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Chrome's Insane Password Security Strategy

jones_supa writes "One day web developer Elliott Kember decided to switch from Safari to Chrome and in the process, discovered possibly a serious weakness with local password management in Chrome. The settings import tool forced the passwords to be always imported, which lead Kember to further investigate how the data can be accessed. For those who actually bother to look at the 'Saved passwords' page, it turns out that anyone with physical access can peek all the passwords in clear text very easily with a couple of mouse clicks. This spurred a lengthy discussion featuring Justin Schuh, the head of Chrome security, who says Kember is wrong and that this behavior of Chrome has been evaluated for years and is not going to change."

350 of 482 comments (clear)

  1. This is also the case on Firefox by briancox2 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done.

    Solution: If security is important to you, don't be lazy.

    --
    We should learn what we need to know about issues, before we decide what we need to feel about them.
    1. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by robmv · · Score: 5, Informative

      Firefox has the option to protect saved passwords with a master passwords and if you already unlocked the password store, in order to read password from the GUI, you need to unlock it again

    2. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by gstoddart · · Score: 5, Interesting

      I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done.

      I'm sorry, but there is a dedicated area for my stuff -- on Windows it's Documents and Settings, and on UNIX it's the home directory. The actual program may not be user specific, but all operating systems have a "home" area specific to users. There are no valid technical reasons why this can't be made secure, other than either having no interest in doing it, or pandering to users who just want convenience.

      This is just a piss-poor implementation of security, and it's why I don't trust a browser to retain passwords for me, and never have. I rank it right up there with giving Facebook my password so they can log into my email and find friends -- not happening, because I don't trust them with my password.

      If this guy is the head of 'security' for Chrome, he's either incompetent at that, or Google as a general rule have a shitty idea about what security should be and he's of the opinion this is "good enough".

      But since Google mostly just wants to collect all of your data, it may not be of value to them to lock it down in any meaningful way.

      --
      Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    3. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by gQuigs · · Score: 5, Informative

      So set a Master Password: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/use-master-password-protect-stored-logins
      More here: http://kb.mozillazine.org/Master_password

      Almost no users actually use this: http://monica-at-mozilla.blogspot.com/2013/02/cant-live-with-them-cant-live-without.html
      "....can be solved somewhat with master password, but only 1 out of 12K users had master password enabled"

    4. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Sigma+7 · · Score: 1

      With Firefox, there's the option of adding a master password.

      It's still substandard - Firefox bleeds login information across sites (e.g. It places 3+ potential usernames, some of which are unique to a specific site), gives sudden "enter master password" prompt when not focusing on a password field, etc.

    5. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Solution: If security is important to you, don't be lazy.

      There is a dilemma in this. The conventional wisdom is that 'don't use any browser based password storage, as it is not secure.' This means that you need to either

      1. memorize every password, or perhaps
      2. use an alternative 'out-of-band' password management solution that is not dependent on the physical security of your system.

    6. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by gmuslera · · Score: 1

      Firefox have also the possibiity of a master password to be able to access those stored passwords. Chrome just didn't saw that as something that would essentially make a difference in the long term. Another different topic is how they are stored here is a comparison between Firefox, Chrome and IE, where Chome seem to not be very secure in that area, Firefox with master password is the safest, and IE dropped badly the security there in the latest versions.

    7. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Spazmania · · Score: 3, Informative

      From TFA:

      The simple fact is that you need to lock your user account if you want to protect your information. If you don't do that, nothing else really matters because it's all just theater and won't actually stop anyone willing to invest minimal effort.

      And there it is. The bottom line. Kember demands that Chrome engage in security theater and the Chrome authors said no. As they should.

      --
      Moderating "-1, Disagree" is simple censorship. Have the guts to post your opinion.
    8. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by The+MAZZTer · · Score: 1

      You are aware Chrome's password stores are encrypted, right? This is a non-issue. You need the user's Windows account credentials to decrypt the passwords.

    9. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by icebike · · Score: 1

      I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done.

      Solution: If security is important to you, don't be lazy.

      But browsers ARE as user specific as any other part of the modern computer.

      With just about every Operating System having the ability to have multiple accounts logged in and to switch accounts easily, browsers, and everything else each user does can be compartmentalized easily.

      And that is probably the best way to handle it in general where what is needed is snoop protection from co-users.

      If you recommend typing in passwords to every websites you have to go with an notebook full of passwords, a single common password, or a trivially guess able combination. Either that or trust third party authentication schemes which creep me out in this day and age.

      So I agree with not being lazy, but I recommend the exercise of locking the account as you walk away.

      Use a bluetooth proximity lock if you think you might get super lazy. Of course if you are in the habit of walking away and leaving your phone on your desk, there is no hope for you anyway.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    10. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by icebike · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Every one can type their own password.

      But what about typing hundreds of passwords?

      Once you have more than a few, you resort to a crutch of some sort.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    11. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by jader3rd · · Score: 2

      I'm sorry, but there is a dedicated area for my stuff -- on Windows it's Documents and Settings, and on UNIX it's the home directory.

      From the Chrome teams response for this issue, I believe that's what they're doing. If someone is logged into your OS session as you, they can see the passwords. Somebody logged into the same computer, but as a different user, can't see the passwords.

    12. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by SecurityGuy · · Score: 1

      There are no valid technical reasons why this can't be made secure, other than either having no interest in doing it, or pandering to users who just want convenience.

      Sure there is. It's hard. Or perhaps it's better to say, it has enough moving parts that it gets screwed up pretty frequently. For example, it's secure until your boss sends you AnnualReport.docx, which happens to contain a virus (and actually wasn't sent by your boss).

      This is just a piss-poor implementation of security, and it's why I don't trust a browser to retain passwords for me, and never have.

      I agree, I just extend that to pretty much all computer products. I hope that someday the plague of insecure software will end, but we're nowhere near that now.

    13. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by AmiMoJo · · Score: 4, Informative

      I just checked and Chrome keeps my passwords in a file under "C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default". This directory is permission locked to me only. Even other admins can't access it unless they add permissions manually.

      As far as I can tell Chrome does use filesystem level security to protect individual user's passwords.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    14. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by X0563511 · · Score: 2

      I wouldn't call this a crutch...

      --
      For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
    15. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      And that is criminally stupid.

    16. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by pixelpusher220 · · Score: 2

      It isn't security theater, or at least isn't broadway ;-) Obviously if you leave yourself logged in, lots of bad things are possible. But having Firefox not show my encrypted passwords if I happen to forgot to lock up the desktop? That's still better than just letting them out without quibble.

      --
      People in cars cause accidents....accidents in cars cause people :-D
    17. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Deathlizard · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Chrome stores everything in the cloud if you're logged into Google. That's what makes this even more dangerous than it's being reported.

      If Chrome is signed into your Google account, and some malicious user gets hold of your Google username and password, then they can retrieve all of your stored passwords simply by installing chrome and logging in. That includes any password on your phone, other systems or otherwise.

      This is why two step authentication, clearing out all stored password, and disabling password storing in sync settings are your friends.

    18. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Impy+the+Impiuos+Imp · · Score: 1

      Most people don't care -- it's just a password wrangling utility. It's like locking stuff up inside your locked house.

      --
      (-1: Post disagrees with my already-settled worldview) is not a valid mod option.
    19. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by ericloewe · · Score: 1

      It's definitely better than keeping all passwords written down on paper, if used with a strong master password. No, it's not perfect, but it's pretty much as good as most people can get - memorizing dozens of totally different strong passwords is not really very feasible.

    20. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by evilbessie · · Score: 1

      Resetting passwords is a hugely complicated process on machines you have physical access to...

    21. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by evilbessie · · Score: 1

      So someone with admin wouldn't be able to reset your password? or change ownership of the file?

    22. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by icebike · · Score: 2

      True, but it's a lot of trouble to copy an paste each password. I know this, because In fact I use one of these on all my devices.

      If it these password vaults could detect you are in a password field and feed the password to it that would be sweet. Only one password to remember.

      Otoh, only one password to steal.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    23. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Colonel+Korn · · Score: 1

      I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done.

      I'm sorry, but there is a dedicated area for my stuff -- on Windows it's Documents and Settings, and on UNIX it's the home directory. The actual program may not be user specific, but all operating systems have a "home" area specific to users. There are no valid technical reasons why this can't be made secure, other than either having no interest in doing it, or pandering to users who just want convenience.

      This is just a piss-poor implementation of security, and it's why I don't trust a browser to retain passwords for me, and never have. I rank it right up there with giving Facebook my password so they can log into my email and find friends -- not happening, because I don't trust them with my password.

      If this guy is the head of 'security' for Chrome, he's either incompetent at that, or Google as a general rule have a shitty idea about what security should be and he's of the opinion this is "good enough".

      But since Google mostly just wants to collect all of your data, it may not be of value to them to lock it down in any meaningful way.

      Google's response to everything is "no, we're doing it the best way." I find it best just to avoid talking to Googlers about their jobs.

      --
      "I zero-index my hamsters" - Willtor (147206)
    24. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by roscocoltran · · Score: 1

      I use this program, but still too many pages (or applications) are not compatible with it, I ended using it more like a notepad and/or password generator, which is already a good thing btw. I'm really surprised that this problem (of password multiplication/length) is not taken more seriously by web administrators and that they don't allow more 3rd party software to be used more eficiently as password managers.

    25. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by RenderSeven · · Score: 1

      Meh. You say "criminal" I say "profitable", just semantics.

    26. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by AmiMoJo · · Score: 2

      Other admins can access it if they change the permissions on the directory, naturally. If you don't trust the other admins on your system you are boned anyway.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    27. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by 140Mandak262Jamuna · · Score: 1

      Strangely some people do lock up jewellery and other valuables in a safe inside the house too. In fact most states require you to lock the gun cabinets. (No requirement to lock the house though ;-))

      --
      sed -e 's/Chuck Norris/Rajnikant/g' joke > fact
    28. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by ArhcAngel · · Score: 1

      Except the company I work for created their image with a default My Documents folder in C:\docs so everyone who logs in to the machine has access to any files stored there. Fortunately they left Local Settings and Application Data in the default location.

      FYI Documents and Settings was replaced with users in VISTA IIRC but it is definitely users in 7.

      --
      "A person is smart. People are dumb, panicky dangerous animals and you know it." - K
    29. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by bmk67 · · Score: 5, Informative

      If only such a thing existed...

      Oh, wait. It does.

      http://lastpass.com/

    30. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by JoshRosenbaum · · Score: 1

      You need the user's Windows account credentials to decrypt the passwords.

      Have you ever seen a user using a Windows machine that isn't logged in? That means there is basically constant access to Chrome passwords. I'd prefer to have the option of a separate master password for my browser like Firefox does. It's not like it would even be that hard for Chrome to implement, so I'm not sure why there is such a struggle to add it. (Could be a hidden advanced feature even.) Are there scenarios where an attacker could get the master password? Yes, of course, but with the current system they are guaranteed access. Are there scenarios where they could not get the master password? Absolutely.

      I'd prefer to minimize my security risk. I'm not proposing that you are forced into the same master password system, merely that I have the option to choose it. (Which I currently do by using Firefox.)

    31. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by jeffmflanagan · · Score: 1

      I was looking through Android password vault apps yesterday after SplashID ate all my password data, just like it did to every other user who accepted their "update," and at least one of them promised to fill fields for you. I imagine there are desktop and iPhone apps that do the same.

    32. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by AliasBackslash · · Score: 3, Informative

      LastPass does exactly this.

    33. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by gregulator · · Score: 1

      Chrome as multi-user support inside of the same OS user account.

    34. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by gregulator · · Score: 1

      Actually, keeping passwords on a sheet of paper has been shown to actually be a pretty secure method for most home users.

    35. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by smooth+wombat · · Score: 1

      Solution: If security is important to you, don't be lazy.

      This is Google we're talking about. The company which says you have no privacy.

      This just shows they really mean it!

      --
      We will bankrupt ourselves in the vain search for absolute security. -- Dwight D. Eisenhower
    36. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by icebike · · Score: 1

      But I'm not sure "home user" and "secure" fit in the same sentence.

      The list is certainly more Secure from Joe Random Hacker, but not your flatmates or suspicious girlfriend or creepy Uncle that comes to visit for weeks at a time.

      They WILL find your list, and they Will copy it with their cell phone. And you will buy a 60 inch flat screen.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    37. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by slew · · Score: 1

      FWIW, There is the general security concept of "fail-safe". If the stuff is encrypted on the file store, stupid things like backup programs which often have administrator privileges by default won't become easy backdoors...

    38. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Notabadguy · · Score: 2

      Let me get this right....

      1. Sit down on any unlocked computer.
      2. Download and install Chrome.
      3. Import IE/Mozilla bookmarks/saved info to Chrome.
      4. Go to Chrome Settings.
      5. Click "Managed Saved Passwords"
      6. Passwords shown in clear text (verified)
      7. Passwords are imported into Chrome from other browsers in clear text?

      That's awful.

    39. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Miros · · Score: 1

      Locked, unlocked, what's the difference? If you're not using whole disk encryption, what good is locking going to do if someone steals your computer? Removing user account passwords from systems tends to be rather trivial...

    40. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by tgd · · Score: 2

      You need the user's Windows account credentials to decrypt the passwords.

      Have you ever seen a user using a Windows machine that isn't logged in? That means there is basically constant access to Chrome passwords. I'd prefer to have the option of a separate master password for my browser like Firefox does. It's not like it would even be that hard for Chrome to implement, so I'm not sure why there is such a struggle to add it. (Could be a hidden advanced feature even.) Are there scenarios where an attacker could get the master password? Yes, of course, but with the current system they are guaranteed access. Are there scenarios where they could not get the master password? Absolutely.

      I'd prefer to minimize my security risk. I'm not proposing that you are forced into the same master password system, merely that I have the option to choose it. (Which I currently do by using Firefox.)

      If you care so little about security that you don't secure your user account, I doubt you care enough about security to worry about your other credentials.

      Stupid is as stupid does, as they say.

    41. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by X0563511 · · Score: 1

      Use autotype (on a computer) if possible. I find it -easier- though to use the copy/paste functionality on Android than it would have been to type in the password itself. I used keepass for months before I tried autotype. It seems to work quite nicely.

      You are right about the one-password-to-steal bit, but isn't that still true if you use the same (or similar) passwords everywhere because you can't remember them all otherwise?

      --
      For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
    42. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by nogginthenog · · Score: 1

      Additionaly, there is a hidden symbolic link from Documents and Settings to Users (presumably for poorly written software).

    43. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Black+LED · · Score: 1

      I was about to suggest the same thing. It's not a good idea to keep passwords stored in the browser.

    44. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by tgd · · Score: 1

      And that is criminally stupid.

      No, its how things work. Do you really think your credentials are secure once I've gotten access to your session on Linux or Windows? I can inject code into your password manager and grab things as they're running. I can get into your browser and hijack your sessions trivially. If you're using any sort of identity federation (AD/Kerberos, SAML-based, whatever) I can access it. If you've got sufficient privileges, I can load a kernel driver/module and grab them out of memory.

      While I won't call you criminally stupid, if you're really placated by the theater, by all means use your "password" secured credential store and keep right on believing its any more secure than a file in a Linux user account, much less the credential store built into Windows.

    45. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Black+LED · · Score: 1

      KeePass does have browser integration plugins.

    46. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by osu-neko · · Score: 1

      It points out what apparently isn't obvious to a lot of people: those passwords in the other browsers aren't safe, either (otherwise Chrome wouldn't be able to easily import them). Chrome just doesn't hide the fact that the passwords are available to anyone who can sit down in front of your logged in computer. The blogger is upset that Chrome doesn't hide the truth of the matter...

      --
      "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
    47. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Miros · · Score: 1

      Answering my own question - this is a non-issue (it seems). Chrome apparently uses an API (at least on windows) to use account info to encrypt the passwords which presumably is only available if the user has actually logged in.

    48. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Miros · · Score: 1

      and on mac it uses the keychain to store things...? I'm starting to see why this may actually be a non-issue

    49. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by rastos1 · · Score: 1

      Unless someone boots from a USB stick. Or get's hold of an old backup media. Or .... I encrypt my sensitive documents regardless of whether they are in my home directory or not.

    50. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      "I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done. "

      Simply not true. If you have a user account on the machine, then you have a "profile" in Firefox. It's YOUR profile, not accessible to anyone else but an administrator.

      If you CHOOSE to install and run Firefox in a system-wide ("administrator") manner, that's your choice. But it isn't a flaw in Firefox.

    51. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by icebike · · Score: 2

      I'm not sure I want any plugins into the browser.

      First, browser plugins have a pretty shaky security reputation.
      Second, I'm not always on a browser that accepts plugins. I use several browsers.
      Third browsers change too fast, and plugins don't keep up.

      It should probably be done at the OS level, hooking the keyboard for password injection. But that
      still leaves you with the problem of knowing what web page you are no, so you are back to
      some sort of browser plug in.

      It really cries out for a industry wide agreed upon API between the password vault writers
      and the browser companies. Otherwise you have ad-hoc developers rolling their own.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    52. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Chrome stores everything in the cloud if you're logged into Google. That's what makes this even more dangerous than it's being reported.

      Only if you request chrome to do so, and then specifically tell it to sync your passwords, and then specifically tell it to save your passwords. And if you do, it offers to let you use an encryption password for your chrome sync.

      This is why two step authentication,

      I believe "google account auth + secondary encryption key" counts as two factors.

    53. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Someone with the capability to do so is by definition an administrator, and able to keylog everything you do quite trivially.

      Im really glad most of the slashdot commenters here dont develop security systems, because they would constantly be reinventing the wheel to defend against attacks that cannot be stopped. Worrying about whether a sysadmin can get access to stored passwords is the LAST thing a browser should worry about.

    54. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Someone with admin rights could replace the Chrome executable with a trojan'd version which keylogs everything you do and reports everything to the admins mailserver.

      This just in: users cannot defend themselves against a determined systems administrator. He will just drop a userland rootkit in your logon session and all of your clever defenses are useless.

    55. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Billly+Gates · · Score: 1

      The issue is not someone who is casually walking by your computer and getting your password.

      The issue is anything run as "you" has full access without a UAC prompt or gksudo. A clever JS exploit can get this as you do not need to be admin to read the fucking password.

      As someone else said here AnnualReport.docx from your boss who actually never sent it can run a virus/macro that can easily obtain it. Infact, I bet your AV software wont even detect it as it can get the passwords easily without any hacks whatsoever!

      Yes only a local admin can read it *if* he/she is not you, but as you it is ripe for the taking.

      In the coming weeks we will see this flaw in infected Javascript and flash ads as malware writers use ad servers these days in legit websites now that this knowledge is widely known. Why can't the password be cloud based?

    56. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Plus theres the whole "the attacker can simply wait for the keystore to be unlocked" thing, which makes the whole thing an exercise in futility.

    57. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      "Well, I was going to ask about this, but thanks for the comment. I make a policy of always typing my passwords rather than letting software save it, so that I am forced to learn my own password, but even if I didn't, this would make me delete the data from my system entirely."

      You are probably trading one kind of security problem for another one that is arguably worse.

      If you are very active on the Web, as I am, there is no way you would remember all your passwords *IF* they are sufficiently different for each site and service. Therefore, you use one password for many sites and services. This is a security problem, and arguably it is worse than one involving physical access to your computer.

      If you aren't using a "common" computer (say, in an office somewhere), then physical access to your machine is likely to be far more secure than the SUM OF the security on all the sites for which you use a single password. Vulnerabilities (and mis-management) of those sites are likely to give up one or more of your passwords, which can then be used to access other common sites. It happens all the time.

      But how many people are stealing passwords by physically sitting at your computer? Probably not very many.

    58. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by teg · · Score: 1

      Other admins can access it if they change the permissions on the directory, naturally. If you don't trust the other admins on your system you are boned anyway.

      The Keychain on Macand GNOME Keyring store the passwords encrypted - e.g. by the default, the Mac keychain is encrypted with the login password. If you read it, you can't use it. If you reset the user password, the passwords are still not accessible.

      Of course, against a really determined admin attacker this won't be enough (provide custom system binaries), but it will raise the bar. And for many attacks, that will be enough. NSA or business espionage? No. Most jeaulous SOs or peeping siblings? Yes.

    59. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      But having Firefox not show my encrypted passwords if I happen to forgot to lock up the desktop? That's still better than just letting them out without quibble.

      The issue with firefox's method-- and why i stopped using if years ago-- is that it has to re-lock itself periodically, or else other programs / admins on the system can simply scrape from the unlocked keystore. But re-locking isnt preventing such an attack, its simply shortening the window of availability for an easily automated attack that would take just a few seconds to execute.

      In other words, youre creating headaches that wont actually stop the sort of attack that it is designed to defeat. Any program that might scrape chromes keystore could also wait until the firefox keystore is unlocked, and immediately dump it. There simply is not any technical method to dealing with this other than "let the OS worry about userland security".

    60. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Billly+Gates · · Score: 1

      Even then many corporate users on laptops have local admin rights anyway.

      Fucking drives me crazy to see clients do this, but without it helpdesk gets inundated with calls saying "Help I can't install my printer or print directions to the airport from the hotel printer etc."

      As a common security practice we always re-image each computer from a terminated employee before handing it back out to someone else but still the security issue is more of any macro or malware can read it without elevated privileges.

      If it is run under you it has full access to appdata in your profile. Therefore no escalation tricks are needed and your AV software wont even detect it either.

    61. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by DRJlaw · · Score: 1

      Other admins can access it if they change the permissions on the directory, naturally. If you don't trust the other admins on your system you are boned anyway.

      That explains why Linux, Windows, OS/X, and pretty much every operating system stores the actual password instead of a hash.
      Oh, wait...

      THEY DON'T.

      The administrator should not be able to retreive the user's actual password, merely change it to a different one. If an administrator can retreive the password, that's as much a security defect as any permissions escalation attack to the kernel is.

      In this instance you would have to store the actual passwords in encrypted form and control access/decryption with a hash, but golly gee whiz Ma, Chrome won't even provide an option for that (unlike Mozilla).

      Kudos to Google...

    62. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by JoshRosenbaum · · Score: 2

      If you care so little about security that you don't secure your user account, I doubt you care enough about security to worry about your other credentials.

      Stupid is as stupid does, as they say.

      The problem with this is that it is very short-sighted. There is no 100% effective way to secure an account other than to not use it or to keep it disconnected from networks and away from other users. That may be an acceptable risk for you, but I prefer having another layer of protection.

    63. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by shipofgold · · Score: 1

      Forgive my ignorance but I fail to see the difference between a separate password manager app, and password management in a browser that has the necessary crypto to secure the passwords on the disk, and reveal them only with proper credentials (aka master password).

      Only advantage I see for a password manager is that it could be used across different applications.

      The problem with the browsers is that they make it all too easy with the ubiquitous "save password?" every time one is entered. I know I can turn off the function, but most people don't and they do blindly save them.

      I never knew that Chrome didn't have anything between the user and the plaintext password....how many people take their computers in for service not realizing that the techs behind the counter now have access to their bank, health and other info?

    64. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by SnicersX · · Score: 1

      You wouldn't need last pass if you could trust chrome to store your passwords behind a master password file.

    65. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by pixelpusher220 · · Score: 1

      It will stop anyone who happens to be on my machine from casually getting them. If there's someone with the chops and motivation to scrape and otherwise do actual 'hacking' (loaded term I know) no it won't. But it makes it more than a 'Click here' scenario.

      That IS better than nothing. The perfect shouldn't be the enemy of the good.

      --
      People in cars cause accidents....accidents in cars cause people :-D
    66. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by dk400 · · Score: 1

      Only if the attacker is already running arbitrary code with access to the userdata, in which case youre screwed anyways. Such an attacker could simply log keypresses, or wait in the background for firefox's keystore to unlock, he has full access. Trying to defend against arbitrary code running in the user context is really not in the scope of what a browser should be doing.

      Hell no! the simple usecase is most of the time, leaving a comp. unattended happens many a time. It is not always computers are locked. This is not about Technicality of which code will be able to attack the keystore. this is a simple usecase scenario of somebody leaving his comp. unattended and someone snooping around. I'm sure browser cannot offload its guilt to the OS. Every piece of the system has to be secure. Juz because the OS is crappy, doesnot mean the browser needs to shitty too ! that is just a lame argument. Master password should be an option for sure.

    67. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Deathlizard · · Score: 1

      Only if you request chrome to do so, and then specifically tell it to sync your passwords,

      If you log into Chrome it asks you to sync everything by default. Most people will choose the default. Passwords by default are checked.

      And then specifically tell it to save your passwords. And if you do, it offers to let you use an encryption password for your chrome sync.

      Yes it asks if you want to save a password in the password list. You should answer no to this, but keep in mind that people will say yes not knowing the risks associated with the choice.

      As for the encryption password. It asks you when you first setup chrome, but again by default it uses your Google Password for the Encrytion Key. Grandma will not type in a different password if it doesn't force her to, and if it does, most likely she'll forget it and have to wipe all of her settings and bookmarks when you have to Reinstall Chrome.

      Ideally, the option to show passwords should not exist. If I have a problem with a Password I should just simply delete it and go though the site procedures to recover my password. Having an easy to read password store that's cloud accessible is asking for trouble.

      I believe "google account auth + secondary encryption key" counts as two factors.

      I'm specifically talking about 2 Step Verification. Two factor comes into play when it comes to storing your Chrome User data using the secondary encryption key, Which also isn't a bad thing to do.

    68. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      You realize chrome IS using the OS "home" area to store the passwords, right? The reason that "passwords" was greyed out in the Chrome "import from safari" is probably because both use the OS keychain, so chrome would already have access to the safari passwords-- just like every other application running in the user's context.

      If this guy is the head of 'security' for Chrome, he's either incompetent at that

      Youre pretty clearly not the person to judge that as you not only dont understand how chrome is storing its passwords, you also apparently dont understand how the OS stores it, and what the threats being worked against are.

    69. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by MobyDisk · · Score: 2

      Almost no users actually use this:

      Of course not. Anyone security minded won't let Firefox save the passwords in the first place.

    70. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by LordLimecat · · Score: 1, Insightful

      It will stop anyone who happens to be on my machine from casually getting them.

      Security theatre. Such an individual would take 5 seconds to google "how to dump chrome passwords", and would realize theres about 800 ways to do so. In a few seconds, he could browse to amazon.com, for example, and use the HTML inspector to change the password field to be cleartext. Bam, theres your password.

      Or he could install an extension which has almost certainly already been created which pulls the password store into the extension storage as soon as the store is unlocked, and then uploads it to a website.

      So yes, you would prevent completely incompetent people from gaining access to your passwords, but that is NOT how you design security. You design based on the principle that people will always attack the weakest link, not the strongest, and in this case the correct choice is to let the OS handle keystore security.

    71. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      Saving passwords in a browser is just a very bad idea in general. I keep mine written in a file on a thumbdrive that I keep disconnected and a backup copy elsewhere, and for places I visit often I have the passwords memorized.

      I happen to be one of the laziest people I know in the entire world and that's counting politicians. And yet I still type in my passwords manually!

    72. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by bmk67 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      I also wouldn't need LastPass if I didn't need a cross-browser, cross-device password management tool, which Chrome is not, regardless of the trust level I assign it.

      So, in fact, even if I did trust Chrome, I would still need it.

    73. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Mike+Van+Pelt · · Score: 1

      Actually, even if Chrome or Firefox had absolutely secure password storage, I'd still want LastPass -- it transparently synchronizes all my passwords between every computer I use, including Android phones. And with hundreds of logins all over the place, everyone* is going to be re-using passwords, using insecure passwords, or both, if they don't use some kind of password manager.

      * "Everyone" here excludes the one-in-a-million outliers, of course. You may have an editic memory and use a unique 32-character true-random password for each of a hundred sites, and keep them all in your head, but the people who can do that are very rare indeed.

    74. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by tlhIngan · · Score: 1

      I just checked and Chrome keeps my passwords in a file under "C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default". This directory is permission locked to me only. Even other admins can't access it unless they add permissions manually.

      As far as I can tell Chrome does use filesystem level security to protect individual user's passwords.

      Which should not be the only means of protection - perhaps I reboot the system into a Linux or Windows live CD or USB which ignores permissions. Or perhaps some application I use accidentally granted full permissions to everyone?

      At least with encryption, there's still another layer of protection.

      And of course, casual copying that happens while you're logged in and have permissions to access said fail.

      Installing a Trojan or other malware may not be as easy given they normally require administrator rights, but if you're logged in, then encryption protects you from the casual copying attack.

    75. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      No one's in my house but me and my invisible girlfriend that only I can see.

      Plus, if I ever snuff it I've got the passwords to important stuff where family can find it (not on paper but on thumb drive).

      Even if you use a password remembering program, you still need a backup.

    76. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by pthisis · · Score: 1

      From the Chrome teams response for this issue, I believe that's what they're doing. If someone is logged into your OS session as you, they can see the passwords. Somebody logged into the same computer, but as a different user, can't see the passwords.

      This isn't exactly right; the password store is encrypted with the Windows master password, which is needed to decrypt them. Normally that defaults to your login password (in which case what you said is true), but you can change your login password without changing the encryption password. If you do that, someone who's logged in as you won't be able to decrypt your Chrome passwords.

      This also means that if someone steals your machine and then physically resets your login password (or uses admin privs to "become" you) that they won't be able to decrypt your Chrome keyring.

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    77. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by pthisis · · Score: 1

      It's stored encrypted (in a SQLlite database), as well, and needs your password to decrypt. An admin might be able to key-log you or something to get your password, but it's not just as simple as having FS permissions and hence being able to read your passwords.

      Gnome/KDE/Mac handle this better, but the Windows method isn't totally broken (and the major flaws are not surprisingly based on the fact that Windows isn't quite as adept at handling multiple user accounts gracefully out of the box, though it's certainly workable).

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    78. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Zmobie · · Score: 1

      I think the bigger complaint here is how easy it would be for someone that has no real clue how to perform a real attack in such a way gaining access to the computer easily (as many have stated due to the computer being left unattended and unlocked for a short period of time). For me, I constantly lock my computer while I am not sitting at it anyway, and usually if someone asks to use it I am right beside them (though not 100% of the time). The passwords I have stored in Chrome are mostly non-essential accounts/passwords though I should probably double check it when I get home and purge anything that might not be.

      I think a master password not tied to the OS login credentials would be pretty easy for them to add on and abate most of the fears people have with the password management system in chrome. They could still allow the browser proper access for the passwords through secure means while keeping snoopers at bay (just like what Firefox already implmented). The thing that surprises me here is NO ONE seemed to noticed this for so long. I stumbled onto to this quite a while back (I want to say over a year, but I think its more like 6+ months) and thought it was a poor implementation, but because I practice other physical access security measures better (BIOS password, optical drive behind main drive in boot priority, lock the computer when not at it etc.) I really didn't worry about it.

    79. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by JoshRosenbaum · · Score: 1

      Firefox certainly gets props for going beyond that, except for 3 things:
      A) a re-implementation of a keychain outside of the OS opens additional potential security issues. Generally the OS's keychain security will have more eyes / devs looking at it than Firefox's.
      B) 99% of users dont use the master password mechanism
      C) once the keychain is unlocked, whether it is the OS keychain or firefox's, any program can access it.

      A) Can't argue with this. However, there is guaranteed always on access to Chrome password store while there is not with master password encrypted Firefox store. (While logged in of course. Which is almost always the case for attacks.)
      B) I agree, but that doesn't mean there isn't extra security for the 1%. The code change to add it would be pretty insignificant and wouldn't need to inconvenience users who don't want it. One could argue this is exactly what extensions are for and I could agree with that. I believe there are some for Chrome/Firefox that utilize Keepass for example. At the same time I believe the Firefox master password is opt-in, which can explain the low uptake.
      C) Yes, but it's not always guaranteed that the attack will happen when the master password keychain is unlocked or that it will be an ongoing attack. That means this is a security risk mitigation. I'm fine with that.

      Only if the attacker is already running arbitrary code with access to the userdata, in which case youre screwed anyways. Such an attacker could simply log keypresses, or wait in the background for firefox's keystore to unlock, he has full access. Trying to defend against arbitrary code running in the user context is really not in the scope of what a browser should be doing.

      Yeah, I said as much in my original post. However, there is no guarantee the attacker will wait around (or be around) long enough to keylog. (Might be a hit/run or the user/antivirus might detect something and stop activity.)

      This seems to be a classic philosophical debate of ideal security vs realistic security. I understand the ideal security side of this, but I prefer to mitigate risk as much as possible. Luckily we have choices that fit our various needs out there. (Firefox with/without master password. Chrome/Firefox with extensions to add Keepass or other password support. Or just utilizing the OS keychain.)

    80. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by pthisis · · Score: 1

      But having Firefox not show my encrypted passwords if I happen to forgot to lock up the desktop?

      Huh?

      Edit->Preferences->Security->Saved Passwords->Show Passwords

      (Chrome uses the OS's password manager by default. If you're using gnome-keyring or kwallet (Linux and others), or keychain (Mac) then you can lock/unlock the password access independently of locking the screen or logging in. Even on Windows you can change the login password to be different from the Chrome keyring password).

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    81. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by pthisis · · Score: 1

      Fundamentally you have to store the passwords in a way that the user can access their plaintext in order to be able to send them to the remote web site.

      In Firefox if you want to see the clear text:
      Edit->Preferences->Security->Saved Passwords->Show Passwords

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    82. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by RobertM1968 · · Score: 1

      Actually, Chrome can be set to link such things to the Google/Chrome account.

      The rest of the "behavior" being complained about in the article is "this is actually a function in every browser - let's pick on Chrome". :-(

    83. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      C) Yes, but it's not always guaranteed that the attack will happen when the master password keychain is unlocked or that it will be an ongoing attack. That means this is a security risk mitigation. I'm fine with that.

      Someone wanting to attack a browser with such a mechanism would specifically design it to wait resident until that keychain was unlocked and immediately dump it.

      The real issue with the "weak security" being suggested is that it will cause people to misunderstand the level of security they have. See all of the responses that are absolutely shocked that you dont NEED to give your password for a program to be able to access your OSX keychain; the password prompt had given them a false sense of security, and they had assumed that their computer was more secure unattended than it actually is.

    84. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Nimey · · Score: 1

      They can't, fuckwit. They store an encrypted blob that's inaccessible without your password, which they never see.

      --
      Hail Eris, full of mischief...

      E pluribus sanguinem
    85. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by WuphonsReach · · Score: 1

      The advantage of the master passphrase comes into play in cases of stolen computers / hard drives / backup tapes. Where relying on disk-based user-account permissions won't save your bacon, but the attacker won't be planting malicious software on your system either.

      --
      Wolde you bothe eate your cake, and have your cake?
    86. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by realityimpaired · · Score: 1

      You may have an editic memory and use a unique 32-character true-random password for each of a hundred sites, and keep them all in your head, but the people who can do that are very rare indeed.

      I do have an eidetic memory, and I still use lastpass. It's easier to share passwords (when needed) with people who don't have a good memory that way. It's also backup/security should I get hit by a bus tomorrow: my family only needs to know one password, which is included in a sealed envelope with my will.

      It's perfectly safe as long as you don't use it for anything that has financial implications.

    87. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Nimey · · Score: 1

      There's no point in trying to argue with you, then.

      --
      Hail Eris, full of mischief...

      E pluribus sanguinem
    88. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by porjo · · Score: 1

      "... only 1 out of 12K users had master password enabled"

      That's possibly because most people haven't a clue that they can or should set a master password. I didn't know the feature existed until I read this article!

    89. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by reve_etrange · · Score: 1

      Seconded.

      Lastpass frees you to use long, generated passwords. It supports two-factor authentication. It has a secure model in which only encrypted blobs are ever sent remotely (a master password is used locally to encrypt and decrypt the transmitted data), even when the web version is used. AFAIK it's the only password manager to support multiple password fields on the same form. It tracks duplicate passwords, so after Ubuntu Forums was hacked a couple weeks ago, it was easy for me to change my accounts using the same throwaway forum password (now they're all generated).

      --
      .: Semper Absurda :.
    90. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by ArhcAngel · · Score: 1

      We were admonished earlier this year for having given so many laptop users in our groups admin rights and told to never do it again. The support calls for printer installs has skyrocketed. Security is slowly...quietly giving more laptop users admin rights.

      --
      "A person is smart. People are dumb, panicky dangerous animals and you know it." - K
    91. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by jader3rd · · Score: 1

      Resetting passwords is a hugely complicated process on machines you have physical access to...

      Especially if the computer has UEFI Secure Boot enabled.

    92. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by jader3rd · · Score: 1

      And that is criminally stupid.

      Why is having my user account, have information local only to my user account criminally stupid?

    93. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by jader3rd · · Score: 1

      I have to resort to a Guest account for their use and switch back and forth? I don't know anyone who operates Windows that way (at least for personal home use).

      I have my home computers setup that way, and so does my extended family. As easy as switching between accounts was in Windows 7, it became a lot easier and faster in Windows 8.

    94. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Billly+Gates · · Score: 1

      Rumor has it Microsoft is working on a new API in IWndows 8.1 and 8.2 for any local standard user to access a local device.

      This would be a godsend as printers requiring ring0 and to install some service as admin just to send a job to the spooler is a big security and user flaw that has been in Windows since its infancy.

      MacOSX users do not need to be root or admin to install printers.

      Unfortunately because of METRO corporate users will do another XP and hold their ears and pretend they can't hear if you say anything is better than Windows 7. It iwll be with us for a very very long time and maybe longer than XP I fear.

    95. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by CKW · · Score: 1

      It is theatre. Even your non-techie friends can use google, which immediately leads to tools that can brute force the master password (http://securityxploded.com/firemaster.php), and without a doubt there are tools out there that will read the master password from running memory, and I'd expect that to appear in open/published tools like the above someday too.

      The main problem with this theatre is that you and other people might be fooled into believing you are more secure than you are, and store things there that you should not.

      The software developers are refusing to participate in this theatre in order to force you to recognize the actual reality of the situation.

      If one person stores their bank credentials in their browser password database and looses their life savings, it's unacceptable.

      Note -- Pidgin doesn't support a master password nor does it even obfuscate the stored passwords, the passwords are stored in a text file IN THE CLEAR, because they are making a conscious choice to explicitly point out to you that there is no actual security for 90% of the cases where you will be attacked. If someone can read your files and your user's system memory, they have you.

    96. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by hardaker · · Score: 1

      Except that lastpass also synchronizes across multiple browsers too, including mobile, safari, opera, firefox, etc. So it doesn't tie you to a single browser vendor like using chromes (non-secure) password storage would do.

      --
      The next site to slashdot will be ready soon, but subscribers can beat the rush and start slashdotting it early!
    97. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by X0563511 · · Score: 1

      Well here's an example. It takes (because I configured it) a computer similar to mine 10 seconds to try a password. Good luck doing a brute force with that kind of thing!

      There's also far more features built in. URL fields, notes fields, expiration handling, password generators, automatic locking when your session locks or after a timeout, etc.

      If all you do is save passwords for website yes, there's not much to gain here. But it's useful for far more than that.

      Finally.. what if you want to use Chrome, want to store your password somewhere, but don't want to rely on Chrome's gimpy storage mechanism?

      --
      For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
    98. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by cbhacking · · Score: 1

      The legacy folder name is still there (it's a junction, which is basically a directory hardlink, but it's still there). However, yes, as of NT6 (Vista), the default location for user profiles is the \Users\ directory on the system drive.

      --
      There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
    99. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by DMUTPeregrine · · Score: 1

      Oh, wait, Keepass can do that. Both via auto-type hotkeys, and via plugins (PassIFox for Firefox with KeePassHTTP for Keepass)

      --
      Not a sentence!
    100. Re: This is also the case on Firefox by Patch86 · · Score: 1

      I'm intrigued- what important stuff? If I snuff it, my family will have no great reason to get into my emails, social networks, shopping accounts, etc. And they don't need the password to my online banks and whatnot- they just need to inform the bank I'm dead (and present proof that they're my estate's executor), and the bank will give them access to everything they need to know. Indeed, it's illegal to access and withdraw money from the account of a dead person without going through the proper channels, as you might be doing so to deprive the beneficiary of their will, or to avoid inheritance taxes, or whatnot.

      I'm not sure what my family would a) need to access and b) not be able to access by flashing my death certificate around. Pretty narrow Venn Diagram, there.

    101. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by pixelpusher220 · · Score: 1

      You appear to be talking about Chrome? I'm talking about Firefox.

      and if you're into HTML inspection, you're passed the majority of people's skill. It is still better than nothing - such as Chrome 'security'.

      --
      People in cars cause accidents....accidents in cars cause people :-D
    102. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by makomk · · Score: 1

      Chrome does store the actual passwords in an encrypted form. Unlike Firefox, it even does so basically automatically without requring users to manually enable password encryption (which I think used to be a fairly well-hidden option).

    103. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by makomk · · Score: 1

      That's probably because you have to know about the master password support, then manually go into the preferences and enable it. Naturally hardly anyone does. Meanwhile, Chrome encrypts your passwords with your login password automatically on most supported platforms.

    104. Re: This is also the case on Firefox by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      Important stuff would be bank account, or more specifically a list of the bank type services. Or online games so someone can log in and say that I'm not coming back. Or cancel my subscription to some recurring internet services.

    105. Re: This is also the case on Firefox by icebike · · Score: 1

      Is remembering 15 different passwords, and variations of them for more, really that difficult?

      In my password vault application I have 74 web sites over 15 computer logins
      10 email accounts 6 pgp passphrases 4 bank accounts and a collection of
      miscellaneous combo-lock passwords and odds and ends.

      Well over 140 records.

      Don't ever get old son. Your Memory is the Second thing to go.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    106. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Zaelath · · Score: 1

      So for you it's the pill, tubal ligation, a vasectomy and condoms?

      Having a real password on your login account and locking it before you walk away will stop all but the most determined attackers, on the other hand, walking away with your computer logged in and sharing your account with guests/family is an open door.

      Besides, locking the computer is a lot more effective security than "not allowing the browser to remember passwords" given a LOT of websites will give you an multi-hour cookie and allow you to reopen a closed web browser and resume using a web site in a logged in fashion.

      My family can use my login while I'm sitting there, but if I get up to pee I lock the computer, and strangely, I'm one of the few people I've met in online games that hasn't been "hacked" at some point, strange :P

    107. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by ArhcAngel · · Score: 1

      Our migration TO Windows 7 isn't even completed yet. Highly unlikely 8/9/X will be on the budget for years.

      --
      "A person is smart. People are dumb, panicky dangerous animals and you know it." - K
    108. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by Chris+Hodges · · Score: 1

      And on FF/Thunderbird it's very useful - if the built-in local keystore stops saving passwords in a reasonably recoverable way, given how many of them most of us have, and how many machines many of us use, another local solution would be needed. I'm moving towards keepass, but slowly.

    109. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by jonadab · · Score: 1

      Realistically, anyone with physical access can easily get the passwords anyway, by using a hosts file (or equivalent) to cause them to be sent to a local http server.

      So yeah, if your computer is not physically secure (and most aren't), don't store data on it that you need to keep secret.

      --
      Cut that out, or I will ship you to Norilsk in a box.
    110. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by fast+turtle · · Score: 1

      More Eyes/Devs looking at it? If it aint open source, then how many folks are actually being paid to look at the code? Then how many of those paid employee's have the responsibility to ensure that the code is Secure?

      Although you do have a valid point about the master pw in Firefox possibly having flaws, people at least have the option to actually review the god damn code to ensure they didn't do something stupid where-as the Chrome code is no not completely open. I run Gentoo and let me tell you, even though Chrome is available in the repositories, it's by no means the same as what's available for Windows.

      --
      Mod me up/Mod me down: I wont frown as I've no crown
    111. Re: This is also the case on Firefox by metamatic · · Score: 1

      In my password vault application I have 74 web sites over 15 computer logins

      I work with computers and do a lot of online shopping, so I have over 600 login/password combinations in mine. Seriously.

      --
      GCHQ Quantum Insert installed. If only our tongues were made of glass, how much more careful we would be when we speak
    112. Re:This is also the case on Firefox by tgd · · Score: 1

      If you care so little about security that you don't secure your user account, I doubt you care enough about security to worry about your other credentials.

      Stupid is as stupid does, as they say.

      The problem with this is that it is very short-sighted. There is no 100% effective way to secure an account other than to not use it or to keep it disconnected from networks and away from other users. That may be an acceptable risk for you, but I prefer having another layer of protection.

      And that protection is theater, nothing more.

  2. Why is Google being singled out? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    If you save your passwords in Firefox, you can obtain them, in plain text, by going to preferences, security, and saved passwords. Similar functionality is available in Internet Explorer. Safari is the only browser, that I know of, that asks for an account password before revealing the contents of the key chain password manager, but, with a little javascript, this security check can be easily bypassed.

    The solution is to never hand anyone access to your operating system user account. Understanding and using OS user accounts and browser profiles, which Google Chrome includes an option for, would solve this “problem.”

    On a side note, if other browsers are barely more secure or just as "bad" as Chrome, why is Chrome being singled out? When did it become fashionable by some in the tech community to attack Google?

    1. Re:Why is Google being singled out? by Clsid · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Maybe you didn't read the article and what is being discussed. The reason Google is being singled out is because one guy discovered an issue with Chrome and then Google's top chief for Chrome security had a crappy response.

      So next time, at least try to post with a proper Slashdot account or something, at least that way we can check if you are just a zealot for a given company or making a legit complain.

    2. Re:Why is Google being singled out? by tgd · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Maybe you didn't read the article and what is being discussed. The reason Google is being singled out is because one guy discovered an issue with Chrome and then Google's top chief for Chrome security had a crappy response.

      No he had exactly the right response, but there's a lot of morons (at proven by the threads on this story) who think they understand security and don't.

  3. Firefox is the same by rHBa · · Score: 2, Informative

    Firefox menu -> Preferences -> Security -> Saved Passwords -> Show Passwords

    1. Re:Firefox is the same by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Informative

      ../../Set Masterpassword

      face it : chrome sucks at security, but that's no big surprise.

    2. Re:Firefox is the same by hobarrera · · Score: 2

      Actually, is this any different for ANY browser?
      If the password is available (without being prompted for any master password), then it's accesible one way or another. Period.

    3. Re:Firefox is the same by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Safari stores them in the system keychain encrypted/unlocked with your login password (or another password if you want)

    4. Re:Firefox is the same by Clsid · · Score: 5, Insightful

      You can secure this in Firefox, there is no option to do so in Chrome.

    5. Re:Firefox is the same by Colonel+Korn · · Score: 1

      Firefox menu -> Preferences -> Security -> Saved Passwords -> Show Passwords

      Firefox: "Please enter the master password."

      --
      "I zero-index my hamsters" - Willtor (147206)
    6. Re:Firefox is the same by jrumney · · Score: 1

      Actually, Firefox is not the same, it is both better, and worse. Better because there is an option to use a master password. Worse, because in firefox there is one button that shows all your passwords. In Chrome, there is a separate button for each password. If someone has taken the precaution of setting a password on their login account and locks their screen whenever they walk away from the PC, the remaining risk is shoulder surfers hanging around when the legitimate user wants to check what their password is for a site.

      Also, if you don't lock the screen when you walk away, but you are one of the 0.01% of users who use a master password, your Mozilla passwords are sitting unencrypted in memory (or at least the key to get at them is), even if Mozilla prompts for a password when you try to view the stored passwords through the browser UI. This is what the Chrome developer is talking about when he says that the master password gives you a false sense of security. Yes it stops your little sister getting your facebook password while you're taking a crap and embarrassing you online. It isn't going to protect against anyone who is going after your bank account.

    7. Re:Firefox is the same by Clsid · · Score: 2

      Security is a theater most of the time. Nothing prevents you from robbing a bank and taking down the guards except, morals aside, the fear of losing your freedom or getting shot.

      Passwords by itself are a laughable protection we use nowadays, especially if you use short strings. It just happens to be the most convenient option we have so far. A lot of banks have switched to having code cards and passwords for more security, or even sending codes to your cell phone. A simple keylogger can take away all the precautions you took to secure your passwords by remembering them. And to be honest, if you can remember your password, most likely you are using a bad password. You should really start using some sort of password manager with extremely long and complicated passwords. Keepass is very effective at this, especially when you pair it with add-ons like Keefox. These software have ways to even fool keyloggers like using secure desktops in Windows or doing some random stuff when they paste the password string on webforms. If you combine this stuff with plugins like Key xchanger, that lets access your key files on your cell phone via Bluetooth you can probably have the most secure setup available without too much hassle.

      So that being said, I still believe even if Firefox's way isn't the most secure, at least it is way better than what Chrome is doing. Hell if it was Microsoft's IE doing it, we wouldn't be having this conversation I believe.

    8. Re:Firefox is the same by osu-neko · · Score: 1

      So that being said, I still believe even if Firefox's way isn't the most secure, at least it is way better than what Chrome is doing. Hell if it was Microsoft's IE doing it, we wouldn't be having this conversation I believe.

      Are you saying if it was IE, you wouldn't be arguing what you're arguing? I know Google is the new Microsoft on /. these days, but Microsoft is still Microsoft, too. People would be just as quick to pile on IE as they are on Chrome here, and I'd be just as compelled to point out the flaws in the arguments, because bad information is bad, even if the person using it is using it to attack something I don't like. If it was Firefox, now, then you're right, we wouldn't be having this conversation, but only because the blogger would never have written the article with it's incoherent attack in the first place, and if they did, the /. editors would have been critical enough to not run it. But MS or Google? Sure, the argument's incoherent, but someone wrote Chrome/IE/whatever-the-new-favorite-whipping-boy-is is bad, let's pile on!

      --
      "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
    9. Re:Firefox is the same by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      THe problem is that its only "sort of" secure in firefox.

      Any scenario that might present a threat to Chrome's password storage would compromise Firefox's just as easily-- once the master password is input, the keystore is unlocked.

    10. Re:Firefox is the same by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      ""Part of the argument is protecting lame user Joe who doesn't know his passwords can be accessed in such a fashion right if he's asked the browser to save them for him. Well how is he to know, if never prompted by firefox, that this is the case and if he is storing passwords he has the option to protect them with a master password?

      Yes, it does. You are prompted to enter a master password to be able to access your other passwords. You have to actively check a box to tell it to stop asking you.

    11. Re:Firefox is the same by osu-neko · · Score: 1

      Firefox: "Please enter the master password."

      The practical upshot of this is, Firefox's way is better if you enjoy security theatre, and Chrome's way is better if you think it's best for the browser to not fool its users into thinking they're more secure than they actually are.

      --
      "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
    12. Re:Firefox is the same by pthisis · · Score: 1

      So does Chrome. It uses keychain on OS X, kwallet on KDE, and gnome-keychain on Gnome (as does Firefox, at least the latter two--haven't tested on a Mac). The real issue here is that Windows doesn't offer a secure password/key storage solution so browsers are forced to roll their own.

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    13. Re:Firefox is the same by Agent0013 · · Score: 1

      And locking the front door of your house is just security theater so you have gone and removed all locks from your house right. After all, it is quite easy to just break a window to get in.

      Locks are to keep honest people honest. A master password would keep honest people from doing the extra work necessary to crack or get at the stored passwords. A friend over at your house, your kids or significant other easily seeing them, things like this. The master password would not stop the dedicated thief, but there are many less dedicated thieves out there than there are honest people that may take an easy opportunity.

      --

      -- ssoorrrryy,, dduupplleexx sswwiittcchh oonn.. -Quote found on actual fortune cookie.
    14. Re:Firefox is the same by WuphonsReach · · Score: 1

      Any scenario that might present a threat to Chrome's password storage would compromise Firefox's just as easily-- once the master password is input, the keystore is unlocked.

      How about the scenario of "stolen / lost hard drive (or computer)".

      They've got the physical hardware, which means software-based permissions are easily bypassed and they can easily read off the password file.

      --
      Wolde you bothe eate your cake, and have your cake?
    15. Re:Firefox is the same by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Thats maybe the one scenario this would help against, and Im not convinced that should be a browser job rather than a full disk encryption job.

    16. Re:Firefox is the same by cbhacking · · Score: 1

      IE offers to delete the passwords for you, but has no built-in option to show them. They are listed in the Credential Manager, but only as *********; there's no way I can see on Win7 to extract them without digging deeper into the system or getting them one at a time out of the target sites.

      --
      There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
    17. Re:Firefox is the same by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      If i have access to the computer for 4 minutes, why couldnt I drop a malicious extension into firefox which waits until you have unlocked your password store, and then dumps the whole thing up to a website? Or wait until you visit your email provider, and grab the password form data as firefox fills it in?

      The fact is, as has been explained ad nauseum, you cannot defend every single one of these vectors once the attacker has gotten access to your session; there is too many ways for him to dump those passwords.

    18. Re:Firefox is the same by Demonantis · · Score: 1

      Physically access means all bet are off. You could just use a keylogger. Two factor is really the best situation, still has issues, and thats not reasonable for a lot of websites to afford.

    19. Re:Firefox is the same by hobarrera · · Score: 1

      So once you've logged in, it's accesible.
      Others OSs encrypt your home directory with the user password, so the same would apply. Doesn't mac have disk encryption as well?

    20. Re:Firefox is the same by hobarrera · · Score: 1

      If the browser can read them, then they're readble.

      I haven't done much research on IE in particular, but this works for any browser:
      -Set up a DNS server. Spoof everything to localhost and proxy the real stuff.
      -Set up a web server (with TLS with your own CA if you want).
      -Install your custom CA
      -Open the browser, have it autocomplete the password.
      -Log traffic.
      -Profit.

  4. Firefox has done this for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    I have taken advantage of it to post on friend's Facebook pages. Why the sudden interest in this ability on Chrome?

    1. Re:Firefox has done this for years by The+MAZZTer · · Score: 5, Informative

      I don't think people realize that

      1. The passwords are encrypted on disk.
      2. The key for the encryption )on Windows at least) is the user's account... so Chrome can transparently decrypt them as long as you're logged in, for user convenience, though in this case it gives the appearance of not being encrypted.
      3. Chrome MUST be able to store the passwords in a decryptable form so it can USE them, like you asked it to!
    2. Re:Firefox has done this for years by Zalbik · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I don't think people realize that
              The passwords are encrypted on disk.
              The key for the encryption )on Windows at least) is the user's account... so Chrome can transparently decrypt them as long as you're logged in, for user convenience, though in this case it gives the appearance of not being encrypted.
              Chrome MUST be able to store the passwords in a decryptable form so it can USE them, like you asked it to!

      Fantastic. I don't think that you realize that the issue people are concerned about is that Chrome will easily display these password in plain text to any user who happens to sit down at an unlocked computer.

      Now to some of the silly supporters of this bizarre behavior:
      If I have access to an unlocked user account, I can already: install keyloggers, corupt data, pwn their machine, rape their dog, etc...
      Yes, yes you could. But just as there are different levels of security, there are different levels of "hackers". Not everyone out there is a l33t haxor who can own your PC with nothing more than a paper clip, a rubber band and an old FM radio. Security is also intended to stop "casual hackers". A "friend" who is just borrowing your browser for a few minutes. A neighbor who just dropped by and needs to check their email quickly. Your soon to be ex-spouse who wants to check up on what sites you've been visiting...etc. Having a UAC prompt / sudo prompt would at least stop these casual users from finding all your passwords in plain text.

      If the browser stores the password, someone could just log onto the site and change it
      Yes, but unless they: (1) validated the password change in email, (2) deleted the email notifying the user of password change, (3) changed the browser to have the new password stored, the user would likely notice the change pretty quick. I know I'd notice password changes of this type when my (a) phone, (b) laptop, (c) other PC all stopped being able to access the site that was changed.

      People shouldn't store their passwords in the browser....they should use: [insert favorite password storage site here]
      Agreed. But in this case, Google should just remove the feature and redirect the user to one of those sites.

      The way they have it implemented is:
      (a) stupid
      (b) insecure
      and
      (c) dishonest as their messages imply that passwords are stored securely.

      And their idiotic defense of this behavior makes me wonder if Google even bothers hiring security-aware people at all. It concerns me enough that even though I don't store passwords in any browser, I'm uninstalling Chrome when I get home. If they are this lax about basic password security, I am very worried about what other stupid security policies they have in Chrome.

    3. Re:Firefox has done this for years by makomk · · Score: 1

      Yeah, it does that on Linux if you're not using KDE or Gnome from what I recall. If you are it stores the passwords using their encrypted keychain support as of a few versions ago.

  5. Moronic. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

    If your browser can read the passwords and use them on the web, so can a local user. No surprise. Unless you set a master password (firefox offers this, not sure about chrome), there's no way to fix this. It's just how computers work.

    1. Re:Moronic. by Clsid · · Score: 1

      Lol this is like Google's AC army all over the comments section now. Computers don't work that way. But to make it simple for you, a password can be encrypted with a public key, and then decrypted with Chrome's private key. It is not advanced technology and please, go tell your coworkers at Google to get their act together.

    2. Re:Moronic. by The+MAZZTer · · Score: 2

      I believe Chrome uses OS passwords stores on Mac and Linux which both support a master password. Not 100% sure. The Windows mechanism used uses your Windows login information so no master password is needed, it's very convenient and just as secure (unless you leave your computer logged on... but then all the files you encrypted in the exact same way with Microsoft's file encryption will be readable as well).

    3. Re:Moronic. by aardvarkjoe · · Score: 4, Insightful

      But to make it simple for you, a password can be encrypted with a public key, and then decrypted with Chrome's private key.

      How do you intend to keep a local user from being able to extract the private key that Chrome is using? (Note that in your scenario, asymmetric key encryption is kind of pointless in the first place.)

      See: why DRM doesn't work either.

      --

      How can we continue to believe in a just universe and freedom to eat crackers if we have no ale?
    4. Re:Moronic. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Lol this is like Google's AC army all over the comments section now. Computers don't work that way. But to make it simple for you, a password can be encrypted with a public key, and then decrypted with Chrome's private key. It is not advanced technology and please, go tell your coworkers at Google to get their act together.

      That'd be simple but accomplish nothing. The private key would be installed on everybody's computer, thus rendering it not private.

    5. Re:Moronic. by Dynedain · · Score: 1

      Which means Chrome's private key needs to be stored in Chrome itself (unless you want to start shipping everything off to Google for server-side processing), and so can be plucked out of the binary for decryption purposes.

      --
      I'm out of my mind right now, but feel free to leave a message.....
    6. Re:Moronic. by aardvarkjoe · · Score: 1

      You can't, but I wouldn't expect a local user to have the time to install a hex editor and decompilers on a machine that I use to extract a private key from the executable.

      If you assume that the local users on your machine are potentially going to try to steal your passwords, you should also assume that they are going to potentially put in the required effort to get around a scheme like this. Perhaps you're not very well versed in what it would take to extract the key when using this scheme -- take it from someone who is; it's going to be fairly trivial.

      If you want to prevent that sort of attack, you need a way to only allow decryption of the passwords by the person who is authorized to use them. For instance, using a tool like KeePassX with a master password works; apparently the Firefox master password uses the same scheme. But that doesn't give the same ease of use as the automated password entry. If you want it automatic, then you have to accept that the database can be accessed by anyone, not just your web browser.

      --

      How can we continue to believe in a just universe and freedom to eat crackers if we have no ale?
    7. Re:Moronic. by maccodemonkey · · Score: 2

      If your browser can read the passwords and use them on the web, so can a local user. No surprise. Unless you set a master password (firefox offers this, not sure about chrome), there's no way to fix this. It's just how computers work.

      Not on OS X/Safari. All my saved passwords are locked by a master password. A user without that master password can see that the entries exist, but they can't decode the passwords without first entering the master password. And, where things get really different, they are sandboxed, so only the original application that entered the password can read it without user intervention.

    8. Re:Moronic. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Last I checked (i.e. every day when I use it), Chrome/Chromium on KDE does indeed go straight to the KDE Wallet (password store). KDE itself prompts me for a password as soon as I start Chromium (or as soon as I visit any site where Chromium wants to look at the store for potential data). I'd imagine it to be the same on GNOME with their keyring. It looks like on XFCE it must fall back to whatever it uses internally or I have a password store-like thing set up without a password by default and I didn't know that. In fact, I'd say that Chrome is depending more on the OS/DE to supply the password store, if available, under the assumption that, well, that's what it's there for, and that it's been tested more. The local Chrome store probably isn't as well-tested and is just there for a fallback.

      But, of course, don't mind me. According to Clsid above, I'm just "lol" another part of the Google AC army "lol". Facts apparently can't come from me.

    9. Re:Moronic. by Clsid · · Score: 1

      Well I never intended to propose the perfect solution with my comment but it sure as hell is better than what Chrome is doing right now. Your Slashdot id might be older but unless you are some sort of uberhacker we pretty much are from the same camp so I can tell you what I do regarding this issue and you can make your own conclusions.

      I use Keepass and Keefox. I also use a key file which is stored on a pen drive. I made a point of always carrying that pen drive with me more for practical reasons than security, but in this case it adds an extra layer of protection if you will. The database itself is encrypted with AES and I store that in a Yandex.Disk so I can share it between multiple computers. As you know, Keepass has some extra protection against keyloggers, without mentioning that having a proper commercial antivirus updated should keep a lot of automated attack tools out of your system with little effort. So this way, I do have to use a master password but only once per session and it works so far and I can use passwords that are much harder to crack. I used to have KeePassX but I recommend you switch to Keepass instead and use Mono if you have to run on Macs (Keefox is also compatible in this regard) since KeePassX does not support the 2.0 KDB format and it does not integrate with the extremely cool Keefox. You could make this setup even better by adding the bluetooth plugin so you can store the key file on your cell phone, but some of the computers I have to use do not have bluetooth.

      So having said that, even after all those measures, somebody comes to me and demands my passwords for whatever reason by asking nicely while carrying a gun, all of that would have been for nothing. But more to the point, I still believe that even if you can't have perfect security, that should not be an excuse to be so careless as to store plain text passwords. I hope we can at least agree on that.

    10. Re:Moronic. by Clsid · · Score: 1

      Locking the desktop is even less secure as having a master password in my opinion. Do you know how easy is to reset the local admin password on a Windows machine with one of those Linux boot CDs?

    11. Re:Moronic. by Clsid · · Score: 1

      The software could generate the pairs for each user, but while it's not a perfect solution, I think it is way better than storing password in plain-text.

    12. Re:Moronic. by aardvarkjoe · · Score: 1

      Yes, I use a password vault for any passwords that would be worth stealing. I agree, storing your email, financial or similar passwords using any method that can be accessed by an unauthorized local user -- whether that's plain text, or obfuscated by an easily-bypassed encryption scheme -- is a bad idea. If that is how your browser stores passwords (which applies to chrome, firefox without a master password, etc.) then you shouldn't be using it for anything where a compromised password would be harmful.

      On the other hand, I allow chrome to remember my slashdot password and other unimportant ones. The ease of use outweighs any security risks there.

      I can see an argument for including password vault-type support in Chrome -- although I would personally prefer a cross-platform, standardized interface for storing and encrypting passwords that any browser could access. But I don't see much point in including obfuscation of unprotected passwords -- if anything, that just lends a false sense of security.

      --

      How can we continue to believe in a just universe and freedom to eat crackers if we have no ale?
    13. Re:Moronic. by Clsid · · Score: 1

      I see your point and it is totally reasonable. Mine was more about having the equivalent of onion layers. You add more depending on the importance of the data, but even with some basic stuff I like to have the equivalent of the mall cop guarding it.

    14. Re:Moronic. by Clsid · · Score: 1

      Getting a Slashdot account isn't that hard to begin with, and it helps so you won't get tagged along with other AC's that were saying some very strange things. In your case it was the there is no way to make this work comment, when in fact there are a variety of ways to make something like this works, from biometric devices to even using your cell phone. But I do agree that the master password is a very simple and effective way, just not the ONLY way.

    15. Re:Moronic. by Billly+Gates · · Score: 1

      If your browser can read the passwords and use them on the web, so can a local user. No surprise. Unless you set a master password (firefox offers this, not sure about chrome), there's no way to fix this. It's just how computers work.

      Sure they can.

      1. Use cloud based passwords encrypted with your forms autofill in. Problem solved and use SSL to make sure it is encrypted.
      2. Encrypt the damn passwords if you store it locally. During a re-install create new public keys and have a C.A. issue a masterkey. This way it still can be recovered during an import and a Mozilla or google server can then use the private key to unlock the previous password and then re-encrypt it for the newer public keys.

      Viola. Easy to do.
      This way if an evil macro runs or malware hits the only thing they will see are encrypted jargon when they read the passwords.

    16. Re:Moronic. by Billly+Gates · · Score: 1

      The users do not need it.

      They only get the public keys generated to unlock it. The private key is never uploaded to a users computer. Instead the data is sent to Google and comes back in a SSL datastream.

    17. Re:Moronic. by Billly+Gates · · Score: 1

      Which means Chrome's private key needs to be stored in Chrome itself (unless you want to start shipping everything off to Google for server-side processing), and so can be plucked out of the binary for decryption purposes.

      What is wrong with that? That is how any e-commerce site works. Just make sure SSL is on the process. You can actually have just the public keys generated each time after an install encrypt it. The only time the private key would be used is if someone imported the data during a re-image or a refresh.

    18. Re:Moronic. by Agent0013 · · Score: 1

      You are assuming that the local user on your machine came prepared to steal the passwords. Yeah, if they do same research online to figure out how to do it, get the required tools together, get enough time alone on the computer to pull it off, then they can do that. If they get 10 seconds alone while you go to the bathroom and decide to glimpse your facebook password so they can mess with you, then even an insecure master password would have helped out. Locks are only on houses to help keep honest people honest. They don't stop lockpicks and professional thieves. Does that mean we should stop using them? Most people haven't learned how to pick locks yet (I have), and breaking a window leaves too much of a trace.

      --

      -- ssoorrrryy,, dduupplleexx sswwiittcchh oonn.. -Quote found on actual fortune cookie.
    19. Re:Moronic. by Zalbik · · Score: 1

      If you assume that the local users on your machine are potentially going to try to steal your passwords, you should also assume that they are going to potentially put in the required effort to get around a scheme like this

      I see. So the choices are;
      1) Make it harder to get at these passwords
      2) Don't

      One of these choices is more secure than the other.

      It is also fairly trivial to get past the door locks on most houses. I don't advocate that people remove their door locks for this reason.

    20. Re:Moronic. by Dynedain · · Score: 1

      The difference is that in an e-commerce site is that the private key is somewhere on the server where presumably a very limited number of people can access it.

      If the private key that Chrome uses to decrypt your password chain is stored locally on your machine (somewhere in the Chrome binaries or user prefs) then it can be extracted by a local user. Doesn't make password attacking any more difficult (from a scripting standpoint) than it already is.

      If the private key is hosted by Google, then Google is doing decryption of all your passwords. And there's already uproar about Google having wifi passwords saved in Google-hosted backups of Android devices.

      It's really the same problem in both scenarios where people are screaming blood murder. If you trust the computer to be you, then the computer can do anything you can do. The only way to block it is to require the user to input a password every time (can be a master password), which is annoying for most people, and defeats the purpose of saved passwords.

      --
      I'm out of my mind right now, but feel free to leave a message.....
    21. Re:Moronic. by aardvarkjoe · · Score: 1

      Would you suggest buying a high-security door lock if there's an easily-broken window right next to the door that a thief could use?

      The best analogy for the "door lock" in this scenario ... is the physical lock on my front door. That's what keeps the easily-deterred thieves away from my physical items, and it also keeps them from taking my computer and looking up the passwords stored by my browser.

      Comparing the built-in browser security to the lock on my front door is not a particularly good analogy. My computer isn't anywhere where casual thieves could access it anyway.

      --

      How can we continue to believe in a just universe and freedom to eat crackers if we have no ale?
    22. Re:Moronic. by aardvarkjoe · · Score: 1

      I suppose that method may work -- it's still breakable if a local attacker compromises the browser so they can intercept the decrypted passwords, but that's probably going to be a lot more difficult -- but at least I certainly would not be willing to give Google the ability to decrypt and view all of my sensitive passwords. So that would kind of limit this scheme to only non-sensitive/unimportant passwords .. and then I'd kind of have to ask, why bother with that if they're not important anyway?

      --

      How can we continue to believe in a just universe and freedom to eat crackers if we have no ale?
    23. Re:Moronic. by Billly+Gates · · Score: 1

      Google does this with gmail already.

      In my opinion it either has to be all cloud based OR the browser creates random keys and encrypts them when you install it ala Windows. The problem being is if it gets corrupted or you need to upgrade you lose all your data :-(

      Firefox sync and Google sync do this already. Yes it is a lot of power for them, but you have convenience of having everything together and Google does not read them. They are encrypted and they destroy all the hard disks from servers when decomissioned.

      I assumed it was done this way already ...plain text passwords accessible by limited users!! WTH seriously as any piece of malware does not even need to escalate itself as admin/root to read this?!

    24. Re:Moronic. by Billly+Gates · · Score: 1

      The private key is not on the machine. The browser when you sign into Google or Firefox will then use SSL to obtain public keys that are used to sign the password file.

      Sandboxing will keep this secure (hopefully) in javascript. It is still non destructible as the keys are in ram when you load the browser after an install, but it makes it a hell of alot more difficult to get.

      My issue is if it is plain text then any exploit does not have to do things like privileged escalations that would trigger your anti virus software or memory corruption bugs. All it would need to do is run as "you" as a limited user and read it. That is insane

      So if it were encrypted the piece of malware would have to escape the sandbox and then escalate a kernel privileged or attach to a kernel level service, and also avoid detection while doing these 2 things with the anti virus software, then run the debugger to get the public key, then get the password. That is harder to do.

      Since the public keys are different for each install if you hack one account you can't use the same keys for another as only Google has the private key.

    25. Re:Moronic. by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      You can't, but I wouldn't expect a local user to have the time to install a hex editor and decompilers on a machine that I use to extract a private key from the executable.

      THe user will google "how to dump chrome passwords", see a webpage explaining how to install such and such extension which performs that task, and another webpage offering a 50kb executable which does that decryption by hand, and use that.

      You want a golden example of this simply not working? Outlook password storage. Theres no "easy" way to show the passwords, until you visit nirsoft.net, and see that there has been an outlook profile password "decryptor" available for the last 10 years which anyone could use to dump all passwords. Now poll your friends: How many of them assumed that because there was no easy way to view said password, that an attacker could not grab it?

    26. Re:Moronic. by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Im trying to envision what computer security would look like if designed by slashdot groupthink. I have a feeling it would be complicated, frustrating, and utterly ineffective.

    27. Re:Moronic. by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Not on OS X/Safari. All my saved passwords are locked by a master password. A user without that master password can see that the entries exist, but they can't decode the passwords without first entering the master password.

      According to the Chrome security lead, that is not correct. You as the user are required to provide that password, but any program can trivially make an API call which grabs data from the keychain so long as it uses your session. This is, he noted, a prime example of the kind of false security that everyone is demanding.

    28. Re:Moronic. by maccodemonkey · · Score: 1

      According to the Chrome security lead, that is not correct. You as the user are required to provide that password, but any program can trivially make an API call which grabs data from the keychain so long as it uses your session. This is, he noted, a prime example of the kind of false security that everyone is demanding.

      Then the Chrome security lead would be wrong. If your application is signed on Mac OS X, only application's that match that signing can access that password without user intervention. And even that "user intervention" step is fuzzy. Apple has threatened to even more restrict a differently-signed apps permissions to the keychain.

      Application signing means the OS can sandbox data and dish it out per app. The user can unlock any encrypted password using their master key, but a application cannot simply troll the database because the OS knows that password belongs to another app.

    29. Re:Moronic. by Dynedain · · Score: 1

      So you're proposing every time the browser launches it gets the private key from Google?

      Sandboxing to prevent javascript is already in place. So current scenario or your scenario, the risk of a content-based malware breaking the sandbox to execute code in user-land is the same. So it doesn't really matter if the private key is stored at Google or locally on the machine.

      The only thing your scenario does over the current scenario is block the casual user from hitting "show password" if they step up to someone's unlocked machine while they're away from the keyboard. And even still, the UI could be programmed to display the password the way it currently does.

      No matter what, it comes down to "if I trust the software to decrypt for me, then the software will decrypt for me, and anything that can act as me (without additional credentials) can trigger the decrypt"

      --
      I'm out of my mind right now, but feel free to leave a message.....
  6. This is nothing new by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Saved passwords have always been stored in a way that they can be recovered easily.

    By definition, saving passwords will always be insecure, unless the program has a way to encrypt them using another key provided by the user.

    They MUST be recoverable to be of use, because the plain text password must be available to the program for transmission to the web page.

    1. Re:This is nothing new by Clsid · · Score: 1

      There is a software called Keepass and it tackles that issue in a really good way. It might not be perfect but if you find somebody that can crack a Keepass database that uses Twofish or AES, they totally deserve to have your passwords.

    2. Re:This is nothing new by jbengt · · Score: 1

      Saved passwords have always been stored in a way that they can be recovered easily.

      I know you probably didn't mean it this way, but I quit saving passwords because of my experience with too recoverable passwords in IE:
      When at work, I tried to access a folder on a client's ftp site. IE kept remembering an old password for a different folder on that ftp site. Even when I clicked the "forget the password" option, IE kept helpfully auto-loading the wrong one, telling me I can't access that folder, and not giving me any apparent way to input the correct password without being overridden by the recovered, incorrect, password. Rebooting didn't help it forget, I couldn't find anything to overcome the memory of that password, and I eventually had to log on to a different computer in order to download the files I needed.

  7. I don't see what the fuss is about. by haploc · · Score: 2, Informative

    This functionality has been both in Chrome and Firefox for years now, so I don't see why people make a fuss about it only now..

    Either you don't give other people access to your user account, or you use a 3rd party password-protected keystore like Keepass, Lastpass, 1Password, with a separate (or even 2-factor) authentication.

    1. Re:I don't see what the fuss is about. by dirtypoole · · Score: 1

      Either you don't give other people access to your user account, or you use a 3rd party password-protected keystore like Keepass, Lastpass, 1Password, with a separate (or even 2-factor) authentication.

      exactly!

    2. Re:I don't see what the fuss is about. by pixelpusher220 · · Score: 1

      No it isn't. Firefox has the ability to protect your saved passwords with a Firefox Master Password. From what I'm reading here, Chrome does not have that capability.

      --
      People in cars cause accidents....accidents in cars cause people :-D
  8. He missed something by Lieutenant_Dan · · Score: 5, Interesting

    How about the fact that Chrome can import passwords stored in Safari to begin with?

    So Safari has some security issues as well. Where is the "master key" to export passwords?

    I guess the underlying message is that if you leave a computer unattended the information is accessible to anyone. E-mail, passwords, documents, MP3s, etc.

    This is a convenience feature and 99% rather have the convenience of a cached web passwords on their personal computer then worrying about something walking by.

    --
    Wearing pants should always be optional.
    1. Re:He missed something by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Safari passwords are stored in the users keychain and the master password is usually,but doesn't have to be, the users login password.

    2. Re:He missed something by Lieutenant_Dan · · Score: 1

      Thanks; that's good info.

      So the underlying convenience is at fault.

      --
      Wearing pants should always be optional.
    3. Re:He missed something by Clsid · · Score: 1

      Safari uses the keyring, an OS level service to access passwords. So all you need to provide is your system password when an app wants to access the keyring and that's it.

    4. Re:He missed something by Anubis+IV · · Score: 1

      This really is a Chrome issue, not a Safari one, for reasons I'll go into, but the solution to the problem is to just remove the Show button from within Chrome, rather than taking more drastic steps, since the problem is that Chrome's setup is enabling casual "hacking" by over-the-shoulder attackers and everyday guests using the computer, which users have a reasonable expectation should not be as easy as Chrome is making it.

      Safari's passwords are stored in an OS-level keychain on Macs (not sure about Windows), which gets unlocked for use by other applications when the user logs into the computer (side note: most home users have their Macs configured to login automatically, since it's the default behavior in a single-user system). Clearly, if you're dealing with a real attacker, your system is compromised as soon as you give them physical access (e.g. they literally could just run an app that asks for all of your passwords), but that's not the concern here. The concern here is that users have an expectation that well-behaving apps won't show guests using the computer their passwords. Safari abides by this expectation by not displaying passwords in plaintext anywhere, even though it obviously has access to them, whereas Chrome upsets this expectation by making the passwords available for anyone to see.

      Regarding the keychain, from within the OS, the user can launch the Keychain Manager application to access their entire keychain and see all of the stored passwords and other credentials, but to do so they have to explicitly unlock the keychain by re-entering their OS-level username and password. As such, typical guests on the computer do not have direct access to the credentials stored in the keychain, even though they are able to still use them via other applications that request access to the keychain. When Chrome attempts to import passwords from Safari (really, from the system-level keychain), the user is prompted to Deny, Allow, or Always Allow the Chrome application to access the keychain in order to pull the relevant passwords.

      Again, well-behaving apps are expected to not reveal passwords to the user, so the real issue here is that Chrome is not abiding by those expectations. Hiding the Show button would fix this issue entirely, and it wouldn't just be security theater, as the Google employee claims in some of his statements, since it would provide a meaningful improvement in deterring the most common threat that most people face: their friends, coworkers, family, and other everyday people who happen to borrow their computer for a few minutes. And it would do so without introducing any additional burden or inconvenience on the user. Obviously, a dedicated attacker would have compromised virtually everything you had at that point, but the Chrome team is using that as an excuse for enabling casual "hackers" to compromise your passwords easily as well, which isn't acceptable.

    5. Re:He missed something by Clsid · · Score: 1

      Lol keychain, you are right.

    6. Re:He missed something by jrumney · · Score: 1

      Safari passwords are stored exactly the same way that Chrome ones are - encrypted by the system against the user's logon credentials. But apparently Safari, like IE, does not have an option for users to look up those passwords that they created long ago and saved in their browser so never had the need to actually remember them before. This makes it safe against fellow incensed bloggers, but for anyone who is likely to be a genuine threat, retrieving the passwords from any of the major browsers is trivial - except Firefox with a master password set (which almost no-one does, as it defeats the purpose of saving passwords if you have to type a password every time you want the browser to autofill your password).

    7. Re:He missed something by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      So Safari has some security issues as well. Where is the "master key" to export passwords?

      This whole article is basically an indicator of those who understand security, and those who do not. Author does not.

      The reason this isnt a problem is that like any sane browser, Safari, Chrome, etc are using the OS's user keychain. If the user is logged in, the keychain is unlocked. It puts such security concerns where they belong-- with the OS. Any attack which could compromise Safari / Chrome would compromise Firefox even with a master password.

    8. Re:He missed something by aliquis · · Score: 2

      Not really.

      Because with a program like 1Password or KeyPass or whatever you can generate say a password 30 characters long with numbers and all kinds of weird characters and you don't have to give a shit about trying to remember it and can have unique such passwords everywhere.

      Site is hacked into? No problem for all your other accounts. Something which isn't true if you just use the same password everywhere.

      It's less likely that someone would brute force crack your password I suppose but if they tried.. Then good luck.

      And you can still use your lazy short one password for everything-password.

    9. Re:He missed something by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      So Safari has some security issues as well. Where is the "master key" to export passwords?

      Its in your OS keychain, which is locked with your user account.

      You would think that people would take a few moments and google this stuff before wildly speculating about how it COULD be done.

      I guess the underlying message is that if you leave a computer unattended the information is accessible to anyone. E-mail, passwords, documents, MP3s, etc.

      The fact that you are now realizing this means "mission accomplished, you are no longer being deceived by security theatre".

  9. ..okay? And? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    If Chrome is going to enter your password for you, it has to know your password. This simple requirement ultimately means that any attempt to obfuscate the stored password is going to be trivial to overcome by anyone who has physical access to the box, unless you're flat out encrypting them with another password that the user would have to enter to decrypt them, and at that point, we've pretty handily defeated the purpose of storing passwords (because let's face it, it's not like you're going to want to do this EVERY time you need to autofill a password, so we're just going to do it once and then leave the db unlocked), so you may as well just remember your passwords and enter them manually in the first place.

  10. Doomed anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    If someone has physical access to my (unlocked) account I'm doomed anyway - he/she could install all sorts of backdoors or keyloggers trivially.

    1. Re:Doomed anyway? by Fwipp · · Score: 1

      Uh... wouldn't they just log your KeePass password, then log in and get all of your passwords?

    2. Re:Doomed anyway? by Clsid · · Score: 1

      They need more than just your Keepass password, especially if you store your key file somewhere else or use bluetooth devices, etc.

  11. Re:Same thing in Firefox by liamevo · · Score: 2

    Pretty easy these days, you can setup a master password on the page where you access the plain text passwords.Most people don't do this though, and do use the remember my login feature. Really it should be one of the first things it gets you to do when you setup the browser.

  12. Should I stop locking my doors too? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    The main argument seems to be that if a malicious user is able to access the unlocked operating system then, one way or another, they're going to be able to retrieve the stored passwords. While this may be true, that doesn't mean it should be made so easy that my grandmother could stumble across my entire list of saved passwords by accident.

    1. Re:Should I stop locking my doors too? by icebike · · Score: 1

      Then just log out for Pete sake?
      How hard is that?

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    2. Re:Should I stop locking my doors too? by wile_e8 · · Score: 1

      If you are really that worried about your grandmother or anyone else stealing your passwords and using them maliciously, maybe you shouldn't give them access to your computer under your account? Or maybe not store your passwords in the browser on a computer that you're loaning to people that would use them for harm if they can?

    3. Re:Should I stop locking my doors too? by vlueboy · · Score: 1

      Then just log out for Pete sake?
      How hard is that?

      Doesn't every OS since Windows XP auto-lock around the 15 minute mark as soon as the screensaver kicks in?
      The real issue is that laymen who live alone sometimes force windows to have password-less accounts on the first-use setup. If so, locking or logging out has no net effect on their security.

    4. Re:Should I stop locking my doors too? by icebike · · Score: 1

      But "Lives Alone" solves most of that guys problem, No?

      The burglar is just going to take his whole computer. Not much point in worrying about passwords
      when the thief has all the time in the world to break whatever scheme you set up.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    5. Re:Should I stop locking my doors too? by cbhacking · · Score: 1

      Oh, that was present well before XP (9x doesn't count, being an inherently single-user OS). The problem here is that the reason the timeout is at 15 minutes is because people figure that if they walk away from their machine for less time than that, there won't be an opportunity for an attacker to do much harm. And, in the vast majority of households, that's true; most people know practically zilch about computers. However, that doesn't mean it makes sense to make it *easy* to extract passwords from a machine what was left unlocked... and this Chrome "feature" does exactly that.

      --
      There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
  13. Master password? by coder111 · · Score: 1

    I don't use Chrome much, but is there a master password that you can set?
    If there is no master password, then no matter how the data is stored, it's as safe as plain text anyway. Even with master password, dictionary attacks will get you quite often.
    And you can transfer/import/export the data encrypted with master password between different installations without decrypting it.

    --Coder

  14. Why is this making news? by vawwyakr · · Score: 3, Funny

    I've seen this on several sites, is this news to anyone?? Did you miss it many years ago when this was added? You know what, when someone is physically on my machine while its logged in, they can also send emails from my account!! Its just right there ready to go! We need to do something about this!

    1. Re:Why is this making news? by gstoddart · · Score: 2

      You know what, when someone is physically on my machine while its logged in, they can also send emails from my account!!

      If it's sitting there in plain text for anybody to get, what's to prevent a malicious web-page from asking for it?

      Or are we meant to believe they made it trivial to access from the machine, but have put in super-duper security around accessing it from with the browser? Because I'm not buying that.

      --
      Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    2. Re:Why is this making news? by gstoddart · · Score: 1

      It's sitting there in plain text for anybody with _physical access_ to the machine to get

      Right, and exploits have never allowed people to access local files they're not supposed to. Nosiree, it's iron clad and has a perfect track record.

      So no, any website can not access it, but anybody on the machine can.

      Well, you can choose to believe that -- me I'll treat browsers like an untrusted entity in which stuff like that can bleed out in ways nobody planned for. We already know that cross-site cookies can be a problem.

      Knowing that all those tasty passwords are sitting in a known place and unencrypted makes it a really nice target. So I'll just not put those passwords there to begin with, and cut out a possible threat. How you handle that, well, that's your problem.

      --
      Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    3. Re:Why is this making news? by jader3rd · · Score: 1

      It's sitting there in plain text for anybody with _physical access_ to the machine to get. So no, any website can not access it, but anybody on the machine can.

      That's assuming that there's no security holes in Chrome. But there could be a security hole which will then make it so that the computer can't distinguish between a user with physical access and a program running.

    4. Re:Why is this making news? by Fwipp · · Score: 1

      It's encrypted, hun. Chrome decrypts it and shows it to you using your Windows login credentials.

  15. All browsers store their passwords in plaintext by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    If it really bothers you, encrypt your browser's settings files with your operating system's filesystem encryption feature.

    1. Re:All browsers store their passwords in plaintext by icebike · · Score: 1

      Then go out for a celebratory beer.
      And forget to logout of the account in your rush out the door.

      Same problem.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
  16. Hmmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Anybody notice Justin's LinkedIn profile? See any interesting prior employers? You guessed it.

  17. And this is why real IT professionals... by chemosh6969 · · Score: 1

    look down on web developers.

  18. Seems silly.. by segfault_0 · · Score: 2

    Why complain about this. If you're storing your passwords in your browser - im not sure how this qualifies as being significantly worse -- they can already just sit down at your browser and change your passwords - which is worse since it locks you out of your own account.

    Just dont save passwords if you cant secure your workstation i think is common sense.

    --

    I was crazy back when being crazy really meant something. (Charles Manson)
    1. Re:Seems silly.. by The+MAZZTer · · Score: 1

      Anyone can secure a workstation. It's easy, there's really no excuse. Press Win+L. Really. Do it now if you haven't done it before and prepare to be amazed at technology.

    2. Re:Seems silly.. by pruss · · Score: 1

      Changing passwords typically requires confirming the password, and the auto-fill typically doesn't work for that confirmation field in my experience.

    3. Re:Seems silly.. by segfault_0 · · Score: 1

      Good point, but seriously -- you are short circuiting security by saving the password. It seems to me this is really a case of the user being their own problem.

      --

      I was crazy back when being crazy really meant something. (Charles Manson)
    4. Re:Seems silly.. by segfault_0 · · Score: 1

      Better yet, use an encrypted password safe to store your passwords and trouble yourself to make those two or three extra clicks.

      --

      I was crazy back when being crazy really meant something. (Charles Manson)
    5. Re:Seems silly.. by kermidge · · Score: 1

      I suppose it mostly depends on time available or if the hard drive is encrypted. Else it's a matter of rebooting and going into safe mode to get at the passwords. If necessary, use a good recovery CD or Reatogo with the appropriate tools packaged in. Knoppix and such ought to work as well, if memory serves.

      If there's a BIOS pword, reset with jumper or take the battery out for a minute. If the HD is encrypted then it's beyond what I can do.

  19. Is this part of Google/NSA collaboration? by ron_ivi · · Score: 1

    With the recent leaks about how Google cooperates with government surveilence; I almost wonder if blatent weaknesses like this are by design. Sad when what should be outlandish conspiracy theories sound tame compared to what it's revealed they're alerady doing.

    1. Re:Is this part of Google/NSA collaboration? by gstoddart · · Score: 1

      With the recent leaks about how Google cooperates with government surveilence; I almost wonder if blatent weaknesses like this are by design

      It may not be that way by design, but it's certainly a possibility to be exploited.

      Imagine if the government went to Google and said "you need to add secret code which uploads these user/passwords to us so we have them".

      Google may not be directly part of a conspiracy like this, but I see no reason to keep acting like they couldn't be forced to or might not occasionally have one of their 'lapses' like when they collected all of people's wi-fi information -- sometimes hubris is as dangerous as malicious intent.

      If you don't entrust them with the information, they can't become the source of someone else getting their hands on it.

      --
      Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    2. Re:Is this part of Google/NSA collaboration? by gstoddart · · Score: 1

      Stop being paranoid.

      Nope. Not happening.

      People gladly upload their passwords to Google and other companies so they'll be automatically synced to their other devices through the cloud.

      I'm not one of those people -- the 'cloud' has always been synonymous with giving up control of your own data.

      It moves your data into the cloud where they can rent it back to you and it means you no longer have to worry about backing up, remembering passwords, or transferring your data.

      Again, not happening.

      That's a major win in the eyes of most consumers, even many technical ones.

      That's an unfortunate thing for those consumers then. Me, I was saying years ago that with the DMCA and who knows what else you can't trust your data to be safe in the cloud. Because way too many parties I wouldn't let into my network have access to it, and you have no way of knowing.

      There's a reason why many governments do not allow use of a cloud system under the control of a US company -- because you have no real control over what they do with it, and we have plenty of evidence that if the NSA wanted it, they'd go get it.

      To hell with that.

      --
      Lost at C:>. Found at C.
  20. Passwords have to be in the clear anyway by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Passwords have to be stored in a decryptable form, because the browser needs them decrypted to fill in the password fields or to respond to HTTP authentication responses. That means that any malware with access to the browser can get those passwords in decrypted form too. A master password doesn't help, the malware can just get the passwords after I've entered the master password to decrypt them for use (assuming it can't just get the master password when I enter it). The only thing encrypted password storage really protects against is someone with access to the physical storage media but not the running system, or essentially stolen mobile devices (phones or laptops). On those you probably shouldn't be storing passwords at all, because any reversible encryption is too easy to crack using off-line attacks with modern hardware.

    It's similar to my objection to the old "don't write down your passwords" thing: the risk of a remote attack against easy-to-remember passwords is much higher than the risk of an attacker physically getting into the locked drawer of my desk in the locked area of the secured and patrolled building my office is in, and if the attacker has gotten into the locked drawer in my desk I've got much bigger security worries and the attacker has much juicier targets he can go after.

    1. Re:Passwords have to be in the clear anyway by Colonel+Korn · · Score: 1

      Passwords have to be stored in a decryptable form, because the browser needs them decrypted to fill in the password fields or to respond to HTTP authentication responses. That means that any malware with access to the browser can get those passwords in decrypted form too. A master password doesn't help, the malware can just get the passwords after I've entered the master password to decrypt them for use (assuming it can't just get the master password when I enter it). The only thing encrypted password storage really protects against is someone with access to the physical storage media but not the running system, or essentially stolen mobile devices (phones or laptops). On those you probably shouldn't be storing passwords at all, because any reversible encryption is too easy to crack using off-line attacks with modern hardware.

      It's similar to my objection to the old "don't write down your passwords" thing: the risk of a remote attack against easy-to-remember passwords is much higher than the risk of an attacker physically getting into the locked drawer of my desk in the locked area of the secured and patrolled building my office is in, and if the attacker has gotten into the locked drawer in my desk I've got much bigger security worries and the attacker has much juicier targets he can go after.

      TFA doesn't seem concerned with malware. It seems to be based on the idea that normal people with physical access to your computer can steal your passwords. From that perspective I think it makes a good point. Probably something like 10-50% of browser users know how to look at the saved password list. If they try to retrieve those passwords on Chrome, they click a few times and write down the passwords. On Firefox, which offers a master password, they click a few times and then give up when they don't know that master password.

      The scope of this scenario is an order of magnitude greater than the most widespread malware infections.

      --
      "I zero-index my hamsters" - Willtor (147206)
    2. Re:Passwords have to be in the clear anyway by maccodemonkey · · Score: 1

      A master password doesn't help, the malware can just get the passwords after I've entered the master password to decrypt them for use (assuming it can't just get the master password when I enter it).

      Not if you've sandboxed using code signing (a la OS X.)

      Of course your sandbox would have to be free of bugs, but that's not impossible. iOS can be jailbroken, but that has to be user induced.

    3. Re:Passwords have to be in the clear anyway by Kryai · · Score: 1

      There really isn't going to be malware that sophisticated where they will attack the browser just waiting for the master password to be entered. Additionally, it would need another avenue to attack the OS/browser. From a perspective of a normal user, I would say that the master password would protect you from the vast majority of attacks that rely on reading your password in plaintext stored in your settings. Additionally, while possible, sniffing out the master password is still possible, no malware authors would go so far to get those passwords outside of specific targeted attacks. There is just so much other low hanging fruit. I think a master password is an imperfect but effective tool to use. I've started to use Keepass myself for password management, they have browser plugins but I have not evaluated it yet myself. Password encryption for storage is a good thing, not a bad thing!

    4. Re:Passwords have to be in the clear anyway by jrumney · · Score: 1

      Basically the complaint amounts to the fact that this feature opens up an avenue of information gathering that was previously thought only available to pale, overweight guys who live in their mothers' basements to jealous wives and girlfriends. I predict that the guys next post will be about the even more dangerous security hole that is chrome://history

    5. Re:Passwords have to be in the clear anyway by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 1

      You (and most of the other comments so far) are completely missing the point of the original complaint. This isn't about malware or hackers, it's about letting a friend or stranger use your device for a moment to lookup a meeting room number, a store location, call someone because they locked themselves out, etc... By having all stored passwords easily readable after a couple quick clicks, the friend/stranger can easily view the passwords without the user knowing and attack/blackmail/prank/whatever the user later at any time in the future on multiple accounts.

      I know that scenario. The problem is that most people want to avoid having to retype passwords every time one's needed, so they set things up to only require entering the master password once. When they hand their phone to the stranger, it's already unlocked and ready to compromise. Given what can be done with a smartphone these days, I simply have a policy of not lending it to people at all. With everything on it it's just too easy to get sensitive information out no matter what security's in place short of a complete lock-out of access to the phone. So that's what I have: if you aren't me, you aren't getting into the phone. If you try, the hardware's going to lock you out. Anything less and we end up playing little Dutch boy at the dike.

    6. Re:Passwords have to be in the clear anyway by Clsid · · Score: 1

      Get Keefox for Keepass, you are going to like it a lot.

    7. Re:Passwords have to be in the clear anyway by Agent0013 · · Score: 1

      It's similar to my objection to the old "don't write down your passwords" thing: the risk of a remote attack against easy-to-remember passwords is much higher than the risk of an attacker physically getting into the locked drawer of my desk in the locked area of the secured and patrolled building my office is in, and if the attacker has gotten into the locked drawer in my desk I've got much bigger security worries and the attacker has much juicier targets he can go after.

      That's just the point. It this example the list is in an unlocked drawer of an unlocked desk in an unlocked area with security guards that gave you a guest pass to get in with someone else. The drawer should be locked to make the guest take a few minutes to try to pick it and you may catch him in the act rather than he takes a photo real quick while you are walking over to the printer.

      Having the system get the passwords so it can enter them isn't a big deal. I only put my low risk passwords in the browser storage anyway. But that doesn't mean they should just be left pinned to the bulletin board for all to see! If a guest gets a list of all passwords they can pose as you at all the sites where the passwords were stored at a later date for as long as it takes you to realize something is up and then change them. If they log into a single site while using the computer, they have to do the damage then and are at a much higher risk of being caught in the act when you come back from the printer. That's the difference. Most crimes are simple crimes of opportunity. We should take away the easy opportunity and then we only have to worry about the dedicated thieves.

      --

      -- ssoorrrryy,, dduupplleexx sswwiittcchh oonn.. -Quote found on actual fortune cookie.
  21. Incorrect title by LordKaT · · Score: 1, Insightful

    Title should read: "Elliott Kember's Insane Password Security Strategy"

    Seriously, why are you storing passwords, at all? Unless you're storing them on in an encrypted space of some kind that requires two-factor authentication you shouldn't be storing passwords at all (and even then I really question your sanity).

  22. Hmm, doesn't show them for me by medv4380 · · Score: 1

    Maybe it's that I've never imported passwords from another browser, going to chrome://settings/passwords as suggested doesn't show any plain text passwords for me. It only shows a few sites anyways on this machines. I'm fairly sure Chrome on my Linux box at home is using a different method since Chrome prompts for my password file password just for opening up the browser because I have the password file password different from my login password.

  23. Reminds me of this conversation.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    New Dev Team: "The password for automatically accessing the remote server is in plain text!!! We need to encrypt it to make things more secure!!!!"
    Old Dev Team: "But it is only root readable. And where will the keys for this encrypted password be stored?"
    New Dev Team: "We'll put them somewhere only root can get to."
    Old Dev Team: "How does an extra layer of work for us make things more secure?"
    New Dev Team: "It's encrypted!"
    Old Dev Team: "You suck."

  24. Similar argument about Maemo's messaging by GameboyRMH · · Score: 1

    Maemo's messaging app stores passwords in a plaintext file, some users found it and wanted it obfuscated to at least make them non-trivial to retrieve. The Maemo devs argued that obfuscation would be better at lulling users into a false sense of security about what is stored than thwarting those who want to access it maliciously.

    --
    "When information is power, privacy is freedom" - Jah-Wren Ryel
  25. It's only for blogs by GWBasic · · Score: 1
    And this is why storing passwords should only be used for things like blogs. It shouldn't be used for things like banking.

    Start locking your computer when you walk away from it.

  26. Re:..okay? And? by pruss · · Score: 2

    It would be less trivial if one had something like the Android model where each application (with some exceptions) stores (some of) its data as a separate user, and without root privileges, one can't access the data for the application except by the methods provided by the application.

  27. Re:People actually do that? by lister+king+of+smeg · · Score: 1

    yeah i use it for sites i don't care about loosing the password to like my account needed to comment on popular science or gawker sites don't really care if they are compromised. slashdots password is not saved and neither is my email accounts' password. a large problem is that every site under the sun wants you to register a account just to make one comment so peoples mind become inundated trying to remember dozens of passwords they rarely ever use.

    --
    ---Saying gnome 3 is better than windows 8 not so much a compliment as it is damning with light praise.
  28. Google's rationalizatoin is ridiculous by JoeyRox · · Score: 1

    Google's rationalization that the system is already insecure if someone else has physical access to it is absurd. That's like saying it's ok for a bank to leave everyone's money on the counter overnight because if someone breaks in then that same person can easily break into the vault, which is obviously not the case. Computer systems should have multiple levels of protection as well.

    1. Re:Google's rationalizatoin is ridiculous by osu-neko · · Score: 1

      Google's rationalization that the system is already insecure if someone else has physical access to it is absurd. That's like saying it's ok for a bank to leave everyone's money on the counter overnight because if someone breaks in then that same person can easily break into the vault, which is obviously not the case. Computer systems should have multiple levels of protection as well.

      Poor analogy. Although breaking into a vault isn't impossible, it does add significant difficulty to obtaining the money, even after breaking into the bank. Indeed, breaking into the bank is the easy part compared to breaking into the vault.

      In your analogy, you're adding a significant barrier (breaking into the vault) on top of a much less significant one (breaking into the building). In the case of my browser passwords, someone who's gotten physical access to my computer while I'm logged into it has already scaled a much bigger barrier than hiding the "show passwords" button presents. It's taking the money already in the vault and saying putting it in a child-proof plastic bin is making the money safer than simply keeping it in the vault. Possibly technically true, but really not worth the hassle at that point. The attacker that's in the vault is going to get the money if they want it, the plastic bin isn't actually helping...

      --
      "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
    2. Re:Google's rationalizatoin is ridiculous by Russ1642 · · Score: 1

      You leave your workstation unlocked for 1 minute while you take a piss and I walk over, write down your bank password, and leave. I don't have to sit down, log into your bank account or whatever, figure out how to do what I want, etc. No, I can go home and do it at my leisure. Is this concept so hard to fucking understand?

    3. Re:Google's rationalizatoin is ridiculous by Clsid · · Score: 1

      The problem with your example is that you are thinking of one particular scenario. A workstation that can be locked. How many computers you have seen where people just have the machine login automatically? Also Chrome is used a lot, not only in work machines but also at home or places with not so saavy computer users. Now if somebody steals that equipment, or if they boot your computer with any Linux CD with chntpw you are going to be pretty screwed. As you say, I fail to see why "this concept so hard to fucking understand?"

    4. Re:Google's rationalizatoin is ridiculous by Agent0013 · · Score: 1

      What about an attacker that has access to the vault, but cannot walk out with the money because the person they are with will notice. But if they get one second to take a picture of the money, they can use that picture later to teleport the money out without anyone knowing. Having the plastic bin will stop a camera from getting a picture then, huh!?

      --

      -- ssoorrrryy,, dduupplleexx sswwiittcchh oonn.. -Quote found on actual fortune cookie.
    5. Re:Google's rationalizatoin is ridiculous by Russ1642 · · Score: 1

      The concept is that you should need a Linux boot CD. You should need to do some work. It should take more way more than ten seconds.

  29. Next "Insane Password Security" issue here: by Wrath0fb0b · · Score: 1

    ... will be that the user can tamper with the SSL root certificates (or just add her own) and trick Chrome into giving up the password to a locally-hosted web server presenting an apparently-valid cert for the target domain.

    In order to remedy this, Chrome must adopt the policy of asking the server to pinky-swear that they are really the named entity.

  30. Re:..okay? And? by The+MAZZTer · · Score: 1

    Actually, the passwords ARE encrypted with another master password, so you already have your best-security scenario. You just never have to enter it (at least on Windows) because Windows uses your session logon information to decrypt the passwords. Not logged on? Your passwords are secured. Yay!

  31. Re:..okay? And? by Dynedain · · Score: 1

    And where do you keep the private key? Inside the distributed Chrome binary? That's locally accessible.

    --
    I'm out of my mind right now, but feel free to leave a message.....
  32. Just use LastPass by Virtucon · · Score: 1

    Done.

    --
    Harrison's Postulate - "For every action there is an equal and opposite criticism"
  33. Re:..okay? And? by cmat · · Score: 2

    There are things like private/public key encryption you know.

    Apparently you need to think about this a bit more. How exactly is Chrome supposed to decrypt a password without storing the secret that allow it to do so on the same machine/account? Even if the password is encrypted with an asymmetric key, the corresponding key must be stored where Chrome can access it to de-crypt the password(s).

    --
    -- Humans, because the hardware IS the software.
  34. Re:People actually do that? by icebike · · Score: 1

    And your super secure scheme is WHAT?

    list of passwords under the lamp?
    Single common password
    Single common password with a site specific appendage?
    Log into every site via the oh-so-secure Facebook authentication proxy?

    Log into only Slashdot and always post as AC?

    --
    Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
  35. Re:Seems like an easy fix by fullmetal55 · · Score: 1

    Easier fix.. don't click the "Save my password" button... yeah it's hard to remember them all, but you know what, saving your password anywhere is a major security problem. This is no different than having your password on a post-it note stuck under the keyboard...

    and in a shared computer situation... you're just asking for trouble saving your password...

    It's a lazy solution to a problem that nobody has really come up with a good fix for, remembering passwords to various sites. heck for infrequently used sites, I tend to just click "I forgot my password" and get a new one emailed to me. for more frequently used sites, I have a mental package of 10 passwords that it could be. I know them all by heart, and I cycle through them. usually i'll remember which one is for which site.

  36. A helpful crutch by AliasMarlowe · · Score: 2, Interesting

    But what about typing hundreds of passwords?
    Once you have more than a few, you resort to a crutch of some sort.

    Here's a crutch. Just paste it to something like safepassword.sh in /usr/local/bin or similar:

    #!/bin/bash
    # script: safepassword
    # this script depends on sha512sum
    if [ "$2" = "" ]
    then
    echo "usage: safepassword constant_key password_purpose"
    echo " where constant_key is a string of printable non-whitespace characters,"
    echo " and password_purpose is a memorable string related to the purpose of"
    echo " the password, e.g. a website address. Since the script removes any"
    echo " characters outside 0-9 a-z A-Z it is possible that the password will"
    echo " be too short in some cases."
    else
    echo -n "%1-%2" | sha512sum | xxd -r -p | tr -cd [:print:] | sed -e "s/[^0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ]//g" | sed -e "s/ //g"
    echo
    fi

    The script is indented, but stupid slashcode ignores   characters.

    --
    Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. - Voltaire
    1. Re:A helpful crutch by jrumney · · Score: 1

      I'm having trouble figuring out what purpose this is supposed to serve. What is the point of locally storing SHA512 hashes of your passwords for remote systems?

    2. Re:A helpful crutch by lgw · · Score: 3, Interesting

      The script is indented, but stupid slashcode ignores characters

      While stupid slashcode ignores pretty much any 21st century concept, it does support an <ecode> tag, which turns each pair of leading spaces into a level of indention. Bizarre, but workable.

      thing
        thing indented
          thing indented more
        another thing
      done indenting

      It also supports the <tt> tag, which turns each single leading space into a level of indention. Less bizarre, more workable.

      thing
        thing indented
          thing indented more
        another thing
      done indenting

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    3. Re:A helpful crutch by key134 · · Score: 2

      I'm having trouble figuring out what purpose this is supposed to serve. What is the point of locally storing SHA512 hashes of your passwords for remote systems?

      It looks like a more complex much more secure version of:

      Main password:
      pass123
      Google password:
      googlepass123
      eBay password:
      ebaypass123

      So this generates a unique password for each site that you use based on a memorable set of information.

    4. Re:A helpful crutch by suutar · · Score: 1

      looks like a password generation system. Uses a constant (that hopefully only you know) and a variable (where it's being used) to generate a unique string; then you can use that unique string as your password. In theory, this means that it's easier to remember what you have to remember and instead of recording your passwords you can just re-generate them as needed.

    5. Re:A helpful crutch by fizzup · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Don't do this. It basically puts your passwords (their building blocks, really) in clear text in your command history. It's not any greater security than Chrome has when someone has physical access, and it is significantly less convenient.

    6. Re:A helpful crutch by AliasMarlowe · · Score: 1

      Exactly. For example, using secret phrase = Lumberjack
      Password for www.google.com = sgvxVFFXbMPJNGAeOtKn7L
      Password for www.ebay.com = sFnDZyrK0Ah4ma
      Password for www.amazon.com = JNo9bhQa54DgPqHrR
      No need to remember anything much, other than the single common phrase. I don't even bother trying to remember passwords, and certainly don't allow any browser to store them: copy-paste does it all. An advantage of using a script such as this is that the password for any site can be regenerated on any PC, even if it's not one you normally use, just by knowing the single secret phrase (the script exists on all of our home PCs). The truly paranoid may wish to delete their bash history intermittently, or before logging out, of course.

      --
      Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. - Voltaire
    7. Re:A helpful crutch by Curate · · Score: 1

      How do you turn single leading spaces into single spaces?

    8. Re:A helpful crutch by Culture20 · · Score: 1

      s/%1-%2/$1-$2/

    9. Re:A helpful crutch by LordLimecat · · Score: 5, Insightful

      This thread is a goldmine of security theatre. Any hiring personnel could probably also use this to weed out folks who dont actually understand security.

    10. Re:A helpful crutch by Mike+Van+Pelt · · Score: 2

      This works -- until one of the sites you log in to says "You must change your password, and you can not use your old one." Sure, you can add a new 'something' to the "purpose"... but then you have to remembere that, too, and we're back to the "remembering a bunch of strong passwords" problem.

    11. Re:A helpful crutch by Yakasha · · Score: 1

      Don't do this. It basically puts your passwords (their building blocks, really) in clear text in your command history. It's not any greater security than Chrome has when someone has physical access, and it is significantly less convenient.

      1. Modify safepassword.sh to grab a local salt from the individual user's directory.
      2. echo "export HISTIGNORE=\"safepassword.sh*\"" >> ~/.profile

    12. Re:A helpful crutch by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      Command history vanishes as soon as you kill the command window. If you have physical security for your computer then it's pretty safe. If you're in a college dorm though or in a shared lab then don't trust it. And you don't have to keep it all in that script, you still have to type in something that won't appear in command history in order for it to be converted to a password.

    13. Re:A helpful crutch by jones_supa · · Score: 2

      The script is actually quite cool, but it still has the vulnerability that if someone happens to capture the single secret phrase and figures the method you use to generate the scrambled ones, at that point he too can discover all your passwords for any web site.

    14. Re:A helpful crutch by Culture20 · · Score: 1

      If you're using bash, open a new shell and start it out with unset HISTFILE

    15. Re:A helpful crutch by hotrodent · · Score: 1

      Not saying this validates the use of the script but you can hide commands from your history very easily: http://www.thegeekylinux.com/2011/04/how-to-hide-command-from-commandline.html.

    16. Re:A helpful crutch by Outtascope · · Score: 1

      The script is actually quite cool, but it still has the vulnerability that if someone happens to capture the single secret phrase and figures the method you use to generate the scrambled ones, at that point he too can discover all your passwords for any web site.

      Pfffft! You are just being paranoid. I mean what, do you think he is going to post the code somewhere public or som... er, nevermind.

    17. Re:A helpful crutch by Outtascope · · Score: 1

      That is SOOO freaking irritating. I have a password generation program I wrote to create (relatively) easy to memorize passwords that are cryptographically secure. And then find out the site won't handle * or something. Honestly, if it won't take * in a password, i am TERRIFIED of the level of SQL injection vulnerabilities that they are CERTAIN to have, and become quite convinced that the devs of the site don't know what a salted hash is, much less do they use it to store your password.

      My favorite was Oracle though (pre-version 10). Passwords were quietly forced to upper case, only the first 8 characters were actually considered, and your password couldn't start with a number because Oracle uses it as an identifier. But hey, it costs $100K so you have to accept their "sophistication". [:rolleyes:]

  37. All Browser do this by wisnoskij · · Score: 1

    first off the main first issue is obviously a problem with Safari.
    But in general, that is how all browsers do it. how is this news?

    --
    Troll is not a replacement for I disagree.
    1. Re:All Browser do this by Clsid · · Score: 1

      Not all browsers do it like this. Firefox has an option to set a master password.

  38. Interestingly... by Balinares · · Score: 1

    ... Chrome is able to use the KDE password wallet if present, which is protected under a master password. (I assume it can use the GNOME equivalent too). If so, Chrome won't save anything itself, so on that count at least, you're safe.

    That said, I would recommend using a service like LastPass anyway, so the problem is taken entirely out of the hands of the browsers.

    --

    -- B.
    This sig does in fact not have the property it claims not to have.
  39. Earth to browser vendors by WaffleMonster · · Score: 1

    Yea I get the basic argument browser needs to be able to decrypt passwords somehow when needed this means either a password encrypting password thing or punting responsibility down the stack.

    In many operating systems there are secure ways of doing precisely this. Use underlying operating systems keychain where available such as windows credential store (Sorry XP users). The credential store is at least protected by the users security context and syskey if non-default setting is used. On shared computers this will at the very least keep a users password stash safe from other users. It can also keep the users password stash safe in the event their computer is stolen.

    It is easy to make argument in the real world doing x may practically offer little benefit but it is easy to be lazy. There is no harm in over delivering and under promising. Tell the user their stored passwords are insecure AND at least try to do the right thing anyway.

    1. Re:Earth to browser vendors by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 1

      The problem is that the malware has access to the decrypted password when the browser fills in the password field. I can encrypt the underlying password store using a totally unbreakable ever algorithm with a 1-gigabit key stored in a physically-secure completely-untamperable-with hardware device, and the malware can completely ignore all that and snarf the cleartext password when the browser fills in the form field. So how does all that security offer any benefit?

      It's like bragging about the bullet-proof unbreakable windows you put in the reinforced window frames with the vibration-detecting alarm system to alert you if anybody tries even touching the windows, while leaving the front door unlocked and open. Sure you've made it so the thief can't get in the window. None of that does you any good when the thief's just going to walk through the front door, bypassing the windows completely. You get far more benefit by skipping all the window-dressing and, you know, closing and locking your front door using the basic lock it came with.

    2. Re:Earth to browser vendors by jrumney · · Score: 1

      Use underlying operating systems keychain where available

      This is exactly what Chrome (and Safari and IE) are doing already (Firefox does its own thing, which is why it needs a master password to be at all secure). The complaint is not that the passwords are available in plaintext on the disk, it is that when the user walks away and leaves their computer unlocked, someone else can come and view their passwords.

  40. Re:..okay? And? by pixelpusher220 · · Score: 1

    Sheesh. Auto-fill is NOT showing you the passwords. Granted with a little work, you could probably capture it as it is moved from browser store to web page password field but that's a serious level of escalation compared with Chrome just saying "here's the unencrypted passwords for all stored passwords". Firefox has the ability to lock down the display of unencrypted passwords with a master password. Chrome doesn't apparently.

    Very very different things.

    --
    People in cars cause accidents....accidents in cars cause people :-D
  41. No, Firefox is much more secure by frovingslosh · · Score: 1

    can peek all the passwords in clear text very easily with a couple of mouse clicks

    it takes at least 3 clicks with Firefox.

    --
    I'm an American. I love this country and the freedoms that we used to have.
  42. Re:..okay? And? by osu-neko · · Score: 2

    There are things like private/public key encryption you know.

    Yes, and if you understood how public key encryption works, you'd realize its existence is not relevant to the discussion at hand. It has no useful function here. (Note: your "master password" is not a private key of this sort -- no hand entered password ever could be... unless you're Lt. Cmdr. Data.)

    --
    "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
  43. Disappointed by Wormsign · · Score: 1

    I am disappointed to see that this non-story has made the front page of Slashdot. I don't want to echo all the comments made here already, but I completely agree that: It has always been this way in Chrome Firefox does it too (with the option of Master Password to "protect" it) Firefox's protection is Security Theater The author comes across as fairly clueless The real place to secure this is at the user login, since it involves physical access. There are a million other nasty things someone can do if they are sitting in front of my PC unlocked. So I will parrot: why is this news?

    1. Re:Disappointed by Wormsign · · Score: 1

      Ugh, forgot I was set for HTML posting mode and didn't use break tags. That was supposed to be a list. *sigh*

    2. Re:Disappointed by sideslash · · Score: 1

      You also forgot to be correct. If Google never displayed passwords in plaintext, they could prevent 99% of users from reading them, because only a small percentage of people would be likely to use hacking tools to extract saved passwords. But anybody can click with the mouse. It's true that if they're at my computer they can browse the web and pretend to be me. But actually knowing my password raises that to a new level, because they can log in elsewhere and spy on me, etc. So is Google saying that I should never let anybody else sit down at my computer and use it, for fear that they can casually look up my passwords? Really?

      It's been said that door locks keep honest people out. A savvy crook can bypass them easily, but they work for 99% of people. The same could be said for always showing the little asterisks for saved passwords. It's just stupid of Google (and FF etc.) to make them so easy to view.

    3. Re:Disappointed by Russ1642 · · Score: 1

      If you use Chrome at work, like I do, then this is a real problem. Even some noob can read your passwords if you so much as forget to lock your workstation and are away for 30 seconds. It doesn't need to be so damn easy.

    4. Re:Disappointed by Wormsign · · Score: 1

      Well, as a sys admin, I use this feature of Chrome (and FF before it) all the time, because the browser doesn't always recognize password fields on many sites and thus won't auto fill it for me. Most of my passwords are in KeePass but this is much easier to get at, so I let it still exist. I consider it a feature and, as has been pointed out, most options to lock users out of seeing this are security theater anyway. The browser HAS to be able to use this password if you want it to autofill, so they might as well let US, the users, see them as well. When I worked at an office with others, I never left my PC unlocked. Some users took the extra step of not storing passwords in the browser. If you don't like it, don't use it. I don't want it to change.

    5. Re:Disappointed by Wormsign · · Score: 1

      I'd be onboard with them adding an optional Master Password like FF uses to get into this. I wouldn't use it, but I get it. Also, forgetting to lock your workstation can leads to lots worse than this.

    6. Re:Disappointed by sideslash · · Score: 1

      The browser HAS to be able to use this password if you want it to autofill, so they might as well let US, the users, see them as well.

      The convenience of autofill and having the ability to have your browser tell you the password are two separate concerns, and I don't see your logic here. For most users, locking 99% of casual guests out of viewing their passwords in plaintext is both desirable, and a common assumption about how this works. Hence the fact that this is news to a lot of people.

    7. Re:Disappointed by Wormsign · · Score: 1

      Maybe that's the problem. You call them concerns, I call them features. I guess put me in the group who is surprised that most people didn't know this about Chrome already. People who have concerns about this information being readily available to guests on their PC don't have to use it. Or they can use a guest account. Or a guest Chrome user. There are lots of options available. No one is forcing you to use Chrome. I like it the way it is, but if they want to add an option where you can set a Master Password, that would be ok with me.

  44. Similar to the "shocking" ssh vulnerability. by 140Mandak262Jamuna · · Score: 1

    Any one who can log in to your unix/linux account, (or any one who can read your ~/.ssh folder, if you are dumb enough to leave it group/world readable) can steal your ssh keys and pretend to be you and log in to all machines in the known hosts file.

    --
    sed -e 's/Chuck Norris/Rajnikant/g' joke > fact
    1. Re:Similar to the "shocking" ssh vulnerability. by psmears · · Score: 1

      Any one who can log in to your unix/linux account, (or any one who can read your ~/.ssh folder, if you are dumb enough to leave it group/world readable) can steal your ssh keys and pretend to be you and log in to all machines in the known hosts file.

      Ummm... no, because my private keys are encrypted with passphrases.

  45. Google's right on this one by davide+marney · · Score: 1

    If the attacker has physical access to my machine in a logged-in state, tell me how any kind of master password or encryption scheme is going to keep him out of my data, including anything on my local hard drive, or any web-hosted services that have a cached credential? The barn door's already opened, fellas.

    Besides which, any "solution" such as storing passwords offsite, encrypting, etc. will also require the user to take definitive action to open and close the password repo. The problem is our user can't/won't be bothered with taking action to secure his access, so that solution is no solution.

    Google's right on this one.

    --
    "We receive as friendly that which agrees with, we resist with dislike that which opposes us" - Faraday
    1. Re:Google's right on this one by Russ1642 · · Score: 1

      You don't need to be an ATTACKER to do this. Hell, my Mom could figure this one out and read someone's passwords in seconds.

    2. Re:Google's right on this one by cryptoluddite · · Score: 1

      If your machine is ChromeOS then it has a secure bootloader and doesn't have any way to access the actual unix system except through Chrome, so there is no official way to access the passwords directly. But Chrome simply hands your passwords over and anybody using the computer unsupervised for 10 seconds can see all your passwords and take a photo of them to use later on. Just going to the bathroom while somebody is using your computer and all your saved passwords are compromised. A user would have to root ChromeOS in order to do this without Chrome's help, which is an extremely high bar.

      The only difference between ChromeOS and desktop Chrome is that the bar to stealing protected passwords is lower than rooting the OS -- but the bar still exists and it is higher than most people can reach, so it is still mostly effective at protecting the passwords.

      If Google feels that a master password is annoying and useless because people won't use it then the proper solution is to *never show the saved password*. Except then if some site changed their forms a lot then you couldn't log in unless you remembered the password, but so what? Use the site's password recovery mechanism.

      The simple fact of the matter is that Google purposely made an insecure system to make the browser more convenient, and allows no option for people that want to choose security over convenience. This is Google's vision of the future internet: whatever they decide is your only option. That's the real reason why this teapot has a tempest in it... if Google gets what it wants and the only browser is Chrome, on ChromeOS, what then? Sure Chrome has poor security for the passwords, but the real problem here is Google's explanation which is "we decided to do it this way, and that's final".

    3. Re:Google's right on this one by cbhacking · · Score: 1

      It's going to keep "them" (the typical class of attacker for a home PC, who is barely computer literate and has no idea how to find the tools that are needed to extract passwords out of a running system quickly) from retrieving your passwords in a few seconds. Sure, they could still do it... by Googling for a program to find the passwords, going to that site and downloading it, running it and following the steps... and that's assuming they know to look for such a program in the first place, and that the user's antivirus doesn't block it, and so on. It's also a barrier to entry; by making a dangerous activity more inconvenient, fewer people will do it.

      You aren't trying to keep the NSA and FBI out, here. You aren't even trying to keep somebody like the typical Slashdot reader out, here. You're trying to keep out your nosy girlfriend who notices you left your computer unlocked while you stepped out for a piss.

      For a car analogy, just because anybody who spends the time and effort to figure out how can trivially gain entrance to any car (ever gotten your keys locked in the car and called AAA?) doesn't mean you shouldn't lock the doors anyhow. It doesn't stand a chance against a determined attacker, but it will slow almost anybody down a bit, require them to do something that looks more suspicious, and will make the effort not worthwhile to the casual would-be attacker.

      --
      There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
  46. I should be able to log in and out of Chrome by itamblyn · · Score: 1

    Currently I am able to log in and out of gmail on a friend's laptop without any (reasonable) fear that my email will keep living on that machine (and is unencrypted). Obviously keyloggers etc could grab my password, but let's assume I'm not _that_ paranoid.

    I do not have this option with the Chrome browser itself. At best, I can log into Chrome (and am encouraged to do so at first startup) and at the end of the session, I can delete the profile (rm -rf .config/google-chrome). This certainly deals with the problem, but is pretty clunky. The should be a login / logout feature to the browser, not just my email.

    Compare this to Chrome OS. Here the functionality is built in; you don't have to delete your user account at the end of every session. Encrypted files are stored on the local drive which you can then access the next time you log in. It's quick and painless. This needs to be built into the standard Chrome browser.

  47. Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by 7bit · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Firefox has the option to protect saved passwords with a master passwords and if you already unlocked the password store, in order to read password from the GUI, you need to unlock it again

    Exactly. Mozilla's email client Thunderbird also uses a Master Password to unlock the view-ability of the stored passwords.

    For those who insist on saying that chrome's security method is good enough consider this: How many people use separate log-in's for the "Family" computer that stays on most of the time? Not very many I'd imagine, just too much trouble for most to deal with. This means that both other family members as well as house guests can casually access all those passwords in no time.

    Even if you do use different log-ins consider this type of common scenario: Your son or daughter has a "friend" over and they are cruising the web on her account doing whatever. Say that they are reading some news item or article together when the daughter gets up to go the bathroom. Do you think for one second that she is going to lock the computer and force her friend to wait to finish what she is doing? No. Her "friend" will then be able to casually and quickly access all those passwords and type them into her iphone for safe keeping before your daughter gets back. She now pwns your daughters facebook account, bank account, cellphone account and who knows what else.

    How can anyone with a straight face say that is an acceptable security method? The fact that my open source email client has an easily useable default master password system proves that it is something that chrome could easily implement as well, hell, just copy the open-source code from thunderbird if you need to...

    To be quite frank; when I think of Google or Microsoft "my security" is not something I honestly expect from them, and this newest revelation just further confirms that perception.

    1. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by icebike · · Score: 2, Informative

      How many people use separate log-in's for the "Family" computer that stays on most of the time? Not very many I'd imagine,

      More than you imagine, because teenagers insist upon it.

      And in reality, its by far the easiest thing to set up, and the easiest thing to do.

      Just select the Switch User button, and you are out of your account, ready for the next person to use it,
      and its as secure as your computer's OS is (which might not be all that secure, but that's another issue).

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    2. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Best option: don't let your browser remember your passwords.

      1) You might need to sign in from a different browser someday, and if you don't know your password, you are stuck.

      2) Having all your passwords in one place means someone need only hack that one place to get access to everything.

      3) Encrypted or not, if the passwords are on the disk then they can be stolen.

      Putting some effort into a personal, comprehensive password-management strategy is very worthwhile. You think you have more important things to do? These passwords are the keys to your entire life. Think again.

    3. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Generally if you have access to the logged in session, it would be absolutely trivial to drop a userland agent which captures keystrokes, or waits until the browser's keystore is unlocked and then grabs credentials then. I think I recall seeing tips on how to snag someone elses keystore in that manner for firefox as early as the 1.0 days.

      It would be great if chrome had some sort of master key, but A) 99% of users would not do it, and B) I do not think it is wrong to rely on the OS's security mechanisms, and to assume that "unlocked user session = access to all user data". I will be honest, I would not use chrome's master-key doohicky either, because when I want that functionality I use lastpass.

      It is way overblown to call this "insane" when the vast vast majority of users dont use the password locking feature of the one browser that supports it.

    4. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by 7bit · · Score: 2

      Best option: don't let your browser remember your passwords.

      1) You might need to sign in from a different browser someday, and if you don't know your password, you are stuck.

      2) Having all your passwords in one place means someone need only hack that one place to get access to everything.

      3) Encrypted or not, if the passwords are on the disk then they can be stolen.

      Putting some effort into a personal, comprehensive password-management strategy is very worthwhile. You think you have more important things to do? These passwords are the keys to your entire life. Think again.

      In general I agree, I disable the auto-password feature in my browser but many many people do use the browser password memory system. One way or another, if chrome is going to offer the feature they should at least allow the option for the use of a master password instead of categorically refusing to for some unknowable reason.

      It's very easy to implement and open source code is readily available for them to copy or learn from at their leisure. I just can't see any rational excuse for them to maintain this stance.

    5. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      1) You might need to sign in from a different browser someday, and if you don't know your password, you are stuck.

      That argument is not even remotely valid.

      If you don't let the browser remember passwords, then you have to keep track of your passwords in some other manner. This is a given. If you use a different browser, then you also have to use a different manner to keep track of your passwords. Again, this is a given.

      But putting those things together is NOT a valid argument against letting the browser remember your passwords. Logically (if we ignore your other points), you would gain far more efficiency and convenience by letting your browser remember the passwords AND keeping track of your passwords in another manner.

      Your other arguments may be valid, but (1) is not.

    6. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by LordLimecat · · Score: 2, Informative

      Chrome's security tech lead gives a pretty good answer here:

      Consider the case of someone malicious getting access to your account. Said bad guy can dump all your session cookies, grab your history, install malicious extension to intercept all your browsing activity, or install OS user account level monitoring software. My point is that once the bad guy got access to your account the game was lost, because there are just too many vectors for him to get what he wants.

      People worried about the security of this are worried over the wrong things. Firefox's master password would do absolutely nothing to stop a dropped-in extension from monitoring webpages for when passwords are filled, grabbing the filled form-data, and storing it in the extensions own preferences; and that wouldnt even take a background process, admin privileges, or really anything more than the ability to drop a file in the firefox profile.

      I would be willing to place a large bet that in any scenario that would allow me to recover Chrome or Safari passwords, I would also be able to recover firefox passwords that are locked with a master password, within a reasonable amount of time. As has been said many many times, anything that tries to protect against a malicious user with access to your user session is pure security theatre.

    7. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by pthisis · · Score: 3, Informative

      Exactly. Mozilla's email client Thunderbird also uses a Master Password to unlock the view-ability of the stored passwords.

      Chrome uses the same core OS key storage that Firefox/Thunderbird does, and encrypts with the same master password--if I save a password in Firefox, it's available in Chrome and vice-versa. Both use kwallet on KDE, gnome-keyring on Gnome platforms, keychain access on the Mac, etc.

      You can lock access to view them however the OS does so (e.g. with gnome, either Applications->Settings->Passwords and Keys, and select "Lock passwords", or from the command line, and gnome automatically locks them when your screensaver locks; on KDE it's the "Wallet Manager", I forget which menu it's under; on the Mac it's Utilities->Keychain Access, and click the little lock at the top of the keychain to lock/unlock). All 3 of those systems default to using your login password and automatically unlocking the keychain when you log in, but you can set the password separately (and be prompted to unlock it when you go to use it) if you want.

      The problem here is that Windows' password management doesn't offer a reasonable alternative, but that's not Chrome's fault.

      For those who insist on saying that chrome's security method is good enough consider this: How many people use separate log-in's for the "Family" computer that stays on most of the time? Not very many I'd imagine, just too much trouble for most to deal with. This means that both other family members as well as house guests can casually access all those passwords in no time.

      a) Lock your passwords when you turn over the computer

      b) You don't actually need to log in and out all the time to use separate accounts on the communal machine. Mine is usually sitting there logged into a guest account that everyone can use, with a browser running as the guest. I'll also use if I'm just looking something up on IMDB or googling/wiki'ing a quick question or whatever. There's a button on the menubar to "Run browser as..." with options for me and each of my family members, which prompts for the user's password and then runs a browser as them--if I need to check email or pay a bill or something, that browser's got my info but it's not available from the guest account/browser.. That covers the vast majority of cases, you just need to remember to close your browser when you're done with it.

      For more complicated stuff, I pop over to VT8, log in, do what I need to do, and pop back. If I'm in the middle of something and someone needs to use the machine briefly, I can lock my terminal and switch back to the guest terminal for a few minutes, then switch back and unlock my screen without really disrupting anything.

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    8. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by killerzax · · Score: 2

      Chrome let's you password protect your passwords as well, at least in Linux with KDE. When I go into Chrome, it opens up the KDE Wallet to store the passwords, which makes me type in the password for it. After this, you can view the passwords plain text. You can also specify the wallet behavior, including making it so that every time anyone tries to access it you need to type in your password. Sounds like normal security functionality to me.

    9. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by 7bit · · Score: 1

      Chrome's security tech lead gives a pretty good answer here:

      Consider the case of someone malicious getting access to your account. Said bad guy can dump all your session cookies, grab your history, install malicious extension to intercept all your browsing activity, or install OS user account level monitoring software. My point is that once the bad guy got access to your account the game was lost, because there are just too many vectors for him to get what he wants.

      People worried about the security of this are worried over the wrong things. Firefox's master password would do absolutely nothing to stop a dropped-in extension from monitoring webpages for when passwords are filled, grabbing the filled form-data, and storing it in the extensions own preferences; and that wouldnt even take a background process, admin privileges, or really anything more than the ability to drop a file in the firefox profile.

      I would be willing to place a large bet that in any scenario that would allow me to recover Chrome or Safari passwords, I would also be able to recover firefox passwords that are locked with a master password, within a reasonable amount of time. As has been said many many times, anything that tries to protect against a malicious user with access to your user session is pure security theatre.

      You are both missing the point entirely. The issue is to have the default security bar set high enough to at least stop casual information theft. Your definition of a "Malicious person" only accounts for an incredibly tiny percentage of people with such skill sets and doesn't even consider the majority of people. As it is now chrome is practically begging average people to steal that info if even the slightest opportunity arises.

      Most kids or people in general likely don't know enough or aren't motivated enough to bother setting up some kind of exploit on a usb stick or website to do the kind of things you are talking about. However; if you make it as incredibly easy as chrome does to grab that info without having even necessarily pre-planned to do it then those same people will be highly tempted to do it, and enough will.

      It's the same principle as locking your home or your car. Sure, someone could pick the lock or break it, does that mean you give up and don't bother locking it and just count on the "security" offered by the police force? Does that make locking your door "Security Theater"? No, because for the most part the lock is more than enough of a barrier to block "casual" entry and most people won't pick it or break it. However; leave your car & home unlocked all the time when you are gone with a sign on them saying they are unlocked (equivalent of using chrome while logged in but stepped away for even a short time) and eventually some otherwise "honest" citizen or lazy crook will not be able to resist the temptation. The percentage of illegal activity will shoot way up. There is a solid case for locking your door, as well as keeping password lists locked under a separate Master password.

      Again; Why not just allow a separate Master password like Thunderbird does? It's clearly not difficult to implement or use.

    10. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by 7bit · · Score: 1

      Chrome uses the same core OS key storage that Firefox/Thunderbird does, and encrypts with the same master password--if I save a password in Firefox, it's available in Chrome and vice-versa. Both use kwallet on KDE, gnome-keyring on Gnome platforms, keychain access on the Mac, etc.

      You can lock access to view them however the OS does so (e.g. with gnome, either Applications->Settings->Passwords and Keys, and select "Lock passwords", or from the command line, and gnome automatically locks them when your screensaver locks; on KDE it's the "Wallet Manager", I forget which menu it's under; on the Mac it's Utilities->Keychain Access, and click the little lock at the top of the keychain to lock/unlock). All 3 of those systems default to using your login password and automatically unlocking the keychain when you log in, but you can set the password separately (and be prompted to unlock it when you go to use it) if you want.

      The problem here is that Windows' password management doesn't offer a reasonable alternative, but that's not Chrome's fault.

      If chrome uses the same code for password storage as Thunderbird does then they have even less of an excuse for not allowing a separate Master password like Thunderbird does by default. That then does in fact become chrome's fault. It makes the chrome dev's obtuse iron-clad stance look even more nefarious and deliberate than before...

      Thunderbird's master password system has nothing to do with the OS so I'm not really sure what you are talking about. I have to type my separate master password into Thunderbird in order to access those passwords in plaintext, regardless of how I'm otherwise logged in. Perhaps you've never actually used it?

    11. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by 7bit · · Score: 1

      Chrome let's you password protect your passwords as well, at least in Linux with KDE. When I go into Chrome, it opens up the KDE Wallet to store the passwords, which makes me type in the password for it. After this, you can view the passwords plain text. You can also specify the wallet behavior, including making it so that every time anyone tries to access it you need to type in your password. Sounds like normal security functionality to me.

      Sounds like it is depending on external software to do that, software that isn't on all platforms. As nice as it is to have the option of using that external software when using that particular OS, it would be even nicer if it also directly supported such a feature like Thunderbird does. When using Thunderbird in Windows it offers that same functionality by default within itself without requiring some possibly-not-present external software. Why can't chrome do that too? Especially if, as another poster says, it is using the same core code for password storage as Thunderbird already?

    12. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by bondsbw · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Said bad guy can dump all your session cookies, grab your history, install malicious extension to intercept all your browsing activity, or install OS user account level monitoring software

      This assumes bad guy has access to an account with root/admin access. How about OS accounts that are locked down, for the exact reason of preventing these types of exploits? Obviously Chrome can run on a limited account.

      It is irresponsible to rely on the underlying OS security (or insecurity) as a crutch. So what if someone has physical access? Just because they can type on a keyboard or insert a USB drive, doesn't mean they can run an exploit. What will they do, install a rootkit? What if they can't reboot the computer? What if they can't get past BIOS and full disk encryption?

      Seriously... I'm getting mad just at the thought that the head of any computer security team can think in this way.

      --
      All my liberal friends think I'm a conservative, all my conservative friends think I'm a liberal.
    13. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by 7bit · · Score: 1

      For those who insist on saying that chrome's security method is good enough consider this: How many people use separate log-in's for the "Family" computer that stays on most of the time? Not very many I'd imagine, just too much trouble for most to deal with.

      And that's exactly why Chrome didn't add this feature. Nobody wants to log out and log in again just to get into Facebook to check their status, which is exactly what you have to do if you want the browser to remember your facebook password, but don't have the Firefox password for the main Windows/Mac/Unix profile.

      Seriously? Seriously? That's why they don't "allow" the "option" of a separate master password like Thunderbird has? Really?

      If someone is going to be super-unsecure in how they do things, then fine, that's them. But to then mandate that as the standard and not even "allow" better security practices? I'm scratching my head really hard trying to understand this point of view of "crappy-security = best-security" newspeak that some people including the chrome dev keep trying to defend...

    14. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by LordLimecat · · Score: 2

      A limited account can still install extensions, userland rootkits (which do exist), background startup programs (which would have full access to the user's running program memory and files), and so on.

      Seriously... I'm getting mad just at the thought that the head of any computer security team can think in this way.

      Thats because like so many others you do not have a clear conception of what the actual threats are and the proper way of mitigating them.

      This is really very simple: If the attacker has access to your session, you have lost. If an attacker has access to your machine and you have not used disk encryption, you have lost. If you dont understand why those two are true, you will not understand Google's response here, but if you were willing to place money on the line I could easily write you a service in AutoIt or Powershell which scrapes all of your "secured" firefox passwords and mails them to me with nothing more required than the ability to drop a file somewhere in your user profile.

    15. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by pthisis · · Score: 1

      If chrome uses the same code for password storage as Thunderbird does then they have even less of an excuse for not allowing a separate Master password like Thunderbird does by default.

      They do offer that, though. Except on Windows, where as I pointed out there is not decent built-in password/key management system and everything breaks down (forcing browsers to roll their own systems).

      Thunderbird's master password system has nothing to do with the OS so I'm not really sure what you are talking about. I have to type my separate master password into Thunderbird in order to access those passwords in plaintext, regardless of how I'm otherwise logged in.

      Again this isn't true on systems that have OS-supported password/key management.

      For instance, on gnome-keyring systems by default the keyring is encrypted with your login password, and it's automatically unlocked when you log in and locked when you log out (or unlock/lock the screen). If you want to you can change the keyring password to be something different, then you have to manually enter it (a GUI password prompt pops up when Thunderbird or Chrome or whatever tries to ask for a key) to access things.

      Thunderbird has nothing to do with that implementation, it just happily uses it. So do Chrome and Firefox. They all behave the same way. You can, in fact, store a password in Chrome and then retrieve it in Firefox or Thunderbird (or vice-versa) without having to do a re-import from one to the other, because it's the OS that's handling it all rather than everyone reinventing the wheel.

      kwallet and keychain systems (for KDE and OS X) work similarly from what I understand.

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    16. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by ImdatS · · Score: 1

      Actually his argument is not valid if you use OS-based password storage such as Keychain on OSX.

      The way it works is that all your confidential data (passwords, etc) are stored in a keychain, which is encrypted. In order to access a password from the keychain, the app in question must send a request to the OS. The OS then asks the user whether he/she wants to grant access to that password to the app in question. The user can then decide to give one-time access all "Always Allow".

      The good thing is that if you use "Allow" and NOT "Always Allow", every time the same app request access to the same password, the OS asks the user again and the user must enter his password to allow access to it.

      For quite some time, I didn't use Firefox because it had its own password storage - not because I didn't trust Firefox but because it was insecure to save my passwords in a place only protected by Firefox (and not being able to just copy the password-file to somewhere else, e.g. new machine).

      I don't know how secure Keychain encryption is, but I assume it is secure enough that you can rely on it - also, having your passwords in one place and accessible across apps (with user-grants) is a nice-to-have.

      The scenario the Google guys are explaining above is not possible either as the extension-install on Safari needs either an Admin-Account (to install the extension for all users) or can only be installed for one user. Lastly, yes, the malicious guy can have access to session cookies and grab my history, but at least he cannot grab my passwords.

    17. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by Deathlizard · · Score: 1

      yes a keylogger can collect this data, but that takes time and patience to wait for someone to type in those details. This makes it so easy, i could walk a 8 year old child through giving all of your passwords over the phone.

      Hell. been playing with some other autofill settings and found that it does the same thing with credit card numbers if you store them in autofill. Passwords are one thing but If I can get your Expiry and CC info if you typed it in and saved it with chrome and I only need a few seconds of your PC time without any external programs or copying, that's a design flaw. Period.

      When part of my job everyday is cleaning up some mess that some "MS Support Tech" Scammer did to some old lady's PC, and Now these guys just by glancing into Chrome or Firefox or IE to "check for extraneous viruses" can get passwords and Credit card details just by taking a screenshot, there's no justification.

    18. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by phoenix_rizzen · · Score: 1

      Since when does Firefox use kwallet? Never had on any of my KDE installs, whether FreeBSD or Linux, binary package or compiled from source.

    19. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by pthisis · · Score: 1

      Sorry, you're right--Chrome uses kwallet natively but Firefox needs the add-on for it.

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    20. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Actually his argument is not valid if you use OS-based password storage such as Keychain on OSX.

      The way it works is that all your confidential data (passwords, etc) are stored in a keychain, which is encrypted.

      This is what they do. Im pretty sure they explained that about a thousand times so far. /thread.

    21. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by BZ · · Score: 1

      Firefox doesn't use keychain access on Mac. It uses its own password store, encrypted with its own master password. That's why https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106400 is still open.

      Likewise on Windows, last I checked.

      I haven't checked recently whether Firefox use gnome-keyring on Gnome, but based on past code inspection I rather doubt it.

    22. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by PNutts · · Score: 1

      How can anyone with a straight face say that is an acceptable security method?

      It's not a security method, it's a convenience method.

    23. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by semi-extrinsic · · Score: 1

      This is really very simple: If the attacker has access to your session, you have lost.

      The problem with this approach is that you assume "attacker" == "black hat hacker". How about when "attacker" == "disgruntled babysitter who borrows you computer"? Is that not a valid threat which is actually more plausible than a black hat hacker?

      --
      for i in `facebook friends "=bday" 2>/dev/null | cut -d " " -f 3-`; do facebook wallpost $i "Happy birthday!"; done
    24. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by gdr · · Score: 1

      So because a master password does not provide perfect security we should make do with no security?

      You might as well argue (warning, car analogy approaching) that because a determined thief could easily break into your car you might as well leave it unlocked with your laptop on the back seat.

      I would be willing to place a large bet that in any scenario that would allow me to recover Chrome or Safari passwords, I would also be able to recover firefox passwords that are locked with a master password, within a reasonable amount of time.

      Maybe, but without a master password anyone with a passing knowledge of firefox could get a copy of all your passwords in seconds.

    25. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by fast+turtle · · Score: 1

      Don't forget that once all of those PW's are imported into Chrome, they're shared with Google, especially if you have a Gmail account. It's one of the many reasons I don't use Chrome as my browser. Hell I don't even use the latest FF, preferring the 10.0.11 LTS version

      --
      Mod me up/Mod me down: I wont frown as I've no crown
    26. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by fast+turtle · · Score: 1

      Turn in your geek card as the Switch User button does not log you out. All it does is switches to another user so they can get things done. You need to explictly log-out so your user is not active and open to flaws that can be used to steal creditentials, pw's and what not.

      --
      Mod me up/Mod me down: I wont frown as I've no crown
    27. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by bkcallahan · · Score: 1

      "Do you think for one second that she is going to lock the computer and force her friend to wait to finish what she is doing? No. "

      And that's HER fault. Not Chrome's. It's all for shit if the users won't follow basic security procedures.

    28. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by icebike · · Score: 1

      The point is that home users share a machine are looking for precisely this feature and it is secure enough in modern versions of operating systems to do the job.

      Any one capable enough to install password stealing software would not be deterred by your logging out, because they would be be the ones not logging out and other than rebooting the machine there is no way to force them to log off once they have left the premises.

      Multiple accounts are reasonably secure, and if not secure enough then you shouldn't be sharing a machine at all.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    29. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by misosoup7 · · Score: 1

      Your child needs better "friends."

      Security is when you don't store your password in any browser in the first place. Consider your child's "friend" again. When your child is in the restroom, that "friend" can easily compromise your child's account by simply visiting the site (they're already logged in thanks to saved passwords).

    30. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      babysitters know how to google.

      Is that not a valid threat which is actually more plausible than a black hat hacker?

      Then they already have access to your files. The solution is to lock your computer.

    31. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by semi-extrinsic · · Score: 1

      Well, I don't think people keep a "my-cc-numbers.txt" on their desktop. The babysitter wouldn't be able to steal my money by looking at Documents/Kitten photos/

      --
      for i in `facebook friends "=bday" 2>/dev/null | cut -d " " -f 3-`; do facebook wallpost $i "Happy birthday!"; done
    32. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by pthisis · · Score: 1

      I was all ready to come out guns blazing, because on my work Mac if I store something in Chrome it's available in Firefox. But it turns out we have the keychain firefox extension installed there. Pretty much everything I said about firefox should be disregarded. That's a big problem on my end, apologies for the misinformation.

      Still, Chrome uses keychain/gnome-keyring/etc, and the problem this article purports to uncover only exists on the one (albeit very widely deployed) platform that doesn't have a useful key/password management system. On the ones that do, Chrome happily uses them. Still a big problem on my end, but the article is wildly misleading.

      --
      rage, rage against the dying of the light
    33. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by bondsbw · · Score: 1

      Assume for a minute that the OS is doing its job. Then no, you can't install userland rootkits. You can't install background startup programs.

      If the attacker has access to your session, you have lost.

      No. If my session limits the attacker, then I most certainly have not lost.

      If an attacker has access to your machine and you have not used disk encryption, you have lost.

      But I have disk encryption. So how have I lost?

      if you were willing to place money on the line I could easily write you a service in AutoIt or Powershell which scrapes all of your "secured" firefox passwords and mails them to me with nothing more required than the ability to drop a file somewhere in your user profile.

      Who said Firefox was doing things any better?

      I will bet money that you can't do the same to my Keepass database.

      --
      All my liberal friends think I'm a conservative, all my conservative friends think I'm a liberal.
    34. Re:Master Password (Thuderbird+Firefox) by RockDoctor · · Score: 1

      consider this: How many people use separate log-in's for the "Family" computer that stays on most of the time? Not very many I'd imagine, just too much trouble for most to deal with.

      I've never (knowingly) met anyone who used that sort of set-up. Everyone gets their own computer, pretty much as soon as they can type.

      I suppose that it's theoretically relevant if you've got 27 kids, or everyone back to your great-grandparents and all their descendants. That's not a normal situation.

      UK average household size : 2.4 people in 2011 (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_259965.pdf). For the US, it's 2.7 people (http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html).

      --
      Birds are not dinosaur descendants;birds are dinosaurs, for all useful meanings of "birds", "are" and "dinosaurs"
  48. "Passwords are always encrypted" by burritoaddict · · Score: 1
  49. Casual users by Russ1642 · · Score: 1

    Maybe they can't make it locked down tight enough for a hacker or someone who's determined to get at your passwords, but then they don't need to abandon that effort. They've basically said "We can't make it super secure so we're leaving the door wide open instead". You forget to lock your work machine when you go to the bathroom and the guy in the next cubicle can read all of your passwords in seconds, without any hacker knowledge or skill whatsoever.

  50. how is this different from, say, kdewallet? by BACbKA · · Score: 1

    How is this "you can get a cleartext password in a couple of clicks" is different from, say, kdewallet? With physical access to unlocked wallet you can also ask it to display the cleartext password. This actually helped me once when I forgot my sf password having relied on kdewallet for a while and then I had to retype it on another box.

    --

    VKh

  51. Re:Passwords by xombo · · Score: 1

    You can access passwords in cleartext out of LastPass, as well.

  52. Re:People actually do that? by Clsid · · Score: 1

    And let's not forget, it is always about convenience over security at some point. Using the master password in Firefox is actually ok for basic stuff so the AC is just being a snob here.

    Having said that, icebike you should check Keepass with Keefox. It is really good, and there are ways to make it work among multiple machines. Plus in my case I store the key file (which you need to decrypt the password db with your master password) on a flash drive that I carry with me. Best setup I have found so far.

  53. Re:about:settings/passwords by jrumney · · Score: 1

    It's a couple of mouse clicks, for each password, after doing this.

  54. Actually Useful by gman003 · · Score: 1

    I actual used the "Show Passwords" feature quite frequently. Certain sites seem to like blocking auto-complete of username and password fields (mainly banks, I've found). These sites also tend to have the most archaic password policies, where my standard password (which I append with a site-specific suffix, as per recommended security practice) cannot be used because it contains non-alphanumeric characters.

    So it's a password I cannot remember, and while Firefox remembers the password it is being blocked from filling it out for me. I used to go in, look up the password, and copy-paste it in. Now I've moved away from it (found a JS bookmarklet that forces autocomplete on), but I still remember exactly how to do it. And you know what? It has to be more secure than constantly resetting the password and getting it emailed to me.

    You know what's worse? I actually tried to have three-tiered passwords. A simple one used for places where it can be compromised without impacting me, a more complex one for standard usage, and a fiendishly-complex one I was going to use for the most important things: root logins to servers and banking passwords. Sadly, my twenty-plus-character, mixed-case-with-numbers-and-symbols non-dictionary superpassword is rejected by every bank I've ever used, so all it's securing right now is direct root access to my BSD box.

  55. Re:Kember is wrong by Clsid · · Score: 1

    I'm sorry but I fail to see how it is a sane design to have something that can be so easily abused. Storing passwords per se is the way to go these days with so many websites and things to remember. The last thing you want to do is use the same password for lots of things. After reading some of the comments I realized that one of the worst case scenarios is having a laptop stolen and then the thief also gains easy access to all your information, especially if your security relied on a Windows login password.

  56. Re:..okay? And? by DRJlaw · · Score: 1

    If Chrome is going to enter your password for you, it has to know your password. This simple requirement ultimately means that any attempt to obfuscate the stored password is going to be trivial to overcome by anyone who has physical access to the box, unless you're flat out encrypting them with another password that the user would have to enter to decrypt them, and at that point, we've pretty handily defeated the purpose of storing passwords (because let's face it, it's not like you're going to want to do this EVERY time you need to autofill a password, so we're just going to do it once and then leave the db unlocked), so you may as well just remember your passwords and enter them manually in the first place.

    Others: you've modded this driven insightful? For shame.

    AC: You should call LastPass and patiently explain to them why nobody will pay them money for their password manager, because this is exactly what it does. Well, 'exactly' with the exception that you can set it to remember your master password until you close the brower session and/or are idle for a specified time and/or (implicitly) log off. Sort of addresses that "EVERY time you need to autofill a password" thing.

    After all if you memorize one password you may as well just memorize all of them and enter them manually in the first place... there's no convenience at in memorizing just a handfull.

  57. Re:My browser (Chrome) by Clsid · · Score: 1

    You do realize that it is extremely easy to crack Windows user accounts passwords?

  58. Don't look at the gorilla by ntropia · · Score: 1

    anyone with physical access can peek...

    pretty much everything he wants/like.
    'Nuff said...

    No, actually, Obligatory XKCD Citation(TM)

  59. The plaintext passwords isn't the issue by brentonboy · · Score: 2

    Sure, it's shocking for someone who thought their passwords were safe in Chrome to realize that they're visible with four clicks. But the real issue is that Chrome passwords aren't really stored safely. If you get a virus on your system, it has full access to the passwords.

    Honest question: why doesn't Chrome implement something similar to KeePass or LastPass? Is there some technical reason? Is it astoundingly difficult? Does it not actually provide additional security against malware?

    1. Re:The plaintext passwords isn't the issue by brentonboy · · Score: 1

      Why not just use KeePass or LastPass? Occam's Razor suggests it. In other words, why reinvent a wheel that has already been invented?

      I do. It's a huge pain. It would be "simpler" to have it built-in to my browser. But there must be a reason Google hasn't done it. (Other than "LastPass already exists".)

    2. Re:The plaintext passwords isn't the issue by smash · · Score: 1

      I do and it is NOT a huge pain, as my password database follows me from computer to computer, is across different browsers (and even applications).

      Your browser isn't going to be remembering your RDP or VPN passwords for you, so why use it to store web specific passwords and need to store everything else in another application anyway?

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
  60. Re:Smoke, mirrors, ignorance and fame-hunger by Clsid · · Score: 1

    You cannot protect any data even if you lock your OS account. It is very easy to change system passwords, and really ask yourself, if you had important information on a sheet of paper, would you just leave it on a drawer easily accesible by anyone when you are not there or would you just lock it with a key?

  61. Windows Safari? by sabt-pestnu · · Score: 1

    Is this true on Windows implementations of Safari as well? What OS service is used?

  62. I'm using plain old firefox, out of the box. by viperidaenz · · Score: 1

    When I click Tools -> Options -> Security -> Saved Passwords -> Show Passwords -> Yes
    All my saved passwords are displayed for all to see.
    That's the default.
    The master password is opt-in and never mentioned unless you poke around in the settings.

  63. So, don't use Chrome to store passwords by RubberDogBone · · Score: 1

    Where the hell is the fire? Browsers like Firefox have LONG stored passwords with a button to click to reveal said password. And they kept on making Twinkies the whole time. Holy creme-like filing

    So along comes somebody who has apparently never seen this before and wow, they have stopped making Twinkies this is so serious! Except, well, it's not. And the Twinkies are back. More or less.

    The fix for this is easy: don't store passwords in the browser. I know, DOH! And if you do, don't let other people use your browser. And if you do, then use a password manager, which aside from being cross-platform and mostly free, do a hella better job of inventing good passwords for you and keeping you from using the same passwords all over the internet, because remember, you don't have to worry about your OWN security. You also have to worry about the security of EVERY site where you use a password. If you use the same password and user combo everywhere, or even one that appears to be a pattern, then you are basically asking for trouble when some forum gets hacked and your password turns out to be pass+websitename=supersecretpass. Simple patterns for you to remember are also simple to reverse engineer. So don't do that. Quit whining and get a password manager. And use it right.

    The burden is on YOU to wisely manage your passwords, the quality of said passwords, and who has access to them. Does not matter which browser or OS you use. Don't be a stump and try to pin responsibility anywhere other than between chair and keyboard.

    --
    Sig for hire.
  64. Re:Seems like an easy fix by RubberDogBone · · Score: 1

    Bu bu bu but! It's a BUTTON! You have to click it! It's in the EULA and also comes with the combo meal. Buttons must be clicked! Which rhymes with wicked.

    Easier fix.. don't click the "Save my password" button...

    --
    Sig for hire.
  65. PBKDF2 by tepples · · Score: 1

    Note: your "master password" is not a private key of this sort -- no hand entered password ever could be

    What makes key stretching to generate keys from passphrases an invalid technique?

  66. Re:..okay? And? by tepples · · Score: 1

    Generate the encryption key from a master password that the user reenters at the start of each browsing session, and never write that key to the file system.

  67. newsflash! by smash · · Score: 1

    Compromised user account has access to all user's data! Film at 11.

    --
    I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
  68. MS designed this? by slashmydots · · Score: 1

    The embedded flash plugin was a disaster. Pages still display incorrectly. Scripts still run incorrectly. It's still a privacy catastrophe. Then they store passwords in plaintext and stand by it? I swear, Microsoft's Windows 8 team designed Chrome as one giant troll or something,

  69. Your other arguments may be valid, but (1) is not. by pem · · Score: 1

    Sorry, I agree with the OP. One "other way" to keep track of passwords is simply to memorize them. But, since memory is often a "use-it-or-lose-it" proposition, forcing yourself to use the password will help refresh your memory.

  70. Re:Your other arguments may be valid, but (1) is n by bingoUV · · Score: 1

    And there will be accounts which you will use rarely. E.g. when most of your finances are "automated" like they should be, logging on to banking website may be rare - say once a month. There could be some important email accounts which are used rarely.

    A password used once, a month ago, is not very likely to be recalled easily.

    --
    Bingo Dictionary - Pragmatist, n. A myopic idealist.
  71. Damn Novices... by SubtleArray · · Score: 1

    What happens when an Apple troll writes an effective piece of link bait, and a bunch of people who don’t know any better fall for it... The Chromium FAQ explains why local attacks aren't in Chrome’s threat model. Passwords can be accessed as easily in Firefox, and passwords in Internet Explorer and Safari can be hacked out in under a minute with a little JavaScript. Google's "go-to" argument is right. If you're worried about security, don't share your operating system user profile. Understanding and using OS user profiles would solve this “problem.”

  72. real world difference by thehumble1 · · Score: 1

    Both FF and Chrome have decrypted access to your passwords. Just that FF doesn't for the first 3 seconds you start the program, before you punch in your Master password. I see why Google would simply let be visible, since it's there anyway, but I really do believe that Elliot's core statement is right: the people that hack into your computer or get around your security aren't the people who are going to be using your laptop or desktop. It's the soon to be ex-husband or your daughters friend or your son in a fit of anger after you cut off his cell phone. simply requiring your google account password to access that page would be more than enough to dissuade an entire sector of would-be opportunists. I don't lock my office, but I do close the door and Google doesn't see how there's a difference because in terms of security there isn't, but in terms of actual property loss over 15 years, there is a real world difference.

  73. Don't save passwords you want to remain secret by Karmashock · · Score: 1

    Problem solved. All arguments to the contrary will be filed in the circular filing cabinet.

    --
    I've decided to stop wasting my time responding to AC trolls/sockpuppets... so if you want a response from me... login.