Yes, but it's a different article. Meaning that somehow we had another topic which pulled these keywords together. We can probably thank the trolls for that.
When I got laid off after my company was acquired, I took my severance check to Australia for two months. I ended up stuck in Bundy for a week or so waiting for weather to clear up, and used the free time to get my PADI Rescue Diver cert.
The little dive shop there had a couple of computers with a shared dial-up connection. They sold Internet access time by the half-hour to the local backpackers for some supplemental income. Every once in a while they had some problems so I helped them out, pro bono.
By the time I had dived my way up through Airlie and the Whitsundays, I was seriously considering just never going back to the US, working my way through the rest of the certification chain, and just working at a dive shop the rest of my life. Indeed, one of the instructors in Bundy used to work in the US (doing mostly construction work), but had been extending his work visa ever since he fell in love with the job.
Then I got to Cairns, and I started thinking that if I was doing this for a living, what would I do for vacation?
Here I am back in the states again, doing the well-paying, but not nearly as enjoyable work. If you get paid well, you can afford to do all the other things you really want to do in your free time and when you retire. Not very idealistic, but pragmatic at least.
Nope, that works fine. At most, they'll run 10 or 20 viruses before they'll have to start mousing with their nose. That makes it hard to see the monitor.
I would argue in fact that it is vital we publish the ballots that people cast. It is the only way to be certain that an election is on the level. The arguments we always hear against this doing this never stand up to scrutiny.
Explain how these arguments against voter-identifiable ballots don't stand up to scrutiny:
1) Ultra-rich candidates/candidate supporters can offer $50 for each verified vote for the candidate, effectively buying an election.
2) Union/mafia types can coerce union members or other voters into voting for their candidate, effectively bullying the election.
3) Bosses can threaten termination of employees who don't vote for their candidate, again coercing the election.
I posted this comment yesterday, but probably too late and too deep to be noticed:
The system designed by TruVote takes into account all of these considerations. It prints out two receipts: one the that the voter keeps and the other that the voter verifies which is then dropped into a sealed box for later count. The voter verifies this receipt from behind a piece of Plexiglas so that it cannot be tampered with and so additional fake votes cannot be inserted into the box (which could probably be made difficult or impossible with a cryptographic hash verification system anyway).
The receipt given to the voter contains an ID and pin number that can be used to verify the status of the vote (counted, uncounted, chosen candidates, etc...) on a voting Web site. This ensures voter confidence.
By having both an electronic count and a manual count, the validity of the poll can be easily demonstrated. Of course, the manual count must be performed by a different organization than that which controls the automated count. Manual counters feel added pressure to do the job right because their count must be reasonably close to that given by the automatic count. The same holds true for the electronic count. This prevents hacking or malicious tampering with the electronic count (as well as just plain error).
If the results don't match (within reasonable confidence levels), the voter receipt helps determine the problem. Voters can be asked to verify their votes again on the Web site to validate the electronic count. If this count is validated, then the manual count comes under scrutiny.
In my mind, this system is about as perfect and tamper-proof as it gets. Of course, the legislation doesn't require paper trails for voting machines yet.
As a side note, I find it curious that Diebold makes ATM machines which all give paper receipts for transactions, but their voting machines do not.
I think it was an Asimov short story which was predicated on a future where the candidate was chosen based on just one voter each year. In fact, I'm sure it was Asimov because the outcome was determined by feeding the results of a serious of interview questions, biometrics, etc. into a Multivac computer (an Asimov creation). The computer calculated the popular opinion through extrapolation from this single voter, chosen randomly each election year. IIRC, the story was written over thirty years ago. Pretty scary stuff.
The system designed by TruVote takes into account all of these considerations. It prints out two receipts: one the that the voter keeps and the other that the voter verifies which is then dropped into a sealed box for later count. The voter verifies this receipt from behind a piece of Plexiglas so that it cannot be tampered with and so additional fake votes cannot be inserted into the box (which could probably be made difficult or impossible with a cryptographic hash verification system anyway).
The receipt given to the voter contains an ID and pin number that can be used to verify the status of the vote (counted, uncounted, chosen candidates, etc...) on a voting Web site. This ensures voter confidence.
By having both an electronic count and a manual count, the validity of the poll can be easily demonstrated. Of course, the manual count must be performed by a different organization than that which controls the automated count. Manual counters feel added pressure to do the job right because their count must be reasonably close to that given by the automatic count. The same holds true for the electronic count. This prevents hacking or malicious tampering with the electronic count (as well as just plain error).
If the results don't match (within reasonable confidence levels), the voter receipt helps determine the problem. Voters can be asked to verify their votes again on the Web site to validate the electronic count. If this count is validated, then the manual count comes under scrutiny.
In my mind, this system is about as perfect and tamper-proof as it gets. Of course, the legislation doesn't require paper trails for voting machines yet.
As a side note, I find it curious that Diebold makes ATM machines which all give paper receipts for transactions, but their voting machines do not.
I read a similar article on BBC News a few weeks ago and went and did some more digging. Apparently the CEO of Diebold is a staunch Republican and contributed heavily to the Bush campaign. This may also be coincidence, but partisan elections in Georgia using the new systems also heavily favored Republicans. Call me a right-wing conspiracy theorist, but the current state of electronic voting scares me.
I may be feeding the troll here about all his books sucking, but I actually preferred Angels and Demons to the Da Vinci Code. I do agree with some other posters on this topic that his writing tends to be formulaic and made-for-Hollywood (was that redundant?), but A&D seemed less bogged down with beating-us-over-the-head, dumbed-down historical and technological explanations regurgitated through 2-dimensional characters.
What I appreciated about A&D is that it actually had reasonably thought-provoking content about the role of religion and science in society, without feeling too preachy or leading. Some of the Da Vinci Code dealt with similar issues, but they seemed more dumbed-down and preachy.
Ditto that. I've got two 60GXP 80GB striped in hardware, and the only problem I've had is the way Win98 handles the driver for the RAID device. They're fairly new (bought them in 2001), and IIRC at that time the word on the street is that the 60GXP and 120GXP lines were safe. It was only the 75GXPs that were shoddy.
Slashdot Mirror
Yes, but it's a different article. Meaning that somehow we had another topic which pulled these keywords together. We can probably thank the trolls for that.
When I got laid off after my company was acquired, I took my severance check to Australia for two months. I ended up stuck in Bundy for a week or so waiting for weather to clear up, and used the free time to get my PADI Rescue Diver cert.
The little dive shop there had a couple of computers with a shared dial-up connection. They sold Internet access time by the half-hour to the local backpackers for some supplemental income. Every once in a while they had some problems so I helped them out, pro bono.
By the time I had dived my way up through Airlie and the Whitsundays, I was seriously considering just never going back to the US, working my way through the rest of the certification chain, and just working at a dive shop the rest of my life. Indeed, one of the instructors in Bundy used to work in the US (doing mostly construction work), but had been extending his work visa ever since he fell in love with the job.
Then I got to Cairns, and I started thinking that if I was doing this for a living, what would I do for vacation?
Here I am back in the states again, doing the well-paying, but not nearly as enjoyable work. If you get paid well, you can afford to do all the other things you really want to do in your free time and when you retire. Not very idealistic, but pragmatic at least.
Nope, that works fine. At most, they'll run 10 or 20 viruses before they'll have to start mousing with their nose. That makes it hard to see the monitor.
Reading this reply, I realize I have been trolled.
Interesting that you don't see that if a voter has a legitimate fear of voting then democracy has already been subverted on a grand scale.
I would argue in fact that it is vital we publish the ballots that people cast. It is the only way to be certain that an election is on the level. The arguments we always hear against this doing this never stand up to scrutiny.
Explain how these arguments against voter-identifiable ballots don't stand up to scrutiny:
1) Ultra-rich candidates/candidate supporters can offer $50 for each verified vote for the candidate, effectively buying an election.
2) Union/mafia types can coerce union members or other voters into voting for their candidate, effectively bullying the election.
3) Bosses can threaten termination of employees who don't vote for their candidate, again coercing the election.
Three of many possible scenarios.
I posted this comment yesterday, but probably too late and too deep to be noticed:
The system designed by TruVote takes into account all of these considerations. It prints out two receipts: one the that the voter keeps and the other that the voter verifies which is then dropped into a sealed box for later count. The voter verifies this receipt from behind a piece of Plexiglas so that it cannot be tampered with and so additional fake votes cannot be inserted into the box (which could probably be made difficult or impossible with a cryptographic hash verification system anyway).
The receipt given to the voter contains an ID and pin number that can be used to verify the status of the vote (counted, uncounted, chosen candidates, etc...) on a voting Web site. This ensures voter confidence.
By having both an electronic count and a manual count, the validity of the poll can be easily demonstrated. Of course, the manual count must be performed by a different organization than that which controls the automated count. Manual counters feel added pressure to do the job right because their count must be reasonably close to that given by the automatic count. The same holds true for the electronic count. This prevents hacking or malicious tampering with the electronic count (as well as just plain error).
If the results don't match (within reasonable confidence levels), the voter receipt helps determine the problem. Voters can be asked to verify their votes again on the Web site to validate the electronic count. If this count is validated, then the manual count comes under scrutiny.
In my mind, this system is about as perfect and tamper-proof as it gets. Of course, the legislation doesn't require paper trails for voting machines yet.
As a side note, I find it curious that Diebold makes ATM machines which all give paper receipts for transactions, but their voting machines do not.
I think it was an Asimov short story which was predicated on a future where the candidate was chosen based on just one voter each year. In fact, I'm sure it was Asimov because the outcome was determined by feeding the results of a serious of interview questions, biometrics, etc. into a Multivac computer (an Asimov creation). The computer calculated the popular opinion through extrapolation from this single voter, chosen randomly each election year. IIRC, the story was written over thirty years ago. Pretty scary stuff.
The system designed by TruVote takes into account all of these considerations. It prints out two receipts: one the that the voter keeps and the other that the voter verifies which is then dropped into a sealed box for later count. The voter verifies this receipt from behind a piece of Plexiglas so that it cannot be tampered with and so additional fake votes cannot be inserted into the box (which could probably be made difficult or impossible with a cryptographic hash verification system anyway).
The receipt given to the voter contains an ID and pin number that can be used to verify the status of the vote (counted, uncounted, chosen candidates, etc...) on a voting Web site. This ensures voter confidence.
By having both an electronic count and a manual count, the validity of the poll can be easily demonstrated. Of course, the manual count must be performed by a different organization than that which controls the automated count. Manual counters feel added pressure to do the job right because their count must be reasonably close to that given by the automatic count. The same holds true for the electronic count. This prevents hacking or malicious tampering with the electronic count (as well as just plain error).
If the results don't match (within reasonable confidence levels), the voter receipt helps determine the problem. Voters can be asked to verify their votes again on the Web site to validate the electronic count. If this count is validated, then the manual count comes under scrutiny.
In my mind, this system is about as perfect and tamper-proof as it gets. Of course, the legislation doesn't require paper trails for voting machines yet.
As a side note, I find it curious that Diebold makes ATM machines which all give paper receipts for transactions, but their voting machines do not.
all of Maryland's machines had two identical locks, which could be opened by any one of 32,000 keys or be easily picked
Wait a minute, doesn't Diebold make locks!?!?!
I read a similar article on BBC News a few weeks ago and went and did some more digging. Apparently the CEO of Diebold is a staunch Republican and contributed heavily to the Bush campaign. This may also be coincidence, but partisan elections in Georgia using the new systems also heavily favored Republicans. Call me a right-wing conspiracy theorist, but the current state of electronic voting scares me.
The funny part is that the owners registered the site with the Dotster domain registrar.
complete with mug shots
Shouldn't that be pug shots?
The fact is, a person's writing skills is almost a direct correlation to the quality of their education.
Classic.
BTW, I have a slashcode improvement request: I'd like the ability to moderate front page articles as "-1 Troll"
Lately I'm noticing that any article with more than 500 comments attached would probably rate a -1 Troll.
Anyone have a .pdf of the specification? I don't do .doc (or other proprietary) formats.
You do realize that PDF is a proprietary format?
Don't worry though the USA PATRIOT ACT's will take care of all your problems.
Yes, it's much nicer in Cuba than Canada this time of year.
This coming from a user who identifies himself as "syco"
I think "syco" is short for "sycophantic".
I may be feeding the troll here about all his books sucking, but I actually preferred Angels and Demons to the Da Vinci Code. I do agree with some other posters on this topic that his writing tends to be formulaic and made-for-Hollywood (was that redundant?), but A&D seemed less bogged down with beating-us-over-the-head, dumbed-down historical and technological explanations regurgitated through 2-dimensional characters.
What I appreciated about A&D is that it actually had reasonably thought-provoking content about the role of religion and science in society, without feeling too preachy or leading. Some of the Da Vinci Code dealt with similar issues, but they seemed more dumbed-down and preachy.
My favorite comments: // HACK OF DEATH:
* The magnitude of this hack compares favorably with that of the national debt.
Why would they bother with a press release? PATRIOT says they can just rot in Cuba without anyone knowing.
...except for the fact that women are XX and men are XY.
I know it's not as common here in the Bay Area, but must women are still looking to make use of the Y chromosome.
You're looking at those text editors the wrong way. Pretty soon, emacs will have a MMO in it.
Give me Verant vi any day!
I'm probably as jaded as you, but if it makes you feel any better, at least Jeffrey Skilling (of Enron infamy) is finally in court to defend himself.
If anyone else was wondering what VeRO was all about, here's eBay's page on it:
. html
http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/vero-program
Ditto that. I've got two 60GXP 80GB striped in hardware, and the only problem I've had is the way Win98 handles the driver for the RAID device. They're fairly new (bought them in 2001), and IIRC at that time the word on the street is that the 60GXP and 120GXP lines were safe. It was only the 75GXPs that were shoddy.