To me, success is putting bad guys in a hole in the ground
In the case of combatting terrorism, putting bad guys in a hole in the ground who would otherwise kill hundreds or thousands of other innocent people is only the very bare *MINIMUM* standard of success... and while that is still a very positive goal, I do not think that it, by itself, should warrant being decorated. Being awarded a medal should, in my view, also involve doing something where the person has taken on at least some kind of personal risk, or at the very least having successfully completed a task or assignment that would push someone to the very limits of what might be ordinarily expected for somebody.
Awarding a medal to somebody who has taken no great risks or who has not completed any grand challenges is treating adults like children, who get awarded a gold star for simply doing what has been expected of them, finishing all of their household chores, etc... I don't knock the approach for children, because it really can motivate them, I just don't think it's appropriate for adults, and I think it diminishes the significance of getting a medal in the first place.
On a much lighter note...
Until then: I say make it shaped like an X-Box controller.
I don't suggest that the military not practice such things, I just suggested that I don't believe that such things are worthy of being decorated. Why are so many people construing my words as suggesting that I don't support any military action at all?
Snipers do, to an extent, put themselves in a line of fire... certainly they are close enough to be facing some personal risk, even if they are hidden. There is always a chance of discovery. Controlling a robot form afar to let it fight for you is not taking any kind of risk at all.
I haven't suggested that I don't support military action where it's appropriate, I just don't think that doing what essentially amounts to hiding in a control room potentially many miles away from a target and letting what is basically a robot fight for you is doing anything that is particularly worthy of a medal.
Aren't military medals supposed to be for noble things like bravery, heroism, or honour? What's honourable about taking out an opponent from so far away that the risk to yourself is nonexistent?
Peculiar, since what I've described is actually simpler to implement from an electronics perspective than actually having separate firmware logic to explicitly turn the LED on or off independently of what is going on with the sensor. As a much intended bonus, such a design would offer consumers positive certainty that as barring physical sabotaging the device and breaking the LED (which should generally be physically obvious), the camera cannot *POSSIBLY* be used without providing indication of it
Webcams (or rather CCDs) are not turned off when you disable them, only LED is affected. The current measured over the sensors remains the same, regardless of what the device UI claims
Current doesn't exist without voltage being applied across the photosensor array, and the LED can easily be hard wired directly to the voltage signals that go to sensor. No voltage means that it is impossible to detect anything, and no LED light means no voltage is present. Any voltage high enough to get any information at all from the array would easily be enough to turn activate the signal line connected to the LED . Not all webcam manufacturers do this, of course, but it is no more costly at the hardware level than having a separate firmware logic controlling the LED,
So what you're saying is that it's a wolf in sheep's clothing.
Which does not, by any means, make it a sheep, or any less dangerous than wolves which are obviously wolves. Arguably, in fact, it makes it even more dangerous on account of it.
That's what a firewall does, that is not all that NAT does.
NAT obfuscates all aspects of the network behind it by hiding every connection from any machine that is behind it behind a single IP address. A firewall alone does not do that. Even IPv6 privacy extensions will not achieve that... each connecting machine is given a distinct outward-facing IP, and one can count the number of distinct IP's coming from a subnet over a period of time to gain an idea of the number of physical machines that are located therein.
You can achieve the breakage in communication offered by NAT by using a proxy, but unless the proxy is transparent, it will require additional configuration to work with either at the application or operating system level. If the proxy is at layer-3 on the 7 layer OSI networking model, and transparent, then it achieves precisely what NAT does: breaking all end-to-end connectivity and hiding all outgoing connections behind a single IP address, regardless of the number of actual machines that may behind the NAT. At that point, however, you may as well be using NAT... the only difference might be that you may have more control over which devices hide behind a typical proxy than you might have with deciding which devices to hide behind a NAT, at least with typical consumer grade devices. Serious enough hackers can modify the firmware and/or the default configuration of their home routers to accommodate such flexibility even in current devices anyways.
Ultimately, the problem with NAT is not that it breaks end-to-end connectivity, because in fact it is not unimaginable that there are genuine needs for devices that require the facilities that NAT provides in that respect. The problem with NAT is that it is being used in situations where it actually hinders otherwise desirable communication, and the only justification for using it at all in those circumstances was to conserve IP addresses. This justification is warranted in an IPv4 climate, but in IPv6, there will be no such need, so NAT can applied with more discrimination only to the devices that genuinely do not require the kinds of communication that are otherwise needed by preserving end-to-end connectivity, while still maintaining a second-hand connection to the outside 'Net via the proxy.
Perhaps.... and while it is doubtlesss fair to acknowledge the existence of such incompetence, I believe it is gross underestimation of other people to assume that most who work at a technical company like Adobe are certain to be too clueless to realize that publicly flaunting wealth that might get a person in trouble with their boss is unwise.
That level of intellectual vacuity is what you'd expect from a fictional character in a comedic situation where the audience or reader is expected to laugh at the character's outlandish stupidity behind the character's choices more than it is a realistic expectation of an actual member of society. While I won't dismiss that it's certainly possible... but I wouldn't expect it to be particularly likely.
Please note, Gus Gorman from Superman 3 is *NOT* a typical example of an individual that pulls in a salary like that of an average Adobe employee.
Actually, yes I have. But how many people I have met is irrelevant to the veracity of my statement. If all people were truly that dumb, then there would be no such thing as an unsolved crime because nobody would be smart enough to get away with doing anything illegal.
With 1:1 mapping, the IP address that the receiver gets does give some indication about your internal network, as each unique machine will be providing a unique IP. Mapping many IP's on your network to a single one for outgoing connections obfuscates even how many different machines you have, and leaves the listener with no information about your network other than that you may be using a NAT device.
You appear to assume that breaking end-to-end connectivity does not provide any security that a firewall cannot provide.
While most of the security that it does provide can be provided more robustly by a firewall, the additional breaking of end-to-end connectivity does carry a certain level of security with it all by itself that a firewall alone cannot achieve, and for many purposes is all of the security one will ever require. Likewise, a firewall may offer all of the security one will ever need, but that doesn't mean there isn't enough room in the world for both, and each offers something by itself that the other does not.
You can combine a firewall that by default blocks all incoming connections with a layer-3 transparent proxy to get all of the security that a typical consumer NAT device offers, but then at that point, you are really just using NAT anyways... just calling it by a different name.
NAT by itself is not security... but it does offer a certain type of security that a firewall alone will not achieve. The fact that this may be unimportant to you does not mean it is unimportant to everyone.
but the other part of NAT is that it also acts as a layer-3 transparent proxy between the devices you place behind it and the outside world
Which you can still have with IPv6
Of course, but if you are doing that, then you may as well be using NAT because that is what NAT is - a layer-3 transparent proxy. Web proxies are usually not transparent, and are typically at layer-7.
Ideally, NAT should be a end-user selectable notion, and more specifically, should be on a per-device basis that you connect to the network, so that if an end user wants a device to appear to be behind a NAT, then it can be, and if they want it to have a globally visible IP address, they can do that too. This issue is orthogonal to the presence of a firewall.
The only reason that people have to create nasty hacks to work around NAT in the first place is because NAT is so ubiquitous with IPv4, and the primary reason that it is so commonplace is on account of the lack of address space. No address scarcity exists in IPv6, so there is no reason to expect NAT to be as ubiquitous, although it may still be applied where the end user has networked devices that still require some connectivity to the outside world, but no need for any end-to-end connectivity. A transparent proxy is ideal in that respect because the application and even the operating system being used do not have to know about it or be especially configured to use it... they can carry on as though they still have end-to-end connectivity when not having it is sufficient for their purposes. Put the transparent proxy at layer 3 and you have basic NAT. Add a firewall that blocks incoming connections from the outside and you have typical consumer grade NAT.
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In the case of combatting terrorism, putting bad guys in a hole in the ground who would otherwise kill hundreds or thousands of other innocent people is only the very bare *MINIMUM* standard of success... and while that is still a very positive goal, I do not think that it, by itself, should warrant being decorated. Being awarded a medal should, in my view, also involve doing something where the person has taken on at least some kind of personal risk, or at the very least having successfully completed a task or assignment that would push someone to the very limits of what might be ordinarily expected for somebody.
Awarding a medal to somebody who has taken no great risks or who has not completed any grand challenges is treating adults like children, who get awarded a gold star for simply doing what has been expected of them, finishing all of their household chores, etc... I don't knock the approach for children, because it really can motivate them, I just don't think it's appropriate for adults, and I think it diminishes the significance of getting a medal in the first place.
On a much lighter note...
Thank you.... this made me laugh.
I don't suggest that the military not practice such things, I just suggested that I don't believe that such things are worthy of being decorated. Why are so many people construing my words as suggesting that I don't support any military action at all?
Snipers do, to an extent, put themselves in a line of fire... certainly they are close enough to be facing some personal risk, even if they are hidden. There is always a chance of discovery. Controlling a robot form afar to let it fight for you is not taking any kind of risk at all.
I haven't suggested that I don't support military action where it's appropriate, I just don't think that doing what essentially amounts to hiding in a control room potentially many miles away from a target and letting what is basically a robot fight for you is doing anything that is particularly worthy of a medal.
For what?
Aren't military medals supposed to be for noble things like bravery, heroism, or honour? What's honourable about taking out an opponent from so far away that the risk to yourself is nonexistent?
I prefer desktop websites that don't require flash to view.
TV network websites are the absolute worst for this
Peculiar, since what I've described is actually simpler to implement from an electronics perspective than actually having separate firmware logic to explicitly turn the LED on or off independently of what is going on with the sensor. As a much intended bonus, such a design would offer consumers positive certainty that as barring physical sabotaging the device and breaking the LED (which should generally be physically obvious), the camera cannot *POSSIBLY* be used without providing indication of it
Current doesn't exist without voltage being applied across the photosensor array, and the LED can easily be hard wired directly to the voltage signals that go to sensor. No voltage means that it is impossible to detect anything, and no LED light means no voltage is present. Any voltage high enough to get any information at all from the array would easily be enough to turn activate the signal line connected to the LED . Not all webcam manufacturers do this, of course, but it is no more costly at the hardware level than having a separate firmware logic controlling the LED,
Oooooh, what a burn. I am scarred for life by your witty repartee.
Twin fail.
Although to be honest once they announced they were halting support for Linux, I stopped being interested.
Pretty much, yep. It was part of his post graduate thesis. I think he got a C+.
So what you're saying is that it's a wolf in sheep's clothing.
Which does not, by any means, make it a sheep, or any less dangerous than wolves which are obviously wolves. Arguably, in fact, it makes it even more dangerous on account of it.
That's what a firewall does, that is not all that NAT does.
NAT obfuscates all aspects of the network behind it by hiding every connection from any machine that is behind it behind a single IP address. A firewall alone does not do that. Even IPv6 privacy extensions will not achieve that... each connecting machine is given a distinct outward-facing IP, and one can count the number of distinct IP's coming from a subnet over a period of time to gain an idea of the number of physical machines that are located therein.
You can achieve the breakage in communication offered by NAT by using a proxy, but unless the proxy is transparent, it will require additional configuration to work with either at the application or operating system level. If the proxy is at layer-3 on the 7 layer OSI networking model, and transparent, then it achieves precisely what NAT does: breaking all end-to-end connectivity and hiding all outgoing connections behind a single IP address, regardless of the number of actual machines that may behind the NAT. At that point, however, you may as well be using NAT... the only difference might be that you may have more control over which devices hide behind a typical proxy than you might have with deciding which devices to hide behind a NAT, at least with typical consumer grade devices. Serious enough hackers can modify the firmware and/or the default configuration of their home routers to accommodate such flexibility even in current devices anyways.
Ultimately, the problem with NAT is not that it breaks end-to-end connectivity, because in fact it is not unimaginable that there are genuine needs for devices that require the facilities that NAT provides in that respect. The problem with NAT is that it is being used in situations where it actually hinders otherwise desirable communication, and the only justification for using it at all in those circumstances was to conserve IP addresses. This justification is warranted in an IPv4 climate, but in IPv6, there will be no such need, so NAT can applied with more discrimination only to the devices that genuinely do not require the kinds of communication that are otherwise needed by preserving end-to-end connectivity, while still maintaining a second-hand connection to the outside 'Net via the proxy.
Perhaps.... and while it is doubtlesss fair to acknowledge the existence of such incompetence, I believe it is gross underestimation of other people to assume that most who work at a technical company like Adobe are certain to be too clueless to realize that publicly flaunting wealth that might get a person in trouble with their boss is unwise.
That level of intellectual vacuity is what you'd expect from a fictional character in a comedic situation where the audience or reader is expected to laugh at the character's outlandish stupidity behind the character's choices more than it is a realistic expectation of an actual member of society. While I won't dismiss that it's certainly possible... but I wouldn't expect it to be particularly likely.
Please note, Gus Gorman from Superman 3 is *NOT* a typical example of an individual that pulls in a salary like that of an average Adobe employee.
So.... yes? Okay, too bad. I'm pretty sure somebody could have claimed the hundred otherwise.
Actually, yes I have. But how many people I have met is irrelevant to the veracity of my statement. If all people were truly that dumb, then there would be no such thing as an unsolved crime because nobody would be smart enough to get away with doing anything illegal.
First of all, their boss would have no way to know what an employee can or cannot afford.... at least not legally.
Secondly, not all people who would commit such an act are dumb enough to publicly flaunt illicitly acquired wealth.
Does it matter which one?
How would their boss know?
With 1:1 mapping, the IP address that the receiver gets does give some indication about your internal network, as each unique machine will be providing a unique IP. Mapping many IP's on your network to a single one for outgoing connections obfuscates even how many different machines you have, and leaves the listener with no information about your network other than that you may be using a NAT device.
[nt]
In what way are you suggesting that such a planet would not be an exoplanet?
If the tax money is being given to so-called criminals legally, what are they doing to be criminals in the first place?
You appear to assume that breaking end-to-end connectivity does not provide any security that a firewall cannot provide.
While most of the security that it does provide can be provided more robustly by a firewall, the additional breaking of end-to-end connectivity does carry a certain level of security with it all by itself that a firewall alone cannot achieve, and for many purposes is all of the security one will ever require. Likewise, a firewall may offer all of the security one will ever need, but that doesn't mean there isn't enough room in the world for both, and each offers something by itself that the other does not.
You can combine a firewall that by default blocks all incoming connections with a layer-3 transparent proxy to get all of the security that a typical consumer NAT device offers, but then at that point, you are really just using NAT anyways... just calling it by a different name.
NAT by itself is not security... but it does offer a certain type of security that a firewall alone will not achieve. The fact that this may be unimportant to you does not mean it is unimportant to everyone.
Of course, but if you are doing that, then you may as well be using NAT because that is what NAT is - a layer-3 transparent proxy. Web proxies are usually not transparent, and are typically at layer-7.
Ideally, NAT should be a end-user selectable notion, and more specifically, should be on a per-device basis that you connect to the network, so that if an end user wants a device to appear to be behind a NAT, then it can be, and if they want it to have a globally visible IP address, they can do that too. This issue is orthogonal to the presence of a firewall.
The only reason that people have to create nasty hacks to work around NAT in the first place is because NAT is so ubiquitous with IPv4, and the primary reason that it is so commonplace is on account of the lack of address space. No address scarcity exists in IPv6, so there is no reason to expect NAT to be as ubiquitous, although it may still be applied where the end user has networked devices that still require some connectivity to the outside world, but no need for any end-to-end connectivity. A transparent proxy is ideal in that respect because the application and even the operating system being used do not have to know about it or be especially configured to use it... they can carry on as though they still have end-to-end connectivity when not having it is sufficient for their purposes. Put the transparent proxy at layer 3 and you have basic NAT. Add a firewall that blocks incoming connections from the outside and you have typical consumer grade NAT.