Encrypted USB Key With TOR, Firefox

An anonymous reader writes "Gizmodo has a writeup on the new IronKey — a self-destructing, hardware-encrypted and -authenticated USB flash drive with on-board secure Firefox, high-speed TOR network, password manager, and online encrypted backup. Here is the demo page. $79 for a 1GB, $149 for 4GB." Ironkey works on XP and Vista only. Let's hope its self-destruct feature works better than Secustick's.

Comments

If it works

[UncleWilly]

If it works, spies will love it.

I bet it gets cracked within 30 days.

Re:If it works

[Actually, I do RTFA]

A lot of bad security is never broken, because nobody cares enough.

Oh, that's why there isn't any malware for MacOSX/Linux. I knew there was nothing to that OSS->Security arguments.

How long until it is illegal to possess one?

[Bob Gelumph]

In how many countries is it already illegal to possess one?

Re:How long until it is illegal to possess one?

[sakdoctor]

It's legal to possess one here in airstrip one, but I'm going to need some plausibility deniablity with my self destructing key thanks to the RIP act.

10 tries?

[MichaelSmith]

after ten consecutive failed password attempts, the IronKey self-destructs

For better security, type the wrong password nine times before you take it on the plane.

Re:10 tries?

[Kazymyr]

Who modded this funny? It's actually very sound advice.

Re:10 tries?

[The_Wilschon]

You know, you are allowed to use something other than your birthday, your pet's name, and your favorite Transformer as passwords... Some of us use random sequences of characters. If you can't remember such a thing, use a pronounceable string of letters (make it plenty long), such as generated by pwgen. It is much easier to remember a string of sounds that is perhaps 4 syllables long than a string of characters which is 12 characters long.

Re:10 tries?

[fastest fascist]

Why would anyone suspicious of destructive countermeasures try the password even once? They'd know the chances of guessing the password are infinitesimal, and the risk of losing data high. Such an adversary would move directly to alternative methods, and again, it doesn't matter if it would take 10 tries or one try to wipe the drive.

Re:10 tries?

[Actually, I do RTFA]

you are allowed to use something other than your birthday, your pet's name, and your favorite Transformer as passwords...

NOOO... who told you? I mean, I hate Megatron... Are favorite Pokemon any more secure?

XP and VISTA only

[koh]

Ironkey works on XP and Vista only.

Remember, it's only secure as long as you don't plug it in.

I know, I know. I kid.

Re:XP and VISTA only

[StarfishOne]

When I read that it only works under XP and Vista, the first thought that I had was actually that, instead of Ironkey, they should have called it Irony ;P

Useless because of host security

[iamacat]

If you don't trust the host machine, it can log the password, read/alter your data after the valid password is entered and even maliciously destroy your data by simulating 11 wrong authentication attempts. If you do trust the host, there is little point in hardware encryption/authentication. And if your flash drive is physically stolen, it's enough to have plain software file encryption. Sounds like a solution in search of users who misunderstand the problem.

Re:Useless because of host security

[BlueParrot]

If you do trust the host, there is little point in hardware encryption/authentication.

It is still a good idea to have hardware that supports it. In particular, USB flash drives have a tendancy to store logical changes to data in new physical locations. They do this in order to minimise the number of writes to any one portion of the drive, and thus extend the lifetime of the flash memory. Normally this is a good thing, but for encryption purposes it is a pain since it makes it difficult to change / revoke a key without overwriting the entire drive. Of course, if you suspect a key has been compromised it is just good practise to do so anyway ( or better yet, destroy the drive).

Re:Useless because of host security

[TubeSteak]

If you do trust the host, there is little point in hardware encryption/authentication. The point of having onboard hardware encryption is that you don't need to install a decryptor on someone else's box.

I generally agree with the rest of your points though.

Re:Useless because of host security

[rdl]

I agree. The best security is to have your own trusted CPU/display/input (i.e. a laptop or pda). This is getting easier all the time -- a PDA or cellphone is close to sufficient for most non-data-entry tasks.

Failing that, I'd go with something which uses commodity, standard, and commonly available technology at the lowest level possible. It's PROBABLY the case that a DVI monitor is not bugged; much less likely that a random DVI monitor at a net cafe is itself secure than that the host OS is secure.

The host OS and applications installed are by far the weakest link. I carry a laptop everywhere, but the next step down from that is a bootable USB flash drive with your choice of secured OS installation on it. It's easy enough to implement disk encryption.

It is also fairly straightforward to use "write only" public key cryptography (i.e. each time you save your work, encrypt it with a public key, the private key for which is held on trusted hardware at home).

The only customization I'd do to the USB dongle would be for protecting the keying data -- some way to mount a / partition, but have a data partition which is encrypted with PKC held on the USB device, with only the passphrase being entered into the local PC, rather than an actual key entered via the host PC. This in practice only gives you marginally better security, as if you used a hardware-trojaned PC (or vmware installation...) to boot your USB device, that trojaned machine could just copy the relevant data out of your USB key.

There are a lot of "procedural" ways to improve security with this USB boot thing. Maybe have multiple partitions, each with different keys, per project or security level. If you're at a machine belonging to client A, and need access to client A files, you can stick your USB in a client A machine, boot, and then only unlock the client A partition on the USB. Or if you just need basic secure computing, but not access to your stored files, you could just unlock the OS partitions, leaving your own data partitions encrypted. Or, just buy multiple USB keys, and stick the least important key into the machine that is needed to accomplish your task.

Re:Useless because of host security

[Anonymous Coward]

It isn't useless because of host security. They need to make a mod that fit my needs. I need it to have a timer on it that after I update the data, it expires after a set time in days. After it expires, it can erase everything. The problem with encrypted data is that it can be decrypted. Destroying the data on the USB drive prevents rubber-hose-attacks and law enforcement could not detain me beyond the auto destruct time I set in days. In other words, destroying data means beating or detaining me to get my passphrase now becomes a useless attack. I don't think it is fair to suggest no one has a use for self-destructing systems; they assure the data can never fall into the wrong hands.

I, however, am looking for a USB key with the encryption and password entry built into the key itself. I am looking to enter the password or fingerprint on the device. That way, I am not dependent on the host. The drive could allow mounting after the biometric or password are supplied to it, and present a FAT32 volume, which would mount on any OS. I am looking for a portable solution.

Re:Useless because of host security

[ZorinLynx]

I don't get why they implement these things only for Windows.

It's so trivial to implement security on a flash drive that's fully cross platform.

When you insert the drive, mount a basic filesystem with an empty file in it called "password.in". Then all you have to do is:

echo 'yourfr3ak1npa$$w0rd!!11' > /mnt/flashdrive/password.in

upon which the "virtual" filesystem on the drive will receive the password and present a new USB storage device, the unlocked filesystem.

This implementation will work on any platform that can mount FAT, and is easy to put behind front-ends when used on Windows or Mac OS X systems.

But nooo, they use some useless proprietary stuff that makes the key useless on anything but a Windows box. Really smart. :P

-Z

Re:Useless because of host security

[IronKey Dave]

You can learn more about why hardware encryption is better than software encryption in our whitepaper: https://learn.ironkey.com/docs/IronKey_Whitepaper- Benefits_of_Hardware_Encryption.pdf Briefly: - it is 5 to 10 times faster than software encryption, which is important if copying large files or running portable applications off the device - the key storage is far more secure. IronKey stores randomly generated AES keys in a tamper-resistant chip which will destroy itself if physically or electrically tampered with. - there is no way to prevent brute-force password or key guessing attacks with software encryption. I can eventually crack any TrueCrypt encrypted data. IronKey manages password unlocking in hardware and cannot be brute forced. Also the storage volume is not mounted until the password is correct, unlike TrueCrypt on a regular flash drive (Imagine if I copy your TrueCrypt files onto 100,000 bots, and start cracking in parallel....) - no drivers and no administrator rights are needed with hardware encryption. - we can use the same cryptochip secure storage to manage stored passwords, which makes it more secure than software password managers. To address your issue with malware on the host killing the drive with 11 bad password attempts... we prevent this by requiring the drive to be physically unplugged and re-plugged in after 3 bad password attempts. If malware is on the computer, it copying your password is the least of your worries. Once you log into the device, it can copy all your files. Nothing you can do about that. We have designed a keylogger proof IronKey, but this will be coming in a future hardware design. Dave Jevans. IronKey

Re:Useless because of host security

[IronKey Dave]

Z, Unfortunately you're not correct. The flash drive firmware would have to be able to parse the FAT file system in order for this to work. USB storage media does not receive data as files, but rather as blocks, at a much lower level than the windows file system. Also, your approach basically sends your password in the clear over USB. We AES encrypt our USB traffic, protecting your password from USB level sniffers. We have IronKey working on MacOS now, and are working on Linux. Please be aware that we are more than a secure flash drive. We've got hardware encrypted password storage, strong 2-factor authentication (the firefox has a PKCS11 driver that talks to our onboard crypto). Dave @ IronKey

Re:Useless because of host security

[IronKey Dave]

TrentTheThief, I have no idea who you are, but your statement is patently false: "Ironkey provides the US gov't access to anything it wants." The US government, and anyone else, are free to purchase IronKeys. On the EU side of things, if you use our backup services, then yes we would have some data in the US. However, that data is encrypted on your IronKey, so it's just an encrypted blob. Also, we don't know who a given user is, so there's no way to track that back to an individual customer. Dave @ IronKey.

High speed Tor

[Konster]

What caught my eye was the blurb about high speed Tor...

I thought, OMG! I want, NOW!!

Re:Why The Fuck are such things MS-only?

[Ant P.]

The simple answer is that Linux already has far better security tools that a novelty like this can never match.

Mmmm?

[Elemenope]

Most of the spies you know?

Re:Mmmm?

[infonography]

Spies? Who said anything about Spies Comrade. Natasha bring some nice tea for Moose and Squirrel here. - Boris Badenov

/soto voice/ Remember to put truth serum in it this time /

Yes dollink -Natasha Fatale

Re:Mmmm?

[kestasjk]

I meet spies on IRC all the time, it's no big deal. Most of them are huge manga buffs too

Re:Mmmm?

[PopeRatzo]

I meet spies on IRC all the time, it's no big deal. Most of them are huge manga buffs too

I know what you mean. All my neighbors are spies. When I take the Ashland Ave bus there are usually 20 or 30 spies on there.

And the government spied on me through the television until I bought 20 square yards of copper screen to wrap around my sofa. I got the plans from a guy on IRC.

And voices are telling me Astro Boy is Jesus.

Bootable Debian on USB key with root encryption?

[alexandre]

http://feraga.com/node/94 - why not use this instead on any key...

pointless security

[bl8n8r]

While you're decrypting your Sup3rs3kr3t w4r3z on the usb key, any malware* you haven't found yet is potentially logging every keystroke. You need to choose windows, or security; you really can't have both.

[*] - http://www.emsisoft.com/en/malware/?Adware.Win32.P owered+Keylogger

Hmmm

[The MAZZTer]

But for $149 you could get a simple 16gb thumb drive and just use TrueCrypt...

Everyones the miracle device

[BitZtream]

I've write encryption software for use by normal users on USB devices (shameless plug: http://www.rtsz.com/products/pss/ ) and it never ceases to amaze the bullshit that people fall for.

I try my best to prevent false claims in our advertising, things like 'Your data is completely secure' falls into the false catagory as far as I'm concerned.

We've had two major companies asking us for secure USB devices to hold sensitive personal information, one of which was medical related, the other of which I dont recall right off the top of my head. Both of these places wanted software you could install on ANY flash drive, would encrypt all the data on it, would prevent the data from ever being copied off to another device, harddrive or whatever, and of course would automatically destroy itself if too many incorrect passwords were given.

Needless to say we were unable to help them, or even explain to them that what they were asking for is not currently possible. This is probably a failure to communicate on my part, but the real scary part is they went with other companies who claimed they could do it! Just to be clear, this was a software only solution running on any PC with the data on any flash drive.

Makes me wonder if we should start letting the BS flow in order to boost sales :(

This is old news..

[hacker]

I did a talk for my local LUG back in September of 2006 describing exactly how to do this using TrueCrypt for Linux and Windows

I described in detail how to install, boot and use the USB key as a bootable Linux distribution, and also how to use the USB key in Windows (or Linux) with TrueCrypt, using some fancy tricks to auto-prompt for the password upon insertion of the key, how to use a slew of PortableApps on the key, and even a launchable menu to find and access them.

This was almost a full year ago. IronKey, whatever it is, is nothing new.

Typically self-destruct is bogus...

[gweihir]

There is basically one option that works: A secure microcontoller, that keeps the key in internal RAM and does all the encryption and decryption itself. Everything else can be broken by interrupting or disabling the writes. AFAIK you cannot get any secure microcontroller for the price they claim. Certainly you cannot get one that does encryption and decryption with decent speeds.

According to the website, it does a "flash trash". This is insecure. Flash writing is relatively slow and draws a lot of energy. This allows stopping and preventing writes to flash. Also, unless they use special flash chips, the same hack as with the Secustick will work. Again, for the price I do not see them getting a specially bonded or manufactured Flash chip. Even if they do, desolder the chip and read it directly. You can then clone it for unlimited attack attempts.

I ecpect this will be relatively easy to break, just as the Secustick, i.e. at best a small step above a conventional stick encrypted, e.g., with TrueCrypt.

Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus...

[IronKey Dave]

The key-store in the cryptochip will destruct if tampered with physically or electrically.

You are right that without a battery we cannot reliably delete the gigabytes of encrypted data if the device is immediately pulled out of a power supply and never re-inserted into another computer. This would only happen with a very determined and knowledgeable attacker. In such case, their recourse is to disassemble the device and try to attack AES encrypted data.

Because the AES keys are randomly generated, and not based on a hash of a password for example, an attacker would have to brute force an AES key, which would be pretty impractical.

Dave @ IronKey

I use Fearless Browser

[DisorderlyConstruct]

Instead of this, you can get Fearless Browser for free and install it on any USB drive. It is far more secure than any Windows version because it runs in a Gentoo-based virtual machine. It comes preconfigured with Tor and OpenDNS anti-phishing, and is updated frequently. I carry it around everywhere I go and use it at friend's houses and public terminals that I don't trust.

Re:I use Fearless Browser

[Hatta]

A keystroke logger in the host OS or hardware could still be catching your passphrase.

Re:I use Fearless Browser

[DisorderlyConstruct]

They have a bare metal version that boots directly off the stick, so you don't need to worry about a compromised OS. I keep all my passwords stored in the Fearless Browser, encrypted with a main password. A hardware keylogger will only be able to capture my USB stick password, which is useless without my USB stick. It's an easy way to do two-factor authentication.

Only works if someone doesn't know what it is

[BlueCoder]

In all reality you wouldn't plug it in, you'd take the thing apart and dissolve the black goo. Then you would proceed with a hardware attack, reading the contents of the flash memory out and then attempt to crack the memory file.

Only if the attacker doesn't know what the memory stick is will it be able to erase itself.

Re:Only works if someone doesn't know what it is

[IronKey Dave]

BlueCoder, in essence you are correct. However this narrows the attack surface down considerably. An attacker has to etch away the potting compound to get at the flash chips. Then unmount them. Then they can get at the AES encrypted data, and try to crack AES.

The AES keys are not accessible, because they are not stored in the flash memory, but rather in our cryptochip which is tamper-resistant. The AES keys are not based on a password (they are generated by a random number generator), thus they are very strong. This means that password guessing isn't going to be effective for cracking the encrypted data. You would have to do an exhaustive AES key space attack. Dave @ IronKey

Re:Sound?

[iminplaya]

Better not to have the blueprints than let the enemy have them.

Is that code for "keeping your wife out of your porn collection"?

Ok, but what if...

[8ball629]

What if the computer has a keylogger and it logs the password that unlocks your data? Am I missing something?

Advertised Via SPAM

[BillTheKatt]

I wouldn't buy one of these to save my life. Jerks got my email address from our receptionist, added me to their marketing SPAM list, and guess what, their reply address and unsubscribe links are broken. I know where I'd like to stick their ironkey...

Re:Why The Fuck are such things MS-only?

[IronKey Dave]

We started with M$ because it's the largest market. We have MacOS working in the lab and are also working on Linux support. We recognize that Linux users are the most security savvy, but that part of the market is miniscule compared to the Windows market (think about financial services, hospitals and government markets). We've spent over $7M in research and development on the product, and unfortunately we've got to target the larger markets first. - Dave Jevans. IronKey

Re:It doesn't work!

[IronKey Dave]

Sorry, your "dd" attack will not work on an IronKey. We do not mount the secure volume until the password is correctly entered. In fact, we present as 2 devices to the computer. Your data is stored as a removable media. We don't "insert" the media until the password is entered correctly. That is one aspect why it's better than a regular USB key. Our security whitepaper gives a description of how it works, and the benefits of the approach over software implementations. https://learn.ironkey.com/docs/IronKey_Whitepaper- Benefits_of_Hardware_Encryption.pdf Oh yeah, we wanted to put some thermite into it, but it wouldn't pass CE safety tests. Thanks, Dave Jevans. IronKey

IronKey FAQ and Crypto White Paper

[IronKey Dave]

Thanks to everyone for your really interesting comments and questions. We will update our website to make it more clear that we have a FAQ section that answers many of the questions posed here on SlashDot. https://learn.ironkey.com/faqs We also have a whitepaper that describes how our hardware encryption works, the threat models, and how it is better than software encryption. https://learn.ironkey.com/docs/IronKey_Whitepaper- Benefits_of_Hardware_Encryption.pdf We released Windows versions first, as the majority of the market is using that OS. We are working on Linux and MacOS versions. Thanks, Dave Jevans @ IronKey

Private TOR nodes Re:I smelled bullshit

[IronKey Dave]

We run a number of TOR nodes across the world. The TOR client selects these preferentially. Thus you get higher bandwidth, lower latency and more predictable performance than using the regular public TOR network, where you could end up going through some guys computer connect to the net on a DSL or dial-up line. Dave @ IronKey

Re:Self-destruct?

[IronKey Dave]

We tried to get a small amount of thermite into the device, but it just refused to pass the CE and FCC approvals needed to sell in USA and Canada. Maybe we can sell the thermite-grenaded versions out of China and have people mail order from there? :-) D @ IronKey