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Schneier: The US Government Has Betrayed the Internet, We Need To Take It Back

wabrandsma writes "Quoting Bruce Schneier in the Guardian: 'The NSA has undermined a fundamental social contract. We engineers built the internet – and now we have to fix it. Government and industry have betrayed the internet, and us. This is not the internet the world needs, or the internet its creators envisioned. We need to take it back. And by we, I mean the engineering community. Yes, this is primarily a political problem, a policy matter that requires political intervention. But this is also an engineering problem, and there are several things engineers can – and should – do."

397 comments

  1. Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    One solution at hand are darknets - awesome and uncensorable (but slow, though that is the price) Freenet,
    and I2P for hidden services, and the orginal plain Tor.

    Come join us, at #freenet at freenode.org we are supporting all users of freenetproject.org

    Also, consider just started channel #mempo where new linux distribution is planned with the goal of being most secure one (combining best ideas from Hardened Gentoo, Debian, Tails, Whonix, Qubes-Os). Because security must be complete on all levels (e.g. darknet but also av, rootkit protection, programs compartmnet :)

    1. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

      There is not going to be privacy as long as the physical links are not in the hands of the people. You are not the king of your castle if you rent. People need to start digging ditches and burying fiber to connect to their neighbors.

    2. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by N1AK · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The issue with Darknets etc is that it'll only protect a limited proportion of what normal people do:
      1/ Email, if you want to send or receive, from normal people won't be secret.
      2/ Facebook, Youtube, Skype, Amazon etc won't be on it.

      If you've got something you want to hide enough then the tools to try and do it are available. For the average person though it isn't a viable or effective proposition. We need to stop this happening, not just find ways for a few people to work around it.

    3. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Nerdfest · · Score: 2

      There is also a KickStarter for software called Trsst that's a secure, distributed replacement for Twitter. Basically it's makes the key management and public key distribution easy, and gives you control over your own data. They're at about 50% funding with a week or so left. If you have any interest in this sort of thing, have a look. This sort of thing shouldn't be required, but until things change, this is a nice solution.

    4. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Wouldn't a wifi mesh network be easier?

    5. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Demand IPv6. Yell at your ISP. At least ask for it and tell them how important it is. With IPv6 people can start running own servers and more P2P stuff. The Internet before the last 10 years worked that way and it was good. The "Internet" of today is centralized and that is a major problem. No wonder it's easy for Intelligence agencies to do what they are doing if the only thing they need to do is attack 10 or 20 corporations to succeed.

      Teach people around you about technology, encryption and how the Internet works. Give them an image of how their clear-text messages hop around and where they land and what happens to it when it does.

      Don't be ignorant and don't say stuff like "well, I've known it all the time - I don't have anything to hide anyway so I don't care". Are your really sure about that? Do you know how your life will look like in 10 or 20 years time and how the political climate will look like where you live at that point?

      Support organizations fighting for your freedom - I don't care if it's EFF, FSF, Pirate Party or something else. There are people willing to take on the big guys for you when you are not, but they can't do it without your help.

    6. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Maybe, but also much slower, less reliable and easier to catalog, to intercept and to disrupt.

    7. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      There is not going to be privacy as long as the physical links are not in the hands of the people. You are not the king of your castle if you rent. People need to start digging ditches and burying fiber to connect to their neighbors.

      ...or just encrypt all the data that passes along the existing cables.

      --
      No sig today...
    8. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Neither will make a difference so long as people use Gmail/Hotmail/Yahooo/Facebook/etc.

      If your communications go through a large US corporation then no amount of quantum-encrypted cables (or whatever) will help.

      --
      No sig today...
    9. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No, that's not sufficient. Encrypted data still exposes metadata: Who, when, where. And that's under the generous assumption that the encryption actually does what it promises to do.

    10. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by aliquis · · Score: 1

      I'm more interested in a "Internet 2" built out of peoples access points and possibly routed over the regular Internet when needed to reach a destination.

    11. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by aliquis · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Now even better! Only 159 characters per message! .. ? =P

      Seriously. Twitter suck. Why would I want any form of twitter? 160 characters suck. SMS suck to.

    12. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ain't gonna hapend.
      We have seen people being charged in kiddie porn, when all they did were node in TOR.

    13. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So what's your recommendation? Give up?

    14. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by rvw · · Score: 1

      No, that's not sufficient. Encrypted data still exposes metadata: Who, when, where. And that's under the generous assumption that the encryption actually does what it promises to do.

      And today we know it doesn't. Does codename Bullrun ring any bells? (Hint: Snowden, NSA)

    15. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by rvw · · Score: 1

      There is also a KickStarter for software called Trsst that's a secure, distributed replacement for Twitter.

      All these free/secure Facebook and Twitter are great, but who is going to use it? How do you connect to eachother if nobody you know uses it or wants to use it?

    16. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      An internet is a type of network, the world wide web is a internet. Many different internets exist from local networking to wide area networks. Community wireless projects are essentially an internet.

      Join a local network to peer with or start making your own and others will come.

    17. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Make it really easy to encrypt/base-64 encode your emails before they're uploaded to Gmail/Hotmail/Yahooo/Facebook/etc.

      "Transparent to the user" would be ideal. I don't know if a browser plugin could manage that but I don't see why not - just intercept the "send" process.

      Encryption keys could be generated automatically during the first few exchanges with another person by attaching information to the end of the email. After two or three replies the displayed email address turns green and you're good to go.

      Yes, they could do mass man-in-the-middle attacks during the key exchange but so long as two people can verify their keys by phone (or whatever) then we'll know about it. More importantly, we'll be able to prove they're doing it. That would lead to more news stories about what the NSA does and more public awareness of the importance of installing an encryption plugin.

      --
      No sig today...
    18. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Nerdfest · · Score: 1

      Only a few used Twitter and FaceBook in the beginning. If people are looking for a groundswell of support for properly encrypted communications, I think recent events are about the best advertising you're going to get.

    19. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's never going to be even moderately secure. If you type the cleartext into a browser window with Javascript or read the cleartext in a browser window with Javascript, then any encryption is moot. And even if it worked, it would still leave the metadata wide open: Who, when, where.

      You don't build a house on quicksand and you don't build cryptographic systems on compromised hosts.

    20. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Dr+Max · · Score: 1

      How about an encryption key that evolves based on previous emails, so that unless the NSA have your entire email history with another person stored and unencrypted, they will have to brute force the key each time.

      --
      Rocket Surgeon.
    21. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      PGP

    22. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      That's never going to be even moderately secure. If you type the cleartext into a browser window with Javascript or read the cleartext in a browser window with Javascript, then any encryption is moot.

      Packet sniffers would soon reveal any nefarious business, and there's plenty of people who'd run a sniffer just to be able to prove something was going on.

      The real problem right now is proving anything - anybody in a position to provide hard proof is being gagged. An encrypting plugin plus sniffer would enable anybody to prove it.

      even if it worked, it would still leave the metadata wide open: Who, when, where.

      I admit that's a tougher problem to solve.

      One step at a time, though. Let's start by encrypting the contents...

      --
      No sig today...
    23. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They can afford to brute force it every time now

    24. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by ehack · · Score: 2

      Yes, one could have a stateful encryption with a very long state built into a threaded mail reader.

      The idea obviously is not to make decryption impossible, it's to slow down mass decryption, thereby making mass mail searches harder and restoring a measure of civil liberties.

      --
      This is not a signature.
    25. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Because deleting an email would then completely destroy your data. In fact all the NSA need do is cause data to be dropped and then you can't use it either, at which point if you start again then they can just start logging your emails from the 'beginning' and have them all.

    26. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Dr+Max · · Score: 1

      You're right you wouldn't be able to delete any emails, but you could build in a system to deal with not receiving the latest email (and not getting an undelivered email notification). Something like sending the key for the last email you got, and if that key doesn't work, then send a request for an alternate version of the key using data from the previous emails they both agree have been received.

      --
      Rocket Surgeon.
    27. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by kubajz · · Score: 1

      It sounds like you want FireGPG or Mailvelope. Too bad the first one is discontinued and the second one is not ready for Firefox yet, just Chrome. Is there a widely used browser plugin I missed?

    28. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In principle you could have a darknet -> mixnet e.g. Tor -> www bridge, but the latency would be horrendous and it would mean the darknet wasn't really dark anymore.

      But yeah, darknets and even anonymising opennets have a big chicken-and-egg content problem, and outproxying to solve this is one of the main reasons for Tor's success, though it's clearly at the cost of security.

    29. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Dr+Max · · Score: 1

      Exactly i have no doubt the nsa can crack any encryption we throw at them (they have been cracking codes for the past 60+ years), but if each individual message had to be cracked the majority of mail would be left alone. Even if they start trying to store everything so they can bulk decrypt (which would be insanely huge after a few years) a few emails shared on a safe network and they would have to go back to one by one.

      --
      Rocket Surgeon.
    30. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by vettemph · · Score: 1

      Another problem with most darknets is that they have to run across the oligopoly network (verizon, comcast, level3, at&t, sprint...).

      The FCC insures that only a few billionaires have access to useful spectrum and wattage. Running our own networks is highly discouraged. We need a way to take over some portion of the spectrum and make our own networks. One without a meter attached to each house.
      There will be issues of congestion and noise for sure but that might be better than dystopia.

      --
      The government which is strong enough to protect you from everything is strong enough to take everything from you.
    31. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Another solution is just to include large blocks of encrypted data with everything you do, so that they waste time decrypting it. It doesn't help you but it helps the general situation.

    32. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But what if you live next door to an NSA employee? :P

    33. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by elashish14 · · Score: 1

      You don't even need to exchange the key through gmail. You can simply host the encrypted mail on Google's servers, download it, and exchange the key through a third party service.

      Now who's gonna do it?

      --
      I have left slashdot and am now on Soylent News. FUCK YOU DICE.
    34. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Vintermann · · Score: 2

      Please do not try to come up with your own cryptographic protocols! Odds are there are easier and safer ways to achieve what you're trying to achieve.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    35. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      Nobody can brute force 128-bit encryption.

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      No sig today...
    36. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      You don't even need to exchange the key through gmail. You can simply host the encrypted mail on Google's servers, download it, and exchange the key through a third party service.

      That doesn't sound as 'simple' as via email attachments. The point is to make it a complete no-brainer for people to use. Any extra step is one step too many.

      --
      No sig today...
    37. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      Nope. Most people do 'email' via a website.

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      No sig today...
    38. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      How about an encryption key that evolves based on previous emails, so that unless the NSA have your entire email history with another person stored and unencrypted, they will have to brute force the key each time.

      a) There's no reason to the NSA won't have that complete history - they're spying on you, right?
      b) The NSA can't brute force your key. They don't have enough electricity to power a computer that big, or even a place to hide it (it would be bigger then the Earth).

      --
      No sig today...
    39. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      No, that's not sufficient. Encrypted data still exposes metadata: Who, when, where.

      The NSA isn't going to learn much from knowing you write to your mom. There's anonymous mail drops, remailers, etc. for the important stuff. We shouldn't delay encryption of the contents just because the system isn't flawless yet.

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nirvana_fallacy#Perfect_solution_fallacy

      --
      No sig today...
    40. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You can't have things like Facebook and have information security. The two are mutually exclusive. Just like you can't build a perpetual motion machine, you can't build a network that allows you to post personal information for all to read while keeping it secure from people you don't want to see it.

    41. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There is no reason not to move to 256- or even 512-bit symmetric ciphers. Not only do we need to stay ahead of the game, but far, far ahead. 512-bit would be very hard to brute-force even with the NSA's resources and assuming a major breakthrough that the rest of us are unaware of. If a large amount of data is encrypted, they're going to have to expend a ton of resources decrypting meaningless crap.

    42. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by N1AK · · Score: 1

      You can't have things like Facebook and have information security.

      Perhaps that's true but if it is then it simply shows that tools like darknets, encryption etc aren't going to protect most people any way. Taking a black and white view is not always helpful. If you use a credit or debit card then someone taking an even more stringent position could say you give up information security.

    43. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by N1AK · · Score: 1

      The issue with a technical solution, without an effective legislative or societal solution, is that the government can defeat almost any of them by asserting influence. If the government can knock on any door, demand access to your data and make it a crime to tell you then any service that government can reach is at risk. Yes in theory if you run your own mail client locally, running an open and publicly validated encryption program, on an open OS, with no untrusted programs and everyone you communicate with is doing the same then you might at least force the government to use it's supercomputers to bust the encryption if they want to see it enough.

    44. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No. IPv6 solves some problems, but creates others. It results in complete trackability of each user and/or each device on the internet.

      We can't do anything about the protocols anyway, as they will always be applied somehow. What we need are engineering solutions that can ignore protocols and ignore policies, and even laws.

      We need something completely beyond the control of others.

    45. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by seyyah · · Score: 1

      Status.net and Pump.io are already distributed, open-source replacements for Twitter.

    46. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      We should ask the NSA which to use, they seem to have researched this.

    47. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Nerdfest · · Score: 1

      They do not support encryption, that I know of.

    48. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Base-64 is not strong enough. In fact, this is the age of Quantum computers. Even though they are still under development, they will soon become the norm. In this age, we need nothing short of 8192 bit encryption

    49. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by DuckDodgers · · Score: 1

      There's another angle to consider - volume. The NSA's datacenter in Utah has had estimates of as much as 5 zettabytes of storage, but other estimates tap it out at 3 exabytes (roughly 3 million terabytes). http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/24/blueprints-of-nsa-data-center-in-utah-suggest-its-storage-capacity-is-less-impressive-than-thought/

      Facebook generates more than 500 TB of data per day. Youtube has 60 hours of video uploaded per minute. Tumblr has 75 million posts per day. An estimated 300 billion emails are sent per year.

      If the social web and inter-communications keep getting common, even with the increasingly cheap cost of storage the NSA might not be able to figure out what I had for breakfast this morning because they have to sift through 1.8x10^34 kitten pictures to figure it out.

    50. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      IPv6 allows device-specific tracking, doesn't it?

    51. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If you plan on using se-linux on that, you are about as secure as a paper bag. The nsa is the main maintainer for it.

    52. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by dbIII · · Score: 1

      Exactly i have no doubt the nsa can crack any encryption we throw at them

      At this point after some things that have come out I'm starting to think they couldn't find their arse with two hands and an atlas, but for the moment let's assume they are Tom Clancy SuperSpies. Even those are thwarted by one time pads, then there are a series of less difficult ones that still take geological time to brute force with no crack in sight. Thankfully for the Tom Clancy SuperSpies there is plenty that are more easily accessed and there are also things like the mere existence of a tricky encrypted message going between two points tells you something is happening. That can give them somewhere to start looking for an easier way to work out what is going on.

    53. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Everyone here is forgetting, what if the hardware is compromised. What if keyboard input is covertly being sent and broadcast over the network because of hardware 'features' embedded in network cards and cpu's? It would be trivial to compromise such things and just record raw keyboard output.

    54. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      128-bit is impossible to brute force with any conceivable amount of resources.

      Be careful: 256-bit AES turned out to be not much stronger than 128-bit.

      (256 bit AES is a hacked-around version of 128 bit AES, made to satisfy the NIS competition requirements. It didn't really work out...)

      --
      No sig today...
    55. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Not only javascript... everyone is jumping on the bandwagon to work around the popular commercial service providers but forgets they are running a very complex client-side software stack also produced by similar or even the same commercial interests. Do we really know that Mozilla, Google, nor MS have compromised their popular browsers? Do we really know that the operating systems are not also compromised? This is even more of a question with smartphone platforms as they have such an intimate relationship with the user and are such a perfect embedded sensor platform.

      What if end-to-end requires you to not trust the browser nor normal client computing platform? Where is the root of trust for your end-to-end security in this malicious pile of intermediaries? You could try to make some sort of security goggles that read ciphertext on screen and show you the plain text as augmented reality, then have some double-entry system to enter plain text to your goggles, have it show you ciphertext, then enter that into the untrusted client PC. This would be a bit like the old days with the ciphering being done on scratch pads before and after normal messaging protocols.

      But what if this goggle platform were compromised? Even though you might prove it has no means of external communication other than you as a relay, you might find it difficult to prove that it wasn't embedding extra payload into the ciphertext it produced for you. You would need multiple such solutions that could cross-check each others' work... any crypto algorithm simple enough to execute (and verify) by hand is almost assuredly inadequate to protect content, so you need some kind of computational support and yet will struggle to form a valid trust root in the industrial supply chain that provides this support.

    56. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by GargamelSpaceman · · Score: 1

      https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html

      Without ssl to protect you, none of these are going to help.

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      ...
    57. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There are two fundamental technical flaws though. IPv6 does not default to encryption, and does not encrypt packet header information as was originally planned. This was probably blocked in order to facilitate spying and second, DNS is still not secure, with govts. trying to block DNSSEC and other solutions. Without those two features, the Internet is fundamentally flawed.

    58. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by hibiki_r · · Score: 1

      IPV6 does not help, because the issue is network topology: If all traffic in the US passes through a very limited set of nodes, then you can still snoop all the traffic. You could ask for a different topology, with more long distance routed, but that's ridiculously expensive. It's not like 5 guys can easily set up a new fiber line between Chicago and Cleveland, and get the equipment to make it available to the open internet. To provide a semblance of security from a snooper the size of the NSA, this would have to happen tens of thousands of times to make sure that it's impossible to capture a relevant enough percentage of traffic.

      And then we have the trouble of building private intercontinental lines.

      If you want a semi-realistic way of avoiding snooping, look for ways to increase internet traffic. If there's enough traffic, and it's hard enough to know what the traffic is about, it becomes impossible to analyze. Bury the needle in such a huge haystack, it's impossible to sort out.

    59. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Twitter is worse, 140 characters? why? they should standardize with SMS. Oh and don't give me that usual BS "the addressee eats into the 160 chars" or whatever Twitter claims.

    60. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Windwraith · · Score: 1

      Bah, Tor? As long as it's "that thing pedophiles use", I am not willing to use it. Any safety I might gain with it is nullified by its fame of pedo-tool.

    61. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by blueg3 · · Score: 1

      Base64 is an encoding to turn encrypted data into text so that an e-mail client is happy with it.

      Symmetric encryption is generally 128 or 256 bits. Even 128-bit encryption is quite strong, though 256-bit is recommended for future-proofing.

      Quantum computers are not useful against symmetric encryption. They're useful against public-key encryption and key-exchange protocols, though, which is presumably how you're conveying your symmetric private keys.

    62. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      well, unless they know the cipher and have discovered some weakness inherent in the algorithm (such that the effective key strength is reduced to some manageable size - see change to DES S-boxes re differential cryptanalysis).

    63. Re: Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If I was said corrupt agency and I was going to try to gather information in that scale I would be going at it in the most basic way possible. By modifying the base system at the hardware then who cares what encryption everybody uses insert module in bios to log all the basic inputs. Then mod the video firmware for screen caps. Followed by the network card. The tech exists look at how computrace works. Very similar minus the video firmware and bios input logging it already uses the network interface. We're fighting a losing battle and were talking about building something secure on an insecure platform. its insanity in my opinion.

    64. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by rwv · · Score: 1

      two people can verify their keys by phone (or whatever)

      And why would you believe this to be secure?

      Three people can keep a secret, if two of them are dead.

    65. Re: Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Sintar · · Score: 1

      IPv6 that's really not gonna help with privacy especially when they have backdoor access to your router because they compromised it before it left the factory maybe before the board was even built and theres other reasons too but I don't want to even go there. The biggest question is do you trust your hardware vendors, chip makers and so on and so forth. If hardware is insecure then what does the security implemented in or by software going to really matter.

    66. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Anyone who states "I have nothing to hide" is lying. Ask them if they would mind the FBI coming in and photographing everything in their house "just in case". Then ask them if they are for having all cars tracked via GPS, "just in case". Now ask if they would mind real-time cameras in their house the government can watch, "just in case". The obvious answer is NO. If they are say no to any one of those, then they DO have something to hide, even if it's just privacy.

      Don't let the straw man of "I have nothing to hide" rule. It should be "I have nothing to hide, so don't waste resources watching me".

    67. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There are multiple ways of looking at what is and isn't in the haystack.

      Communications to google, facebook, netflicks, etc, are all unencrypted or at least effectively unencrypted through rubber hose cryptology. So if the bottleneck is the brute forcing of encryption, they are not part of the haystack. If these were peer-to-peer, as the Internet was intended to be, there may not be enough rubber hoses to go around. This is an area where ipv6 may help, as it would allow peers to more easily host their own servers.

      Most people don't really care all that much about privacy (despite the noises they make; actions speak louder than words and all that) unless the effort barrier is very low. Ipv6 would lower the barrier slightly.

    68. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      Not sure where you're getting that from. It currently has about 252 bits of security under the best known theoretical attack.

    69. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What makes you think they will give you public IPv6 addresses, or not install a firewall "for your security". I just asked my ISP for what I wanted: IPv4 addresses. They just gave me 5 and a form to justify more. That's my home ISP, which I pay $60 per month. (However my ISP is awesome. Yours may not be.)

    70. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Yvanhoe · · Score: 1

      These are a patch, but not a long term solution. They work by using an interstice that law-makers do not understand very well. I, for one, do not want to consider that it is an acceptable practice to censor or spy on regular communication.

      See, if we rely too much on a solely technical solution without having also a strong political stance, the mentality will slowly change to say that censorship and spying are a necessity, and to slowly make people admit that secure cryptography is the tool of the terrorist and should be banned.

      Ask yourself : how many people would really understand and be angry if tomorrow the Congress decided to criminalize the use of encryption algorithms not vetted by the NSA ?

      I think that technical solution are very important and should continue to be improved, but raising a political voice is in my opinion a very useful thing to do in parallel.

      --
      The Wise adapts himself to the world. The Fool adapts the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the Fool.
    71. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by hacker · · Score: 1

      But Trsst relies on a protocol (SSL) that we know is now suspect, and likely broken in most cases (weak keys, compromised CAs).

      So what now?

    72. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Burz · · Score: 1

      I2P is way beyond IPv6 in terms of addressing: Your address is not only unique but it actually follows you and serves as a pseudonymous identity. It encrypts everything end-to-end, and you can set the number of hops (default is 3) to choose the level of anonymity.

    73. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Nerdfest · · Score: 1

      Trsst relies on distributed P/K keys, not just SSL.

    74. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by hacker · · Score: 1

      And what happens when those keys are transmitted in the clear, across the two endpoints, when SSL might as well be cleartext at this point, given the computational power, intentional design flaws and other mechanisms of the NSA to break the conversation in real-time.

      Still trust the other end? I don't.

    75. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Nerdfest · · Score: 1

      Keys are not transmitted in the clear (well, not the private keys). You should read up on Trsst, they're actually doing the security correctly. It's basically the same as PGP based email, but Trsst handles the management of the *public* keys. It would be secure even without SSL.

    76. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by tiagosousa · · Score: 1

      IPV6 does not help, because the issue is network topology: If all traffic in the US passes through a very limited set of nodes, then you can still snoop all the traffic

      IPv6 makes topology less important because it enables opportunistic p2p encryption such as ipsec. The same applies for running our own services with our own CAs. The current public CA system is fundamentally flawed, and third-party services are never secure regardless of encryption or topology because they're legally snooped from within. Snowden leaks made clear that the math behind encryption is still sound; it's everything around it that has been broken.

    77. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by Joce640k · · Score: 1

      Google for "Related-Key Attack on the Full AES-256"

      http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/317.pdf

      --
      No sig today...
    78. Re:Freenet, I2P, Tor - darknets by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      Yes but related-key is a really weird model which doesn't apply to most use cases. The only thing I have heard of where it might work is if you are using AES in hash function mode, which is incredibly rare.

  2. Low tech by MrDoh! · · Score: 5, Funny

    That whole 'IP over Carrier Pigeon' thing doesn't look so crazy now does it? Until the NSA start training intercepting hawks.

    --
    Waiting for an amusing sig.
    1. Re:Low tech by DMUTPeregrine · · Score: 1

      Falcons would be more effective than hawks for catching pigeons.

      --
      Not a sentence!
  3. GOOD LUCK with that shit by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    they've got flamethrowers, man

    1. Re:GOOD LUCK with that shit by black3d · · Score: 2

      That, and, they'll simply legislate against anything which removes their central control. It'll only be a matter of time before darknets are legislated against "for the children", at least those they haven't already entirely honeypotted.

      --
      "The true measure of a person is how they act when they know they won't get caught." - DSRilk
  4. Keeping things safe. by auric_dude · · Score: 2

    Thought I would use Bruce's Password safe http://passwordsafe.sourceforge.net/ and dowwnload http://sourceforge.net/projects/passwordsafe/files/ but no HTTPS, should I be worred?

    1. Re:Keeping things safe. by black3d · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Naw, HTTPS only protects you against folks who don't already have the keys. You pretty much can't trust virtually any data communication that takes place on the internet. However, that doesn't mean stop doing stuff - it just means weigh the value of what you're doing against the expectation that the information is likely to be used against you. For example - the NSA may have my internet banking credentials - but am I worried they're going to steal my money? No - either 1) they don't need to, 2) if some rogue agent decided to, there are legal protection and insurance avenues I can take to regain my money, 3) if the government decided they needed to steal my money, then even them not having my internet banking credentials isn't going to stop them anyway.

      I'm not an advocate for "if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to worry about" at all. I'm just facing the realization that our government is completely morally corrupt, and outside of changing it by force, I can never protect my information online unless it's information I've encrypted and uploaded myself (and even then I'm still at risk if my OS is rooted or my encryption algorithm has a master algorithm). So, I weigh that knowledge against my activities and don't worry too much. If I was concerned about being identified, then you can protect yourself, but it largely involves not using your net connection, among other things.

      --
      "The true measure of a person is how they act when they know they won't get caught." - DSRilk
    2. Re:Keeping things safe. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      no.

      why would you worry?

      it is source code, you can verify it yourself before you build it.

      password safe operates on your computer, as long as your computer is uncompromised you should be relatively fine.

    3. Re:Keeping things safe. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      no.

      why would you worry?

      it is source code, you can verify it yourself before you build it.

      password safe operates on your computer, as long as your computer is uncompromised you should be relatively fine.

      Oh, yeah. How many people are qualified to verify code themselves? I doubt that many programmers/software engineers are able to qualify the code of another major project without spending considerable time, probably more time than they are ever going to spend using the program itself.

    4. Re:Keeping things safe. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      it is source code, you can verify it yourself before you build it.

      While I'm able to read source code, I don't think I would be able to judge an encryption algorithm. All I could do is to determine whether the code does something so obviously fishy that you don't need to be a crypto expert to see that you should not do it. But as the Debian SSH debacle shows, it's one thing to be able to find obvious flaws, and it's a completely different thing to be able to judge whether the algorithm as implemented actually gives security.

    5. Re:Keeping things safe. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Since they're attempting to archive all electronic communications in a database for every person, and government databases are known to be unhackable...

  5. Agreed by msobkow · · Score: 3, Insightful

    But in all practicality, how do you seize back control from the likes of the three-letter agencies?

    It's not like there is any party in the US which hasn't been complicit in granting them ever-greater powers. It's not like a Canadian like myself can vote against the bullshit. It's not like Canada is about to invade the US over the issues, nor anyone else, seeing as their three-letter agencies are doing the same god-damned thing.

    --
    I do not fail; I succeed at finding out what does not work.
    1. Re:Agreed by Joce640k · · Score: 5, Insightful

      See Robert Heinlein's book "Take Back Your Government" for details.

      Unfortunately, it needs people like you to get up from their sofas and actually do something instead of just grumbling about it.

      --
      No sig today...
    2. Re:Agreed by Joce640k · · Score: 4, Informative

      Update:

      According to Wikipedia a new edition was printed last year - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Take_Back_Your_Government

      That's quite timely...

      --
      No sig today...
    3. Re:Agreed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      get off the sofa and do what? Protest and you get maced and taken to jail. Vote? Only two candidates and both are in the pocket of special interests. bomb government buildings? Violence unites people _against_ the reason or cause you use to justify the violence.

      Im open to any suggestions that dont involve me either
      A: wasting my time
      B: getting put in jail
      C: getting killed

    4. Re:Agreed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Rebuild the internet based on private nodes. If everybody in the country had a micro-wifi cell on their roof routing encrypted traffic, through dozens of routes, even setting up rogue stations wouldn't capture enough data to be meaningful.

      Multi-route encrypted UDP packets using FEC (forward error correction) through private wifi cells. It could wind up being faster, too.

    5. Re: Agreed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      If you won't go to jail for your beliefs, then they might not be that important to you.

      Most of the major social movements, and you are hoping for a social movement, required confronting the state, and risking jail time. Civil rights in US easiest example, but Indian independence and anti-apartheid movement are others.

    6. Re:Agreed by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      It's too bad neither you nor Wikipedia can manage to summarize the book. Unfortunately, you didn't even care enough to jot off a descriptive paragraph instead of just grumbling about it.

      If it involves "working through the system" though, HAHAHAHA.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    7. Re:Agreed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      There are more than two candidates; you just refuse to vote for them for what is ultimately a self-defeating reason. Voting third party can send a message to the main parties if enough people do it. Whatever the case, voting for evil is not an option.

    8. Re:Agreed by Sloppy · · Score: 1

      But in all practicality, how do you seize back control from the likes of the three-letter agencies?

      You don't need to take back control, you just have to stop continuously ceding control to them.

      Let me phrase this as ridiculously as possible, to make it easier to see how comically awful our decisions are:

      The next time someone tells you to not install gpg, to not generate a key, and not cross-sign with people you know, tell them "no, I'm going to do those things."

      The next time someone suggests you use webmail instead of a mail client that can encrypt and decrypt messages on a computer that you control, tell them, "no, I'd rather use my common sense instead of doing something obviously stupid."

      The next time someone tells you that using a single high-stature central faceless corporation as the sole trusted introducer to authenticate a public key, tell them "that's insane on the face of it, and even 20 years ago, before HTTPS was invented, everybody knew that, which is why PGP was based on the opposite idea."

      The joke, of course, is that (almost) nobody is ever there, really telling us to do things that we already know are insecure. We do those insecure things for other reasons, and usually those reasons have jack shit to do with governments pointing guns at our faces, telling us to be insecure. Democrats and Republicans aren't causing our problem here (though our underlying problem may be why we keep electing Democrats and Republicans). We do it because we don't give a fuck. If you start giving a fuck, many options become easier to see.

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    9. Re:Agreed by dbIII · · Score: 1

      If it involves "working through the system" though, HAHAHAHA.

      See Syria for details of how the other way works out. It wouldn't be trying to get out from under a distant enemy of a rich and powerful France this time, but instead full on bloody civil war that would make the last one look very civilised.

    10. Re:Agreed by qwijibo · · Score: 1

      Vote for a third party. Takes very little time, has no risk, but if enough people did it, we could have an alternative to the national socialist party (red or blue hats, they're all the same).

      I've heard that there are many prominent parties in India, none of which can get enough votes on their own, so they have to work together to get anything done. That's a much more realistic solution to our problem than hoping that one party will match all or even most of your views.

      Our federal-government-heavy system can't cope with the idea that people in California may have different views and want different laws than people in the bible belt. That's the whole idea with states rights - everyone doesn't have to agree or live with one set of standards.

      And if that doesn't work, vote for me for supreme emperor. I promise to prosecute everyone who violated their oath to defend the constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. =)

    11. Re: Agreed by nbauman · · Score: 2

      If you won't go to jail for your beliefs, then they might not be that important to you.

      Most of the major social movements, and you are hoping for a social movement, required confronting the state, and risking jail time. Civil rights in US easiest example, but Indian independence and anti-apartheid movement are others.

      I know people who went to jail for their beliefs.

      I don't suppose you have, have you?

      I'm ready to go to jail for my beliefs -- and I've confronted the authorities many times -- but I don't want to give up my life by doing something that is futile and won't work.

      I know people who went down South to work in the Civil Rights movement in the U.S., and one of them got killed. I wish I had gone with them. I didn't realize then how important it would be.

      One of the striking things I noticed was that many of them were Communists. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highlander_Folk_School http://vault.fbi.gov/Highlander%20Folk%20School

      The Communists taught them two important ideas: (1) You have to change the system. Incremental change will only make things worse. (2) The way to get something is to organize the people. And they taught people, like Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, how to organize.

      A lot of Communists left the party, and unfortunately went into the conservative movement, where they used the same techniques. When the Tea Party went to meet-your-Congressman meetings and shouted everybody else down, that was exactly what the Communists used to do.

      Unfortunately, we don't have anything like the Communist Party around any more to show people how to organize. Occupy Wall Street was a good try, but we don't have that culture any more.

      Now we just had a whole generation fall in love with Obama, who, with Rahm Emanuel, was just a front for the same corporate interests as the Republicans, and who got his campaign contributions from the same corporate interests as the Republicans.

    12. Re:Agreed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Your sense of entitlement is quite impressive.

    13. Re:Agreed by nbauman · · Score: 1

      I vote for the third party in every election.

      But I'm dismayed at the results of the 2000 presidential election. Nader got 3% of the vote. He cost the Democratic Party the election.

      There were 3 million voters who would have voted Democrat, and won the election for them, except that the Democratic Party was treating the left wing of their own party with contempt.

      So you'd think the Democratic Party would have learned from that -- if you tell the progressive Democrats to fuck off, they won't vote for you.

      But no. Once Obama got in (with all that help from the left) he immediately rejected the strongest, most rational progressive policy, single payer health care. When the progressives tried to drum up support for single payer, using the same kind of TV commercials that the right wing was using so successfully, Rahm Emanuel called them "fucking retarded" to their faces. And then the next day, when it got out, he apologized to the retarded organizations.

      That sends a message to me: The Democratic Party would rather lose the presidential election than even listen politely to the left. They'd rather serve their corporate contributors than make even the slightest accommodation to the people who vote for them.

      So the strategy of using a third party as a kind of gate to amplify the Democratic party towards the left doesn't seem to be working.

      So what's the goal of a third party? To ultimately win more votes than the Republicans or Democrats? One, two, many Vermonts? That doesn't seem likely any time soon. I don't see any popular uprising.

      In Europe, when the government tries to raise college tuition, students riot in the streets. Here, students are being turned into indentured servants by privatized loans, a legitimate outrageous injustice, and students don't do anything.

      If you can figure out how to get democracy back in America, let me know. I don't think I'll be alive to see it.

    14. Re:Agreed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And after you finish Heinlein, you should get started on Kafka:

      "Every revolution evaporates and leaves behind the slime of a new bureaucracy."

    15. Re:Agreed by ultranova · · Score: 1

      See Robert Heinlein's book "Take Back Your Government" for details.

      I remember reading "The Moon is a Harsh Mistress". I'm not so sure I'd want political reform to take cues from someone who was obviously quite enamored with the benevolent dictator archetype.

      --

      Forget magic. Any technology distinguishable from divine power is insufficiently advanced.

    16. Re:Agreed by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      If it involves "working through the system" though, HAHAHAHA.

      See Syria for details of how the other way works out. It wouldn't be trying to get out from under a distant enemy of a rich and powerful France this time, but instead full on bloody civil war that would make the last one look very civilised.

      It's unclear that anything else will be effective at this point. People who work through the system are rapidly co-opted or symbolically castrated.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    17. Re:Agreed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The work of Gene Sharp should be mentioned as well. Has helped topple oppressive regimes worldwide: How to start a revolution

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vk1XbyFv51k

  6. Sorry by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    (Sorry for bad englihs)

    As I have stated my opinion multiple times in last two decade, commercial, designers and politics has ruined the Internet
    WWW should have been mostly textual information with good clear layout without "Everything can be clickable" and fancy animations and pictures everywhere (CSS, you are terrible!).
    People have forgot that Internet is not same thing as WWW but WWW is only a "top-layer" using Internet and commercial has burn that false believe to consumers foreheads.
    Politics has ruined internet by trying to "own it", same manner as well commercial (ISP/Carriers, big corporations like Microsoft) by inventing own protocols or limiting access to API. How do I miss the times when Xerox Star was the thing with ethernet.

    It is sad thing that Unix in one manner died but nice to see that Linux is carrying the torch (vision) of possibility to have clear file-based networking systems.

    1. Re:Sorry by foniksonik · · Score: 1

      Your vision of the www is 1000x worse than what we have. It should be more open not less. Let people do what they want. Maybe we'll come back to hyper text markup eventually. For now everyone is way more excited about reactive data binding on the document object model and restful json data services. Oh and apps, lots of apps.

      --
      A fool throws a stone into a well and a thousand sages can not remove it.
  7. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by Shadow+of+Eternity · · Score: 1

    The sarcasm BURNS it's so powerful...

    --
    A bullet may have your name on it but splash damage is addressed "To whom it may concern."
  8. Good luck with that,,, by ksemlerK · · Score: 1

    Let me know how it turns out.

  9. Union by StripedCow · · Score: 1

    Actually, I think we need "unions" for programmers or engineers in general to sort out this kind of issue.

    As another example, if we had unions back in the Windows95 era, then there would never have been an IE6. We would have had stronger web standards.

    --
    If Pandora's box is destined to be opened, *I* want to be the one to open it.
    1. Re:Union by basecastula+ · · Score: 3, Funny

      gnUnion?

    2. Re:Union by jabberw0k · · Score: 4, Insightful

      If there had been programmer unions in the Win95 era, we never would have got rid of IE6 to protect all the people with certifications in IE6-specific programming. Spare us, please.

    3. Re:Union by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

      You're missing the bigger picture - if we had unions, we could sit behind nice desks, and have those with computers problems make appointments to see us (at times convenient for us, when we're not playing golf). Then we'd sit down and discuss the problem with them and go "reboot it twice and if it doesn't fix it call me in the morning", and charge a hefty fee.

    4. Re:Union by msobkow · · Score: 2

      You're in fantasy land.

      Working for a union just means more and more onerous paperwork than any other job I've ever worked. Shuffle this, shuffle that, shuffle, shuffle, shuffle.

      Even AT&T and Bell Canada didn't have as much paperwork as I got stuck filling out and filing while working a union job as a programmer.

      Hated it, big time!

      --
      I do not fail; I succeed at finding out what does not work.
    5. Re:Union by daem0n1x · · Score: 2

      In the US, union workersplay golf? That explains a lot about the US labour policies. I don't think you grasped the concept very well...

    6. Re:Union by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Bullshit, but go on believing whatever you want. Taking orders from large corporations with no ability to fight back against stuipidity is just fine, I guess? Every kind of dumb thing you associate with unions has at its root some kind of abuse by employers. The only thing seriously wrong with them is that these large mega-unions are just as overweight in useless administration as the corporations they complain about. That can be fixed, but the concept of people demanding certain wages/conditions/etc. and having some ability to enforce those demands is a good one.

      That said, it may not be the right solution for IT people. Our basic problem is lack of enforceable standards. We lack responsibility and accountability for the things we design. Frankly too many of us lack imagination (as to how our stuff will be abused) or we lack morals in that we won't say no to designing evil things. For that second thing, you need the ability to not get fired or blacklisted, hence some bargaining power.

      Now I know that stuff goes against all the Ayn Rand worshippers that seem to pervade this industry, and who brought us all these corporate/government backdoors and other such cooperation in the first place, but I can't help that. If we had an actual discipline like doctors, or especially like physical engineers do, an awful lot of the crap out there would either not be there or would be better built. It would take longer. It would also cost more. It would prevent a lot of Silicon Valley startups from starting up, and I don't care. I don't care because the net bad we've created vastly outweighs the net good. I'd trade all of Facebook, Twitter, Gmail, etc. to not have the NSA spying on everything we do. That's an easy trade for me because I don't use any of that garbage, but average people don't know why those things are bad, just like average people don't know why some building designs are safe and others are not. They shouldn't have to NEED to know just to survive, and in every other aspect of our society we've managed to do something to make it so they don't personally need to be an expert in everything.

      Granted some things we've done are bad, like the way lawyers have it rigged so you can't even give an opinion to somebody without risking "practicing law without a license"--the bar associations are a really bad model. Some others are OK, some are good, some are terrible. We have a lot of examples to know what works and what doesn't, but we lack the desire to be better, to get the weak and the corrupt out of our profession, and to stop designing things that are either easily breakable or deliberately backdoored.

    7. Re:Union by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      You're full of it. There's plenty of unions for programmers in Europe, and they have none of the problems that Americans seem to fear.

      Though I don't see how unionization should have prevented IE6. They mainly deal with things like avoiding overreaching non-compete clauses and getting ergonomic keyboards.

    8. Re:Union by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I've had a number of union programming jobs in Denmark. The union ensured that I got to take my vacation, that my contract was in order, that I got training on company time for new technology and that if something illegal happened, I'd have access to a lawyer. I don't doubt that what you are saying was true in your case, it's hardly a universal property of programmers' unions.

      We don't need unions. We need _good_ unions.

    9. Re:Union by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I agree. In my opinion, there needs to be controls on unions that have industry monopolies. My industry suffers greatly at the hands of one of the largest and strongest unions in the US. I routinely get calls from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on my every month filings because the pay and hours are so far out of line with anything that reasonably makes sense. We have manual laborers that makre more than our top paid executives in our american division, with bigger bonuses and benefits. We pay them to take printed spreadsheets and re-key them when we can send it in data fomat, which they refuse to accept because then they'd lose several useless cushy data entry jobs, all for several times more my salary. We can't protest because they can put us out of business in a week by striking at all of our locations on the entire eastern seaboard at once. It is a cartel, flat out.

    10. Re:Union by Necronomicode · · Score: 2

      And the moral of this story is that whether you are a government, union, company or individual, power corrupts eventually.

    11. Re:Union by Impy+the+Impiuos+Imp · · Score: 2

      Unions try to bloat their membership by requiring separate workers for different job classifications, even if that work type isn't full time.

      You must hire extra sweepers rather than have, say, machinists clean their own area at the end of the day, even on company time. Also, when Hostess went bankrupt, one of the things they got rid of was unions forcing two different delivery trucks, one for bread, one for sweets, even if they were going to the same delivery places. And at one point in the 1970s, the auto unions had something like 1 full-time, company-paid-for shop steward for every 6 employees, in stead of 30 or 100.

      Whatever good they do (which is always trotted out as a defense) they are the opposite of increasing efficiency and productivity trends.

      --
      (-1: Post disagrees with my already-settled worldview) is not a valid mod option.
    12. Re:Union by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You can always count on Libertarians to build an entire philosophy from speculation, hearsay, and anecdotes. Leave the science to scientists, we're trying to discuss politics, right?

    13. Re:Union by geminidomino · · Score: 1

      I think it was more angling towards lampooning MDs than UAW.

    14. Re:Union by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There's plenty of unions for programmers in Europe, and they have none of the problems that Americans seem to fear.

      It's a different culture. In Europe the union bosses don't see the union as a cash-cow, at least not so much. In America, the unions were very quickly seized by the mafia. They've worked most of that out; but it's still a racket.

      This is like saying, "there's freedom of religion in America, and they have none of the problems that Saudis seem to fear".

      You open up a church in Mecca, it'll burn. You start a union in America, it'll become a racket.

    15. Re:Union by squiggleslash · · Score: 1

      Wait, doctors are unionized? I didn't know that!

      --
      You are not alone. This is not normal. None of this is normal.
    16. Re:Union by jwhitener · · Score: 1

      Or the flips side would have happened: massive pressure from the union for MS to provide a smooth upgrade path from IE6 and to start supporting web standards.

  10. Mesh internet / web of trust now! by foreverdisillusioned · · Score: 1

    It's our only hope.

    Also: mandatory encryption, support for non-RSA modes of key exchange, and (this is what Tor really lacks) extra latency on request.

    1. Re:Mesh internet / web of trust now! by sxpert · · Score: 1

      either latency, or constant speed traffic with mostly useless junk inside

    2. Re:Mesh internet / web of trust now! by foreverdisillusioned · · Score: 1

      Junk traffic degrades performance for other people; optional variable latency improves it. That said, they could coexist.

    3. Re:Mesh internet / web of trust now! by foreverdisillusioned · · Score: 1

      And by non-RSA, I don't just mean elliptic curve. The encryption protocol needs to support stateful and nonstateful solutions. Symmetric-only with web of trust, asymmetric+symmetric (like we have now), changing-response symmetric signing as an alternative to asymmetric certs, even one time pads need to be supported. All of these have advantages and disadvantages. And it should never be obvious to an eavesdropper which is being used at any given time.

    4. Re:Mesh internet / web of trust now! by foreverdisillusioned · · Score: 1

      *challenge-response

    5. Re:Mesh internet / web of trust now! by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      That can be set up as a non profit. A small fee may go towards upkeep and community backhaul like equipment.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    6. Re:Mesh internet / web of trust now! by ClassicASP · · Score: 1

      I agree, but first we have to deal with a whole planet of naysayers who insist it can't be done. I've made the same mesh internet comment more times than I can remember, but someone always talks about latency and bottlenecking and a myriad of other arguments to support their stubborn position on the topic. My theory is: if we just go ahead and try doing it anyhow, solutions will be found in the course of time. Its just a matter of collective determination and will. Humanity can make it happen.

    7. Re:Mesh internet / web of trust now! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Your post reminds me of a usenet debate regarding how crypto software is engineered. In the debate, Terry Ritter ( http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/AUTHOR.HTM) argues that we shouldn't trust any single cryptographic algorithm as there is no formal proof of "strength" and we should assume adversaries that have resources greater than those in academia who will not publish what they know. He asks why we trust AES (or any other crypto algorithm) and why is crypto software engineered with this single point of failure. He advocates using 3 independently keyed algorithms and changing them frequently.

  11. What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 5, Informative
    FTFA:

    Since I started working with Snowden's documents, I have been using GPG, Silent Circle, Tails, OTR, TrueCrypt, BleachBit, and a few other things I'm not going to write about.

    He recommend Silent Circle right after saying "the NSA also works with security product vendors to ensure that commercial encryption products are broken in secret ways that only it knows about. "

    Silent circle - a US and UK connected commercial company - propriety closed source, and in a sneaky "no we are open, really trust us" sort of way. W T F!???

    let me reproduce this informative message posted to the comment section of the article:

    I usually rate Bruce Schneier highly, except for his faux pas a few years ago when he initially endorsed showing passwords on screen, saying that shoulder surfing is not such a big deal.

    But I am not sure about some of the security mobs he is advocating here.

    GPG: OK, clever people can read the source code (though most average Joe programmers can't)

    Silent Circle: It's USA based, and subject to the same backdoor 'requests' as anyone US-based company. It also employs ex-special forces 'security experts' - just the sort of people who might go and do wiretaps in foreign climes.

    Tails: What I have just seen on their website, 'Numerous security holes in Tails 0.19 Posted Mon 05 Aug 2013 12:00:00 AM CEST'. Not exactly the best advert and hardly comforting if one wanted security.

    OTR: Same as GPG as the source code is available.

    Truecrypt: Well the soruce code is avaiable, so I would put it in the same basket as GPG. It has a choice of algorithms, including one (partly) designed by Schneier.

    Bleachbit: Well that is client-side. Anything in the clear across the net (i.e. non encrypted traffic) can be read anywhere along the route.

    But the big glaring thing is, at least in the UK, you can be sent to prison for refusing to hand over your encryption keys. And this has happened. People like to talk big, but the prospect of eating porridge with a lot of nasty looking and foul smelling prisoners, does not appeal to most people.

    I would say that doing your own encryption, by this I mean using some of the open source tools and not closed source ones (and definitely not American ones) is a good thing.

    1. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 5, Informative

      He recommend Silent Circle right after saying "the NSA also works with security product vendors to ensure that commercial encryption products are broken in secret ways that only it knows about. "

      Do you know who founded and remains a principal of Silent Circle? Phil fucking Zimmermann. This is the guy who wrote and released PGP because he feared the NSA would get away with forcing everyone to use their back-doored skipjack clipper chip. He was subsequently harassed with a criminal investigation. If there is one guy that you can trust not to knuckle under to the NSA, it is Phil Zimmermann.

      In fact, Silent Circle just withdrew their Silent Mail product because they feared that the NSA would force them to backdoor it in the near future. They canceled a product line rather than risk it being compromised.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    2. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 4, Interesting

      All fair points. Gag orders are gag orders however and they do not care for big famous names. If it does not have peer reviewed source code hanging out there - how can we trust it especially given this latest bombshell of a revelation showing just how far they are willing to go to "undermine the social contract" of the Internet?

    3. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If I cannot compile it to use it and must reply on binaries shipped to me by a private company, then this latest news just underlines the fact: YOU CANT TRUST THAT PRODUCT. Any security company that does not go full open source after these revelations is just being disingenuous, no matter how many big names you throw about as some kind of ultimate proof that the binary is secure. Let me raise a term that security professionals love to toss about to justify not bothering to encrypt anything at all: "False sense of security". If it is closed source, then that is at best all you got...

    4. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Peer review is no panacea. I'm not going to argue against open-source, but open-source is at significant risk too. You can't pull an _NSAKEY but with the resources available to the NSA it is no big feat to weaken an implementation in a non-obvious way.

      Silent Circle's approach is that they sell their software to the US and UK government. If the NSA were to require them to install a secret backdoor then the NSA would be compromising the security of all of their government customers because they don't sell two different versions of their software, it is the same for all customers.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    5. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by wbr1 · · Score: 4, Informative
      About tails..you say the 'numerous security hols found' is not comforting...Did you read the post?

      The tails devs regularly post all the security hols found, with links to the source of the hole, and then patch it in the next version.

      The issues are often bugs in the browser, or libcrypt, or some other part of the system. Perhaps even a new TOR version. Since they are essentially just packaging a distribution, this shows not that it is OMG SCARY UNSAFE, but that they are staying abreast of the issues with the apps and libs they roll into their distro. Not just keeping up with it, but linking right on the front page all the information you need to determine if this is a significant threat or applies to you.

      If you cannot bother to read the reports or care to even try to understand what they mean, then perhaps you should stick with windows. It auto updates for you and sound more than secure for your purposes.

      --
      Silence is a state of mime.
    6. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I agree that peer review is no panacea and that open-source is at significant risk too. however open peer review is sure better than no open review. Silent Circle could easily continue to sell their services to the US and UK government AND fully open source the code. Why dont they? More $$$ instead of more security, more likely - not a good sign.

      Also your logic that they sell their software to the US and UK government so the NSA would not want to backdoor it does not hold up to scrutiny. How do we know that the NSA does not buy 10K worth a licenses - hardly a blip on their budget - just to shelve and never use them. In exchange the Silent Circle product is backed doored through gag orders, threats, coercion and/or covertly subverted (all things we know they now do, regularly). How do we know that the binary we get is not different than the binary the NSA gets - because their sales team told us?

      There is no way around it anymore - if your a company providing security products and your not full open source, and that source has not been stable and well reviewed for some time, then your product cannot be trusted no matter how many famous upstanding people are on your board of directors or licenses the US/UK Gov buys from you.

    7. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by mcneely.mike · · Score: 0

      Tomorrows Obituary page:

      'Phil Zimmermann has, unfortunately died. His company, Silent Circle, is currently looking for a new CEO... one who cannot be compro... comprom... (sorry... just can't type this with a straight face)... one whose morality is beyond compare...(snicker)

      His company, Silent Circle, is now looking for Jesus as their CEO...... someone the NSA has not gotten to...(oh man, this is hilarious to type... Hey Joe, come read this stuff I'm typing in this guys obituary... it's incredible.... someone the NSA hasn't gotten to... good stuff here, man!'

      :)

      Richard Stallman perhaps?

      --
      soylentnews.org Go there to enjoy the people!
    8. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      TrueCrypt supports hidden volumes. So you're free to give up your "encryption key" and just put stuff like your tax returns in the volume you want them to find. They have no way of proving otherwise that a second partition even exists.

    9. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Ash+Vince · · Score: 2, Insightful

      There is no way around it anymore - if your a company providing security products and your not full open source, and that source has not been stable and well reviewed for some time, then your product cannot be trusted no matter how many famous upstanding people are on your board of directors or licenses the US/UK Gov buys from you.

      But if you do release all your source then someone can take all you hard work and then undercut you on price in the case of something like silent circle where you are selling a service not a product. Alternative people can take your source and just use it in house to roll their own solution. In both of these cases nobody pays you a penny and you go broke real fast.

      Open Source is really tricky to do well and make money from and sometimes it is just not a viable business model.

      --
      I dont read /. to RTFA, I read /. to offend people in ignorance.
    10. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In this area, binary-only junk is a showstopper to begin with.

      Regardless of Phil fucking Zimmermann or not.

    11. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      But if you do release all your source then someone can take all you hard work and then undercut you on price in the case of something like silent circle where you are selling a service not a product. Alternative people can take your source and just use it in house to roll their own solution. In both of these cases nobody pays you a penny and you go broke real fast.

      Yes and yes. So it is more $$$ Vs more security/customer (and leechers) confidence in your product decision. This latest round of news will galvanize a new round of "If it is not open source it cannot be trusted" thinking so closed and partially closed source companies may now start to sell less sales - the balance is tipping in favor of coming clean, opening up all the source and selling your professional services on the side. Yes less $$$, but I think that is going to happen anyway now that anyone who is paying attention will start to steer clear of closed source security products.

      Oh, and the rout many companies seem to take of partially opening their source or showing source to companies who sign NDA's just does not cut it - it does not allow widespread many eyes peer review of the source over a long period so is little better than fully closed source.

    12. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      More likely -- The tails devs regularly add new security holes, regularly post all the security holes found, with links to the source of the hole, then patch it in the next version while releasing new security holes.

    13. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Or, it's closed source so the NSA can't make their own copy with a back door and then force the secure version out the market so that everyone uses their version. While I agree that open source is preferable, it might be that the author is sacrificing one moral to protect a greater one.

    14. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Kinwolf · · Score: 1

      Err, what article are you talking about? I read the article linked in the summary and nowhere does he talks about GPG or others. I'd be interested in reading the FA you are quoting from.

    15. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You have no way of proving otherwise that a second partition doesn't exist. The US and UK are heading towards "guilty until proven innocent".

      FTFY

    16. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      Sorry your right I mixed up his article links. Here is the one I was quoting: "How to remain secure against NSA surveillance"

    17. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What all the TrueCrypt messengers forget is, using it will alert any half-decent investigator to the fact you are hiding something. And now you can't prove you've shown them everything. In "The War Against Terror(ism)" you'll find that you have to prove your innocence, not that they have to prove your guilt. And now you can't.

    18. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I believe one issue people think we have is that the root CA's are compromised. Now I have no information one way or another there, but if that is true, one possibility might be a web of trust type approach. For instance, rather than one signing authority, you could use three and then use three levels of public key encryption. The assumption would be that if say the CA's were in countries that did not trust each other, then presumably at least one of the signing keys would remain secure regardless...

    19. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

      TrueCrypt supports hidden volumes. So you're free to give up your "encryption key" and just put stuff like your tax returns in the volume you want them to find. They have no way of proving otherwise that a second partition even exists.

      I'm not smart about these things. If I have a 1TB drive and only a .5TB visible partition, are the Feds going to fall for the story that I've given them everything? Don't they know about the "hidden partition" trick yet?

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    20. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by PopeRatzo · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Bruce Schneier is putting his name on the line with everything he publicly does and says. I trust him more than I trust someone who posts FUD wanting to know what his "game" is.

      One thing about the compromised web: don't trust anyone but really be suspicious when someone tries to spread FUD on someone who has generally been trustworthy.

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    21. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by wisnoskij · · Score: 0

      I disagree, completely.

      Open source is just one more whole that they can insert malicious code into. They can still go up to the head of the open source organization and says "you must include this back-door in your program, or go to jail". Or/and they can just just hire someone to contribute code that has security flaws.

      And in the extremely unlikely event that anyone spots the bas code, just replace it with something else 2 days latter.

      --
      Troll is not a replacement for I disagree.
    22. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 5, Insightful

      They can still go up to the head of the open source organization and says "you must include this back-door in your program, or go to jail". Or/and they can just just hire someone to contribute code that has security flaws.

      And in the extremely unlikely event that anyone spots the bas code, just replace it with something else 2 days latter.

      Yes they could, and probably do. However your leap to the conclusion that it is extremely unlikely that anyone spots code change is not correct. Thousands of people, even millions for the more successful products will update their source code repositories - the exact lines of source code that have changed will be highly visible to many people - and a subset of those will be security professionals and they are _very_ interested in any changes to the base code of their main security tools. You just proposing that we close our eyes download a binary and trust it instead. To reiterate: todays news has told us just how far the NSA has gone to compromise ALL MAJOR proprietary closed source security tools. All of them.

    23. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by bolek_b · · Score: 1
      The visible partition reports whole 1TB. Truecrypt does not "know" about the hidden partition nor tries to protect it. If you store 1TB of data in the visible part, you will damage whatever was stored in that hidden compartment (the hidden part is stored at the very end of the container file).

      For example, I do have a file 2GB large. But it is 99% empty, as I store only passwords, private keys, scans of various personal documents etc. there, all together takes up a couple of megabytes. If there was a need, I could put a 1,5TB hidden partition there. I would argue that the container file size was based on some assumptions regarding future content...

    24. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 0

      I posted FUD - Please elaborate? I called into question his promotion of Silent Circle - a US based closed source company, that todays news and Schneier himself repeats: all major closed source security software providers are the target of NSA pressure and to insert backdoors, weaken their algorithms, expose their keys etc etc. If I misinterpreted something or posted FUD please feel free to articulate exactly where, thanks.

    25. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Vintermann · · Score: 1

      Also, Silent Circle offers something currently very few or no one else offers: encrypted calls and videoconferencing from your cell phone. I'm sure Bruce Schneier would have recommended the mature, well-examined open source alternative, if it existed.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    26. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by elashish14 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Open Source is really tricky to do well and make money from and sometimes it is just not a viable business model.

      Agreed, but the counterargument is that if it's closed source, you can't trust its security, and nobody should really trust it anyways. Why would I use some security software if it may well be carrying around an NSA backdoor? Why should anyone pay for it?

      Once you close the source to your security product, you effectively have no product anymore. Open source is not 100% bulletproof, but closed source is by this point bloody close to 0%.

      --
      I have left slashdot and am now on Soylent News. FUCK YOU DICE.
    27. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Vintermann · · Score: 3, Interesting

      They can still go up to the head of the open source organization and says "you must include this back-door in your program, or go to jail".

      And what happens if he refuses? Is he "disappeared"? A public prosecution would be risky, of course, since then they would have to reveal (at the very least) that they tried to force him to do something bad.

      And what if he complies? He inserts the line, it's immediately spotted by his co-developers and they say "no way that goes in, it's an obvious security hole!". Project maintainer says "Um. I'll just keep it in my tree if it's all the same to you. Maybe you can leave it out in your trees."

      Life isn't nearly as easy for NSA as you would believe. Especially not these days. Thank God.

      --
      xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
    28. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by chill · · Score: 3, Interesting

      That is a red herring.

      Will the security researchers be putting that level of scrutiny on evey desktop application?

      Screw trying to backdoor the security software. It is much easier to simply backdoor something innocuous to get a foothold on the machine. Once it is compromised, just read all the encrypted stuff BEFORE IT GETS ENCRYPTED.

      --
      Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
    29. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by wisnoskij · · Score: 2

      OK, but defence is 100 times harder than offences. It would be relatively easy to plan a security hole that is implemented only over a 2 month period in completely unrelated parts of the problem.

      And if you have the authority to arrest anyone who does not comply, it would be easy for the compiled binaries to be different than the source code in one or two tiny ways.

      Done right, by security experts, it would be impossible to spot.

      --
      Troll is not a replacement for I disagree.
    30. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      Yes this - it is the only conclusion I can think of as well. However if your a high profile security expert going to start making recommendations to people you really have the utmost responsibility to point this out. Something like: "Silent Circle, it is closed source and the news I am writing about todays shows that we just cannot trust it but it is the only thing we have got until it is open sourced and reviewed, or another FOSS competitor comes along. Use at your own risk don't use it with a false sense of security."

    31. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The user's PoV is this: do I go with the company who have made a very difficult business decision which is making their life hard? Or do I go with the company who has things a bit easier, but whose product simply can't be verified to work?

      What would you do, as a user (not a developer who is required to "eat his own dog food")?

    32. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by marauder · · Score: 1

      Yes they know about the hidden partition. What's worse is that they can't prove it's there, but you can't prove it's not there. They will rubber-hose you until you give up the secret partition. If you don't actually have a secret partition to give up, they'll rubber-hose you forever.

    33. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by smpoole7 · · Score: 3, Interesting

      >> Open Source ... is just not a viable business model.

      > Agreed ... closed source ... can't trust ...

      But then again, one of Bruce's arguments is that WE -- the engineers and geeks who built the Internet -- should fix it. Doesn't that imply an open source approach as well? The existence of third-party, closed-source vendors is just a symptom of the underlying problem. If they go out of business as a result of the Net being "fixed" by the community, then ... oh, well. Just my opinion.

      Interesting discussion, by the way.

      --
      Cogito, igitur comedam pizza.
    34. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      After the problems with Diginotar being compromised, I've completely lost all trust in the "Chain of Trust" of any CA and consider them all to be compromised.

      Why I have made this decision is based upon the entire trust model of the Certificates themselves. By default the Root CA is trusted by every other CA and the originating key for each and every certificate is a subkey of the Root key. This means the government or anyone else only has to compromise Verisigns master key to break every other key on the net. Don't believe me, just check out PGP/GPG and their sub-keys. Could I be wrong on a technical basis - Sure but that no longer mattes because the entire house of cards is collapsing. Slowly due to the lack of trust that has occured.

    35. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's not how a hidden partition works.

      When unlocking a truecrypt volume you have to give the main partition passphrase. You can optionally give the hidden partition passphrase as well.

      If you don't supply a hidden partition passphrase (either because you don't have a hidden partition or because you don't want to) then the drive will happily mount with just the main passphrase.

      the unlocked volume will appear as if it has the full volume available and you will be able to use the entire volume... if you do it will clobber the hidden partition though as the hidden partition is stored in the unallocated area of the main partition.

      It is by design that there is no way to tell the difference between a volume with a hidden partition and one without.

    36. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      Impossible I am not so sure. Less probable might be more accurate for the situation you describe - it might just take longer but the chance of discovering the security flaw is still there. Even if it is not discovered directly all it takes is one compromised system to have everyone jumping on the code to review it. If this news is to be believed, choosing any major US/UK proprietary security product now means that there is no defense or offense - you have lost outright from the start. So I think informed decision makers when it comes to security software concerns will begin to migrate away from closed source now that the cat is out of the bag... only time will tell.

    37. Re: What is Bruce Schneier's game? by tolkienfan · · Score: 2

      You are utterly wrong.

      Backdoors in encryption software would necessarily involve weakening the core encryption code. This section rarely changes, and is the most important part to get right. It's also not a lot of code. Any changes to this section will get a LOT of scrutiny.
      Plus, it's actually hard to weaken encryption... you probably go after the key generation and make it generate keys from a smaller space than necessary.
      To write code like that and sneak it in without it being spotted would be very difficult. The NSA isn't magical.
      My bigger fear is that the currently popular encryption methods have already been broken for current sized keys at the NSA. It's just not possible to prove an encryption algorithm secure.
      I just saw a story about the discrete log problem being closer to a solution. The NSA has been ahead of public sector researchers in the past, and it's reasonable to expect that will continue.

    38. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That sounds like a variant of the broken window fallacy. For what reason would they want to act like that?

    39. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Do you know who founded and remains a principal of Silent Circle? Phil fucking Zimmermann.

      Wow. Zimmermann is a busy guy. I still don't know how he finds time to be neighbourhood watch as well....

    40. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by bryguy5 · · Score: 5, Interesting

      I worry more about the NSA putting something in the binary on popular linux distributions. If they modified the c compiler to put backdoors in the programs it creates it would be very hard to detect. The backdoors would not be in any visible source code but would magically get inserted during the compilation, especially the complilation of a new compiler.

      Does anyone know if anyone is actively looking for that type of exploit?

    41. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      N.S.A.

    42. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by ultranova · · Score: 1

      And what happens if he refuses? Is he "disappeared"?

      Or has an accident. Or an anonymous tip results in a raid that optionally kills him and reveals a meth lab at his home. Or child porn on his computer. Or he is accused of rape or molesting children and gets put to the sex offender registry. Or a kin of his dies and it's discovered he took a life insurance in their name a month earlier.

      The possibilities are endless.

      --

      Forget magic. Any technology distinguishable from divine power is insufficiently advanced.

    43. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Sloppy · · Score: 2

      Open source is just one more whole that they can insert malicious code into. They can still go up to the head of the open source organization and says "you must include this back-door in your program, or go to jail"

      But then they also have to persuade all the users to adopt that fork. "Use crappy software or go to jail," didn't even work for the MPAA, so why does the NSA think they have a chance? ;-)

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    44. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I don't recognize gag orders. Only if it comes from a bonefid judge and bonafid court (not FISA).

    45. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by DuckDodgers · · Score: 5, Insightful

      If the root certificate private key is held by the NSA, they can bypass the entire remainder of the web of trust.

      Say I set up a website, whatever.com, and I have a root certificate from Verisign, an intermediate from Intermediate CA, Inc, and my whatever.com certificate. If the NSA subpoenas or hacks and steals the Verisign root certificate, they can make a fake public and private key with the name Intermediate CA, Inc and sign that with the Verisign private key. Then they can make a public and private key for whatever.com. Then they use their fake Intermediate CA Inc.certificate to sign that. Unless you the person visiting whatever.com specifically have an original copy of the real whatever.com certificate public key, and you look at the public key of the certificate every time you visit the website, you'll never notice that the NSA has replaced the real certificate with theirs. As long as they're using the correct Verisign private key, your browser will not detect any problems.

      This of course permits the NSA to do a classic Man-In-The-Middle attack. They give your browser the fake certificate chain and a copy of the website login page, you type things in, they decrypt them, and use them to log in to the real website, they get the results back from the real website, re-encrypt them with the fake certificate chain, and send them back to you. As far as you know you're using the real website, as far as the website server knows they're speaking with a normal browser, but the NSA is capturing everything either side transmits in clear text and can inject fake content in either direction whenever they want.

      The SSL/TLS chain of trust only works if private keys of the root certificate authorities are genuinely private. If anyone gets a private key, SSL's security is demolished (unless the theft of that private key becomes public, in which case that key is added to certificate revocation lists).

    46. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by mlts · · Score: 2

      Maybe we need to move to a superset of the existing CA system, to a WoT. That way, CAs can suggest that a key offered from somewhere is legit, but are not the be all and end all. Plus, a CA can be trusted, semi-trusted, or left untrusted. Semi-trusted would mean that if multiple CAs in different countries all signed a cert, then that cert is likely OK and hasn't been tampered with.

      The problem, as always, is end user education. The days of just assuming that a green lock icon on a webpage meaning complete assurance are gone, although one can always show trust level with some method. However, and end user might just not bother if it gets in the way of him getting to his bank or whatnot.

    47. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Sloppy · · Score: 1

      For instance, rather than one signing authority, you could use three and then use three levels of public key encryption.

      This is, in fact, The Best way to make PKI work. But it's not that there are multiple "levels" of PK encryption. It's that there are multiple attestations ("that key belongs to that person") in parallel, chosen by the users (and the details of their choice not strictly known to the attacker, though assuming they use gpg's defaults are a pretty decent bet), and for the output to be wrong, all the certs have to be consistently wrong.

      The strength of a good WoT connection is that it requires the attacker to develop a wide conspiracy (and those are hard to keep secret) rather than coercing central authorities (which can be kept secret, though amusingly, we've learned it doesn't even have to be a secret in order to work). It multiplies defection probability estimates, quickly turning it into a pretty small number. (The downside is that the chaining does the opposite, so you've really gotta get out there and build up a lot of links. And yet, at least chaining is better than nothin'.)

      Verisign can keep a NSL secret. The dozen people that you know, all of which signed a government's or criminal's replacement key for the guy that you're trying to talk to, can't keep the NSL secret.

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    48. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by thoromyr · · Score: 2

      I'm not sure that I would've categorized it as FUD, but some defintions.

      FUD: Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt characterized by non-specific statements and innuendo to create such about specific targets

      Fear: that encryption will be bypassed
      Uncertainty: you can't trust closed source software
      Doubt: in the silent circle offering

      Fear: that you can't trust Schneier
      Uncertainty: he recommends silent circle, but recommends against US/UK based software
      Doubt: maybe Schneier has a hidden agenda

      As to silent circle: you have no evidence that silent circle is compromised and appear to rely on Schneier's general caution and ignore mitigations. In essence this is relying on Schneier's general advice for a specific case and posits Schneier as an authority.

      As to Schneier: you take your application of Schneier's general (not absolute) rule in a specific case and find that it contradicts his *specific* recommendation. Somehow you find a contradiction in this.

      There is no contradiction.

      I can safely say that -- in general -- male athletes run faster than female athletes. Or, more particularly, I might recommend that if you bet on the outcome of a race that you put your money on male athletes rather than female. However, in terms of *specific* recommendations I might recommend putting money on a particular female athlete in a particular race. This may appear contradictory, but only until you realize that this female athlete out performs most male athletes.

      Schneier may not have specifically justified his recommendation of silent circle despite where they are based, but others have pointed out logical reasons why. There are plenty of reasons for people to take Schneier and Phil Zimmerman seriously even if they don't provide a detailed analysis of all parts of a statement.

    49. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 1

      How do we know that the NSA does not buy 10K worth a licenses - hardly a blip on their budget - just to shelve and never use them.

      Because Silent Circle has support contracts that involve interacting with the actual users. The big money is always in the support contracts.

      . Silent Circle could easily continue to sell their services to the US and UK government AND fully open source the code. Why dont they? More $$$ instead of more security, more likely

      If they open-sourced it, then the NSA gets the opportunity to pervert the public release while building a secure release for the government customers who need the product - thus eliminating the one piece of leverage that Silent Circle can use to keep the NSA from weakening their software.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    50. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by mlts · · Score: 1

      If done, someone running diffs would spot it pretty soon. What is to worry about would be a site that offers binaries (RPMs for example) to have those from a different built tree than where the source comes from.

    51. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Sloppy · · Score: 1

      There mere fact that you're being investigated already means they're convinced you're hiding something. Even before they find out you're using TrueCrypt, you have already lost and they've already decided to torture/terrorize/imprison/expensively_annoy you.

      The tech is irrelevant in cases like this. Imagine the same scenario, where you're not using TrueCrypt, and you simply don't have the data that they want. Same exact outcome.

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    52. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Sloppy · · Score: 1

      Bruce Schneier is putting his name on the line with everything he publicly does and says.

      Or somebody is putting his name on the line. Did you check the fingerprint? ;-)

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    53. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And what happens if he refuses? Is he "disappeared"? A public prosecution would be risky, of course, since then they would have to reveal (at the very least) that they tried to force him to do something bad.

      Uh, that's why we have extraordinary rendition, agreements with maniacal regimes with no scruples, and as a last resort, Gitmo.

    54. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by dbIII · · Score: 4, Insightful

      People who torture will just make up evidence anyway. What you say is not going to matter. It's a terror tactic and not for information gathering - the KGB knew that from day one due to their Czarist predecessors, it's only us in the west that get suckered by "24" or whatever into thinking it's a way to get people to confess secrets.

    55. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      Uncertainty: you can't trust closed source software

      Schneier is talking about and responding to a news story is exactly about this - with examples right from the mouth of the NSA.

      As to silent circle: you have no evidence that silent circle is compromised

      ...and there is no evidence that it is not. Worse, it is impossible for anyone to really check given its closed source nature which leads back to the whole basis for the news story and the evidence presented within. Further, Silent Circle have released select source code samples however journalists covering the company have assumed or been led to believe that their products is full open source peer reviewed - when it has not been - dishonest.

      Fear: that you can't trust Schneier ... Doubt: maybe Schneier has a hidden agenda

      Clearly a a straw man argument there. I never said or implied that you can't trust Schneier or that he has a hidden agenda. What I did imply and question, very clearly, was his recommendation of a questionable product - right after talking about why we can no longer trust these kinds of products, to quote:

      As was revealed today, the NSA also works with security product vendors to ensure that commercial encryption products are broken in secret ways that only it knows about. We know this has happened historically: CryptoAG and Lotus Notes are the most public examples, and there is evidence of a back door in Windows. A few people have told me some recent stories about their experiences, and I plan to write about them soon. Basically, the NSA asks companies to subtly change their products in undetectable ways: making the random number generator less random, leaking the key somehow, adding a common exponent to a public-key exchange protocol, and so on. If the back door is discovered, it's explained away as a mistake. And as we now know, the NSA has enjoyed enormous success from this program.

      As a widely read and listened to high profile security professional that many people take seriously (including myself) he does have a a heavy responsibility to be forthcoming when he recommends security software to people. Instead of just blurting out that he uses Silent Circle (and so you should too) he could have taken his responsibility more seriously and written something like: "Silent Circle, it is closed source and the news I am writing about todays shows that it falls into the high risk category - but it is the only thing we have got until it is open sourced and reviewed, or another FOSS competitor comes along. Use at your own risk don't use it with a false sense of security.".

      Am I asking too much or spreading "FUD" - I don't think so.

    56. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by neuro88 · · Score: 1

      Peer review is no panacea. I'm not going to argue against open-source, but open-source is at significant risk too. You can't pull an _NSAKEY but with the resources available to the NSA it is no big feat to weaken an implementation in a non-obvious way.

      Silent Circle's approach is that they sell their software to the US and UK government. If the NSA were to require them to install a secret backdoor then the NSA would be compromising the security of all of their government customers because they don't sell two different versions of their software, it is the same for all customers.

      In fact, I think you may very well be correct. I think it's time for folks to take another look at this story:
      http://blogs.csoonline.com/1296/an_fbi_backdoor_in_openbsd

    57. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Fnord666 · · Score: 3, Informative

      This of course permits the NSA to do a classic Man-In-The-Middle attack. They give your browser the fake certificate chain and a copy of the website login page, you type things in, they decrypt them, and use them to log in to the real website, they get the results back from the real website, re-encrypt them with the fake certificate chain, and send them back to you. As far as you know you're using the real website, as far as the website server knows they're speaking with a normal browser, but the NSA is capturing everything either side transmits in clear text and can inject fake content in either direction whenever they want.

      This is why there are browser addons such as Perspectives which allow you to verify the certificate and will notify you if a certificate's signature changes at any time.

      --
      'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
    58. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by MacDork · · Score: 3, Interesting

      In both of these cases nobody pays you a penny and you go broke real fast.

      So you can't make money off the code. Who cares? Vine is free, yet they sell cute stickers in app. They make a ton of money and the messenger app is just the vehicle to sell stickers. What is to stop anyone making a messenger app with strong end to end encryption that is open source and also happens to sell these copyrighted stickers? Oh, right, nothing. That's a very easy, proven way to make money.

      Want to add some trust to the build for regular people? Post a page stating "We have never received a request by the NSA to distribute a broken product" and leave that page posted so long as it is true. If the page goes down, someone not related to the company can post a build, post the same message and again, as long as it is true, the message stays up. If you think that third party is the NSA and lying, you have the build instructions. Build it yourself, just to be sure. In fact, the build instructions could be as simple as install java, click this .jnlp that installs a hudson build server locally which does the build for you.

    59. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      If they open-sourced it, then the NSA gets the opportunity to pervert the public release

      This was covered by someone else in the thread above. TL;DR "But then they also have to persuade all the users to adopt that [new NSA modified] fork. " - i.e. not going to happen.

      ...while building a secure release for the government customers who need the product - thus eliminating the one piece of leverage that Silent Circle can use to keep the NSA from weakening their software.

      Do you really think the NSA or any big govermental agency serious about security buys binaries from Silent Circle and never sees the full source code? Of course not - if the NSA buys any software it is after signing NDA's and reviewing the source themselves.

      Support contracts are how companies with open source products make most of their big money as well... remind me again why Silent Circle have not open sourced their security software. At the end of the day it is their right to do what they want with it, but a security expert like Schneier should know better than go recommending to use it in a high profile post read by many non security experts without any caveat's or warnings.

    60. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by thoromyr · · Score: 1

      hey, you asked to have what you said broken down into FUD. I started by saying I wouldn't necessarily categorize it as FUD, but showed how to apply.

      Funny what qualifies as a strawman these days...

    61. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by sexconker · · Score: 1

      I don't recognize gag orders. Only if it comes from a bonefid judge and bonafid court (not FISA).

      I don't recognize gag orders. I have a fundamental, inalienable right to free speech. It is impossible for the government to legally limit my speech.
      I may be held accountable for the direct consequences of my speech, but the government does not have the legal power to limit my speech.
      Every judge who has ruled otherwise is a traitor and a moron who can't read English at a 2nd grade level.

    62. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by GargamelSpaceman · · Score: 1

      This is more interesting than what I posted. I wish I'd modded instead.

      --
      ...
    63. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      My apologies I read it as backing up the original accusation (which surprised me!) Thank's for helping me interpreter the accusation then ;-)

    64. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why don't they just move operations overseas rather than just pretend that only the USA exists. I know there's a lot of thick bastards out there who actually believe that, but company chairmen should know there are other markets beyond the USA and that by basing their operations overseas especially away from allies or even potential allies, they are out of NSA danger.

    65. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by LoRdTAW · · Score: 2

      Sounds like you are talking about Ken Thompson's speech/paper "Reflections on Trusting Trust". If you read the Wikipedia article on Backdoor (computing) there was a virus, W32/Induc-A, which used the tactic to infect the Delphi compiler and produce tainted binaries. The GNU site which distributes the GCC suite only offers source so the source could be checked for such exploits. A tainted binary distribution could be planted into a distro repository or malicious ISO images could be distributed. Bittorrent is used for ISO distribution and could be used to seed malicious pieces to unsuspecting users. A clever attack would be to figure out which pieces contain the target binary and switch those pieces for the infected one using a collision attack to disguise it. Then connect to the torrent as seed with a fat pipe and log all ip's that downloaded that piece and wait. Might be difficult if the binary spans multiple pieces but could be done.

    66. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by amicusNYCL · · Score: 2

      It is much easier to simply backdoor something innocuous to get a foothold on the machine.

      Right, in the XKeyscore presentation slides that were released, one of the example queries was "give me a list of all exploitable machines in country X."

      --
      "Our two-party system is like a bowl of shit looking at itself in a mirror." - Lewis Black
    67. Re: What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Prune · · Score: 1

      > I just saw a story about the discrete log problem being closer to a solution.

      And yet, Schneier recommends encryption based on it over elliptic curves (though, to be fair, the latter is recommended by the NSA).

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
    68. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There are numerous companies making money off free software and contributing to it and dependent on it. ThinkPenguin for instance has a policy of only shipping free software friendly hardware. They refused to ship a newer USB N adapter for years. They finally got Atheros to release the code (with help from various others) to newer firmware under various free software licenses. The point of this is that you can make money off free software. There sales are heavily dependent on the code being available and there reputation thereof.

      But it's not just them doing it. CodeWeavers also does it. They release the majority of there code and while there have been numerous others whom have tried to make money off it the most successful (only successful?) company has been the primary contributor.

      I won't even mention Redhat or the dozens of other companies/organizations which have succeeded.

      And it doesn't have to be just a company. There are non-profit organizations which are succeeding as well. Tor for example employs a number of developers and other individuals, MailPile, and MediaGoblin too.

    69. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Or he could only make the investigation go away by agreeing to add a backdoor.

      Just a quick conspiracy idea, but who knows what people can be made to do by mighty gouvernment agencies.

    70. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by amicusNYCL · · Score: 1

      Further, Silent Circle have released select source code samples however journalists covering the company have assumed or been led to believe that their products is full open source peer reviewed - when it has not been - dishonest.

      If you're going to accuse Silent Circle of being dishonest for leading journalists to believe that their products are 100% open source and peer reviewed, then either you need to show your sources for that claim or admit to just a bit of hyperbole that could be interpreted as FUD. The fact that they closed down their mail product rather than risk giving in to the NSA lends them a certain amount of credibility when we know that other major companies have been complicit in this for years without saying anything.

      Maybe their mail product was already compromised, I don't know. I don't have any information on that so I'm not going to suggest that it is a possibility and risk sounding like I am trying to make people uncertain, or doubtful.

      I'm not trying to attack your personally, this is a good and necessary discussion to have and I'm glad that there are so many more people paying attention to what government is doing today versus during the last election. It needs to continue.

      Now if I could just find a credible organization with a sufficient lack of apathy to publish and support my essay about what the problems with government are and how to fix them. I was hoping the League Of Women Voters would help me out, but they appear completely uninterested.

      --
      "Our two-party system is like a bowl of shit looking at itself in a mirror." - Lewis Black
    71. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by bill_mcgonigle · · Score: 1

      If there is one guy that you can trust not to knuckle under to the NSA, it is Phil Zimmermann.

      I think this is right, but does PZ have complete control of Silent Circle? Does he audit every line of code? Is there nobody at SS who would comply with a lead-pipe backed order?

      The one advantage LavaBit had is that it was a one-man show. Anybody who has investor money will most likely not scuttle the ship. Yeah, SS scuttled a product that wasn't their core offering or even very popular.

      --
      My God, it's Full of Source!
      OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
    72. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Open Source is really tricky to do well and make money from and sometimes it is just not a viable business model.

      I would argue thinking about open source as a business model (i.e. a way to make money) is a fundamental and philosophical mistake, regardless of what product is being developed. In general, it leads primarily to problems. Case in point, Ubuntu...

    73. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      Yes you could be right it could be hyperbole - however it does have some legs to stand on especially in some of the marketing/media stories targeted at the less technically inclined like the one I just linked. An uninformed reader would read that article and arguably assume that the product is all open source peer reviewed, "torn to shreds" and no possibility for govermental back doors. Ok yes maybe dishonest is too strong a term, but it certainly creates distrust for those of us that pay attention to this little detail.

      The fact that they closed down their mail product rather than risk giving in to the NSA lends them a certain amount of credibility when we know that other major companies have been complicit in this for years without saying anything.

      If everything is as they say it is, then yes, it is very admiral of them. That in no way should buy them a free pass validating all the binaries they sellwith a free security pass though, should it? The cynical might conclude differently, saying that Silent Circle may have taken the opportunity to both terminated a low profit product and win marketing feel good points in the process driving sales of their more popular and profitable products. The really paranoid might conclude that they shutdown the mail service because if they didn't follow LavaBit's lead and it ever got out, their reputation would be nil.

      Personally I do not consider myself paranoid or overly cynical so do not believe in those two theories - but I am concerned when high profile security researches recommend security software that many will take as good advice when there is a very good chance the thing is compromised given what we have learned from the news (and Schneier's own research) today.

      Like you I also welcome the debate and agree with Schneier's goal of encouraging engineers to "take back the internet". Good luck getting that essay published.

    74. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Kadin2048 · · Score: 1

      If the NSA were to require them to install a secret backdoor then the NSA would be compromising the security of all of their government customers because they don't sell two different versions of their software, it is the same for all customers.

      Unless the product has been certified for use with classified information, that's not much of an assurance. The government has its own internally-developed tools -- which presumably it has confidence in (SIPRNet, etc.) -- for protecting information that it deems sensitive. The NSA might well decide that subverting a commercial tool is worth the risk of compromising something that's used by the government, but only in relatively trivial ways.

      I don't know enough to impugn Zimmerman et al, but I don't think "it's used by the government!" is necessarily a great seal of approval, unless it's a formal certification (e.g. NSA Type 1 listing) saying that it can be used to protect classified information. And I'm not aware of any COTS software products that are on the Type 1 list; the NSA only approves particular hardware implementations (at least that I've seen, though I'm happy to be corrected although I'd be surprised).

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    75. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sorry your right

      Sorrier that you're an uneducated anti-book guy. Gees, a third grader knows the difference between your and you're. As in "you're right about your right". I'm seeing way too much of this (as well as grocer's apostrophes) these days. You guys should sue your school districts for malpractice.

    76. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Rakarra · · Score: 1

      I don't recognize gag orders. Only if it comes from a bonefid judge and bonafid court (not FISA).

      But in Soviet America, gag orders recognize you!

      Ignore them at your peril. I plan to, if I ever (doubtful) get into the position where I'd be legally required to respect one.

    77. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      WE -- the engineers and geeks who built the Internet -- should fix it. Doesn't that imply an open source approach as well?

      Actually, no. What it implies is one step further...an open standards approach. There can be closed-source and open-source implementations of an open standard.

      The important part here is that he's making an appeal to engineers because he believes that we're the ones that will see that there are some things that are more important that self interest. A single business creating a solution will always look to maximize profits. But we, as engineers, should strive to create an environment/platform that is open to all and fosters innovation by any number of companies. Look at everything that's grown out of the original internet...none of that would be possible if that internet were a creation of a single company.

      Engineers need to go back to the drawing board and create a protocol that basically shuts the NSA out and allows verifiably-secure communications between both network nodes and internet users. And we'd do that not because we could make money off it but because we see the value in such a communications platform existing. Others can and will figure out how to make money building on top of that. Note that this isn't entirely a philanthropic endeavor...lots of us would be employed to build on top of that platform.

    78. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by spire3661 · · Score: 1

      We arent talking about making money. Open Source's point is not MONEY. Its about making sure we have free and available building blocks to create an information society.

      --
      Good-bye
    79. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

      Truecrypt does not "know" about the hidden partition nor tries to protect it. If you store 1TB of data in the visible part, you will damage whatever was stored in that hidden compartment (the hidden part is stored at the very end of the container file).

      Does this mean that as long as I leave a sufficient amount of my "clean" partition empty, then my hidden partition is undetectable and usable and only becomes available if I enter the "real" password into Truecrypt.

      So, use password #1 and I get a 1TB partition that's maybe half-used. If I put in password #2, I see the 500gb hidden partition. Is that right?

      I haven't used Truecrypt for a while, and I've never set up a hidden partition. I'm going to try, because I think a good way to fight against this snooping is if as many people as possible make their data as hard to snoop as possible. Let the spies know we're not just going to lay down and make it easy for them.

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    80. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

      As to silent circle: you have no evidence that silent circle is compromised ...and there is no evidence that it is not.

      The fact that they shut down operations of one of their products rather than give in to the NSA's demands is pretty good evidence.

      The reason I suspect you of FUD is because of your use of the word, "game". As in, "What kind of game is Schneier playing?" If you had written a post reminding people of Silent Circle's status as a non-open product, it would have been informative. By making it into "Bruce Schneier is running some kind of game" you turned it into FUD, and trolling.

      There are plenty of people who mean us no good that would love to see people like Bruce Schneier discredited. We have to be more careful than ever about these things. Look at the armies of trolls that came out to trash Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald, etc for everything from their sexual orientation to their hair. It's enough to make people a little more aware when it comes to the agendas of the people who are slinging mud on people who up to now have been fighting on the side of freedom.

      Use at your own risk don't use it with a false sense of security.

      But see, that's not what you said. You came right out of the box, in your subject line, with "Bruce Schneier is running a game on us". This is why it was FUD. I bet if you think about it for a while, you'll get it.

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    81. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 1

      This was covered by someone else in the thread above. TL;DR "But then they also have to persuade all the users to adopt that [new NSA modified] fork. " - i.e. not going to happen.

      Your TL;DR is as long as his post which is nothing more than a bald-faced assertion. It isn't anywhere as simple as that - every part of that risk that closed source has is the same this scenario. They NSL the company and force it to put a non-obvious weakness into their code as part of a much larger refresh and nobody even notices.

      Do you really think the NSA or any big govermental agency serious about security buys binaries from Silent Circle and never sees the full source code?

      Yes, they absolutely do buy binaries without source. I know someone with personal experience of such a program buying custom binary libraries from RSA - RSA didn't let anyone near the source and she was in the position to see the source herself if RSA had.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    82. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 1

      > SIPRNet

      Not so useful for things like talking to undercover agents in the field. Yes, the government does have some dedicated infrastructure that serves very specific purposes, but it doesn't have the flexibility to cover all areas which is where Silent Circle seems to have found its niche.

      There is no 100% guarantee when you are faced with billion dollar budgets, what I am saying is that Silent Circle has thought things through and are taking one reasonable approach and being closed source does not negate that.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    83. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The original paper said "you could bug a compiler and nobody could detect it." But David Wheeler figured out that you can "bootstrap" the trust of a real compiler by writing your own toy compiler. (Not such a hard thing to do). If the "trusting trust" attack were tried today, it would be not be as hard to discover as originally thought.

      http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/

    84. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by lgw · · Score: 1

      That's about right. You can also put in both passwords, and be able to use the normal partition safely. With just password #1, almost any change to the normal partition will damage the hidden partition.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    85. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Or, they prosecute you for making your Russian wife mysteriously disappear. They make you into such a pariah that nobody will come to help you. Then they send you to jail after a very public trial that has nothing to do with your refusal to comply. And if you even tried to bring that up, you would sound like even more of a dangerously crazy person.

    86. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by DuckDodgers · · Score: 1

      Thanks for the information, I just bookmarked that link to check later.

    87. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Cacadril · · Score: 1

      From now on, there will be.

      --
      There is no substitute for common sense. Especially, no body of rules will do.
    88. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by vux984 · · Score: 1

      Open Source is really tricky to do well and make money from and sometimes it is just not a viable business model.

      Agreed. But security is a paramount concern for society, so perhaps a little NSA and TSA funding can be redirected to funding OSS security products.

      That's how I'd approach it if you made me benevolent dictator for life at least. :)

    89. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That is if anyone bothered to use valid certs anyway. Even Oracle uses expired certs

    90. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by multi+io · · Score: 1

      Or, they prosecute you for making your Russian wife mysteriously disappear. They make you into such a pariah that nobody will come to help you. Then they send you to jail after a very public trial that has nothing to do with your refusal to comply. And if you even tried to bring that up, you would sound like even more of a dangerously crazy person.

      Reiser himself led the cops to his wife's body...

    91. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      Ok yes now you have given me more to go on I can understand how the title could be interpreted as a FUD attack and might be over the top - my bad. In my defense at that time I was thinking more along the lines of - what on earth is Schneier "playing at"/"game", did he have shares in the company or something. How could he recommend Silent Circle right after this major news story and even what he himself has just written underlying exactly why we cannot trust propriety companies like Silent Circle anymore - they are high risk not to be trusted. Your right I should just have written "Silent Circle?" for the title.

      For the record I personally think Bruce Schneier is a credible guy - but I think that makes it even harder to understand his recommendation.

      The fact that they shut down operations of one of their products rather than give in to the NSA's demands is pretty good evidence.

      There are other less admirable interpretations for that action (my post above outlines a couple I have seen expressed around the internet). Main new one I see many people commenting: If the Snowden leaks might possibly name Silent Circle as one of the collaborators in the future, then closing down their mail product would give their PR team some moral defense - "see we did not collaborate!". Not that I believe any of these theories one way or the other mind you - I don't care and don't have to. I just do not think it is wise for anyone to give any closed source security company a free pass and our blind trust because of something like that, especially after all that we have learned today.

    92. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What if the backdoor is in the hardware? Intel Inside ...

    93. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      but the prospect of eating porridge with a lot of nasty looking and foul smelling prisoners, does not appeal to most people.

      I like porridge, sounds like a typical Saturday morning hangover.

    94. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by hacker · · Score: 1

      Then they can make a public and private key for whatever.com. Then they use their fake Intermediate CA Inc.certificate to sign that. Unless you the person visiting whatever.com specifically have an original copy of the real whatever.com certificate public key, and you look at the public key of the certificate every time you visit the website, you'll never notice that the NSA has replaced the real certificate with theirs. As long as they're using the correct Verisign private key, your browser will not detect any problems.

      This is precisely why you should be checking site fingerprints and using browser add-ons like Certificate Patrol, in combination with a secure browser (eg: TorBrowser).

      If you blindly stumble around the Internet accepting certs, not checking source and destination, you deserve what you get. If you verify the authenticity of your connections, and deny/block/forbid those that don't match, you'll be much closer to the secure environment we're all striving for.

    95. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by NoKaOi · · Score: 1

      But the big glaring thing is, at least in the UK, you can be sent to prison for refusing to hand over your encryption keys. And this has happened. People like to talk big, but the prospect of eating porridge with a lot of nasty looking and foul smelling prisoners, does not appeal to most people.

      The real question is, what kind of oversight is required in order for them to do that? Can they bust down your door and send you off to a foreign prison without judicial oversight or access to an attorney? Or do they require a search warrant, obtained through proper judicial oversight and requiring adequate probable cause, while granting you access to an attorney the whole way?

      Of course in real life "proper" and "adequate" are subjective, but the point is there's a big difference between handing you a search warrant signed by a judge and reading you your rights vs sniffing everything and busting down your door because some stupid algorithm red-flagged you.

    96. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by DuckDodgers · · Score: 1

      If you blindly stumble around the Internet accepting certs, not checking source and destination, you deserve what you get.

      What, you expect the general population of internet users to understand proper SSL/TLS security as well as someone that has listened to every episode of Security Now? That's unfair, and not practical. We the engineers and technical professionals should be striving to make genuine security easy to use for the general population. Reserving best practices for the educated elite just means the NSA has a population of 99.95% of people it can monitor at will and a small enough uncrackable 0.05% that it can devote additional resources to monitoring them through other means.

      What I would like to see instead is Firefox releases, officially supported by Mozilla, that have Certificate Patrol, Perspectives, Disconnect.me, and most of the add-ons at http://fixtracking.com/ (except Adblock Plus, which of course has been revealed to bypass its own blocking for certain paying customers ) installed by default. Maybe even the canonical Firefox release should be that way. If we can't bring the masses into security territory along with us, we'll be easy to track because secure territory will be too sparsely populated for anyone to effectively hide.

    97. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "And what happens if he refuses? Is he "disappeared"? A public prosecution would be risky, of course, since then they would have to reveal (at the very least) that they tried to force him to do something bad."

      A third scenario, and more likely, is that they plant "evidence" on a person's home/car/machine and basically go: he/she will do or say anything to try to get out of jail! or another line to discredit what the person says, which the sheeple will believe . . . I, long long ago, spent 3 years in Federal prison for controlled substances and firearms, and I worked at the law library, where I read many many legal opinions and cases . . . I do not believe many of you fellows can imagine the lengths to which certain people in the gov are willing to go, and how easily the system swallows innocent people, and hardly anyone gives a hoot or helps . . . you yourself are probably thinking that what I am saying is suspect since I participated in two drug sales and was later arrested with firearms in my possession, and that is the very mechanism in the human mind that those animals exploit to their advantage.

      I feel that we are on the verge of the 21st century Red Scare, where those very same people will label all of us computerists who won't bend over and spread them cyber terrorists or similar. I myself am frightened because I have witnessed what those people will do to innocents. I was guilty as hell and pled to it in open court, however, and I never thought I would see it until I did, there are MANY MANY innocent people in there serving loooooong sentences and nothing works to get them out. It truly is coming down to a fight between good and EVIL, because those fucks are EVIL, no other word, so please keep that in mind, they are weak AND DUMB in many ways, but COVER YOUR ASS, watch your step, make it to where anything they can try to fabricate against you is so unlikely to be true that they would have to utilize a lot of their resources to make it stick, some people will go down even so, however, they can only take down so many before they start running low on resources, and that is what it comes down to, their resources, because they have more money than brains, but even their wallet has a bottom, and once that is reached, they will be helpless prey.

      Make of this what you will, but remember for example that if someone has a lot of debt etc, then the setup will be that the person stole something because they needed money, and so forth . . . they exploit a person's weaknesses and flaws when it comes to that. You were once charged with date rape and found innocent? Ok. Guess what? a dead hooker was found in your garage . . . after a certain point, after enough false evidence is presented to the public and enough crap is smeared on you, who's going to believe you DIDN'T strangle miss crackhead? Your mom?

      Point is, keep your nose clean, don't make it easy for them, they WILL attack us.

      Only good thing is that those types in gov are NOT THAT SMART, many are downright DUMB, all they have is money, no real brains, and just like in Stalingrad, a determined number of opponents with modest resources can eventually SWALLOW large groups of highly trained, well armed, and well equipped professionals, and for those who would point out that the Sixth Army eventually collapsed owing to lack of supplies, I say read the details of how they got to that point: they could not beat all those determined amateurs because those guys would not stop fighting in spite of massive casualties.

      Oh, and the amateurs were in THE RIGHT.

    98. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Agripa · · Score: 1

      And then *one* person notices that one certificate does not match the other and the certificate authority has to explain how someone else signed a provably false certificate with their private key. Has this happened yet?

      The NSA or other agency can get away with this up until the time one person notices and at that point, the certificate authorities and their system lose all credibility.

    99. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by wurp · · Score: 1

      You're talking about the Thompson hack, an extremely effective mechanism for subverting huge swaths of software: http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?TheKenThompsonHack

      The only way around it is to view the binary code and inspect it (either manually or automatically). Either way, the level of effort to detect it is immense, and either way you may still be subject to some further hack that shows you different binary data than what's actually executed.

      I suppose in theory the hack could be in the hardware somewhere.

    100. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by wurp · · Score: 1

      Mod parent up. I had no idea there was a trusted way to show a compiler hasn't been Thompson hacked!

      http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/

    101. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Ash+Vince · · Score: 1

      We arent talking about making money. Open Source's point is not MONEY. Its about making sure we have free and available building blocks to create an information society.

      But everyone needs money so it has to be part of the conversation. Without money you starve.

      --
      I dont read /. to RTFA, I read /. to offend people in ignorance.
    102. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > The GNU site which distributes the GCC suite only offers source so the source could be checked for such exploits.

      But as the Thompson paper shows, having the compiler source code is not sufficient to protect you against a back door, since you still have to COMPILE that verified source ... with a binary compiler which you got somewhere, and which could have a back door which plants a back door into the compiled compiler.

  12. UK Official Secrets Act by gramty · · Score: 5, Informative

    "One, we should expose. If you do not have a security clearance, and if you have not received a National Security Letter, you are not bound by a federal confidentially requirements or a gag order"

    Once again the UK trumps the US in the paranoia and anti-freedom game. The UK Official Secrets Act applies to all British subjects, OK they get you to sign it, but that us mostly a symbolic gesture to remind you of your obligations and the penalties. Under the act you don't even need to have clearance or be the recipient of a leak. Even if you have worked it out for yourself from publicly available information you can still be gagged, and breaking a gag can bring down the full force of the law against you.

    1. Re:UK Official Secrets Act by Bogtha · · Score: 4, Informative

      The UK Official Secrets Act applies to all British subjects

      This is not true. There are some parts that only apply to government workers, and there are some parts that apply to everybody, regardless of nationality.

      Also, practically nobody is a British subject these days, and this has been the case for over 30 years. People with british nationality are British citizens, not subjects. British subjects are a different category and there's hardly anybody in that category. It's mostly just a historical technicality that the category even exists.

      --
      Bogtha Bogtha Bogtha
    2. Re:UK Official Secrets Act by gramty · · Score: 1

      OK, I stand corrected.

      The UK Official Secrets Act applies to everyone (with varying scope, but only likely to be enforceable in UK jurisdiction ), OK they get you to sign it, but that us mostly a symbolic gesture to remind you of your obligations and the penalties. Under the act you don't even need to have clearance or be the recipient of a leak. Even if you have worked it out for yourself from publicly available information you can still be gagged, and breaking a gag can bring down the full force of the law against you.

    3. Re:UK Official Secrets Act by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      If you face a sealed court, people will know, you become a topic of legal whispers that grows fast to protests. If your in open court your legal team can question many things, getting the press on your side/message out.
      UK Official Secrets Act is not the dream it was in the past for stopping publishers, press, the politically connected and academics.
      What cannot be published in the UK can be seen from the UK via the net.
      What cannot be hosted in the UK can be seen from the UK via the net.
      The act of contacting you over information thats in the public is seen as bad optics. Other people start to read up/study/host/spread info just over that move by the gov.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    4. Re:UK Official Secrets Act by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What's the difference between a British citizen and a British subject? As far as I can tell, there is no difference and no increase in any rights.

    5. Re:UK Official Secrets Act by BigSlowTarget · · Score: 1

      In the US the laws are so screwed up, reworded, artistically intepreted, overlaid with regulation and in some cases even secret that you probably can't even figure out if your employer is breaking the law without seeing a lawyer and even then it's going to be argued over long after you are broke, homeless and unemployable. We need a dramatic reworking of the ridiculously complex legal system that is supporting a sort of fear and confusion based collection of legal priests and the political patrons that can deploy them en masse to crush their opponents. Unless a common person can understand the laws they aren't likely to be able to completely follow them. Unfortunately change is not something likely to happen.

    6. Re:UK Official Secrets Act by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The OSA isn't there to protect secrets, Bernard. It's there to protect officials!

    7. Re:UK Official Secrets Act by lgw · · Score: 2

      I think everyone born in Ireland before 1949 (ie, those over 64) are Still British subjects, right? That's more than "hardly anybody". Plus a few people in India or Pakistan over 64 who never applied for citizenship in their nation (or any other), I believe, which probably is a small group.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
  13. Only try and you will land in jail by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Nobody messes with US government. If you try to change it, you are endangering your family and put yourself in jail at best.

  14. Spot On by some+old+guy · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Bruce nailed it. We've sat on our collective asses and watched the politicians, spooks, and marketing clowns turn an engineering marvel into a sad parody of it's former intended self. I don't think anyone nowadays can question the need for some serious re-engineering. We can solve the technical problems and propose new standards and protocols.The real question is how do we implement the fix.

    Will the standards committees support it? Will the Powers that Be allow it? Like Bill the Bard wrote, "Aye, there's the rub."

    --
    Scruting the inscrutable for over 50 years.
    1. Re:Spot On by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Bruce nailed it. We've sat on our collective asses
      and watched the politicians, spooks, and marketing clowns turn an engineering marvel into a sad parody of it's former intended self.

      The physical outlay of light pipes circling the globe connected by fancy many-gigabit packet pushers are indeed quite marvelous. While EE's continue to kick ass and take names things get progressivly less impressive as you go up the stack. (e.g. SMTP, DNS, HTTP..etc)

      We can solve the technical problems and propose new standards and protocols.The real question is how do we implement the fix.

      Will the standards committees support it? Will the Powers that Be allow it? Like Bill the Bard wrote, "Aye, there's the rub."

      It is called hard work with no expectation of profit. Competely irrelevant whether "standards committees" support it or not. The "rub" is will users and by extension any needed operators care to support it.

    2. Re:Spot On by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Bruce did not "nail it". It has nothing to do with engineering. The internet's engineering is just as solid as it ever was. Leave it the hell alone.

      Compare the internet to a hammer. A hammer is a tool to drive nails. A roofer uses it to attach shingles to a roof. A carpenter to build houses. A signmaker uses one to drive stakes into the ground when putting up (small) advertising billboards and signs for commercial locations. A criminal uses them to break windows of cars and houses in order to rob them. A mafioso uses them to break kneecaps and knock the forms off of shoes. A government acquisition office uses them to cover up expenses that are deemed "secret". And a government spy uses it to coerce information out of an "enemy combatant".

      Is that hammer engineered incorrectly just because it facilitates things that it wasn't intended for? No. It's not. And to "nerf" it is to limit the freedoms of those that abuse the tool.

      Instead of fucking up perfectly good tools, try fucking up the people that abuse those tools instead.

    3. Re:Spot On by kwikrick · · Score: 1

      And don't forget: who's going to pay for it?

      --
      assignment != equality != identity
  15. Find the back doors by mrspoonsi · · Score: 1

    There is proof there are back doors in VPN routers / switches / firewalls, so expose, only then when business feel the pressure, will the US government see the error of their ways (when leaned on by big business), until then it is just something needed for fighting a bunch of guys in caves on the other side of the planet.

    1. Re:Find the back doors by MysteriousPreacher · · Score: 1

      Which products are affected by this? I'm aware of the Barracuda Networks backdoors. Are these backdoors exploits, or intended? If intended, any idea for whom they are intended?

      --
      -- Using the preview button since 2005
    2. Re:Find the back doors by mrspoonsi · · Score: 2

      The guardian article mentions control of 30 VPN now and 300 VPN expected by 2014, almost certainly this includes big brand routers / firewall sat right now in the worlds datacenters...people need to be looking at the code running in cisco / dell / etc devices. This is taking the internet back from unreasonable searches (I for one think a business operating legally should not have all its data sent to a building in the US to be spied upon).

      This all has created a climate of untrust, US businesses are going to see a % drop in business as the world decides to vote with its feet. You can imagine the shit storm which is brewing in capitol hill, nothing the administration can say now can save face, it is like catching the fat kid with his hand stuck in the cookie jar.

  16. Education by j-b0y · · Score: 1

    I think a necessary step is to make sure that there is a general understanding that this is a problem -- here we must not merely preach to the choir but reach a wider and maybe technically illiterate audience) Who are we dealing with

    1. People who willingly forgo their right to privacy (and therefore understand the issue at hand)
    2. People who are ignorant their privacy rights are not respected (and therefore do not understand the issue at hand)
    3. People who are aware that their privacy rights are not respected but wish to interact with 1) and 2) and therefore give up some or all of their privacy rights (and therefore understand the issue at hand)
    4. People who will protect their privacy rights at the cost of limiting their ability to interact with at least those in 1) and 2) (and therefore understand the issue at hand)

    We cannot save those in category 1), they know the risks and accept the "terms and conditions" of using the internet with public and private data mining/surveillance in place. These people are lost to the Dark Side.

    People in category 2) need education on what the consequences of their actions are, and may then resolve into one of the other groups.

    People in category 3) should accept that their permissiveness strengthens the hand of the NSA et al. If a practical alternative solution is presented they will probably help to bring people in category 2 away from the Dark Side.

    People in category 4) are probably a small population already using Tor, Freenet, PGP, etc. They can help by adopting new technologies that do not compromise (too much) their desire for privacy.

    --
    Please remain calm, there is no reason to pani... wait, where are you all going?
    1. Re:Education by w_dragon · · Score: 1

      You missed those people who don't do private stuff online. I know this will surprise a lot of slashdot, but for normal people a lot of life is public. The most private thing I do online is banking, and I suspect those records can be accessed by the government in easier ways than reading and decrypting every bit of Internet traffic. As always, if you want to keep something private don't use communication mechanisms you don't control. Sneakernet is still the best private network.

  17. P2P works by dirtaddshp · · Score: 1

    I would say more peer networks would work well, unfortunately in alot of cases it would take alot of resources on the host computers but it may be the price to pay to keep your data yours. Look at BitTorrent, Bitcoin or most other P2P systems... government has a very hard time stopping their use.

  18. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by daem0n1x · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Just wait until the character assassination begins for Schneier too. He's been taking very strong positions, I'm waiting for a photoshopped picture of him fucking a sheep to be released on the Internet for the whole world to see. Pretty soon, he'll be living in a South American country's embassy.

  19. The REAL Story by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Now why isn't this a story on /. almost a day after its publicatoin:

    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security

    In brief, almost nothing is safe anymore, even if it's encrypted.

  20. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by benjfowler · · Score: 0, Flamebait

    With the likes of Julian Assange, "character assassination" is hardly necessary. The guy is a walking PR disaster area.

  21. Local Networking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Also join your local community wireless network, real networking directly with other people. CB Radio for computers.

  22. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by daem0n1x · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I couldn't care less if Assange or Snowden are nice guys. That's completely irrelevant for the matter if they're sweet little cherubs or like to fuck sheep on their spare time. Nobody does what they did by being that nice guy everybody wants to have a beer with.

    The hateful crimes they exposed are the true stars, here. If you focus on the messenger, you miss the message. That's what the governments, corporations and their global propaganda machine (a.k.a. mass media) badly, badly, badly want you to do. Quite successfully.

  23. The destruction of trust by Arrogant-Bastard · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The worst part of the damage done by this isn't technical. It's human.

    The reporting on this latest disclosure reveals that the NSA has systematically inserted itself into the standard-crafting process, in order to deliberately weaken those standards. It also reveals that the NSA has bypassed the management of communications providers and recruited technical staff directly. In both cases it's reasonable to assume that the people involved have been through a security clearance process and are thus barred for life from disclosing what they know.

    I must now ask myself how many people I've worked with weren't doing so in good faith. When they argued that such-and-such a fine point of a network protocol standard didn't need improvement or that it should be changed in a certain way, were they doing so because it was their principled engineering opinion, or because it served some other purpose? Or when they were recommending that one of the many operations I've run move its colocation point or change its router hardware, was that good customer service, or was it to facilitate easier traffic capture?

    Will anyone be asking themselves the same questions about me? (They probably should.)

    The Internet was built on, and runs on, trust. Every postmaster, every network engineer, every webmaster, every system admin, every hostmaster, everyone crafting standards, everyone writing code, trusts that everyone else -- no matter how vehemently they disagree on a technical point -- is acting in good faith. The NSA, in its enormous arrogance, has single-handedly destroyed much of that trust overnight.

    1. Re:The destruction of trust by MRe_nl · · Score: 4, Interesting

      The exact same process has been going with doctors (The Red Cross, Doctors without borders, World Polio programs etc.) being used as cover by intelligence services and special forces. This practice is forbidden by the Geneva conventions, and now real doctors working in war zone's are being treated with suspicion at the very least, or shot on sight at worst.

      "Ah, arrogance and stupidity all in the same package. How efficient of you!"

      --
      "Kill 'em all and let Root sort 'em out"
    2. Re:The destruction of trust by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      The Internet was built on, and runs on, trust. Every postmaster, every network engineer, every webmaster, every system admin, every hostmaster, everyone crafting standards, everyone writing code, trusts that everyone else -- no matter how vehemently they disagree on a technical point -- is acting in good faith. The NSA, in its enormous arrogance, has single-handedly destroyed much of that trust overnight.

      Nonsense. First of all, what the NSA has done was not done overnight. Second, we let them do it. How did we ever get where we are now, where something like the NSA can even exist? We collectively abdicated.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    3. Re:The destruction of trust by cardpuncher · · Score: 3, Insightful
      The original Internet wasn't built on trust, it was built by the government for military purposes in the sure and certain knowledge that the only people that had the ability to mess with it knew what was likely to happen to them if they did.

      The Internet was later coopted by groups of academics who didn't really have to worry if their communications were intercepted because they were pretty much public anyway and had nothing really to gain from abuses such as faking BGP route updates. Trust wasn't required.

      The public, commercial, Internet may have had an illusion of trust, based solely on the fact that nobody historically worried about it. That doesn't mean it was based on trust, if means any trust it enjoyed was based on ignorance.

      Trust in the Internet is in any case a wider issue than who is listening in. It's also knowing what really happens to the data about you provided voluntarily that gets hoovered up by all those online services chatting to each other behind the scenes.

      Nor is it merely about the Internet - it's about your phone, your car, your smart watch, your contactless payment card and all the other things that can be enabled by technology to spy against you.

      There isn't a technical fix to all of that, some of it has to be a political fix.

    4. Re:The destruction of trust by Weedlekin · · Score: 1

      The Geneva Conventions only apply when a state of war exists between a nation that has signed them and one or more sovereign countries. This is one of the reasons that modern politicians like to describe acts of bombing or invading somebody else's country as a "police action", "insurgency suppression operation", "humanitarian aid mission", or whatever other made-up name they can come up to avoid having to apply a bunch of inconvenient rules about wars that they agreed to abide by.

      --
      I'm not going to change your sheets again, Mr. Hastings.
    5. Re:The destruction of trust by Princeofcups · · Score: 1

      The NSA, in its enormous arrogance, has
      single-handedly destroyed much of that trust overnight.

      Don't kid yourself. They've been there from day 1. One of my managers 12 years ago was an ex-NSA math PhD who spent her time there cracking encryption.

      --
      The only thing worse than a Democrat is a Republican.
    6. Re:The destruction of trust by dbIII · · Score: 1

      The original Internet wasn't built on trust, it was built by the government for military purposes

      The first three Universities linked where not military bases the last time I looked :)
      There were other links before that which became other networks, but what became the internet was trusted for civilian use instead of locked down for military use.

    7. Re:The destruction of trust by perp · · Score: 1

      Do anyone have any information supporting this assertion of MSF's involvement in intelligence and/or special forces operations?

      --
      There are two kinds of sysadmins: paranoids and losers. I'm both kinds.
    8. Re:The destruction of trust by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The people themselves are its only safe depositories." -- Thomas Jefferson

      The internet has never reached the level of peering originally conceived for it. Bottlenecks are also good locations for traps. Is it possible that providers avoidance of seeking the goal of greater pathing coverage was not just them avoiding the costs?

    9. Re:The destruction of trust by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Makes you wonder if SELinux is such a good idea after all.

    10. Re:The destruction of trust by nbauman · · Score: 1

      In medicine, the similar problem is that doctors who are getting payments from drug companies are on the guidelines committees that recommend drugs. These agencies are usually in the government or medical professional societies.

      For example, there was a committee to establish guidelines for treatments to stop smoking. Several of the members of that committee were getting grants, speakers' fees, etc. from the companies that make stop-smoking drugs. There was a lot of debate about how effective the stop-smoking drugs were, whether they were effective at all, and what their adverse effects were. The committee recommended the drugs.

      Lots of drugs like that.

      If it were a unanimous vote, I wouldn't be concerned, but for some of these votes, if you took everybody off the committee who was on the payroll of the drug company, they wouldn't have approved the drug for that application. The excuse is that most of the people with expertise are getting grants from the drug companies, and if you eliminated them, you wouldn't have enough experts to make the best judgments. I don't believe it.

      (As for the vaccine and public health programs being used as cover by intelligence agencies, I haven't heard of that being done recently, with the one prominent exception of the Pakistani doctor who set up a fake vaccination program to help find Osama bin Laden. The Pakistanis prosecuted him and he 's now serving I think 30 years in jail, which he deserves. It doesn't happen too often -- but it only takes one to destroy the credibility of medical workers around the world.)

    11. Re:The destruction of trust by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Due to the nature of the beast very little is sure. But the rumors/abuse I've heard about; MSF used in Chechnya (?sp) by French(?) intelligence, the Red Cross in Libya by the SAS, and the Pakistani World Polio-program by the CIA. But many of the accusations come from single sources.

    12. Re:The destruction of trust by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And we all trusted that we didn't have a genocidal Jewish shadow government that flys airliners into buildings as a pretext to weaponize the rest of the government against us. They built the first Soviet Union. They are building a second. Sorry if you can't handle that much truth.

    13. Re:The destruction of trust by theNAM666 · · Score: 1

      >The original Internet wasn't built on trust, it was built by the government for military purposes in the sure and certain knowledge that the only people
      >that had the ability to mess with it knew what was likely to happen to them if they did.

      Now now. It was built by BBN in co-operation with many at MIT. And like von Braun... they reinterpreted the instructions a bit, didn't they?

  24. Re:"Engineers" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    And you're just a chronic masturbating troll. Your point?

  25. Retry by Hutt1235 · · Score: 1

    It is look like war ! I would say that doing your own encryption, by this I mean using some of the open source tools and not closed source ones (and definitely not American ones) is a good thing. Hamlet Devnozashvili Las Vegas 11 Ave Email - hutt1-petviashvili1@hotmail.com Website - Stick War

  26. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by benjfowler · · Score: 0

    I'm not sure it's that easy to distinguish the message and the messenger.

    These people have a radical and fairly crude ant-secrecy agenda, and the stuff they bring to light may be done in a highly selective and self-serving manner. And regardless of whether you think governments should be allowed to keep secrets or spy on people, I dispute that these vigilantes should decide what should be "declassified" or what isn't. It's only slightly better when the leaks are channelled through the media, given that journalism is a "soft option", and that journalists are only slight better qualified than the leakers themselves to decide what's safe to leak or not.

    As for secrecy and spying, that debate needs to happen, and it's happening. That's a happy byproduct of what is going on. I just strongly object to the methods being used by the anti-secrecy crowd, and I don't trust their motivations at all.

  27. IP AutoSEC by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Although in a very new stage it aims to bring encryption on IP-Level without the need of client-side configuration:

    https://github.com/kechel/ip-autosec

  28. Reviews needed: programs, protcols, algorithms by Alain+Williams · · Score: 1

    The first thing that we need is a good audit of programs, protcols, algorithms. That won't be easy. Open Source stuff has a head's start, but someone needs to read it all. We knew that Skype was broken, but what else: SSL ?

    As for encryption algorithms, there are only a handful of people in the world who are really qualified to check them; what if their opinions can be bought/blackmailed ... ? This will take a lot of effort, but what good is GPG if the encryption algorithms that it uses have been weakened ?

    1. Re:Reviews needed: programs, protcols, algorithms by silas_moeckel · · Score: 1

      SSL was broken by design. The requirement for trusted cosigners is far to easy to corrupt. The NSA just needs a copy of one of there signing keys and they can man in the middle at will with a few administrative subpoena's . You can band aid the client side sure. The best bet seems to be dnssec rooted at the various country TDL's but that's just spreading the potential abuse around. Requiring multiple pathways to agree could help alleviate that, say having two or more mutually hostile nations.

      --
      No sir I dont like it.
  29. Excellent point by bradley13 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    You make a really excellent point. Sadly, we can only react at this point. It seems to me that there are three useful reactions:

    - Keep up the political and media pressure. Don't let this issue die in the news cycle. Americans can apply internal pressure; those of us elsewhere can do our bits to keep up international pressure. For example: I will be integrating the NSA as part of a larger Internet security discussion in at least two of my university lectures in the coming semester.

    - Promote open-source software for all security purposes. While not everyone can audit the software, there are enough people out there who can and will. The NSA cannot predict who will do so, and hence cannot have them all in its pay.

    - Refuse to use any American IT services where security is important. This is not only sensible, it also applies economic pressure to companies that can lobby in Washington.

    --
    Enjoy life! This is not a dress rehearsal.
    1. Re:Excellent point by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Only American IT compromised? You need to keep up with the news better.

  30. Keyloggin by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It takes very little memory / diskspace to store every single thing you ever type with your keyboard. Sending this data will provide access no matter how fancy encryption mechanisms and programs you use.
    So if you are using an operating system that has been made in the US I would not count on it having no built-in keylogger to simply bypass every single encryption mechanism out there.

    1. Re:Keyloggin by gatkinso · · Score: 1

      Key logging is more complex than you think... and limited. Autocomplete cut/paste, gestures, voice command, mouse input... the list goes on.

      Not to mention that it is only useful for grabbing passwords, won't help a wit with hardware or cert based security.

      It is certainly an issue that should be kept in mind, but it is not the complete compromise that you seem to imply.

      --
      I am very small, utmostly microscopic.
    2. Re: Keyloggin by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The OS can quite obviously log the copy&paste buffer and access any data on any UI component. So when you type/enter data on any UI component it is in unencrypted format at some point. Unlikely but possible to keep storing all that and relay onwards per request or while updating OS or at whatever point. Just saying that if your OS provider is 'compromised' then you cannot guarantee 'safety' in any way. The plain text hand typed/entered data is so small and compresses well that it would be no problem to just take it all.

  31. And are "we", exactly? by argStyopa · · Score: 0

    Superficial utopianism, ahoy!

    "The government" broke it, and "we" have to fix it, eh?
    Remember, WE are the ones that elected this government, and all the previous ones. (And don't give me the crap about "all they give us is fake choices - this system is an evolution of what we've asked for...)
    Remember, WE are the ones who vote in such elections at a what, sub-50% rate?
    Remember, WE are the ones who, through our commercial choices have made Hollywood and television the engine of derivative, repetitive, simplistic, stupid entertainments.

    I don't know about you, but just about everything "we" do is pretty fucked up. The odds that something positive is accomplished by a herd of humans is approximately 1/(2^(# of people involved)).

    Personally, I'm finding Mr Schneier less practically relevant and more of an attention-whore every year.

    --
    -Styopa
    1. Re:And are "we", exactly? by ledow · · Score: 2

      America is not the world. I'm from the UK.

      I didn't elect any of your governments. Or even my own, come to that.

      Even if I had have voted, I could not have voted for/against certain provisions, so my vote means nothing in terms of individual actions by the government. We still went to war despite most people who voted the parties in not agreeing with it (and look likely to do so again soon).

      My commercial choices don't "make" Hollywood, or other people, anything. People are dumb now, have been in the future, and always will be. Most of the "most popular" shows / movies, I've never seen in my life.

      And, yes, everything "we" do is fucked up. That's why it takes the few who SEE that to come along and fix it - for themselves at first, and others later.

      I don't get how you then jump to the last paragraph of your comment. His suggestion is actually pretty smart, fairly dangerous to assert in the current climate, and a call-to-peaceful-arms to regain freedoms we had, lost, the Internet returned, and we've lost again.

      All he really wants is a secure Internet. How can you break that down to be a "bad" thing that's not practically relevant? I've been arguing that the same would happen for years, it's just taken discovery of major government tampering to make it happen.

      A secure Internet? Boy, I'd pay to have one now. Trouble is, Tor is SSSSLLLOOOWWW, and not that secure (because eventually it has to talk to insecure sites for anything "popular"), private darknets are frowned-upon and limited in scope, and the public Internet is largely unencrypted unless we're about to put in a credit-card number (where our transactions are then once-again trackable).

      Personal privacy is something that the governments of the world do not want us to have, but cannot give anywhere near a reasonable explanation why. As such, it's something I'd like to have. And that comes about by engineers, the same type as those who designed a network that anyone can join, anyone can talk to anyone else, and anyone can extend and expand without government authorisation, building such a thing.

      I'm pretty sure I have a comment on here from my first few posts, back pre-2000-ish) that says pretty much exactly what's happened - governments will overstep the mark, we'll all go into a much more secure mode (no more plain text emails whizzing around email servers), and eventually it will be impossible to track or trace anything even though the actual communication is inherently public - even someone ordering groceries.

    2. Re:And are "we", exactly? by argStyopa · · Score: 1

      While most of your post is perfectly reasonable, I'd take issue with this bit:

      "...My commercial choices don't "make" Hollywood, or other people, anything. People are dumb now, have been in the future, and always will be. Most of the "most popular" shows / movies, I've never seen in my life.

      And, yes, everything "we" do is fucked up. That's why it takes the few who SEE that to come along and fix it - for themselves at first, and others later..."

      First: So you don't watch movies? You don't pay your money to rent a dvd or go to a theater? Because if you don't think your dollars (or pounds, or euros, or whatever) are a method of 'voting', you're sadly mistaken. Studios are profit-making entities, seeking the largest profit for the least effort possible: your 'votes' tell them where that profit is. Your commercial choices most certainly do have a (small, proportional) impact.

      Your second paragraph is more troubling. The problem is that EITHER something is driven democratically, or it isn't. And if we establish that the bulk of the people are stupid, then we're resigned to either a) bad policies driven by the democratic but bovine masses, or b) non-democratic action, driven by the visionaries that see "what needs to be done, despite what the masses want, for the good of all".

      Of course, this latter group isn't necessarily people you agree with, and could be a label applied to 19th century missionaries, eco-terrorists, or George W Bush/Dick Cheney. I could go further, but I don't want to invoke Godwin's Law.

      We have EXACTLY the governments we collectively wanted. Their policies reflect, largely, the desires of their masses. The moment some narcissist starts spouting that they "know better than everyone" is the moment I start checking my wallet, my rights, and my rights. The conflict between my personal beliefs and what governments tend to do is why I generally believe in WEAKER centralized power...but again, I'm outvoted by the collective around me who prefers a society ringed with safety nets.

      --
      -Styopa
    3. Re:And are "we", exactly? by ledow · · Score: 1

      I haven't rented a DVD in my life. I once went with a schoolfriend and he rented a VHS. That's as close as I get.

      I haven't been to a cinema in years. Nearly a decade. And before that, my cinema trips are minimal. I have been to the cinema more times in the US than I have been in the UK town I lived in for 20 years. I have been to the US - once. For a week.

      My personal contribution to anything Hollywood is so small as to be infinitesimal. But, I realise that I'm an outlier here.

      The problem is that democracy, in and of itself, is not as democratic as the word suggests. I cannot vote for myself. I cannot vote for you (unless you live in my country, maybe even my locality, and pay an awful lot of money and your time to register yourself as a candidate), I cannot vote for anyone that I have ever personally met and had a drink with. This, I have an issue with that extends beyond anything else.

      However, I agree that the alternatives are no more appetising - yet I would argue that democracy in its current form is not "more appetising" than any other form of government. They all suffer the same basic problems, when you look deeply enough. Claiming that somehow democracy is a superior form of government is a claim that can only invite argument and comparisons - if I can't vote for who I want, even myself, does that make it a democracy? Or are we back to the "chosen few" model again already, in one simple swoop of the associated administrative issues of everyone being able to vote for anyone else?

      (For example, would writing down an ID number of an individual that you WANT to vote for, instead of a box-ticking exercise, not be as simple as - and more fair - than ticking between half-a-dozen people you've never met and who obviously WANT a career in politics for some reason? Then the big-name people could publish their ID numbers and get people to write them on the ballot, and I could vote for me, or my friend Jack, too. I'd still "lose" the vote, of course, probably to a celebrity, but it would have some semblance of democracy about it).

      However you cut it, the vast majority of people did not put any government in charge of them into power freely, nor would ever agree with all their policies. That is the inherent problem.

      The problem HERE is that the US government, with aid from allies admittedly, has broken what was an international effort and network. And people are trying to say that "we" voted them in - no, we didn't. I have absolutely NO control whatsoever over that. And that's the most worrying part. If Russia, to pluck a country at random, was to have done the same to the US, and be the first revealed to have done so, and did so in contravention of its own and international laws, would we be having the discussion, or would my country now be in the middle of another battle?

      The Internet wasn't the US's to break. Parts of it might have originated there (but not even the majority of it), but it has never owned it. But now "we" (collectively engineers and other people of the world) have to fix it. There's a very common mistake of thinking that the US is the only part of the world with an opinion, or which might want to do things its own way.

      And so the goal is to bring the "inter" back into the Internet once more. Let the US do what it wants. Because when the rest of the world is only passing and can only be interacted with, using fully-encrypted traffic, their spying efforts get exactly what the outcome they brought upon themselves - more work, and less results.

    4. Re:And are "we", exactly? by Burz · · Score: 1

      I2P (the Invisible Internet Project) works well as a secure Internet. You can have whatever kind of traffic on it, and choose the number of hops from 0 to 4 (merely encrypted to very anonymous). They have bittorrent, and a decentralized email system running on it that works pretty good.

  32. This article needs to be pinned! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    This article needs to be pinned to the front-page of Slashdot for the next year.

  33. DSA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Defense Security Administration - not a peep so far about them. And you think they've been sitting on their asses this whole time?

    1. Re:DSA by PPH · · Score: 1

      Are you referring to the DSS? I'm sure they are a user of this intelligence product. But they have a limited charter: To conduct investigations related to DoD contractors and personnel. As such, they usually don't get involved with members of the general public unless they fall into one of the above categories. I say 'usually', because its logically the same as you contacting a foreign national. Your communications will be intercepted. Likewise, if you communicate with an employee of the DoD (who has been informed that a condition of their employment will be such monitoring) they get your side of the conversation as well.

      --
      Have gnu, will travel.
  34. Re:"Engineers" by gatkinso · · Score: 1

    There are software developers that can be considered engineers.

    They are rare however.

    --
    I am very small, utmostly microscopic.
  35. SSH by gatkinso · · Score: 1

    Has it been cracked? This question is of utmost importance.

    I suspect that is has.

    --
    I am very small, utmostly microscopic.
    1. Re:SSH by dbIII · · Score: 1
      SSH is more a front end for a pile of different ways to communicate than a communications method in itself. So the answer is probably some but most likely not all, and it's pretty easy to bolt new methods on top anyway. Some of the variety is shown from the man page of a linux version:

      protocol 2 is the default since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160)

  36. Salute by Habberhead · · Score: 0

    Is it just me, or does the one guy in the photo look like he's saluting another guy who is throwing out a Heil???

  37. All we have to do by davide+marney · · Score: 1

    ... is make it more difficult for the government to spy on us, right? How may more people have to start routinely encrypting email before it gets so computationally expensive that bulk searches are no longer worth the effort?

    --
    "We receive as friendly that which agrees with, we resist with dislike that which opposes us" - Faraday
    1. Re:All we have to do by MrDoh! · · Score: 4, Interesting

      That's what I'm hoping, but also wonder if the deployment of fast net in the US is being deliberately crippled so the NSA can keep up with it. "You can't install that tech until our capacity is up to speed" If everyone has 1gb connects to/from the net, and decent encryption is used on everything moving up and down the pipe, even the NSA would have trouble keeping up to speed on it all. Everyone would/could be running various TOR (and whatever comes next) to make it a moving target. But for now.. speeds what they are, it's got me wondering. The tech's there, other countries have deployed it, as well as breaking the internet, is it also slowing it down for US citizens to facilitate spying?

      --
      Waiting for an amusing sig.
  38. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? Open source ... by davecb · · Score: 1

    Available at https://github.com/SilentCircle, but now we have the problem of validating the binaries are built from the code. This is subtle: see, for example, https://lwn.net/Articles/565113/

    --
    davecb@spamcop.net
  39. Step 1: compilers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    All the open source crypto is for naught... if you can't trust your compiler.

    Schneier and his disciples want to do this, fine. They *must* start with a complete audit of GCC and any other compilers they plan on basing their work on.

  40. Focus on quantity, not quality by davide+marney · · Score: 1

    We need to make dirt-simple to encrypt messages and files, then start spreading the word to your personal support circle (you know, the people who rely on you to keep things running for them) that "everybody encrypts these days". If you see an unencrypted message or file, say, "ugh, don't touch that, that's like spam". We engineers have a lot of influence on the ground, where it is hardest for any government to interfere.

    It will be an order of magnitude easier to overrun government's spying capabilities than it will be to thwart them.

    --
    "We receive as friendly that which agrees with, we resist with dislike that which opposes us" - Faraday
  41. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 5, Informative

    I dispute that these vigilantes should decide what should be "declassified" or what isn't.... I just strongly object to the methods being used by the anti-secrecy crowd, and I don't trust their motivations at all.

    That is a fair enough opinion and nobody can argue with it, it is good to have a healthy dose of skepticism about any information that is presented to us via any channel. However what is more difficult to dispute is when a leaked document reveals heinous war crimes - should focusing on the messenger still be more important than a message of that significance? Also remember that Washington leaks information all the time (for example the Bin Laden operation) - why are leaks that expose crimes be worse than leaks that make the president look good? To most people that just reeks of hypocrisy.

    The usual reply to this logic is "what war crimes, there were no war crimes exposed - but look over there - Assange is a narcicist and Manning is a traitor!!". However even a basic search and read of the documents they destroyed their lives to bring to us show that this claim is absolutely false:

    Revelations from the Afghanistan and Iraq war logs detailed the use of paramilitary death squads, complicity in the torture of Iraqi citizens, the indiscriminate killing of civilians by private military contractors and many other abuses. Meanwhile, the leaked State Department cables brought to light scores of secret drone strikes in countries we are not even at war with, and uncovered the collusion between the U.S. and Yemini governments to lie about American responsibility for the massacre of 41 people in the Al-Majalah region. They also revealed U.S. interference with judicial efforts in Spain to investigate the Bush administration's torture practices. In Tunisia, leaks exposing the opulence and corruption of Ben Ali's government were a catalyst for the revolution that brought down the repressive regime and ignited other pro-democracy movements throughout the Arab world. The list could go on but the point is simple: it would have been a disservice to democracy to withhold this important information.

  42. US Government betrayed far more by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    US gov has betrayed its people, its constitution, the Internet and most of the world. Thanks a lot Obama.

    1. Re:US Government betrayed far more by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Not to defend Obama - I would call him the scum of the earth, but that would be insulting scum - but things weren't exactly butterflies and unicorns on January 19, 2009. That also applies to Bush. Things weren't exactly butterflies and unicorns on January 19, 2001, either.

      HOWEVER, Obama ran specifically on the platform to putting an end to all of this nonsense. He ramped it up to a level Bush couldn't even dream of.

    2. Re:US Government betrayed far more by TheSkepticalOptimist · · Score: 1

      Its funny how Americans continually blame Obama for the world wide fuck up that was George Bush, both Sr and Jr.

      Sure Obama could do more to clean up the mess, but its like walking into a latrine after someone else's shit storm with nothing more than a toothbrush and being blamed for why it still stinks an hour later.

      The US gov has betrayed its people and the world, thanks a lot US voters.

      --
      I haven't thought of anything clever to put here, but then again most of you haven't either.
  43. Trust was destroyed a decade ago by SirGarlon · · Score: 2

    I would argue that trust is what got us into the current mess of pervasive vulnerability. There's been too much trust, for too long. It is easier to program in a world where you can ignore the risk that someone is going to inject SQL commands into a Web form, or believe that once you've stored data on a server inside your firewall, that data is safe. That world is gone and it's not coming back. We, the tech community, have left too many back doors unlocked and unguarded for too long, and now there is a whole economy of data crime. The fact that the NSA has made sure there is no such thing as real encryption is just a piece - a significant piece, I'll admit - of an industry-wide failure.

    What I'm saying is that designing systems based on trust is naive, and looking back, was a bad idea to begin with. Trust is for suckers. It doesn't scale: the larger the system, the greater the chance for a malefactor to infiltrate it. What we need today, I believe, is to approach re-engineering the Internet with a healthy does of *mistrust*.

    --
    [Sir Garlon] is the marvellest knight that is now living, for he destroyeth many good knights, for he goeth invisible.
  44. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by rvw · · Score: 1

    I couldn't care less if Assange or Snowden are nice guys. That's completely irrelevant for the matter if they're sweet little cherubs or like to fuck sheep on their spare time. Nobody does what they did by being that nice guy everybody wants to have a beer with.

    The hateful crimes they exposed are the true stars, here. If you focus on the messenger, you miss the message. That's what the governments, corporations and their global propaganda machine (a.k.a. mass media) badly, badly, badly want you to do. Quite successfully.

    Same as the porn industrie fighting for freedom of speech. If I remember correctly, I once read that you can measure the freedom of speech in a country by looking at the pornography made and consumed there. To be honest, this comparison seems to be losing value, in my eyes at least.

  45. Multi-route encrypted UDP with FEC on private wifi by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    We can't take back the Internet, we have to completely replace it. Privately owned wireless cells are the only way. Multi-route protocols, forward error correction, default encryption, etc. We need a strong technical solution such that rogue cells all over the place intercepting packets will still not get enough data to do anything. By using randomly mutating multi-route (instead of just finding a route and sticking with it), encrypted packets and FEC, you can broadcast packets all over the place and only the intended recipient is able to reconstruct the payload. We'd need more bandwidth, the net would be stuffed full of chaff, but if literally every house in the country had a wifi cell on the roof there would be tons of routes. The protocol has to be adjusted so that the true source addresses aren't known by intermediaries, and only immediate destinations are revealed. Embracing openness means you should be able to broadcast your communications and still be secure. The recipient has to take an active role, going out and finding some of the packets. Private ownership is key. They can't strong-arm/rubber hose all of us.

  46. Re:Step 1: compilers by ledow · · Score: 1

    Though it is well worthy of investigation, I don't see that it's a prerequisite.

    If your source code has all been compiled with a malicious compiler, but otherwise represents the bulk of your work, it doesn't take much to recompile it with another compiler later on. The problem can be fixed retroactively, and only prior binaries suffer the problems.

    Additionally, auditing GCC would take years (and is, and has, been done by quite a few people), and the "double-compiler" trick pretty much rules out rogue interpretations that weren't in the source sneaking their way into the binary.

    So, although important, the problem is fixable, and we can plough on with everything else first, rather than wait for the results of some lengthy GCC audit.

    To be honest, more useful would be to implement double-compilation checking into the build system and then build with EVERY compiler and spot any differences. I think you'll find quite a lot of distros already do that, just to be sure (more from clever malware than some state-sponsored effort). Rather than relying on one compiler, get ALL the compilers involved, rogue or not, and spot the ones that do something different to all the rest.

    So, no, they must NOT start with that. They should do that alongside everything else. And shout the second they see something suspicious. Unless you are compiling from source yourself, you're already trusting the person who builds the binaries and those distributing them not to play with SHA1 hashes, etc. that they confirm to the source they say they do.

    Finding out later down the road that GCC is compromised isn't such a big deal in the scope of such a project (but obviously very serious elsewhere) - just recompile with something else, mark all previous binaries as untrusted and off you go. And in the meantime, the double-compile trick will let you know if any one particular compiler is doing ANYTHING it shouldn't anyway.

    Waiting 10+ years for an audit of GCC is not unrealistic, but completely impractical to be something that acts as a prerequisite to anything else.

  47. Warrant canary. by caitriona81 · · Score: 5, Informative

    A more robust version of rsync.net's "warrant canary" (http://www.rsync.net/resources/notices/canary.txt) might help, if it were to become more commonplace, people would start to assume any provider not providing one to already be under gag order.

    IANAL, but the legal theory is that while a gag order can make it illegal to speak out, it can't force someone to make falsified or fraudulent statements - any entity that has not already received a secret order is free to testify to that fact, and simply stop making that assertion at such time that they are compromised.

    If this were made more robust, for example, key employees being videotaped undergoing a polygraph regularly where they are asked questions about the integrity of their service, it might just work. (I realize a polygraph isn't secure. For this purpose, however, it doesn't matter, because it provides a means to deliberately fail a test while having deniability of your intent to do so.

    I'm sure similar creative ideas could be used :)

    1. Re:Warrant canary. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The problem with this theory is that it hasn't been proven in practice. IANAL either, but it strikes me as something that hinges on a possible technicality, rather than something that has a solid basis in law.

      The warrant canary method is akin to using a passphrase, or some other non-obvious way of communicating the fact that you've been given a gag order. It still constitutes disclosure, even if your method is posting "the weather in Instanbul is nice this time of the year" or signalling your compromised state through the absence of a post.

    2. Re:Warrant canary. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That is just so wrong. Gag orders are to keep someone from communicating certain ideas. It is well established that, even when we are not dealing with super-secret FISC ones, they can force you to say and do certain things because the underlying message is what is important. Additionally, when it comes to violating a gag order, the burden surprisingly easy to meet. People have gotten nailed just for having a system set up beforehand and just so happened to let go of the deadman's switch or set off some fail-safe, when habit or a formal time system keeps it set. When it comes to these sorts of FISC gag orders, I'd especially hate to be on the wrong side of a violation of one.

  48. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? Open source ... by Vintermann · · Score: 1

    Are the binaries stripped? If they ship with debugging symbols (and why shouldn't they?) I don't envy the job of the NSA guy who's supposed to sneak a back door into it.

    I don't think this should be much of a concern. Corrupting stuff at that level, in an area with so much scrutiny, costs more than it's worth for NSA. It's hard, and detectable.

    --
    xkcd is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
  49. Steady on... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ... we'll have complete, anonymous free speech next, then how will our political masters survive?

  50. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    They don't need to break the encryption when they literally own the wires. They already have back-doors in the certificate infrastructure, so they can do man-in-the-middle attacks and brute force your passwords (your password is your dog's name, right?)

    We don't need to "fix" the internet, we need to replace it completely with something privately owned. Private WIFI cells in every house with something like randomly mutating multi-route UDP and shared-secret N-K FEC (you need to receive, say, 3 packets to be able to reconstruct the content. If you only have 2 packets you have nothing). We need to assume and expect that there will be many rogue stations intercepting all traffic and work around that.

    The government thinks it "owns" radio-waves but it is wrong, that's like owning the light coming from the sun. They have outlawed encrypted radio since before the internet existed, because they fear it, they know they won't be able to stop it.

    1. Re:A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. by gatkinso · · Score: 1

      >> They don't need to break the encryption when they literally own the wires.

      Wrong. So wrong. With strong (and uncompromised!) crypto I can send an encrypted message safely through any untrusted (and known to be monitored) path. While they can gather metadata about the message they cannot read the message.

      Did the US own the atmosphere during WW2? They most certainly did not... yet the Windtalkers were able to operate quite effectively while the Japanese listened to every word they said. Date, time, length of message, frequency, transmitter location/direction - that is "all" they got.

      >> your password is your dog's name, right

      Not. While my passwords could be bruteforced like any other, the best starting point would be to throw away a dictionary.

      --
      I am very small, utmostly microscopic.
    2. Re:A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. by PPH · · Score: 1

      They don't need to break the encryption when they literally own the wires.

      But that's the whole point of encryption. You don't trust the wires, so you secure communications over them.

      They already have back-doors in the certificate infrastructure,

      That's the bigger problem. Hierarchical structures are easy to break if one can attack a few points and get many keys. Peer-to-peer structures are more difficult to crack, as one has to go after a large number of peers. And between two trusted peers, there is no third party that can be subverted. I'm certain this is one reason for the continued propaganda campaign against peer-to-peer protocols. If you are using one, you must be trading ripped CDs, illegal copies of movies, CP, etc. And why the government interferes with operations like Apple's Facetime peer-to-peer operation using NSA fronts.

      --
      Have gnu, will travel.
  51. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? Open source ... by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

    You cannot compile the Silent Circle product from that source code sample (and that is all it is, a sample). Silent Circle tells all journalists that the sample is all the source code (or they incorrectly get that opinion and write about the product as if it is fully open source) - which is not true and creates distrust.

  52. Its a global coup-d'etat by Marrow · · Score: 2

    You cannot fix this technologically, politically, or socially. This is not a "problem". Its a global coup-d'etat.

  53. Where is my Opportunistic Encryption? by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

    Once upon a time, we had a thing called Opportunistic Encryption, and it was bad, because the implementations were flawed. But it's been some years since then, where is my OE? It should be a mere apt-get away.

    --
    "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
  54. NSA and elliptic curve by cybaz · · Score: 1

    Does anyone know why he says "Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can". We've been looking at moving to elliptic curve because of the smaller keysize, but I'm concerned people will start to move away from it because of this.

    1. Re:NSA and elliptic curve by TempeTerra · · Score: 1

      He elaborated (slightly) in a blog comment

      >"You recommended to 'Prefer symmetric cryptography over public-key cryptography.' Can you elaborate on why?"
      > It is more likely that the NSA has some fundamental mathematical advance in breaking public-key algorithms than symmetric algorithms.

      http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html#comments

      I think his reasoning is that the NSA is more likely to have a clever hack for elliptic curve crypto which is why they've been pushing it - the ideal situation for the NSA is that everyone uses crypto that the NSA but nobody else can break.

      --
      .evom ton seod gis eht
    2. Re:NSA and elliptic curve by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      That would only make sense if you think the NSA is unfathomably arrogant. If they have a way to break ECC, then they have to admit that someone else might be able to break it too. Recommending that every other government agency use a broken system to encrypt their potentially valuable information would be ridiculous.

  55. Irony by GLOACAI · · Score: 2

    The internet was originally setup by DARPA as a government network and then evolved out of that into what we have now. It could be considered that everybody else are squatters and the government is just taking it back from us.

  56. Oh Well There's Your Problem by Greyfox · · Score: 2

    Maybe we should be electing people who will actually respect our rights an the constitution. As soon as someone like that actually runs...

    --

    I'm trying to teach myself to set people on fire with my mind... Is it hot in here?

  57. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by log0n · · Score: 2

    [quote]These people have a radical and fairly crude ant-secrecy agenda, and the stuff they bring to light may be done in a highly selective and self-serving manner. And regardless of whether you think governments should be allowed to keep secrets or spy on people, I dispute that these vigilantes should decide what should be "declassified" or what isn't. It's only slightly better when the leaks are channelled through the media, given that journalism is a "soft option", and that journalists are only slight better qualified than the leakers themselves to decide what's safe to leak or not. [/fullstop]

    You're still missing the message to focus on messengers. Tyranny is what is the problem. Doesn't matter if it's Judy Gardland, Edward Snowden or Ariel Castro delivering the message. If the statements are true, focusing on the flaws/brokenness/evils of the messenger is ensures tyranny continues to succeed.

    I'm pissed and I don't know what to do. The NSA is stealing both the ideals of what our democracy is based on, as well our increasingly modern era implementation of it. I don't think anything short of bloodshed in the streets has a chance of changing anything, and even then it likely won't. The Government in the name of security can lie, cheat, steal and kill and not be held accountable.

  58. Sneakernet - an old friend indeed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Who thought Sneakernet was dead ?
    No back doors
    No NSA spy shit looking for porn to worry about
    No more FB to get upset about when befriended
    No more bull-shit chats with the boss on Skype
    Cut that network cable, life is better without it.
    Sneakernet - maybe slow but an old friend indeed

  59. Technology cannot solve social problems. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    People want to be spied on—look at how they vote. No engineering our way out of this problem.

  60. Re:Step 1: compilers by gatkinso · · Score: 1

    Great. Start building your secure internet 2.0 on a compromised foundation. Have fun with that.

    --
    I am very small, utmostly microscopic.
  61. Silly. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I don't think you comprehend the size of the world. Have fun with your little 100 meter radius wireless islands.

  62. Dream On by shawnhcorey · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The internet has always been open. There have been fools that think adding "security" to it will change this. It doesn't. Get real, people. There are only two rules to security on the internet: 1. Never put anything on the net that you can't afford to be viewed by the public. 2. Never put anything solely on the internet that you can afford to lose. Corollary: Never put anything in a cloud that you can't afford to be viewed by the public.

    --
    Don't stop where the ink does.
  63. So long, and thanks for making computers creepy! by ggraham412 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I think the totalitarian sickness Schneier describes goes well beyond the NSA. Computers and especially mobile devices are becoming creepy, for lack of a better word, even without government intervention. They are the prying eyes in your house Harriton High School Used Laptop Webcams To SPY On Students At Home, they are following your every move Government Location Tracking: Cell Phones, GPS Devices, and License Plate Readers, they are keeping tabs on what you like and don't like Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome (featured on slashdot yesterday, itself a thinly veiled phishing scam IMHO). Although subject to government abuse, none of the "services" highlighted in those links were instigated by the government. Just yesterday I was innocuously checking for prices for various professional training seminars on Google, and on cue my Email inbox started overflowing with unsolicited offers. On some days, I want to throw my smartphone in the trash and unplug my computer from the internet and only plug it back in when I need to access the SVN repository.

    So Kudos to Bruce Schneier for addressing his call to the engineering community, but now it begs a question: aren't engineers, including those outside the NSA/DEA/FBI, somewhat responsible for creating this creepy user experience? I don't think they're suddenly going to wake up one day and fix it; a significant subset has embraced the creepiness and fundamentally doesn't understand why it might be a problem for others.

  64. What we need... by new+death+barbie · · Score: 1

    1) we need solid encryption, with decently secure keys, BY DEFAULT, on EVERY box, BEFORE it leaves the box. If it hits a network, it's encrypted first. Period. Even if you're running Windows. Even on your Grandmother's Windows computer. Email, IMs, and Web browsing, file sharing, voice, the works. If I choose to encrypt my transmitted data, I don't want to accrue suspicion because I stand out, because EVERYTHING is encrypted. If the government wants to know what I'm sending or receiving, they can ask for my encryption keys. Depending on the law, maybe they'll get them. But then a) I'll KNOW they're watching me, and b) watching me doesn't automatically let them watch my neighbors. Decrypting one computer at a time doesn't scale well.

    This is really, really, hard, and won't happen overnight. But we've learned a lot since the Internet was young, I think it's workable from a technical standpoint. It's the social part that will be hardest, convincing companies that the additional expense is justified and convincing people that a little extra complexity (hopefully none at all -- except maybe when you set up your computer for the first time) is worth it.

    2) we need REALLY secure interfaces. Part of this is accomplished by part 1) but not all. We need to work towards fewer viruses, fewer zero-day exploits, and we need them fixed faster and with less manual intervention. Why are botnets STILL possible? This is also really hard. But the government should want this, too. Every time we hear about how vulnerable our power grids, or automobiles, or pacemakers, or telecom might be to cyber warfare, we should be shouting about this. Instead the government wants to exploit the zero-days for themselves, because they are dependent on them for their own cyberwar offensives. Yes, Microsoft might own some of the heat for this, (but not all, by any stretch of the imagination) but by their omnipresence they are in the best position to make a serious dent in the problem, too. IF it was worthwhile for them to do so. I might be interested in Windows 9 or 10 if security -- REAL security, designed in from the ground up, not marketecture -- was the goal. But again, motivating software companies is a social problem, not a technical one.

    I'm sure there are other things we need, but these are the ones that seem most important to me.

    --

    It's supposed to be completely automatic, but actually you have to press this button.

  65. Re:Step 1: compilers by ledow · · Score: 2

    What compromised foundation? A compiler that you can suck out and replace in a second with any of the alternatives?

    Your *CODE* doesn't corrupt when you compile with a rogue compiler (that's what source management is for), only the base binary built from it.

    The point is not to assume that your compiler is safe, but to work in a way that - WITH A SAFE COMPILER - your code is fine. Other people will be working with different compilers and - AGAIN - by comparing outputs of different compilers you can work on the assumption that they are not ALL compromised and so anything you use to code is fine. The step of later finding that GCC is malicious is a matter of replacing compiler and recompiling, not corrupting every line of code you've written in the meantime.

    But losing YEARS of effort because you can't write a single line of code until you've audited GCC is insanity.

  66. Are SELinux and FreeBSD compromised? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    One issue that darknets don't solve is operating system security. After all, the NSA has been contributing "security code" to Linux, and one would have to be very naive to think that they've been working to reduce their own snooping capability.

    From Security-Enhanced_Linux,

    The United States National Security Agency (NSA), the original primary developer of SELinux, released the first version to the open source development community under the GNU GPL on December 22, 2000.[3] The software merged into the mainline Linux kernel 2.6.0-test3, released on 8 August 2003.
    ...
    Experimental ports of the FLASK/TE implementation have been made available via the TrustedBSD Project for the FreeBSD and Darwin operating systems.

    Post-Snowden, all these contributions now need to be reviewed for backdoors and weaknesses. Giving NSA the benefit of the doubt is NOT appropriate.

  67. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by Digital+Vomit · · Score: 0

    These people have a radical and fairly crude ant-secrecy agenda

    I can understand the government wanting to go after these people if they are in league with the ants. However, I, for one, will welcome our new insect overlords when their plans come to fruition.

    --
    Modern copyright is theft of culture from everyone and it retards the progress of the useful arts and sciences.
  68. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Nobody does what they did by being that nice guy everybody wants to have a beer with.

    That's why they need to be hunted down and killed like the dogs they are.

  69. Bruce Schneier is now on the naughty list for sure by GameboyRMH · · Score: 0

    This article ensures it, it makes Aaron Swartz' manifesto look like a hippy drum circle in comparison. If he slips up the legal system will hit him with everything. Watch out Bruce.

    --
    "When information is power, privacy is freedom" - Jah-Wren Ryel
  70. Re:Step 1: compilers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Don't forget your Sandy-bridge or newer intel CPU has a BUILT IN 3G connectivity.

    They've pwned your CPU.

    Supposedly to shut down stolen laptops remotely even if not internet connected, but I've never ONCE heard of this being used.

    I'd rather believe it's a way to constantly update the CPU to do things like steal passwords right out of memory and allow them to scan your computer should they decide to send the right 3G pulse in your neighborhood.

    They could even do things to detect if it's compiling and introduce a trusting trust compiler attack as well. As new tools/compilers come out, they update your chip over 3G to learn how to detect when those run and compromise them as well.

  71. Correct me if I'm wrong by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    But didn't the whole "internet" thing start with a DARPA-funded project? Kind of makes it theirs from the get go I think.

    Also, the demise of "internet freedom" is inevitable for many reasons. First, it takes a huge amount of effort to setup and maintain the internet - that costs someone a lot of money. The people spending the money to operate the internet own it.

    Secondly, the dream of letting anyone communicate with anyone else is bound to fail. The reason is that people start to feel that they can engage in behavior on the internet without consequence - either due to a perceived anonymity or the simple lack of physical presence. As we have seen, this seems to bring out the worst sort of behavior in people which leads to abuses that then require oversight to control.

    Thirdly, since it crosses international boundaries, it becomes an obvious attack vector both for political and criminal pursuits. Even the internet's short history has shown this. Once something becomes an attack vector (particularily when it crosses international boundaries), there will be government intervention.

    This is *not* an engineering problem. No amount of engineering is going to impact the fundamental socio-economic-political issues that naturally lead us to where we are now. Until we find some way to change the basic nature of mankind (which has not changed for as long as there have been people) there is no way that an internet-like construct can be anything different than what it is becoming.

  72. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Julian Assange... is a walking PR disaster area.

    Did you read that in the news?

  73. Re:No complaints about the NSA here by pr0fessor · · Score: 1

    There is no reason that secure can't also be user friendly, the illusion that secure must also be difficult is part of the problem.

    People don't send just send lolcats through my email they get order confirmations when they purchase something and other sensitive data. A low pay NSA Analyst could become and identity thief just as easily as any other low pay employee that can gain access to your information. So keep it secured.

    If I were a guest in your house, well you wouldn't be charging me, so I'm not a guest and as a paid service I have expectations.

  74. Just one question? by TheSkepticalOptimist · · Score: 1

    What stupid terrorist is using the Internet to coordinate these days?

    I mean the NSA and most governments are trying to monitor all internet traffic, and this is widely known, so I mean are their ANY terrorists out their dumb enough to be using the internet still to coordinate their attacks?

    This ain't exactly a secret. I guess people are trying to use clever ways of encoding their transmissions through the Internet, but since the Internet is fundamentally corrupted then its no longer a viable resource for communication IMHO.

    So all the NSA is doing is wasting billions of dollars monitoring the benign traffic of innocents using FUD to continue to fund program.

    --
    I haven't thought of anything clever to put here, but then again most of you haven't either.
    1. Re:Just one question? by PPH · · Score: 1

      Terrorists? Who said anything about terrorists?

      This is all about tracking you. To make sure you aren't downloading songs and movies. Or keeping an offshore bank account. Or underbidding one of the government's buddies.

      --
      Have gnu, will travel.
    2. Re:Just one question? by DrVomact · · Score: 1

      What stupid terrorist is using the Internet to coordinate these days?

      I mean the NSA and most governments are trying to monitor all internet traffic, and this is widely known, so I mean are their ANY terrorists out their dumb enough to be using the internet still to coordinate their attacks?

      Why arrange actual attacks when you can just call your buddy and tell him "the attack on the American nest of spies in Yemen is a go"? You know that the NSA will suck up this "chatter", and evacuate every embassy in the region amid much hyperventilation, thus making the U.S. look like cowards and fools, without costing you more than the price of a throwaway cell phone. Such "surveillance" is completely worthless—in fact, it is a cheap weapon in the hands of our enemies.

      This ain't exactly a secret. ... So all the NSA is doing is wasting billions of dollars monitoring the benign traffic of innocents using FUD to continue to fund program.

      Right. The organs of the State are self-perpetrating. Their main purpose is to justify their existence and to expand their size and power. One could hope that Congress would institute radical budget cuts on such agencies, but that's a bit like hoping that the Mississippi will start flowing toward Canada. My own hope is that the entire apparatus will become so complex that it collapses of its own weight, but maybe that's just another form of self-deception.

      --
      Great men are almost always bad men--Lord Acton's Corollary
  75. Re:My problem with Schneier by geminidomino · · Score: 1

    Yet, Chinese people seem to get the best use out of it, hacking it and taking it over with their hardware.

    Normally, I don't bother feeding the partisan trolls, but it's a funny day, so might as well break with tradition for a bit.

    You do realize that the reason that Chinese hardware gets to "take over" the internet is because they manufacture it cheaper? Good, old-fashioned, conservative-friendly capitalism.

  76. Re:What is Bruce Schneier's game? Open source ... by davecb · · Score: 1

    Yes: they need to publish more, and provide ways for end-users or their nerds to validate the work. In a previous life I ran stuff through a disassembler/decompiler and read the diffs. I think that's likely too hard for a program this big (;-))

    --
    davecb@spamcop.net
  77. Here's why it has to be open by dbIII · · Score: 4, Informative

    I'll add a bit more to what people have written above with another reason why these things have to be open.
    Let's see an example of closed source encryption - Adobe Acrobat from a few years ago. Their code was the same one used by Julius Caesar, a very simple letter substitution code which could be cracked with a cardboard code wheel that used to be printed on the back of corn flakes packets to entertain children. Commercial "security" software needs to be open to prevent such laziness being used to defraud people that think they have paid for something that will stop third parties being able to read their PDF files or whatever.
    Any readers that think I am making that ridiculous situation up should google Dmitry Sklyarov. The only thing more ridiculous than Adobe's code was that they hit Sklyarov with a DMCA notice for it which somehow resulted in him being imprisoned for months - a DMCA notice for something Julius Caesar wrote about so should be in the public domain by now! No penalty for a false DMCA notice was levied on Adobe (or anyone else - it's one sided with no consequence for crying wolf).

    1. Re:Here's why it has to be open by devman · · Score: 1

      The Sklyarov incedent was absurd for a variety of reasons, but don't enhance the facts, report them as is. Sklyarov spent 22 days in jail and was then out on bail, charges were eventually dropped.

  78. First they tax our internet purchases by Provocateur · · Score: 1

    ...then they track our internet purchases. Can't they just stick with our landlines and our 1040 EZ's like they used to?

    --
    WARNING: Smartphones have side effects--most of them undocumented.
  79. Shades of the Dark Knight by daboochmeister · · Score: 1

    NSA as Batman, wanting to use the cellphone technology to locate the Joker. Lucius Fox as the engineers who created the internet.

    Bruce Schneier will no doubt be played by Morgan Freeman in the inevitable movie version of this whole saga.

    --
    "Ahh! I see you're in that indeterminate Schrodinger state where - oh, uh ... never mind." Dave Bucci
  80. Re:Do you trust your exit node? by Technician · · Score: 1

    Do you trust your exit node or proxy? Defcon had a recent talk on setting up proxy servers as a very quick way to find people who have something to hide. Now you have their IP address and their destination. Tor works only as long as exit nodes are not in the bad guy's control.

    The phrase Tor works only as long as exit nodes are not in the bad guy's hands applies to NSA searcing for bad guys, and good guys hiding from the NSA.

    Who has your exit node.

    It is worth looking up and watching the following on Youtube.
    DEF CON 20: Owning Bad Guys And Mafia With Javascript Botnets

    --
    The truth shall set you free!
  81. A small thing to do to help by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Something I have been meaning to do for months now, I will do this weekend.
    1. I am adding an email sig with a link to the Schneier article saying Take Back the Internet.
    2. In said email sig, I am going to provide a link to my public key (which heretofore only 3 people in the world actually had),
    3. Under said link to public key, and a link to a HOWTO for PGP for noobs.

    I haven't looked for the noobs howto yet, any suggestions?

  82. Betrayed the Internet? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The internet is just a thing; the US government has betrayed the American people.

  83. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by cellocgw · · Score: 1

    The hateful crimes they exposed are the true stars, here. If you focus on the messenger, you miss the message. That's what the governments, corporations and their global propaganda machine (a.k.a. mass media) badly, badly, badly want you to do. Quite successfully.

    Same as the porn industrie fighting for freedom of speech. If I remember correctly, I once read that you can measure the freedom of speech in a country by looking at the pornography made and consumed there. To be honest, this comparison seems to be losing value, in my eyes at least.

    So, are you disgusted by the *volume* of USA porn, or by the *quality* of the porn?

    --
    https://app.box.com/WitthoftResume Code: https://github.com/cellocgw
  84. Re:So long, and thanks for making computers creepy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You can only tell users a limited number of times that they don't really want what they say they want before they turn to someone else to get what they think they want. I've explained over and over again why Facebook is not a good idea, why Gmail is not a good idea. Do people abstain? We all know that they would never give up the shiny. It's like smoking: They know it's bad for them, but they're hooked. Is it really the engineers fault for eventually giving in and doing what needs to be done to get paid?

  85. Can you take back E.Snowden first? by Max_W · · Score: 1

    Major western newspapers publish the stuff he reveled. Give him a legal immunity, so that he could return back home on his own will.

    Uncle Sam is very angry with Russian Federation. It is getting out of control. I guess the RF did not realize how serious is all this. It seemed at the beginning that he was sort of an American Solzhenitzyn, but it turns out the the US government has lost a lot of money because of this event.

    But it was not Eurasia's fault. It is an American story.

  86. Re:What we need... Botnets to save us? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Maybe the criminals' techniques can be used to foil the NSA types? You can buy their packages "on the side" supposedly.

    Just a thought...

  87. fight back by flooding with false positives by theobstacleisthepath · · Score: 1

    Presumably, the NSA is searching emails for keywords indicative of "people of interest". Would we devalue their snooping by inserting random false positives into every message that is sent? Imagine the killer app that makes all emails look like they came from.... killers. I could see this turning into a perpetual arms race with privacy advocates rebuilding a keyword generator to get more false positives to flow through the filters that the NSA woul have to keep revamping.

  88. I don't have the math chops necessary to prove by mark_reh · · Score: 1

    it, but common sense tells me there is not and can never be any such thing as secure internet/network communication. An individual with limited resources can't possibly compete with the comparably unlimited resources of any government.

    If you want any hope of secure communications, you have to communicate in person. Yes, it is expensive. Encrypting stuff to send it "securely" over the internet is simply an attempt to reduce the cost of such communications by compromising on the security.

  89. Re: The destruction of trust... by Sintar · · Score: 1

    In My opinion is that most of the world has gone to hell in a handbag. There's more corruption then ever before. We are losing liberty's for temporary safety and security. We need to heed the words and warning of one of our founding Fathers "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." Or another variant "Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and lose both." We're all moving like a high speed train headed at a slow bend and doing nothing about it. All the time holding hope that our Democratic train stays on the tracks and In doing so we're heading straight at becoming a police state all while talking on a cell phone. if something isn't done then its going to be bad news for everyone. Unfortunately the longer it takes the worse it will be for everybody.

  90. IPv6 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    FYI, AT&T DSL does IPv6 via "6rd" : http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=KB414401 . OpenWRT supports it (via the "6rd" package).

  91. Bruce, read a history book by govett · · Score: 1

    Take it back? The U.S. Government developed the Internet, and it was paid for by U.S. taxpayers. Schneier may be a computer security expert, but he is no historian.

    1. Re:Bruce, read a history book by daveime · · Score: 1

      The irony of someone talking about "taking back the Internet" on yet another thread about the "big bad NSA" ... posting from a fucking Google+ account?

      Are you taking the piss, or are you really that fucking stupid?

  92. That way the NSA can get back to their roots... by DarthVain · · Score: 1

    http://xkcd.com/538/

    #OBLIGATORYXKCD

  93. Went to the library today - by catman · · Score: 1

    and saw a translation of Cory Doctorow's Little Brother, which I read in the original some time ago. And I thought, reality is actually worse. I could tell from the tone that the author was angry when he wrote that book - how does he feel now?

  94. The U.S.Government Is Just The Face by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The U.S. Government is the GUI 'Home Page' of the Internet's abusers. The U.S. NSA is a set of pages. There are more, and worse, abusers behind and in with the NSA, using the NSA for a stalking horse. If you could "Fix" the NSA and stop its abuses, you would do no more than close an 'echo' window, a window you can see in through. Abuse would go on, you would sinply havve to get into the code to see.

    The Internet is gone. It had potential, but the potential is not worth the price. So the Internet is going to be abandoned.

  95. The NSA will find a way... by FrankenPC · · Score: 1

    Unfortunately, as long as the Feds have unhindered authority to force companies to do what they command, there will be no real way to stop their snooping. Think about an extreme example: the NSA gets a "court order" to force Symantec to open up a back door to allow them to put keylogger trojans on any machine they choose. At that point, no matter how secure a tunnel is through the internet, the NSA will always be able to gain access. So, you say: "Well Franken, your full of it! I have a SecureID fob, so my last password is irrelevant!" Then the NSA goes after the fob manufacturer to build in a mirrored fob to your own. They can literally do anything NOT LIMITED TO the crowbar approach to password extraction. We should all be very afraid. This is way beyond overreach at this point.

  96. Bring back UUCP! by zaft · · Score: 1

    Maybe we need to bring back a modernized, encrypted UUCP?

    1. Re:Bring back UUCP! by Burz · · Score: 1

      Maybe we need to bring back a modernized, encrypted UUCP?

      Fiddle around with this: http://geti2p.net/

  97. Re:No complaints about the NSA here by causality · · Score: 1

    There is no reason that secure can't also be user friendly, the illusion that secure must also be difficult is part of the problem.

    People don't send just send lolcats through my email they get order confirmations when they purchase something and other sensitive data. A low pay NSA Analyst could become and identity thief just as easily as any other low pay employee that can gain access to your information. So keep it secured.

    If I were a guest in your house, well you wouldn't be charging me, so I'm not a guest and as a paid service I have expectations.

    I appreciate and admire your intentions here, but the sad fact is: you cannot reason with this kind of narrow-mindedness.

    Although, I would be glad to be proven wrong on this one.

    --
    It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education. - Einstein
  98. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by causality · · Score: 1

    I don't have time for leakers, traitors and narcissistic wreckers like Snowdon and Assange. And it has been easy for me to dismiss their statements, and those of their camp followers out of hand.

    For me, having somebody as credible as Bruce Schneier take such a stand, changes everything. He's not just some criminally insane lunatic like Julian Assange, or some spotty kid out to make a name for himself -- he's an erudite, wise man with a proven track record of good judgement. If credentials matter -- then I think that having Schneier weigh in on this side of the political debate will have a major impact on people who are formerly undecided about the issue, including myself.

    Really? Because I make these decisions based on the facts of the matter, not the popularity of those involved. I suppose during the early 1500s you'd have sided with Tolosani against Copernicus because the latter was not considered credible (and by some, heretical - our version of a "crackpot") during his time.

    I scrutinize the message, not the messenger. I doubt you appreciate just how easy it is to demagogue and character-assassinate, not to mention that both of those are carried out with emotional arguments/manipulation and other propaganda techniques. Reason is much more difficult to twist; facts are even more difficult still.

    I'm not trying to be rude, but the mentality you demonstrate (which was instilled in you) is the major reason why society has as many faults as it does today.

    --
    It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education. - Einstein
  99. State you have never submitted to a fisa letter by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Simply add that statement to your website. Dare them to force you to keep that statement up after they serve you. We need a good privacy seal that you promise to take down your devices if you are serviced.

  100. Re:Do you trust your exit node? by hacker · · Score: 1

    Do you trust your exit node or proxy? Defcon had a recent talk on setting up proxy servers as a very quick way to find people who have something to hide. Now you have their IP address and their destination.

    It's not just about exit nodes anymore. The NSA can, and regularly does, de-anonymize users within the Tor network, with or without compromised or 'baddie-controlled' exit nodes.

    Tor works only as long as exit nodes are not in the bad guy's control.

    Correction: Tor only works (in its current implementation) when there isn't a single bad node in the entire network. IOW, not going to happen.

    Let's also keep in mind that 60+% of the funding for Tor, comes directly from the Department of Defense (DoD).

    Concerned yet? You should be.

  101. Re:Thanks Mr Schneier by rvw · · Score: 1

    The hateful crimes they exposed are the true stars, here. If you focus on the messenger, you miss the message. That's what the governments, corporations and their global propaganda machine (a.k.a. mass media) badly, badly, badly want you to do. Quite successfully.

    Same as the porn industrie fighting for freedom of speech. If I remember correctly, I once read that you can measure the freedom of speech in a country by looking at the pornography made and consumed there. To be honest, this comparison seems to be losing value, in my eyes at least.

    So, are you disgusted by the *volume* of USA porn, or by the *quality* of the porn?

    I'm not disgusted. For me, quality and fun have an inverse relationship in porn, and the fun (but not funny) porn is not easily found in a porn-world that is dominated by money.

  102. Well by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The US Government has betrayed the whole humanity.

  103. i remember u2 saying the same thing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    about "helter skelter"

  104. Other Countries start disconnecting from U. S. by bbsalem · · Score: 1

    The fear of a Balkenized Internet has greatly increased by the revelations about how much spying is done by security agencies on it. If the fear was about a Great Firewall of ..., it should be now about whole nations snipping fibre at their borders, and thanks to the duplicity of the U.S. and others about free speech and freedom.

    And it should be addressed locally by meshes using encrypted low-power radio to send packets between local store and forward nodes. We may yet see the reappearence of something like UUCP.

    The reason the spying has happened is that it is easy to snoop on the main pipe. That can be made a whole lot harder by distributing the traffic and making the network typology go ad hoc and dynamic.

  105. Flood the NSA with bogus encrypted stuff by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If everyone created bogus messages with keywords such as would be written by someone doing espionage, terrorism, etc. etc. And by flooding, I mean a few million emails per day, from random or even non existent IP addresses, we would soon see that the NSA with limited manpower and even with supercomputers to break encrypted messages would run out of resources. They want to snoop, give them all that they want en masse.

  106. Re:"Engineers" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    That is very true. There are so few people operating trains to start with and only a tiny percentage of those people are also software developers.

  107. The Evil Ones: Apple, Amazon, Google and Microsoft by ClintonGallagher · · Score: 1

    NSA is working evil but its Apple, Amazon, Google and Microsoft that have captured the use of the WWW by compelling the use of the software app store gulags denying us the rights to write software that can be deployed to what may be presumed to be our own devices as private property given that the device is in fact paid for in full and not under contract by some other 3rd party which is in collusion with the technocrat CELO(ligarchy) that Apple, Amazon, Google and Microsoft are now operating as the censors of the WWW. Back in the day it was books that were banned and now its software.

  108. The real problem by petrus4 · · Score: 1

    The real problem is the fact that, at least as far as intelligence or exercising genuine self-responsibility is concerned, 95%+ of human beings are literally not worth the oxygen they breathe.

    Almost every single brainless, technophobic fucking moron out there uses Facebook, and various other forms of centralised social networking. Even Eric Raymond, not long ago, started advocating Google+, and dared to actually become *indignant* about people warning him of what a corporate abomination it was.

    Stop using Facebook. Start re-using public key encrypted Usenet, and p2p DCC chat nets with IRC as an entry point, which is what used to be done in the old days.

    The feds literally were not able to touch that, which is the entire reason why all three IRC nets were DDoSed in January 2001. It wasn't a technology which they could easily control or monitor, so they simply wanted to destroy it. Then we got Twitter. Do you really consider that a fucking coincidence?

    You might have noticed the degree of rage in this post. I've been getting banned more recently from virtually every forum other than 4chan, and there is a reason for that.

    I. CANNOT. STAND. the continual, brainless fucking stupidity and myopia of the rest of my species, at this point. I can't stand the fact that you are all craven, gutless, stupid Good Germans, who don't want anything other than a giant nanny state to change your nappies and microwave your bottle.

    This situation is NOT because of Google. It is not because of the NSA. It is not because of Verizon. It is because of YOU. If you are someone who uses ANY form of social media, YOU are to blame. YOU are part of the problem. No one else. YOU.

  109. Off-the-Record plugin -- tell devs to update it by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The Off-the-Record (by cypherpunks) plug-in uses DH-1536 and they plan to switch to ECC and use NIST curves..not good. Should use their own curves. And meanwhile update from DH-1536 to at least DH-2048...