The city for a half-dozen miles around the WTC, including NJ and Brooklyn, were engulfed in a white cloud. The pair of fifth-mile tall buildings that dominated the skyline for 50 miles, burned for hours after being hit by a pair of jumbo jets.
Something like 10-20 million people in the area were subjected to terror, the entire point of the attacks, and wild rumors, without the slightest hint that the authorities had anything under control. Even after the military jets were scrambled, and all planes were grounded.
Of course everyone in the city - and around the country/world - jumped to their nearest TV to find out what had actually happened, and what might happen next, and what to do to help/survive. Where were you that day, that you don't remember that happening?
That attack was most certainly the exact kind of scenario in which to broadcast the EBS. I might add that the nuclear attack scenario that was explicitly warned for generations was even more like the scenario you describe. So what would you say the point of the EBS could be?
Besides, when there are simultaneous attacks on NYC and DC, without anyone knowing when they will end, that's a "local" emergency everywhere in the country.
You mean like a useless Emergency Broadcast System that never worked right, but we've been paying for (and believing in) for over a dozen years since we "won" the Cold War?
Anonymous denial Coward, get underneath your desk and kick your ass goodbye.
So the test was a total success. Because it proved, in undeniable public, that in the event of an emergency, the first responders around essential Air Force bases would be getting jammed by people opening their garage doors.
These tests are important. That's why I was stunned when I realized (3 years later) that on September 11, 2001, I didn't hear a single transmission of the Emergency Broadcast System. If ever there were an emergency during my lifetime that the public needed broadcasts to know what what was happening and what to do, it was multiple aerial bombings of NYC and the Pentagon. But there was nothing.
Though we'd all been taught since childhood to be always at least a little bit subconsciously afraid, but trusting the government had a system to handle even the ultimate emergency: nuclear war. And endured countless nerve-rattling drills, usually interrupting the most otherwise "relaxing" TV and radio (PBS, mostly).
I guess those weren't "tests" at all. They were the real thing: steady fear/trust propaganda. Never really expected to do anything in any kind of emergency, even survivable ones like 9/11/2001. Because they all delivered the desired result.
So maybe these Air Force tests are really failures. Because instead of keeping people irrationally afraid, yet trusting the government, they've actually woken people up.
Skimming the seas for extra oxygen and hydrogen power, and the pure water runoff, seems like the salvation of mankind from the CO2 Greenhouse and otherwise inevitable oil and water exhaustion wars. But if those pressures see us pumping these chemicals into the seas, without consuming the catalysts, then we'll be burning off the seas without limit, and destroying our ecosystem in a grand "antiflood".
Some people are already talking about seeding the seas with iron to promote massive algal blooms to sink more carbon and liberate more O2 to rebalance the atmosphere. Others are talking about massive sulphur jets into the upper atmosphere to absorb more incoming solar radiation. Some want to just burn dirty coal willy nilly to replace imported oil/gas, and damn the consequences. And most people won't believe that polluting our fresh water is the most dire threat we face to our way of life.
So I'm sure many will just want to release these chemicals into the warm, salty seas. All it takes is a few misguided governments or industrialists to do a lot of damage. I really hope we don't just overdose on stupidity, while getting high on how smart we are.
I think the best way for consumers to take these matters into our own hands is to start with controlling our own client HW/SW, including these bankcards. I mentioned elsewhere in these subthreads that I'd like my smartcard to keep transaction histories for multiple bank accounts in multiple banks. With an interface, maybe Bluetooth, for using my mobile phone as the GUI. The next step to making the smartcard encrypt the transactions for transmissions thru a transparent ATM that's merely the gateway to the bank WAN would be very short. It wouldn't be hard for people to pressure a small bank among the account maintainers to go with the end-to-end encrypted system with OTP. Maybe a credit union, or a large corporation/association's health insurance claims. Then the others would hurry up to compete, even before understanding the specific benefits.
In other words, consumers must sieze control of our transactions, and level the playing field for all the account maintainers. Then raise the bar on one institution, and watch the others follow. The economics do work, but they must be applied.
This will probably happen naturally in the US within 15 years. I just want to cut our losses now.
This is a frivilous lawsuit. Lawyers are ethically required not to file them. That rule exists. It just needs teeth not to be a joke. Lawyers not taking baseless cases is the main gatekeeper of the integrity of the legal system. In principle, anyway. Though "principle" is clearly not operative for these lawyers. Which
It's not just that I'm mad at SCO. I'm fed up with subsidizing these cases and these lawyers which have a chance to succeed only by extorting from the plaintiffs, or getting lucky. The only way to stop them from abusing our system, and us, is to make the lawyers and plaintiffs accountable for those ethics. Maybe the review trial can sentence them to suspension, or just a fine (though that just encourages them to take more baseless cases, hoping to hit the jackpot). Disbarment should certainly be on the table, especially for repeat offenders.
Yes, we do. And we've got several laws against lying the US into war, including the basic "contempt of Congress", and "making a false statement", and I'm sure several others related to perjury in official testimony.
And I don't have an exact law reference "against ignoring PDB warnings of terrorist attacks", but swearing to defend the Constitution and the US should cover that.
So maybe we don't need another law against any of those. But we'll probably get them anyway. You know, the way we'll probably get a law against burning flags.
The only question is who will enforce those laws, when the Executive is the criminal breaking them? The only answer is impeachment.
No one cares about any kind of security until after they've been violated.
Then they close the barn door after the horse has escaped.
Most of them get a new horse. Newly secure.
People will complain about PKI, but now that most people have a digital "address book" (in their email or phone SW), adding a signature and a social network of trust seems ready for prime time.
That improved our lives in a very tiny way. Not one that you usually read about, or probably even notice. Is Microsoft done innovating in those small ways? Absolutely not. Office 2007 lets me do some things (like cool looking charts) in seconds that used to take many minutes, maybe even hours for some people to do.
Yeah, they improved on Microsoft's bad old way by copying someone else's good new way.
That clown Scoble's head is so far up Microsoft's monopoly that he thinks "innovation" means "new to Microsoft", even when they're copying tech from elsewhere. That the standard of comparison is the other people damned to working entirely inside MS monopoly so that they can't even tell something exists until MS gives it to them. Until which time they're crippled, though the rest of the world is stepping large and laughing easy.
Only the Wall Street Journal (and its fascist ilk) could pretend that such a debate is "fair and balanced": reason balanced by retarded corporatism.
Practically everyone can scramble our email, like with "Pretty Good Privacy" (PGP). If many of us do it, they might be able to crack it or force our password after due legal process, but private parties won't be able to snoop through all of us on any possible budgets.
Your government can probably crack any nonsymmetric crypto (with help from the US), but might not have the resources to crack everyone's all the time. You can try a tinfoil hat, YMMV.
The real problem is webmail, which can't use any installed crypto on either end (with possible rare exceptions, but the rarity and/or nonintegration makes them useless at only one end of the comms).
If GMail let me upload a PGP applet I signed myself (which I could validate in the pages when I hit them), which they embedded into their pages in Javascript the public could audit for holes, they might actually become by far the best email system for the masses. And win the webmail wars. And really piss off the government(s) that have been trying to pry into their transactions for years.
The entire protocol that the banks currently use on my plaintext PIN is irrelevant. I have no way of knowing whether the ATM I'm swiping somewhere in the crowded downtown bar district, so drunk that I must have that pack of chocodiles and Dr Pepper, though I've spent all my cash on whiskey, is a trojan horse that's harvesting my PIN before sending it to the real ATM interface embedded in the trojan. Months later they replay my PIN and steal my money. I'll never find that ATM again to track who did it.
So yes, in fact is is exacly like "OMG, anyone running an ATM can find out my PIN".
A chipcard would generate a onetime password, typically sync'ed to time, though a serialized pseudorandom walk would do it, especially if reset every time I visited my own bank's ATM. The entire transaction would be encrpyted by the dumb terminal ATM using my OTP as the key, sent to my bank ecnrypted for validation - using my OTP (or its private key) as the decryption key, then returning a signed message to the ATM to issue me money. The ATMs would need to have readers for the chipcard, but those are as cheap as magstripe readers.
The backend clearing of a charge is their problem to secure for themselves, as the banks are already using plenty of security to ensure they don't steal from each other, because they know they all would when they could.
Meanwhile, a good chipcard would keep a transaction log with the ID of the ATM I used for later audits. A really good one would have multiple accounts for multiple banks, and keep my history and balances. Communicate with my mobile phone for a GUI. Maybe even hold the auth secrets for securing transactions over the mobile networks. So I don't have to trust these random ATMs, let alone stumble through bad weather in dark, unknown neighborhoods at weird hours looking for an ATM.
The fact is that plenty of European banks, and some US ones, already use chipcards which can do all this today, and they're supercheap. Even at the lower scale economies before widespread US use.
The point of my comment is that I don't trust these random ATMs, but I give them my single plaintext PIN every time I need the convenience. And that an OTP system like the one banks already use for physical access to their offices is entirely possible. And much more economical for everyone than the current system.
The primary concern for banks is harvesting the lowest-hanging fruit, while not doing anything new or different, unless forced. The vast amount of loss to fraud, especially now falling on customers in ID fraud, demonstrates just how low is this priority. Especially when the solution is not even new to the banks existing operations.
Fascinating that the NIST requires an evidence trail only after Bush is no longer involved in a single election, only weeks after Democrats take back control of Congress.
So the law makes it harder for Democrats to steal elections like Republicans could get away with for years.
Though I bet Jeb Bush (R-FL) is pissed.
Next up, a law against lying the US into war. Or maybe against spending $TRILLIONS in debt. Against ignoring PDB warnings of terrorist attacks? Or maybe against NSA warrantless wiretapping. It all looks so much more sensible to live in a democracy when you're a civilian than when you're "the decider".
I have. I used "jury-rigged" myself, which has more resonance with my sense of "design by committee", than with "jerry", which has no resonance at all, except an archaic ethnic slur. That apparently (at least some) German people wouldn't even recognize.
I've worked developing infosystems, often secure ones, for many banks, for over a decade. US, Canadian, European. Familiar depositors, commercial, credit corps, insurance, brokers, interbanks. Banks are a bizarre world of risk-averse analysis and dizzying unnecessary risk taking.
The cost of chipcards, and the key infrastructure, is minimal compared to the profits the banks make off of us. And compared to the costs of losses in security. And the costs of losing customers. What about the ATM thefts we're discussing in this story?
If security isn't a selling feature, why do I see several bank ads a day pitching their ID theft services?
If you think merchants absorb the costs of losses due to insecure cards, you don't know where merchants get their money from to pay their bills.
Currently banks do leave consumers paying the time, effort and risk costs of ID theft. That would be a good basis for consumer protection security requirement laws, because the banks haven't made the changes themselves, despite their self interest in doing so.
Just because banks are too lazy and complacent making vast, unprecedented profits despite their security problems and losses, as well as customer churn when burned by ID theft and fraud, doesn't mean that consumers should be unprotected. You know that banks didn't protect themselves from the overextensions that the 1929 Crash caused, right? Not even by 1934, when the Congress finally reformed banking. Though the 1895 Panic had a similar lesson to teach. And previous collapses, for hundreds of years.
Banks are like any protected upper-tier global corporate entitlement class. They spend their time shooting fish in a barrel, plucking the lowest hanging fruit. The only hard stuff is rigging the system to perpetuate their power to make ever more money. Depositors aren't important, except when they're regulated, or cause large losses in massive numbers - very rarely. And history shows that they don't change to reflect those savage lessons.
If you think the solution is for me not to use payment cards, rather than urge better security for people like me (most of us), then you deserve a corner office at a bank.
Every bank I know of with back-end offices here in NYC requires everyone passing through their building doors to use onetime password cards (usually RSA keycards) for access. Yet those banks all make us run around broadcasting our PINs to whichever fly-by-night ATM dispenses $100 latenight when we're drunk.
The cost of chipcards that generate onetime passwords, to protect from replay attacks, is minimal. Especially compared with fraud and theft. What's taking them so long?
The last thing the US needs is another hereditary millionaire president. This time a ("convicted") monopolist, become an unaccountable billionaire. Whose attitude towards security is "keeps the bucks rolling in", and is more comfortable with lying about it than fixing it. Like lying directly to Federal judges deciding whether he's violated consent decrees, or monopoly laws.
If you want corporate government ("fascism"), elect the guy with the biggest corporation operating the business software monopoly, that routinely threatens foreign governments that interfere with his policies on competition, patents, and anything else standing in the way of his power.
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The city for a half-dozen miles around the WTC, including NJ and Brooklyn, were engulfed in a white cloud. The pair of fifth-mile tall buildings that dominated the skyline for 50 miles, burned for hours after being hit by a pair of jumbo jets.
Something like 10-20 million people in the area were subjected to terror, the entire point of the attacks, and wild rumors, without the slightest hint that the authorities had anything under control. Even after the military jets were scrambled, and all planes were grounded.
Of course everyone in the city - and around the country/world - jumped to their nearest TV to find out what had actually happened, and what might happen next, and what to do to help/survive. Where were you that day, that you don't remember that happening?
That attack was most certainly the exact kind of scenario in which to broadcast the EBS. I might add that the nuclear attack scenario that was explicitly warned for generations was even more like the scenario you describe. So what would you say the point of the EBS could be?
I am from NYC. They did not broadcast the EBS.
Besides, when there are simultaneous attacks on NYC and DC, without anyone knowing when they will end, that's a "local" emergency everywhere in the country.
"You sound like a cold war relic."
You mean like a useless Emergency Broadcast System that never worked right, but we've been paying for (and believing in) for over a dozen years since we "won" the Cold War?
Anonymous denial Coward, get underneath your desk and kick your ass goodbye.
So the test was a total success. Because it proved, in undeniable public, that in the event of an emergency, the first responders around essential Air Force bases would be getting jammed by people opening their garage doors.
These tests are important. That's why I was stunned when I realized (3 years later) that on September 11, 2001, I didn't hear a single transmission of the Emergency Broadcast System. If ever there were an emergency during my lifetime that the public needed broadcasts to know what what was happening and what to do, it was multiple aerial bombings of NYC and the Pentagon. But there was nothing.
Though we'd all been taught since childhood to be always at least a little bit subconsciously afraid, but trusting the government had a system to handle even the ultimate emergency: nuclear war. And endured countless nerve-rattling drills, usually interrupting the most otherwise "relaxing" TV and radio (PBS, mostly).
I guess those weren't "tests" at all. They were the real thing: steady fear/trust propaganda. Never really expected to do anything in any kind of emergency, even survivable ones like 9/11/2001. Because they all delivered the desired result.
So maybe these Air Force tests are really failures. Because instead of keeping people irrationally afraid, yet trusting the government, they've actually woken people up.
Can these proteins work properly in the sea?
Skimming the seas for extra oxygen and hydrogen power, and the pure water runoff, seems like the salvation of mankind from the CO2 Greenhouse and otherwise inevitable oil and water exhaustion wars. But if those pressures see us pumping these chemicals into the seas, without consuming the catalysts, then we'll be burning off the seas without limit, and destroying our ecosystem in a grand "antiflood".
Some people are already talking about seeding the seas with iron to promote massive algal blooms to sink more carbon and liberate more O2 to rebalance the atmosphere. Others are talking about massive sulphur jets into the upper atmosphere to absorb more incoming solar radiation. Some want to just burn dirty coal willy nilly to replace imported oil/gas, and damn the consequences. And most people won't believe that polluting our fresh water is the most dire threat we face to our way of life.
So I'm sure many will just want to release these chemicals into the warm, salty seas. All it takes is a few misguided governments or industrialists to do a lot of damage. I really hope we don't just overdose on stupidity, while getting high on how smart we are.
Who says they'd be stored on Google's servers?
More than twice, in a post about Microsoft's monopoly?
John Ashcroft ever said the word "monopoly", other than "you're not a monopoly in my opinion", or "monopoly is OK"?
What are you talking about? Will you understand this post, even though I said the word "monopoly" 7 more times, while talking about monopoly?
I think the best way for consumers to take these matters into our own hands is to start with controlling our own client HW/SW, including these bankcards. I mentioned elsewhere in these subthreads that I'd like my smartcard to keep transaction histories for multiple bank accounts in multiple banks. With an interface, maybe Bluetooth, for using my mobile phone as the GUI. The next step to making the smartcard encrypt the transactions for transmissions thru a transparent ATM that's merely the gateway to the bank WAN would be very short. It wouldn't be hard for people to pressure a small bank among the account maintainers to go with the end-to-end encrypted system with OTP. Maybe a credit union, or a large corporation/association's health insurance claims. Then the others would hurry up to compete, even before understanding the specific benefits.
In other words, consumers must sieze control of our transactions, and level the playing field for all the account maintainers. Then raise the bar on one institution, and watch the others follow. The economics do work, but they must be applied.
This will probably happen naturally in the US within 15 years. I just want to cut our losses now.
This is a frivilous lawsuit. Lawyers are ethically required not to file them. That rule exists. It just needs teeth not to be a joke. Lawyers not taking baseless cases is the main gatekeeper of the integrity of the legal system. In principle, anyway. Though "principle" is clearly not operative for these lawyers. Which
It's not just that I'm mad at SCO. I'm fed up with subsidizing these cases and these lawyers which have a chance to succeed only by extorting from the plaintiffs, or getting lucky. The only way to stop them from abusing our system, and us, is to make the lawyers and plaintiffs accountable for those ethics. Maybe the review trial can sentence them to suspension, or just a fine (though that just encourages them to take more baseless cases, hoping to hit the jackpot). Disbarment should certainly be on the table, especially for repeat offenders.
Yes, we do. And we've got several laws against lying the US into war, including the basic "contempt of Congress", and "making a false statement", and I'm sure several others related to perjury in official testimony.
Then there are other laws against various ways we've been spent into $TRILLIONS of our debt, including "The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned." Like when Bush said the Social Security debt was "just a piece of paper".
And I don't have an exact law reference "against ignoring PDB warnings of terrorist attacks", but swearing to defend the Constitution and the US should cover that.
So maybe we don't need another law against any of those. But we'll probably get them anyway. You know, the way we'll probably get a law against burning flags.
The only question is who will enforce those laws, when the Executive is the criminal breaking them? The only answer is impeachment.
No one cares about any kind of security until after they've been violated.
Then they close the barn door after the horse has escaped.
Most of them get a new horse. Newly secure.
People will complain about PKI, but now that most people have a digital "address book" (in their email or phone SW), adding a signature and a social network of trust seems ready for prime time.
Ah, but building demand by promoting the existing tool will encourage new developers to make it more useable.
A legal system actually interested in justice would strip those "experts" of their privilege to testify credibly in court.
And disbar SCO's lawyers for their outrageously frivolous lawsuit.
Instead, those experts and lawyers will make the only money anyone will see in this endless travesty.
And American taxpayers will subsidize it, with all the time and resources consumed by the public courts which have a lot better things to do.
Yeah, they improved on Microsoft's bad old way by copying someone else's good new way.
That clown Scoble's head is so far up Microsoft's monopoly that he thinks "innovation" means "new to Microsoft", even when they're copying tech from elsewhere. That the standard of comparison is the other people damned to working entirely inside MS monopoly so that they can't even tell something exists until MS gives it to them. Until which time they're crippled, though the rest of the world is stepping large and laughing easy.
Only the Wall Street Journal (and its fascist ilk) could pretend that such a debate is "fair and balanced": reason balanced by retarded corporatism.
Practically everyone can scramble our email, like with "Pretty Good Privacy" (PGP). If many of us do it, they might be able to crack it or force our password after due legal process, but private parties won't be able to snoop through all of us on any possible budgets.
Your government can probably crack any nonsymmetric crypto (with help from the US), but might not have the resources to crack everyone's all the time. You can try a tinfoil hat, YMMV.
The real problem is webmail, which can't use any installed crypto on either end (with possible rare exceptions, but the rarity and/or nonintegration makes them useless at only one end of the comms).
If GMail let me upload a PGP applet I signed myself (which I could validate in the pages when I hit them), which they embedded into their pages in Javascript the public could audit for holes, they might actually become by far the best email system for the masses. And win the webmail wars. And really piss off the government(s) that have been trying to pry into their transactions for years.
No, it's clear that you don't understand.
The entire protocol that the banks currently use on my plaintext PIN is irrelevant. I have no way of knowing whether the ATM I'm swiping somewhere in the crowded downtown bar district, so drunk that I must have that pack of chocodiles and Dr Pepper, though I've spent all my cash on whiskey, is a trojan horse that's harvesting my PIN before sending it to the real ATM interface embedded in the trojan. Months later they replay my PIN and steal my money. I'll never find that ATM again to track who did it.
So yes, in fact is is exacly like "OMG, anyone running an ATM can find out my PIN".
A chipcard would generate a onetime password, typically sync'ed to time, though a serialized pseudorandom walk would do it, especially if reset every time I visited my own bank's ATM. The entire transaction would be encrpyted by the dumb terminal ATM using my OTP as the key, sent to my bank ecnrypted for validation - using my OTP (or its private key) as the decryption key, then returning a signed message to the ATM to issue me money. The ATMs would need to have readers for the chipcard, but those are as cheap as magstripe readers.
The backend clearing of a charge is their problem to secure for themselves, as the banks are already using plenty of security to ensure they don't steal from each other, because they know they all would when they could.
Meanwhile, a good chipcard would keep a transaction log with the ID of the ATM I used for later audits. A really good one would have multiple accounts for multiple banks, and keep my history and balances. Communicate with my mobile phone for a GUI. Maybe even hold the auth secrets for securing transactions over the mobile networks. So I don't have to trust these random ATMs, let alone stumble through bad weather in dark, unknown neighborhoods at weird hours looking for an ATM.
The fact is that plenty of European banks, and some US ones, already use chipcards which can do all this today, and they're supercheap. Even at the lower scale economies before widespread US use.
The point of my comment is that I don't trust these random ATMs, but I give them my single plaintext PIN every time I need the convenience. And that an OTP system like the one banks already use for physical access to their offices is entirely possible. And much more economical for everyone than the current system.
The primary concern for banks is harvesting the lowest-hanging fruit, while not doing anything new or different, unless forced. The vast amount of loss to fraud, especially now falling on customers in ID fraud, demonstrates just how low is this priority. Especially when the solution is not even new to the banks existing operations.
Now I can finally get a Ferrari in true "candy apple red".
They've got a machine to smash cesium, the largest atom? No wonder it's taking so long to smash such a large particle.
Fascinating that the NIST requires an evidence trail only after Bush is no longer involved in a single election, only weeks after Democrats take back control of Congress.
So the law makes it harder for Democrats to steal elections like Republicans could get away with for years.
Though I bet Jeb Bush (R-FL) is pissed.
Next up, a law against lying the US into war. Or maybe against spending $TRILLIONS in debt. Against ignoring PDB warnings of terrorist attacks? Or maybe against NSA warrantless wiretapping. It all looks so much more sensible to live in a democracy when you're a civilian than when you're "the decider".
I have. I used "jury-rigged" myself, which has more resonance with my sense of "design by committee", than with "jerry", which has no resonance at all, except an archaic ethnic slur. That apparently (at least some) German people wouldn't even recognize.
Thanks for helping out.
I've worked developing infosystems, often secure ones, for many banks, for over a decade. US, Canadian, European. Familiar depositors, commercial, credit corps, insurance, brokers, interbanks. Banks are a bizarre world of risk-averse analysis and dizzying unnecessary risk taking.
The cost of chipcards, and the key infrastructure, is minimal compared to the profits the banks make off of us. And compared to the costs of losses in security. And the costs of losing customers. What about the ATM thefts we're discussing in this story?
If security isn't a selling feature, why do I see several bank ads a day pitching their ID theft services?
If you think merchants absorb the costs of losses due to insecure cards, you don't know where merchants get their money from to pay their bills.
Currently banks do leave consumers paying the time, effort and risk costs of ID theft. That would be a good basis for consumer protection security requirement laws, because the banks haven't made the changes themselves, despite their self interest in doing so.
Just because banks are too lazy and complacent making vast, unprecedented profits despite their security problems and losses, as well as customer churn when burned by ID theft and fraud, doesn't mean that consumers should be unprotected. You know that banks didn't protect themselves from the overextensions that the 1929 Crash caused, right? Not even by 1934, when the Congress finally reformed banking. Though the 1895 Panic had a similar lesson to teach. And previous collapses, for hundreds of years.
Banks are like any protected upper-tier global corporate entitlement class. They spend their time shooting fish in a barrel, plucking the lowest hanging fruit. The only hard stuff is rigging the system to perpetuate their power to make ever more money. Depositors aren't important, except when they're regulated, or cause large losses in massive numbers - very rarely. And history shows that they don't change to reflect those savage lessons.
If you think the solution is for me not to use payment cards, rather than urge better security for people like me (most of us), then you deserve a corner office at a bank.
Why should I read the card? That's the machine's job. Letting me know the onetime passwords just increases the risk.
Every bank I know of with back-end offices here in NYC requires everyone passing through their building doors to use onetime password cards (usually RSA keycards) for access. Yet those banks all make us run around broadcasting our PINs to whichever fly-by-night ATM dispenses $100 latenight when we're drunk.
The cost of chipcards that generate onetime passwords, to protect from replay attacks, is minimal. Especially compared with fraud and theft. What's taking them so long?
The last thing the US needs is another hereditary millionaire president. This time a ("convicted") monopolist, become an unaccountable billionaire. Whose attitude towards security is "keeps the bucks rolling in", and is more comfortable with lying about it than fixing it. Like lying directly to Federal judges deciding whether he's violated consent decrees, or monopoly laws.
If you want corporate government ("fascism"), elect the guy with the biggest corporation operating the business software monopoly, that routinely threatens foreign governments that interfere with his policies on competition, patents, and anything else standing in the way of his power.
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Sleazy trollMods never brush their teeth, anyway. Why should they even read the posts, let alone reply when they disagree?