> your anecdote is not verifiable and so worthless.
Without references, the anecdote merely states that this type of suit is not uniformly justified. Which should be a surprise to no one. Not much call to verify it. With references, you'd still have insufficient basis to judge the merits of that particular case. You'd then have to get first hand information to attempt to verify the case. And even then, it would not inform you about the validity of the Thuen case.
So why are you kicking up a fuss about the anecdote?
Records about you do not belong to you, that is the only issue here. He doesn't have standing to challenge a warrant for records about him.
And here you describe the Third Party Doctrine in a nutshell. And then you spoil the ride by talking about a warrant, when the challenge is, to paraphrase The Matrix, "there IS no warrant".
I'll repeat that: the information was not collected through a warrant. There is no warrant to challenge.
Which bring us back to the third party doctrine: "he had no expectation of privacy" in data someone else collected. Even that's not on the table. As you said, the government is saying that he can't even challenge that evidence "because it didn't come from him". Which is a whole other ball of wax.
Create a bomb. Attach a trigger designed to be set off by (scanning of particular type). Ship by method scheduled to be scanned.
1) if it is not scanned, hey, you've got a bomb you can use! Win! 2) if the trigger fails, you've got a choice... 2a) the bomb was detected, disarmed, and tracked. Good luck hiding! 2b) the bomb wasn't detected, see 1).
or 3) the trigger works, the bomb detonates, demolishing the scanner.
Bombs are cheaper than scanners, and easier to replace. Win!
And while the scanner is down, port activity may be slowed or stopped. Win!
So if you send the bomb to some place you have no intention of picking it up from (say, an Amazon.com warehouse?), you are probably safe just watching the cargo container make its way to where your secondary trigger fires off. Or to the DEA warehouse for repurposing...
I believe the point was airplane security, rather than airplane access per se. If I can drive up to the airplane, wearing maintenance coveralls and in a vehicle with insignia on it, chances are good I can do things like "inspect the fuselage" or "add the captain's baggage". Or even "this parcel is to test destination airport security, would you please add it to the bags being loaded?"
Groklaw noted a number of instances where websites were changed as a result of information revealed in court... or on Groklaw as a result of research prompted by court documents.
Before you crow the victory of frugility with your beans and rice, you might consider that those are "unprepared foods".
Same sort of problem that aid NGOs have: You can hand out 5 pounds of rice to a family to "feed them for a week" (or however long), but unless said family ALSO has the means to prepare that rice, you aren't FEEDING them.
Software Engineering is pure logic, filtered through languages, APIs, etc. Given this problem and this desired outcome, there exists only a limited set of possible "logical devices" that will get there. In this sense, all programs are math, and thus should not be subject to patenting at all.
There is also the very blurry line between patents and copyright re software. Google vs Oracle comes to mind.
See wikipedia for an example of MS attempting to charge 3.85% for patent licensing re the EU interoperability case. Since interoperability was mandated by the EU, I find it reasonable to equate this case to a FRAND licensing case.
The EU beat them down to lower values, but could only do that because they held the bigger stick.
If thousands of developers truly were poring over the code, this shouldn't occur.
Examining N sections of code (or programs, or systems...) is an O(n) problem. Examining N sections of code as they relate to each other of the N sections of code is an O(n^2) problem. And it only gets more complex from there once you add in the dimension of time.
If there is one person studying each piece of code, there's still more than a lifetime of work, to examine how that code interacts with all the rest of the code in the world. Viewed that way, it is not surprising that security flaws remain undiscovered for years.
But you're right. Software for the typical user "just works". And if it works, it doesn't get examined closely.
If you are going to hold a "read every document" standard to Manning, then you must hold it to the prosecution as well.
Did they find explicit evidence that a document was NOT evidence of a war crime? Given the weight of documents that WERE evidence of such, is the release of the other documents excusable?
I don't think that the government's case was based on the particular contents of any given document or set of documents. I'm pretty sure they considered the entire corpus to be theirs and thus that ANY release of ANY document punishable.
Putative war crimes coverup issues were not at issue. Venue of release was not at issue. "He disclosed things we wanted kept secret" was the only issue that the prosecutors were concerned with.
So when this test goes into practice, you've "only" got a 1-in-5 chance of unjustly being put into restraints in your hospital bed "for your own good"?
> if he changes it by accident everything will be broken and he won't know why.
If that is the case, "you're doing it wrong". There are so many ways to fix that without simply denying the option to everyone:
1) hide the option behind "advanced" options, requiring more clicks to get to. There's a reason for a GUI rather than having people hack.ini files. 2) providing explicit documentation, at the location of the control, explaining the effects. Maybe even a test-drive URL showing the difference. 3) providing a "first-time mulligan" when javascript is blocked... a "you have javascript disabled and this page uses it. want to re-enable it?" type of event.
I'm confident I haven't fully explored the solution space here...
Up to the point the Supreme Court slaps them down.
Do you want to test the legality of some law that (you believe) violates the (nth) amendment? You have to be prepared to fight it in court, and fight it to the Supreme Court in many, many cases.
Slashdot Mirror
> your anecdote is not verifiable and so worthless.
Without references, the anecdote merely states that this type of suit is not uniformly justified. Which should be a surprise to no one. Not much call to verify it. With references, you'd still have insufficient basis to judge the merits of that particular case. You'd then have to get first hand information to attempt to verify the case. And even then, it would not inform you about the validity of the Thuen case.
So why are you kicking up a fuss about the anecdote?
> Do you walk around with a phone thinking "in my pocket, near my crotch is a continuing, unending fire risk that occasionally makes phone calls".
No, but occasionally I think that of my laptop.
Records about you do not belong to you, that is the only issue here. He doesn't have standing to challenge a warrant for records about him.
And here you describe the Third Party Doctrine in a nutshell. And then you spoil the ride by talking about a warrant, when the challenge is, to paraphrase The Matrix, "there IS no warrant".
I'll repeat that: the information was not collected through a warrant. There is no warrant to challenge.
Which bring us back to the third party doctrine: "he had no expectation of privacy" in data someone else collected. Even that's not on the table. As you said, the government is saying that he can't even challenge that evidence "because it didn't come from him". Which is a whole other ball of wax.
Here's a scenario:
Create a bomb. Attach a trigger designed to be set off by (scanning of particular type). Ship by method scheduled to be scanned.
1) if it is not scanned, hey, you've got a bomb you can use! Win!
2) if the trigger fails, you've got a choice...
2a) the bomb was detected, disarmed, and tracked. Good luck hiding!
2b) the bomb wasn't detected, see 1).
or 3) the trigger works, the bomb detonates, demolishing the scanner.
Bombs are cheaper than scanners, and easier to replace. Win!
And while the scanner is down, port activity may be slowed or stopped. Win!
So if you send the bomb to some place you have no intention of picking it up from (say, an Amazon.com warehouse?), you are probably safe just watching the cargo container make its way to where your secondary trigger fires off. Or to the DEA warehouse for repurposing...
Every now and then, someone WILL lean against the wall and stumble back against the server room's Emergency Power Disconnect switch.
And the very next day, someone will fit a flip-up cover for it.
> The homeless can't cook, but anyone with heat and water can prepare rice.
There you have hit the nail on the head. Heat and water are not ubiquitous.
> Good luck driving onto the airplane.
I believe the point was airplane security, rather than airplane access per se. If I can drive up to the airplane, wearing maintenance coveralls and in a vehicle with insignia on it, chances are good I can do things like "inspect the fuselage" or "add the captain's baggage". Or even "this parcel is to test destination airport security, would you please add it to the bags being loaded?"
> That's why there are lawsuits, to determine how to portion the stupidity properly.
You say that like there was a shortage.
>This won't be a popular perspective, but I agree that metadata is not data.
You may view this merely as pedantic, but... metadata is data. Data about data. Thus the "meta".
It's just not considered "personal" data, just as you described.
Groklaw noted a number of instances where websites were changed as a result of information revealed in court ... or on Groklaw as a result of research prompted by court documents.
Before you crow the victory of frugility with your beans and rice, you might consider that those are "unprepared foods".
Same sort of problem that aid NGOs have: You can hand out 5 pounds of rice to a family to "feed them for a week" (or however long), but unless said family ALSO has the means to prepare that rice, you aren't FEEDING them.
We could always ask Yoda. I hear he lives in a swamp where the sequestered CO2 comes up all the time.
Software Engineering is pure logic, filtered through languages, APIs, etc. Given this problem and this desired outcome, there exists only a limited set of possible "logical devices" that will get there. In this sense, all programs are math, and thus should not be subject to patenting at all.
There is also the very blurry line between patents and copyright re software. Google vs Oracle comes to mind.
No... Econophysicists. Dark money
The only problem with Bear Proof Suit development is cleaning out the failed prototypes.
See wikipedia for an example of MS attempting to charge 3.85% for patent licensing re the EU interoperability case. Since interoperability was mandated by the EU, I find it reasonable to equate this case to a FRAND licensing case.
The EU beat them down to lower values, but could only do that because they held the bigger stick.
So really, not so long a time after all.
That looks a lot like a quote from something, but Google didn't find it for me. Could you cite your source?
I don't doubt you quoted it (misspelling and all), but perhaps I need a Pacer subscription instead of looking on Google?
It's Quebec (french-inspired) legal system, so who knows.
But were it the US, you could end up being the butt end of a default judgement against you.
If thousands of developers truly were poring over the code, this shouldn't occur.
Examining N sections of code (or programs, or systems...) is an O(n) problem. Examining N sections of code as they relate to each other of the N sections of code is an O(n^2) problem. And it only gets more complex from there once you add in the dimension of time.
If there is one person studying each piece of code, there's still more than a lifetime of work, to examine how that code interacts with all the rest of the code in the world. Viewed that way, it is not surprising that security flaws remain undiscovered for years.
But you're right. Software for the typical user "just works". And if it works, it doesn't get examined closely.
If you are going to hold a "read every document" standard to Manning, then you must hold it to the prosecution as well.
Did they find explicit evidence that a document was NOT evidence of a war crime? Given the weight of documents that WERE evidence of such, is the release of the other documents excusable?
I don't think that the government's case was based on the particular contents of any given document or set of documents. I'm pretty sure they considered the entire corpus to be theirs and thus that ANY release of ANY document punishable.
Putative war crimes coverup issues were not at issue. Venue of release was not at issue. "He disclosed things we wanted kept secret" was the only issue that the prosecutors were concerned with.
So when this test goes into practice, you've "only" got a 1-in-5 chance of unjustly being put into restraints in your hospital bed "for your own good"?
Hmm... So Romney had a job in National Security before becoming governor?
> if he changes it by accident everything will be broken and he won't know why.
If that is the case, "you're doing it wrong". There are so many ways to fix that without simply denying the option to everyone:
1) hide the option behind "advanced" options, requiring more clicks to get to. There's a reason for a GUI rather than having people hack .ini files.
2) providing explicit documentation, at the location of the control, explaining the effects. Maybe even a test-drive URL showing the difference.
3) providing a "first-time mulligan" when javascript is blocked... a "you have javascript disabled and this page uses it. want to re-enable it?" type of event.
I'm confident I haven't fully explored the solution space here...
"The other candidate would have handled this differently" may be true.
But the differences may well have been superficial. Or the situation might well be worse than it already is.
Swapping candidate B for candidate A isn't a magic wand even in a thought exercise.
Up to the point the Supreme Court slaps them down.
Do you want to test the legality of some law that (you believe) violates the (nth) amendment? You have to be prepared to fight it in court, and fight it to the Supreme Court in many, many cases.
And the Supreme Court may allow the law to stand.
State secrets privilege, particularly the seminal United States v Reynolds
National Security letters and Warrant canaries (canaries may or may not be termed legal; a NSL may instruct to "not take down the canary", for instance)
Children's Internet Protection Act (found constitutional)
Communications Decency Act (portions struck down)
It's a crap shoot. The state secrets privilege, for instance, was clearly illegal behavior but the court allowed it to stand.