be easier for the Chinese police, for example, to track American visitors.
Don't go abroad! Don't see the world except through the lens of CNNABCCBSNBCFOXNPR! That's how the political class wants it. A population that is scared to travel is a population that can't as easily see the world on its own and make its own decisions.
I'm not even an expert in the field, but an RFID tag with an "on" switch seems pretty obvious. Just put the switch between the antenna and the rest of the device. It can be either a traditional on-off switch or a pressure-sensitive "off when not pressed" switch. Imagine an RFID-enabled passport that ONLY broadcasts when someone was holding down the "broadcast" switch.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
Too late. The majority of US opinion is already against every country in the world, "Freedom" fries anyone? The only exceptions to this are a few countries like England and Australia, which most Americans think of a funny sidekicks to Uncle Sam, as long as they know their place and don't start getting uppity. Or countries like Sweden, Norway, etc. who most Americans never think of at all, and would never remember if asked to name all the countries in the world.
There is one exception that does prove your rule though... the US itself. Just look at the idiocy, promoted day-after-day in the media, being perpetrated by the American govt. and all you get is angry comments, from the general public, to the effect of "why does the NYT hate America?"
"Unheard of means only it's undreamed of yet,
Impossible means not yet done." ~~ Julia Ecklar
Appearently, the US Government will be doing exactly this - they have hashes to prevent altering the data and human inspectors to prevent data mismatch.
Still, is RFID that's activatable without human intervention really necessary? I say no.
Is lack of encryption irresponsible? I say yes.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
Why is it so hard to implement a challange-response mechanism to avoid airing the entire passport data?
Especially when they are going to store fingerprints /images/iris scans on the chips, I would expect the passport chip to do the matching up. (Of course, it has to legitimate itself, too.) Just imagine having to change your fingerprints because of identity theft. Americans already have a taste of this with social security numbers.
BTW, if all you'd like to broadcast is your name and number, just print a barcode. That works perfectly fine in Chile (or Colombia? sorry).
-- up-modding policy: make a good point, write self-contained.
Unfortunately, we've already seen that governments place a higher importance on the appearence of security rather than actual security. For direct evidence, just look at airport screening.
I'll conceed that x-ray'ing baggage would highlight obvious weapons like knives or guns. However, as we've seen from the likes of Yousef Josef and other terrorists, people can smuggle bomb components on plains using items, such as watches, which would not be picked up by the usual airport screening proceedures. Add to that the ever so effective comparison of the name and date on my boarding pass with the name on whatever casually inspected ID I provide. Please don't even get me started on how rediculous making me take off my shoes is.
If governments were really serious about airport security, they would adapt a model similar to the one used in Israel. Roving groups of heavily armed, well trained commandos that stop "interesting" individuals and select them for additional screening. However, this method would be too inconvienent and intrusive for travelers (Americans).
This is the state of governmental security. To the not very determined to violate it, lay individual, it appears that there is SOME kind of security in place. With a slight bit more investigation, someone with a bit of desire can easily violate it, thereby rendering the "security" utterly useless. But hey, they have to have some way to spend our tax dollars, right?
-Runz
The German passports do not employ the optional active authentication standard as specified by ICAO. Active authentication means that there is a private key within the passport. This private key can be used in a challenge-response authentication of the passport chip. The public key itself is stored in a data group on the passport, which is protected against alteration in the same way the biometric data is protected against alteration (a digital signature from the state).
I %20mrtds%20ICC%20read-only%20access%20v1_1.pdf
Nobody seems bothered to even *look* at the ICAO specifications, including 100% of the previous responses on e-Passports on slashdot. Why the hell should politicians even bother with citizens if not even the technological top 1% takes an interest?
http://www.icao.int/mrtd/download/documents/TR-PK
Check out chapter 2.3.2, 3.2.2, Annex D, Annex G.1.2
Just wait it out. A year from now they will see they made a mistake. Unfortunately it will be at the expense of travelers. But hey the only way politicians will listen is after the bad thing you predict will happen happens. They only wear hindsite glasses.
Can I bum a sig?
Renew your passport at a consulate overseas. Incidentally, this is also much quicker than renewing it in the UK (typically takes 2 weeks). The only snags are the obvious ones that you need to stay out of the UK for long enough to get your new passport, and you need an overseas address (maybe a friend's).
I would not advise trying the obvious trick of just mailing your old passport to a friend in country X with all the forms, and asking them to post them to the consulate as though you were in X, then post the passport back to you when it arrives at their address. Cross-border postal mail is checked more often than most people realize, and I have heard of cases where identity documents have been removed.
From TFA:
"What this person has done is neither unexpected nor really all that remarkable," Moss says. "(T)he chip is not in and of itself a silver bullet.... It's an additional means of verifying that the person who is carrying the passport is the person to whom that passport was issued by the relevant government."
Moss also said that the United States has no plans to use fully automated inspection systems; therefore, a physical inspection of the passport against the data stored on the RFID chip would catch any discrepancies between the two.
If the RFID passports were to used like some kind of gas card--where a traveller just waves his or her passport through a reader, gets a beep and a green light, and goes on--this news would be a problem.
But that's not how they'll be used. There will still be an inspector checking the RFID data against the printed data, and against the physical appearance of the traveller. Like they already do now, for crying out loud.
In the USA the passport jacket will have a metal lining so that the RFID cannot be read when the passport is closed.
Little venture I started about a year ago....
Stylish RFID blocking passport cases and wallets
http://www.difrwear.com/
While I 100% agree with your first paragraph, it's just a "something must be done!" kind of response to keep the voters happy and concentrate power in DC.
Your next couple of points should be reconsidered carefully:
There is no evaulation of technology
On the contrary, there is quite a bit of evaluation of technology. Only the U.S. gov't can afford to pay people to spend the time to come up with these torture tests. My current employer was very briefly involved early on in the process for the new U.S. passport and I can tell you the tests the Feds came up with are very high quality tests that have improved the technology and force companies to better comply with ISO standards.
Please consider RFID passports as a response to the demand for *much* more international travel in even larger planes. In order to more accurately process many more people through customs at airports around the world, this is a good way to do it more efficiently.
Finally, I believe no one is claiming they are "secure" as in magically impenetrable. They are not. And like most security systems, the critical control points of entry are probably not staffed by the "brightest and best" so the usual systemic failures will occur. Only, the wait at customs will be a little shorter and govt's will have more data (not necessarily better or higher quality!) as to who is entering when.
http://www.maxineudall.com/2010/02/should-economists-be-sued-for-malpractice.html
In the wired-article are some fotos with a RFID-shielding device for the passport./ products_id/130
cheers,
axel
I found it here https://shop.foebud.org/product_info.php/cPath/30
I used to set off security alarms in stores pretty much anywhere because of a RFID key for my condo. I found though, that keeping the RFID key right next to my cell (candybar) would negate the RFID signal, and I could get through stores with no alarm.
Neil is that you? Yeah yeah, it's me... Neil...
The addition of extra identifying characteristics to the passport system widens the skillset required to accurately produce a forgery. As few people are capable of the full range of these skills, the cost of the forgery increases and thus its value goes down.
You can be reasonably sure that the most dangerous entities have access to these skillsets anyway.
To create a full passport it would therefore be necessary to clone the passport itself, physically alter the appearance of the picture to match yours and ensure all the data is consistent.
Or blackmail/bribe someone who issues passports...
He was planning to give a demo today at BlackHat in Vegas. Look at what they did to Skylarov for Adobe. You think they're going to sit idly by while some *gasp* foreigner shows them up? THOU SHALT NOT TAUNT THE HAPPY FUN BALL
Seriously, I'm waiting for word that he cancelled his presentation "voluntarily" or has been arrested.