Slashdot Mirror
Slashdot Asks: Should Businesses Switch To Biometric Passwords? (hbr.org)
This question was inspired by a recent article in Harvard Business Review:
It's become abundantly clear that passwords are an untenable way to secure our data online. And asking your customers to keep track of complicated log-in information is a terrible user experience... The threat to security when relying on passwords is one reason businesses are increasingly migrating to biometric systems. Identity verification through biometrics can ensure greater security for personal information, while also providing customers with a more seamless experience in the digital environment of smartphones, tablets, sensors, and other devices... the idea is to verify someone's identity with a high degree of assurance by tying it to multiple mechanisms at once, known as biometric modalities [which] when used in concert, can provide a significantly safer environment for the customer, and are much easier to use... [I]f an app simultaneously requires a thumbprint, a retina scan, and a vocal recognition signature, it would be close to impossible for a bad actor to replicate that in the seconds needed to open the app.
This got me curious -- are Slashdot's readers already seeing biometric verification systems in their own lives? Share your experiences in the comments, as well as your informed opinion. Do you think businesses should be switching to biometric passwords?
This got me curious -- are Slashdot's readers already seeing biometric verification systems in their own lives? Share your experiences in the comments, as well as your informed opinion. Do you think businesses should be switching to biometric passwords?
I can see a whole lot of privacy and "Big Brother" problems with biometric authentication...
If you want news from today, you have to come back tomorrow.
No.
Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
Biometrics seems fine as a means of 2FA. In fact I would find it much less annoying that the Yubikey and Gemalto I currently I have to use because it would be impossible for me to forget it, but you still need the something you know part of the equation. Arguably you could be a little more loose with your password strength and uniqueness between services if you knew everything was going to also require biometric data. Really though it seems like security is something that everyone professionals and ley people are going to have to get better about in the near future.
And you know that.
Slashdot, fix the reply notifications... You won't get away with it...
Biometrics are subject to replay attacks and, once compromised, can never be changed.
Biometrics seems fine as a means of 2FA. In fact I would find it much less annoying that the Yubikey and Gemalto I currently I have to use because it would be impossible for me to forget it, but you still need the "... something you know" part of the equation. Arguably you could be a little more loose with your password strength and uniqueness between services if you knew everything was going to also require biometric data. Really though it seems like security is something that everyone, professionals and ley people alike, are going to have to get better about in the near future.
Biometry is not suitable for authentication. Essentially using biometry is like using a password you cannot change, but constantly tell anybody around you.
It's trivial to keep your passwords secure, it's much harder to keep your fingerprint or iris pattern secure. Both can even be read out remotely.
Too much room for false positives/negatives. I mean look at your phone: You can put a fingerprint on it but it'll require a backup PIN in case that doesn't work. You don't gain any security if there has to be a backup password, it is just a convenience thing.
The right answer is a smart card (or other device with that chip in it like Yubikey). Here you go to token+PIN. It's two factor, thus much harder for an adversary to get around, and it allows for a much shorter, easier to remember password. Reason is that the password/PIN is stored on the card itself, and you get only a small, fixed number of attempts to try it (3 normally) before it locks and can only be unlocked with an administrative code. That means it isn't the kind of thing subject to brute force and thus doesn't need to be long and complex.
There's also no issue with replay attacks since it is PKI, you actually auth by doing a challenge response with a private key stored only on the secure element of the card. At no time does your password/PIN transit the network and even if someone captures all the traffic it is useless since all they get is that particular challenge/response communication, it will be difference next time.
Downside is cost and complexity, of course, but really it is worth it and works damn well. You basically eliminate the problem of accounts getting stolen, and once users get used to it it is easier. Especially since the ID card can be the same card they use to open the doors and so on. HID makes combo cards that work with their existing ISOProx readers and function as NIST PIV smart cards too, or you can get readers that work directly with the smart card certificate.
Biometrics is neat, and I think bio+token could be great in the future, but for now it just seems too problematic. It is useful on a phone, as a convenience thing, but you are actually decreasing your security for it.
Biometric is a ONLY username, not a password. It does not matter how much combo you think you can put together to eliminate bad actors, all those technics do is verify who you are, and if they can be fooled each single, chance is that they can be all fooled taken together. And once your system is compromised, what do you do ?
C. Sagan : A demon haunted world:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0345409469/
visit randi.org
If you are no longer employed by a company and for whatever reason they cannot decrypt some critical business data without your biometric authentication...?
As usual, this will bring a collection of new problems for some. Will work fine for some people but others will struggle. Fingerprints will not be much use for me; my prints were clear when I was younger, but they have faded. To the extent that at a border control earlier this year where fingerprint capture was mandatory, the immigration clerk had difficulty with my left hand and found it impossible with my right. He wrote a brief report which said that he could just see the patterns but could not capture them. I might have been lucky not to be refused admission, but it seems this situation was not new to them.
What could possibly go wrong
I see some biometric verification systems:
* My Macbook
* My iPhone
* In my datacenter
But don't think biometrics can replace your passwords imho, as the following password rules keep applying: :-)
* rule no 1 with passwords is: "don't use the same one on different places". Try using different biometrics for once... mmm... you can't just change your fingerprint now can you?
* rule no 2 with passwords: Change passwords frequently (as they might get compromised).. Ah, see point 1.
* rule no 3 with passwords is: "don't trust the client (your phone/pc/etc.), but verify on the server". So, how about every company saving your fingerprint? Would that be safe? Nope. For sure your current App that uses a fingerprint (with Touch ID) checks it locally, it will actually get a YES or NO (not even which finger). So do you consider that safe if you remember you can't trust the device?
* rule no 4 with passwords: don't share them. Wow... wait a minute: did you just touch that glass, did you leave a copy of your fingerprint? Surely your fingers aren't on any photo?
Let's have businesses do 4 things:
1. Don't enforce needlessly strict / complicated security policies for websites that don't matter that much.
2. Don't make me reset my password when I've merely forgotten it - it just puts me into a never-ending loop of creating harder and harder to remember passwords that need to be constantly reset.
3. Provide easy to use 2 factor authentication that lets me use simpler passwords, or even delay the "authentication" to be when I pay for something and validate my billing address. 4. Take on more of the security burden yourselves, and detect when malicious agents are doing unusual things, rather than requiring the users to negotiate needlessly secure procedures.
Maybe after all these things are in place, we can talk about biometric methods.
For remote use, there is not a lot of difference between biometrics and passwords, except that:
-- you can't change the biometrics if they are compromised
-- there is little scope for using different credentials for different sites
Can't see any advantages to them, and I really don't want to be authenticating to my bank with the same credentials I use for Slashdot.
I know, lets use a password I broadcast everywhere and can't change! Brilliant!
First time poster, long time reader.
Biometric elements regarding authentication fail regarding two major issues.
First issue, they can't be revoked. There won't ever be a "change your retina" or "forgot my bird to flip" form. Forget being forgotten, forget witness protection etc.
Second major issue : risk shifting.
If my credentials have value, then it stands to reason I can be assaulted to get them. To protect itself, my employer asks me at least two factors and I am OK with what I know and what I have. Both can be acquired without major hurt to my person (yes, under duress I will gladly give them and no one could blame me).
Biometric elements, provided that a copy of what I am cannot fool the system WILL have to be harvested from me.
Therefore, Biometrics is still heck of a bad idea
Let's take a look at the characteristics of a username:
And let's take a look at the characteristics of a password:
Now, let's take a look at what a fingerprint or other biometric property is:
Conclusion: biometric properies are more like usernames, not like passwords. So, use them for identification, not authentication. Any biometric system supplier telling you otherwise is just telling marketing nonsense.
[1]: http://www.tomsguide.com/us/ph...
It doesn't have to be like this. All we need to do is make sure we keep talking.
"Biometrics are more like a username than a password" is something that I heard and feel is appropriate.
There are lots of issues with biometrics:
1) Most of them are easy to steal.
2) They can't be changed once stolen and have bigger repercussions when stolen (identify theft, framing crimes).
3) Some of them like iris scans change over time.
4) Privacy issues.
5) They don't work for passwords that are shared (these should be avoided whenever possible anyways, but they can't be avoided entirely)
6) They don't work for service accounts (accounts associated with programs, not people)
7) They aren't always accurate: false positives and false negatives.
8) Health issues can affect some of them. The most obvious is losing your voice. Some are less obvious like being pregnant affects the eyes for iris and retinal scans.
9) Some are not disability friendly. If you use retinal scanners, what do you do with employees with fake eyes?
The so-called "biometric" "password" is
- not a password
- less secure than password
- cannot be changed
- is easily breached
- cannot be easily stored in a secure way
- unsafe as long as businesses keep their shitty security open to little Bobby Tables ';--
- enables more tracking and surveillance and behavioral control
- is voluntarily given to the NSA and China
So no, fuck no.
This absurd conception of "identity" from some limited number of immutable facts is only going to get worse the more technology develops.
Identity as it actually exists is the sum of the things that makes you distinct from everything else. Right down to the cellular level. Of course, it isn't very practical to create what amounts to a hash out of all of our cells, DNA, experiences, memories, etc. So instead you end up with things that are obviously weak shorthand.
Absolutely none of these stand-ins remains static for the entirety of your life. Sure, retina doesn't change much unless you suffer eye trauma. Sure, fingerprints don't change much. My fingers developed cracks in the prints over the course of my lifetime. And, of course, there's the looming issue of prosthetics without prints at all being widespread. Sure, voice print doesn't change much. Unless you smoke or sing. Sure, gait doesn't change much unless you take some trauma to the legs, spine, or feet.
The point is, of course, even if these things weren't vulnerable to attack at the technology/replication level (which they will be), they're insufficient over long periods of time. Perhaps even worse degradation properties than passwords. Hard to say. Suppose you have a 30-character password today, how many years of shelf life does that have left? Well, at least the update protocol is clear and consistent. You just log into the account and change it with a stronger one. What does the update protocol on biometrics look like? Your properties have fundamentally changed too much to log in. What do you do now? Call up the vendor and let them know that you're the real you?
That brings up another point. What kind of tolerance will be built into the systems, if any? Will your crying into your beer at 3 AM voice allow you to do things? Should it?
We've always been a bit sketchy on what it means to be human and the coming century is going to test our definitions quite harshly. Biometrics only work if there's biology there.
The problem with most biometric systems is that we literally leave our password behind on everything we touch.
Biometrics as a sort of user ID, on the other hand...
NO! NO!! NO!!! NEVER EVER!!!!
What if I lose my voice, and my thumb is injured and bandaged so that I can't give a thumb print?
Why solve a problem already solved? Just use 2FA. Problem SOLVED.
maybe just a card you can scan than an actual body print. Just a physical card mailed to you so you can just scan it in,
[($)]
Easy to steal, not protected by any laws, cannot be changed should they be compromised. Worst system imaginable.
Matching bio data isn't an exact 1:1 match. The mechanism is a proximity comparison. So the original data can't be protected by a one way encryption. Therefore it is way easier to steal that information for reuse. After all any biometric reader attached to a personal device can be simulated by an attacker and the stolen bio data fed in directly - so it is even easier than any of the current 2FA (the use case for readers in protected locations, think doors, is only slightly better). In summary having a unchangeable second factor lowers security, especially when the second factor can't be protected properly #badidea
It's too bad no one invented such a thing decades ago because by now we would have something that worked out of the box on Windows and Linux
Not to mention that almost all biometric methods are really cheap shortcuts, even the kind of DNA analysis they do for crimes.
So there are at least thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people just in the US that will have "essentially the same" biometric data as you.
Which means that they are not even usable as user names (as others suggested) on a large scale.
Apart from the basic fact that you cannot change it when it is compromised, and it will be, there is also that real problem in that they are extremely unreliable. You sweat and the scanner has trouble reading your fingerprint or you get an eye infection and the machine cannot recognise your iris. When we installed fingerprint scanner on all the POSs we had to remove them soon after as staff had to jam the tills open all the time because they kept failing to open when they should. Biometrics are a security risk that is not worth taking.
I love stacking my barbecues in the shed at the end of summer - you can't beat a bit of grill on grill action.
... when someone steals them?
Watch this Heartland Institute video
A practical example of biometrics at work. Our parking lot decided to install fingerprint readers. Some people who work with their hands have worn fingerprints and they can't drive in and have to wait for the security to let them in.
When it's sunny, the reader gets too warm and doesn't work.
When it's raining, it's too wet and doesn't work.
When you put your finger on it a bit wrong, it doesn't work.
When your finger gets hurt and you plaster it, it won't work.
When the system is rebooting, it won't work.
When the fingerprint copy is printed on paper and light is shined onto it, it will let anybody in.
When asked if the data is secure on the system, nobody knows the answer.
It's the username, not the password.
I created a new device that might be of use here. The fecal reader can be used to identify and it only takes a quick wipe. It would be very quick and easy and highly secure. Your shit can't not be faked. I also have a plug in for older iPhones that have an audio jack. Using the iWipe app I created and have available at the iStore is so easy even young children find it fun to use. My nephew loves to play log-in now that he can use the fecal reader.
Not authentication.
You use biometrics to help identify yourself, and then use a password, secure keyfob, time sensitive variable keyphrase to authenticate. Along with some form of meatspace anti-spoofing technology (whether a security guard, or verficiation that a human of approximately your shape and build is sitting in front of the authentication terminal and not for instance holding a photograph in front of the webcam, or fingermold in front of the fingerprint scanner, or a usb keyboard emulator in place of a real physically connected/authenticate keyboard.) Some of these are obviously stretching the 'realistic consumer level authentication factors', but anything short of that is no better than a username and password, and biometrics, depending on your device-specific input/output speed are not really any faster to identify and authenticate than a username/password(+optional fob) authentication mechanism anyways.
.. at least for most online-sites there is really no need for passwords at all.
Most online-shops, forum, whatsoever don't improve much due to user authentication, also if there is no secret information i usally use the same simplistic password like asdf oder start or password and wouldn't mind if anyone else uses the same account. .. next time i'll just sign up with another stupid login
btw: biometrics are very very stupid idea for authentication, it's like a single password that you have to tell every site unencrypted, can be stolen very easily and can almost not be changed ..
so the best authentication is to simply don't give information that need to be kept secure so no authentication is needed
The result is that biometrics make the employee/customer/citizen(!) expendable.
Also, of course, that they're shitty usernames, not suitable as passwords.
In most cases there's no good reason to prove your identity. What you need to prove is your right to do whatever it is you're doing. I don't want to give an online store the information that would let them buy things with my credit card, or which could be stolen and misused by others. The information I give to buy something from Amazon should not be sufficient to buy something from Apple.
as well as your informed opinion.
Informed? Posters on /. ?
You must be new here...
By all means, have a biometric username, but never have a biometric password. It's a basic rule for anyone that actually understands how to implement auth in the real world.
Easy to change a real password, impossible to change a biometric password..
- This sig deliberately left blank. Nothing to see, move along.
I do believe biometric data should never be used for passwords. Fingerprints and Eyescans can be robbed with good camera's and lenses, dna gets spread more than you want to know - even voice can easyly be robbed.
So biometrical passwords are even worse than passwords - that's my point of view.
"It's become abundantly clear that passwords are an untenable way to secure our data online."
Can you please provide some evidence for this "abundantly clear" claim?
Any discussion of biometrics without discussing the crossover rate (or Equal Error Rate) is woefully incomplete. see this explanation: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/57589/determining-the-accuracy-of-a-biometric-system
The crossover rate is that point in the sensitivity settings of the system that yield minimum errors, where the False Acceptance Rate = the False Rejection Rate. In layman's terms, you're letting in unauthorized bad guys at the same rate you're keeping authorized good guys out. Any biometric system that doesn't list their crossover rate is pure snakeoil. Run away.
Another data point few consider. A Large Theme Park used biometrics a few years back for their annual ticket holders. It soon became known as the "identical twins two-for-one sale". Can your biometrics discern identical twins? Few can.
Except that real users don't follow those rules anyway. If they did, they'd have to break
* rule number 5 -- keep your passwords in your head, not written down where they can be stolen.
You can't see ANYTHING from a car, You've got to get out of the goddamned contraption and walk...Edward Abbey
I have to scan my badge to enter the building and access floors and specific rooms. And I have to scan my badge to use the printer. Seems like it would be easy to add scanning the badge to the entering of the password when I login to a computer too.
Wouldn't that go a long way to addressing this aspect of security?
You will turn hacking into hacking off my eyeball and fingers, torture for my voice, if someone wants in they will get in, but don't make it so hard the only option hurts me!
Having to give the company you work for biometric data would be an incredible invasion of privacy... and if you work in a position that makes you a target for something like "tiger kidnapping" it would be possible to use your biometrics just by having you along. No need to get a passcode out of you, just stuff your eye in front of the scanner, or your finger onto a fingerprint reader, or your hand on a hand sensor. It would probably make such attacks more frequent, because there would be no need to coerce people in these positions by kidnapping their families etc.., just bring the one person along. It also means that, at least in the U.S., the police could forcibly open any data device protected with biometrics without a warrant etc.., due to recent court rulings in regard to that.
unfortunately all the biometric systems I've seen are vulnerable to impersonation, at a surprisingly low cost in many cases. The major down side, you cannot replace your finger, or other body part (or at least not easily).
honestly I've been most happy with 2 factor systems that involve a registered device
Most biometric scanners have poor resolution and are easily defeated with very modest resources. MythBusters did a very good episode about the ease of replicating fingerprints, and found recent scanners that could be defeated by copying a fingerprint on a laser printer and simply moistening the printout. There was also an infamous paper, available at https://cryptome.org/gummy.htm, describing more sophisticated approaches with the image transferred to gelatiin. That has never been refuted since its original publication. American police, and many security groups worldwide, collect large libraries of fingerprints that can be copied wholesale for just such intrusion.
Fingerprint scanners, which are the most common biometric device, remain quite vulnerable to targeted breakin. Fingerprints may be a handy access option, but they can't be considered robust security.
Want to keep my fingers.
If a fingerprint is needed, a thief might just cut it off to be used.
I want to keep my fingers, eyes, or whatever else biometric is used.
Voice and faces can be faked.
No. Next question.
Your biometric password can't be changed. Just because we don't know how to hack them now doesn't mean it won't be trivial in the future. finger print readers are wafer thin right now, whose to say a wafer thin electrode array can't drive one of these with some one eleses fingerprint. As for getting that finger print well, you will have it from any one of the biometric devices that the person gave it to.
It's just a passing phase in password land where biometric passwords are convenient but no ubiquitous enough and not standard enough that anyone wants to invest the time to hack them. But hack them they will once it becomes useful to do so. then you are struck with a permanent reminder of a temporary feeling.
Some drink at the fountain of knowledge. Others just gargle.
Having a combination of a CHIP card and an RSA Security Device or key seems to wok just fine. When I lived in Europe, for remote access to work, I used an RSA Security key which consisted of a 6 digit code which changes every 90 seconds and an assigned static 4-digit code. The MAC address of the machine was registers and that seemed adequate. Personal/banking transaction were handles with a CHIP card, 4-digit PIN, and an RSA security device that looked like a calculator. By using the combination I could not only sign in to online banking with a unique password every time, but I could validate each financial transaction using a calculated checksum provided by the RSA device that looked like a calculator with a slot for the CHIP card. We should have this system in the United States, but we should also get over our paranoia of a national ID card. The national id card in the country where I lived was a CHIP card as well and you could purchase a USB reader to insert your your identity card to access federal social websites. Biometrics has the potential of making the current American police/surveillance state even more pernicious. Notice the ubiquity of police cameras seen at the Occupy Wall Street protests and other demonstrations. Just like collecting fingerprints sans probable cause, the government is face-printing the population in order to preemptively round people up if necessary at a later time. We've already seen preemptive raids and the seizing of computers of people suspected of possibly disrupting the Republican Convention in 2012. There are other, better methods for securing transactions, however, in America the corporations rules and the government claims powerlessness no force them to provide adequate security to their customers.
And what, Pollyanna, do you gain from the biometric if you're carrying a smart card?
Biometric authentication is like a password that can never be reset, can be stolen off your body, and in some cases, that you accidentally leave copies of all over the place (fingerprints). They're fine as a second factor but the hard, cold, fad-deflating truth is that nothing beats the security of the good ol' password. A strong password can be hard to crack and is the hardest form of credentials to steal (requires torture or an fMRI machine). People are often careless with passwords but biometrics are no solution to that, for the reasons I mentioned before.
"When information is power, privacy is freedom" - Jah-Wren Ryel
Biometrics aren't passwords, they are user IDs.
Treating them as passwords is a popular idea but will inevitably lead to disaster. Who would choose a password they could never change and then give that same password to countless other parties? Even if we did that, what would be the equivalent to good practices like storing password hashes instead of the originals in case of compromise?
If you disagree, post your argument. (-1, Overrated) isn't your personal censorship tool for views you don't like.
yet you grab a story from the harvard business review.. come on now! the editors should be smarter than this as its the simplist logic that anyone can use.
Can you change your biometrics? NO! so when attackers figure out how to spoof the physical hardware that takes the biometrics there will be nothing that anyone can do to secure the data other than going back to passwords, as an added bonus now all of that users other accounts are compromised as well. .
If this is news for nerds can we please stop listening to mba's because stuff like this makes the editors look like a bunch of kids.
Physical scanners are much easier to spoof than software is to crack.
capcha: comply
Yeah... just waiting for the next headline from "Slashdot Asks"
Slashdot Asks: Should I Saw Off An Employee's Legs To Keep Him From Leaving The Company
Anons need not reply. Questions end with a question mark.
Relatively easy to fake, and can't be repudiated once compromised. Brilliant.
Every so often it requires me to use my regular login credentials.
It works very well indeed.
And yes, if someone cut off my finger or thumb, and it was one of the ones registered in the phone, or if someone caught my fingerprints some where, and went on a MythBusters type effort, where they lifted the print, and went through gyrations to duplicate it. Yup, they could break into my phone.
y tho?
That's a metric fuckton of trouble to go to, and if the standard login pops up on them, they wasted a lot of effort to spoof my fingerprint. Then steal my phone, and somehow keep me from erasing the phone as soon as I noticed it gone. And my credit card puts a hold on any large purchase, and calls a different number for verification before it allows it, and if not verified as legit, cancels the card.
It isn't perfect. But it's pretty good. Perfection is too often the enemy of pretty good.
The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
questions remains, Hell No.
I don't even give my company access to medical history, what makes you think I would give them biometric data ?
With unique personally identifiable information now traversing the corporate networks, are they going to be forced to implement HIPAA standards to protect it ?
I doubt most companies will want to go that route due to cost, upkeep and penalties should that data get compromised.
Utilizing a "password" that can't be changed and is readily left by its users in daily activities (opening a door, sitting, looking into a camera, etc) is idiotic. I would say that it could be a decent part of a 2 part authentication process but history has shown that usually when bio-metrics are used the other factors suffer.
Nothing more to say really.
Biometrics is more like a user-name. They cannot, and should not, be used to access an account.
Identity alone is not the issue, for which a biometric signal would be OK. Biometrics could be likened to a door key, if someone steals it they can get in. But you also need the code to turn off the alarm. There ends the similarity.
A password should both identify the user and act as a lock. The user-name should really also be a "password", not an e-mail address or a real name.
Fingerprint scanner, besides being hackable, can be activated by a dead persons finger, or a gun held to the owners head, is not a good thing.
For security, at least one more layer should be needed, preferably also a "escape password", that could be used under duress, to erase whatever needs to be erased.
I tried to use a FIDO U2F security key in my side business. Most of my vendors don't support using two-factor authentication with a security key. My web host provider plans to implement it Really Soon. Google will prompt me for my key if I make a major change to my YouTube account. Biometric passwords aren't going to work if vendors don't get onboard to upgrade their login systems.
The short answer: No
The long answer: Fuck no!
Most of these places must have a different form of authentication - otherwise how are they compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act? What about someone without hands - how do they provide a fingerprint? How about someone with no eyes?
Businesses should not switch to biometric passwords. They could use biometry for convenience paired with password for security, but biometry isn't enough for one main reason: if someone figures a way of replicating even a single biometric identification, the whole system is defeated.
It's a difference between replacing a single user password versus possibly having to recall and replace all hardware, and the entire system behind it.
You can easily replace passwords. Biometrics cannot be replaced.
It uniquely identifies people and is uniquely tied to each one, which also creates a problem regarding privacy.
It's always a bad idea to use something that is uniquely identifiable as a password, because you end up running in scenarios where anonymity becomes impossible.
And in the end, the problem with security systems is that they are prone to failure due to a bunch of different factors.
Smartphone fingerprint readers were easily defeated just recently because they were implemented to work faster.
http://www.computerworld.com/a...
Technology catches on. We'll always be one step from a scanner with high enough resolution and a printer of some sort with high enough definition and usage of the right materials.
You know what people said about fingerprint readers in the past? That it would be close to impossible to replicate because of how complex our fingerprints are. That argument being made by Harvard Business Review in the end of the quote is just the same. We can't assume how hard it's gonna be to replicate even if you are tying a bunch of biometrics together because it hasn't been out yet, nor there's any incentive for people to break it just yet. If someone haphazardly implements it through a wide range of businesses, then all bets are off.
Also, companies behind such systems will always fail to recognize the problem because recalling and replacing devices will always be impossibly expensive, and in several instances we're basically relying on security through obscurity.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/e...
https://hackaday.com/2015/11/1...
Now, with things as they stand, imagine this scenario: as we all know, several companies nowadays are basically building entire dossiers about each and every costumer with all sorts of information about them to sell for advertisers and whatnot. Imagine if biometrics got into that, and then innevitably one of those companies gets hacked or leaks their entire databases. Instead of people scrambling to reset and change their passwords, we'd get people who could do nothing about it, biometrics in the wild, just waiting for someone to come up with a way to use/replicate them. This happens to enough businesses and enough databases, biometric data becomes something as easy to find out as an address or name.
No question, Bio passwords should be mandatory. HOWEVER, along with this, we have to come up with a way that this doesn't turn into tracking.
Reading the commentary here it is obvious that biometrics is a mess. Some think it's a user ID, others a password, and the list goes on.
If it is so confusing here just imagine how bad it would be for the millions of implementers out there who can't even grasp the concept of going beyond a cleartext version of a password in a database.
Caution: Contents under pressure
I will not give any company my biometric data
No fingerprints
No DNA
No blood samples
No, never.
Posting as AC since I've already moderated this article.
Sorry the initial statement of this question is pure BS. The problem is not with passwords, but with the way
1) People choosing them (stupid simple passwords like 12345)
2) Companies allowing them (the same)
3) Companies storing them (without strong hashing and no salting)
4) Companies requiring authentication for things which are basically free because they want to profile us/spy on us.
5) People using insecure operating systems and/or devices.
6) Companies requiring to regularly change your password - this one is the most sadistic/idiotic requirement. Unless your password has been leaked, there's almost never a good reason to change it.
// Artem S. Tashkinov
Millions of people have to use key cards to access physical buildings and rooms. It's pretty strange that we aren't using those same key cards to unlock our computers.
That works until they total recall your *SS.
Why are you continuing to argue something that can not currently happen, and quite frankly may never happen? The first time I can let slide, but defending a hypothetical.. Really? Irrationality at it's finest.
-The wise argue that there are few absolutes, the fool argues that there are no probabilities.
YMMV
all can ultimately be transformed into Something You (or a computer) Knows. Therefore, almost every multi-factor authentication system depends on several things that an attacker can discover, and mimic.
The security industry has found that biometerics have a major down side, in that they can't be changed. Once they are discovered by attackers, they are permanently discovered.
For example, the major compromise of the US Office of Personnel Management by the Chinese in 2015 disclosed 5.6 million recorded fingerprints. This included everybody who had a security clearance, and all covert agents in Intelligence and law enforcement. Since biometerics can't be changed, it will take decades before this compromise stops causing harm to the US government. US Covert agents can be identified. Any attempt to use fingerprint biometerics for these people can now be more easily attacked: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
Every government has aggressively begun to collect biometeric information from every possible source. Shortly afterwards, almost every government database of collected biometerics has been successfully compromised. Biometric information is collated by insurance, law and intelligence agencies. It is sold and resold on the various criminal marketplaces.
Part of this flourishing criminal marketplace in biometeric information includes permanent, unchangeable health and medical information: https://hipaahealthlaw.foxroth...
Also, US courts have ruled that biometeric info has almost no legal protections against collection, resale or forced disclosure.
Therefore, some security professionals now believe that well funded attackers can overcome the biometeric parts of an authentication system with less expense than overcoming a password.
It should, however, be also tied to something that can be easily changed, if the need arises, just like any other password. The difference between a regular password and this would be that it requires biometric data to validate. The difference between this and simple biometric data alone is that it requires information known only to yourself.
And if you tied that into a wetware kind of technology, then you could even design a kind of dead-man's switch into it so that if you were under any kind of duress to enter your password, it would not work.
Biometrics are good for identification, i.e. you take someone's fingerprint and compare it to a database. Someone can't show up with a severed or fake one and fool you with it.
It does not work for authentication, however. Imagine a password that you can never change and you leave pieces of it everywhere you go... well that's exactly what your fingerprint is. Maybe retina scans are better, but I have serious doubts, the biggest being that if it ever does become compromised, again, you can't change it. Voice recognition is not secure either, you could easily be recorded and/or have your voice synthesized.
Also this:
[I]f an app simultaneously requires a thumbprint, a retina scan, and a vocal recognition signature, it would be close to impossible for a bad actor to replicate that in the seconds needed to open the app.
is complete bullshit.
Only crack the nuts that crack. You don't put the ones that don't crack in the sack.
And like they need more data -_-. Besides, you then got to hope that the IT people are complete sh*t heads and most are.
A switch to only biometric passwords will provide governments a way to force you to grant access to your private phone and social media data. How can you refuse it? you fingerprints and retina will grant them access.
Do you think businesses should be switching to biometric passwords?
No