This is truly stupid. How is it that the AG is going after a company whose entire business model has been fairly transparent since day one, yet the banks, credit-card companies, student loan companies, car loan companies, and many other non-internet companies have been doing this for years?
It's called branding, and any public figure needs to control their brand regardless of how honest or honorable the offender might declare themselves. You can't just let people do whatever they want with your brand, even if that brand is yourself. Otherwise Trump will do it as the precedent has been set. Really, some T-Shirt guy is mad because he's trying to profit off of something he has no right to? This isn't even a story.
This really makes no sense. If an American citizen isn't protected by the U.S. Constitution when travelling overseas then they can't be bound by it either. This negates the whole concept of extradition. If a user breaks a U.S. law in another country then they aren't subject to extradition. This would therefore mean that Julian Assange would not be able to be extradited as he isn't beholding to U.S. laws while overseas. The opposite side of that coin would indicate that if persons *are* subject to U.S. laws while overseas then those responsible for the rendition of Amir Meshal are in fact beholding to those laws. They can't have it both ways.
Ok, so to clarify right off the bat, I'm not a racist, not a bigot, not an antisemite, not an extremist, not really anything of importance in any way, shape, or form. But any speech should be free speech. I don't agree with any extremist organizations (or any organizations entirely) nor do I endorse their principles.
That said, I believe that everyone, from centrists to extremists deserve the right to be able to say whatever they want. In the case of Google and Apple I don't believe that "showing" those views is an endorsement in any way. The fact is that this is censorship, and I am _VERY_ opposed to any kind of censorship. Just because I don't agree with something doesn't mean it's wrong, regardless of how offensive it might be. I'm sure that I do lots of offensive things, but I think that censorship of speech should never be done by anyone other than the person responsible for said speech. I would not want someone deciding that a really funny joke I made up should be censored because someone might be offended. That would drastically curtail my humor.
I disagree. It was written in an 80-hour weekend, and admittedly had a few bugs during beta testing, but once those were resolved it went into production and there was never a single bug reported. In fact this was probably 8 years ago and although it has mostly been replaced by other applications, it is still in use at a number of customer sites. Writing code with bugs is inevitable, however refusing to fix them because "there is no such thing as bug-free code" is just asinine. It's like saying "car accidents are inevitable" and then driving away from an car you just smashed into. You're as responsible for the bad code you wrote as you are for the good code. If you weren't then you probably shouldn't get paid at all.
I really have no idea what that means but if you're indicating that this post is only about networking gear then that isn't what the post indicated. But I'm really guessing here, as your comment seems to indicate, well, nothing intelligible that I can tell.
Well, we're actually an integrator. We generally recommend new gear for two reasons: Age & insufficiency. We understand that the gear we sell is the lifeblood of many of the companies that use it. We understand that even if a 5 year old raid is sufficient to the task that it will soon begin to start failing. These are under support and the parts will be replaced quickly, but the potential for a catastrophic failure rises dramatically. Additionally, if we wait until year 6 to start pressing for replacement then it will likely be well into year 7 before it's replaced. In the case of sufficiency, often with newer hardware (raids/SANs & tape libraries specifically) there are substantial performance improvements to tbe had. When a customer grows because of the products we sell they will often come back at some later date and complain of performance issues. We try to spec gear correctly so that there is headroom, but often the customer will not have the budget for the headroom. So if you buy at the low-end you don't have that flexibility moving forward. In other words not all vendors are just trying to squeeze you for more money. Well thought out purchases will likely be useful longer if you plan correcty, even if you're paying more. Additionally, respected integrators with good references can often help you get exactly what you need even if you have no clue. Yes, that's a self-serving plug for my industry, but assuming you get actual customer references and speak with the customer then you should be much better off.
I have thought about this some, and if I own a CD with DRM on it, I cannot legally break that DRM to make a backup copy of the disk. Yet, I am entitled to a fair-use copy of that disk for archival purposes, no? If I am entitled to a fair-use copy, am I not entitled to download that fair-use copy from someone else who has already made a copy for archival purposes? By doing so, I in fact am not breaking the encryption/DRM on that disk, but rather just downloading a copy of the songs on that disk as my fair-use copy.
From everything I've been able to garner from the DMCA, along with what the RIAA and MPAA have indicated, my only option with regards to making a fair-use copy of a CD or DVD that I own, is to download it from someone else who has broken the rules of the DMCA. This means that I did not actually break the DRM of the disk, but someone else did, and I am just downloading what is rightfully mine. So, it seems that the DMCA, RIAA and MPAA are actually encouraging downloading of music CDs and movies through their attempts at discouraging my fair-use rights. Grant M.
There is no such thing, so get a backpack for your wyse terminal, and you should be all set. And for God's, don't even think of using Google - my new Microsoft Anti-Virus told me it's a virus and categorized it as SEVERE (but they said that they would have a patch for it by next year sometime).
The Intelligence Community likely has a LARGE number of satellites in orbit (1000s?)that perform intelligence gathering missions. If this box is intended to communicate with those systems, and those systems have older, less secure or less flexible encryption mechanisms aboard that aren't easily upgraded, then letting this device fall into the wrong hands could mean the loss of some very important sources of military/intelligence information. If the only way to change the encrypted satellite control/comms mechanism is to go there and physically swap it out, then how do we do that with a grounded shuttle program? Remember, some of these satellites could very well be 1970s era.
A friend of mine received a similar letter when he was working for a company in the UK. It was relativiely small (less than 30 people), and they weren't sure what to do, until one of the IT guys who had previously worked for Oracle in the US made a suggestion... lie.
They sent a very legal-looking response to the BSA that stated (paraphrasing here) that they had no pirated software on site and that they were a contractor to the Israeli Security Agency (they weren't of course) and that if the BSA wished to have access to the facility they would need to get joint clearance from Britain's MI5 (the British security service) and the Israeli government before they would be allowed to enter the facility. They even gave the contact information for both agencies. The BSA was never heard from again.
Actually, there has been quite a bit of study on this subject, and many folks now believe that the human subjects that appear immune are missing one of the two key proteins that allow HIV to attach to and infect T-cells. This theory would likely mean that the immunity of chimps through a variation in their immune system is an unlikely comparison to make, unless this is the same variation that is in the chimps (which the article doesn't really describe well enough to rule it out).
"Iris Scans", which is what the article stated, are scans of the colored part of the eye, not the retina. These can be easily fooled by contacts, and are therefore an unlikely security mechanism. But none of this is even an issue.
The point is that there will not be stored images of your iris, retina, face, or even your DNA, at least not for the purpose of identification. That's not the way that security systems work. Security systems will only store enough information to uniquely identify you. Here's what I mean with regards to the particular systems currently in development:
Retinal scans are difficult and presently relatively slow and cumbersome processes. I expect that if any sort of retinal scan technology is ever implemented, it is a long way off, if ever. Retinal scanning presently requires you to immobilize your head in a fixture so that the system can take a picture of the INSIDE of your eye. Only then can it match that based on identifying points to a record of those key points. It is not likely to store a complete image of your retina, just those identifying structures, which means that it would likely only be useful for ID purposes. For instance it might store the image of a reference point as a "key", and then indentifying structures would be referenced from that. For example, ref #1 is 240 pixels from KEY at 270 degrees (compass direction).
The same is true for face recognition, which only stores data-points in regards to facial feature locations. In the future, I suspect that these would be further reduced as an algorithm which can be used to recreate those features. These will not be actually images of your face, as that would be entirely inefficient. No system will likely store all of the information needed to recreate the owner even in a general sense.
Even if we develop a "DNA scanner", it would be ridiculous to store the gigabytes of genomic data for a single individual, just for the purpose of security. Those systems would work just like every other system, storing only the combination of points necessary to identify the specific user. And as I stated before, these would likely be reduced even further to an algorithm of some sort.
The other particular aspect of this is that many systems will need to work remotely. That means that unless you want to install these systems in remote locations, then the process is pointless.
With that said, I suspect that any sort of future security system will likely incorporate some sort of simple key system, perhaps combined with one of the above technologies (I tend to think biometrics is the likely candidate at present). Even the DOD HPMC uses SecurID and is satisfied. My personal suspicion is that we will likely have some sort of biometric-keyed SecurID card with the scanner in the card. The card will use the features of the scan to create an algorithn used to encode a password, and the controling system will use it's stored user id algorithm to decode that password to use for access. If the algorithm or password don't match that of the user, then access cannot be granted.
First of all, the article said "Iris Scans". The iris is that part of the eye that has the color. It can easily be fooled by colored contacts, which many people wear. How is this any kind of security.
Second, even if the article had stated "retinal scans", I think this likely will never catch on, as it requires one to place their eye against some sort of reader. This is not only inconvenient, but it is also a relatively slow process (at least at present, as there are alot of variables involved).
All-in-all, I think that these sort of recognition systems are quite a way off, if they are implemented at all. I tend to believe that the more likely options are face, fingerprint, and body chemistry recognition systems for business security, but expect that even those will be less likely than the old standby of a simple key system or something akin to SecurID (see the DOD HPCMP page).
The guys that always come to mind for me when talking security is the old l0pht.com (now www.atstake.com, but l0pht.com still works). These are the guys that the media always calls when they have questions about hackers.
For someone so interested in getting his book to earn him money, you would think that he would link to B&N or someone who isn't pushing the sale of used books over new ones. As far as anything being 'Open' about amazon, well that's another story.
Part of the problem is that there is no agreed-upon implementation. The POSIX group could not choose between X/Open's catgets implementation and GNU's gettext, and as such, left it out of the standard entirely.
Another problem with both toolsets is that neither presents a truly extensible strings database format. If you need to add additional storage fields to the strings database for a language other than C, you're out of luck if you plan to use the library and tools on the same files. Very short-sighted IMHO.
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This is truly stupid. How is it that the AG is going after a company whose entire business model has been fairly transparent since day one, yet the banks, credit-card companies, student loan companies, car loan companies, and many other non-internet companies have been doing this for years?
It's called branding, and any public figure needs to control their brand regardless of how honest or honorable the offender might declare themselves. You can't just let people do whatever they want with your brand, even if that brand is yourself. Otherwise Trump will do it as the precedent has been set. Really, some T-Shirt guy is mad because he's trying to profit off of something he has no right to? This isn't even a story.
This really makes no sense. If an American citizen isn't protected by the U.S. Constitution when travelling overseas then they can't be bound by it either. This negates the whole concept of extradition. If a user breaks a U.S. law in another country then they aren't subject to extradition. This would therefore mean that Julian Assange would not be able to be extradited as he isn't beholding to U.S. laws while overseas. The opposite side of that coin would indicate that if persons *are* subject to U.S. laws while overseas then those responsible for the rendition of Amir Meshal are in fact beholding to those laws. They can't have it both ways.
Ok, so to clarify right off the bat, I'm not a racist, not a bigot, not an antisemite, not an extremist, not really anything of importance in any way, shape, or form. But any speech should be free speech. I don't agree with any extremist organizations (or any organizations entirely) nor do I endorse their principles. That said, I believe that everyone, from centrists to extremists deserve the right to be able to say whatever they want. In the case of Google and Apple I don't believe that "showing" those views is an endorsement in any way. The fact is that this is censorship, and I am _VERY_ opposed to any kind of censorship. Just because I don't agree with something doesn't mean it's wrong, regardless of how offensive it might be. I'm sure that I do lots of offensive things, but I think that censorship of speech should never be done by anyone other than the person responsible for said speech. I would not want someone deciding that a really funny joke I made up should be censored because someone might be offended. That would drastically curtail my humor.
Yeah, if you let your children make their own decisions it could end horribly. They might become Republicans or something crazy like that!
I disagree. It was written in an 80-hour weekend, and admittedly had a few bugs during beta testing, but once those were resolved it went into production and there was never a single bug reported. In fact this was probably 8 years ago and although it has mostly been replaced by other applications, it is still in use at a number of customer sites. Writing code with bugs is inevitable, however refusing to fix them because "there is no such thing as bug-free code" is just asinine. It's like saying "car accidents are inevitable" and then driving away from an car you just smashed into. You're as responsible for the bad code you wrote as you are for the good code. If you weren't then you probably shouldn't get paid at all.
I really have no idea what that means but if you're indicating that this post is only about networking gear then that isn't what the post indicated. But I'm really guessing here, as your comment seems to indicate, well, nothing intelligible that I can tell.
Well, we're actually an integrator. We generally recommend new gear for two reasons: Age & insufficiency. We understand that the gear we sell is the lifeblood of many of the companies that use it. We understand that even if a 5 year old raid is sufficient to the task that it will soon begin to start failing. These are under support and the parts will be replaced quickly, but the potential for a catastrophic failure rises dramatically. Additionally, if we wait until year 6 to start pressing for replacement then it will likely be well into year 7 before it's replaced. In the case of sufficiency, often with newer hardware (raids/SANs & tape libraries specifically) there are substantial performance improvements to tbe had. When a customer grows because of the products we sell they will often come back at some later date and complain of performance issues. We try to spec gear correctly so that there is headroom, but often the customer will not have the budget for the headroom. So if you buy at the low-end you don't have that flexibility moving forward. In other words not all vendors are just trying to squeeze you for more money. Well thought out purchases will likely be useful longer if you plan correcty, even if you're paying more. Additionally, respected integrators with good references can often help you get exactly what you need even if you have no clue. Yes, that's a self-serving plug for my industry, but assuming you get actual customer references and speak with the customer then you should be much better off.
I have thought about this some, and if I own a CD with DRM on it, I cannot legally break that DRM to make a backup copy of the disk. Yet, I am entitled to a fair-use copy of that disk for archival purposes, no? If I am entitled to a fair-use copy, am I not entitled to download that fair-use copy from someone else who has already made a copy for archival purposes? By doing so, I in fact am not breaking the encryption/DRM on that disk, but rather just downloading a copy of the songs on that disk as my fair-use copy.
From everything I've been able to garner from the DMCA, along with what the RIAA and MPAA have indicated, my only option with regards to making a fair-use copy of a CD or DVD that I own, is to download it from someone else who has broken the rules of the DMCA. This means that I did not actually break the DRM of the disk, but someone else did, and I am just downloading what is rightfully mine. So, it seems that the DMCA, RIAA and MPAA are actually encouraging downloading of music CDs and movies through their attempts at discouraging my fair-use rights.
Grant M.
There is no such thing, so get a backpack for your wyse terminal, and you should be all set. And for God's, don't even think of using Google - my new Microsoft Anti-Virus told me it's a virus and categorized it as SEVERE (but they said that they would have a patch for it by next year sometime).
The local encryption may not be the problem here.
The Intelligence Community likely has a LARGE number of satellites in orbit (1000s?)that perform intelligence gathering missions. If this box is intended to communicate with those systems, and those systems have older, less secure or less flexible encryption mechanisms aboard that aren't easily upgraded, then letting this device fall into the wrong hands could mean the loss of some very important sources of military/intelligence information. If the only way to change the encrypted satellite control/comms mechanism is to go there and physically swap it out, then how do we do that with a grounded shuttle program? Remember, some of these satellites could very well be 1970s era.
A friend of mine received a similar letter when he was working for a company in the UK. It was relativiely small (less than 30 people), and they weren't sure what to do, until one of the IT guys who had previously worked for Oracle in the US made a suggestion... lie.
They sent a very legal-looking response to the BSA that stated (paraphrasing here) that they had no pirated software on site and that they were a contractor to the Israeli Security Agency (they weren't of course) and that if the BSA wished to have access to the facility they would need to get joint clearance from Britain's MI5 (the British security service) and the Israeli government before they would be allowed to enter the facility. They even gave the contact information for both agencies. The BSA was never heard from again.
Actually, there has been quite a bit of study on this subject, and many folks now believe that the human subjects that appear immune are missing one of the two key proteins that allow HIV to attach to and infect T-cells. This theory would likely mean that the immunity of chimps through a variation in their immune system is an unlikely comparison to make, unless this is the same variation that is in the chimps (which the article doesn't really describe well enough to rule it out).
"Iris Scans", which is what the article stated, are scans of the colored part of the eye, not the retina. These can be easily fooled by contacts, and are therefore an unlikely security mechanism. But none of this is even an issue.
The point is that there will not be stored images of your iris, retina, face, or even your DNA, at least not for the purpose of identification. That's not the way that security systems work. Security systems will only store enough information to uniquely identify you. Here's what I mean with regards to the particular systems currently in development:
Retinal scans are difficult and presently relatively slow and cumbersome processes. I expect that if any sort of retinal scan technology is ever implemented, it is a long way off, if ever. Retinal scanning presently requires you to immobilize your head in a fixture so that the system can take a picture of the INSIDE of your eye. Only then can it match that based on identifying points to a record of those key points. It is not likely to store a complete image of your retina, just those identifying structures, which means that it would likely only be useful for ID purposes. For instance it might store the image of a reference point as a "key", and then indentifying structures would be referenced from that. For example, ref #1 is 240 pixels from KEY at 270 degrees (compass direction).
The same is true for face recognition, which only stores data-points in regards to facial feature locations. In the future, I suspect that these would be further reduced as an algorithm which can be used to recreate those features. These will not be actually images of your face, as that would be entirely inefficient. No system will likely store all of the information needed to recreate the owner even in a general sense.
Even if we develop a "DNA scanner", it would be ridiculous to store the gigabytes of genomic data for a single individual, just for the purpose of security. Those systems would work just like every other system, storing only the combination of points necessary to identify the specific user. And as I stated before, these would likely be reduced even further to an algorithm of some sort.
The other particular aspect of this is that many systems will need to work remotely. That means that unless you want to install these systems in remote locations, then the process is pointless.
With that said, I suspect that any sort of future security system will likely incorporate some sort of simple key system, perhaps combined with one of the above technologies (I tend to think biometrics is the likely candidate at present). Even the DOD HPMC uses SecurID and is satisfied. My personal suspicion is that we will likely have some sort of biometric-keyed SecurID card with the scanner in the card. The card will use the features of the scan to create an algorithn used to encode a password, and the controling system will use it's stored user id algorithm to decode that password to use for access. If the algorithm or password don't match that of the user, then access cannot be granted.
First of all, the article said "Iris Scans". The iris is that part of the eye that has the color. It can easily be fooled by colored contacts, which many people wear. How is this any kind of security. Second, even if the article had stated "retinal scans", I think this likely will never catch on, as it requires one to place their eye against some sort of reader. This is not only inconvenient, but it is also a relatively slow process (at least at present, as there are alot of variables involved). All-in-all, I think that these sort of recognition systems are quite a way off, if they are implemented at all. I tend to believe that the more likely options are face, fingerprint, and body chemistry recognition systems for business security, but expect that even those will be less likely than the old standby of a simple key system or something akin to SecurID (see the DOD HPCMP page).
The guys that always come to mind for me when talking security is the old l0pht.com (now www.atstake.com, but l0pht.com still works). These are the guys that the media always calls when they have questions about hackers.
For someone so interested in getting his book to earn him money, you would think that he would link to B&N or someone who isn't pushing the sale of used books over new ones. As far as anything being 'Open' about amazon, well that's another story.
Part of the problem is that there is no agreed-upon implementation. The POSIX group could not choose between X/Open's catgets implementation and GNU's gettext, and as such, left it out of the standard entirely. Another problem with both toolsets is that neither presents a truly extensible strings database format. If you need to add additional storage fields to the strings database for a language other than C, you're out of luck if you plan to use the library and tools on the same files. Very short-sighted IMHO.