My public key is signed by me and the government, and on file in some public public keyserver. How do they manage to fake my public key?
They don't.:-)
Once the forger has his own fake keypair for you, that is signed by the government Certificate Authority (CA) his keypair are legally binding as proof that he is you, until it is proven in a court of law that the card, keypair, and peronsal details have been forged.
Like cheque forgers; who don't break into banks, they withdraw the money by asking the bank tellers nicely. The smartcard forgers don't break the cryptography, they attack the system.
P.S. The forger would know your public key, you give it away, in every transaction. I suspect you mean how do they fake your private key. Same answer, they work around it.
I'm not sure it would be that easy to clone the cards. Not impossible, but not easy.
How are cards created? Well, the smart cards are made at the factory under security similar to handling printing currency. Then they are sent to government agencies which initially record the details of an indiviual using a standard smart card reader (and writer).
So the fraudster needs to bribe a clerk at a government office to record the details he has to a "virgin" smart card. Not hard, not high tech. Costs less $50 per card in quantity.
With a turnaround of $10,000s to $100,000s of damages currently by identity fraud, I hate to imagine how much bad debt could be accumilated by using "high security but easily bribed" id cards.
Currently if one of my security devices or passwords fails, my entire life is not compromised, thats what an universial-use / "national" id card proposed to do.
Early on there was both an anonymous Usenet posting,and something to cypherpunks mailing list. One may of been reserved engineered, but one was claimed by those with access to RSA Inc.'s BSAFE library to be leaked from RSA Inc.'s code.
Anyhow, AFAIK Rivest wrote the first implementation of RC4 algorithm himself. I never said it was published or public knowledge.An internal reference implmentation is still a reference.
What I'd advocate, and I'm sure that privacy nuts and other security wonks would hate, would be government-issued smart cards that contain a user's private key.
Security wonks hate it because it is insecure. It links the security of everything you authenicate to, from your parking permit, or restaraut reservation, to your root password to the corporate servers you maintain, to your personal financial details. So if the bus boy at the restaraut gets your details, clones them onto a forged card, and saves a "snapshot" of your biometric details, that bus boy can get your SSN, credit report, and likely get credit cards in your name as well as commit government mandated identity theft.
That sounds like a stupid idea. Bypassing the Chinese Wall of everyday life, is a dumb idea. A single id card is as stupid as Microsoft's universial id system formally known as Passport.
... key management systems are either proprietary or too complex for ordinary users, or just involve too many steps...
You are right, it is too complex, hard to use, and security engineers need to work on building better systems, and customers need to demand and pay for better systems.
Or you'll have an Oracle/Microsoft/US Government national id card secured by MS Windows, and Oracle's nearly unbreakable database.
You are right, the human factor is often ignored in building secure systems, though Schneier's Secrets and Lies and Anderson's Security Engineering (Chapter 3 I believe) deals with building entire systems that are secure including making them usable to the human users.
why can't the crypto whizzes put together a few lines of math.h and networking code to be a proof of concept?
Nearly all cryptographers do write reference implementations of their cryptographic algorithms. Rivest (RSA, MD4, MD5?, RC4, RC5, many more), Schneier (Blowfish, Twofish), Daemen (AES), Rijmen (AES), and many others write their own code AFAIK.
The issue that Peter Gutmann is focusing on (cryptographic) security protocols and systems, not cryptographic primitives like encrypting, signing which can be insecure when used incorrectly. E.g. A working RSA implmentation can be written in about 100 lines of C and a multi-percision interger library like GMP or MPI. The problem is that unless you do message padding following a scheme like OEAP your security is not as strong as expected / advertised.
crypto is very much an applied field, so the theorists should include example source in their papers.
Cryptography / cryptology falls into a relation with number theory and abstract algebra and computation computer science. Security Engineering is the practice of building secure systems including using cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
Businesses are a for-profit corporation. Do not forget this, every when dealing with them. If they can get free resources, then that will be more profitable to the business, and they will continue to use these free resources as much as they can in order to maximize profits.
If you are no longer employed, there is no gain (profit or otherwise) for you in doing a free favour for a for-profit business. The business won't return the favour. They will be too "overworked", and unable to spare the resources to return such a favour.
Now perhaps you forgot to document something when you left a company, and you could quickly (i.e. not use your most valuable asset, time) answer the question. Perhaps you felt that your actions would improve your reference from said manager to help you secure a job in the near future. Those are reasonable cases, but in general, it is a waste of your time/resources to work for the company that does not employ you. You need to concentrate on finding gainful employment.
Normally when a licensed or unlicensed (or unintended) operator causes interference then, regardless of their transmitting privileges (say 100W with a 4.5dB gain omni directional antenna at site A), they must change their transmissions (reduce power, new site and/or antenna) to not interfere or stop the transmitting.
This includes licensed taxi radios, licensed ham operators, and unintended radiators like power utility companies (transformers on poles -- pole pigs can produce RF harmonics when in need of repair).
So why not Digital TV broadcasters? Is it because it been a FCC pet project for what nearly 10 years now?
To answer 2 & 3, they eliminated all the publically elected seats. This appears to be in an attempt to non-discriminatorly remove Karl, and to reduce input into ICANN.
3, be a friend of Stuart Lynn (President and CEO, and acts like he is Mr. ICANN), or the US Dept of Commerce.
Contact your political representative (in whatever country), and ask them to contact the US Department of Commerce to express your growing concerns that ICANN is not working in the best interests for everyone, and perhaps in light of its tactics to silent critics whom are board of director members by eliminating their position, perhaps the Dept of Commerce should have an inquiry into the affairs of ICANN and its executive.
one must be aware that the electric fields from the equipment can be so high that spontaneous glow discharges can be produced by any metal object within six inches of the routers,
Bollocks. You appear to be very uneducated about HF radio communications for the last 50 odds years.
fluorescent tubes can be lit up anywhere in the surrounding room without being contacted.
Yup. A magic trick the tour guide at Radio Canada International's shortwave transmiter site in Sackville, New Brunswick, involved the young tour guide lighting a florescent tube by bring it outside close to the kilowatt antenna array. See the The Initiation as well (The Ilford Group, G3XRT).
The RF energy being generated is probably so immense and so poorly defined in frequency that probably all air-traffic communications must be jammed for a few miles around when this news system is operating.
Sigh. This is pure trolling. Stable oscillators and high/low pass filters have been around for what, 90+ years now. Stable VFOs, about 70+ years.
How does this system organize the data streams? What if two people miles apart transmit their message at the same time on the same frequency? How does it handle contention issues? They have an awful lot of bandwidth to transmit so the messages should be pretty "bursty" and fast unless they're downloading entire web pages and such.
From my reading of the article they use an ad-hoc token method, of stations rotating who connects via RF and sessions are limited to 15 minutes.
As far I gathered from the article, they send/receive email, not randomly browse web pages. The qmail server is configured to accepts messages up to 8,000 bytes, to prevent huge messages (like HTML email with images attached spam).
With RF, contention means errors, the weaker signal is wiped out and the stronger signal suffers interference. This is really bad when two remote stations trying to connect to the central hub cannot hear each other and you end up with what is called the hidden transmitter problem.
You can find discussion areas like people using TINI embedded Java card along with STA013 mp3 decoder [greenend.org.uk] to do it but they all seem to be characterized by an initial burst of activity and then a trailing off once enthusiasm fades away...
Thanks. MP3elf and PJRC MP3 player look like the sort of thing I was thinking, and available in kit form.
In the cryptography mailing list, it appears that Theo may not need to declare jihad on licenses he doesn't like.
According to Ulf Möller there will be a patch made before the next release to isolate the ECC code in case of patent concerns. The ECC code can be included or excluded based on a configure flag like the present RC5 and IDEA algorithms which are still patented in various parts of the world.
Apparently the patent claim is an additionaloptional provision that companies can use the Sun code under a truce against lawsuits if they agree to not sue about ECC patent infrigement either.
Copyright laws are not about phyiscal properity, they are about the control of distribution of their "intellectual" material in a fixed medium such as words on a page or a magnetic cassette recording of a musical performance.
The book or DVD disc is almost an accidential artifact that is no ways embodies copyright control.
With a book, the first sale doctrine, allows you to own the physical artifact of the paper and binding, and allows you to resell that single copy of it. It does not give you permission to alter the contents, or produce a reproduction.
Maybe I am wrong here, but I take it CleanFlicks produces a new DVD of the modified content, which in my lay understanding is an unauthorized reproduction of the copyrighted contents. It is not a backup copy because the contents are modified by CleanFlicks, so the exemptions for archival purposes are not relevant.
The reproduced contents are altered which makes it a derived work (reproduce, adapt and publicly present a work by cinematograph, that uses a substantial portion (i.e. the vast majority) of the original creator's content. This should fall under the copyright owner/creator's copyright control.
Lastly it violates the copyright creator's moral right (only creators not owners have moral right, at least in some countries).
So 'OpenSSH' was originally witten by Tatu Ylonen and added to by Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song.
OpenSSH uses source originally written by Tatu Ylonen (ssh 1.2.12), and Björn Grönvall (OSSH), but OpenSSH was created by the OpenBSD developers (Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song).
If you want more developers to use your library, you need to make it easier for them to use libtomcrypt in a secure fashion.
That includes secure protocols (network, storage), consistant access to cryptographically strong PRNG/RNG, etc.
Standard protocols increase the usefullness because developers can use them to interact with other (often already existing) applications.
When you add these additional features I think you will then see an increase in interest in libtomcrypt.
Single Sign On (SSO) worked within a limited realm
on
Passport vs. Plan 9
·
· Score: 4, Informative
Single Sign On (SSO) works within a limited realm under the same control, such as within the scope of a government agency, a corporation, or a school. These bodies already exist deal with issues of various policies including privacy policies within the scope of the "realm" (i.e. the laws of the nations a multinational corporation is functioning within).
Universial SSO, such as this plan and Passport, breaks that and cannot be consistant since different companies want different privacy policies, are governed by different government legistation, yet are suppose to "control" and use the same information (the online identity credientials).
So the goal of only needing one online identity, whether a username/password, or a PIN and smartcard, within a given controlled realm such as your university does make sense. This is possible through sensible use of existing services like directory services and secure network authentication. The use of directory services such as X.400, RADIUS, and more recently LDAP (and LDAP perversions like Active Directory) can help towards this. As well as secure network authentication like Kerberos.
Universial SSO does not make sense, because of the shift of power and control is not carefully thought out in the contexts of legal issues (privacy, evidence, children online protection), contractual issues, limited and total revocation, ownership, and other issues.
Universial identities for an unlimited number of purposes does not make sense, it is a nightmare of management logistics, a total lack of correctness, legal quandary, and telemarketing hell.
Slashdot Mirror
My public key is signed by me and the government, and on file in some public public keyserver. How do they manage to fake my public key?
:-)
They don't.
Once the forger has his own fake keypair for you, that is signed by the government Certificate Authority (CA) his keypair are legally binding as proof that he is you, until it is proven in a court of law that the card, keypair, and peronsal details have been forged.
Like cheque forgers; who don't break into banks, they withdraw the money by asking the bank tellers nicely. The smartcard forgers don't break the cryptography, they attack the system.
P.S. The forger would know your public key, you give it away, in every transaction. I suspect you mean how do they fake your private key. Same answer, they work around it.
I'm not sure it would be that easy to clone the cards. Not impossible, but not easy.
How are cards created? Well, the smart cards are made at the factory under security similar to handling printing currency. Then they are sent to government agencies which initially record the details of an indiviual using a standard smart card reader (and writer).
So the fraudster needs to bribe a clerk at a government office to record the details he has to a "virgin" smart card. Not hard, not high tech. Costs less $50 per card in quantity.
With a turnaround of $10,000s to $100,000s of damages currently by identity fraud, I hate to imagine how much bad debt could be accumilated by using "high security but easily bribed" id cards.
Currently if one of my security devices or passwords fails, my entire life is not compromised, thats what an universial-use / "national" id card proposed to do.
Early on there was both an anonymous Usenet posting,and something to cypherpunks mailing list. One may of been reserved engineered, but one was claimed by those with access to RSA Inc.'s BSAFE library to be leaked from RSA Inc.'s code.
Anyhow, AFAIK Rivest wrote the first implementation of RC4 algorithm himself. I never said it was published or public knowledge.An internal reference implmentation is still a reference.
Security wonks hate it because it is insecure. It links the security of everything you authenicate to, from your parking permit, or restaraut reservation, to your root password to the corporate servers you maintain, to your personal financial details. So if the bus boy at the restaraut gets your details, clones them onto a forged card, and saves a "snapshot" of your biometric details, that bus boy can get your SSN, credit report, and likely get credit cards in your name as well as commit government mandated identity theft.
That sounds like a stupid idea. Bypassing the Chinese Wall of everyday life, is a dumb idea. A single id card is as stupid as Microsoft's universial id system formally known as Passport.
You are right, it is too complex, hard to use, and security engineers need to work on building better systems, and customers need to demand and pay for better systems.
Or you'll have an Oracle/Microsoft/US Government national id card secured by MS Windows, and Oracle's nearly unbreakable database.
You are right, the human factor is often ignored in building secure systems, though Schneier's Secrets and Lies and Anderson's Security Engineering (Chapter 3 I believe) deals with building entire systems that are secure including making them usable to the human users.
why can't the crypto whizzes put together a few lines of math.h and networking code to be a proof of concept?
Nearly all cryptographers do write reference implementations of their cryptographic algorithms. Rivest (RSA, MD4, MD5?, RC4, RC5, many more), Schneier (Blowfish, Twofish), Daemen (AES), Rijmen (AES), and many others write their own code AFAIK.
The issue that Peter Gutmann is focusing on (cryptographic) security protocols and systems, not cryptographic primitives like encrypting, signing which can be insecure when used incorrectly. E.g. A working RSA implmentation can be written in about 100 lines of C and a multi-percision interger library like GMP or MPI. The problem is that unless you do message padding following a scheme like OEAP your security is not as strong as expected / advertised.
crypto is very much an applied field, so the theorists should include example source in their papers.
Cryptography / cryptology falls into a relation with number theory and abstract algebra and computation computer science. Security Engineering is the practice of building secure systems including using cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
Do they mean the Internet Society or the Internet society in general?
Aren't they illegally distributing these copyrighted content without permission, which is still criminal regardless if it is of low quality?
Or do they have the copyright owner's permission (i.e. licensed), in which case it is legal to download those recordings?
Businesses are a for-profit corporation. Do not forget this, every when dealing with them. If they can get free resources, then that will be more profitable to the business, and they will continue to use these free resources as much as they can in order to maximize profits.
If you are no longer employed, there is no gain (profit or otherwise) for you in doing a free favour for a for-profit business. The business won't return the favour. They will be too "overworked", and unable to spare the resources to return such a favour.
Now perhaps you forgot to document something when you left a company, and you could quickly (i.e. not use your most valuable asset, time) answer the question. Perhaps you felt that your actions would improve your reference from said manager to help you secure a job in the near future. Those are reasonable cases, but in general, it is a waste of your time/resources to work for the company that does not employ you. You need to concentrate on finding gainful employment.
Normally when a licensed or unlicensed (or unintended) operator causes interference then, regardless of their transmitting privileges (say 100W with a 4.5dB gain omni directional antenna at site A), they must change their transmissions (reduce power, new site and/or antenna) to not interfere or stop the transmitting.
This includes licensed taxi radios, licensed ham operators, and unintended radiators like power utility companies (transformers on poles -- pole pigs can produce RF harmonics when in need of repair).
So why not Digital TV broadcasters? Is it because it been a FCC pet project for what nearly 10 years now?
Ask for an inquiry.
Ask why Network Solutions/Verisign still dominates control of domain names registries, and root servers.
Ask why ICANN has founding members like Esther Dyson, and Vince Cerf not impressed with the direction it has tken.
To answer 2 & 3, they eliminated all the publically elected seats. This appears to be in an attempt to non-discriminatorly remove Karl, and to reduce input into ICANN.
3, be a friend of Stuart Lynn (President and CEO, and acts like he is Mr. ICANN), or the US Dept of Commerce.
Contact your political representative (in whatever country), and ask them to contact the US Department of Commerce to express your growing concerns that ICANN is not working in the best interests for everyone, and
perhaps in light of its tactics to silent critics whom are board of director members
by eliminating their position, perhaps the Dept of Commerce should have an inquiry
into the affairs of ICANN and its executive.
one must be aware that the electric fields from the equipment can be so high that spontaneous glow discharges can be produced by any metal object within six inches of the routers,
Bollocks. You appear to be very uneducated about HF radio communications for the last 50 odds years.
fluorescent tubes can be lit up anywhere in the surrounding room without being contacted.
Yup. A magic trick the tour guide at Radio Canada International's shortwave transmiter site in Sackville, New Brunswick, involved the young tour guide lighting a florescent tube by bring it outside close to the kilowatt antenna array. See the The Initiation as well (The Ilford Group, G3XRT).
The RF energy being generated is probably so immense and so poorly defined in frequency that probably all air-traffic communications must be jammed for a few miles around when this news system is operating.
Sigh. This is pure trolling. Stable oscillators and high/low pass filters have been around for what, 90+ years now. Stable VFOs, about 70+ years.
How does this system organize the data streams? What if two people miles apart transmit their message at the same time on the same frequency? How does it handle contention issues? They have an awful lot of bandwidth to transmit so the messages should be pretty "bursty" and fast unless they're downloading entire web pages and such.
From my reading of the article they use an ad-hoc token method, of stations rotating who connects via RF and sessions are limited to 15 minutes.
As far I gathered from the article, they send/receive email, not randomly browse web pages. The qmail server is configured to accepts messages up to 8,000 bytes, to prevent huge messages (like HTML email with images attached spam).
With RF, contention means errors, the weaker signal is wiped out and the stronger signal suffers interference. This is really bad when two remote stations trying to connect to the central hub cannot hear each other and you end up with what is called the hidden transmitter problem.
Snort is an Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) which is open source, and fast.
The rules are the signatures Snort uses to detect "attacks" or other activities that match a given rule.
You can find discussion areas like people using TINI embedded Java card along with STA013 mp3 decoder [greenend.org.uk] to do it but they all seem to be characterized by an initial burst of activity and then a trailing off once enthusiasm fades away...
Thanks. MP3elf and PJRC MP3 player look like the sort of thing I was thinking, and available in kit form.
I'd like to know if anyone has any advice on building your own?
I assume that a microprocessor like an ARM or PowerPC with a Ethernet chip (say Realtek 8139) and a LCD display could do what you want.
I've been wondering how easy it would be to build my own portable player, but this might even be easier...Any advice?
A "heterogenous mix at the server level." could simply mean a mix of NT2000, NT4 and XP
Or different colour cases on machines from Dell, Gateway, and IBM.
In the cryptography mailing list, it appears that Theo may not need to declare jihad on licenses he doesn't like.
According to Ulf Möller there will be a patch made before the next release to isolate the ECC code in case of patent concerns. The ECC code can be included or excluded based on a configure flag like the present RC5 and IDEA algorithms which are still patented in various parts of the world.
Apparently the patent claim is an additional optional provision that companies can use the Sun code under a truce against lawsuits if they agree to not sue about ECC patent infrigement either.
Copyright laws are not about phyiscal properity, they are about the control of distribution of their "intellectual" material in a fixed medium such as words on a page or a magnetic cassette recording of a musical performance.
The book or DVD disc is almost an accidential artifact that is no ways embodies copyright control.
With a book, the first sale doctrine, allows you to own the physical artifact of the paper and binding, and allows you to resell that single copy of it. It does not give you permission to alter the contents, or produce a reproduction.
Maybe I am wrong here, but I take it CleanFlicks produces a new DVD of the modified content, which in my lay understanding is an unauthorized reproduction of the copyrighted contents. It is not a backup copy because the contents are modified by CleanFlicks, so the exemptions for archival purposes are not relevant.
The reproduced contents are altered which makes it a derived work (reproduce, adapt and publicly present a work by cinematograph, that uses a substantial portion (i.e. the vast majority) of the original creator's content. This should fall under the copyright owner/creator's copyright control.
Lastly it violates the copyright creator's moral right (only creators not owners have moral right, at least in some countries).
So 'OpenSSH' was originally witten by Tatu Ylonen and added to by Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song.
OpenSSH uses source originally written by Tatu Ylonen (ssh 1.2.12), and Björn Grönvall (OSSH), but OpenSSH was created by the OpenBSD developers (Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song).
I certainly agree with most of what you say.
If you want more developers to use your library, you need to make it easier for them to use libtomcrypt in a secure fashion.
That includes secure protocols (network, storage), consistant access to cryptographically strong PRNG/RNG, etc.
Standard protocols increase the usefullness because developers can use them to interact with other (often already existing) applications.
When you add these additional features I think you will then see an increase in interest in libtomcrypt.
Single Sign On (SSO) works within a limited realm under the same control, such as within the scope of a government agency, a corporation, or a school. These bodies already exist deal with issues of various policies including privacy policies within the scope of the "realm" (i.e. the laws of the nations a multinational corporation is functioning within).
Universial SSO, such as this plan and Passport, breaks that and cannot be consistant since different companies want different privacy policies, are governed by different government legistation, yet are suppose to "control" and use the same information (the online identity credientials).
So the goal of only needing one online identity, whether a username/password, or a PIN and smartcard, within a given controlled realm such as your university does make sense. This is possible through sensible use of existing services like directory services and secure network authentication. The use of directory services such as X.400, RADIUS, and more recently LDAP (and LDAP perversions like Active Directory) can help towards this. As well as secure network authentication like Kerberos.
Universial SSO does not make sense, because of the shift of power and control is not carefully thought out in the contexts of legal issues (privacy, evidence, children online protection), contractual issues, limited and total revocation, ownership, and other issues.
Universial identities for an unlimited number of purposes does not make sense, it is a nightmare of management logistics, a total lack of correctness, legal quandary, and telemarketing hell.
Look at Crypto++ benchmarks for a concrete example on a desktop machine (32-bit >>100 MHz x86 processor).
I do not have any benchmarks for low end processors. Sorry.