Slashdot Mirror

← Back to Stories (view on slashdot.org)

Encrypted USB Key With TOR, Firefox

Posted by kdawson on from the and-a-pony dept.

An anonymous reader writes "Gizmodo has a writeup on the new IronKey — a self-destructing, hardware-encrypted and -authenticated USB flash drive with on-board secure Firefox, high-speed TOR network, password manager, and online encrypted backup. Here is the demo page. $79 for a 1GB, $149 for 4GB." Ironkey works on XP and Vista only. Let's hope its self-destruct feature works better than Secustick's.

152 of 170 comments (clear)

  1. If it works by UncleWilly · · Score: 2

    If it works, spies will love it.

    I bet it gets cracked within 30 days.

    1. Re:If it works by MichaelSmith · · Score: 1

      If it works, spies will love it.

      Actually most of the spies I know take a low tech approach to the job. Far better just to email the stuff to your own hotmail account, than to have it on you in a potentially crackable form.

      "flash-trash" technology notwithstanding

      --
      http://michaelsmith.id.au
    2. Re:If it works by gweihir · · Score: 1

      I bet it gets cracked within 30 days.

      If anybody is interested enough to make the attempt. Which may not be the case. A lot of bad security is never broken, because nobody cares enough.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    3. Re:If it works by Actually,+I+do+RTFA · · Score: 2, Funny

      A lot of bad security is never broken, because nobody cares enough.

      Oh, that's why there isn't any malware for MacOSX/Linux. I knew there was nothing to that OSS->Security arguments.

      --
      Your ad here. Ask me how!
  2. How long until it is illegal to possess one? by Bob+Gelumph · · Score: 4, Interesting

    In how many countries is it already illegal to possess one?

    --
    I'm gonna need a spec.
    1. Re:How long until it is illegal to possess one? by sakdoctor · · Score: 3, Informative

      It's legal to possess one here in airstrip one, but I'm going to need some plausibility deniablity with my self destructing key thanks to the RIP act.

    2. Re:How long until it is illegal to possess one? by barwasp · · Score: 1

      OSCE.org's fresh report "Governing the Internet," has a partial answer, stating that about two dozen countries practice censorship. And in addition many other countries have adopted needlessly restrictive legislation and government policy.

      For example, in Malaysia government official said this week that laws would be drafted for bloggers and authorities would not hesitate to prosecute those deemed to have insulted Islam. And in Thailand insulting their assaholian King is almost guaranteed to result a jail sentence.

      Oups, did I just call thailands king assaholian? Well sorry about that... (in case TOR does't work as advertised)

    3. Re:How long until it is illegal to possess one? by Wanon · · Score: 1

      Just one, yours.

      In Soviet Amerika, USB keys destroy you!

  3. 10 tries? by MichaelSmith · · Score: 5, Funny

    after ten consecutive failed password attempts, the IronKey self-destructs

    For better security, type the wrong password nine times before you take it on the plane.

    --
    http://michaelsmith.id.au
    1. Re:10 tries? by Kazymyr · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Who modded this funny? It's actually very sound advice.

      --
      I hadn't known there were so many idiots in the world until I started using the Internet -Stanislaw Lem
    2. Re:10 tries? by gEvil+(beta) · · Score: 1

      You'd better hope you don't hit some turbulence as you're typing your password in. I'd do 7 or 8 wrong passwords just to give myself a little bit of wiggle room.

      --
      This guy's the limit!
    3. Re:10 tries? by fastest+fascist · · Score: 1

      Assuming your password isn't 1234, but something more reasonable, like a 20-key random sequence, I'd say it's pretty unlikely anyone will guess it right in ten tries.

    4. Re:10 tries? by Main+Gauche · · Score: 1

      "Who modded this funny? It's actually very sound advice."

      Don't worry, some moderators from the US Patent Office came around and fixed that right up.

    5. Re:10 tries? by WED+Fan · · Score: 1

      For better security, type the wrong password nine times before you take it on the plane.

      <sarcasm>Is that what most of the spies you know do?</sarcasm>

      Honestly, why not just configure it to destruct after 1 failed password? (Note: I know nothing of the product, but if you can't configure this, then it is a waste. 10???????? attempts? Great if you have a non-TLA agency trying to crack it, or the person isn't working with a list of your likely passwords.

      --
      Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong fix.
    6. Re:10 tries? by The_Wilschon · · Score: 2, Informative

      You know, you are allowed to use something other than your birthday, your pet's name, and your favorite Transformer as passwords... Some of us use random sequences of characters. If you can't remember such a thing, use a pronounceable string of letters (make it plenty long), such as generated by pwgen. It is much easier to remember a string of sounds that is perhaps 4 syllables long than a string of characters which is 12 characters long.

      --
      SIGSEGV caught, terminating

      wait... not that kind of sig.
    7. Re:10 tries? by StarfishOne · · Score: 1

      Get ready for the movie hit of 2007: Sticks on a Plane! xD

    8. Re:10 tries? by arth1 · · Score: 1

      You miss the point. No one half sane will try more than once: with no password. If that fails, one will try different methods of gaining access, not the standard password mechanism.
      So 9 times is correct -- if the next attempt fails, you want the contents cleared before the device can be attacked through other means (like a bitwise copy, brute forced against the key itself, without running any of the software on the key; or, like exploiting file system weaknesses, or even using a backdoor key which NSA and the manufacturer undoubtedly have access to).

    9. Re:10 tries? by fastest+fascist · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Why would anyone suspicious of destructive countermeasures try the password even once? They'd know the chances of guessing the password are infinitesimal, and the risk of losing data high. Such an adversary would move directly to alternative methods, and again, it doesn't matter if it would take 10 tries or one try to wipe the drive.

    10. Re:10 tries? by Actually,+I+do+RTFA · · Score: 2, Funny

      you are allowed to use something other than your birthday, your pet's name, and your favorite Transformer as passwords...

      NOOO... who told you? I mean, I hate Megatron... Are favorite Pokemon any more secure?

      --
      Your ad here. Ask me how!
    11. Re:10 tries? by Sigma+7 · · Score: 1

      Honestly, why not just configure it to destruct after 1 failed password? I've experienced a few cases where I mistyped a password that I did know. This resulted in an account lockout (and thus preventing me from doing some of my work properly), as I took around three attempts. Normally, typing in a password is not an issue, but if you are tired, hyperactive or confused, you will encounter this problem.

      Also, if you have an acceptable-strength password (e.g. random alphanumeric of 8 characters), there's no practical difference in security between 1 attempt and 10 attempts. A converntional brute force or dictionary attack would wear out the attempts with no progress, while the rubber hose algorithm would remain just as effective.
  4. Demo page. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

    The demo page is mostly blank. Oh, well. Guess it saved on web design costs?

    1. Re:Demo page. by MichaelSmith · · Score: 1

      It is meant to be running a presentation of some sort. Audio and video. I didn't hang around for the full story so I can't relay it to you.

      --
      http://michaelsmith.id.au
    2. Re:Demo page. by skoaldipper · · Score: 1

      I think it's flash. I watched it all the way through - slick flick with a swanky hip background musical score. The whole time while watching the demo, it got me thinking WWJD with this stick? We will all soon find out this August.

      --
      I hope, when they die, cartoon characters have to answer for their sins.
  5. XP and VISTA only by koh · · Score: 5, Funny

    Ironkey works on XP and Vista only.

    Remember, it's only secure as long as you don't plug it in.

    I know, I know. I kid.

    --
    Karma cannot be described by words alone.
    1. Re:XP and VISTA only by StarfishOne · · Score: 4, Funny

      When I read that it only works under XP and Vista, the first thought that I had was actually that, instead of Ironkey, they should have called it Irony ;P

    2. Re:XP and VISTA only by numbski · · Score: 1

      The under XP and Vista thing, I'm curious - is this because it isn't a UMS device (thus no drivers for Linux, BSD, and OSX) or that it IS a umass device, but the software that triggers the hardware stuff is win32, and thus the security features are useless on anything else.

      If the latter, then yes, this *is* a joke. If the former, if the hardware documentation is released to open source groups and drivers written, this might not be so bad...

      --

      Karma: Chameleon (mostly due to the fact that you come and go).

  6. Useless because of host security by iamacat · · Score: 4, Insightful

    If you don't trust the host machine, it can log the password, read/alter your data after the valid password is entered and even maliciously destroy your data by simulating 11 wrong authentication attempts. If you do trust the host, there is little point in hardware encryption/authentication. And if your flash drive is physically stolen, it's enough to have plain software file encryption. Sounds like a solution in search of users who misunderstand the problem.

    1. Re:Useless because of host security by BlueParrot · · Score: 4, Informative

      If you do trust the host, there is little point in hardware encryption/authentication.
      It is still a good idea to have hardware that supports it. In particular, USB flash drives have a tendancy to store logical changes to data in new physical locations. They do this in order to minimise the number of writes to any one portion of the drive, and thus extend the lifetime of the flash memory. Normally this is a good thing, but for encryption purposes it is a pain since it makes it difficult to change / revoke a key without overwriting the entire drive. Of course, if you suspect a key has been compromised it is just good practise to do so anyway ( or better yet, destroy the drive).
    2. Re:Useless because of host security by TubeSteak · · Score: 2, Insightful

      If you do trust the host, there is little point in hardware encryption/authentication. The point of having onboard hardware encryption is that you don't need to install a decryptor on someone else's box.

      I generally agree with the rest of your points though.
      --
      [Fuck Beta]
      o0t!
    3. Re:Useless because of host security by rdl · · Score: 5, Informative

      I agree. The best security is to have your own trusted CPU/display/input (i.e. a laptop or pda). This is getting easier all the time -- a PDA or cellphone is close to sufficient for most non-data-entry tasks.

      Failing that, I'd go with something which uses commodity, standard, and commonly available technology at the lowest level possible. It's PROBABLY the case that a DVI monitor is not bugged; much less likely that a random DVI monitor at a net cafe is itself secure than that the host OS is secure.

      The host OS and applications installed are by far the weakest link. I carry a laptop everywhere, but the next step down from that is a bootable USB flash drive with your choice of secured OS installation on it. It's easy enough to implement disk encryption.

      It is also fairly straightforward to use "write only" public key cryptography (i.e. each time you save your work, encrypt it with a public key, the private key for which is held on trusted hardware at home).

      The only customization I'd do to the USB dongle would be for protecting the keying data -- some way to mount a / partition, but have a data partition which is encrypted with PKC held on the USB device, with only the passphrase being entered into the local PC, rather than an actual key entered via the host PC. This in practice only gives you marginally better security, as if you used a hardware-trojaned PC (or vmware installation...) to boot your USB device, that trojaned machine could just copy the relevant data out of your USB key.

      There are a lot of "procedural" ways to improve security with this USB boot thing. Maybe have multiple partitions, each with different keys, per project or security level. If you're at a machine belonging to client A, and need access to client A files, you can stick your USB in a client A machine, boot, and then only unlock the client A partition on the USB. Or if you just need basic secure computing, but not access to your stored files, you could just unlock the OS partitions, leaving your own data partitions encrypted. Or, just buy multiple USB keys, and stick the least important key into the machine that is needed to accomplish your task.

    4. Re:Useless because of host security by Lumpy · · Score: 1

      If he host is running XP or Vista? no I do not trust the host.

      Give me a USb key with incredibly hard to break encryption and a linux live CD. barring someone installing a keylogger INSIDE the machine it's safe. and there are ways to get around that as well, on screen keyboard for example.

      --
      Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
    5. Re:Useless because of host security by Jeff+DeMaagd · · Score: 1

      Sounds like a solution in search of users who misunderstand the problem.

      The number of people that understand security/encryption/related is very small. I don't think I qualify as being knowledgeable. Anyways, it's a big potential market out there, those that don't know any better.

    6. Re:Useless because of host security by RAMMS+EIN · · Score: 1

      ``If you don't trust the host machine...''

      And you shouldn't, because it runs Windows. All Microsoft-bashing and fanboyism aside, Windows just cannot be trusted.

      --
      Please correct me if I got my facts wrong.
    7. Re:Useless because of host security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Interesting

      It isn't useless because of host security. They need to make a mod that fit my needs. I need it to have a timer on it that after I update the data, it expires after a set time in days. After it expires, it can erase everything. The problem with encrypted data is that it can be decrypted. Destroying the data on the USB drive prevents rubber-hose-attacks and law enforcement could not detain me beyond the auto destruct time I set in days. In other words, destroying data means beating or detaining me to get my passphrase now becomes a useless attack. I don't think it is fair to suggest no one has a use for self-destructing systems; they assure the data can never fall into the wrong hands.

      I, however, am looking for a USB key with the encryption and password entry built into the key itself. I am looking to enter the password or fingerprint on the device. That way, I am not dependent on the host. The drive could allow mounting after the biometric or password are supplied to it, and present a FAT32 volume, which would mount on any OS. I am looking for a portable solution.

    8. Re:Useless because of host security by gweihir · · Score: 1

      Give me a USb key with incredibly hard to break encryption and a linux live CD. barring someone installing a keylogger INSIDE the machine it's safe. and there are ways to get around that as well, on screen keyboard for example.

      Sounds good, but is bad as well. Frist there are keyboard-based hardware keyloggers. Second, whow do you know you are not booting into a virtual machine? With the PC actually waking from hibernation instead of booting clean? I bet the effort to rig this would be quite reasonable.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    9. Re:Useless because of host security by ZorinLynx · · Score: 2, Informative

      I don't get why they implement these things only for Windows.

      It's so trivial to implement security on a flash drive that's fully cross platform.

      When you insert the drive, mount a basic filesystem with an empty file in it called "password.in". Then all you have to do is:

      echo 'yourfr3ak1npa$$w0rd!!11' > /mnt/flashdrive/password.in

      upon which the "virtual" filesystem on the drive will receive the password and present a new USB storage device, the unlocked filesystem.

      This implementation will work on any platform that can mount FAT, and is easy to put behind front-ends when used on Windows or Mac OS X systems.

      But nooo, they use some useless proprietary stuff that makes the key useless on anything but a Windows box. Really smart. :P

      -Z

    10. Re:Useless because of host security by LuSiDe · · Score: 1

      Insecure lines, potentially bugged monitors and keyboards and such are mitigated by using S/Key or OPIE. *BSD and Linux support these w/SSH.

      --
      WE DON'T NEED NO BLOG CONTROL.
    11. Re:Useless because of host security by BlueParrot · · Score: 1

      I, however, am looking for a USB key with the encryption and password entry built into the key itself. I am looking to enter the password or fingerprint on the device. That way, I am not dependent on the host. The drive could allow mounting after the biometric or password are supplied to it, and present a FAT32 volume, which would mount on any OS. I am looking for a portable solution.
      Tell me, what does it matter if the decryption is in the hardware if you send the password through the USB stack ? How will you prevent the host system from carrying out a man in the middle attack ? How do you stop it reading anything you read from the device? How do you stop it from modifying anything you input on the keyboard ? How do you stop it from making screen, RAM and or even CPU ( think virtualisation ) dumps 60 times a second while you access the device? Basially, if you don't trust the machine you are using, you're fucked. End of story. The only exception is if you're doing the encryption / decryption manually, before it even hits the keyboard.
    12. Re:Useless because of host security by mlts · · Score: 1

      If the Ironkey had some type of PINpad integrated into itself, then it would have some decent security, where the host, no matter how compromised it may be, could not intercept the password entered onto it.

    13. Re:Useless because of host security by hax0r_this · · Score: 1

      By using a secure machine? I've never met anyone who uses encryption to prevent their computer from stealing their data. Usually you use encryption to prevent other people from accessing your data after it has been stolen. Keeping the encryption/decryption onboard the hardware itself, and presenting a FAT32 volume achieves a good degree of software independence, because any computer capable of mounting a USB FAT32 device would work with your drive.

    14. Re:Useless because of host security by BlueParrot · · Score: 1

      Keeping the encryption/decryption onboard the hardware itself, and presenting a FAT32 volume achieves a good degree of software independence, because any computer capable of mounting a USB FAT32 device would work with your drive.
      Uhm, I'd pick software dependance over hardware dependance any day. Software is easier to patch and maintain, if a vulnerability is found there is a higher chance you can fix the software than the hardware. If it is open source you have mor insight into what it actuallyd does etc... If you use hardware encryption and find out the implementation is flawed somehow, fixing it will be a pain and will frequently involve buying more hardware.
    15. Re:Useless because of host security by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 2, Informative

      You can learn more about why hardware encryption is better than software encryption in our whitepaper: https://learn.ironkey.com/docs/IronKey_Whitepaper- Benefits_of_Hardware_Encryption.pdf Briefly: - it is 5 to 10 times faster than software encryption, which is important if copying large files or running portable applications off the device - the key storage is far more secure. IronKey stores randomly generated AES keys in a tamper-resistant chip which will destroy itself if physically or electrically tampered with. - there is no way to prevent brute-force password or key guessing attacks with software encryption. I can eventually crack any TrueCrypt encrypted data. IronKey manages password unlocking in hardware and cannot be brute forced. Also the storage volume is not mounted until the password is correct, unlike TrueCrypt on a regular flash drive (Imagine if I copy your TrueCrypt files onto 100,000 bots, and start cracking in parallel....) - no drivers and no administrator rights are needed with hardware encryption. - we can use the same cryptochip secure storage to manage stored passwords, which makes it more secure than software password managers. To address your issue with malware on the host killing the drive with 11 bad password attempts... we prevent this by requiring the drive to be physically unplugged and re-plugged in after 3 bad password attempts. If malware is on the computer, it copying your password is the least of your worries. Once you log into the device, it can copy all your files. Nothing you can do about that. We have designed a keylogger proof IronKey, but this will be coming in a future hardware design. Dave Jevans. IronKey

    16. Re:Useless because of host security by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 4, Informative

      Z, Unfortunately you're not correct. The flash drive firmware would have to be able to parse the FAT file system in order for this to work. USB storage media does not receive data as files, but rather as blocks, at a much lower level than the windows file system. Also, your approach basically sends your password in the clear over USB. We AES encrypt our USB traffic, protecting your password from USB level sniffers. We have IronKey working on MacOS now, and are working on Linux. Please be aware that we are more than a secure flash drive. We've got hardware encrypted password storage, strong 2-factor authentication (the firefox has a PKCS11 driver that talks to our onboard crypto). Dave @ IronKey

    17. Re:Useless because of host security by FutureDomain · · Score: 1

      Give me a USB key with incredibly hard to break encryption and a Linux live CD. barring someone installing a keylogger INSIDE the machine it's safe. and there are ways to get around that as well, on screen keyboard for example.

      Excellent idea. By booting a portable OS, you remove the untrusted OS/Applications problem. The on-screen keyboard would be a good idea as well, but it would be hard to implement without an OS in memory. A VM would defeat this, but I don't think anyone would go to that length just to steal a password for this one brand of key. If everyone was using these, then hackers might go to more extreme methods. A fingerprint reader would be a welcome addition and would help mitigate attacks from keyloggers. Making the amount of tries before auto-destruction changeable would also be a good idea. It would help rubber-hose attacks since if you set the retry amount to a low number (2-3), you could just give them a couple wrong passwords and your data would be toast.

      The IronKey just seems to be an encrypted USB key with better hardware, but not much more secure than TrueCrypt on a normal key. If they could keep their good hardware design, add a fingerprint reader, add the capability to change the number or retries, and implement a good bootable OS with Firefox and Tor, then it would be truly secure. For now, I think I'll stick with my password protected U3 drive with TrueCrypt for my secure files.

      --
      Hydraulic pizza oven!! Guided missile! Herring sandwich! Styrofoam! Jayne Mansfield! Aluminum siding! Borax!
    18. Re:Useless because of host security by iamacat · · Score: 1

      Care to explain just what exactly do you do for a living to make it worthwhile for someone to keep beating you up for two weeks to get to your USB drive?

    19. Re:Useless because of host security by iamacat · · Score: 1

      A fingerprint reader would be a welcome addition and would help mitigate attacks from keyloggers.

      Yeah, they would just have to dust the same keyboard that had a logger installed for your fingerprints.

    20. Re:Useless because of host security by iamacat · · Score: 1

      Thanks for the official word. So basically, advantages of IronKey over saving an encrypted dmg on a regular flash drive:

      1. Faster. Now qualify this - did you run benchmark against a SSE3-optimized software implementation running on 2.33Ghz Core 2 Duo? Does the later really performs AES slower than the speed of USB2 or read/write speed of your flash hardware?

      2. Hardware-based self-destruct

      Disadvantages of IronKey:

      1. No way for the user to supply their own algorithm other than AES - say if they distrust US government standard or want to use public key cryptography.

      2. No option to use open source software that the user can examine for backdoors and security holes

      3. Malware can kill the drive by getting the user to remove and re-insert the drive 3 times or by automatically power cycling the host computer.

    21. Re:Useless because of host security by TrentTheThief · · Score: 1

      No matter. Ironkey provides the US gov't access to anything it wants. And all you EU people? Your Ironkey stats end up in the US. That allows your EU hosts to request the data from the US who will obligingly geek you.

    22. Re:Useless because of host security by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      We will publish benchmarks on speed, but it's faster than any software crypto we've tried. You are missing a number of advantages. Did you read the whitepaper on why hardware encryption is better than software???? https://learn.ironkey.com/docs/IronKey_Whitepaper- Benefits_of_Hardware_Encryption.pdf You fail to mention: - prevents brute-force password attacks (this is a big one) - prevents offline attacks on the encrypted data (because there is no .img file to copy and crack) - strong key generation and storage - no software or drivers to install, and works in non-admin mode on Windows (TrueCrypt installs a driver and required Admin-mode) - always on, cannot be disabled by user error or malware (unlike software crypto) As far as your disadvantages: 1. you're free to run an open source software crypto package on the device as well as the hardware crypto. 2. We are doing a FIPS-140 certification, whereby a third party is reviewing our code. 3. Possible, but if malware is power cycling your computer, you've got other things to worry about than it trying to DOS your IronKey.... like it would probably just erase your hard drive, no? Thanks for your comments and questions. - Dave @ IronKey

    23. Re:Useless because of host security by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 2, Informative

      TrentTheThief, I have no idea who you are, but your statement is patently false: "Ironkey provides the US gov't access to anything it wants." The US government, and anyone else, are free to purchase IronKeys. On the EU side of things, if you use our backup services, then yes we would have some data in the US. However, that data is encrypted on your IronKey, so it's just an encrypted blob. Also, we don't know who a given user is, so there's no way to track that back to an individual customer. Dave @ IronKey.

    24. Re:Useless because of host security by TrentTheThief · · Score: 1

      So are you saying that IronKey will ignore orders for logs and not monitor traffic when the FBI come to knock on your door? That your system will not comply with federal network wiretapping laws?

    25. Re:Useless because of host security by rdl · · Score: 1

      One of the "swipe" fingerprint readers would be great for this. I think I've seen them in USB key form factor, maybe 1cm3, and compatible with USB power.

    26. Re:Useless because of host security by rdl · · Score: 1

      You can protect your passphrases with one-time passwords, but can't really protect the data :) If you're viewing your secret mission plans or whatever on a bugged monitor, obviously the secret mission plans might be compromised, even if the one time password is no longer valuable.

      It's a little more difficult to keep changing passphrases for bulk encrypted data stored locally, and a lot of the value of a USB drive vs. network storage is offline or limited-bandwidth use. (otherwise, just store all your sensitive files on an encrypted-disk remote server). There might be an interesting hack to this device where you use S/Key to authenticate to the security IC to unlock the drive each time.

    27. Re:Useless because of host security by LuSiDe · · Score: 1
      Good point however, to defeat a keylogger, S/Key & OPIE work great. If you suspect a keylogger you obviously don't trust the whole computer hence the monitor argument is kinda moot. In my opinion, at least.

      I was more thinking about a situation where you actually have to copy the data over to a local storage device without watching the data itself while protecting the source. S/Key and OPIE only do the latter. A bugged monitor or bugged keyboard is not a viable attack against such situation. A bugged USB port or bugged I/O controller could be mitigated by having the data encrypted (but the key may not be send over the SSH connection in any way whatsoever) for example with GPG. Issueing a few remote commands on an otherwise secure server is also not a problem as long as you trust your SSH client (e.g. USB stick) which is another weak link in the whole story. Now, once you get your USB stick to a secure place with a secure computer you'll be able to read your data e.g. by entering your GPG password.

      It's a little more difficult to keep changing passphrases for bulk encrypted data stored locally
      Good disk encryption solutions such as LUKS and GELI support key management. However, they don't support S/Key or OPIE.
      --
      WE DON'T NEED NO BLOG CONTROL.
    28. Re:Useless because of host security by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1
      We have taken great care to ensure that the design of our crypto and key management ensures that only the owner of an ironkey can access their data and traffic. This is completely legal.

      We comply with all applicable laws.

    29. Re:Useless because of host security by TrentTheThief · · Score: 1

      "We comply with all applicable laws."

      Just so. A compromised system.

    30. Re:Useless because of host security by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1
      Not at all. Any system could be compromised or taken over or have a subpoena to get the data IN ANY COUNTRY.

      This is why systems like IronKey are designed using strong cryptography with great attention to key management, no back doors, etc. To rely on someone saying they won't disclose data is not a secure system.

  7. High speed Tor by Konster · · Score: 2, Funny

    What caught my eye was the blurb about high speed Tor...

    I thought, OMG! I want, NOW!!

  8. Re:Why The Fuck are such things MS-only? by Ant+P. · · Score: 2, Insightful

    The simple answer is that Linux already has far better security tools that a novelty like this can never match.

  9. Mmmm? by Elemenope · · Score: 3, Funny

    Most of the spies you know?

    --
    All the techniques ever used to make men moral have been themselves thoroughly immoral... (Nietzsche)
    1. Re:Mmmm? by infonography · · Score: 4, Funny

      Spies? Who said anything about Spies Comrade. Natasha bring some nice tea for Moose and Squirrel here. - Boris Badenov

      /soto voice/ Remember to put truth serum in it this time /

      Yes dollink -Natasha Fatale

      --
      Sorry about the writing. Robot fingers, you know? Cliff Steele in DOOM PATROL #23
    2. Re:Mmmm? by kestasjk · · Score: 2, Funny

      I meet spies on IRC all the time, it's no big deal. Most of them are huge manga buffs too

      --
      // MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
    3. Re:Mmmm? by PopeRatzo · · Score: 2, Funny

      I meet spies on IRC all the time, it's no big deal. Most of them are huge manga buffs too
      I know what you mean. All my neighbors are spies. When I take the Ashland Ave bus there are usually 20 or 30 spies on there.

      And the government spied on me through the television until I bought 20 square yards of copper screen to wrap around my sofa. I got the plans from a guy on IRC.

      And voices are telling me Astro Boy is Jesus.
      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    4. Re:Mmmm? by Thundersnatch · · Score: 1

      Dude, everyone knows the CTA has cameras and mind-control devices installed on all buses and trains. If you want to be free, you must WALK.

  10. Ha by akkarin · · Score: 1

    "high-speed TOR network"
    Don't make me laugh.... bitterly.
    --
    This sig left intentionally blank.
  11. Re:Why The Fuck are such things MS-only? by teslar · · Score: 1

    Why is this kind of product not targetted directly at the kind of user who is aware of the issues at stake?

    Because the kind of user who is aware of the issues at stake can recognise a pointless gadget when he sees one and knows he's far better off with something like TrueCrypt?
  12. Re:Why The Fuck are such things MS-only? by eclectro · · Score: 1, Funny

    No, because the NSA needs a backdoor...

    --
    Take the cheese to sickbay, the doctor should see it as soon as possible - B'Elanna Torres, "Learning Curve"
  13. Bootable Debian on USB key with root encryption? by alexandre · · Score: 4, Informative

    http://feraga.com/node/94 - why not use this instead on any key...

  14. pointless security by bl8n8r · · Score: 2, Insightful

    While you're decrypting your Sup3rs3kr3t w4r3z on the usb key, any malware* you haven't found yet is potentially logging every keystroke. You need to choose windows, or security; you really can't have both.

    [*] - http://www.emsisoft.com/en/malware/?Adware.Win32.P owered+Keylogger

    --
    boycott slashdot February 10th - 17th check out: altSlashdot.org
  15. Hmmm by The+MAZZTer · · Score: 2, Informative

    But for $149 you could get a simple 16gb thumb drive and just use TrueCrypt...

  16. Everyones the miracle device by BitZtream · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I've write encryption software for use by normal users on USB devices (shameless plug: http://www.rtsz.com/products/pss/ ) and it never ceases to amaze the bullshit that people fall for.

    I try my best to prevent false claims in our advertising, things like 'Your data is completely secure' falls into the false catagory as far as I'm concerned.

    We've had two major companies asking us for secure USB devices to hold sensitive personal information, one of which was medical related, the other of which I dont recall right off the top of my head. Both of these places wanted software you could install on ANY flash drive, would encrypt all the data on it, would prevent the data from ever being copied off to another device, harddrive or whatever, and of course would automatically destroy itself if too many incorrect passwords were given.

    Needless to say we were unable to help them, or even explain to them that what they were asking for is not currently possible. This is probably a failure to communicate on my part, but the real scary part is they went with other companies who claimed they could do it! Just to be clear, this was a software only solution running on any PC with the data on any flash drive.

    Makes me wonder if we should start letting the BS flow in order to boost sales :(

    --
    Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
    1. Re:Everyones the miracle device by banished · · Score: 1

      You may want to hire someone else to do your marketing.

  17. This is old news.. by hacker · · Score: 4, Informative

    I did a talk for my local LUG back in September of 2006 describing exactly how to do this using TrueCrypt for Linux and Windows

    I described in detail how to install, boot and use the USB key as a bootable Linux distribution, and also how to use the USB key in Windows (or Linux) with TrueCrypt, using some fancy tricks to auto-prompt for the password upon insertion of the key, how to use a slew of PortableApps on the key, and even a launchable menu to find and access them.

    This was almost a full year ago. IronKey, whatever it is, is nothing new.

    1. Re:This is old news.. by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      TrueCrypt is exceptionally good data encryption software. Our whitepaper describes the IronKey hardware crypto approach and how it's better than a pure software implementation: - speed - brute force key guessing - brute force password guessing - cross platform without drivers or admin mode required - tamper resistant We also provide strong 2-factor authentication for Internet password protection. The device does strong PKI crypto, which is integrated into FireFox with PKCS11.

  18. High-Speed TOR Network by RAMMS+EIN · · Score: 1

    ``high-speed TOR network''

    There is such a thing? I mean in terms of latency?

    --
    Please correct me if I got my facts wrong.
    1. Re:High-Speed TOR Network by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      We are running a number of TOR nodes in different countries. We route to these preferentially. Thus you can get much higher bandwidth, lower latency, and more consistent performance. Dave. IronKey

    2. Re:High-Speed TOR Network by WNight · · Score: 1

      Isn't that a bit insecure, seeing as how you're supposed to go through a random selection of nodes not all controlled by the same entity? Especially as probably only a few people in any given area will buy your device, making it relatively easy to correlate device usage with device purchase, and thus a name or at least register-cam footage.

    3. Re:High-Speed TOR Network by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1
      Its is actually more Secure, because the exit-nodes aren't going to be injecting malware, tracking bugs, or providing false DNS information (eg. pharming).

      It may be less Anonymous (although it was recently discovered that a group of Tor nodes in the Washington DC area were routing large amounts of the public Tor network http://cryptogon.com/?p=624)

      We're working on giving you the option of public mix-in, along with optimized route selection.

    4. Re:High-Speed TOR Network by rdl · · Score: 1

      If you'd provide some subset of your TOR servers for the general public TOR network as well, I'm sure you'd get a lot of community goodwill. If you put them all in the same "family" you could assume no one outside of ironkey users will use SOLELY ironkey servers, so your bandwidth impact should be fairly acceptable. Maybe also have a different exitroute policy for ironkey users (I'd pay extra for SMTP/IRC/etc. access)

    5. Re:High-Speed TOR Network by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      Great ideas. Thanks. I like the thought about different exit policies.

    6. Re:High-Speed TOR Network by Burz · · Score: 1

      That claim about colluding nodes in DC was false.

    7. Re:High-Speed TOR Network by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      Actually, the nodes WERE in fact operated by a single operator. I don't recall Roger ever naming who this fellow actually was. According to Roger "He's still running quite a few, on the same network, but now he sets the MyFamily torrc option on them." Also it caused him to add code to the tor client to not pick more than one node from a /16 when building a circuit.

  19. Re:Bootable Debian on USB key with root encryption by ai3 · · Score: 1

    Quite a complicated setup, but otherwise nice. I have been looking for an equivalent solution for Windows, so that I can plug it in any computer and boot my own environment. This would eliminate many potential problems (keyloggers, ...) and make it possible to install own software easily.

    Did anyone implement this already?

  20. Typically self-destruct is bogus... by gweihir · · Score: 3, Informative

    There is basically one option that works: A secure microcontoller, that keeps the key in internal RAM and does all the encryption and decryption itself. Everything else can be broken by interrupting or disabling the writes. AFAIK you cannot get any secure microcontroller for the price they claim. Certainly you cannot get one that does encryption and decryption with decent speeds.

    According to the website, it does a "flash trash". This is insecure. Flash writing is relatively slow and draws a lot of energy. This allows stopping and preventing writes to flash. Also, unless they use special flash chips, the same hack as with the Secustick will work. Again, for the price I do not see them getting a specially bonded or manufactured Flash chip. Even if they do, desolder the chip and read it directly. You can then clone it for unlimited attack attempts.

    I ecpect this will be relatively easy to break, just as the Secustick, i.e. at best a small step above a conventional stick encrypted, e.g., with TrueCrypt.

    --
    Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    1. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by rdl · · Score: 1

      It's epoxy potted, which means you need to break out the dremel and some acid to get to the chips, so I wouldn't reliably say I could get the data off a SINGLE instance of this device, at least not without practicing on some spares first.

      There's a big difference in attacking a one-off device vs. recovering something like the decoder keys from a bluray player where ANY single device is sufficient.

      (I wonder if they potted it more for mechanical durability than for security, however)

      Basically, if it's not FIPS 140-2 Level 4, it's crap. No solely bus-powered device will meet 140-2 level 4.

    2. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by gweihir · · Score: 1

      It's epoxy potted, which means you need to break out the dremel and some acid to get to the chips, so I wouldn't reliably say I could get the data off a SINGLE instance of this device, at least not without practicing on some spares first.

      Takes patience, that is all. And you can get theones to practice on quite cheaply. However the epoxy will possibly prevent published break-ins, since nobody wants to spend the effort.

      Basically, if it's not FIPS 140-2 Level 4, it's crap. No solely bus-powered device will meet 140-2 level 4.

      Exactly. If the device does not have its own power, then it cannot reliably delete anything. Or retain and then forget anything.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    3. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      We have a secure microcontroller on the device. This is where the AES encryption keys are stored. It does in fact protect against physical and electrical attacks, has shielded memory areas for key storage, and will self-destruct if tampered with. The flash memory is regular high quality high speed SLC NAND flash. All data is AES encrypted to this flash. When an attacker exceeds the password try count (currently 10 tries), the keystore hardware locks out and the device is dead. We also erase the encrypted flash contents ("flash trash"). This simply adds another layer of security for people who are concerned about cryptanalysis attacks (this is a real concern in certain markets). The benefit of doing this in hardware is that we can erase any bad flash blocks, thus avoiding the wear levelling and flash bad block mapping which affect software erase algorithms. Dave Jevans. IronKey

    4. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 2, Interesting
      The key-store in the cryptochip will destruct if tampered with physically or electrically.

      You are right that without a battery we cannot reliably delete the gigabytes of encrypted data if the device is immediately pulled out of a power supply and never re-inserted into another computer. This would only happen with a very determined and knowledgeable attacker. In such case, their recourse is to disassemble the device and try to attack AES encrypted data.

      Because the AES keys are randomly generated, and not based on a hash of a password for example, an attacker would have to brute force an AES key, which would be pretty impractical.

      Dave @ IronKey

    5. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by gweihir · · Score: 1

      So, do you have a power-source in there? Without one, your claims are bogus, since you cannot reliably detete the key-store in the crypto chip. (And without one, that would be a key stored in Flash.)If you think of attackers "pulling out the key",then you are still thinking of amateurs. Think more of attackers using ultra-fast current sensing equipment and nanosecond switching power-mos power cutout circuits. Still costs less than a few hundred dollard to make. And then you are getting somewere...

      So if you are sure your chip is secure, open it up to public review. Otherwise go away.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    6. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by gweihir · · Score: 1

      Ok, so which microcontroller would that be? And does it do the AES itself?

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    7. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1
      IronKey's CryptoChip includes voltage, frequency and temperature detectors, illegal code execution prevention, tampering monitors and protection against side channel attacks and probing. The CryptoChip can detect tampering attempts and destroy sensitive data on such events. We are designed to not leak information when attackers measure current consumption, radio emissions and other side channel attacks.

      The chip was designed in conjunction with one of the major security chip vendors in the space, and its core has been used in millions of secure devices.

      All crypto is standard open algorithms (AES, RSA, SHA). No proprietary crypto.

    8. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by gweihir · · Score: 1

      I ask again, does it have its own power-source? Were are the specs? What crypto-processor?

      Your claime may well be true, but without hard facts, they are nit really distinguishable from the ijdustry-standard snake-oil.

      And there are quite a few fancy attacks against hardware, that do not use power measurements...

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    9. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by swillden · · Score: 1

      Basically, if it's not FIPS 140-2 Level 4, it's crap.

      I wouldn't go that far. A level 3 device would be more than adequate for most people.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    10. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by rdl · · Score: 1

      I think I could put enough capacitor power inside a USB shell to zeroize. The problem is having enough power to continuously monitor, AND protect those batteries well enough that they themselves are not a point of failure.

      DS did this with the iButton, and that can fit inside the USB key form factor.

      You might be able to get an ultracapacitor now which would power tamperdetect/destroy circuits for a few days at a time, and recharge when on USB. I'd be fine with a device which needed to be plugged into USB every few days or it would zeroize.

    11. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by rdl · · Score: 1

      True. Depends on price point, really.

      There's also "designed to meet" vs. "certified". I'd be fine with level 3 cert, designed to meet 4, at least in most areas.

    12. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1
      Thanks gweihir. We have tried to be quite open about our product and algorithms (see our whitepapers, demo and FAQ as well as https://learn.ironkey.com./

      We're not prepared to discuss in a public forum which processors we are using. Might be competitors lurking about :-)

    13. Re:Typically self-destruct is bogus... by gweihir · · Score: 1

      Ok, I admit that is a problem. Hmm. Well, then, I hope you actually did this right and have commercial success. In this combination.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  21. Re:Why The Fuck are such things MS-only? by RAMMS+EIN · · Score: 1

    ``Why is this kind of product not targetted directly at the kind of user who is aware of the issues at stake?''

    Because said users will also quickly identify this product as snake oil.

    --
    Please correct me if I got my facts wrong.
  22. Re:Crap. by gweihir · · Score: 1

    I doubt you can get real tamper-resistant Flash for anything close to "$79 for a megabyte".

    For that price I would be willing to build you one, if you take at least 1GB size. Not too hard: A small, dedicated Linux computer, batteries, a strong steel box with light, shock and some other sensors, filled with epoxy and a keyboard on the outside. Tamper with it or enter your password wrongly several times and the power in the batteries is used to clear the encryption key in SRAM.

    Still not very high security and might be a bit heavy...

    --
    Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  23. Irony by dna_(c)(tm)(r) · · Score: 1

    'IronKey' sounds a lot like 'irony'

    Of course the irony would be that your most valuble data would become inaccesible because you forget your password.

    Or law enforcement singles you out because you had this tool, known to be used by pedophiles and the likes...

  24. Sound? by FatSean · · Score: 1

    Only 10 tries are allowed. Do you want to increase the risk of the destruction of your data because some TSA goon tried to guess a password? I would think they would give up before 10 attempts but might try one or two maybe.

    Artificially reducing the re-try count to 1 seems to increase risk of data loss with negligible increase in security...but I'm no security expert.

    --
    Blar.
    1. Re:Sound? by Captain+Splendid · · Score: 1

      Artificially reducing the re-try count to 1 seems to increase risk of data loss

      God, we're such geeks. Yes, data loss=bad, but in this case, data loss would be kind of the point. Better not to have the blueprints than let the enemy have them.

      --
      Linux, you magnificent bastard, I read the fucking manual!
    2. Re:Sound? by iminplaya · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Better not to have the blueprints than let the enemy have them.

      Is that code for "keeping your wife out of your porn collection"?

      --
      What?
    3. Re:Sound? by Jaidan · · Score: 1

      I don't know about you but my porn collection wouldn't fit on either of these USB keys. >.

      --
      Mobius Custom Computers
  25. It's ok. by Derek+Loev · · Score: 1

    Is it just me or do the majority of people that have need of something like this are not running Windows?

    1. Re:It's ok. by Saurian_Overlord · · Score: 1

      I assumed that the majority of people that have need of something like this are likely to not be running Windows at home, but probably are at school or at the office or what have you, which is precisely why they need a Windows app on a USB drive.
      Just a thought.

  26. I use Fearless Browser by DisorderlyConstruct · · Score: 5, Informative

    Instead of this, you can get Fearless Browser for free and install it on any USB drive. It is far more secure than any Windows version because it runs in a Gentoo-based virtual machine. It comes preconfigured with Tor and OpenDNS anti-phishing, and is updated frequently. I carry it around everywhere I go and use it at friend's houses and public terminals that I don't trust.

    1. Re:I use Fearless Browser by Hatta · · Score: 2, Insightful

      A keystroke logger in the host OS or hardware could still be catching your passphrase.

      --
      Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!
    2. Re:I use Fearless Browser by DisorderlyConstruct · · Score: 2, Informative

      They have a bare metal version that boots directly off the stick, so you don't need to worry about a compromised OS. I keep all my passwords stored in the Fearless Browser, encrypted with a main password. A hardware keylogger will only be able to capture my USB stick password, which is useless without my USB stick. It's an easy way to do two-factor authentication.

    3. Re:I use Fearless Browser by dhammabum · · Score: 1

      A hardware keylogger will only be able to capture my USB stick password

      Assuming a) you have access to a USB port and b) the system allows boots off USB, I'm intrigued. You are still using the keyboard after you boot off the USB - why wouldn't it then record anything you type in? The recording can be held in the hardware device.

      --
      I am not a robot. I am a unicorn.
  27. Re:Bootable Debian on USB key with root encryption by RpiMatty · · Score: 1

    http://www.ngine.de/index.jsp?pageid=4176

    This talks about installing windows xp onto a USB hard drive, but a large enough flash drive should be the same.
    I haven't tried it yet because my thinkpad t20 doesn't support booting from USB.

    As long as you can get to the BIOS of a machine and tell it to boot from USB you should be all set.

  28. I smelled bullshit by pair-a-noyd · · Score: 1

    as soon as I read the part that said "high-speed TOR network"..

    Right.. Anyone that's ever used TOR knows there ain't no such critter..

  29. Re:Bootable Debian on USB key with root encryption by ai3 · · Score: 1

    Thanks!

  30. p.o.s. by decavolt · · Score: 1

    Ironkey works on XP and Vista only.
    Bbbzzzzzzt. You lose. Next solution, please.

    1. Re:p.o.s. by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      We are working on MacOS and Linux support. Sorry, we decided to get Windows XP and Vista out first. We didn't do Win2K for technical reasons around their driver and device support. Dave @ IronKey

  31. Must have battery... by bagofbeans · · Score: 1

    If it doesn't have an internal battery, a totally reliable means of detecting intrusion, and finally the ability to erase the data memory before an attacker with laser or drill cuts the PCB track from the battery then this is insecure.

    Just destroying the escrow keys is not enough. Doubt they are using really heavy crypto such as the AES-Twofish-Serpent I use fo r my TrueCrypt backups... after all they are using a relatively moderate performance microcontroller for the OTF decryption.

    Like the crypto description of "military strength". So was Julius Caesar's substition cypher...

    1. Re:Must have battery... by swillden · · Score: 1

      Doubt they are using really heavy crypto such as the AES-Twofish-Serpent I use fo r my TrueCrypt backups... after all they are using a relatively moderate performance microcontroller for the OTF decryption.

      I don't know what they're using, but there's no reason they can't be using AES. AES is a very efficient algorithm, significantly faster in software (or hardware) than DES, and low-performance microcontrollers have been able to perform 3DES in software with acceptable performance for over a decade. Performance was one of the key requirements for AES and, in fact, the cipher selected (Rijndael) was the fastest of the serious competitors.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  32. Only works if someone doesn't know what it is by BlueCoder · · Score: 2, Insightful

    In all reality you wouldn't plug it in, you'd take the thing apart and dissolve the black goo. Then you would proceed with a hardware attack, reading the contents of the flash memory out and then attempt to crack the memory file.

    Only if the attacker doesn't know what the memory stick is will it be able to erase itself.

    1. Re:Only works if someone doesn't know what it is by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 3, Informative
      BlueCoder, in essence you are correct. However this narrows the attack surface down considerably. An attacker has to etch away the potting compound to get at the flash chips. Then unmount them. Then they can get at the AES encrypted data, and try to crack AES.

      The AES keys are not accessible, because they are not stored in the flash memory, but rather in our cryptochip which is tamper-resistant. The AES keys are not based on a password (they are generated by a random number generator), thus they are very strong. This means that password guessing isn't going to be effective for cracking the encrypted data. You would have to do an exhaustive AES key space attack. Dave @ IronKey

  33. Spy vs. Spy by arth1 · · Score: 1

    Because the chances of there being no password is infinitesimally higher than there being an auto-destruct after one try, and the time saved can be of more value than the minimal risk?
    Or because of human curiosity which will probably make quite a few people try despite orders to the contrary?

    That said, if it's a government that's after you, you're probably better off with a dead mans switch, where the content will auto-erase unless the device has been logged into during the last day. My guess is that most agencies would be unable to get the device to a lab and copied within a day, and if you're up against those that do, you have no chance in hell anyhow.
    Another option is Bluetooth -- if the pairing disappears for more than, say, a minute, zap all data and release the killspookium...

  34. Re:Mission Explodable. by Saurian_Overlord · · Score: 1

    So, will this explode, killing everyone in a 5 foot radius if an incorrect password is typed in?

    That would be sweet as hell. I'd buy one if it did.

  35. Re:Crap. by mlts · · Score: 1

    If the cryptochip automatically encrypted all I/O to and from the flash memory, storing the actual key in an area easily overwritten a ton of times the instant its tamper detection circuitry noticed something awry, I can see the data being secure, and resistant to someone reading it off device.

    However, until there is a way to enter the password that is not on the physical host, I'm not sure what security this provides (other than being allowed to run as a non admin user) over TrueCrypt in Traveller mode.

  36. hidden faq page https://learn.ironkey.com/faqs by nycfresh · · Score: 1

    https://learn.ironkey.com/faqs they should have put this on the home page but from what i read they've got their shit together....

  37. Ok, but what if... by 8ball629 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    What if the computer has a keylogger and it logs the password that unlocks your data? Am I missing something?

  38. Re:Bootable Debian on USB key with root encryption by scott_karana · · Score: 1

    Too bad hardware keyloggers would still eat you up.

  39. You? by NEOtaku17 · · Score: 1

    No, but they are.

    --
    Creative Demolition
  40. Advertised Via SPAM by BillTheKatt · · Score: 2, Informative

    I wouldn't buy one of these to save my life. Jerks got my email address from our receptionist, added me to their marketing SPAM list, and guess what, their reply address and unsubscribe links are broken. I know where I'd like to stick their ironkey...

    1. Re:Advertised Via SPAM by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      Bill, I am truly sorry that you got spammed. We have not sent ANY email advertising at all. We think this must have come from a reseller or from our VAR builder. We're looking into it. Hey, I spent the last 7 years in the anti-spam industry. I'm the last person who want to spam people. Dave Jevans. IronKey

    2. Re:Advertised Via SPAM by BillTheKatt · · Score: 1

      Dave,
      You might want to take a serious look at your VARs or resellers then, and consider taking legal action against ironkeysales.com for using your name and product when violating US law. Full email follows:

      Received: from Redacted by Redacted with ESMTP
      (SMTPD-9.00) id A0370278; Tue, 10 Jul 2007 11:30:15 -0700
      X-Barracuda-Connect: chchnhhed01-lo0-pool1-a2.chchnh.tds.net[69.130.7.2 ]
      Received: from mail.mtsl.com (chchnhhed01-lo0-pool1-a2.chchnh.tds.net [69.130.7.2])
      X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
      X-ASG-Orig-Subj: IronKey
      Subject: IronKey
      Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2007 14:27:31 -0400
      Message-ID:
      From: "Anthony Napolitan"
      To: "Redacted" Redacted


      From: Anthony Napolitan [mailto:anthonyn@ironkeysales.com]
      Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2007 11:28 AM
      To: Redacted
      Subject: IronKey


      Dear Redacted,
      Sorry I missed you when I called to introduce IronKey and myself to you.
      As I stated in my voicemail message to you, IronKey provides the most secure USB flash drive technology available. Our hardware encrypted secure flash drive provides data and password protection, secure surfing and simple backup and restore.

      Our solution is really about Secure Portable Computing. IronKey gives you military-grade security in the palm of your hand allowing you to protect your data with hardware-based encryption, store and manage your online passwords, and surf the web safely with your portable version of FireFox and your personal VPN.

      IronKeys rugged metal casing makes it tamperproof and waterproof and has ultra-high speed, up to 30MBps Read and up to 20MBps write. The IronKey product was developed partially in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, and is the most secure flash drive available.

      Thank you for your time and consideration. I will follow up with you to discuss IronKey and its benefits with you in more detail; I look forward to speaking with you soon. You can also visit us on the web at www.ironkey.com

      Best regards,
      Anthony Napolitan
      anthonyn@ironkeysales.com
      (248)347-8890x302
      IronKey - enterprise - datasheet.pdf

    3. Re:Advertised Via SPAM by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      Thanks Bill for posting the domain and headers. The registrant of the domain ironkeysales.com gives me a good clue who to chase. DJ

  41. Re:Why The Fuck are such things MS-only? by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 2, Informative

    We started with M$ because it's the largest market. We have MacOS working in the lab and are also working on Linux support. We recognize that Linux users are the most security savvy, but that part of the market is miniscule compared to the Windows market (think about financial services, hospitals and government markets). We've spent over $7M in research and development on the product, and unfortunately we've got to target the larger markets first. - Dave Jevans. IronKey

  42. Re:Crap. by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

    The key storage IS tamper resistant. The chip will self-destruct if tampered with physically or electrically. This chip is separate from the flash memory where your data is stored AES encrypted. You are correct that the flash memory will not destroy itself if tampered with, but all data in there is AES encrypted. It is most important that the AES key be destroyed. Note that the devices are sealed with epoxy potting compound, which makes it extremely difficult to get the chips off the board without physically destroying them. To help you in your determination of shiny turdness, try reading our whitepaper on the security model and crypto employed. https://learn.ironkey.com/docs/IronKey_Whitepaper- Benefits_of_Hardware_Encryption.pdf Thanks, Dave Jevans. IronKey

  43. Re:Bootable Debian on USB key with root encryption by alexandre · · Score: 1

    Worst case implement the random onscreen keyboard they used on http://tinfoilhat.shmoo.com/

  44. Re:It doesn't work! by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 2, Informative

    Sorry, your "dd" attack will not work on an IronKey. We do not mount the secure volume until the password is correctly entered. In fact, we present as 2 devices to the computer. Your data is stored as a removable media. We don't "insert" the media until the password is entered correctly. That is one aspect why it's better than a regular USB key. Our security whitepaper gives a description of how it works, and the benefits of the approach over software implementations. https://learn.ironkey.com/docs/IronKey_Whitepaper- Benefits_of_Hardware_Encryption.pdf Oh yeah, we wanted to put some thermite into it, but it wouldn't pass CE safety tests. Thanks, Dave Jevans. IronKey

  45. Keyloggers Re:Ok, but what if... by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

    If you have malware on your computer, having it keylog your IronKey password is the least of your worries. Even without a keylogger, malware can copy all your files once you unlock and IronKey or any other encrypted media for that matter. We considered doing our first version with external password entry to avoid keyloggers, but we decided that it was 1. too expensive 2. the majority of people would not understand it 3. requires a battery for best usability 4. makes the device larger 5. at the end of they day, data-copying malware can still get your stuff once you unlock the device. Dave Jevans. IronKey

  46. IronKey FAQ and Crypto White Paper by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 5, Informative

    Thanks to everyone for your really interesting comments and questions. We will update our website to make it more clear that we have a FAQ section that answers many of the questions posed here on SlashDot. https://learn.ironkey.com/faqs We also have a whitepaper that describes how our hardware encryption works, the threat models, and how it is better than software encryption. https://learn.ironkey.com/docs/IronKey_Whitepaper- Benefits_of_Hardware_Encryption.pdf We released Windows versions first, as the majority of the market is using that OS. We are working on Linux and MacOS versions. Thanks, Dave Jevans @ IronKey

  47. External Password Entry? by 8ball629 · · Score: 1

    You mean like a projected keyboard? That would be really cool and I was just saying if you went onto a public terminal and they had a keylogger just for the sake of having one and then someone stole the information and then your IronKey.

    Thanks for the input anyway!

    1. Re:External Password Entry? by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      We prototyped a laser projected keyboard, but they are pretty expensive ($100) and require a flat surface. We have put more effort into a keypad and also a rotary numerical selector design on the case. Dave

    2. Re:External Password Entry? by rdl · · Score: 1

      There's a market for a secure input/output device, logically isolated from the host CPU. If you could put even 2 capacitative switches (top + bottom of a split case) and a tricolor LED on the device, it would be possible to do a lot of interesting stuff. Obviously a pinpad + LCD would be a lot more interesting, but something USB key or at most pager sized which was tamper-evident, had limited CPU/memory, and direct user I/O, plus host I/O, would be great.

      You can kludge this now by using a cellphone + bluetooth + laptop, but as far as I know no one really makes a secure (x9.9 would be great) device like this. The pinpads for POS applications are close, but not generally designed for mobile use, or for end users, and no one has put interesting security apps on them.

    3. Re:External Password Entry? by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

      Yep, agreed that there is utility and a market. We're working on it.

  48. Private TOR nodes Re:I smelled bullshit by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 2, Informative

    We run a number of TOR nodes across the world. The TOR client selects these preferentially. Thus you get higher bandwidth, lower latency and more predictable performance than using the regular public TOR network, where you could end up going through some guys computer connect to the net on a DSL or dial-up line. Dave @ IronKey

  49. Self-destruct? by Ub3rT3Rr0R1St · · Score: 1

    Hm...If it doesn't actually explode, then I don't want it.

    -sigh- What happened to the good ol' days when something that was said to self-destruct would mean that it exploded?

    1. Re:Self-destruct? by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 2, Funny

      We tried to get a small amount of thermite into the device, but it just refused to pass the CE and FCC approvals needed to sell in USA and Canada. Maybe we can sell the thermite-grenaded versions out of China and have people mail order from there? :-) D @ IronKey

  50. Re:It doesn't work! by dch24 · · Score: 1

    Hey IronKey Dave,

    Just wanted to say that (unlike lots^Wsome of the comments here) I think your device is a great idea. I'm especially excited to see a laser-keyboard version but I'll probably get one if you release a version that has a rotary or button password system on the device itself...

    Cheers, dch24

  51. Even cheaper, much better by WaZZu2002 · · Score: 1

    I remember seeing this kind of application for U3 device on http://www.eisst.com/products/private_browser/usb- u3/ and it was much cheaper than $79... which can work on any USB device, encrypting all your private information. And it doesn't expose saved data to OS.

    -wz.

  52. Re:It doesn't work! by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

    Thanks dch24, Once people dig into the technical details, and actually use the device, I'm confident that initial scepticism will turn into enthusiasm. Thanks for your support. Dave

  53. Not the same thing Re:Even cheaper, much better by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1

    WZ, What you refer to is a $29 browser with crypto from EISST. I am sure it is a great product, but its just software Remember that you would have to factor in the cost of purchasing a U3 drive to run it on. And you'd need truecrypt or some other flash drive encryption software to protect your data on the flash drive. With IronKey you are getting a super-fast, super-reliable, tamper-resistant, waterproof hardware encrypted drive. And it comes with FireFox that talks to our CryptoChip for authentication operations, plus the password manager and private Tor network. All browsing data is stored encrypted on the IronKey, and no software is installed on the host computer. Dave

    1. Re:Not the same thing Re:Even cheaper, much better by WaZZu2002 · · Score: 1

      Dave,
      as far as I learned their browser encrypts all the data saved on the USB or HD(cookies, cache, bookmarks, history and any intermediate files), and includes support for Tor network too. Moreover, instead of using truecrypt, they've got the bundle solution with private safe application, which will be anyways overall cheaper even with U3 device. Another thing is that, right after you insert ironkey device into PC and enter owner credentials all the data on the usb device will be accessible to OS, or any kind of malware that can steal the information from the usb disk.
      -wz.

  54. Re:Crap. by mikey1134 · · Score: 1

    If this is a little offtopic I apologize but I am curious, has your company thought about including a small resident memory scanner into your product? By this I mean essentially a small antivirus just to check the RAM for the pressence of known keyloggers, etc. That might silence some of the detractors here complaining about a compromised host. Though truthfully I don't understand that complaint given that anything sufficiently sensitive to be put on this device shouldn't be opened on an untrusted machine anyway....Anywho, I look forward to your response, this looks like a very interesting device and I can definitely see a lot of potential in it

    --
    <gir voice> I love this sig... </gir voice>
  55. memory scanner/antispyware scan Re:Crap. by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1
    Mikey, Yes, we're looking into this. The trick is to get one that does not require software to be installed on the computer. There are a couple of lightweight options out there. Thanks for the great suggestion.

    Dave

  56. Re:Crap. by rdl · · Score: 1

    We're pretty good at depotting, and attacking even salted ICs :) (really, anyone who does design/test on milstd devices or avionics gets good at this just from debugging, but there are people who specialize in extracting keys from devices...)

    Any info on which foundry/process/etc.? I assume at the $149 price point it's a custom chip.

  57. Re:Crap. by IronKey+Dave · · Score: 1
    It is a salted IC.

    We store the AES keys encrypted (just in case).

    Major partner with well used and tested core.