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First AACS Blu-Ray/HD-DVD Key Revoked
Thomas Charron writes "An update posted for Intervideo WinDVD 8 confirms that it's AACS key has been possibly revoked. WinDVD 8 is the software which had its device key compromised, allowing unfettered access to Blu-Ray and HD-DVD content, resulting in HD movies being made available via many torrent sites online. This is possibly the first known key revocation which has taken place, and little is known of the actual process used for key revocation. According to the release, 'Please be aware that failure to apply the update will result in AACS-protected HD DVD and BD playback being disabled,' which pretty much confirms that the key revocation has already taken place for all newly released Blu-Ray and HD-DVD discs."
I don't completely understand what's going on here. And that's exactly my point. I don't want to understand. Does this breach disable any user's player until they update their hardware? Will some disks play and others not? (I'm kind of making this up, but I'm role-playing what most consumers are experiencing based on my limited anecdotal observations).
I don't want to know the ins and outs of the security of the media. I want it to work like the old CD players. I insert a disk, I watch a movie. Simple. Easy. Done.
I think above and beyond the hurdle of introducing a new format, ahem, two new formats, for DVDs this kind of hiccup could be fatal to the rollout. People are annoyed enough with little things (cables plugged in wrong way, audio/video receivers improperly configured, etc.), when it comes to having to update firmware to be able to play stuff they've paid for, they're going to be mad. And maybe some, maybe many are going to rethink their upgrade plans and find regular DVD okay enough. And maybe people who have been considering HD DVD will stay away in droves. Fingers crossed.
No one can deny how convenient this is for the customers. The companies love us.
Copyright infringement is "piracy" in the same way DRM is "consumer rape"
How many of you like to have your computers controlled by media corporations and Microsoft? Voting time is now. http://defectivebydesign.org/
so if WinDVD 8's AACS key gets banned, basically all WinDVD 8 has to do is issue a patch to give it a new key, so that future discs will work? seems like that would be something that would be hackable and exploitable... especially if other aacs keys are known, i imagine hacks would come out to change the program's aacs key to any known unblocked aacs key...
it's entirely possible that i have this all wrong.
this is what's more curious to me.. when/if a hardware player ever is compromised, what are you gonna do then? the content owner denies your access to their content.. you think the manufacturer will step up with an "oops, our bad; here's a new unit to play stuff.." har.
.. that might actually be one class-action suit i could hop on and enjoy, just to watch potential legal fallout. :)
i don't even know if this has happened with dvd or how possible it is.. but i have to think the potential is out there, and unless the unit has some sort of design foresight to resolve some issue (firmware updates to my bluRay player? and what kinda new 'security' hole is that?!?) i'd think you could be toast.
-r
-'fester
Update your software now because you are may be guilty of a crime.
What are the implications for hardware players? Will they now need to be updated, or does this key revocation only apply for WinDVD in particular. If so, does this mean that it would be possible to hack apart a hardware HDDVD/Bluray player and take its key? This doesn't seem like a very secure system if that kind of attack is possible.
Soo, what if PS3s key gets revoked? Would all the owners have to return their machine?
Particles, stuff that matters.
And the update must have the new key in it!
And we know how smart InterVideo have been about protecting the keys so far...
The fact of the matter is that if it can be decrypted and the user has physical access, there is *no way* to make "unbreakable" DRM. None. At all.
Especially on most modern CPU architectures where memory and the bus are unencrypted. The data *has* to go through RAM and over the bus.
Therefore there *is no protection*
It takes *one* decrypt to defeat their supposed purpose "keeping them dirty pirates from getting it" and this decrypt will *always* happen. But yet they waste millions in R+D money making ridiculously bad systems to try to prevent something that's physically impossible to prevent.
Spam a bunch of new disks with an update patch?
Can you be Even More Awesome?!
This is another new "Upgrade Cycle" that the (legit) consumer has to pay for in the end. How so? How long is WinDVD 8 going to be supported; aka how many patches are going to be issued for said software, also for how long.
It should be a lot more difficult to get the keys for a hardware player than for a software player. WinDVD made an easy target because it is running on a general-purpose computer, which means that the key is sitting there in memory at some point to be snooped out. It's not easy, I'm sure, to find that key among the many megabytes of code, but it's there.
A hardware player isn't a general purpose computer. I'm sure it's possible for somebody with the right hardware to snoop inside its memory (say, inserting a special thingamabob between the memory and the mother board that allows you to read all reads/writes as they go past), but it's not going to be readily available.
Presumably somebody will be the first one to do this, and that is sure going to be a bad day for both formats. People are prepared to upgrade their software; it happens all the time and it's a relatively painless process for most people. Upgrading your hardware is not going to be easy, and it may not even be possible. (I used to own a DVD player which was "upgraded" by downloading a patch, burning it onto a CD, and putting that in the machine, but I don't know if every DVD player supports that.)
If they start denying keys on hardware players, there will be a world of pain, but I don't expect this to shatter the world. They'll just advise everybody to download a patch with a new key.
Oh, come ON!
"An update posted for Intervideo WinDVD 8 confirms that it's AACS key has been possibly revoked. WinDVD 8 is the software which had it's device key compromised,
Really, IT'S != ITS
how long until
Does anyone seriously doubt that there will be a day-zero crack of the new keys?
...and certainly not the last. Beware, HD-DVD/Blu-Ray consumers, you're in for a bumby road of software patches and exploits that move twice as fast!
And the uber encrypted movie only on BluRay will be filmed in a Thai movie cinema and sold for $2 on the street... where's the protection again?
I want to delete my account but Slashdot doesn't allow it.
You distribute a shared secret, it gets compromised you have to update every user with the new key.
What really happens.....people get annoyed with the hassles and either choose a better method, or no encryption at all.
Not a happy future for the current generation of HD players.
(firmware updates to my bluRay player? and what kinda new 'security' hole is that?!?)
You may gawk at the idea, and though you are correct that it would probably present a security hole for hardware and networks aren't well protected, with more and more of the home becoming wired/wireless (TVs, toasters, media centers, stereo systems, the Wii/360/PS3) it won't be long before your cutting edge Blu-Ray players are also on-line 24/7, getting firmware updates while you sleep.
My Samsung (BD-P1000 iirc) doesn't have a network jack unless I am missing it somewhere.
Thank you for using the word "customers" instead of "consumers." Consumers are force-fed; customers have a choice.
But therein lies the problem with this situation. The **AA cartels have purchased the necessary legislation to reinforce their monopolies. When they revoke a DRM key that effectively bricks your hardware player for future media releases, what are you going to do? They've cost-shifted the upgrade burden onto you, and since they own the entire distribution chain, you can't take your business elsewhere. I'm quite surprised that the media cartels haven't tried to mandate use of Scrip to purchase a lease for their items-that-shall-not-be-owned-by-the-customer. Long live the Company Store!
This is a perfect example of why monopolies are bad. This will resonate all the way down to Joe Sixpack in a form that he'll understand - "Damned 'new' movies don't play in my DVD player." He may not understand the ins and outs of DRM legislation, but he sure as hell knows what getting screwed by the establishment means.
"confirms that it's AACS key has been possibly revoked"
Well, I'm glad that's been confirmed...
If anyone really wants to piss off Sony, start a PS3 Linux project to build a PS3-based supercomputer that can be used to crack all of the Blu-Ray keys.
and if people just refuse to buy the product, they'll but legislation that gives them a hefty subsidy to 'protect a core intellectual property industry'. Meaning we all pay, but now don't get a product either. Ah corruption - can't beat it (literally).
FGD 135
If the player was already hacked once, the probability only goes up that it would be hacked again. Especially if a hardware level flaw was uncovered (i.e. a physical attack which was able to intercept the key as it is being read/used would make any new key given the device just as exposed as the last key).
We were all warned a long time ago that MS products sucked, remember the Magic 8 Ball said, "Outlook not so good"
The industry will never listen/read a bunch of slashdot posts and change. Now if every /. reader went out and bought a few Blu-Ray/HD-DVD's then returned them as unplayable and asked for money back--now that might start to get the industry's attention.
I don't know if it's done, but if they give each individual hardware player its own key, then there should not be any problem. The only system won't be able to play vids anymore is the one that was used to hack the key.
You'd be surprised, but AACS uses a pretty clever system for key revocation which can revoke a single key without having to change anything in players with a different set of keys.
The keys are nodes of a binary tree where the leaves are the individual keys per player. Each player has the keys from itself to the root node.
The movie itself is encrypted with a symmetric key which is then encrypted as follows:
Initially, it is encrypted using the root key. Every player can play it because it they all have the root node in their "key path".
When a player is to be revoked, the symmetric key is then encrypted log(n) times with the keys just not the revoked key's path.
It includes the key neighboring the revoked key so it doesn't get hurt, it includes the key neighboring the revoked key's parent so keys on that side don't get hurt and so on.
^_^
...VideoCipher II?
As quick as the satellite broadcasters changed keys, the hackers would crack and distribute them.
Cloned foods give the statement "We had that last week!" a whole new meaning.
At least we'd be getting free movies out of the deal, and thereby completely defeating the point of the copy protection. I doubt spammers would be nearly as successful as they are if you had to pay thirty bucks a message.
How are sites slashdotted when nobody reads TFAs?
The solution to AACS, from my understanding, is to release the key the disk is bulk encrypted with, and not your own decryption key. For practical reasons, it's not that the entire disk is encrypted with each of the keys (then you'd need a separate copy of the disk for each key!) what happens instead is that a single encryption key is encrypted with each of the keys mentioned in the parent. If you release that key, you can free the disk without giving away which player you used to do it! Use of Freenet from behind Tor is recommended :-)
What happens when they release a new version of the software that you have to pay for? Say someone then cracks V8 again, will they release a free update or will everyone be expected to pay for V9 in order to watch new movies?
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
Even if it's not part of their job description to "install a camcorder where it can film the screen from above the heads of patrons and use a Y-cable to patch the sound directly to the camcorder", I can't imagine how anyone can pretend it's impossible for someone to arrange a special screening with the projectionist at one of the tens of thousands of movie theaters available worldwide.
Unfortunately, you're assuming that the memory holding the key is in a separate chip from the processor which will use it. These days, it's common for chips to have internal non-volatile storage (Flash). I bet (note: speculation) one of the design goals for AACS was to ensure that the key was never in-flight on a PCB trace. You can't probe a signal if it's routed internally in the silicon, never leaving the chip.
:(){
But what about the people who can't get high speed internet and only have dial up?
...that hasn't happened with BSkyB in the UK. Their encryption is secure, and has been for many years, unless anyone can correct me!
Please learn it once and for all. IT'S stands for IT IS, IT IS a CONTRACTION.
I know that Microsoft has the Xbox 360 with the HD-DVD add-on drive, but surely they might have a bit of incentive to be in the "media centre" market where Vista is the focus of an HD home theatre? If there are only "hardware" solutions, they would be shut out. Could Microsoft afford that?
Look at the tomato! Isn't it sad? He can't dance! Poor tomato!
I was wondering, what if you bought a commercial disk and made a copy without protection (via copy circumvention in a country where fair use isn't demolished by the dmca, like in sweden), and then destroyed the original, and resold it as a "drm-free" version? No one can argue the content has changed... so doesn't this then fall under the right of first sale, which was upheld by the supreme court some time ago?
Imagine a Beowulf cluster of PS3 driven botnets.
the NPG electrode was replaced with carbon blac
Too bad, move to a place with broadband if you want to watch movies as they will stop making DVDs soon.
From their announcement:
"This update includes security enhancements as well as updated licensing keys that will be required to view both newly purchased HD DVD/BD titles and those in your existing HD DVD/BD collections."
I tried to find any release note to see what "security enhancements" were being included for my benefit. Low and behold, I couldn't find any release note for the patch that told me what to expect.
Having a network port is a mandatory feature for all HD DVD players, so updated keys and other updates can be easily delivered. It's mainly there for downloadable content (like adding subtitles in a new langauge for an existing disc).
Blu-ray, however, has networking optional, and most Blu-ray players don't have a port.
Yet another way in which the baseline functionality in HD DVD is much higher than Blu-ray.
My video compression blog
I mean, it makes sense. And while doing it many times, it probably helps to do it to many different chips, so you have differences to compare.
I can imagine this being very difficult, especially if the crypto engine is a small part of a much larger chip (like, an FPGA or something).
:(){
It still isn't a problem if you choose to run Vista. Turns out that the DRM in Vista isn't composed of little DRM gremlins that go and encrypt your media when you sleep. If you don't get media that is DRM'd, you aren't aware of it at all. Monitors without HDCP work just fine, HD video works just fine, MP3 encoding works just fine, etc. I'm sure that there might be issues if I decided to get media protected by the new DRM, but I'm also sure that it is my option not to. I can continue to use what I always have.
I really think that people on Slashdot don't understand what DRM actually is. To them, it is just a bad word. DRM=bad, and that's all there is they know about it. I certainly agree that DRM isn't useful, but it doesn't matter to me if people want to go and release DRM'd shit. I am free to not buy it. Thus far, I haven't seen an OS that forces DRM on all media, so it is a non-issue.
Remember that players have individual keys. If a hardware player is revoked, it is only one specific physical player which is affected.
"...inserting a special thingamabob between the memory and the mother board"
There are plenty of instances where that wont work, especially if the nvram is inside the devices processor. But the all-in-one approach is uncommon.
About a year ago, I built a thingamabob called a 2MHz realtime logic probe - with a readily available microcontroller. Works just like you describe it. I used it to view the communication between a Z80 and some DRAM. However, the faster the signals are, the more complex the RTLP has to be to keep up.
Alternately, when the firmware for your electronic device is stored in an nvram chip, things get easier. Just remove the nonvolatile memory chip, and you can read it's contents with something as simple as a PC's parallel port.
Making heads or tails of what you get from either approach, are the hard part.
Also, working with SMD components can be tough, until you learn how to etch circuit boards. One way to do that by hand, is with a bright lamp, magnifying glass, copper clad board covered in ink (dried), sewing needle for drawing lines and some ferric chloride etchant.
been tying a while not to remove my email from their list. their system is defective. try it. you can always opt back in if you want to.
five ...
four
three
what? already? I didn't even finish the countdown.
Oh, say does that Star-Spangled Banner entwine / The myrtle of Venus with Bacchus's vine?
I predict that hardware players will be regularly compromised in the future.
I also predict that the player manufacturers will insist that the revocation of the keys to their previous model occurring about the same time as the release of the new model is entirely coincidental.
"Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." [KJV: I Thessalonians 5:21]
Now if this statement is correct "An AACS licensed drive shall retain in non-volatile storage, the most recent Host Revocation List (HRL) data which it encounters and has verified."
So obviously there is an set ammount of memory for this, anyone know just how much this is on common consumer drives?
Basically my marijuana induced thought is... How long before that memory gets full?
And then what happens?
I'm sick of following my dreams. I'm just going to ask where they're goin' and hook up with 'em later.
This is a perfect example of why monopolies are bad. This will resonate all the way down to Joe Sixpack in a form that he'll understand - "Damned 'new' movies don't play in my DVD player." He may not understand the ins and outs of DRM legislation, but he sure as hell knows what getting screwed by the establishment means.
And the establishment will respond thus:
Yeah, that copy protection sure is painful, huh? Goddamn those freedom hating movie pirates for making us put it on there. You know those guys fund terrorists? It's true. The 911 hijackers paid for their flight training with funds made hawking pirate copies of the Phantom Menace. You want to help fight terrorists, don't you Joe? So you don't mind this anti-piracy/anti-terror stuff, do you? Great. Here's a flag. Go back to sleep. [/channeling inner hicks]
"I realise this is not a very popular opinion but it's the truth, and there for needs to be said" -Bill Hicks
None of that matters for hardware players, because each individual player can be revoked independently, without affecting the one that came off the line immediately before it, or the one that came right after it. They don't bother issuing unique keyset to each copy of a software player, for obvious reasons, but hardware players all have unique key sets so if the keys in one of them are compromised, and known to be compromised, then that specific player can be revoked so that future disks won't play on it. No updates to other players are required.
What makes this magic possible is a very clever and sophisticated key derivation scheme. Basically, there is an enormous tree of trees of possible keys, and each player is given a carefully-chosen subset of them, which allows that player to derive a large part of the possible keys, but not all of them. To revoke a key essentially just means choosing to encrypt future disks with a key that particular player cannot derive with keys.
The number of key blocks that must be placed on each disk to make this scheme work is linear in the number of revoked players. In fact, it can be shown mathematically that if r players have been revoked, then at most 2r+1 key blocks are required on each disk. Simulations show that assuming a random distribution of revocations, on average only 1.28r blocks are required. Each key block is 16 bytes in length, so they can revoke millions of players without significantly affecting the space available on the disk.
Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
HD-DVD is DRM'd, that's just the way it is. Doesn't matter the OS you try to play it on, the disc itself is encrypted. It's not like it'll work, no problems, on Linux but not on Vista.
That's the point here. People seem to have this "DRM in Vista is controlling your system!" attitude. No, it's not. You can choose to play the game or not, but it doesn't force anything on you. You can still use unprotected media just fine. Hell, you can still rip protected media to an unprotected format, if there's software to do so. Vista doesn't care. However if there is something that requires the DRM, well then you can play it if you so choose.
I am not at all supporting the DRMing of HD-DVD, I'm just saying that this trying to act like Vista's DRM gremlins are taking away your computer form you is extremely ignorant at best and outright lying at worst. That's just not the case.
The real genius of this move is that all Blu-Ray and HD-DVD players require a network connection. That way the first time you BUY A NEW MOVIE and it zaps your player, you can go out on the Internet and look for another source of movies.
... that the only capital letter in the parent's entire post was in the middle of "BluRay"?
You know, there is a difference between trolling and pointing out the flaws in your reasoning. Just saying.
WinDVD 8 is still actively supported, and it's a software player so it's relatively easy to upgrade the key.
....)
What happens when, in a few years, a HW player is compromised and the manufacturer can't/won't distribute a new key?
(forgot how, can't be bothered, out of business, can't find receipt to prove you're entitled to the key, more interested in selling you a new player
Also, the WinDVD replacement key is free (as in beer). What about a replacement key for a hardware player? Will it be a free ISO to download to flash your player, or will it be a 'free' (plus $39.95 for postage and handling) CD mailout?
I have an 8 year old TV and VCR and a 4 year old DVD player. I doubt I'm going to get ANY support for any of them from the manufacturer.
I doubt I'll get any support for any HW player I buy today in a few years time, and that includes replacement keys.
If I buy a hardware HW player today, and in 3 years someone compromises the key, I'll probably be left with a warm brick!
Even better idea: they crack a player key, and then keep using it to derive all the media keys of present, past and future movie releases. Everyone can watch every movie using its media key, and the DRM losers can't revoke any player key since they don't know which player was cracked.
DOWNSIDES:
1- Less convenient; software to view/rip the media has to either lookup the media keys on an online database or ask the user for the key (who will presumably get it from some forum, torrent, irc channel or whatever).
2- The big boys can sue the group/individual who is giving out the media keys (if they don't hide enough, which they can. Alternatively, they can sue the media keys online database, if it exists.
The AACS key is NOT 0xF606EEFD628B1CA427BEA93A9CA9773F
That's the beauty of the free market; people who buy players from hardware makers who can't protect their keys adequately will suffer economical and psychological losses, thus contributing to the evolution of the human species as a whole, in a quasi-intelligent-designed manner. Their next buy will, with a higher probability, be a more "quality" product.
[/sarcasm]
The AACS key is NOT 0xF606EEFD628B1CA427BEA93A9CA9773F
Ok, I'm not a huge supporter of DRM but this sort of FUD about key revocation for hardware devices is foolish at best (at worst, it a distraction from more material concerns regarding DRM). Supposing, arguendo, that a hardware key is indeed compromised - an event I think is not very likely considering that crackers will prefer to attack software based system first. A simple (if somewhat multi-pronged) plan will more than satisfy the majority of consumers:
(1) Network enabled players will automatically update - built in WiFi with WPA/WEP support would cover the vast majority of people technically inclined enough to buy a next-gen player. This is the ideal solution but need to be enforced at the player level.
(2) Downloadable ISOs for those without network-enabled players that want it NOW. While they are downloading, offer them to sign up for (3)
(3) A web form and phone number that will (a) send out an upgrade disk to your home and (b) ask if you would like to automatically receive all updates in the future as soon as they are available. Of course, everyone that registered their product for warranty will get the update mailed as well.
(4) Ask/Require retail places that sell players/movies to keep a stock of these disks handy. All these places have sophisticated POS computers that can make sure that anyone buying a disk with a revoked key gets flagged and is given the opportunity to get an update disk.
Now, are there going to be fuckups? Of course but with this plan a vast majority of people would experience failure exactly once, after which they will sign themselves up for the automatic mailings (which will, of course, be timed to arrive before the retail release of the new disks). To make things a little sweeter, put some content on the update disks - an old movie would do very nicely and give the consumer a reason not to think that this is a chore (yes, it is a chore, but, due to the expense and technical difficulty, I can't imagine that hardware keys will be compromised all that often).
CSS/AACS :
:
:
:
:
:
:
- the content of the disc (BD / HD DVD) is encrypted.
- the password of that encryption is stored on the disc BUT not as-is.
- the password to decrypt the disc (Title KEY) is also encrypted.
- in fact it is stored several time, each time encrypted using a different password (Player Key).
- those password for password (player key) aren't on the disc, they're secret.
- each playing program, either the firmware on a standalone driver, or the software running on your box, has its own player key, with which it'll be able to decipher at least one of the copies of the Title key on the disc : that copy that was encrypted and stored using the exact key corresponding to the programm running on the player.
- once the player find a crypted Title key it can decipher with it's player key, the player has the password needed to start decrypting and reading the movie (in fact additional stages occurs, but you got the basic idea).
Revocation
- company stops producing discs that use the corresponding player keys. The new disc is encrypted with some random title key. This title key is encrypted and stored several time, each time with 1 player key corresponding to all players *EXCEPT* the key corresponding to the blocked player.
- all other 'legitimated' users can still view newer movies, because their player can find an entry crypted with its own key and thus can get the password needed to play the movie.
- the blocked player can't : it only has 1 player key. The entry that it used to decrypt the password it needs is gone. And the player's key won't work with any other copy of the password stored on the disc, because all other copies are crypted with other Player Keys that the player doesn't have.
- legitimate users of the blocked player have to either flash a newer firmware or upgrade to a newer version of the software, that will come with a newer Player Key that will be able to extract the password for the movie (from a different entry, that wasn't stopped on newer disc).
What the CSS/AACS creators hoped
- To decrypt movies people need a password.
- We can't keep the movie decrypting key a secret, because once it gets stolen, there won't be a way to make newer movies that won't operate with such pirate players.
- So instead each movie has its own key, and each player has its own mean to find this key.
- If players steal key from player X, we will revoke its keys and force the company that made the player to make a more secure version with a newer key.
Problems with open-source software
- Software needs to know a valid Player Key to play movie.
- Opensource software writers don't have one.
- Disc-makers won't provide one because they fear that, because the software is open source, anyone could get the key and use it for pirating purpose.
What happened with CSS (on DVD discs)
- The crypting algorithm chosen for the whole procedure is just marginally less stupid than a rot13 from a mathematical point of view. Cleverly written brute force algorithm can guess the password to open the movie, without going through the whole key decyphering process.
- libdecss is a library that automates the process : now any opensource software can read DVD's without needing a key.
What happened with AACS (HD DVD and BD)
- muslix64 realised that, once you know the Title key that is used to decrypt a movie is known, you don't need to repeat any effort : just decrypt the movie each time with the known title key.
- muslix64 realised that the title key can be found in the memory used by player software WinDVD.
- muslix64 wrote a program that is able to decrypt a HD DVD disc if you can provide the corresponding Title Key.
- community starts a growing list of such keys.
Revoking key of WinDVD8 won't work because the Player Key isn't what was compromised. This is the procedure
- Choose some random software that can play the disc you want to decrypt.
- Install software inside a virtual machine OR along with a debugger OR along w
"Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]