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San Francisco DA Discloses City's Passwords
snydeq writes "The office of San Francisco District Attorney Kamala Harris has made public close to 150 usernames and passwords used by various departments to connect to the city's VPN. The passwords were filed this week as Exhibit A in a court document arguing against a reduction in $5 million bail in the case against Terry Childs. Though they placed the passwords in the public record, city prosecutors do seem to think that they are sensitive. InfoWorld's Paul Venezia, who has been following the case closely, provides further analysis of the technical details in the city's case. 'By themselves, [the passwords] would not be enough to allow anyone to access the network via VPN,' Venezia writes, 'but the fact that the city entered them into evidence is quite shocking. At the very least, they'll have to shut down their VPN access for awhile until they've changed them all and modified the configurations of some large number of VPN clients.'"
AH HA! See, Childs was right , he is the only competent one!
Caveat Utilitor
If this is the level of fuckwittage he had to deal with while in his job I'm not surprised he locked others out.
Then the users will change them right back to what they were.
Where I used to work, you had to change your password every month. After you changed it three times, you could it back to the original.
So people just changed their password 4 times.
I had my doubts at first, but this makes it abundantly clear that Childs was right . More right than any of us might have imagined when this spin-doctored story first came out.
In hindsight he took totally reasonable, prudent measures to protect incompetent city officials from themselves. Who knows how they got into that situation, but I won't blame him for anything in light of this, and I sincerely hope a jury wouldn't either.
He should first collect damages himself, and then initiate a class action suit against the city on behalf of all their residents. Maybe put the DA in jail for criminal negligence - in fact I'd venture a guess that he's mentally defective enough to file the charges himself.
Does anyone have a torrent of these alleged usernames and passwords?
The top 5:
password
admin
root
guest
t3rrych1lds1337haxx0r
AH HA! See, Childs was right , he is the only competent one!
Dang! You beat me to posting about it.
Wasn't part of Childs' point that password security in the S.F. government was lax and that divulging the big one in a way that would spread it around was dangerous to the network?
Given that the configurations on the routers weren't saved, the first guy to use that password on them had better be DARNED careful to get them recorded before changing anything or he's likely to break the network big time. So handing it to an administrator, who will hand it to several people, any of whom might leak it, could cause the net to come crashing down.
If all they'll let him do for a handoff is hand off the passwords, I can see how a prima donna BOFH would want to hand the big one directly to his successor, who would then spend the next week carefully recording the configs as-running before making changes or sharing the password with less-skilled delegates.
Not that it's right. But looks to me like the city is making his point for him - which his lawyer should use in a counter-argument at the bail hearing. B-)
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
Even if the sysadmin referred to as 'Childs' was a paranoid schizophrenic, does not mean he wasn't right.
"Thanks for all the money you paid to us. We've used it to buy off ISO among other things" -Microsoft
So who will be the first to print up and sell t-shirts to support Terry Childs? Perhaps they can also print the SF VPN usernames and passwords on the back. Design suggestions welcome.
I can see that there is a bright future in the cluestick market...
They seem to be operating under the assumption that Childs was sniffing passwords. Which judging from the case is just stupid. Why would anyone sniff passwords that they had absolute control of? He was sniffing unencrypted messages over the network. Even sans the unrestricted power over the network, I can't imagine Childs has any use for those passwords. Or anyone else for that matter.
I attended a lecture some years ago by a Microsoft employee who was high up in their security structure.
He started his speech by asking the audience, "Passwords and policies should be made as strong and secure as possible, right?"
A show of many hands.
He said, "Wrong! It is possible for a password policy to be TOO secure. Let me give you an example. It is possible to set up a security policy in NT that requires a password of at least 8 characters, which must also be mixed case, have at least one numerical digit, and at least one non-alphanumeric character, and which will require a change of password every week."
"As soon as you implement that policy, users will write their password on a post-it note, stick it to their monitor, and replace it with a new one every week. So you see, a password policy CAN be too secure for your own good."
I've got to say voyeuristically looking at other people's passwords can be pretty entertaining sometimes. I know I've had a few passwords I wouldn't care to have other people know.
If you can read this... 01110101 01110010 00100000 01100001 00100000 01100111 01100101 01100101 01101011
This is unfortunately par for our fine DA. Kamala Harris has proven herself to be an incompetent tool more often that I'd like to hear.
She has angered many San Franciscans by refusing to prosecute violent criminals, and lately, found to have been lax towards the city's worst crime of the year...the murder of a father and his two sons in the Mission by a suspected illegal alien due to the city's stupid sanctuary law.
She should be dragged out, tarred, whipped and ejected from the city, never to return.
Contrary to popular belief, life is not a bitch. It is far far worse.
that has more sense than San Francisco: Louisiana!
"I don't know, therefore Aliens" Wafflebox1
According TFA, the thing about his not saving the configs to flash is a CLAIM by the city, not something confirmed by Childs.
So how do they KNOW that, if they don't have the passwords? Did they try rebooting some network boxes and have them not come up? (If so, how is it that the net is still running...)
This is looking more and more like a pointy-haired-boss SNAFU than logic-bomb job-insurance/revenge sabotage.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
It'll be fun to see what happens, now that he's been removed from the loop.
********* sig: If you don't like the law, get filthy stinking rich, and buy a better one.
No, he wasn't an asshole. He had a very good point that has just gone over your head. To elucidate, if you add too many requirements to user's passwords they can't remember them and need to write them down. Once you get to that point, the passwords aren't strong any more and you've created a security hole by trying to avoid one. There's a limit on how much you can expect the average user to remember when it comes to passwords; go past that and their passwords get less, not more secure.
Good, inexpensive web hosting
From the referenced article - "The passwords are so-called "phase one" passwords, and must be combined with a second password to access the network, the source said. " 99% chance they are using some form of Cisco device as their VPN concentrator (most like a VPN3030, ASA or 7200 series router). If they are these passwords (one per group) are in what is called a pcf file in every employees computer that is allowed to connect. Heck, if you use a Cisco vpn it is on your computer in the following location - C:\Program Files\Cisco Systems\VPN Client\Profiles . The group pass is encrypted with weak encryption that is commonly cracked to allow linux laptops to connect using vpnc. You can do it on the web here - http://www.unix-ag.uni-kl.de/~massar/bin/cisco-decode
The thing is, this group password's primary use is to segregate users into different buckets. E.G contractors may have on password, with different authentication methods, while permanent employees are in a different bucket, with their own authentication methods. The key thing, is that once this first password is provided, the end user still has to provide a unique username and password to gain access. So in effect, having the group password alone is meaningless.
On top of that, I frankly would not be surprised or peeved if a network engineer had possession of PCF files for the network he is responsible for. What is next? Is the DA going to try to prosecute him for having diagrams and configs of the network he is managing on his laptop?
Colin McNamara - CCIE #18233 "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible just takes a little longer"
From the article:
So, in answer to your questions: probably because the police found them as a result of their investigation, because Childs allegedly kept them in plaintext, and yes, allegedly, Childs had plenty to do with it.
Do you have any other questions? Perhaps the article answers them.
Are you adequate?
I agree with the grandparent, he's just being an ass. ;-)
He's using the word "secure" in the original question in a very narrow way. Of course a password policy must be human-centric as well as containing enough randomness to not be brute forced or attacked easily through rainbow tables.
There's education in teaching users how to select strong and yet memorable passwords, and when it's OK to write them down at least partially in your wallet or strong encrypted password store.
He's being an ass because he's asking a complex question, then telling everyone they're wrong and giving a simple smug answer. You can be right and still be an ass.
An aside is the fact that we rely on passwords too much. Dual factor authentication for internal business use is relatively cheap and easy to set up in windows and linux for login, for ssh, etc. I'm genuinely surprised more people outside of the military don't use it.
Blessed are the pessimists, for they have made backups.
Does anyone realize that the passwords would have never been given to the DA's office if it wasn't for his actions? The passwords would then not be part of public record. Do you think the person at the IT office would have made the list of passwords public if Childs left gracefully?
Someone at the the DA's office is the incompetent person in this case, but that does not validate his locking out of everyone competent enough to take care of the system (the people that would have replaced him at the IT department.)
It's government. To think like government in implementing something like VPN you have to conceive a solution that involves the user not having to do anything (other than maybe push a button) and this includes anything other than a standard login box. Second you have to implement this in a way that the user themselves can go home and implement this solution without any site help from anyone and zero technical knowledge. (you don't send an IT person to a State Employees home, that's asking from some kind of lawsuit). Fourth the solution must be as expensive as possible, support some local business (preferable if the business owner is connected politically with one of the local leaders) and require very few extra hours from the already overworked staff.
What does that result in? Hardware VPN boxes plugged into the network router, with the users computer plugged directly into the VPN box. Costs a lot, requires pre-configuration of the box but should require no site visits, idiots can usually successfully plug in boxes with phone support only and any reconfiguration likey requires the box to be brought back into the office as the VPN keys on the boxes are likely hard coded into a configuration on the VPN device. Likely a turn key solution so you have a hefty support contract and the vendor would likely assist with deployment and any reconfiguration resulting in a nice contract fee for reprogramming all the boxes.
My guess is some VPN box provider is going to be doing a service call on every box and netting themselves some nice profit under their support agreement.
The username/password combos were apparently functioning sets. The DA is saying they found them on Child's own computer. The DA is all in a tizzy because Child's could then use these accounts to sneak into the system and cause mischief without getting tracked back.
Right. The only guy in the world with God level access to this network needs fake usernames/passwords so he can 'cause mischief'?
Give me a fucking break. I can think of many reasons for him to have those combos on his personal system.
Apparently the less than brilliant DA's office is unaware that the GOD level admin has the ability to do anything at all on the network and REMOVE ALL TRACES IN THE LOGS afterwards. It's trivial, when you're the one who runs the tattletales.
Dear DA office: IF YOU LOOK HARD YOU'LL UNDOUBTEDLY FIND EVIDENCE TRACY EAVESDROPPING ON THE NETWORK SNIFFING AND ATTEMPTING TO ILLEGALLY PENETRATE THE SYSTEM. IT'S PART OF HIS JOB, MORONS. IF YOU KEEP BRINGING THIS CRAP UP, YOU'LL ONLY LOOK STUPIDER.
Keep this up, and Nifong will have company in the 'worlds dumbest DA's club'
********* sig: If you don't like the law, get filthy stinking rich, and buy a better one.
If you install S/KEY or OPIE on your UNIX or Linux box to manage logins, you will be presented with a random challenge string. You then plug that challenge string and your (relatively simple) password into a one-time pad password calculator, which tells you what to type into the login prompt. Voila: An easy-to-remember password that cannot be cracked by simple lookup tables. As close to perfectly secure as you're likely to get (meeting the criteria in the actual question) without being complex for the user.
Post-it notes aren't a bad solution, if the physical area is secure against unauthorized access, so long as the user is aware of the fact that their account is communal within that area. Which, for a private office, isn't a fatal problem. The cleaners are still a potential vulnerability, but the cleaners have far easier access to all of your personal notes, which are likely to have far more valuable information than your account.
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
I wouldn't be too sure about that. He did a good job of running the network without issues. Just he got paranoid about his job.
Just they won't hire him as the main network guy but will use him for experience long as the company keeps good record of the routers and passwords that is accessible by other network admins and audit those passwords every month.
I've run networks where the router config did not fit into the flash. It had to be loaded from an external server.
Not having the config in flash need not make the device a brick.
Nullius in verba
that's the only technology anybody in the city with a title is capable of directing.
if this is supposed to be a new economy, how come they still want my old fashioned money?
But, years ago, after leaving IT, I was doing work on my department's portion of the intranet, and we at the time were using NetObjects Fusion (No, it wasn't Cold Fusion, and tho we had Front Phage, and a few other things, we for a while had NOF). I happened to have a packet sniffer because we were in Customer Support and used it to track broadcast packets going through our portion of the test LAN.
One day, I suddenly could NOT remember my password, which sometimes happened after changing one of many of my own passwords. So, I hooked up the Lan Analyzer thingy to track my packets and look for MY OWN packets. I needed to work, and without my password I couldn't.
Shockingly, NetObjects Fusion went out and sniffed the whole fracking NETWORK, and streamed user names and user password, unencrypted. The program designers must have been novices or fools. I began to panic, since I already knew the company had in it's employ one very quiet guy whose job it was was to sit in his cubicle and look at data streams and look for IP mischief. That made me feel he had an arsenal of tools and would find my group's app running on the corporate LAN. Heart racing, armpits sweating, I went straight to my director and told him everything. He said not to worry, and we agreed I should tell IT. I did, and shortly afterward, we ditched NOF.
Apparently, IT didn't vet the program well enough, or the vendor failed to disclose it or outright lied and IT took it at that. Whatever the case, the moral is that any app can have scanners built into them even if for self-diagnostics, and any employee can intentionally or unwittingly loose a scanner onto the LAN, and end up with files they'd rather not have.
For example, I once hooked up my company laptop running a fresh, NON-IT managed SuSE distro (this was 1999) and it scoured the servers (Unix and windows) and filled up my login screen with an icon and user name of OVER *400* employees and counting. I freaked out and yanked it from the LAN and IIRC, never again hooked up a Linux box directly to a LAN without permission.
Previously: "Linux... Toward the Sunrise..." Now: "Linux... Toward the-- No, now, part of Every Sunrise"
to help the City of San Francisco look stupid.
"Not an actor, but he plays one on TV."
Well since the Constitution grants him the right of discovery, if that was the only copy, all Childs has to do is file a motion to see the evidence against him to obtain those usernames and passwords, plus because they were entered into a court record, if he or a friend were to launch an attack or whatever, he would have reasonable doubt given that any court clerk, judge, DA, case officer, police officer, citizen/group/reporter filing open record request, etc. can now see it. Better still if the system were hacked while he was in jail he could use it as defense saying "Hey, when I was running things the network remained secure, but as soon as I was removed it was compromised so how can the DA suggest to the jury that I was somehow putting the network at undo risk? The facts suggest otherwise. Just imagine how cool it would be to read on /. that this happened? Hum?
Honestly the more I read about this the worse SF managers and the DA look. How dumb are they, I mean they are disproving their own case, if I were Childs' lawyer, I would ask this question to the DA in front of the jury "Just so I get this straight, because I am a simple man, you are telling us that this information was so confidential and put the city at so much risk that you publicized it yourself the same day that you made a statement about the dangers of Childs potentially releasing the information? Did you make sure the passwords and usernames were changed before doing so? Isn't it possible that the usernames alone being published could create a target point for hackers to work from? Allowing them to launch either DOS attacks if lockouts are set on thes accounts or to continually work on cracking passwords if no lockout is set? Do you even have the technical knowledge to understand the details of this case without you yourself putting the city at risk like you 'allege' my client has? If Childs put the city at risk by having it on his computer and deserves jail time, what punishment should you get for filing it into the court records? Didn't security concerns worry you? Where is the confirmation the passwords were updated or the account deactivated before you entered sensitive information with the court?"
This is out of a comic stripe, SF is run by idiots. Childs is not the problem it is those that let him control everything so long as he did their work for them. Those are the people who should be on trial. It is a retarded DA that is 1). Putting city systems are risk for a prosecution and 2). Given the defense more ammunition.
Respect the Constitution
"Your honor, my client did not feel comfortable giving sensitive system passwords to idiots. I'd like to enter prosecution's boneheaded public filing as Exhibit A."
They released ALL damn passwords in a public record.
Anyone (who already has physical access to this network), which could be quite many people, could have various degree of access to the network.
I'm sure hackers who already got a way to the network perimeter would like these passwords too.
The ensuing chaos will prove he was right, sadly they will make him the scapegoat for it too, none will see (or admit) Childs was right.
Patents Drive Free Software as Hurricanes Drive Construction Industry
what morons, everybody know the only secure place for your password sticky note is the underside of your keyboard
Apocalypse Cancelled, Sorry, No Ticket Refunds
Please reference the title of this thread. We're way out in the weeds now, and arguing about semantics.
Here's how I see it, and you're welcome to disagree.
It appears you're defining secure as simply strength, which includes randomness, length, and character set.
I'm defining secure as, well, secure, taking in account at minimum both strength and human usability factors.
Security == strength + usability.
Strength is a subclass of secure.
Length is a subclass of strong.
Randomness is a subclass of strong.
Character set is a subclass of strong.
Human usability is a subclass of secure.
Memorability is a subclass of human usability.
Length is a subclass of memorability.
Randomness is a subclass of memorability.
There is overlap the characteristics of strength and usability, which is why password policies are hard to get "right".
It's all semantics. I disagree with your assertion that putting secure in the past tense for human usability factors makes sense, but at least you're defining your words. ;-)
This whole discussion started by saying that a instructor who was making a valid point through using poorly defined terms was being a dick.
I think in this thread I have sufficiently made my point, you're welcome to have the last word if you like, but I'm done here.
Blessed are the pessimists, for they have made backups.