Encrypt and Sign Gmail messages with FireGPG

Linux.com (Same owners as Slashdot) has a story up about FireGPG and says "Gmail may be an excellent Web-based email application, but there is no easy way to use it with privacy tools like GnuPG. The FireGPG extension for Firefox is designed to solve this problem. It integrates nicely into Gmail's interface and allows you...
Encrypt and sign Gmail messages with FireGPG

Comments

The Fascination with Encryption

[Ian McBeth]

For me, I just like to use it, to make people think I am doing something.
Keeps the snoops on their toes.

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[Bromskloss]

For me, I just like to use it, to make people think I am doing something. Keeps the snoops on their toes.

I keep them on their toes by acting completely normal, having them looking for steganography.

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[jimstapleton]

I only use one-time use pads when sending my emails. It keeps them busy and unable to decrypt the emails!

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[Bromskloss]

Well, have you found the hidden message in the parent post yet?

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[UbuntuDupe]

Actually, I heard that one old prank was to send postcards back and forth between major cities with simple, but cryptic sounding statements. For example:

"The birds rise at sundown. Where are the minnows?"
"All is well, north of the river."

Supposedly, the government would see them and get suspicious, thinking they were coded messages.

I've also wondered: why doesn't someone test whether the government is reading emails? For example, have some guys plot an imaginary terrorist attack via unencrypted email and see if they get questioned. Leave physical corroborating evidence in case they follow up. (Make sure to document with several third parties first, so you can prove it's an experiment.)

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[u8i9o0]

I keep them on their toes by acting completely normal, having them looking for steganography.

Well, have you found the hidden message in the parent post yet?

Sorry, there is no hidden message.
1. You noted that you use encryption when acting normal.
2. However, you were posting on /. which has been established (quite conclusively) as abnormal behavior.
3. Since you were not "acting completely normal", it is obvious that you were not employing any encryption scheme.
4. :)
5. Profit!

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[clem]

How about a hint -- does it have anything to do with that strange illegible text in your sig?

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[canajin56]

Here is why you don't do that: Because why wouldn't a terrorist leave corroborating evidence lying around proving it was all just a test to psych the government out, so they can be let go? While they are interviewing your "third parties" you are being beaten half to death, electrocuted, water boarded, and raped. IF, and its a huge, colossally massive if, they ever EVER believe you that you were just kidding about bombing NY with a dirty bomb, they will testify that you cannot be released since after your brutal torture you probably are now a terrorist even through you weren't before. Plus you can't exactly be let go since the torture techniques are classified information and you might leak them. Just like Jose Padilla. First he HAD a dirty bomb, then he was building one, then he was thinking about it, then he knew somebody who was thinking about it, then nothing...but they have ruled he can NEVER face trial, and can NEVER be released. Their reasoning is their "interrogation techniques" have irreversibly damaged him mentally, so he's too unstable to stand trial. But these "interrogation techniques" are highly classified matters of national security, so he can never ever be allowed to talk to anybody in case he tells them what they did to him (especially not a lawyer). And that would be you. Now remember, he _WAS_ a citizen, and there was no evidence against him. Still tortured and given a life sentence without the possibility of a trial. What fucking chance do you think you have if there IS evidence against you? Well you might have white skin so you just may have some kind of chance.

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[MyOtherUIDis3digits]

Man, I miss the days when a post like that would have made me laugh and I would have called you a loon...

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[Warg! The Orcs!!]

My wife uses one-time pads but I wouldn't send them in the mail.

Re:The Fascination with Encryption

[alexo]

Source?

And for the chat

[DrYak]

And if want PGP encryption for chat (Gmail's associated GTalk or any other protocol like MSN, etc.) there is Pidgin (formely Gaim) with plugins :

• Etiher Pidgin Encrypt (formely Gaim Encryption)
• Or OTR

Re:And for the chat

[stinerman]

Note that OTR is "better". From the OTR site:

How is this different from the gaim-encryption plugin?
        The gaim-encryption plugin provides encryption and authentication, but not deniability or perfect forward secrecy. If an attacker or a virus gets access to your machine, all of your past gaim-encryption conversations are retroactively compromised. Further, since all of the messages are digitally signed, there is difficult-to-deny proof that you said what you did: not what we want for a supposedly private conversation!

Re:And for the chat

[Kjella]

No. You're thinking of `downloading` - one of the main things any source-forge style system is supposed to make difficult. Under NO circumstances should you offer a link which you click once to receive and executable. You MUST have to register with your email address and agree to terms and conditions and then try and find the executable - not the source, resource files, the forum etc - but the program you just signed up for the sole reason of downloading.

Well, that qualifies for a -1, troll since I've never signed up to download anything from SF.

Deniability is handy for denying that what the pigs have found on your computer is an encrypted file. It's supposed to look like any piece of random data used by encryption systems.

And this one I can't tell is clueless or trolling again. What this is about is that the other plugin doesn't negotiate a throw-away session key, so that the session can't be replayed later. You're thinking of steganography - hiding encrypted data. However, in this case there's no reason to store anything, unless you're storing an encrypted log. There's two separate issues here: If you are a party to the conversation, you want non-deniability about what the other party said. But both want deniability to third parties on what was said or not, unless they choose to keep a record of it.

Re:And for the chat

[fwr]

It's called nonrepudiation, and yes it is usually a desired if not required feature of public key encryption. There have been some recent issues with in-the-clear messages that are signed with a private key in that the hash algorithm used (MD5 and/or SHA-128) have particular known weaknesses. If you sign a message/file like a PDF that can contain comments that are usually not shown in a viewer then someone could possible add in comments with the appropriate "garbage" text that would make a modified message produce the same hash key. However, for encrypted messages this has not been shown to be as big of a deal, that I'm aware of, because you'd not only have to decrypt the message in order to edit it you'd also have to be able to re-encrypt the message with the necessary added junk bytes required in order to produce the same hash.

In any case, NIST sent out a notice and request for comments for the development and/or selection of a new, more secure, hash. You'll probably see it out in products in 5 years or so, as most hardware-acceleration gear out there is specifically designed for MD5/SHA-128. Just as a lot of people had to replace crypto hardware when AES was developled as the replacement of DES, you will likely see a similar upgrade required in the future for a new hash algorithm.

For normal encryption protocols to work correctly nonrepudiation is required. Otherwise it would be easy to launch man-in-the-middle attacks. This particular protocol, from what I gather from other posts, has things confused. They seem to desire the ability to identify the other end, and supposedly encrypt the sessions, yet have no mechanism for nonrepudiation. So the only comparison I could make would be sending a "signed" message in the clear without the critical hash of the plaintext message. So you'd send the message and attach your signature but anyone could modify the message en-route.

I think people are confusing the encryption protocol with the application program. I'd hazard to guess that there is nonrepudiation in the actual encryption protocol being used. However, it sounds like the application program stores logs of the unencrypted messages in plaintext on the hard drive. The messages are, at that point, out of the scope of an encryption protocol. How messages are handled may be part of an encryption standard, but not really a single encryption protocol. If unencrypted messages are stored in plaintext someone could steal or break into your computer and put all kinds of incriminating material in your logs. Since they are not signed there is no way you could repudiate the contents, which you would want to be able to do if they were faked. I could also edit the stored messages myself and make it look like you sent me anything I desired, even something that would incriminate you and shift the blame from me, which you would certainly want to repudiate.

For a proper encryption standard, something which encompasses more than just the transmission of messages between two endpoints and may address other issues such as message storage, the messages should be stored in encrypted format, and/or at least including the sender's original hash signed with their private key. This way someone that sent you a message would not be able to deny the contents of that message, which you would want if say you were sent a threatening message or something similar.

For those thinking of privacy and dissidents, etc, nonrepudiation would also be something that people would want. Say you were part of a secret organization that was working to overthrow some fictional evil government. If you had a mole in your group you wouldn't want them to be able to deny that they sent particular messages to their contact. Or, you wouldn't want them to deny that they received particular messages, saying that you just planted them there yourself because you are the mole.

Re:And for the chat

[cayenne8]

"Well in traditional crypto/signature schemes, having a provable relation between a specific message and specific sender is a desired attribute. While there are certainly situations where you would like to verify the identity of the person to which you are chatting (wife/girlfriend/boss/etc), it appears that is not one of the wanted 'features' of this encryption protocol. Forward and backward secrecy would certainly be something most would consider useful, however."

Well, you want to make sure it IS from the person you think it is, but, that doesn't mean you have to know who the person IS in real life.

It would be cool if these email plugins would help make it easy to register and use the nym servers. This way you could set up an email address on each end. PGP sigs can be used, but, there is plausible denyability as to who really is at each end of the email.

Of course if you're really worried about tracability, then set up a nym account to send out on, but, on return messages...just have it post encrypted to one of many USENET groups. You then really have a disconnect 'cause there's no good way to monitor around the world who gets what messages of USENET.

Re:And for the chat

[Threni]

> You're thinking of steganography - hiding encrypted data.

No, because the fact that something is hidden doesn't mean you can deny its existance once discovered. If you had a stream of random numbers and you use them to hide a message using a one time pad, it's utterly deniable because you cannot prove there's a message there - you can recover any `message` you like from it, given the appropriate `random` data to xor it with.

I wouldn't think google would like this

[kentmartin]

I thought their business model worked on the idea that they could datamine all your email and (among other things) offer you targeted email based on the content therein... this'll screw with that idea...

"BUY jjhHDJEy6786ERLKLXhdfeprERIOUPewoenOIhgshgrgeyrew now for a low price on Ebay.co.uk"

Re:I wouldn't think google would like this

[morgan_greywolf]

Nah, they'll just start sending 'Soldier of Fortune Magazine'-type ads at you.

Re:I wouldn't think google would like this

[CreatureComfort]

So... you are saying that the NSA has the ability and desire to break every ElGamel 2048-bit length encrypted message it captures with Echelon? I've seen too much of government from the inside to think that any agency operates as well as the NSA FUD would have us believe. Especially when you realize it is far easier and cheaper to make your enemies believe you have super powers than it is to actually develop those super powers, completely in-house with no outside knowledge or help.

Re:I wouldn't think google would like this

[blueZhift]

Interesting question, because datamining email to target ads is exactly what Google said they wanted to do when gmail got started. Since encrypted mail would make this impossible, I wonder if they'll take actions to stop the use of encryption tools with gmail. On the other hand, as it stands, unless they offer such tools themselves, I don't see most users encrypting their gmail anytime soon. So the losses may be acceptable to Google.

Re:I wouldn't think google would like this

[morgan_greywolf]

Gmail supports retrieval of mail via POP3 for free. So there's nothing to stop someone from using GPG and similar support already included in or available for a wide variety of e-mail clients such as Outlook, Thunderbird, Evolution, Eudora, etc.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[morgan_greywolf]

I don't understand this fascination with encryption. Why do people use it. Is it because you're hiding something illegal? It's kiddie porn isn't it? Be honest!

Nope. It's secret terrorist plots to overthrow the tyrannical American Government!

Oh, wait! I wasn't supposed to say that, was I?

Altered for slashdot

[LiquidCoooled]

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GNUPG v0.4.0 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Wonderful
ewurnfi3u834j9few4jf9oewfqvi7y&H*&HAwr8hw78er7hfw8 f7hh4839h47f7e
wf8943f89jw3r8j9fesajaejro5gvl;rhyklyfp[ult0h43jg8 394g84953jgf84
fnw98efj89324rtuerjgeiorgtjerilgtjireogniregunreng erniguiregt980
werj
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

I have nothing more to add

Re:Altered for slashdot

[kypper]

You want me to do what with hot grits?

Re:Altered for slashdot

[ady1]

eitheryourencryptionhasbeencomrpmisedorisuddenlybe engrantedtheabilitytodecryptmessagesinsidemyhead

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[fluch]

It is just that I don't want anybody to intrude my privacy. Do you close the envelope of a regular snail-mail letter? If so, do YOU have something to hide??

Does not this break GMAIL's business model?

[mi]

I thought, their ability to automatically parse the messages — so as to show users the relevant advertisements, was the reason, I am getting an unlimited mailbox with nice interface for free.

If all/most of my messages are encrypted, how will they know, what to peddle to me? Can't do much on Subjects alone... Or can they?

Re:Does not this break GMAIL's business model?

[$RANDOMLUSER]

If all/most of my messages are encrypted, how will they know, what to peddle to me?

Aluminum foil. Survival equipment. Wellbutrin.

Re:Does not this break GMAIL's business model?

[Anonymous Coward]

Aluminum foil.

You need tin foil to make the hats - mind control rays pass right through aluminum!!! Don't you ever wonder why everyone still talks about "tin foil" even though all you can buy on store shelves nowadays is aluminum? It's because They don't want you to notice the switch!!!

Survival equipment.

Sure, if you want a compass that's got the New World Order's tracking devices already installed. I make my own survival equipment.

Wellbutrin.

You see how well my encryption has kept me under your radar? Don't you feel foolish trying to sell me anti-depressants, when I'm in my MANIC phase right now!?! Ha ha ha!

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[joe_cot]

I don't actually use it for encryption; I use it for verification.

Besides encryption, GPG also allows you to sign messages, ensuring that the message is indeed from you, and hasn't been modified after you've signed it. In the Ubuntu Community, this is important for a) verifying messages from developers are real, b) verifying that uploaded packages were created by trusted developers, c) verifying signatures (such as signing the code of conduct).

While FireGPG is useful, it's not so useful for signing messages; gmail auto-wordwraps messages after you send them, and FireGPG doesn't take that into account. Therefore, unless you wordwrap it yourself, gmail's going to add line breaks, and your signature will be invalid. When I need to sign messages, I either word wrap myself so that gmail doesn't, or send it through Thunderbird using Enigmail.

Point & Click Encryption?

[RubberChainsaw]

This extension seems very cool, and I plan to try it out when I get home. When I first read the summary I thought to myself, "A firefox extension and gmail, how much simpler could it get!" But, unfortunately this is not point & click encryption. It requires an additional external program (GnuPG) to function. Even this small, relatively trivial step is too much for beginning to average computer users. Encrypted email is great and all, but I can only send it to other people with encryption-enabled email clients.

Where is the it-just-works email encrytion for dummies?

Re:Point & Click Encryption?

[LiquidCoooled]

When I want to totally encrypt an email I just plug in my DVORAK keyboard, put on a blindfold and type as usual.

Re:Point & Click Encryption?

[Kadin2048]

Where is the it-just-works email encrytion for dummies?

AFAICT, it doesn't exist. At least not outside of corporate environments. There are lots of companies that have their encryption set up so that it's transparent to non-technical employees, but it's a lot of work for the people who actually make it run. Lotus Notes, for instance, will do public-key cryptography, using company-wide keyservers -- although it's a proprietary algorithm, or was last time I checked. Once you have the infrastructure in place, the users don't have to think much about it, besides clicking 'encrypt and sign' on the emails they want secured.

I've also heard that within Apple, they use Apple Mail with S/MIME to great effect ... but if you're just a regular user, getting that feature working is a real PITA. (Though admittedly, most of the trouble is because of the certificate authorities.)

I think the problem with the free encryption tools is that they're still very much a 'hacker's product,' being designed by fairly advanced users, for other advanced users -- or at least, for users who don't have a problem installing extra software in order to communicate securely. This, IMO, is a mistake; in order for an encryption system to be useful, it has to be widely used. And that means getting it into the hands of people who might not even think, in advance, that they want it. There are lots of people who aren't going to go out and download/install encryption software, but if the feature was there, and working, all the time, they'd probably find themselves clicking the 'Encrypt' button quite a bit.

There's no real reason why encryption can't be built in. It's just that it tends to get viewed as a peripheral, rather than core, feature, in everything except some corporate packages. However, I think that if it was incorporated more widely, it would quickly become a core feature; but getting over that 'chicken and egg' hump is hard.

Re:Point & Click Encryption?

[AeroIllini]

It's not just that not all commonly used products include encryption, it's that there's no standard infrastructure for key exchange.

In a standard GPG encryption scheme, each user creates a private key and a public key. Anyone who wishes to send them a message must request their public key in order to do the encryption, and then the private key is used to do the decryption. (Sometimes to save computation time the message is actually encrypted with a symmetrical key, and then the key--which is shorter than the message--is encrypted with the public key. But that's mainly an implementation detail, and the need for key exchange still stands.)

However, if I'm reading my mail in Thunderbird on a personal SMTP server hosted on my own DSL connection, and I want to send an encrypted email to you at your GMail address, I first need to request your public key for encryption. As it stands, there is no standard method for my server, when I click the "encrypt" button, to submit a request to Google's server and then receive in response a public key for encryption. Currently only integrated solutions, such as Microsoft Exchange or Lotus, where all the email is being routed through a single server that can hand out keys, can have this approach.

It would require either a call-and-response system, where Server A could send a specially formatted email to Server B which would then send another specially formated email back to Server A containing the public key, or a registry lookup system, where each user would register their public key with a public keyserver which would act like a DNS, translating email addresses into public keys for systems that request them. Both types of systems have the requirement that everyone you send email to be able to use the same system. If I'm sending an email from my home SMTP server to your GMail account, either my SMTP server has to be able to communicate with GMail in a meaningful way, or both servers (mine and GMail's) need to be set up to talk to the same system of keyservers. I imagine a workable system would include both, just like TCP/IP and DNS.

Only when such a system is used by the majority of email systems will encryption ever be universally available.

Say 'no' to gaim-encryption, use OTR

[Kadin2048]

OTR is miles better than the gaim-encryption/pidgin-encrypt. Honestly, I don't understand why they won't just kill it and move to OTR for good; it's a fundamentally better security model for something transient like instant messages.

Particularly since having two mutually-incompatible encryption packages is a pretty crummy state of affairs; it just means that the few users who do use encryption, are going to be fragmented between incompatible systems.

OTR probably has the greatest market penetration of any IM-encryption system, outside of corporate clients (Sametime, I think, uses encryption by default, although I don't think it's end-to-end, only client-server, because there they want the ability to intercept on the server), because it's built into the fairly popular OS X Adium client. So there's already quite a few users out there who have software that supports it. If only some of the other IM clients would start building it in by default, rather than making it an optional addon, I think it would quickly gain traction as a de facto standard. (And that would be a good thing, since it's a good system and open source.)

Re:Say 'no' to gaim-encryption, use OTR

[99BottlesOfBeerInMyF]

Particularly since having two mutually-incompatible encryption packages is a pretty crummy state of affairs; it just means that the few users who do use encryption, are going to be fragmented between incompatible systems.

This is what standards are for. We need a standard for IM encryption, possibly as part of a larger encryption framework. I have no problem advocating a standard, which I think is a lot better idea than advocating a given program/library.

If only some of the other IM clients would start building it in by default, rather than making it an optional addon, I think it would quickly gain traction as a de facto standard.

OTR is licensed as GPL/LGPL. As such, I'm not sure a lot of major software makers will be all that keen about implementing it. Take a look at iChat or Yahoo Messenger. They're not going to open source their application just to add an encryption format that is still pretty rare and where there is not a lot of demand. This is one of those rare instances where a BSD licensed implementation would be a whole lot more likely to solidify the de-facto standard. Realistically, I doubt that the major players are going to go open source for their clients, and as such I doubt there will be adoption of OTR unless it is submitted as a real, well documented standard and/or a BSD reference implementation is made available. We're a lot more likely to see Microsoft or AOL take over this space with a proprietary encryption scheme, which will be reverse engineered and pseudo-supported on other platforms/clients simply because people will need to communicate with the majority.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[SCHecklerX]

You are forgetting about authentication. Email is trivial to spoof. If you *always* sign your messages, then when some asshat, say, decides to send an explicitly detailed nastygram to your boss from 'you', it is easy to prove otherwise...

Or maybe from your secret lover, etc. You get the picture.

Re:Or you can use an actual mail client

[Enoxice]

Psh, Lynx. Get with the times, man, everyone is using links2 (perhaps links2 -g if they want to be on the bleeding edge).

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[brunascle]

perhaps because i'd like to send an email from work to my GF with something like "hey wanna fuck tonight?" and i'm not particularly keen on the network guys reading that.

GMail S/MIME plugin for firefox

[emj]

I've been using the S/MIME plugin for Firefox. and it's great. I'm not sure I like the way you have to apply for a certificate from Thawte, but it works and it's very painless.

This is not painless and easy, and IMHO S/MIME is alot nicer implemented than PGP signatures.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[kevin_conaway]

Do you close the envelope of a regular snail-mail letter? If so, do YOU have something to hide??

I'm more concerned about the letter (or worse, a check) falling out.

Only Gmail?

[Rob T Firefly]

While the site says only Gmail is supported, could this be made to work with other web apps? It'd be neat to have something like this for webmail on my own domains, forum-based messages, and so on.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[daeg]

Clever. Hiding your kiddie porn encoded in anarchist rants! I'm onto you, buddy!

Works with any textarea, by the way

[croddy]

This works with any textarea, by the way, not just GMail. Not sure why the summary doesn't mention that.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

This works with any textarea, by the way, not just GMail. Not sure why the summary doesn't mention that.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: http://firegpg.tuxfamily.org/

iD8DBQFGZDU/WCKEX KsCq6IRAvAtAJ96BAdus/rVCXS+NxlEbMsDdNxTCgCfe+da
T yi/KWbgNLQUq/qssCj2YR4=
=Y2mA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[toleraen]

I generally close the envelope of snail mail so the mail doesn't fall out.

I use security envelopes to obscure the contents of my mail. You probably would want to use that as an analogy instead.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[Anonymous Coward]

So if you "always" sign your messages, then you can tell off anyone you want as long as you don't sign it. Brilliant!

Won't AJAX textboxes kill this?

[biftek]

I haven't used gmail that much, but I was under the impression that it saved drafts of what's in the composition textbox at intervals.

That data would be all cleartext wouldn't it? Seems a tad risky to me.

Re:Won't AJAX textboxes kill this?

[X0563511]

No, you can't reverse engineer it like that. PGP uses "trapdoor" functions that are mathematically infeasible to work in reverse. It's possible, but it will take several thousand years.

Re:GMail S/MIME plugin for firefox

[Kadin2048]

This is not painless and easy, and IMHO S/MIME is alot nicer implemented than PGP signatures.

S/MIME is oftentimes more slickly implemented, because it tends to get more use on the corporate side, but I think that it's unsuited for wide use because of its reliance on centralized certificate authorities. The whole certificate-based infrastructure isn't anything that most people want to have to deal with.

For 90% of all communications, what people want is an email (or IM, or whatever) version of PGPfone -- they just want the data secured in transit, with the actual user authentication done via some side-channel (calling them up on the phone and exchanging key fingerprints, etc.).

If people have to get and install certificates, they're not going to use the system.

Your girlfriend called...

[xxxJonBoyxxx]

Hey, your girlfriend called. She said she couldn't read the garbled message you sent. However, I passed on your "wanna...tonight" message to her and she said "yes" but I don't think your name came up. So...if you don't mind, I'd like to get out a little early tonight...

Useless if GMail accessed only via POP3

[macraig]

FireGPG is great, I suppose, but doesn't help those of us who only use GMail via POP3/SMTP, both to avoid advertising and have mail archives under our own direct control.

In fact, FireGPG actually benefits Google and its advertising goals, since it only functions via Firefox and Google's ad-infested Web interface.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[Rob T Firefly]

This is your boss. The network guys tell me you've just used the Company's network to write "hey wanna fuck tonight?" on a public website. You're fired.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[iago-vL]

Or maybe from your secret lover, etc. You get the picture.

It's that Cathy, isn't it? She's always trying to break up Alice and Bob!

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[XrayCharlie]

I use FireGPG along with It's All Text! plugin, which I can edit a textfield with an external editor such as Vim. Vim handles wordwrap for me. The only problem I have is that Gmail automatically makes links for URLs or email addresses, which breaks the signature.

PGP/GPG - inherent legal problem?

[Cheesey]

I understand that in some countries, you are legally compelled to provide the keys to access files encrypted with PGP, GPG, etc. if the authorities demand access. If you refuse to produce a working key, or claim to be unable to do so, a judge is able to assume that you are deliberately hiding something.

Firstly, I wondered if anyone could confirm this? I have heard that it is the case for Britain at least, although I don't see how it can possibly be legally compatible with the presumption of innocence.

Secondly, I wanted to suggest that perhaps this is a reason not to use PGP, because PGP encrypted information can always be decrypted using the recipient's key - even many years after the message was originally sent. So law enforcement officers will be able to get old PGP-encrypted documents from your email account (probably even if you delete them, thanks to backup tapes). They'll then be able to force you to decrypt them, and if you don't, they can assume you are witholding the key because the files are full of terrorist plans or whatever.

I suggest that people should only use cryptosystems where the session keys are destroyed immediately after use, such as SSH and (possibly) some secure instant messaging services. Even if law enforcement officers use a wiretap to record everything sent by you over an SSH connection, and then seize your computers, they still can't recover the plaintext because the session keys have already been deleted. It's impossible for you, the suspect, to produce the keys, which should help your legal defense. Here's a way to chat securely by SSH.. if you need to transfer files, you can use SFTP.

Re:PGP/GPG - inherent legal problem?

[m50d]

Firstly, I wondered if anyone could confirm this? I have heard that it is the case for Britain at least, although I don't see how it can possibly be legally compatible with the presumption of innocence.

It's not the case; there was a bill proposed which would have done that, but civil rights activists got it altered so they can only compel you to give up your encryption keys if they can proove you have them.

Secondly, I wanted to suggest that perhaps this is a reason not to use PGP, because PGP encrypted information can always be decrypted using the recipient's key - even many years after the message was originally sent. So law enforcement officers will be able to get old PGP-encrypted documents from your email account (probably even if you delete them, thanks to backup tapes).

That's what gpg --show-session-key is for. If you get subpoena'd, you can give them just the session keys for the specific emails they want, and they'll be able to read them but not any other messages you received for the same public/private keypair.

What's All the Hubub?

[tayker]

I've been using Freenigma (http://www.freenigma.com) way before I even heard of FireGPG, and they've had a Firefox extension since then too.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[ChrisMounce]

Anonymous Coward is hoping to make a fortune on Patent #53892647956403765437856348756438756487563, "Method for tucking the flap inside the envelope".

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[Agelmar]

Not to be too nit-picky, but usually when talking about encryption, the parties are Alice and Bob (the two legitimate users), and Eve (the person who is either 'evil' or 'eavesdropping'). I don't think I've ever heard 'Cathy' used as one of the parties...

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[Critical Facilities]

Methinks thou dost protest too much. In other words, you may want to calm down a bit, you're sounding a little anxious (or jealous?).

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[ndogg]

http://xkcd.com/c177.html

As always, XKCD is so relevent, it's not even funny, except it is, and so are chair dancing on the heads of penguins.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[marimbaman]

The third participant in the conversation is usually Carol.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[Tarquin Sidebottom]

Unfortunately wrap, htmlization and all that marlaky is a general problem when it comes to signing via web interfaces, be it gmail or some generic php webforum. I came across the same issue when I made a few comments in relation to the now stillborn EnigWeb project.

Perhaps it's time for a GPG-wide standard for 'verification-lite', aimed at web-traffic. The idea being to trade a small amount of security for method robustness. Rather than signing a bit-for-bit copy, sign a version where anything other than the main visible characters are ignored. New lines, carriage returns, tabs, multiple consecutive spaces, rare symbols that might by mangled by php scripts: all are ignored. So rather singing:

The cat sat on
the mat.

, you sign instead: 'Thecatsatonthemat.'.

Obviously, greater minds than mine need to sit down and assess the pros, cons and risks (more freedom to try and create collisions), but it strikes me as an idea worth considering.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[semiotec]

then just write the address and add the stamp on the letter/cheque itself, don't bother with the envelope. You can saves trees at the same time!

Silly Rabbit

[Propaganda13]

They use programs to determine who is using high level encryption. Afterwards, they plant a keylogger with burst transmitter in your keyboard. By doing it that way, they don't have to spend anytime decrypting. You can any program or level of encryption you want and it won't do any good since you are compromised at a lower level.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[cammoblammo]

The third participant in the conversation is usually Carol. That's what she wants you to think. If Carol signed her messages Cathy would find spoofing her address much harder.

Re:Nerds with something to hide

[brunascle]

hey guess what? fuck you.