Hackers Wipe US Servers of Email Provider VFEmail (zdnet.com)
Hackers have breached the severs of email provider VFEmail.net and wiped the data from all its US servers, destroying all US customers' data in the process. From a report: The attack took place yesterday, February 11, and was detected after the company's site and webmail client went down without notice. "At this time, the attacker has formatted all the disks on every server," the company said yesterday. "Every VM is lost. Every file server is lost, every backup server is lost. This was more than a multi-password via SSH exploit, and there was no ransom. Just attack and destroy," VFEmail said. The company's staff is now working to recover user emails, but as things stand right now, all data for US customers appears to have been deleted for good and gone into /dev/null.
No offsite backups? No tapes????
Who designed the disaster plan for these guys?
General Relativity: Space-time tells matter where to go; Matter tells space-time what shape to be.
Time to pull yesterday's backup tapes. You do have the tapes from yesterday, don't you?
offsite tape backup is sounding good right about now
Every file server is lost, every backup server is lost.
So, that's the online backup servers, but what about the offline backups... there were offline backups, right? RIGHT???
I am starting to wonder if I don't need to ask every single electronic service I interact with to put in writing what tighter backup policies are. I imagine my stuff on gmail servers is safe... but that is truly only my imagination, who can say for sure even they have offline backups (that can be restored from)??
"There is more worth loving than we have strength to love." - Brian Jay Stanley
Thankfully, VFEmail was primarily an IMAP/POP3 provider. I suspect that the majority of its users had a local backup in the form of an email client with a local store...
That can be both a bug and a feature. No backups mean that there's no cache of deleted emails. Some users may want the ability to truly delete data, not have it able to "appear" due to legal proceedings 5 years from now.
I'd say it's on the users to back up their email using a client that locally caches IMAP folders or downloads via POP3.
Maybe someone needed an email to disappear to avoid public embarrassment or legal trouble.
First onsite backup
Second offsite backup that pulls, not pushes.
- A push backup leaves a trace that there is a backup and to where it is being pushed.
- - Just track the push and wipeout the backup as well.
- A pull backup is only visible from the pulling location and, anyone inside that knows it exists.
- - No trail to trace and wipeout. If it is wiped out, Then it is clearly an inside job.
- - A pulling backup does mean the pulling system has access to the onsite backups.
- - - But the onsite backup can be isolated from the onsite system and data.
Conclusion:
- Onsite hack can wipeout onsite system and data and onsite backup. but not offsite backup.
- Offsite hack can wipeout onsite backup and offsite backup, but not onsite system and data.
- Internal knowledge required to hit both targets.
Looks like ZFS replication may have been their backup plan? https://www.vfemail.net/design...
Damn, talk about annoying.
Oh! So they do know where the data ended up. Just restore it! You know, like in the movies?
#DeleteFacebook
I'm sure they have a recent copy.