Thanks for the clarifications.. I'm a licensed pilot, single engine land, but I've not flown as PIC for 25+ years because with the kids I cannot afford it. I am obviously not current.
Also, does anyone else read this story as, "I don't know how to do my job, but I want to keep getting paid to do it."?
Fucking stupid.
Stick and Rudder skills are like playing a musical instrument. They require constant practice and exercise to stay "current".
This is not a new realization, but one that's been enshrined in the FAA regulations for decades longer than I've been alive. Pilots are required to "be current" meaning they have flown a minimum number of landings as PIC in the last few months before they can fly. I am also are required to "be current" with a flight instructor every year. Airline pilots must be "current" in their type ratings, which includes both training, check rides and flight time.
So it actually makes sense.. We are taking away the On the Job training opportunity in Stick and Rudder operation, replacing it with button pushing and dial turning. What's a pilot to do? Company regulations likely REQUIRE he/she use the automation for safety, efficiency and passenger comfort so it's hands off the controls while "Auto Pilot" flies for you.
This issue has been a concern for more than a decade. The more pilots use automation, the more their manual flying skills languish. Manual flying is a skill that one must practice to stay current. It may be like riding a bicycle, you never forget, but the fine skills required to fly accurately without the automation is something you can loose. It takes practice to stay current and proficient. It takes practice to be smooth and accurate, like playing a musical instrument it takes regular playing to keep your skills sharp.
There have been a couple of instances where the pilots where faced with the loss of automation and made mistakes with their manual flying. Or situations like Asiana Airlines Flight 214 where the automation wasn't set properly and the manual flying skill and experience wasn't enough to notice and avoid the accident. Pilots and airlines LOVE automation. Pilots like it because it makes their job easier (when it works). Even an unskilled pilot can fly like a pro using automation. I've been in simulators, and although I've never flown anything more complicated than a Cessna 172, I can get the simulator on the ground without balling it up, usually. Airlines love it because it allows the aircraft to be operated in the most efficient way, saving them fuel and maintenance costs.
But button pushing and turning dials isn't flying. Pilots are spending lots of their time managing and monitoring the automation and very little flying the aircraft. It's hard to keep your manual flying skills in top form, when you do mostly button pushing and turning dials
When the automation fails, and you are forced to grab the controls and fly while trying to diagnose what's wrong with your aircraft, Navigate, Communicate with ATC under high stress, you really want those "stick and rudder" skills sharp and current. It's one less thing to think about while you are trying to wrap your head around what is wrong with the aircraft.
LOL.. You DO realize that they really do have laws in DPRK lots of laws in fact, what they lack is freedom access to information.
Remember, they just re-elected Kim's party in an overwhelming majority and are in the process of rounding up anybody who voted the wrong way and shipping them off, along with their immediate family and any distant relatives who are suspect, to the "reeducation camps" where you make little rocks out of big ones.
You are right of course, if you want to be stealthy about doing this, cyber is the way to go. But I was talking about what happened in Iraq, twice. Where before the US invaded their communications where disrupted... Both times it was pretty obvious what was happening and who was doing it. The poster I was replying to was trying to claim that the communications disruptions in Iraq had a cyber element to it and I was pointing out that cyber had little to do with it.
Cyber may be the up and coming way a cold conflict is conducted, but in a shooting war, a hot conflict, it's a general waste of time. It's pretty easy to disrupt communications networks when you can hit a target in a 10' circle 99% of the time with high explosives from a thousand miles away, or you have control of the airspace and can do it from 5 miles away even cheaper. Cyber isn't reliable enough to compete with this.
The have the "bitching betty" who will say "terrain, pull up.... Terrain, Pull up.."
But if the aircraft is fighting you on the "pull up" because the stall avoidance system is run amuck I can see how the mixed signals would be confusing.
Also, it may not be obvious but "Lowest safe value" is constantly changing as you fly around and the way you measure altitude is subject to knowing the local barometric pressure with enough precision, data that the pilots generally provide.
Well... What really happened is they ran out of fuel and although it was noticed by some of the crew, nobody thought it was important enough to interrupt the captain in the left seat as he was trying to make sure the wheels where down. Somebody should have been assigned to call out fuel status and not shut up even if the captain was fixated on that stupid light bulb.
It was one of the prompters for the Crew Resource Management movement, which makes subordinates more assertive while still maintaining the authority in the cockpit.
million dollar aircraft brought down by a cheap sensor failure
Well that's better than the aircraft accident I helped to investigate... The pilot died because of a power switch position he specifically set in order to turn off the system that prevented his aircraft from departing it's "flying" envelope by applying back pressure to his control inputs. When he went to "break" during some ACM training looking over his shoulder at his opponent, he applied too much rudder input, the aircraft snap rolled as it stopped flying and started to tumble, his head was caught between the ejection seat and the canopy and he died of a broken neck before his aircraft hit the water.
That guy died because he wanted the competitive edge and specifically tried to cheat by putting the aircraft in a forbidden configuration....
I'd rather die from a sensor failure than by some stupid mistake I made to get an unfair advantge because I want to win some competition..
Aren't flight control systems supposed to be triple-redundant anyway? Everything I've read about them says they are; three systems and if there is incorrect data it uses the two that agree.
Well.. I believe the way the system works allows the control inputs of the pilots are able to overcome anything the system does. It's basically like an autopilot, where the pilot can override the system by applying pressure to the controls. This system is designed to apply backpressure as the aircraft approaches a stall, making it harder for the pilot to continue to increase the angle of attack and hopefully avoiding the stall. So you can still stall the aircraft, just pull harder and keep increasing the AOA...
The problem though, is that pilots are conditioned to change the trim to deal with unusual pressures for the desired pitch angle. So if the system believes the sensor and it's saying "STALL" but you are actually not, the system applies pressure to lower the nose, which the pilots will be conditioned to trim out. IF the stall doesn't go away, the system keeps the pressure there and unless the pilots realize what's going on they will keep trimming nose up. Eventually, the process ends up with an aircraft that's severely out of pitch trim which will be very confusing to the pilots, with really high control pressures required to do anything to the pitch. Thus "control problems" seems to describe exactly what I imagine was going on. It was a vicious cycle that makes the aircraft really hard to control.
So, I understand the engineering and using one AOA sensor. Kind of makes sense... Hey, the pilots can just override this anyway, we are stopping them from actually stalling the aircraft, just making it harder to do. We've don't this before in fighter aircraft and other fly by wire systems w/o any problems. But I think there wasn't enough thought given to what happens when that sensor fails and if they can implement some cross checks between airspeed, rate of climb, rate of turn, they might be able to more gracefully fail the system and disable it, or at least not get into the vicious cycle that leads to a pitch trim issue.
Let's stipulate that back doors are a given, regardless of where you get your equipment, just for the sake of argument.
You are assuming that Germany doesn't have a preference here. That they are OK with either China or the USA being in their networks..
But then... IF Germany really doesn't care who they hand over possible access to their secure networks to, then the USA is well within it's purview to impose security requirements. You want the data? Then you secure your networks to our standards.
I don't see the problem. Germany has a choice. The USA is within their rights to make demands, Germany can take it or leave it.
I also don't figure the USA is being stupid either. IF Germany chooses to allow China into their networks, the USA needs to protect their secrets and disconnecting from Germany may be the only way.
Everybody here has the free choice of association.
Now, on the existence of back doors.... My point here is that you have no way of knowing if some piece of equipment has one or not or if some firmware upgrade doesn't throw one in. You cannot just look at a router sitting in on the table and tell. You likely cannot hook up to the various network ports, do a port scan and watch network traffic for a few hours and know there are no backdoors. The ONLY way to really know is to build the software from source code you have reviewed and understand and then only if you've also reviewed the hardware. You never really know, you never can be sure.
So my question stands.. Who you want to be nosing around your secure networks? A hostile government like China, or your friendly government like the USA? That's up to Germany to decide...
So, why do you think it's a good idea to pay China for equipment that likely has back doors, or the possibility to add them sometime in the future by a company that's owned by a hostile state? Cisco may have well documented security issues, but they are not owned and controlled by a country that is hostile. Huawai would be in position to put a back door into any of their equipment with a firmware update, even if they don't exist now. Why take that chance? And how would you be able to know if they did? I seriously doubt they'd let you build the code from source...
Besides, Cisco and Huawai are not the only two choices here. There are more.
The issue here is who is behind the company. Huawai is clearly state run, in a thinly veiled way. Clearly Huawai would do as the government requires, and if that was to hide backdoors in their firmware updates, you can bet they'd do it. Cisco? Not so much.
Iraq coms was disabled "remotely" by some well placed smart bombs. The USA knew where the critical infrastructure was and how to effectively disable the parts of it they wanted.
IF you stop and think about how all this stuff works, you will realize that it's easier than you might imagine to disrupt networks with weapons that go boom, and certainly easier than trying to disrupt systems from within. How many ways can you disable a switch center reliably?
In my opinion it's harder to do it using cyber attacks. The USA has all sorts of weapon systems for pinpoint hits on such targets. Hits that can be rigorously timed and nearly unstoppable. We don't need cyber to do this kind of thing in cyberspace, we can disable such networks, or at least deny the adversaries of their communications quite handily without it.
But we'll go with the batshit crazy stupid version you prefer, then: USA tells germany that if they move to 5G that the USA will stop sharing anything with them from their intel (though they will still demand that Germany hand over stuff to them, even if it is via a proxy state like the UK).
And it's Germany's right to not share information with the USA if they don't find the relationship beneficial to them.
Look, I get why the USA is saying this. It's not about pushing USA build equipment, it's about preserving security on the networks that carry the terabytes of secret information passing between the countries. The USA doesn't want one specific manufacturer's equipment in that network. I get why.
Citation needed.
I have listened to him speak, and read many of his tweets. This is sufficient for me to know without a shred of doubt, that he is a moron.
Go listen to his last state of the union speech. He said a lot of things during that speech that you should apparently hear. You can find it yourself on Google if you want, so I won't post links here.
Trump says something that isn't completely idiotic!
Love him or hate him, Maybe you should be listening to what he says and tweets more often... Where he is often what you apparently expect, he has said a lot of things which are quite insightful, even more so than this statement. Trust me, the guy is not dumb or even crazy as some claim, he's just not very polished or PC in what he says so it's easy to make fun of him.
I would assume the FAA, in the absence of clear evidence that there was an airworthyness issue with an Airbus aircraft, would let them fly just the same.
I would also assume that the FAA wouldn't be making this decision anyway, but the EU analog of the FAA, EASA would. Airbus is in the EU, certify their aircraft under EU rules and Airbus operates under EU's oversight.
The "confuse pilots" is a natural results of what this system does when it's getting bad information from the AOA sensor.
Where I understand why you want to mess with the control forces to avoid an inadvertent stall where the point is to provide force feedback to keep the aircraft within the normal flight envelope, it provides a subconscious feed back to the pilot that says, don't go there, you are puling to hard... When the sensor goes bad and the system starts providing feed back that doesn't make any sense, the pilots are going to easily get confused. The touch and feel, the forces in the seat of your pants, the attitude of the aircraft don't match so your "skills and coordination" of flying are now a determent to flying.
But the issue for the FAA right now is as follows. Are pilots properly trained in this system? Are the aircraft being properly maintained? After the Indonesian accident it's clear that neither of these conditions where true. Boeing updated their pilot's manuals and updated their maintenance procedures in August to account for this. The FAA only regulates the USA's skies (and by agreement some other countries) and if you have updated your pilot training and maintenance procedures in relation to this issue, it would seem the aircraft is still safe to fly. New information may change that, but for now it's been dealt with.
LASIK is down to about $200 per eye, if you can afford a pair of glasses, you could probably afford to never buy them again.
What they DON'T tell you about in that price of LASIK is that this price is only valid for a small fraction of customers, who have very little correction needed and likely don't have to wear glasses anyway. As your prescription strength increases and if you have other issues, the cost of LASIK rises to an average above $1K per eye to more than $3K per eye for individuals like me who have been looking though coke bottle bottoms for years. LASIK also carries more and more risk of complications the more and more correction you need.
Also, there is a really good chance I'd need glasses AFTER LASIK anyway, at least for reading. And I'd likely need to undergo multiple treatments to first rough in my focus then let it stabilize a few months, then fine tune it. The question is if my cornea is thick enough to support this given that they can only really remove material, not add it back.
So for me, it would cost me about 10 years worth of glasses to get LASIK and I'd likely get to buy glasses anyway, though it would be nice to not need them all the time.
The problem here is how the system is designed to work and how pilots fly airplanes.
The Stall prevention system is designed to make it harder to stall the aircraft by increasing the back pressure the pilot feels as they approach the stall. So as the angle of attack increases, so does the back pressure required to maintain the pitch angle. This actually makes perfect sense as part of of the flying skill is the feel of the aircraft, the forces on your butt, the forces your hands feel all play a roll.
The problem with this system is that it messes with the pitch trim. Pilots are trained to trim the aircraft for the pitch, power and attitude settings so the yoke pressure is nearly zero. The stall avoidance system effectively messes with this trim setting and if a pilot isn't aware of what the system is doing, it's easy to get into a situation where the aircraft is badly out of trim (or at least feels that way) should the system be reacting to an error from a sensor. Where it's *possible* to fly out of trim aircraft (within acceptable pitch trim range which is based on your speed, weight and power) it is a mentally and physically demanding. Then add to the fray the confusion about why the aircraft isn't flying as it should and you are going though the fault isolation check lists, it's easy to see how a pilot might be overwhelmed. Further, it's likely that in this case the fault isolation check list didn't actually include this system failure, so the two guys up front where on their own, trying to figure out something they had no information about.
My point was that this was NOT in the fine manuals, so reading them wouldn't help... It was added in August of last year, which was AFTER the crash in Indonesia.
So I'm not blaming the pilots at all, I'm saying they didn't receive the necessary information for the safe operation of the aircraft with the new system installed, likely never experienced the problem in the simulator during their training. It may be that the aircraft was airworthy and controllable, but if you don't know what to do, haven't been trained to do it, It's hard to blame the pilots for not being able to deal with the problem.
I'm also pointing towards the maintenance staff's training and the aircraft's maintenance procedure documentation. This new feature wasn't well documented there either and the Indonesian aircraft experienced multiple issues with this system, which in hindsight where likely indicators of a failing sensor, but the maintenance crews never fixed the problem, their diagnosis procedures didn't find the pending fault, so they put the aircraft back into service..
So, RTFM wouldn't have produced a different result. The information just wasn't in there.
The speculation is that this is a human factors problem too, where some automated system is messing with the pitch controls in weird ways when presented with sensor failures. Where you can mitigate this problem with pilot training (Hey, when this happens, turn of the stall prevention system) there may also be a pilot manual omission issue too. If that's true, the pilots are properly trained per the documentation provided, so the base cause is really the pilot manual omits some important information, so they didn't have a chance to get trained.
So, I'd not be so fast to blame the pilots, or their training. It could be that it's not their fault.
Well, in the short term, sure. But the issue here just doesn't seem to be a huge problem to me.
Speculation here is that the new stall prevention system on the aircraft is likely the issue. This new system does some unexpected things when there is a sensor failure and if the pilots don't know about the system and how to override it, they can lose control of the aircraft's pitch. Boeing's issue was in not providing proper documentation of this system for the pilots until late last year, AFTER the Indonesian crash. In the Indonesian incident there where indications of the problem in the aircraft's maintenance logs. Where the system was doing strange things, the pilots where complaining about it but maintenance wasn't actually fixing the problem. So there may be a maintenance training and fault tree documentation issue too.
What this is likely to end up being is a pilot and maintenance manual training issue and possibly a design change based on human factors. If this speculation is true, Boeing may be financially liable for the two accidents, but the aircraft is indeed safe to operate, once the pilots and maintenance crews are properly trained.
IF the speculation is right, Boeing isn't in grave danger. The 737 MAX may find a different name and come without the new system, but Boeing's insurers will pay out, Boeing will pay higher rates in the future, but not much else will change.
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Thanks for the clarifications.. I'm a licensed pilot, single engine land, but I've not flown as PIC for 25+ years because with the kids I cannot afford it. I am obviously not current.
How about training pilots how to fly?
Also, does anyone else read this story as, "I don't know how to do my job, but I want to keep getting paid to do it."?
Fucking stupid.
Stick and Rudder skills are like playing a musical instrument. They require constant practice and exercise to stay "current".
This is not a new realization, but one that's been enshrined in the FAA regulations for decades longer than I've been alive. Pilots are required to "be current" meaning they have flown a minimum number of landings as PIC in the last few months before they can fly. I am also are required to "be current" with a flight instructor every year. Airline pilots must be "current" in their type ratings, which includes both training, check rides and flight time.
So it actually makes sense.. We are taking away the On the Job training opportunity in Stick and Rudder operation, replacing it with button pushing and dial turning. What's a pilot to do? Company regulations likely REQUIRE he/she use the automation for safety, efficiency and passenger comfort so it's hands off the controls while "Auto Pilot" flies for you.
This issue has been a concern for more than a decade. The more pilots use automation, the more their manual flying skills languish. Manual flying is a skill that one must practice to stay current. It may be like riding a bicycle, you never forget, but the fine skills required to fly accurately without the automation is something you can loose. It takes practice to stay current and proficient. It takes practice to be smooth and accurate, like playing a musical instrument it takes regular playing to keep your skills sharp.
There have been a couple of instances where the pilots where faced with the loss of automation and made mistakes with their manual flying. Or situations like Asiana Airlines Flight 214 where the automation wasn't set properly and the manual flying skill and experience wasn't enough to notice and avoid the accident. Pilots and airlines LOVE automation. Pilots like it because it makes their job easier (when it works). Even an unskilled pilot can fly like a pro using automation. I've been in simulators, and although I've never flown anything more complicated than a Cessna 172, I can get the simulator on the ground without balling it up, usually. Airlines love it because it allows the aircraft to be operated in the most efficient way, saving them fuel and maintenance costs.
But button pushing and turning dials isn't flying. Pilots are spending lots of their time managing and monitoring the automation and very little flying the aircraft. It's hard to keep your manual flying skills in top form, when you do mostly button pushing and turning dials
When the automation fails, and you are forced to grab the controls and fly while trying to diagnose what's wrong with your aircraft, Navigate, Communicate with ATC under high stress, you really want those "stick and rudder" skills sharp and current. It's one less thing to think about while you are trying to wrap your head around what is wrong with the aircraft.
LOL.. You DO realize that they really do have laws in DPRK lots of laws in fact, what they lack is freedom access to information.
Remember, they just re-elected Kim's party in an overwhelming majority and are in the process of rounding up anybody who voted the wrong way and shipping them off, along with their immediate family and any distant relatives who are suspect, to the "reeducation camps" where you make little rocks out of big ones.
You are right of course, if you want to be stealthy about doing this, cyber is the way to go. But I was talking about what happened in Iraq, twice. Where before the US invaded their communications where disrupted... Both times it was pretty obvious what was happening and who was doing it. The poster I was replying to was trying to claim that the communications disruptions in Iraq had a cyber element to it and I was pointing out that cyber had little to do with it.
Cyber may be the up and coming way a cold conflict is conducted, but in a shooting war, a hot conflict, it's a general waste of time. It's pretty easy to disrupt communications networks when you can hit a target in a 10' circle 99% of the time with high explosives from a thousand miles away, or you have control of the airspace and can do it from 5 miles away even cheaper. Cyber isn't reliable enough to compete with this.
The have the "bitching betty" who will say "terrain, pull up.... Terrain, Pull up.."
But if the aircraft is fighting you on the "pull up" because the stall avoidance system is run amuck I can see how the mixed signals would be confusing.
Also, it may not be obvious but "Lowest safe value" is constantly changing as you fly around and the way you measure altitude is subject to knowing the local barometric pressure with enough precision, data that the pilots generally provide.
Well... What really happened is they ran out of fuel and although it was noticed by some of the crew, nobody thought it was important enough to interrupt the captain in the left seat as he was trying to make sure the wheels where down. Somebody should have been assigned to call out fuel status and not shut up even if the captain was fixated on that stupid light bulb.
It was one of the prompters for the Crew Resource Management movement, which makes subordinates more assertive while still maintaining the authority in the cockpit.
million dollar aircraft brought down by a cheap sensor failure
Well that's better than the aircraft accident I helped to investigate... The pilot died because of a power switch position he specifically set in order to turn off the system that prevented his aircraft from departing it's "flying" envelope by applying back pressure to his control inputs. When he went to "break" during some ACM training looking over his shoulder at his opponent, he applied too much rudder input, the aircraft snap rolled as it stopped flying and started to tumble, his head was caught between the ejection seat and the canopy and he died of a broken neck before his aircraft hit the water.
That guy died because he wanted the competitive edge and specifically tried to cheat by putting the aircraft in a forbidden configuration....
I'd rather die from a sensor failure than by some stupid mistake I made to get an unfair advantge because I want to win some competition..
Why the hell wasn't this the case before?
Aren't flight control systems supposed to be triple-redundant anyway? Everything I've read about them says they are; three systems and if there is incorrect data it uses the two that agree.
Well.. I believe the way the system works allows the control inputs of the pilots are able to overcome anything the system does. It's basically like an autopilot, where the pilot can override the system by applying pressure to the controls. This system is designed to apply backpressure as the aircraft approaches a stall, making it harder for the pilot to continue to increase the angle of attack and hopefully avoiding the stall. So you can still stall the aircraft, just pull harder and keep increasing the AOA...
The problem though, is that pilots are conditioned to change the trim to deal with unusual pressures for the desired pitch angle. So if the system believes the sensor and it's saying "STALL" but you are actually not, the system applies pressure to lower the nose, which the pilots will be conditioned to trim out. IF the stall doesn't go away, the system keeps the pressure there and unless the pilots realize what's going on they will keep trimming nose up. Eventually, the process ends up with an aircraft that's severely out of pitch trim which will be very confusing to the pilots, with really high control pressures required to do anything to the pitch. Thus "control problems" seems to describe exactly what I imagine was going on. It was a vicious cycle that makes the aircraft really hard to control.
So, I understand the engineering and using one AOA sensor. Kind of makes sense... Hey, the pilots can just override this anyway, we are stopping them from actually stalling the aircraft, just making it harder to do. We've don't this before in fighter aircraft and other fly by wire systems w/o any problems. But I think there wasn't enough thought given to what happens when that sensor fails and if they can implement some cross checks between airspeed, rate of climb, rate of turn, they might be able to more gracefully fail the system and disable it, or at least not get into the vicious cycle that leads to a pitch trim issue.
Let's stipulate that back doors are a given, regardless of where you get your equipment, just for the sake of argument.
You are assuming that Germany doesn't have a preference here. That they are OK with either China or the USA being in their networks..
But then... IF Germany really doesn't care who they hand over possible access to their secure networks to, then the USA is well within it's purview to impose security requirements. You want the data? Then you secure your networks to our standards.
I don't see the problem. Germany has a choice. The USA is within their rights to make demands, Germany can take it or leave it.
I also don't figure the USA is being stupid either. IF Germany chooses to allow China into their networks, the USA needs to protect their secrets and disconnecting from Germany may be the only way.
Everybody here has the free choice of association.
Now, on the existence of back doors.... My point here is that you have no way of knowing if some piece of equipment has one or not or if some firmware upgrade doesn't throw one in. You cannot just look at a router sitting in on the table and tell. You likely cannot hook up to the various network ports, do a port scan and watch network traffic for a few hours and know there are no backdoors. The ONLY way to really know is to build the software from source code you have reviewed and understand and then only if you've also reviewed the hardware. You never really know, you never can be sure.
So my question stands.. Who you want to be nosing around your secure networks? A hostile government like China, or your friendly government like the USA? That's up to Germany to decide...
Better the enemy you know than the one you don't.
So, why do you think it's a good idea to pay China for equipment that likely has back doors, or the possibility to add them sometime in the future by a company that's owned by a hostile state? Cisco may have well documented security issues, but they are not owned and controlled by a country that is hostile. Huawai would be in position to put a back door into any of their equipment with a firmware update, even if they don't exist now. Why take that chance? And how would you be able to know if they did? I seriously doubt they'd let you build the code from source...
Besides, Cisco and Huawai are not the only two choices here. There are more.
The issue here is who is behind the company. Huawai is clearly state run, in a thinly veiled way. Clearly Huawai would do as the government requires, and if that was to hide backdoors in their firmware updates, you can bet they'd do it. Cisco? Not so much.
Iraq coms was disabled "remotely" by some well placed smart bombs. The USA knew where the critical infrastructure was and how to effectively disable the parts of it they wanted.
IF you stop and think about how all this stuff works, you will realize that it's easier than you might imagine to disrupt networks with weapons that go boom, and certainly easier than trying to disrupt systems from within. How many ways can you disable a switch center reliably?
In my opinion it's harder to do it using cyber attacks. The USA has all sorts of weapon systems for pinpoint hits on such targets. Hits that can be rigorously timed and nearly unstoppable. We don't need cyber to do this kind of thing in cyberspace, we can disable such networks, or at least deny the adversaries of their communications quite handily without it.
But we'll go with the batshit crazy stupid version you prefer, then: USA tells germany that if they move to 5G that the USA will stop sharing anything with them from their intel (though they will still demand that Germany hand over stuff to them, even if it is via a proxy state like the UK).
And it's Germany's right to not share information with the USA if they don't find the relationship beneficial to them.
Look, I get why the USA is saying this. It's not about pushing USA build equipment, it's about preserving security on the networks that carry the terabytes of secret information passing between the countries. The USA doesn't want one specific manufacturer's equipment in that network. I get why.
Trump says many things that are not idiotic.
Citation needed. I have listened to him speak, and read many of his tweets. This is sufficient for me to know without a shred of doubt, that he is a moron.
Go listen to his last state of the union speech. He said a lot of things during that speech that you should apparently hear. You can find it yourself on Google if you want, so I won't post links here.
Don't cut yourself with that edgy "the left is terrible" rhetoric.
Here I thought the comment was quite blunt...
Trump says something that isn't completely idiotic!
Love him or hate him, Maybe you should be listening to what he says and tweets more often... Where he is often what you apparently expect, he has said a lot of things which are quite insightful, even more so than this statement. Trust me, the guy is not dumb or even crazy as some claim, he's just not very polished or PC in what he says so it's easy to make fun of him.
I would assume the FAA, in the absence of clear evidence that there was an airworthyness issue with an Airbus aircraft, would let them fly just the same.
I would also assume that the FAA wouldn't be making this decision anyway, but the EU analog of the FAA, EASA would. Airbus is in the EU, certify their aircraft under EU rules and Airbus operates under EU's oversight.
The "confuse pilots" is a natural results of what this system does when it's getting bad information from the AOA sensor.
Where I understand why you want to mess with the control forces to avoid an inadvertent stall where the point is to provide force feedback to keep the aircraft within the normal flight envelope, it provides a subconscious feed back to the pilot that says, don't go there, you are puling to hard... When the sensor goes bad and the system starts providing feed back that doesn't make any sense, the pilots are going to easily get confused. The touch and feel, the forces in the seat of your pants, the attitude of the aircraft don't match so your "skills and coordination" of flying are now a determent to flying.
But the issue for the FAA right now is as follows. Are pilots properly trained in this system? Are the aircraft being properly maintained? After the Indonesian accident it's clear that neither of these conditions where true. Boeing updated their pilot's manuals and updated their maintenance procedures in August to account for this. The FAA only regulates the USA's skies (and by agreement some other countries) and if you have updated your pilot training and maintenance procedures in relation to this issue, it would seem the aircraft is still safe to fly. New information may change that, but for now it's been dealt with.
This is all made up by the shorts, Airbus and the big train lobby.
Right... Where you may be right that the shorts are playing this up, I figure this is a buying opportunity myself. Boeing lost 7% today? That's nuts.
Buy on bad news.... It works more often than not.
LASIK is down to about $200 per eye, if you can afford a pair of glasses, you could probably afford to never buy them again.
What they DON'T tell you about in that price of LASIK is that this price is only valid for a small fraction of customers, who have very little correction needed and likely don't have to wear glasses anyway. As your prescription strength increases and if you have other issues, the cost of LASIK rises to an average above $1K per eye to more than $3K per eye for individuals like me who have been looking though coke bottle bottoms for years. LASIK also carries more and more risk of complications the more and more correction you need.
Also, there is a really good chance I'd need glasses AFTER LASIK anyway, at least for reading. And I'd likely need to undergo multiple treatments to first rough in my focus then let it stabilize a few months, then fine tune it. The question is if my cornea is thick enough to support this given that they can only really remove material, not add it back.
So for me, it would cost me about 10 years worth of glasses to get LASIK and I'd likely get to buy glasses anyway, though it would be nice to not need them all the time.
The problem here is how the system is designed to work and how pilots fly airplanes.
The Stall prevention system is designed to make it harder to stall the aircraft by increasing the back pressure the pilot feels as they approach the stall. So as the angle of attack increases, so does the back pressure required to maintain the pitch angle. This actually makes perfect sense as part of of the flying skill is the feel of the aircraft, the forces on your butt, the forces your hands feel all play a roll.
The problem with this system is that it messes with the pitch trim. Pilots are trained to trim the aircraft for the pitch, power and attitude settings so the yoke pressure is nearly zero. The stall avoidance system effectively messes with this trim setting and if a pilot isn't aware of what the system is doing, it's easy to get into a situation where the aircraft is badly out of trim (or at least feels that way) should the system be reacting to an error from a sensor. Where it's *possible* to fly out of trim aircraft (within acceptable pitch trim range which is based on your speed, weight and power) it is a mentally and physically demanding. Then add to the fray the confusion about why the aircraft isn't flying as it should and you are going though the fault isolation check lists, it's easy to see how a pilot might be overwhelmed. Further, it's likely that in this case the fault isolation check list didn't actually include this system failure, so the two guys up front where on their own, trying to figure out something they had no information about.
My point was that this was NOT in the fine manuals, so reading them wouldn't help... It was added in August of last year, which was AFTER the crash in Indonesia.
So I'm not blaming the pilots at all, I'm saying they didn't receive the necessary information for the safe operation of the aircraft with the new system installed, likely never experienced the problem in the simulator during their training. It may be that the aircraft was airworthy and controllable, but if you don't know what to do, haven't been trained to do it, It's hard to blame the pilots for not being able to deal with the problem.
I'm also pointing towards the maintenance staff's training and the aircraft's maintenance procedure documentation. This new feature wasn't well documented there either and the Indonesian aircraft experienced multiple issues with this system, which in hindsight where likely indicators of a failing sensor, but the maintenance crews never fixed the problem, their diagnosis procedures didn't find the pending fault, so they put the aircraft back into service..
So, RTFM wouldn't have produced a different result. The information just wasn't in there.
Not so fast there AC..
The speculation is that this is a human factors problem too, where some automated system is messing with the pitch controls in weird ways when presented with sensor failures. Where you can mitigate this problem with pilot training (Hey, when this happens, turn of the stall prevention system) there may also be a pilot manual omission issue too. If that's true, the pilots are properly trained per the documentation provided, so the base cause is really the pilot manual omits some important information, so they didn't have a chance to get trained.
So, I'd not be so fast to blame the pilots, or their training. It could be that it's not their fault.
This is really bad for Boeing.
Well, in the short term, sure. But the issue here just doesn't seem to be a huge problem to me.
Speculation here is that the new stall prevention system on the aircraft is likely the issue. This new system does some unexpected things when there is a sensor failure and if the pilots don't know about the system and how to override it, they can lose control of the aircraft's pitch. Boeing's issue was in not providing proper documentation of this system for the pilots until late last year, AFTER the Indonesian crash. In the Indonesian incident there where indications of the problem in the aircraft's maintenance logs. Where the system was doing strange things, the pilots where complaining about it but maintenance wasn't actually fixing the problem. So there may be a maintenance training and fault tree documentation issue too.
What this is likely to end up being is a pilot and maintenance manual training issue and possibly a design change based on human factors. If this speculation is true, Boeing may be financially liable for the two accidents, but the aircraft is indeed safe to operate, once the pilots and maintenance crews are properly trained.
IF the speculation is right, Boeing isn't in grave danger. The 737 MAX may find a different name and come without the new system, but Boeing's insurers will pay out, Boeing will pay higher rates in the future, but not much else will change.
https://www.prageru.com/video/capitalism-vs-socialism/
You're welcome.
Excellent video.. Wish I had mod points for you...