For recommendations in favour, this sounds great, so long as the trust metric is attack resistant as described in Raph Levien's thesis. Google PageRank is an example of an attack resistant trust metric.
For recommendations against, it's very hard to make this work, because it's hard to make the shit stick; every time the global reputation of a particular identity takes a dive, it's easy to shift to another one which has no recommendations either way.
Creating hard-to-evade IDs is a very hard problem.
(Aside: they're not claiming to be the first to attack this problem - see eg this paper - but that their technique is much more computationally efficient.)
Every time someone asks you for a block, you send them a new block, which is a random linear combination of all the blocks you have. This new block will almost always be useful to them. As soon as you get n blocks, where n is the number of blocks in the original file, you can reconstruct the original file. So bandwidth is never wasted sending a block the long way when the short way would do - you squeeze the maximum work from every hop.
The really interesting bit is right at the end, almost as an aside:
"In Avalance we use special sets of secure hash functions that survive network coding operations and consume very little computational resources"
So even though each block is novel, they have a way for the receiver to ensure that it's a real piece of the puzzle. That's a hard problem indeed! So why isn't the solution part of the paper? Are they holding off from publishing that until the patent comes through?
Garbage collection techology has been dealing with this well for a long time. Read The Memory Management Reference - multiple threads are assumed, and the single-threaded special case merits barely a mention. The "mutator" threads can keep running while garbage collection is going on, too - memory barriers are used to protect against race conditions.
The thesis is basically that by causing your client to change identity frequently, you can take advantage of the leniency that BT allows newcomers to the network, and thus "leech" without punishment. This isn't done because you'll get kicked out of the communities that publish BT metadata if you do it.
I don't see it. If you're going to leech, that's the way to do it, but cooperating overall results in even better upload rates; you're not fighting for the few slots afforded newcomers, you will be given as many packets as you can eat as fast as you can eat them so long as you reciprocate. And I'm sure those communities will survive - I suspect that Bram will have thought of how to integrate search with community.
I like your description, but for the most part it would be more accurate if you were to omit the first word after the colon. Or even the first three words.
Thomas the Tank Engine is a dirty scab! When the little shunting engines go on strike, Thomas the Tank Engine shows himself to be a gleeful strikebreaker, and lackey of that capitalist pig-dog, the Fat Controller.
I think that Cheney is a dangerous warmonger and right-hand man to the Monkey of the Apocalypse, but it's important to get the Halliburton stuff right. To avoid a conflict of interest regarding Halliburton, Cheney bought an insurance policy regarding his deferred payments. So he gets exactly the same money regardless of whether Halliburton soars or tanks.
There's a whole lot of extremely suspicious stuff going on between the Government and that company, but Cheney's deferred payment plan isn't directly a part of it.
I don't think RSA is overall more trusted than DSA, and I certainly don't see a way in which it's more flexible for this application. It was designed only to do signatures, but that's fine, since only signatures are needed here.
When you say "leaking bits", you're probably thinking of subliminal channels, and you're referring to some rather out-of-date information in Applied Cryptography. It's now established that all secure signature schemes have subliminal channels; they have to be probabalistic for the security proofs to work, and that's enough to give a "low-bandwidth" channel for anyone who doesn't know the signing key, or a "high-bandwidth" chanel for those who do.
Have you read "Obedience to Authority"? The experiment was designed to test the role of authority in obedience. The control, therefore, was a similar experimental setup in which the person insisting that the controls be turned up was *not* an authority figure, but a fellow subject.
Though Milgram's experiment would not be repeated today for ethical reasons, that doesn't make it scientifically unsound.
Slashdot Mirror
The really important patent is
"Biometric Personal Identification System Based on Iris Analysis." U.S. Patent No. 5,291,560 issued March 1, 1994 (J. Daugman).
which describes the first algorithm that really works, and that doesn't expire for nearly six years.
In a just world this would be the highest-scored reply to the article, but the moderation system rewards being early more than any other measure...
Not long afterwards, he's turned into a pig and trapped in that land until his daughter can free him and her mother from the sorceress Yubaba...
(Of course the author of that letter is also biased. What trickiness! See also this article on Pimental...)
It didn't take long to find two things:
(1) Making this case seems to be all Patzek ever does
(2) He may not be wholly unbiased.
Here's the Google search and here's one of many interesting results...
Unfortunately the bad news is that if it's villain, then the mixup has to leave him hideously deformed...
For recommendations in favour, this sounds great, so long as the trust metric is attack resistant as described in Raph Levien's thesis. Google PageRank is an example of an attack resistant trust metric.
For recommendations against, it's very hard to make this work, because it's hard to make the shit stick; every time the global reputation of a particular identity takes a dive, it's easy to shift to another one which has no recommendations either way.
Creating hard-to-evade IDs is a very hard problem.
I'd like to do that, but with exceptions for sites like Slashdot. *goes looking for a suitable Firefox extension*
(Aside: they're not claiming to be the first to attack this problem - see eg this paper - but that their technique is much more computationally efficient.)
Every time someone asks you for a block, you send them a new block, which is a random linear combination of all the blocks you have. This new block will almost always be useful to them. As soon as you get n blocks, where n is the number of blocks in the original file, you can reconstruct the original file. So bandwidth is never wasted sending a block the long way when the short way would do - you squeeze the maximum work from every hop.
The really interesting bit is right at the end, almost as an aside:
"In Avalance we use special sets of secure hash functions that survive network coding operations and consume very little computational resources"
So even though each block is novel, they have a way for the receiver to ensure that it's a real piece of the puzzle. That's a hard problem indeed! So why isn't the solution part of the paper? Are they holding off from publishing that until the patent comes through?
Garbage collection techology has been dealing with this well for a long time. Read The Memory Management Reference - multiple threads are assumed, and the single-threaded special case merits barely a mention. The "mutator" threads can keep running while garbage collection is going on, too - memory barriers are used to protect against race conditions.
Mom?
The thesis is basically that by causing your client to change identity frequently, you can take advantage of the leniency that BT allows newcomers to the network, and thus "leech" without punishment. This isn't done because you'll get kicked out of the communities that publish BT metadata if you do it.
I don't see it. If you're going to leech, that's the way to do it, but cooperating overall results in even better upload rates; you're not fighting for the few slots afforded newcomers, you will be given as many packets as you can eat as fast as you can eat them so long as you reciprocate. And I'm sure those communities will survive - I suspect that Bram will have thought of how to integrate search with community.
Thank you! *bows*
Well, there's at least one instance of someone buying a three-digit (IIRC) /. account on eBay.
For how much?
I'm 34, but I'm glad I'm younger than you.
You couldn't possibly fit a fan this big in any known case.
Coral link to article
Coral link direct to picture of fan
I don't want anyone to male the brains of 8-12 year olds, thank you very much!
And here are some strategies that will safely give more bits:
http://www.ciphergoth.org/software/unbiasing/
Correcting for the increase in decay is practically impossible; use a long-lived source.
I like your description, but for the most part it would be more accurate if you were to omit the first word after the colon. Or even the first three words.
Thomas the Tank Engine is a dirty scab! When the little shunting engines go on strike, Thomas the Tank Engine shows himself to be a gleeful strikebreaker, and lackey of that capitalist pig-dog, the Fat Controller.
I think that Cheney is a dangerous warmonger and right-hand man to the Monkey of the Apocalypse, but it's important to get the Halliburton stuff right. To avoid a conflict of interest regarding Halliburton, Cheney bought an insurance policy regarding his deferred payments. So he gets exactly the same money regardless of whether Halliburton soars or tanks.
There's a whole lot of extremely suspicious stuff going on between the Government and that company, but Cheney's deferred payment plan isn't directly a part of it.
I don't think RSA is overall more trusted than DSA, and I certainly don't see a way in which it's more flexible for this application. It was designed only to do signatures, but that's fine, since only signatures are needed here.
When you say "leaking bits", you're probably thinking of subliminal channels, and you're referring to some rather out-of-date information in Applied Cryptography. It's now established that all secure signature schemes have subliminal channels; they have to be probabalistic for the security proofs to work, and that's enough to give a "low-bandwidth" channel for anyone who doesn't know the signing key, or a "high-bandwidth" chanel for those who do.
DSA is a perfectly good choice here.
What about judicial review?
Have you read "Obedience to Authority"? The experiment was designed to test the role of authority in obedience. The control, therefore, was a similar experimental setup in which the person insisting that the controls be turned up was *not* an authority figure, but a fellow subject.
Though Milgram's experiment would not be repeated today for ethical reasons, that doesn't make it scientifically unsound.
Look again...