Reading TFA, it was almost certainly because STP wasn't set up correctly. For instance, if the switchport in question had bpduguard enabled then it would have become disabled as soon as the erroneous hub was added, resulting in a localised issue not a network-wide problem.
It's an issue that many Network Engineers learn the hard way exactly once and fix quickly by reviewing their STP configuration and in many cases, introduce QoS for sanity.
"We didn't do an official lessons learned [exercise] after this, it was just more of a 'don't do that again,'" says Bowers
If you looked at the code recently, you'd see that they've stubbed out a whole new set of OS-independent classes, and a whole lot of them have been implemented.
That said, chromium is usable right now, for me on Linux.
You don't need to look at the source code to see what other products do. You just need to look at the ODF files they produce.
It seems you are missing the point of standards. Adherence to the letter of the standard should be all that is required. If this is not the case, then the standard is not well-defined enough.
However, for most standards (just read pretty much any RFC), you'll observe a bunch of new versions, iterations, minor amendments and such to get to something that is rigid enough to be relied on.
This is the necessary pain that ODF is currently going through.
However, there's plenty of parties that have monitoring capabilities - every single hop that your packets go through.
Secondly, as a small consolation, at least the UK are being somewhat open with their decision - now we know that everything is to be monitored, we can become more conscious of using SSL.
Wow, looking at your journal, you seem to have an obsession. Who cares if someone has a couple of accounts - if a person's comment is worth something then it will be moderated up.
Modern practice, virtually all passwords when transmitted on the wire are protected through encryption
Considering a *lot* of users use passwords primarily on the Internet, this statement is incorrect.
Any website that requires you to log in, and does not use https/ssl or HTTP digest access authentication will be sniffable.
AFAIK, hotmail, yahoo and gmail, amazon, ebay all allow users to log in via http - that's probably 90%+ of your users vulnerable right there.
Just to put this in perspective - this may be a backwards step for Yahoo Mail users per. se. but isn't really much worse than your average user logging into a bunch of other websites with the same password anyway.
Slashdot Mirror
'Google Instant' as they're calling it is working for me right now - http://www.google.com/instant/#utm_campaign=launch&utm_medium=et&utm_source=rpp
Have fun, seems to be more usable than I originally expected.
Reading TFA, it was almost certainly because STP wasn't set up correctly. For instance, if the switchport in question had bpduguard enabled then it would have become disabled as soon as the erroneous hub was added, resulting in a localised issue not a network-wide problem.
It's an issue that many Network Engineers learn the hard way exactly once and fix quickly by reviewing their STP configuration and in many cases, introduce QoS for sanity.
"We didn't do an official lessons learned [exercise] after this, it was just more of a 'don't do that again,'" says Bowers
Well, apart from that guy.
Take a four-way power strip as well as an international power adaptor, it's most useful for charging.
UK is ~240V, so duoble check that your device chargers cover that range.
Yes, except they seem to have chosen to use a browser-based ballot system, that has IE as a dependency.
Yes, it's a typical MITM attack.
As Trucrypt presents it's drives as block devices to the OS, this BIOS-level Trojan is equivalent to a typical OS-level Trojan.
The real kicker is that GEORGE_BUSH == AL_GORE
You can also disable any keys on any with hardware (or: screwdriver)
If you looked at the code recently, you'd see that they've stubbed out a whole new set of OS-independent classes, and a whole lot of them have been implemented.
That said, chromium is usable right now, for me on Linux.
The easy way, for Ubuntu users
You don't need to look at the source code to see what other products do. You just need to look at the ODF files they produce.
It seems you are missing the point of standards. Adherence to the letter of the standard should be all that is required. If this is not the case, then the standard is not well-defined enough.
However, for most standards (just read pretty much any RFC), you'll observe a bunch of new versions, iterations, minor amendments and such to get to something that is rigid enough to be relied on.
This is the necessary pain that ODF is currently going through.
People posting information on a public website cannot expect their data to be kept private.
You could always play a derivative game such as the (free) Open Arena or Tremulous
All slash-delimited dates are subject to confusion (09/04/01 - what date is that? Today? 8 years ago?)
This is why ISO 8601 uses hyphen delimiters to remove the ambiguity.
Choose YYYY-MM-DD
It's not a network's purpose to define it's intended use - that's what protocols are for.
If a network is broken for a large subset of potential uses, then the network is broken and should be fixed.
Imagine what The Internet would be like if protocols like BitTorrent weren't allowed. No, wait...
me@mymachine:~$ wget -O - google.com -q | wc -c
7140
Except the size of the Google home page is massively larger than a typical MTU size (1500 bytes).
Way to go generic statement man!
A redundant architecture is what you use for important things like dns, which reduces the impact of the decision of what OS you use.
Many (inexperienced) linux admins like to reboot their boxen too remember
A metagovernment/open source government is majoritarianism. Effectively, this means little or no rights for the minority.
maybe, however rebuilding a raid live takes a performance hit on disk I/O, so this may not be desirable.
A *much* better failure model than HDDs forgetting about data on dodgy sectors etc.
Luxury! In my day, there were no such thing as multi line editing. We used ex to edit line by line, and we were lucky!
echo "Wake up you lazy $£"$^" | festival --tts
In all seriousness, rm these days won't let you do that.
If you *really* wanted to do that, you will have to also specify --no-preserve-root
It does indeed error, so you should:
blockdev --report /dev/* 2>&1 | more
My first instinct was exactly the same.
However, there's plenty of parties that have monitoring capabilities - every single hop that your packets go through.
Secondly, as a small consolation, at least the UK are being somewhat open with their decision - now we know that everything is to be monitored, we can become more conscious of using SSL.
Wow, looking at your journal, you seem to have an obsession. Who cares if someone has a couple of accounts - if a person's comment is worth something then it will be moderated up.
Modern practice, virtually all passwords when transmitted on the wire are protected through encryption
Considering a *lot* of users use passwords primarily on the Internet, this statement is incorrect.
Any website that requires you to log in, and does not use https/ssl or HTTP digest access authentication will be sniffable.
AFAIK, hotmail, yahoo and gmail, amazon, ebay all allow users to log in via http - that's probably 90%+ of your users vulnerable right there.
Just to put this in perspective - this may be a backwards step for Yahoo Mail users per. se. but isn't really much worse than your average user logging into a bunch of other websites with the same password anyway.