Cybercriminals Refine ATM Data-Sniffing Software
BobB-nw writes "Cybercriminals are improving a malicious software program that can be installed on ATMs running Microsoft's Windows XP operating system that records sensitive card details, according to security vendor Trustwave. The malware has been found so far on ATMs in Eastern European countries, according to a Trustwave report. The malware records the magnetic stripe information on the back of a card as well as the PIN, which would potentially allow criminals to clone the card in order to withdraw cash. The collected card data, which is encrypted using the DES algorithm, can be printed out by the ATM's receipt printer, Trustwave wrote."
DES doesn't really mean "Designed Extremely Secure" ....
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An ATM is not a desktop computer. WTF is an ATM doing running Windows?
They have to understand that 'eating the loss', while it may make sense from a short term financial perspective does nto make sense for a longer term perspective. There are superior methods out there to verify credit card information, we don't need to use the same method that was used 50 years ago.
excitingthingstodo.blogspot.com
..."on ATMs running Microsoft's Windows XP operating system..."
Let me be the first to say "ur doin it wrong."
When your ATM asks if you want to install an ActiveX control, you always say "no."
How many years do I have to keep telling them that?
"Hi!, I'm an ATM."
Don't think of it as a flame, more like an argument that does 3d6 fire damage.
But how does one install the malware on the ATM without insider help?
ATM's are housed in tamper-proof cases, the user interface is very limited (it's not like you can plugin a USB key or sth.) and they are under constant camera supervision.
I RTFA (yes, yes... I know) but I couldn't find the answer to the most obvious question... how does the rootkit get installed?
If no physical access to the real PC inside the ATM is needed.. that's really cool!
But if you need to plug an usb drive in, this actually reduces the field of the potential thieves by several orders of magnitude...
M
So when the ATM asks me if I'm sure I was to withdraw £200 it's just UAC.
"Are you sure you want to withdraw this money?"
"Will you spend it wisely?"
"You don't seem to have much left, have you planned for an emergency?"
. . . etc. . . .
Schroedinger's Brexit: The UK is both in and out of the EU at the same time!
Why a bank's IT / security team would feel it appropriate to operate ATMs that run Windows is completely beyond me. I mean, if bankers were really that stupid the world economy would probably have crumbled by now. Oh, wait. . .
Facts have a liberal bias.
Once I found a gas station near my work that the pumps where running a version of Windows back around 1999-2000. If you swiped your card and pulled the nozzle at the same time the little LCD screen showed a BSOD and you got free gas. I fill up there for 1 week until they closed the station and changed the pumps. Never got charged a cent!
There were already news of something similar in March.
Judging by the currencies the malware operates with, it seems the "Eastern European countries" are Ukraine and Russia. Does anyone know if it's Diebold again?
And putting aside the incredibly logical choice of the OS, any idea on how this gets installed on the ATMs in the first place?
Isn't that the bigger issue. Regardless of what OS is being run by the machine, the hackers have some back door that is allowing them to install software. Even if it was Mac, Linux or something embedded, if they hackers can install software they can do whatever they want.
To run any "public financial transaction device" certain compliances are required and many of these are related to physical security, data security and communications security standards. Clearly, the presence of malware on ATM core software indicates that the ATM security standards are either not being met or are terribly inadequate.
It occurs to me that one rule that might go a long way to making machines like ATMs (or even voting machines) more secure against corruption is a requirement that the system software should be stored in a read-only format such as CD/DVD or ROM chips. CD/DVD ROMs would probably be the most flexible method and various self-check measures could help ensure that the CD/DVD ROM was genuine. (Say, for example, a validation black-box device of some sort.)
With enough engineering and hacking, even this method could be thwarted I am sure but it would certainly raise the bar significantly beyond "crack the machine open, connect the system drive to a USB adapter, insert additional code, close up" which is the method of entry I suspect is most used. If there was limited to no local storage and ROM-based operating systems and software combined with solid verification technologies, it would take some serious knowledge to compromise such machines.
This sort of method would make running Windows XP as the operating system considerably more difficult, but if they are hard-set on running Windows, I am sure they would find a way to comply if it were required.
What is this 1980? What countries are still using magnetic strips for credit and debit cards?
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WITHOUT any data-sniffing involved...
Plus firewall, 'nuf said. The problem is when people break into the back of a machine and physically install malware on it... if you have people breaking in or social engineering their way into the back of a physically locked machine then you are going to have problems. I don't care if it's running some logic flow on an EEPROM, it's still going to be hacked.
Despite all that scare flags the linked article is triggering, basically it does not say how the ATM is compromised. Can any ATM be compromised by the hacker without any inside help? Or does it require some help from the maintenance people who open the machine provide access to the innards? Unless the method works on the ATM without any inside help it might not be as scary as it sounds.
sed -e 's/Chuck Norris/Rajnikant/g' joke > fact
there are many ATMs in the UK that use Windows XP as their OS of choice. Having personally seen crash screens and machines caught in a restart loop.
Why they are using windows, I don't know to be honest. Why they'd be using a Linux distro, I don't know. The banks probably don't know either, as far as I'm aware they get their ATMs from companies like NCR or IBM (or Diebold, as we've seen before) who are the companies who supply the software. It just so happens that the software they write is written for Windows Operating System. Remember, the cost of hiring someone who can programme for Windows is significantly less for someone who can programme for Linux (As they will likely also be able to programme for Windows, thus, with a larger skill-set they'll demand more money) And a bulk licence for Windows where they're churning out 1,000+ ATMs boils down to next to nothing.
The cheapest programmer, the cheapest hardware, a slightly costly OS. Something has to be a weak link, and the exploiters exploit it.
It pays to be obvious, especially if you have a reputation for being subtle.
...are probably one of the few devices that most Slashdotters would agree should definitely be running proprietary, private software.
I had no idea there were ATMs out there running Windows. Given access to the software/a machine running it, I can't see how this would have been difficult to pull off. This is a serious WTF? moment.
You feel sleepy. Close your eyes. The opinions stated above are yours. You cannot imagine why you ever felt otherwise.
A reasonable report via http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/06/03/atm_trojans/ and something slightly more technical http://regmedia.co.uk/2009/06/03/trust_wave_atm_report.pdf via trust wave.
I think that this story is half bogus. PIN numbers aren't stored on a debit card. They are stored on a server located at a transaction network, that a bank uses to process their card base. When a PIN number is typed into an ATM machine it is automatically encrypted by a 3DES encryptor on the PIN pad. It's NEVER in clear text. The ATM machines and ATM transaction processing companies use a pivate/public key encryption system. At least in the USA, the only part of a transaction that is encrypted down the wire is the PIN number between the ATM machine and transaction network. If the data is sent over the internet, the transaction is encrypted via a IPSEC tunnel or SSL. I have not seen an ATM machine that runs on Windows XP. Most of the newer ATM machines run on Windows CE. It would be trivial to sniff the network and grab card numbers if you had access to the network that the transaction was running across, but the PIN number would be much tougher to get. It's would be a little more complicated to get the card information based upon a device or software installed on the ATM to grab the card number as it's being swiped in the card reader. IF you could do that, then you could also get the track2 data that is loaded on to the card. That information consists of the card holders name and address. Basically, I'm claiming BS on the article, as I see it as hype.
10. Don't always run as root
9. Don't open attachments from unknown sources
8. Don't run Windows!
7. Don't run Windows!
6. Don't run Windows!
5. Don't run Windows!
4. Don't run Windows!
3. Don't run Windows!
2. Don't run Windows!
1. Don't run Windows!
"which would potentially allow criminals to clone the card in order to withdraw cash. "
Heh... the joke is on the hacker. I have no money in my bank account to withdraw!
A friend of mine had his atm card in a Bank of America machine to withdraw money when the power went out. When it came back on a few seconds later, he was greeted with the Windows XP Embedded splash screen before the atm interface came up. The machine didn't realize it still had his card, so he couldn't get it back. (This is especially funny since he is a MS fanboy.)
Insert ATM card...
Observe message stating that the ATM is now deleting all files on your ATM card.
Watch helplessly as the progress bar nears completions while filenames zip across the screen
Take possession of the card as the machine spits it out with an accompanying "GOT YA!" on the screen
Still waiting for this one...
I was talking to someone yesterday that works for a company that deals with card fraud. You wouldn't believe how easy it is to get someone's information; someone can simply put a skimmer on an ATM which will grab your card's track data without you knowing. Many of you have probably heard of it, it's just a piece of hardware that sits on top of the card reader, storing everyone's info. As far as I know it requires absolutely no connection to the ATM software.
The information on magstripe cards is most commonly stored in a two-track format. Track 1 contains your personal information, such as name, address, bank, etc. Track 2 contains the important information, such as card number, expiration, and the CVV/CV2 code.
Once the skimmer has enough information (which can easily be HUNDREDS of cards), they sell "dumps" of the track data which people can either buy and encode onto a card themselves, or buy on a fully-finished card. The latter option is more convenient for most carders (fraudsters), because many of the cards sold by these vendors are indistinguishable from the real thing. Most vendors also have a minimum buy amount, so you have to buy at least $300 worth of dumps, which can be dozens of cards, all with $10k limits.v
This brings up a serious question. You need some cash in an unfamiliar state or country, and you come across an ATM. How do you know if you can trust it?
Given the number of people who've been scammed by everything from bolt-on ATM card skimmers to oldschool fake night deposit boxes, this is worth worrying about.
The standard security mantra is, "only use trusted hardware to authenticate yourself", but that can't happen here.
Anyone have any ideas for an ATM authentication system that will both prove to the bank that I am who I say I am, and prove to me that the ATM isn't stealing my authentication keys?
The only solution I can think of involves trusted hand-held devices like cell phones or keychain password tokens.
Because the banks protect their interests, not those of their customers. They will... exerts themselves to 'protect' their customers if it is of good PR value AND INEXPENSIVE, or required to by the government. Your suggestion made too much sense for the customers and offers no financial benefits to the banks' bottom line but instead will cost them money to implement. Sorry dude, it's never going to happen, short of an act of god.
ELOI, ELOI, LAMA SABACHTHANI!?
My home burglar alarm has a duress code. If someone should ever force me to disarm it at gunpoint ... hello SWAT team.
Good luck with that. My office building has a top-of-the line alarm system that gets tripped every few months from someone forgetting to disarm it in the morning. If the police show up at all, it usually takes them 2-3 hours. They seem to expect that almost all alarm activations are accidental.
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Big companies have people tasked to make purchases. They have to find something that suits the parameters they have been given by their superiors. They could go for the free option or....not, they could pick the option that costs the company cash.
The people who have something to sell have a large inducement to close the sale, (especially the 100% commission folks) moreso than the free version folks. Sometimes, not saying it happened here at xyz bank, but sometimes consultation fees occur in business to speed up this deal closing. These fees, the exchanged cash or gifts or services rendered, sometimes all three, might not be ethical or legal or reported, but they occur.
Apply this same rule to all big government purchase decisions, big corporations purchase decisions, etc. Then a lot of these decisions that look really stupid on the surface level start to make more sense why they went with the more expensive purchase option.
Also see, international voting on "new standards".... and "new law passed".....
"consulation fees" and "campaign contributions" and "lobbying expenses" rule the world right now
I've noticed that a lot of the crappier plasticky, insecure-looking ATMs around the place tend to have big DIEBOLD badges on them.
Diebold also make criminally badly-engineered voting machines. Coincidence?
Its quite easy to infect all those machines, one just needs to be a geeky intern at the company that makes the firmware for the ATMs. (obviously there are other ways to break into the company) So all in all, infect/modify the firmware source at its weakest security point and you have a backdoor into the machine. that being said, id just like to point out that we have smart chips in our credit cards here in the middle of africa too.
Criminals here dont bother with owning the ATM, the fill it with a gas and the explode it open.
Sixteen inch long mag stripe card that causes a buffer overflow to occur which executes a bit of code that then lets the hacker insert more code by swiping the stack of cards they have carefully made up.
What I want to know is, *how* was the malware installed?
Do those ATMs have Autorun turned on for keycard slots? Did they type the code in binary using the 0 and 1 keys? How did it get there in the first place? TFA doesn't mention it, and surely that's the most important thing?
"I think that this story is half bogus. PIN numbers aren't stored on a debit card"
But if you have a keylogger installed on a compromised XP system then you can read it off as they are typing it in.
"When a PIN number is typed into an ATM machine it is automatically encrypted by a 3DES encryptor on the PIN pad"
Do you have any citations for this?
'Abstract. We describe new attacks on the financial PIN processing API'
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ATMs need an OS of some sort.
Do they, really ?
All an ATM needs is to be able to :
- read data from the card
- read a PIN from the keypad
- read an amount of money from said key pad.
- display a couple of messages during this process.
That's something so simple that it could be mostly handled by a PIC microcontroller.
More advanced OS' make it easier to have the software display videos and animations, have more complex functionality and better compatibility with modern software.
But who in his/her right state of mind needs an OS and hardware capable to run a WoW-client on a simple ATM ? /.)
(Or running Doom on an e-voting machine, for those who read the recent that story on
There's no need to play video or surf web. Only handle a couple of simple tasks and that's it.
I understand that, for some embed type of machine, a full-blown OS may have some advantages. An embed machine driving an advertising display, for example. In that situation it has several advantages : .Net can do the job)
- Low cost (of-the-shelf parts instead of custom board with microcontroller)
- Low cost to develop something for it (any person with half a functional brain cell able to throw some shit under Visual Studio
But here we are speaking about banks (same goes also electronic voting machines).
The single most important feature for these machines is security.
Even if it comes at the expense of more custom hardware and less easy to develop for.
A simple micro-controller would be better because :
- A smaller code means easier to debug, audit and check for weaknesses
By Linus' law more eyeballs make bugs more shallow. A smaller code simply makes a higher eyeball-per-line-of-code ratio.
- Less opportunity to run unwanted software on the machine.
If running a full blown desktop OS on common hardware, you have enough resource to run a full Apache server serving the sensitive data to the web. Or use a "blue-pill" like hyper-visor running the main software in a virtual machine and doing all the bad trick from the outside of the machine.
With something as primitive as a micro-controller there's slightly less opportunity to add a malicious payload to the minuscule programme ROM.
If the bank company really needs to display some animated stupid adds, they should use 2 screens :
1 small screen, driven by a simple microcontroller handling the transaction, and the huge stupid blinking stuff executed out of a separate Windows XPe machine on a 2nd screen, with no connection by the 2 machines.
"Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]