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Encrypted PIN Data Taken In Target Breach

New submitter danlip writes "Target has confirmed that encrypted PIN data was taken during its recent credit card breach. Target doesn't think they can be unencrypted by whoever may have taken them, because the key was never on the breached system. The article has no details on exactly how the PINs were encrypted, but it doesn't seem like it would be hard to brute force them." Another article at Time takes Target to task for its PR doublespeak about the breach.

213 comments

  1. 3des by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Other artiicles say the crypto was 3des.

    1. Re:3des by hargrand · · Score: 1

      The article also says "Target does not have access to nor does it store the encryption key within our system." The problem is that 3DES is a symmetric encryption algorithm; both parties need to share the same key to encrypt or decrypt anything. So at some point, they needed to have a key for the transaction.

    2. Re:3des by CreatureComfort · · Score: 4, Funny

      I think they meant to say the key was stored on somebody's Nintendo 3DS.

      --
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    3. Re:3des by Proudrooster · · Score: 3, Interesting

      How did this breach happen? What were the mechanics behind the data theft? Was the server hacked? As it firmware in the POS registers? How did this happen?

    4. Re:3des by davester666 · · Score: 2

      triple rot26

      --
      Sleep your way to a whiter smile...date a dentist!
    5. Re:3des by davester666 · · Score: 2

      the usual. an excel spreadsheet on a computer running bittorrent in the background.

      at least they put a password on the spreadsheet.

      --
      Sleep your way to a whiter smile...date a dentist!
    6. Re:3des by Phreakiture · · Score: 0

      Yeah, that's not really good enough. You need to go to at least quintuple for ROT26 to display any security.

      --
      www.wavefront-av.com
    7. Re:3des by denmarkw00t · · Score: 1

      They said that the keys weren't on the "compromised" systems

    8. Re:3des by hargrand · · Score: 1

      From the first article linked:

      The PIN information is encrypted within Target’s systems and can only be decrypted when it is received by our external, independent payment processor. What this means is that the “key” necessary to decrypt that data has never existed within Target’s system and could not have been taken during this incident.

    9. Re:3des by Em+Adespoton · · Score: 2

      The article also says "Target does not have access to nor does it store the encryption key within our system." The problem is that 3DES is a symmetric encryption algorithm; both parties need to share the same key to encrypt or decrypt anything. So at some point, they needed to have a key for the transaction.

      The way the system works, the 3DES key is embedded in the pin pad which is sealed against tampering. It is also held by the processor (who owns the pad). In this way, the merchant never knows the key, and so only holds the encrypted PINs.

      What I'm waiting for is the moment when some criminally minded individual realizes that "targeting" vendors isn't the way to go, and instead starts APT attacks against the processors -- suddenly, you can pick and choose what data you take, and have access to all the processing information required to make, modify, and revoke transactions. Next stop... compromising the credit companies themselves.

    10. Re:3des by mwvdlee · · Score: 1

      How hard can it be to brute force the key when you know there are only 10000 possible plaintexts?

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    11. Re:3des by liquidrocket · · Score: 1

      Not any harder or easier than any other number of possible plaintexts, ecrypted with the same key. In modern crypto, knowing the plaintext is irrelelvant (even if you know exactly what it is), only the quality of the key matters. If the key is apropriately random and unknown to the attackers, then they will have to brute force the entire keyspace to get to the pins, same as any other encrypted piece of information.

    12. Re:3des by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 2

      Provided it is CPA and KPA secure (chosen plaintext attack, known plaintext attack) then it's as hard as brute forcing the keys.

      However the ANSI X9 series crypto specs and the PCI-DSS stuff, the banks and card processors use are hardly the best available. They might be secure, but without specifics of what crypto profiles the devices were using, you cannot be sure.

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    13. Re:3des by Cederic · · Score: 1

      Perhaps the vendors are targeted because they have weaker security than the banks - both the issuers and acquirers.

      The banks are already being targeted, continually. Eventually someone will succeed, but banks and card providers spend an awfully large amount of time, money and effort in making sure they aren't the first one.

      Anyway, why go for a card company? Sure Visa or Mastercard would be the motherlode? Of course, they too have data security at the top of their requirements list for any new systems.

    14. Re: 3des by pegr · · Score: 1

      Yes, the key is needed to encrypt, but the encrypted PIN block is already encrypted by the card embosser on behalf of the bank. If the merchant passes along the encrypted PIN block as sensitive authentication data to the processor for authorization, the merchant has no need to decrypt.

      This, unfortunately, makes the encrypted PIN block more of a password than encrypted data. Cloning cards is still quite possible.

    15. Re:3des by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      NSA backdoor?

    16. Re: 3des by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Thanks for clarifying this. I thought the Target owned and managed the PIN pad, but that's apparently not the case.

    17. Re:3des by steviesteveo · · Score: 1

      The PIN information is encrypted within Target’s systems and can only be decrypted when it is received by our external, independent payment processor. What this means is that the “key” necessary to decrypt that data has never existed within Target’s system and could not have been taken during this incident.

      Which is dammed misleading. Maybe the information truly is never decrypted on their system, but it is encrypted and it's encrypted with exactly the same key as it would be decrypted with at the external, independent payment processor.

    18. Re: 3des by Aaden42 · · Score: 1

      The encrypted PIN block is only a password to the processor / merchant combination for which that PIN pad was provisioned. The encrypted block couldn’t be substituted in like (for example) an unsalted hash of a password since the key “should” be different for each set of PIN pads (possibly/preferably each individual PIN pad) that is issued.

  2. Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and PIN by WilliamGeorge · · Score: 1, Informative

    Subject line says it all :)

    --
    William George
  3. Why are they storing this data anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Is there a good reason for keeping this that I'm not seeing?

    1. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The government requires it.

    2. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Tool+Man · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Nope, horse-puckey. This would be the same PIN data that their PCI compliance *cough* would disallow from storing after authorization for a transaction, just like the CVV codes which I think also got nabbed. Now, it is possible that they were all captured "in-flight" and not being stored against the rules, but it is very much verboten to keep even with encryption.

    3. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It wasn't more than a few days before the breach started that we were hearing about POS-targeting malware that was going for this kind of data. It looks like it was probably software card-skimming, in which case things like encrypted pins and CVV's would be entirely reasonable to get nabbed.

      But yes, if it does turn out that Target was storing this data, it'll be pretty bad news for them.

    4. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by failedlogic · · Score: 1

      I don't work in PCI compliance, but I've been reading up on it. This is, as I've understood it, a violation of PCI. Adding to parent comment, that it was taken "in-flight" is probably as much a rule breaker .... and one has to wonder how if this data was not being stored just how long it was being taken "in-flight". There's several million cards been taken from the news release. This might represent several hours worth of transactions (given the busy time of the year) so if this info was tapped for a few hours this is concerning.

    5. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well the PIN *does* have to be transmitted from the card-swipe terminal down to the ATM/Debit network that processes the transaction and verify the PIN. So the PIN has to "fly".

      There is probably any number of places where the encrypted PIN data could have been stolen, if it was indeed taken in flight.

    6. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Target stores your CC/CD number because they use it as a tracker. I use my debit card there and while checking out I the register will print coupons for things I have purchased in the past that I have not bought at Target in a while.

      It appears that the CC info isn't encrypted so they can track customers but the PIN is? Sounds like pure and simple negligence to me. "We don't feel the need to encrypt the portion of the card data that can be used to print fake cards that can make any online purchase for debit cards, and any purchases at all for credit cards, but those PINs? We care a whole lot about those, yes siree bob!".

    7. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Baloroth · · Score: 1

      They don't (necessarily) have to, if the attack was ongoing (which it sounds like it very much was) then the attackers could have retrieved the PINs in transit.

      --
      "None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license." --John Milton
    8. Re: Why are they storing this data anyway? by khanta · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Terminals encrypt PIN data inside the device. The terminals they use are PED certified. DUKPT is used, and the data should be safe. The PIN block should stay encrypted all the way to the processor. If it is decrypted it should be done in an HSM. The malware was most likely scraping memory on the POS and grabbing track data as it was passed from terminal to the POS. Then they somehow exfiltrated it out. Obviously they weren't using encrypted terminals. I don't think target stored this data centrally. Most likely just infected POS stations. My bet is at the source and they all booted up infected stations. Sorry for the terse responses.

      --
      ourney weaver
    9. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by beelsebob · · Score: 0

      What's even more confusing, is... why does this data ever leave the card?

      Why does the bank not send a challenge, have the response generated, on the card, with a hash of the pin and the challenge, and verify the result?

    10. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by beelsebob · · Score: 1

      I don't understand why any part of the PIN machine with firmware has access to the PIN at all. The key pad could easily simply route the inputs to the chip on the card, and generate a response from the PIN input, and a challenge there. Only then would the data leave the card/keypad, and be accessible by the firmware.

    11. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by beelsebob · · Score: 1

      As I said above, why are the chip & pin machines not designed to avoid this? Surely the keypad should operate without firmware, and be responsible only for sending the key presses to the card. The card's chip can then generate a response from a hash of the challenge and the PIN, and only then send the data off the card/key pad, and into the system controlled by firmware.

    12. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by rollingcalf · · Score: 1

      In the US they generally don't use chip & PIN. The stolen PINs involved are for bank ATM cards without chips, not PINs for credit cards with chips.

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    13. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by snowraver1 · · Score: 4, Insightful
      I have been doing card processing for a living for 7 years now. The pin, of course, has to go over the wire along with the track2 data. How exactly that happens can differ greatly though. Larger merchants are more likely to use some sort of middleware processing software, and that introduces weaknesses. In many cases communication between the POS and middleware is plaintext. Scooping this data up would be trivial, but PCI mandates that unencrypted data has to be segregated off the network from non-PCI stuff. This makes things a bit trickier for an attacker.

      As for Target, here's my take: This is the only information in the press release:

      The PIN information was fully encrypted at the keypad, remained encrypted within our system, and remained encrypted when it was removed from our systems.

      To help explain this, we want to provide more context on how the encryption process works. When a guest uses a debit card in our stores and enters a PIN, the PIN is encrypted at the keypad with what is known as Triple DES. Triple DES encryption is a highly secure encryption standard used broadly throughout the U.S.

      If they were using "true" end-to-end encryption, there are no known attacks other than card skimmer magic*. If that was the case, there wouldn't be much of an investigation, as the facts (and scope) would be pretty clear.

      That leaves a network packet monitor attack, a database related breach/attack, log file snarfing (depending on the vendor, log files can contain a LOT of data.), or something I'm not thinking of.

      I find it odd that they say that pins have been pilfered, but not the card numbers. That, to me, suggests a DB related attack, and the attackers only got the pin table/columns. A list of pin numbers though, of course, is completely useless (8374 - Here's a free one) on it's own. Decrypting them should be trivial, given the limited number of possible pin numbers, even if the table was salted. But again, what would be the point. I'm guessing that the next release will say that card numbers were compromised as well.

      As for the 3des part, It just doesn't make any sense. As other people have already said, 3des is symmetrical, so saying they don't have the key is impossible. My guess is that they are actually using SSL (which could then in turn negotiate a 3des key). If that is the case, then each session key would be unique, and target would never have "access" to it as it would only exist in RAM.

      To my knowledge. I'd be happy/interested if someone could prove me wrong here.

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    14. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by snowraver1 · · Score: 1

      Bah, I'm sorry...

      [*ThereShouldBeAnAsteriskHere*]To my knowledge. I'd be happy/interested if someone could prove me wrong here.

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    15. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Fnord666 · · Score: 1

      Take a look at DUKPT, short for Derived Unique Key Per Transaction, to better understand how a PIN pad can be loaded with a set of keys that the merchant does not know. Similarly many PIN pads support remote key loading where asymmetric encryption is used to send a random 'working' 3DES key to the terminal. That key will be periodically replaced with a new one. Again the merchant has no idea what key is being used by the terminal at any given time.

      --
      'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
    16. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by FlyHelicopters · · Score: 1

      The card can't do anything, most debit cards have no chips in them, they just have a magnetic strip on them with fixed info, nothing else.

    17. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by WuphonsReach · · Score: 1

      Decrypting them should be trivial, given the limited number of possible pin numbers, even if the table was salted.

      Don't confuse hashing of PINs with encryption of PINs.

      If the PINs were stored / sniffed in a hashed form where the hash algorithm is known *and* the salt is known, then yes it is trivial to figure out what PIN number appears in each record.

      OTOH, if the PINs are encrypted and the key is not known by the attackers, then the attackers have to break that key. Which might be 56 bit or it might be 112 bits or it might be as large as 128 or 256 bits. Assuming that the encryption algorithm is not vulnerable to a plain-text attack, the attackers are left with having to brute-force the encryption key.

      Which is not an easy task, even for 56bit keys. Especially with such a short plain-text of only 4 digits. There may be multiple keys that result in something that looks like 4 digits, but it could be the wrong 4 digits. Longer plain-text are easier to validate. So if the entire table was encrypted with a single key, it becomes easier to say that you have found the right key.

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    18. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by tibit · · Score: 1

      Uh-huh, since, obviously, using a hash of the CC number for that purpose is out of the question. What a doofus of an AC.

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    19. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yep. Target is going to be settling out of court with a number of banks.

    20. Re: Why are they storing this data anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They probably store the hash, but they can't get the card number to hash it unless the card number is unencrypted. This is why they transmit the card data unencrypted. This is why their hacker friends got all the fucking mag stripe data - because it unencrypted.

      The cashiers don't touch the cards at Target. Customers swipe them through like most places. That means unencrypted from the PIN pad to at least the in-store server and probably to their central server(s) and then off to the CC processor.

    21. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hey that's my PIN! I demand to know how you got that!!

    22. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by cbreak · · Score: 1

      Incorrect. The PIN should never leave the device. It should be encrypted by the key pad for the chip on the card, and only that chip should be able to read it, decode it, and then sign the transaction as valid and authenticated. Again, the PIN should NEVER leave the device.

    23. Re: Why are they storing this data anyway? by fatphil · · Score: 1

      Sounds like you know more about what actually happens in the US than either me or target:

      """
      Target does not have access to nor does it store the encryption key within our system. The PIN information is encrypted within Targetâ€(TM)s systems and can only be decrypted when it is received by our external, independent payment processor.
      """
      -- http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-data-security-media-update-4

      That first "encryption key" should read "decryption key", surely? How can they perform encryption within their system without the encryption key being stored somewhere within their system?

      The whole system makes no sense to me. The chip on the card should verify the PIN. It should never be transmitted out of the terminal, definitely not sent to any third party, and it should certainly never be stored anywhere. Once the chip has verified the PIN, that yes/no answer is all you need to store. At least that's how things work in backwards eastern Europe.

      Is there any reason to believe that whatever is required to get from the super-secret encryption key to the session encryption key (a terminal identifier, timestamp, nonce?) has not also been leaked along with the encrypted PIN and other data? Is the distinction between an "encryption" and a "decryption" key meaningful (is this symmetric crypto, the above quote is so mangled it's hard to trust anything in it?) - as even in the absense of a decryption key, an encryption key would permit the creation of a dictionary (or equivalenly a 10^4/10^6 brute force) for finding which PIN encrypted to the particular cyphertext.

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    24. Re: Why are they storing this data anyway? by Soluzar · · Score: 1

      I'm certain that is how PIN terminals work here. Seems like in the US their reluctance to upgrade to 'chip' cards is causing issues implementing the better solution.

    25. Re:Why are they storing this data anyway? by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 1

      As for the 3des part, It just doesn't make any sense. As other people have already said, 3des is symmetrical, so saying they don't have the key is impossible.

      The key for decrypting card PINs (on pre-EMV magstripe cards) is stored inside secure hardware inside the keypad inside ATMs. It's all based on old IBM secure hardware chips, the kind that are designed to self destruct if someone tries to open them. All this stuff dates from the 70's of course, the USA has never upgraded past that era, so the lack of asymmetric crypto is really no surprise. EMV chip cards do use asymmetric crypto and in those the PIN never leaves the card itself (except of course, if you enter a new one at an ATM).

  4. We'll know soon by Above · · Score: 5, Funny

    When 25% of the pins encrypt to one string, and 25% to another, we'll know they used a symmetric cipher with a fixed key, and that one batch is "0000" and one is "1234".

    1. Re:We'll know soon by Spy+Handler · · Score: 1

      Yes but if that's the case they don't even have to crack the encryption, they've already got the PIN for 50% of the cards!

      50% of 4 million cards (or whatever the number was) aught to be more than enough for anybody.

    2. Re:We'll know soon by Above · · Score: 1

      Winner winner chicken dinner!

    3. Re:We'll know soon by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      When 25% of the pins encrypt to one string, and 25% to another, we'll know they used a symmetric cipher with a fixed key, and that one batch is "0000" and one is "1234".

      It depends on the encryption mode used. If it was ECB, then yes, a particular plain-text will always have the same cipher text.

      If they used CTR with a difference nonce/IV for each PIN, then it's a different story.

      Given that most PINs are four characters (32b), they could have also used OAEP and done straight RSA without a symmetrical cipher (AES): public key on that small an amount of data is (assuming per PIN scrambling, and not of a large file) not too pad.

    4. Re:We'll know soon by hotrodent · · Score: 1

      Actually, all the PINs were decrypted and available quite a while ago.

    5. Re:We'll know soon by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ha! Mine is 1111. Shows how wrong you are.

    6. Re:We'll know soon by Above · · Score: 1, Insightful

      I hate to reply to my own post, but I appear to be modded "Insightful". The correct mod selection was "Funny".

      *sigh*

    7. Re:We'll know soon by Fnord666 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Except that they were almost certainly using ANSI PIN blocks which XOR the card number into the data before encryption so that two identical PINs do not encrypt to the same cipher block. In addition, the terminals may have been using DUKPT, which is short for Derived Unique Key Per Transaction. This means that each PIN block is encrypted with a different key. Brute forcing one PIN block will not yield any information about the next one.

      --
      'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
    8. Re:We'll know soon by Above · · Score: 1

      You should be modded Insightful.

    9. Re:We'll know soon by girlintraining · · Score: 2

      Except that they were almost certainly using ANSI PIN blocks which XOR the card number into the

      You're assuming competence here when every aspect of this breach has demonstrated incompetence. I happen to know what Target considers "encrypted" PINs, and it's nothing so elaborate. They are referring to the drive-level encryption mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley. They are correct in that the keys to decrypt the drive is tied to the hardware and that the only copies are stored on a remote server. However, what they aren't telling you is that this breach didn't consist of someone walking into a server closet and absconding with the hard drives -- which is the only scenario in which drive encryption protects the data.

      From what I've been able to gather, the breach targetted the POS terminals directly because they are booted over DHCP and the DHCP server is located on the other side of a WAN link. As you know, DHCP is a broadcast protocol and the first reply is assumed authoritative. All an attacker would have to do is gain access to the wifi or a hard line (accessible on the floor of the store as their IP cameras run on the same network), download the POS image, make a few modifications, and then activate their own DHCP server. For more stealth, you could write a simple daemon to reply to the DHCP sent from the real server so that the leasing database still appears legitimate.

      Oh, and by the way... DUKPT isn't an encryption standard, it's a protocol for exchanging keys. It still requires a shared key, and guess where that would be stored: In the TFTP image. Which is sent in plain text over the wire every morning when the POS terminals get turned on.

      Great security there. Yup. Highly secure. I'm sure nobody figured out how to hack the "super secret encryption key" (bonus: That's actually what early documentation for DUKPT referred to it as)... by simply sending a DHCP request and asking for it...

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  5. Can encyption experts chime in? by postmortem · · Score: 3, Interesting

    How hard it would be to decrypt, knowing that each pin is exactly 4 digits?

    I would think if salting was not using, it is just a matter of the time.

    1. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Even with salts, it would still take an average of 5,000 tries to get each PIN. Unless something like bcrypt was used, this translates to several dozen milliseconds per PIN.

    2. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      They are encrypted using 3Des using the following algorigthm.

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derived_unique_key_per_transaction

    3. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by cyberspittle · · Score: 1

      If you already have known PINs, then it is easier to decrypt the lame 3des that was used.

    4. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by ShanghaiBill · · Score: 1

      How hard it would be to decrypt, knowing that each pin is exactly 4 digits?

      It would not be difficult. But what is the point? The PIN is only useful if you physically swipe the card. You don't use a PIN during a "card not present" transaction, such as an online purchase.

    5. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by hargrand · · Score: 3, Insightful

      You're assuming the PIN was in any way related to the 3DES key. That's almost certainly not the case. More likely, Target requests a transaction key from the bank which is then used to encrypt the PIN and sent the encrypted PIN to the bank. The bank then decrypts the PIN using the 3DES key and verifies the PIN.

      They probably should switch to RSA or some other public key algorithm. With 3DES, both parties need to share the key. With RSA, there is a public key and a matched private key. If the public key is compromised, it's no big deal. Since the bank retains the private key and doesn't share it, it's at least theoretically more secure for this kind of transaction.

    6. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by EvilSS · · Score: 3, Informative

      There is already evidence that the cards are being cloned and used overseas, so having the pin would be very useful for them. They got the entire magstripe for each card in the attack.

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    7. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      How hard it would be to decrypt, knowing that each pin is exactly 4 digits?

      Trivial to brute force depending on how many times you can run the PIN before the bank locks you out. A four digit pin of the numbers 0-9 is only 10,000 different combinations.

    8. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by beelsebob · · Score: 1

      I don't understand why any one would use encryption here at all. Why would they not use challenge/response, so that the PIN never leaves the card/keypad (encrypted or not).

    9. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by irregehen · · Score: 1

      There is a sequence number involved so you got to have a sequential trail for a given terminal and know the valid PIN of one of the cards used to brute it out.

    10. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by snowraver1 · · Score: 2

      Because it's not part of ISO8583?

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    11. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by Fnord666 · · Score: 2

      PIN blocks are encrypted using PIN block format 0. In this format a portion of the account number is XORed with the PIN block prior to encryption. The result is that for two different accounts with the same PIN, even if they are encrypted with the same key, the resulting encrypted PIN blocks will be entirely different.

      --
      'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
    12. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by beelsebob · · Score: 1

      Right, because you know, the ISO standard appeared out of thin air, no one ever sat there and thought "should we use encryption or hashing for this?"

    13. Re: Can encyption experts chime in? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If the guys worked with card skimmers, the data set is large enough to coorilate know card numberS with pins then they can figure out the encryption key easily.

    14. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by WuphonsReach · · Score: 5, Informative

      I don't understand why any one would use encryption here at all. Why would they not use challenge/response, so that the PIN never leaves the card/keypad (encrypted or not).

      Because parts of the system are still asynchronous. There is not real-time communication in a lot of parts of the banking system. And it was much worse 10-15 years ago when a lot of these systems were designed.

      --
      Wolde you bothe eate your cake, and have your cake?
    15. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by Walking+The+Walk · · Score: 1

      knowing that each pin is exactly 4 digits?

      I didn't see anything in the stories saying the pins were all exactly four digits. The examples of bad pins given in one story were four digits long, but most debit systems in North America accept larger pins. For the past 25 years, I've banked primarily with RBC (the largest bank in Canada), and I've always had a 6 digit pin. I have travelled a fair bit in that time, and the only place I had problems was at the ATMs for smaller banks in New Zealand, which had GUIs limiting pin input to 4 digits.

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    16. Re:Can encyption experts chime in? by beelsebob · · Score: 1

      Thank you - if you could +1 you, I would. Great explanation of why this can't work.

  6. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Stargoat · · Score: 0

    It's not that big of a deal for the consumer. According to, ah, GLBA I think it was, the consumer is completely off the hook for any fraudulent activity that takes place on their cards. So if some bad guy gets a hold of your card and begins a spending spree, that's on Chase or Citi or Navy Federal or whoever your card is with. You should always pay attention to activity on your card, but no need to go nuts.

    --
    Hoist Number One and Number Six.
  7. sigh, lamestream press strikes again by sribe · · Score: 4, Interesting

    The article I read stated that the key necessary to decrypt the data was never on the systems which encrypted the data, then went on to state that the data was encrypted with triple DES. Oh my lord. Which is it? Symmetric or asymmetric encryption?

    1. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by taustin · · Score: 4, Informative

      It depends on what was compromised. Normally, debit card stuff is encrypted on the pad you swipe the card in. If the pad was wasn't what was compromised, then the key wasn't on what was, because that's the only place the key is kept.

      (Earlier reports claimed the pads had been compromised, but that smelled like bullshit then, and even more like it now.)

    2. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's, um, triple RSA DES ECDH BIGNAME IMPRESSIVE SOUNDING ACRONYM.

      Salted.

      OK, salt is not healthy for you, so we used "POTASSIUM CHLORIDE" instead.

      Nobody would ever guess that. Really, trust me.

    3. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by DeathByLlama · · Score: 0

      I'm guessing they meant that the key necessary to decrypt the data was never on the systems which *stored* the data, but that's just a guess (since as you pointed out, if they used 3DES, the encryption key IS the decryption key, and I doubt they lied about that).

    4. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derived_unique_key_per_transaction

    5. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by sribe · · Score: 1

      It depends on what was compromised. Normally, debit card stuff is encrypted on the pad you swipe the card in. If the pad was wasn't what was compromised, then the key wasn't on what was, because that's the only place the key is kept.

      Ah, thanks for the clarification.

    6. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Debit pins are injected at a key injection facility (usually) and generally DUKPT is used to generate an encrypting key for the pin. Target was (im pretty sure) using PCI PTS compliant devices. Go read about DUKPT and PTS on the web. The corresponding base key or IPEK is housed at the payment processor inside an HSM.

    7. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by Man+On+Pink+Corner · · Score: 1

      It doesn't matter if they used Triple Double-Dog Secret Patent Pending NSA-Certified ROT13, a large collection of four-digit PINs is about the best known plaintext short of the Pledge of Allegiance. If they aren't salted, it's open season on those cardholders.

    8. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by EricCordian2855 · · Score: 2

      Point of Sale terminals keep their 3DES encryption keys in firmware within a tamper-resistant module. Even with advanced technology like plasma ablation and electron microscopy, it is believed to be impractical to extract the key. The keys are loaded by a courier who swipes special cards while the device is in maintenance mode. This permits the POS stations to be used over an insecure line to the payment processor, and cleartext is never present anywhere outside the sealed module, from which the key cannot be recovered. So unless you tap the keypad, you cannot have access to the unencrypted PIN. Stealing data is insufficient to obtain the information necessary to use the card. That having been said, if there is any way you can do a trial of a large number of PINs, it is trivial to try all 10,000 possibilities, and see which one works, no matter how strong the encryption is.

    9. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by Fnord666 · · Score: 1

      Fortunately the PIN block encryption is salted. Please see my other post for the details.

      --
      'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
    10. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by irregehen · · Score: 1

      That is not salt but just drinking the wine u used for cooking (and you should rather cook with the wine you are going to drink).

    11. Re: sigh, lamestream press strikes again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Thank you for that brain dead comment Ms Palin. Can you see the hackers from your back yard?

    12. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by sribe · · Score: 1

      That having been said, if there is any way you can do a trial of a large number of PINs, it is trivial to try all 10,000 possibilities, and see which one works, no matter how strong the encryption is.

      One would certainly hope that after some small number of attempts with incorrect PINs, the payment processor would flag the card. But I don't know anything about that...

    13. Re:sigh, lamestream press strikes again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      ...you'd be amazed what you can do with a 9-volt battery.

  8. inside job? by wbr1 · · Score: 1
    To me this whole fiasco smacks of an inside job, or at least having a compromised employee/contractor. Certainly other scenarios are plausible, but IIRC they got into a system that pushed corrupt firmware to the card readers. I am assuming Target uses such firmware to put their graphics on screen, plus other Target specific things (like discount ts for target debit card users).

    The number of people with knowledge of how to change the firmware is probably a pretty short list. When crossed against the list of people who have access to the compromised systems it likely gets smaller

    Could others break in and figure it out? Sure, but I think Occam's Razor applies. The data is likely already split and sold (Krebs evidence suggests this). So the guys at the top, if smart, have made their money, and can sit back and relax.

    --
    Silence is a state of mime.
    1. Re:inside job? by Rhyas · · Score: 4, Interesting

      They didn't get anything onto the card readers from all that's been published publicly so far. Most card readers these days will encrypt the pin *before* sending the data to the terminal. Thus, only getting encrypted pins.

      Given that the terminals run windows, it's not that difficult to get some malware to spread to them from a central source. Could still be an inside job for sure, but none of the details published yet can confirm that for fact.

    2. Re:inside job? by Bert64 · · Score: 2

      Windows corporate networks almost always operate on the idea of protecting the perimeter, and leaving the inside horrendously insecure... For something like a retail store, where the general public have physical access to the building that idea breaks down very quickly... You only need to have momentary access to a network socket/cable, and these will often be available at random points on the shop floor or at the very least at the back (i.e. facing the customer) of the pos terminals...
      Once you're on, chances are all the windows boxes are on one domain making them a very easy target.

      --
      http://spamdecoy.net - free throwaway anonymous email - avoid spam!
    3. Re:inside job? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That may have been true 15 years ago but XP on forward comes with a firewall that is turned on by default. Presumably Target's POS' had the firewall turned on and disabled any irrelevant services on the system.

    4. Re:inside job? by swb · · Score: 1

      I've heard from a Target insider that they do believe it involved an insider.

      What I don't understand is even if it was, don't PCI standards, Sarbannes-Oxley, internal financial controls and the sheer IT scale of company of Target's size mean that any random insider would not have broad enough administrative access to compromise enough systems to pull this off?

      In other words, someone with high level data network access (network engineer) wouldn't have access to databases, applications, and operating systems, and the same being true for administrative access to any one of these items preventing access to any of these other items.

      The only thing that would seem to enable this would be a malware plant on IT admin desktops that enabled someone to collect enough credentials to provide broad access, but that seems tougher to pull off, especially if you factor in password changes or a password system that forces daily password changes -- I saw a system like this in use in a managed datacenter. Users had passwords that changed daily across all systems they had access to and an RSA token login was required to gain access to their accounts on the password management system to retrieve that day's password.

    5. Re:inside job? by aaarrrgggh · · Score: 1

      Read up on bar code hacking. There was a presentation at defcon 16, not sure how much improvements have been made since then.

  9. PIN?? is it useful by Nikademus · · Score: 1

    OK, that's fine, but how is PIN code useful? Can't you just order on the web with your credit card without any PIN code? Can't you just pay for speedways in at least France and Italy without PIN?
    To be honest I am wondering why there is even a PIN code on those cards given there are so many ways to use them without entering the PIN code.

    --
    I gave up with the idea of an useful sig...
    1. Re:PIN?? is it useful by Em+Adespoton · · Score: 5, Informative

      OK, that's fine, but how is PIN code useful? Can't you just order on the web with your credit card without any PIN code? Can't you just pay for speedways in at least France and Italy without PIN?
      To be honest I am wondering why there is even a PIN code on those cards given there are so many ways to use them without entering the PIN code.

      The trip a card purchase takes from your physical card to the merchant bank is actually pretty convoluted -- the simplified explanation is that a card purchase with PIN has a lot fewer safeguards and security checks than an online purchase with card, address and CV only. For card purchases where only the number is used, the vendor assumes a HUGE amount of liability. It often makes sense for fast food vendors and such, where the transaction values are small and they get a significant uptick in sales for shorter transaction times, but for purchasing big ticket items, you either do chip+pin or track 1 data plus second factor (usually stored by the vendor).

      So the even shorter answer is: PIN codes mean relative anonymity. Without the PIN, you need to provide other PII at some point in the transaction.

    2. Re:PIN?? is it useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The PIN allows you to go to a cash machine and withdraw cash. So a thief could drain bank accounts by creating a cloned card and visiting an ATM (most or all banks have daily withdraw limits but if you don't pay attention, a thief could still do a lot of damage over the course of a few days).

      You are correct however that the cards could be used at places where ordinary credit cards are accepted without the use of the PIN.

    3. Re:PIN?? is it useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Have you tried buying anything in France with a credit card that's not Chip & PIN? Though that's not what this debit card story is about.

    4. Re:PIN?? is it useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      OK, that's fine, but how is PIN code useful? Can't you just order on the web with your credit card without any PIN code? Can't you just pay for speedways in at least France and Italy without PIN?
      To be honest I am wondering why there is even a PIN code on those cards given there are so many ways to use them without entering the PIN code.

      The verification code on the magnetic strip is not the same one as printed on the card, so purchases cannot be made with an online vendor (or even over mail, fax, or phone) who requires the printed code for verification if the only data collected was from the magnetic strip and the PIN. However, that does not stop anyone from making a copy of the card and using it anywhere you can swipe it so long as a person does not visually inspect the card (assuming the copier is not going to go through the trouble of trying to make the card look legit or make any raised numbers on the card match the magnetic strip numbers).

  10. Is it that important with PINs? by damn_registrars · · Score: 1

    I could be missing something here, but by my understanding PINs are usually only 4 digits long. I would think that the people who were able to snag the cards that they correspond to could probably come up with a clever way to figure out the PINs on most of these cards without ever needing to decrypt the data. I recall not long ago seeing a publication of the frequency of PINs in use today; it would seem that they could probably gain access to a significant share with just that list alone.

    --
    Damn_registrars has no butt-hole. Damn_registrars has no use for a butt-hole.
  11. Nov 27 - Dec 15 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This is the first time I've heard the date range, and it lets me off the hook.

    Having said that, big companies (and especially big non-tech companies) have a history of not being accurate when disclosing the details of data breeches the first time around.

  12. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 4, Insightful

    That depends. How understanding will your landlord or your bank be when your rent or mortgage check bounces because the day it was deposited somebody ran up charges on your debit card that emptied your bank account? Sure you'll be able to dispute the charge, but that didn't stop the checks from bouncing between the time it happened and the time you got to the bank to fill out the paperwork on the fraudulent charge. Same if you're at the end of a trip and go to pay your hotel bill and your credit card's over limit because of fraudulent charges. Sure you'll be able to dispute them, but that doesn't make the hotel bill magically paid.

  13. Target of what ? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What is a "target breach" ?

  14. Why are pins stored? by metrix007 · · Score: 2

    Why combine something you know with something you have? I thought only banks stored pins?

    --
    If you ignore ACs because they are anonymous - you're an idiot.
    1. Re:Why are pins stored? by Horshu · · Score: 1

      My thoughts exactly. It seems to me that the user should enter the pin, the bank and store should exchange keys, encrypt the pin, send it to the bank for decryption/verification, and that's it. What would be the point of storing the pin at the store?

    2. Re:Why are pins stored? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      afaik, merchants are NOT supposed to retain PIN or CVV once they receive authorization for the transaction.. and at a retail point-of-sale, they have absolutely NO FUCKING REASON TO.

    3. Re:Why are pins stored? by EvilSS · · Score: 1

      The PINs could have been captured in flight. They can't be stored, but they still need to make their way from the terminal to the bank for verification.

      --
      I browse on +1 so AC's need not respond, I won't see it.
    4. Re:Why are pins stored? by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      The entire transaction with a request for a postcode noted with the transaction might provide real quality marketing data?

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    5. Re:Why are pins stored? by ljheidel · · Score: 2

      I know for a fact that one of the items on the PCI list for CC transactions is 'no storage of CVV data.' If Target was indeed storing the PIN numbers, I feel like they have some real 'splainin to do about that one. However, based on the fact that they're obsessive about data mining, I wouldn't put it past them. "Why do we need to keep the PIN numbers?" "I dunno, but we can." "Okay, let's do it."

      However, if the data was stolen 'in flight' as EvilSS suggests and it *is* encrypted (and based on the prevarication in which Target has engaged, I wouldn't hold my breath), it does kind of help narrow down the mechanism of the breach. It basically means they didn't crack the individual POS terminals, but some point in between the terminal and the bank. But, as I sit here and think about this, why would the POS terminals encrypt the PIN but not the CC number? This is where my lack of knowledge of the arcane world of computerized banking (and having worked in it for a brief time, I know it's full of WTF) prevents me from making any more guesses. Perhaps it's required by standard that the PIN be encrypted leaving the POS terminal. Perhaps the intercept point was between the Target and the bank, and target was sending the PINs as a hash.

      Exactly how hard would be to run a attack against, say, 40 million salted hashes if you knew each of the pre-hashed values was four digit code from 0000-9999?

      But the more I think about this...this means that each of the CC transactions individually leave the POS terminal, get routed through some branch office infrastructure then back to Target HQ, then onto the banking network. Way too much speculation on my part, but I'm hellishly curious to find out what actually happened.

    6. Re:Why are pins stored? by radarskiy · · Score: 1

      Why are you claiming that the PINs were stored?

    7. Re:Why are pins stored? by EvilSS · · Score: 2

      They are required, by standard, to be encrypted at the POS terminal. CC #'s are not because they can be stored by the merchant. Should they be? Hell yes but I didn't make the rules.

      From my experience working with PCI compliant companies, the CC info is usually kept on a completely separate network from the normal corporate network. It usually routes back to a central office or branch office before making it's way to the payment processor in large companies (small mom & pop it probably dials/VPNs direct from the POS terminal). There would be plenty of chances to grab it along the way if you penetrated that secure network. The upside is that PCI makes it very painful if you fail to protect that network. Thus why Target is staring at a VERY big ($3.6 billion) PCI fine.

      --
      I browse on +1 so AC's need not respond, I won't see it.
    8. Re:Why are pins stored? by metrix007 · · Score: 1

      Read the story, radar.

      --
      If you ignore ACs because they are anonymous - you're an idiot.
    9. Re:Why are pins stored? by radarskiy · · Score: 1

      I did. Of the three linked pages (2 news articles, one press release) none contained the word "stored".

  15. Salt by mrflash818 · · Score: 1

    Hope Target's systems used a salt when creating the 3DES.

    If the Triple DES used a salt, then good, it will make it much more likely the PINS are secure, because then the hackers would have to brute-force trying a salt value, then all possible pins for 1 of the Triple DES encrypted PINS, which would take longer.

    If the salt was unique for each PIN, then that would be the most secure ( but I do not know how a little machine where people give their pins could do that )

    If no salt was used, then might be another case like what happened to Adobe: http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/11/04/anatomy-of-a-password-disaster-adobes-giant-sized-cryptographic-blunder/

    --
    Uh, Linux geek since 1999.
    1. Re:Salt by BlackHawk-666 · · Score: 1

      Given advances in both ASIC and GPU design, I wonder how long it would take to brute force a card these days - or brute force the top 20% of all numbers for instance. GPUs have massively parallel execution which could be brought to bear on the problem.

      That said, over here in Aus, transactions under $100 can be performed just by waving your card near a terminal - no pin or CCV required. If they can clone the card details onto those sorts of cards, then they can use 'smurfs' to run around hitting 1,000s of shops up for these low value transactions.

      --
      All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
    2. Re:Salt by WuphonsReach · · Score: 1

      (sends you back to Encryption 101)

      Hashing relies on salt for security. Encryption does not.

      Passwords are hashed instead of encrypted because you want to make it near impossible to reverse the process and discover the original password. In fact, you hash, because you are simply not interested in being able to reverse the process. You then use custom salt along with the hash step to make pre-generated rainbow attack tables useless. And to prevent the breaking of one account to instantly grant access to all other accounts that happen to have the same password, you salt each account with a unique salt.

      Encryption, OTOH, is designed to be reversed. The only thing protecting your plain-text is the encryption key. In the case of symmetrical encryption, this is usually a 56bit (DES) or 112bit (3DES) or 128/256bit (AES) key. Adding salt to the process gains you nothing in terms of actual security.

      --
      Wolde you bothe eate your cake, and have your cake?
    3. Re:Salt by Fnord666 · · Score: 1

      In this case it does because it makes PIN blocks encrypted using the same working key be completely different. This prevents someone from performing a chosen plaintext attack by setting their own PIN to be 0000 or 1234 and comparing the captured PIN block to others. More of a limited rainbow table I guess.

      --
      'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
    4. Re:Salt by mrflash818 · · Score: 1

      Exactly.

      On the PINS that were stolen, no public news how they were encrypted and stored when the Bad Guys took them, other than the basic "3DES was used."

      Without a salt (aka initialization vector aka IV) Then they only have to look for possible PIN value matches. There can only be (roughly) 100,000 PINS if the Target card PINS are like ATM card PINS (usually 4 or 5 digits only).

      PIN | 3DES value
      ------------------------
      0001 | aslhas..gibberish.that.always.matches.PIN.0001
      0002 | sadglhagh.gibberis.that.always.matches.PIN.0002
      99999 | 97aash.gibberish.that.always.matches.PIN.99999
      etc

      If someone just makes a loop that uses PIN values in a range of MIN_PIN_ALLOWED to MAX_PIN_ALLOWED (going to guess 0001 to 99999),

      Just to say it really simply, it is conseptually a for-loop
      for(int i = 0; i MAX_PIN_ALLOWED +1; i++)
                printf(i); printf(','); printf( ThreeDES(zero_padded_pin) );

      That output could be even in RAM, as a lookup (hashtable)

      Without a salt (aka initialization vector aka IV) Then they only have to look for matches. There can only be (roughly) 100,000 PINS if the Target card PINS are like ATM card PINS (usually 4 or 5 digits only).

      As I understand things, If the PIN was combined with some other information making a salt, or making the pre-3DES-value more unique (and longer) than just the PIN, before 3DES was applied, and a salt were used, would have been more secure.

      --
      Uh, Linux geek since 1999.
  16. DUKPT by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

    PIN are supposed to be encrypted on the terminal (not on the POS computer but the actual card reader/terminal) using Triple-DES Derived unique key per transaction (DUKPT - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derived_unique_key_per_transaction ).

    So no the PINs are safe unless the card terminals have been hacked too.

  17. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    To my knowledge the laws that protect consumers against fraudulent credit card transactions don't apply to debit cards. Banks make a lot of promises about zero liability on debit cards but you'll have to read the fine print and beg for mercy when the time comes.

  18. chip and pin (EMV) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    at least the hackers didn't get the chip information on the card. who enters PIN numbers into a point of sale terminal anyways? I tap the card onto the console and sign the receipt. am I missing something that the U.S. does that the E.U. doesn't?

    1. Re:chip and pin (EMV) by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Depends on your part of the world http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFTPOS
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maestro_(debit_card)
      You country may have a marketing backend, a store or other loyalty points system, at the checkout you may be asked for your postcode... thats a lot of unique data with your card use in many countries.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    2. Re:chip and pin (EMV) by Streetlight · · Score: 1
      It's not what the US does that the EU doesn't. It's the other way around, IIRC. In the EU credit cards and debit cards have RFI or other kind of chips so "tapping" a card is an unheard of phenomenon here. In the US. The card reader reads a magnetic stripe and if it's a debit card a four digit pin is entered by hand (fingers!) using a number pad on the reader. I'm not sure whether the information on the magnetic stripe is encrypted or is in plain text. My guess is it's in plain text. Gasp!

      Our family doesn't use a debit card here because we think they're insecure. The terms of service say that if you use them at a cash dispensing terminal and you don't get the cash you asked for it's too bad. Bank employees always say that they've never refused to make good on such an error, but we are not willing to test their assertions.

      --
      In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act. George Orwell
    3. Re:chip and pin (EMV) by Bert64 · · Score: 1

      If all you have to do is "sign" then thats even worse, a random pen mark is useless for any form of security...
      The PIN will be used to withdraw cash from an ATM using a cloned card, if they have a cloned card they can already make purchases without knowing the PIN if only a signature is required.

      --
      http://spamdecoy.net - free throwaway anonymous email - avoid spam!
  19. PIN and credit cards? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Whenever I use a credit card in America I only need to swipe it and sign, either a printed slip or a touch screen. I've never had to enter a PIN.

    So is this story really that credit and debit card numbers have been stolen, and also the PINs for the debit cards - or have American credit card companies suddenly started issuing Chip & PIN cards without telling anyone?

  20. "Unencrypted PIN data" wasn't compromised? by MillionthMonkey · · Score: 1

    Only "weakly encrypted" PINs. How do you "encrypt" a four-decimal-digit PIN? Even if they only had PIN hashes that were as yet uncompromised, it wouldn't offer much protection. if Target changed policy and invalidated your card immediately after you entered the first wrong PIN, the crooks still stole 40 million cards and would have scored a list of about 4000 working card numbers. At least if the PINs were required to be base-64, the crooks would only find a few.

    1. Re:"Unencrypted PIN data" wasn't compromised? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Encryption and hashing are not the same thing.

    2. Re:"Unencrypted PIN data" wasn't compromised? by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Yes the users cards would have some long numbers in the mix when used with the pin to send back to the bank...

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    3. Re:"Unencrypted PIN data" wasn't compromised? by WuphonsReach · · Score: 1

      Only "weakly encrypted" PINs. How do you "encrypt" a four-decimal-digit PIN?

      The same way that you protect any other plain text of nearly any length at all. You generate an encryption key (56bit DES, 112bit 3DES, 128bit AES or 256bit AES) and encrypt the plain text with that key.

      The only way to get the plain text back is to brute-force the key (assuming that the algorithm is well designed, properly implemented, and that the key can't be leaked in some other fashion).

      Here is an example for you: Please figure out what PIN I used in the following output from an AES-128 encryption:

      2c 5b 22 99 53 42 5b cc 4d bf a7 88 3b 61 95 14

      Oh, and you only get 10 guesses before the card is flagged as stolen.

      --
      Wolde you bothe eate your cake, and have your cake?
    4. Re:"Unencrypted PIN data" wasn't compromised? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    5. Re:"Unencrypted PIN data" wasn't compromised? by MillionthMonkey · · Score: 1

      Yeah yeah. But the plaintext space is small and can be brute forced. They have 40 million cards. They don't need 40 million working PINs.

    6. Re:"Unencrypted PIN data" wasn't compromised? by MillionthMonkey · · Score: 1

      Here is an example for you: Please figure out what PIN I used in the following output from an AES-128 encryption:2c 5b 22 99 53 42 5b cc 4d bf a7 88 3b 61 95 14

      1. I don't care about your PIN. Your grandma's will work fine. I can throw those numbers out the window.
      2. For each card try 1234 (or whatever comes out of a random() call.) 1234- stolen, next card. 1234, stolen, next card. 1234- stolen, next card. 1234- *kaching*. 1234, stolen, next card. 40 million cards / (10000 plaintext PINs / (10 guesses per card) = 4000 cards.

    7. Re:"Unencrypted PIN data" wasn't compromised? by MillionthMonkey · · Score: 1

      fixing parentheses:: (40 million cards / 10000 plaintext PINs) * 10 guesses per card = 400,000 cards, not 4000.

  21. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by AK+Marc · · Score: 2

    When I've had issues, some quick arguing with the bank got money invented from nowhere and put in my account. Yes, it would delay the checkout from the hotel by a few minutes, but it will get the hotel bill paid. I'm sure you can find some cases where someone was a jackass to their bank, who then refused to fix the issue on the customer's time frame. But I've had this issue before, and the bank took care of it outside the minimum contractual requirements.

  22. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Mashiki · · Score: 1

    It depends on where you live and what bank you have. Where I live in Ontario, the same rights are afforded to me on my debit card that my credit card has. Including a lock limit on the RFID of no more than $50.

    --
    Om, nomnomnom...
  23. What was Target collecting all that data for? by AnalogDiehard · · Score: 2

    What was Target collecting credit card numbers AND PIN numbers for? What business purpose did they need that data for? Why has no one raised this question? They have just created a huge credit theft problem for their customers. This is a shining example why businesses should not maintain any database of sensitive customer information.

    I already suffered identity theft and credit card theft in the past and I'm not at all anxious to go through that again. I'm taking my business elsewhere. In fact I may avoid large national chains for this very reason.

    --
    Eternity: will that be smoking, or non-smoking? I Corinthians 6:9-10
    1. Re:What was Target collecting all that data for? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They were probably collecting PIN numbers as part of cash-back debit transactions.

    2. Re:What was Target collecting all that data for? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think you misunderstand the article. Nobody was "collecting" this information and storing it anywhere. In order for these transactions to be processed, the information has to go through a computer system to get to the payment networks. In this case, it was intercepted somewhere in the computer system.

    3. Re:What was Target collecting all that data for? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      MOD UP! Why isn't this question being asked by EVERYONE?

  24. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    So what happened to me a few years ago, there was a suspicious and expensive activity with my debit card. My credit union left the money in my account, but froze it. My rent check was bounced. Thankfully had a good history with my landlord and they didn't go nuts.

  25. easy solution by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Target notifies banks, who then terminate all of the cards and reissue new ones. Seems like banks should make this a standard practice. Target should of course have to pay for all of it.

  26. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by george14215 · · Score: 1

    That depends. How understanding will your landlord or your bank be when your rent or mortgage check bounces because the day it was deposited somebody ran up charges on your debit card that emptied your bank account? Sure you'll be able to dispute the charge, but that didn't stop the checks from bouncing between the time it happened and the time you got to the bank to fill out the paperwork on the fraudulent charge. Same if you're at the end of a trip and go to pay your hotel bill and your credit card's over limit because of fraudulent charges. Sure you'll be able to dispute them, but that doesn't make the hotel bill magically paid.

    Not only that, if you have a debit card and you are disputing charges, the banks will put a freeze on your account while the dispute is being investigated.

  27. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Bullshit.

  28. Why do I have to write a subject? by beelsebob · · Score: 0

    What the hell was Target doing holding onto PINs in any form, encrypted or not...

  29. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Oh, it isn't on Chase or Citi or NFCU - it's on the vendor who accepted the charges. Remember children, win or lose - the bank never loses money...

  30. plenty of ways to confirm PIN without sending it by raymorris · · Score: 1

    You could confirm whether a PIN is correct without sending it.
    For example, send sha1(card number + pin + time of day)
    The machine at bank's end does the same calculation with the correct pin and returns whether or not it matches.

  31. Chip and PIN by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Is it _still_ too expensive to roll out Chip and PIN in the US now?

  32. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Not entirely true. I know Visa, and think Master Card is mostly the same (Other cards rules may vary)

    For credit cards, you are responsible for the first $50 of fraud, if you report the fraud in a reasonable amount of time. They usually use 60 or 90 days, but that may have shortened in the last few years. I don't think any bank or credit union will hold you to the $50, but they have every right to.

    For debot cards, you are responsible for the first $500 of fraud. Other than amount the ruels are the same.

    For fruad, you must contact merchant and attempt to get them to reverse it (If they do that is the end of it). If they refuse you have to go to your bank and file a dispute (Not sure if you have to do 1 for each transaction or not). You will be out the money until the dispute resolves, unless bank is nice to you. The key words to use is "card holder not present for transaction". If the amount is under $30, merchant will not be told and you will probably win automatically. Over that amount they "may" try to go after merchant and full dispute it.

    The more you know!

  33. Merry Christmas For NSA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    They got the Target $$$ and the "Judge."

    Watch Ft. Meade for new stretched limos dropping off the "regulars."

    It will be a Happy New Year for the near by Maryland malls and stores.

  34. Magstripe-and-PIN by tepples · · Score: 1

    Most US debit card machines that I've seen (at least in Indiana) are magstripe-and-PIN, not chip-and-PIN. My debit card from Chase Bank doesn't even have visible "chip" contacts. Besides, there aren't 11 contacts (10 digits + common ground), so the PIN pad machine has to do some sort of translation to get the digits to the serial contacts.

    1. Re:Magstripe-and-PIN by tibit · · Score: 1

      You didn't seriously expect there to be a parallel decimal interface between the terminal and the chip on the card, did you? That stuff was en vogue in instrumentation in the 70s, when you could buy digital voltmeters of various kinds with parallel digital output, sometimes binary, sometimes BCD, sometimes even 1-of-10 decimal. Chip cards use a standardized serial protocol.

      --
      A successful API design takes a mixture of software design and pedagogy.
    2. Re:Magstripe-and-PIN by tepples · · Score: 1

      You didn't seriously expect there to be a parallel decimal interface between the terminal and the chip on the card, did you?

      No, but the way beelsebob's comment was worded implied that he might have expected so.

    3. Re: Magstripe-and-PIN by Soluzar · · Score: 1

      Ugh. Why?

  35. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Your response is orthogonal to the question. Your example is not that of bounced checks, it is of trying to use a debit card at point of sale when the balance was low.

    It is an entirely different thing to write a check and then have it bounce 3 days later. There are all kinds of fees and penalties that get assessed when that happens, some of which can come from the company you wrote the check to, the bank never even sees the penalty. There are even non-monetary penalties like your landlord, or your utility company reporting the bounced check to the credit agencies.

    There really is only one reason to ever use a debit card - your credit is so bad that you can't actually get a credit card. In all other ways credit cards are the superior tool.

    --
    When information is power, privacy is freedom.
  36. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by george14215 · · Score: 1

    You're a douchebag... http://www.today.com/money/5-lessons-learned-target-security-breach-2D11803343 "After the Target breach, a few banks took the unprecedented step of limiting how much customers could spend at stores or withdraw from ATMs using their debit cards. No such restrictions were put on credit card customers."

  37. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 1

    To my knowledge the laws that protect consumers against fraudulent credit card transactions don't apply to debit cards.

    In recent years, things have gotten better for debit card holders, you are right that it used to be all promises. Now there are some federal regulations, but they still aren't anywhere near as strong as the federal laws protecting credit card holders.

    http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/news/cnfall09/debit_vs_credit.html

    --
    When information is power, privacy is freedom.
  38. PIN frequencies by tepples · · Score: 1

    But some of those possibilities are more likely than others.

  39. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 1

    I apologize. I didn't read Todd Knar's entire post. You were addressing his point about hotels, and what you wrote was a reasonable response to that. But being at the mercy of a customer service person feelings about my attitude when I am under a lot of stress is not appealing.

    --
    When information is power, privacy is freedom.
  40. threat eliminated? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The Target CEO has stated the problem has been fixed. Is anybody confident in this assessment? Is it now safe to use a card at Target?

  41. Mod parent up! by khasim · · Score: 1

    Or even use the PIN as part of the encryption key used to encrypt a random string sent from the bank once authentication is requested.

    And the connection between the PoS and the bank should also be encrypted.

    And that connection should be 100% private. ISDN or whatever. Nothing going across the Internet. Not even with a VPN.

  42. Tar-zhay by tepples · · Score: 2

    In case you aren't familiar with major U.S. retail chains, it's a breach of the payment processing systems of Target Corporation. An unrelated Australian company operates a chain called "Target." (with the period) under license from Target Corporation.

  43. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by ColdWetDog · · Score: 4, Funny

    I think you can safely assume that when a Slashdot poster talks about a legal problem, a problem with consumer protection or issues with the health care system, they are either talking about the USA or, perhaps, North Korea.

    --
    Faster! Faster! Faster would be better!
  44. Software that Target uses by Orion+Blastar · · Score: 2

    Can anyone tell me what operating system and software that Target uses?

    I'd really like to know what exploits this software has and if any other store uses them so I can avoid shopping there.

    I think retailers and wholesale clubs ought to be transparent in what operating systems and software they use for their POS system and then list the vulnerabilities they found with an code audit and how they plan to fix them.

    This ought to be a law, so consumers can be protected from retailers and wholesale clubs who don't care about their privacy and credit card and debit card data and just use operating systems and software with exploits in them that they never tested nor figured out how to fix.

    I think the same should be done with websites as well.

    Am I right here or wrong?

    --
    Remember, Slashdot does not have a -1 disagree moderation, and no, troll, flamebait, and overrated are not substitutes.
    1. Re:Software that Target uses by Shados · · Score: 2

      If they're like virtually every other retail chain in the world (short of maybe Amazon, but do they even count?), its probably not an issue with the particular software they use, but that they use old, outdated, or poorly configured versions.

      These companies run -countless- systems, for their ERP, CRM, CMS, a bunch of other 3 letter acronyms, stuff to integrate all of them, stuff to integrate the stuff that integrates them, all those things use different operating systems, need to be in sync to be "supported"... Now add all the in-house applications and customization...

      Tack on the fact that no self respective developer will work there, so you have a bunch of self taught peanut gallery writing code they barely understand, thinking its trivial (hint: a shopping cart software for a company of that scale is NOT easy to write), and well, you're screwed.

    2. Re:Software that Target uses by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      I'd really like to know what exploits this software has and if any other store uses them so I can avoid shopping there.

      People. That's the exploit. You shouldn't shop anywhere with people, they are incredibly fallible and sometimes quite evil bags of mostly water.

      Sorry but if you're looking for perfect security you won't find it anywhere. The NSA couldn't keep control of it's own people, how is some dumb chain store.

    3. Re:Software that Target uses by khanta · · Score: 1

      There is a case study on Target on the Microsoft website. That should point you in the right direction. I am sure I will get flamed for this, but Target is a victim as well here. They were attacked by criminals, and determined ones. I don't think the OS/Software version is what hurt them, I think the fact that they were not using encrypted terminals was the mistake. If you compromise a network, how hard is it to get malware that scrapes memory? A good regex that searches for PANs in POS process space seems like it would be very effective. POS vendors are supposed to make sure their software is handling card data securely, but they trust the OS they are running on. I would love to comment more.... Hopefully it will come out what happened, but most likely it was similar to TJX. Some misconfigured wireless or something to that effect. Get on the network, find some vulnerable systems. Pivot, Find the server that the POS boots of off. Infect. Site back and wait. As for the PIN data. I am not too worried.

      --
      ourney weaver
  45. Re:plenty of ways to confirm PIN without sending i by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The data *is* encrypted. I'm not sure what the method is but it's not being sent plaintext (see the other posts in this story regarding this topic). The person I was responding to may not have got that point, so it's good that you brought this up, but regardless, the companies that process transactions have already thought about these problems and made these rules standard.

    The thieves making off with encrypted PIN data in of itself is not indicative of Target violating any rules it's only indicative of the thieves capturing the data at some point in the transport (from the card reader, the POS terminal, the store's ethernet network, the store's internet uplink, Target's datacenter, and etc.).

    Your proposal to hash the combination of card #, PIN, and TOD isn't particularly useful though. There's a good chance that the PIN data is already timestamped (if the thieves were capturing the data live, they have their own timestamps to work off of) so it's a matter of just brute-forcing the hash to determine the right sequence of numbers.to come up with the PIN. Remember that the thieves already have a list of card numbers, so that drastically reduces the universe of possible numbers to work with, so they only need to guess --. Too easy.

  46. Re:plenty of ways to confirm PIN without sending i by dcollins · · Score: 1

    "Time of day" would seem to be the weak link there. How does the bank-end machine know that exact value so as to replicate the sha1 calculation?

    --
    We know where leadership by an anti-intellectual "strongman" who scapegoats minorities and likes boisterous rallies goes
  47. Driver License by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    I went to target a few years ago to buy a game (BF2 I think). The woman asked to see my driver license to verify I was 18. I snickered because I am well over 18, and handed her my license. She took my license and she swiped it on her keyboard card reader. I immediately asked her why she scanned my card (in a not so happy voice) I told her that when I handed it to her i assumed that she just wanted to get a better look. I told her she did not have permission to scan to scan my id. She said that she needed to verify that i was 18 using the computer. I then asked her what Target privacy policy was on storing customers information. She looked at me with a blank face and said I would have to talk to customer service.

    If you read Targets Privacy policy you will see that they collect and store your Driver License information.

    2 things happened that day. I never shopped at Target again, and I destroyed the back of my card so it is no longer readable by a swipe or scanner.

    Also, some gas stations are using this method to verify age and wont sell 18+ unless your card swipes in the machine. The ones i have called are also collecting your DL information as well. Its not just age verification.

    1. Re:Driver License by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I use my US passport card for anyone who requests ID unless I am driving a car. No address, no barcodes, no mag stripes. It confuses a lot, but I never have any issue that holding my ground does not solve.

  48. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

    US consumer law seems pretty weak. In the UK the bank is entirely liable unless they can prove that the fraud was your fault. That includes things like charges incurred from other companies, interest, fines etc.

    --
    const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
    SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
  49. Unhackable by garyoa1 · · Score: 1

    Yeah they don't think they can be un-encrypted. On the other hand, they didn't think they'd be stolen either.

    --
    Wuddooeyeno? IITYWYBMAD? Like nuts? eclecticallyincorrect.com
  50. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by evilviper · · Score: 1

    There really is only one reason to ever use a debit card - your credit is so bad that you can't actually get a credit card. In all other ways credit cards are the superior tool.

    Superior, how? Superior as in just about anybody is able to easily find out about all your credit cards, and plenty of purchase details? Is that the kinds of "superior" you were talking about?

    --
    Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
  51. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 1

    Superior, how? Superior as in just about anybody is able to easily find out about all your credit cards, and plenty of purchase details? Is that the kinds of "superior" you were talking about?

    I feel you are assuming an air of stupidity to make a point. Perhaps you would like to make your explicitly rather than come at it sideways? I remind you that this is a debate about the merits of debit cards versus credit cards. References to other payment methods would be more than just stupid.

    --
    When information is power, privacy is freedom.
  52. Re: Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Huh? How so? In the UK, won't the bank just say "But your personal PIN was entered for the transaction so it was you!"?

  53. Re: Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Same as in not actually having money leave your personal account till well after the dispute has been processed?

  54. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It depends on where you live and what bank you have. Where I live in Ontario, the same rights are afforded to me on my debit card that my credit card has. Including a lock limit on the RFID of no more than $50.

    Wrong.

    In Ontario, the relevant legislation is the Consumer Protection Act: http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_02c30_e.htm and associated regulations: http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/regs/english/2005/elaws_src_regs_r05017_e.htm

    It does cover unauthorized credit card charges, but not debit cards.

    I like protections in law, not in bank marketing materials with a lot of fine print and weasel clauses.

    Go read the card agreement for your interac purchases, then come back & talk.

  55. Why? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Why can't the major credit card companies disable the cards and mail out new ones?

  56. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Fuck you asshole.

    "limiting how much customers could spend at stores or withdraw from ATMs using their debit card" Is very different from the "freeze on your account" that you suggested.

  57. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by george14215 · · Score: 1

    If you can't get ALL YOUR money when YOU want, then your account is effectively frozen, asshat. Same deal as a bank run, when they don't allow you to get all YOUR money.

  58. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by evilviper · · Score: 1

    I remind you that this is a debate about the merits of debit cards versus credit cards. References to other payment methods would be more than just stupid.

    Information about debit cards are NOT shared with anyone outside of the issuing bank. They are every bit as private as writing a check, doing a wire transfer, or similar. Credit cards are the polar opposite, with all your financial information being reported, and being easy for anyone on the planet to access.

    --
    Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
  59. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 2

    Information about debit cards are NOT shared with anyone outside of the issuing bank.

    I find that impossible to believe when the exact same processing system is used for both credit and debit cards.

    Hell, there are even "rewards" programs for visa and mastercard branded debit cards. I think you would be hard pressed to explain how visa can do that without knowing your spending.

    http://usa.visa.com/personal/cards/debit/visa_extras.html

    --
    When information is power, privacy is freedom.
  60. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by tibit · · Score: 1

    Information about debit cards are NOT shared with anyone outside of the issuing bank.

    LOLWUT? Who cares about the cards, they are meaningless by themselves, the information about underlying accounts (whether credit, checking, etc.) is what counts, and it is most certainly shared! By changing the amount of average monthly balance on the checking account I can select what kind of spam I get via USPS. Seriously. The running joke around here is that if you keep the average above $10K, you are bougie since all your firestarter paper comes by mail!

    --
    A successful API design takes a mixture of software design and pedagogy.
  61. Re:plenty of ways to confirm PIN without sending i by tibit · · Score: 1

    It's even worse. They don't have to guess at all. They can all just use one arbitrary combination, and keep trying it on each card. They've got enough cards to get tens of thousands of hits.

    --
    A successful API design takes a mixture of software design and pedagogy.
  62. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 1

    No, they won't. I've disputed fraudulent charges on my debit card before, and the bank didn't freeze my account. What they did do was invalidate the compromised card and issue me a new one, but that happened right there while I was filling out the paperwork so it didn't really impact me. The only time it impacted me was the one time it came from the bank's end rather than me reporting the charge, and I got a phone call from the security department saying the bank'd been notified and I'd need to stop in ASAP to get the card reissued. Annoying, but I'd rather that than have my account emptied.

  63. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 1

    The problem is that you're away from home, you don't have access to everything you normally would, and you can't deal with the bank in person. It's easy to get the charge handled when you're in the branch and can fill out the paperwork. It's less easy when you're in a different time zone and can't just fork over a driver's license as proof of identity. I could probably handle it, but that's because I'm paranoid and travel with at least one portable device set up for access to everything. But most people aren't that paranoid.

  64. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 2

    Credit cards are in fact better than a debit card in one way: the money doesn't actually come out of your pocket until you pay your bill. With a debit card the money's gone and you're trying to get it back (and the fact that the bank tends to be cooperative doesn't change this dynamic). And the old adage about possession being 9/10ths of the law does ring true here: it's much easier to keep what you have than to get back what you don't.

  65. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by AK+Marc · · Score: 2

    When away from home, I have the 800-number for the bank. On the card. When I travel internationally, I put a stickey-note on every card with the bank's toll-free numbers from every country on my itinerary. Reaching the bank isn't an issue while on the road. I've never had someone ask for ID over the phone. At most, they ask for your most recent transaction, and standard account info anyone would know off the top of their head, like SSN and address.

  66. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Cederic · · Score: 1

    Sorry but what the fuck are people still using cheques for in this day and age?

    Especially for rent!

    Just set up a recurring electronic transfer ffs. It's not hard.

  67. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yes. I think so.

    Guy in front of Sandy and me in Wal-Mart, just before Christmas, had received a new card after shopping at Target. His first warning was when his fraud protection plan called and asked (going from memory, here): "are you buying $$$ worth of exercise equipment in Utah???" We're in Alabama

    Assuming the guy wasn't lying or making it up (he had a new debit card, though -- nice and shiny), this tells me that some of the numbers HAVE been exploited. So, I'm not being an alarmist, but yeah, if you've shopped at Target in the past couple of months, I'd say get a new card. That's just me.

    Also just me: you want my opinion? Target knew about the breach early on, and was hoping that it was inconsequential ... but once fraudulent charges started appearing and customers started screaming, they had no choice but to call in law enforcement and confess to the problem. :)

    -- Stephen (smpoole7) (posting anonymous because I'm on the road)

  68. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by quetwo · · Score: 1

    It all depends on the bank. Last time my debit card got lifted they reported my card as stolen. They overnighted a new card for me (they called me at 6pm, I had the new card in my hands by 9am, four states away), and they setup a 90 day, interest-free loan to cover all the transactions that happened during the time the card was being used by somebody else. I got back a week later, filled out a form, the charges were reversed and I paid back the loan with the money that came in on the reversed charges.

    Sure it was an extra headache, but they really didn't put me out for anything. In fact, they called back a few times to make sure everything was ok.

    You don't have to have a fork up your ass all the time -- you choose it by association. If you let assholes handle your money then expected to be treated as such when things go wonky ;)

  69. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by quetwo · · Score: 1

    If you use your card with a PIN (or PIN and Chip), then there are much fewer protections. If you use your debit card with a VISA or MC logo as a credit-card then you are generally protected (although you will need to fight for the money to come back in your account sooner than later, as opposed to not paying that amount when your statement comes).

  70. Strongbox sends time, rcvr checks, or modulo by raymorris · · Score: 1

    in systems I design, such as Strongbox, the sender also sends gettimeofday() and the receiver confirms the timestamp is within X milliseconds. Both sides use NTP, so both have accurate time to within a few milliseconds.

    I've also implemented systems in which the timestamp element is modulo a few seconds. The receiver accepts either the current modulo time or the previous.

  71. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by whovian · · Score: 1

    There was some television "news" saying the protections of debit and credits cards today were the same as far as zero liability in the case of fraud goes, but it may take longer to remedy if it was a debit card. Personally, I have no reason to vouch for this as I've only used credit cards in my life.

    --
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  72. Re:plenty of ways to confirm PIN without sending i by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Surely the bank locks out the card after a few bad tries?

  73. Re: Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 1

    Yes, they do try that however in practice it's very rare for a genuine dispute to happen, partly because the system is pretty secure. You simply don't get Target style bulk thefts. If money gets mysteriously withdrawn and the PIN was entered, you might be on the sharp end of a new zero-day breach against EMV, but much more likely, someone who knows you managed to figure out your PIN (or you told them) and turned out to not be quite as trustworthy as you thought they were.

  74. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Aikiplayer · · Score: 1

    Credit cards have certain properties that are desirable if you're using plastic (much less impact if your card is stolen, etc.). However, people tend to spend more using credit cards than when using cash and debit cards fall in the middle. For that reason, I prefer using debit cards if using plastic.

  75. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by sumdumass · · Score: 1

    http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2009/08/18/fraud-protection-debit-versus-credit-cards

    That seems to be the going consensus at different sources. I've used both and prefer to use the debit card. However, I have only had one instance I could consider fraud and that turned out to be a battle in and of itself because the merchant that charged my card attempted to validate the purchase even though it was shipped to an address for a house that had been destroyed in a fire in another city altogether 4 or 5 years before the purchase.

    I ended up getting lucky because the UPS driver refused to leave the package in an empty field and instead left a "you can pick it up" thing and the person who took my number actually did. It was a friend of a friend's kid who came over during a holiday party and we moved a TV and gaming system into the basement so they could pass the time doing kids things with the adults upstairs doing more adult things (drinking). Evidently, I left an old card with the same numbers out or something because he wrote down what was needed to order some crap online. (well, that or he broke in later and took the information, he waited for about 5 months before trying to use the numbers, but he told the police it was at the party that he found them). Either way, the bank wasn't going to treat it as fraud because the merchant shows it was delivered and it ended up being UPS that proved who received it making it fraud again. Took about 4 months to get cleared up.

  76. PIN secuirty standards by JoachimV · · Score: 1

    Surprising lack of information and misinformation for a slashdot post and comments. In general, PINs are the most protected part of payment transactions. PIN encryption doesn't use bad/crackable crypto concepts like Adobe did on their passwords. And while it's Triple DES-based, its actually quite strong. All debit PINs in the US are encrypted using the same few standards:
    * PIN Block and PIN encrypytion: ANS X9.8 part 1 and ISO 9564. Examples: http://www.paymentsystemsblog.com/2010/03/03/pin-block-formats/
    * Key management: DUKPT from Annex A of ANS X9.24 part 1. Some DUKPT details: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derived_unique_key_per_transaction

    Each PIN pad is injected with a unique initial key that is a double-length Triple DES key. That initial key is derived into a key set of 21 keys that are used to derive up to 1 million future keys (the counter rules in DUKPT only let it count 1 million values). Those are all unique per device. Each transaction uses a unique future key and that is derived into a PIN encryption key to encrypt the PIN block (according to the ANSI and ISO standards).

    Encryption of the PIN block is Triple DES ECB using a unique key for that transaction for that device. Breaking the encryption for that key would be a 2^112 brute force effort (no shortcuts because only one ciphertext used that key). And breaking that key will not get you any past keys and only some future keys for that device depending on where it is in the key space. In all, cracking PIN blocks coming from PIN pads is not a low hanging fruit.

    PIN pads and their design has to be lab certified and signed off by the PCI Security Council. Merchants can only use PCI certified PIN devices if they take debit cards. (strangely, credit only devices are not required to be PCI certified, but they could be if they encrypt credit card data). While there are older versions of the PIN pad certification requirements, basically the PIN security is the strongest part of the certification. The lab tests for side channel attacks against PIN encryption, ensures physical security of the device, logical security of the device, that applications running on the device (if any) cannot impact/access PIN encryption, and that tampering devices causes them to erase keys.
    list of PCI approved PIN Transaction Security (PTS) devices: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/approved_companies_providers/approved_pin_transaction_security.php#
    PCI documents (including PIN security): https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/documents.php?association=PTS&document=PTS%20Program%20Guide%20FINAL%201%201#PTS%20Program%20Guide%20FINAL%201%201

  77. Re: Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Absolutely not true that they freeze the account. I have had two unauthorized use cases. Both times low tech someone took a photo of the debit mastercard in a restaurant. The card was reissued at the nearest branch and the underlying checking acct remained intact. All fraudulent charges were refunded. I was out a total of no money, a half hour in the bank and an hour in the local PD. Yes they caught the first case perps once several people had the same experience after dining at the same restaurant.

  78. Target blew their nth chance by craighansen · · Score: 1

    The real problem is that Target had the opportunity to say something useful about the mess and blew it. On top of their earlier doublespeak, their latest press release was a mess of inconsistent and incomplete information. They said the encryption was 3DES, which anyone who knows cryptology knows is a symmetric key system, then said they only had the encryption key and not the decryption key. They didn't say that the PIN data is combined with other information so that a dictionary attack would be rendered infeasible, so people were free to assume that the system is as weak as they implied it was. But most of all, PIN numbers themselves are weak thin gruel of security soup. Target had a pulpit where they could have said "If your PIN number is 1234, or the same four digits repeated, like 0000, 1111, 2222, etc., you should change it to something thieves can't easily guess." Fully fifteen percent of people could have read that and realized that they were being morons about their financial security, helping to turn this crisis around for Target. But they missed the opportunity. Who knows if they'll get another?

    Here's my deeper question - why do banks let users choose a PIN number and not tell the idiots who pick 1234 that they're being stupid? They could say: "Ten percent of people pick 1234, please choose another number so that you don't lose all your money to a thief." or they could say to everyone "Please choose a four digit code that isn't 1234." If you're a banker, you should know better: http://www.datagenetics.com/blog/september32012/

  79. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by sumdumass · · Score: 1

    Lol.. Not every rental or land lord is a thriving business. Most of them are simple day to day people who ended up with an extra house somehow. My landlord inherited two houses from his parents when they passed away so check or money order is most appropriate. He's a simple farmer who worked for the country road department all his life, hardly a high tech businessman even though he does have quite a bit of business savvy when it comes to farming.

    Lots of rentals are a lot like this. They either kept their first home when they purchased a better one and rent it out, inherited the home somehow or saw an investment opportunity. When growing up, my father got remarried and my step mom owned a house, we rented it. You would be surprised at how many rentals come about like this and aren't really set up for online bill pay or credit cards or wire transfers and so on once you get away from the big cities. Cash, check, or money order will be just fine to these landlords.

  80. Re:plenty of ways to confirm PIN without sending i by sumdumass · · Score: 1

    I'm not so sure it is all encrypted.

    I had a go with a company that implemented credit card processing directly into their hospitality suit (manage rental cabins and charges). This software is sold to small hotels and rental businesses with it being able to manage reservations, availabilities, different seasonal rates, and so on. They used their own processing center but it had the ability to use any we wanted to but the company I was working with used the provider's processing. Anyways, we had a problem with the processing module functioning with our proxy server. After doing some snooping with wire shark, I noticed some packets containing the numbers and names of the test credit cards. I pieced a couple packets together and had all the information on the transaction including name, address, credit card numbers, the cvc number, expiration dates and for some reason, information about the guest that you wouldn't think a processor needed like phone number and number of guests and dates of the stay.

    Of course I was online with their tech support department trying to figure this all out and they have assured me a number of times that they have this system up and running at over 5,000 locations without a problem and the only difference is we had a proxy server segmenting the network (they actually suggested to the owner that we scrap the proxy and just use a netgear router to separate the public and private networks and I had to show the PCI compliance forms that recommend using a proxy). When I asked about it being sent in plain text, they at first didn't believe me until I sent all the packets. Then they stopped working on making their crap work with a proxy server and supposedly fixed the clear text problem which the solution was to send the CC data to a https site instead of an IP address which the software defaulted to. So the encryption wasn't even built into the program, it basically used a web browser to place the data on a TLS stream and with each update they did, you had to go back into the software and check that the address it was sending to had an https:/// in front of it because some of the updates reverted back.

    Finally, the owner ended up trashing the entire system and going with a complete online version from another company that integrated with the reservation module on the website better that even allowed you to put a deposit on a cabin to confirm the reservation instead of calling and doing it over the phone.

    But you assume it is encrypted because it is supposed to be encrypted but I have first hand experience where amusing didn't have the expected results and we only found out by accident. With any software processing like most modern POS machines and complicated inventory and tracking systems being integrated within them seem to be, anything is possible. Even if it was a lazy tech who decided to take a short cut or something to allow the info to not be encrypted.

  81. Don't Forget Good Old Brute Force by Toad-san · · Score: 1

    I'm not impressed with Triple DES, nor the "security" allegedly provided by having the PIN decryption at the point of sale boxes. But you can always just go for brute force decryption.

    http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2012-09/infographic-day-fastest-way-crack-4-digit-pin-number

    Given tens of millions of credit cards, you're bound to slide right into enough of them to make the crack worth while.

  82. Debit cards can be used like a credit card by Whatchamacallit · · Score: 1

    Most debit cards have a Visa/MC logo and can be used without a pin. In many cases this can avoid a debit card processing fee (most retailers did away with the fee). Making a purchase only requires a signature and gas stations require a zip code and likely a $100 limit. Small purchases at fast food don't require a signature nor pin. The pin is only used at an ATM for cash withdrawal or debit mode at a swipe/keypad terminal.

  83. If the file of PINS itself were 3DES encrypted... by mrflash818 · · Score: 1

    Now, if the entire file of PIN data was itself encrypted with 3DES, so that the stolen file of pins and 3DES hashes just looks like:

    -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
    Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)

    jA0EAgMCmK7S4A7OWXhgyWYzILMlE7ATCioESasDPY3H3JiCSGtoQ/UE0VJJPEry
    qLwoiFhm/Nz1laSMQS/wRITAHSzDTSPnry14W0EdQeAVhvpkhWpJqYovLNTGhweC
    dm3MtNIZu3oN/jQkghTTfTVY4/WEIdo= ...imagine this is really really long and big...megabytes of scrambled data...
    =pg5p
    -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

    Then fantastic! Now the Bad Guys have the PITA of brute forcing the sensitive information file 1st, before they can wreck havoc with the stolen info.

    --
    Uh, Linux geek since 1999.
  84. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by evilviper · · Score: 1

    the old adage about possession being 9/10ths of the law does ring true here: it's much easier to keep what you have than to get back what you don't.

    There's no truth in that at all. The fact that you have to write a check doesn't obviate any responsibility you have to pay your bill, nor does the bank's possession of your money obviate them of the responsibility to fully reimburse you for fraud very quickly. Legally, the two are entirely equivalent.

    --
    Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
  85. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by evilviper · · Score: 1

    I find that impossible to believe when the exact same processing system is used for both credit and debit cards.

    That only proves you are a fool. There is no "debit reporting agency".

    Debit cards do not affect your public credit history. Credit cards, do.

    --
    Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
  86. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by evilviper · · Score: 1

    By changing the amount of average monthly balance on the checking account I can select what kind of spam I get via USPS. Seriously. The running joke around here is that if you keep the average above $10K, you are bougie since all your firestarter paper comes by mail!

    I get no such spam. Of course every time I sign-up for a bank account, I jump through hoops sending in cards or calling-up automated phone numbers to opt-out of ALL information sharing.

    --
    Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
  87. Re:Time to ask the bank a new debit card and P by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 1

    That only proves you are a fool. There is no "debit reporting agency".

    Yes. indeed, I am a fool for thinking you meant more than just credit reports. I figured you were educated enough to be aware of data brokers who look at spending habits like, where, when and how much you spend. What a fool I was for thinking you were putting on an air of stupidity instead of actually being stupid.

    --
    When information is power, privacy is freedom.
  88. Re:Time to ask the bank for a new debit card and P by RyoShin · · Score: 1

    I can personally attest to this. This past labor day my debit card (which I'd had all of six months) was used to purchase some pharmaceuticals over in Spain to the tune of $300+. Since the debit card is through Visa, their protection services called me to let me know about the odd charge. My credit union I had the card with did diddly to inform me; I had to call them. After some pain with paperwork (which they had to mail/fax and I had to mail/fax back) Visa ruled in favor of the merchant (because it's totally plausible for me to order pills from Spain that were likely shipped to a Spanish address when I've never stepped foot outside the continental US.)

    Thankfully, my credit union is really good (aside from not catching the charge themselves) and reimbursed me the total amount after the ruling, but I was still down that amount for about two weeks (and, since I already end each month with no money, this made things quite stressful.) But I will never again use my debit card online.