Hackers Wipe US Servers of Email Provider VFEmail (zdnet.com)
Hackers have breached the severs of email provider VFEmail.net and wiped the data from all its US servers, destroying all US customers' data in the process. From a report: The attack took place yesterday, February 11, and was detected after the company's site and webmail client went down without notice. "At this time, the attacker has formatted all the disks on every server," the company said yesterday. "Every VM is lost. Every file server is lost, every backup server is lost. This was more than a multi-password via SSH exploit, and there was no ransom. Just attack and destroy," VFEmail said. The company's staff is now working to recover user emails, but as things stand right now, all data for US customers appears to have been deleted for good and gone into /dev/null.
No offsite backups? No tapes????
Who designed the disaster plan for these guys?
General Relativity: Space-time tells matter where to go; Matter tells space-time what shape to be.
Time to pull yesterday's backup tapes. You do have the tapes from yesterday, don't you?
offsite tape backup is sounding good right about now
Every file server is lost, every backup server is lost.
So, that's the online backup servers, but what about the offline backups... there were offline backups, right? RIGHT???
I am starting to wonder if I don't need to ask every single electronic service I interact with to put in writing what tighter backup policies are. I imagine my stuff on gmail servers is safe... but that is truly only my imagination, who can say for sure even they have offline backups (that can be restored from)??
"There is more worth loving than we have strength to love." - Brian Jay Stanley
Love that song.
Thankfully, VFEmail was primarily an IMAP/POP3 provider. I suspect that the majority of its users had a local backup in the form of an email client with a local store...
That can be both a bug and a feature. No backups mean that there's no cache of deleted emails. Some users may want the ability to truly delete data, not have it able to "appear" due to legal proceedings 5 years from now.
I'd say it's on the users to back up their email using a client that locally caches IMAP folders or downloads via POP3.
Maybe someone needed an email to disappear to avoid public embarrassment or legal trouble.
It's Life During Wartime, piker.
First onsite backup
Second offsite backup that pulls, not pushes.
- A push backup leaves a trace that there is a backup and to where it is being pushed.
- - Just track the push and wipeout the backup as well.
- A pull backup is only visible from the pulling location and, anyone inside that knows it exists.
- - No trail to trace and wipeout. If it is wiped out, Then it is clearly an inside job.
- - A pulling backup does mean the pulling system has access to the onsite backups.
- - - But the onsite backup can be isolated from the onsite system and data.
Conclusion:
- Onsite hack can wipeout onsite system and data and onsite backup. but not offsite backup.
- Offsite hack can wipeout onsite backup and offsite backup, but not onsite system and data.
- Internal knowledge required to hit both targets.
Trivial, the right Backup Architecture is to have online backup that is done via something like remote btrfs snapshots (for zfs snapshots), and have those servers be secure. But, this does raise the interesting question, how do you know your appliance is secure? No patches in 20 years, and proven to be correct, with 30% market penetration or more... that might do it.
Frankly, I surprised we don't hear more of this type of total wipe more often. Makes for a great test case for the backup strategies that companies use, to see if they can withstand a bad actor.
I wonder which government officials used them.
This sounds a lot like an internal job, more than external attack. Why risk getting logged on the way in, unless you are a disgruntled employee or competitor. Most likely an employee with unfavorable bonus.
Why UNIX?
Why did they "obviously" gain physical access?
Off-site backups can be accessed without physical access if it was designed poorly, and there's no reason to assume they had off-line backups...
Show me on the 1st Amendment bobblehead where the moderator touched you...
Backups are quite often useless and offline backups are usually weeks if not months old and take many hours to restore. Some 70% of "backups" turn out to be broken in some way or another, including not actually backing up the right data, not backing up data that's in a restorable format, and when compressed (as is often done) has unrecoverable bit errors or dropouts that render the whole backup set as good as empty.
Why? Few folks take the time to do backups right, verify they can read the data off the media clean, verify they got the right data and verify they know how to restore it. Even fewer regularly review their backups to keep up with the ever changing system configurations, including doing all the testing outlined before so MOST backups are junk.
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
Sounds like some hacker(s) needed to demonstrate their operational efficacy to potential clients. Either that or just some too-edgy vandal wanted to burn something to the ground. Small probability: someone needed something specific wiped and needed there to be no fingerprints left behind.
Looks like ZFS replication may have been their backup plan? https://www.vfemail.net/design...
That's a terrible way to recall an email.
Seriously, what are these people doing?
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
"Keep Circulating the Tapes!"
Damn, talk about annoying.
Oh! So they do know where the data ended up. Just restore it! You know, like in the movies?
#DeleteFacebook
It depends on the definition of "criminal".
#DeleteFacebook
No secondary backups? Talk about amateurs.
#DeleteFacebook
I'm sure they have a recent copy.
So they have no current backups at all? Seriously?
It's so easy to do these days that there's no good excuse not to. Hell, use a secured AWS bucket and stash your backups there.
Just cruising through this digital world at 33 1/3 rpm...
Or, they do backups, but keep all the copies online? For an app connected to the raw internet? And someone thought this was a good idea?
Oliver's law of assumed responsibility: If you're seen fixing it, you will be blamed for breaking it.
This reeks of internal job. Complete and total devastation with no apparent purpose? Its too comprehensive to be an advanced script kiddie or random attack and therefor also too good to be anything without purpose. But there is no apparent purpose, so it must be an inside job. The offline tapes were probably deleted too, and that requires very skillful cracking indeed!
From the FAQ
> What is your backup strategy / data retention policy?
> VFEmail feels it's important to provide a long-term, stable, environment for our users. In that effort, we perform nightly backups to an offsite host from all on-site and off-site mail storage locations. This backup runs at 12am CST (-0600) and contains all user data.
> 3rd party storage of user data is generally not wanted by privacy-conscious users. If you fall into that category, you will want to use POP3 and download your mail daily. Our backup is on a daily/weekly rotation, initiated by a snapshot. If you do recieve mail between your last POP and the snapshot at 12am, it will exist on backup for a week - unless it's on Saturday night, then it's a year. You should set your POP program to download every 5-10 minutes in order to avoid having your mail caught on backup.
Hahaha
It's so safe that now even NSA, FBI, ... cannot have access to it! Nice job!
Will $CURRENT_YEAR be the year of the Linux Desktop?