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A cantenna is not a part 15 device.

Homemade devices are permitted under Part 15 section 23:

Home-built devices.

1. Equipment authorization is not required for devices that are not marketed, are not constructed from a kit, and are built in quantities of five or less for personal use.
2. It is recognized that the individual builder of home-built equipment may not possess the means to perform the measurements for determining compliance with the regulations. In this case, the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices to meet the specified technical standards to the greatest extent practicable. The provisions of Sec. 15.5 apply to this equipment.

The cantenna itself isn't illegal to posess, but it may very well be illegal to use if it boosts the directional signal beyond the FCC's limit. Remember, 2.4GHz space is unlicensed, but it's not completely unregulated. Power limits are in place to prevent greedy users from stepping on the whole band and locking out others. (See FCC rules.)

The reason why there's all those proprietary connections in antenna space is because you're only supposed to use antennas that are approved for use with the transmitting device, so you stay within the perscribed limits for effective directional power. (Just recently the FCC announced plans to allow for mix-and-matching of antennas.) Connect a tightly directional antenna to a transmitter that's operating at full power meant for omnidirectional use, and you'll have an illegal setup. That's exactly the situation most canttenas find themselves in.

...because there are already laws they can use against those who use the internet access to coordinate acts of terrorism.

It's 14CFR91.21 --All the FBI has to do is call the air traffic control centers (or approaches) and tell them that they have reason to think the Internet is being used for a coordinated attack against the country. Then each airline pilot would merely push the OFF switch on the internet access gear onboard the aircraft.

The bottom line is that 14CFR91.21 says that you're using whatever wireless gizmo on board the aircraft at the express permission of the Pilot-in-Command . The instant the Pilot thinks something might jeapordize the safety of others, they already have express permission to take whatever measures are neccesary to maintain safety of flight.

This is not about your rights, folks. You're a passenger onboard an international vessel and subject to the orders of the captain or pilot in command of that vessle. You can whine about the indignity once you're safely at port or on the ground. Until then, live with it or don't go.

i hate to be an asshat and reply to my own post, but a link to the full report is here:

http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/05aug20041 050/www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf

it suggests vague al-qaida ties to Iraq and a meeting or two, much less of a connection than that of many other middle east countries. Not really a cause for war.

OK, Mr. pthisis, I'm getting kinda bothered by your repeated mis-characterisation of case law. Please read the full document that contains the ruling and the two dissenting opinions. The dissenting opinions give the actual case law backing for why this is wrong, which I think holds more credibility from multiple career judges than your amateur opinion.

Contrary to your assertions, here is some of the historical background, as detailed in the dissenting opinions. The founding fathers were trying to set up the 5th amendment to directly counter the kind of assumption by government that they had been seeing from the monarchy. It was strictly to be used for direct public use (roads, schools, etc.). That was gradually extended somewhat through some of that case law, which is where the "blight" factor comes in. Basically, if an area is deemed really really bad, such that it is a mess and a high crime area, etc. then they could condemn it and buy for a revitalization type work, which may be contracted out.

This new decision is not a reaffirming, as you say, but crossing a very bad line in further extending and broadening the justification of taking land. Instead of any actual blight, where the land is in really bad shape and desperately in need of improvements, the new rule they have condoned is that ANY proposed improvement, even places that are perfectly fine, is grounds for taking land and giving it to a developer.

So, your information is incorrect. I encourage everyone to read the full decision and dissenting opinions so that they can be better informed than being misled by you.

Well if she really voted for it, then her 11 page dissent which you can find in the last half of this PDF is pretty strange.

You're the smackhead, with all your mamby-pamby talk about "intent". Show me where in the decision there's evidence of an explicit public statement by Grokster saying "use Grokster to violate copyright". There's only the "intent" and "expectation of benefit" that I mentioned. From which the court conjectures that advertising to Napster users equates to advertising copyright violation. Well, the new Napster advertises to old Napster users, but that's not advertising copyright violation.

So let's have it: where is the evidence of advertising to infringe copyright, in that decision you've read so much better than have I?

This conversion of "intent" to "liability" is the kind of wishful thinking we get from justices like Scalia. I suppose Scalia "knows an establishment of religion" when he sees it, right? The framed 10 Commandments was on the wall with other hangings, too. No, the whole decision is designed to preserve Scalia's constituency in the Christian fanatics who want him to lead the Court, replacing the Constitution with their own sharia law.

The full text of the ruling is here for anyone who might have missed it.

The Supreme court has not weaseled out of anything. The case brought to them is not the one you might be thinking of. It's not so much P2P vs. *AA as it is whether this specific case has any basis for trial. In fact, you can say that with this decision, they've only strengthened the Betamax decision.

Here's a quick analysis:

The opinion of the court explicitly states that ...mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability in themselves.

What made them decide against Grokster et al. is that

one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.

MGM showed this by presenting evidence that the programs were marketed as Napster alternatives. That's really the clincher, since Napster is a well known tool for copyright infringement. And it isn't so simple as a developer saying "Insert P2P Program Here is like Napster, but on steroids." The programs themselves were marketed in such a manner.

In a footnote with regards to the statement

neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software... we think this evidence underscores Grokster's and
StreamCast's intentional facilitation of their users' infringement.

the opinion adds

Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor.

Finally, remember that this ruling is not be-all end-all. This ruling only means that Grokster et al. can be sued based on the evidence, not that the lawsuit (or any lawsuit against any other P2P application) would win. Before this ruling, the cases had been pretty much thrown out based on the Betamax decision.

The supreme court did a very good job with this decision, I would say. They continued to uphold the Betamax decision and fair use, and they put the burden of proof upon the plaintiffs to show that the program was written with the intent to distribute copyright works. And that's not easy, especially when so many legitimate uses exist for P2P.

I'd liken the chances of the *AA winning against something like BT to a self-defense case where the supposed attacker had done nothing other than wave a gun into the air.

This is, of course, based on the opinions of 6 out of the 9 justices. The other 3 (Ginsburg, Rehnquist, Kennedy) thought the Betamax decision was incorrect to begin with.

The *AA will spin it as a win nonetheless, but as the EFF says, it's really a loss already.

"...Second, neither respondent attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software. While the Ninth Circuit treated that failure as irrelevant because respondents lacked an independent duty to monitor their users. activity, this evidence underscores their intentional facilitation of their users' infringement..."

That's the second bit, but the three points they rattle off are (in a nutshell):

• They actively sought out ex-napster users
• They left out any way to monitor the people who used the software
• They displayed ads in the software

For me, those are extremely weak justifications for the dcision, but there's more.

"...A group of copyright holders (MGM for short, but including motion picture studios, recording companies, songwriters, and music publishers) sued Grokster and StreamCast for their users' copyright infringements, alleging that they knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works in violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U. S. C. 101 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II)..."

Ooookay...I guess that means that I can sue pretty much anyone for selling pretty much anything that can be used for illegal purposes, if I know that that particular thing is regularly used that way. Sudafed is commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamines, for example. Since I know that methamphetamine manufacture is illegal, but Sudafed continues to be sold (with its' manufacturer's knowledge of the same), I can sue them for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute a controlled substance. The logic is the same, and it seems ridiculous to me in both instances.

Even if I could show a record of past methamphetamine manufacture from Sudafed, and even if I could show that pharmaceutical companies were specifically not tracking purchases of their products, and even if I could show that they derived increased revenue from increased use of Sudafed, I doubt the Supreme Court would show much interest in my case.

"...MGM commissioned a statistician to conduct a systematic search, and his study showed that nearly 90% of the files available for download on the FastTrack system were copyrighted works...

What's the magic number for substantial non-infringing use? How does the amount of objectionable material on the network make a difference? Is Apache illegal? IIS? VSFTPD? Should people writing web servers take steps to make sure they don't target users who run warez sites? Should they build in functionality that lets them actively monitor what files are being served from those servers?

"...From time to time, moreover, the companies have learned about their users' infringement directly, as from users who have sent e-mail to each company with questions about playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded, to whom the companies have responded with guidance.6 App. 559-563, 808-816, 939-954. And MGM notified the companies of 8 million copyrighted files that could be obtained using their software..."

Okay...MGM told them that there were 8 million Copyrighted files out there. And? What is Grokster supposed to do about that, exactly? Place PSA-style ads that say "Sharing copyrighted files is wrong and illegal."...how does that help stop infringement?

Then, the opinion goes off on some tangled logic about the companies benefitting directly from infringement because more ads means more money, and more use means more ads, and more infringement (apparently *only* more infringement, as opposed to legitimate use) means more use. Even if the idea was "hey, people share lots of files...we could get a lot of ad revenue if people from napster use our software", the contribution to infringement is no greater (except for in Morpheus' "Top 4

Go to SCOTUSblog for a reasoned discussion by actual law professors who have actually read the opinion (warning: PDF file).

The judgment is available here (linked to from here). That includes the summary, Souter's opinion, and the two concurring opinions. Other people have already talked about the important parts of Souter's opinion, but I found the concurrences just as interesting (though less important).

The first concurrence, Ginsburg's (page 30 of the above file), sounded pretty dangerous to me. It lists over a page of evidence for non-infringing uses (pages 34-35) and then immediately dismisses at all without considering it. It doesn't even talk of the dangers to new technologies. But the last paragraph is the scariest. "If, on remand, the case is not resolved on summary judgment in favor of MGM... the Court... should reconsider, on a fuller record, its interpretation of Sony's product distribution holding. Now, IANAL at all, but that sounds pretty bad.

The second concurrence (page 38), also by three judges, is a lot nicer to me. Pages 42 and 44 have long lists of non-infringing uses including books, Linux software, and things licensed under Creative Commons. It even says that Grokster is protected by the Sony standard. It goes on to talk about how the Sony standard has been a fairly good one. It talks of how both non-infringing uses of Grokster and use of legal programs (like iTunes) will grow. It's still a concurring opinion, but the tone is much more mindful of protecting technology and looking forward to the future, a view that was missing from the first concurrence.

The ruling has been posted as one PDF file.

You can view the complete ruling in pdf here:

http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/27jun20051 200/www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04pdf/04-277.p df

http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/27jun20051 200/www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04pdf/04-480.p df

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.

The problem is that SCOTUS has overruled states on issues before.

Brown vs. Board of Education overturned Please v. Ferguson.

Listen people, the Constitution makes it clear that States rights are key. By god I support those but they have always come back to the fact that certain rights cannot be oer'trumped by the states. As mentioned above, the 14th amendment applied the 5th and others to the states.

I read the entire decision last night after it was available. I printed it out and sat down in my living room and read it.

I UNDERSTAND what the 5 who voted for are saying and on some level I could fall for it at face value. The majority opinion is VERY shortsighted and really does open a can of worms.

I think the most telling fact of the matter is that O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in the primary precendence that the majority relyed upon. She was in disent on this ruling! She understood the subtle difference in Berman v. Parker compared to Kelo v New London.

I would suggest EVERYONE read the actual decision.

You can view it HERE

Especially read what Thomas wrote in his disent. No matter how you feel about the man, you have to admit that his understanding of Constitutional Law and Intent is amazing.

He goes back to not only previous case law but English Common Law and the definition of the word "use" at the time of the Framers. He makes a stunning remark as follows:

The Framers embodied that principle in the
Constitution, allowing the government to take property
not for "public necessity," but instead for "public use."
Amdt. 5. Defying this understanding, the Court replaces
the Public Use Clause with a "`[P]ublic [P]urpose' " Clause,
ante, at 910 (or perhaps the "Diverse and Always Evolving
Needs of Society" Clause, ante, at 8 (capitalization added)), a
restriction that is satisfied, the Court instructs, so long as
the purpose is "legitimate" and the means "not irrational,"
ante, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). This defer-
ential shift in phraseology enables the Court to hold, against
all common sense, that a costly urban-renewal project whose
stated purpose is a vague promise of new jobs and increased
tax revenue, but which is also suspiciously agreeable to the
Pfizer Corporation, is for a "public use."
I cannot agree. If such "economic development" takings
are for a "public use," any taking is, and the Court has
erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution, as
JUSTICE O'CONNOR powerfully argues in dissent. Ante, at 12, 813. I do not believe that this Court can eliminate
liberties expressly enumerated in the Constitution and
therefore join her dissenting opinion.

He brings up a previous ruling from early in our Nation's history that says:

see also Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed
that any clause in the constitution is intended to be with-
out effect");

By changing the meaning of "public use" to "public benifit", the Taking clause is rendered null! Everything can be defined as "public benefit" in the same way that "common Welfare" has been redifined (personal opinion).

My personal plan of action on the matter is this:

- Contact my state government officials including each individual member of my city council (Roswell, GA if interested) and let them know if they vote in favor of any such law, resolution or just try anything like New London, I will make it my personal crusade to see them never elected again. Not even as a city dog catcher.

- I will contact my Congress critters in Washington with the same message. I understand that the Federal burden is much greater than the State burden but it's still a possibility.

- I will petition my city and state government for recall laws so that if something like this happens, I don't have to WAIT for them to

here is the complete PDF file with the ruling, I found it from The Supreme Court website.

Although I live in the other side of the Atlantic, I wrote about this issue on my blog. I read most of the ruling, and I didn't like it.

Here's what happened:

1. New London is a small city which had high unemployment and declining population levels lately. In 1996 the Federal Government closed a facility which employed 1500 people there, so something had to be done to boost the local economy, especially in Fort Trumbull.
2. The NLDC (New London Development Corporation) was authorised by the State in January 1998 to help with the situation. NLDC is a private non-profit entity, but its members are not elected by the people.
3. The city/NLDC wanted to create a state park with marinas, maybe a parking, and hotels etc, in Fort Trumbull.
4. In February, the pharmaceutical megacorp Pfizer announced it would build a $300 million research facility next to Fort Trumbull. That would create new jobs, so it was good news.
5. Oopps! But there was a problem: Some land needed for the state park was the property of individuals. This property included residential homes as well as investment homes. NLDC was authorised to buy the necessary land from the people. That's ok, but there are bad news too: NLDC was authorised by the city to seize property too!
6. Some people (Kelo et al.) disliked the idea that their beautiful home would be destroyed to allow Pfizer open its facility near there. One of these people was born and lived in their home for their whole lives. NLDC said it would seize their homes and provide compensation. The people remembered the last sentence of the Fifth Amendment: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation". They went to the courts. Their problem is not with the compensation, they don't want higher compensation, it's a matter of principle, about the definition of "public use". Why a Pfizer facility would be of any "public use"? Of course it would be beneficial for the city's economy and create jobs, but is this enough to justify home seizure for "public use"? I personally would say: No! (but IANAL - I am not a lawyer).
7. Some time the matter reached the Supreme Court of the United States. It decided 5-4 to allow the city/NLDC to seize the property. Too bad: Now corporations have a way to use your land for their factory, if a city government can prove that it would generate more tax revenue, jobs etc than your home. Theoretically the land would still be public property, but in practice some private entity is using it. Do you see the problem? Gov takes your land and allows someone else to use it because it says he can use it more productively than you.
8. Dissenting Justice O'Connor, J., said in his opinion to the Supreme Court: "Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result" (I quoted from Supreme Court of United States case 04-108, O'Connor, J., dissenting, 13, in page 39, I added the emphasis myself).

I wrote this overview quickly from my memory after reading most of the 04-108 ruling. I encourage you to read it, too, as it contains many interesting references to other court rulings too.

Also note that you are getting a bit of a slanted story for Slashdot, they supreme court didn't rule that land could be siezed for private use, they ruled the states can decide if land can be siezed for private use.

No, they did even less than that. They said that this land is being seized for public use. Specifically, they said:

The city's proposed disposition of petitioners' property qualifies as a "public use" within the meaning of the Takings Clause.

Reading the ruling, I find the dissents by O'Connor and Thomas much more perusasive. The ruling amounts to saying that, starting today, if others can use your property in a way that will be better for the general public, for example if:

1. they will pay more taxes than you do now; or,
2. the public will find the house they will build more aesthetically pleasing than yours is; or,
3. they bribe the local politicians more than you can afford.

Of course you have to be "justly compensated". However, all this means is you will get back the "market value" of your property, i.e. what it is worth to a random person on the street. That could be very different from what it is worth to you, or even what it is worth to the developer who will get it and profit from it. Unlike normal economics, where the developers will have to pay based on what they can use the property for, the fair market value will depend on what you are using the property for today. And you personal enjoyment of living in a home you've owned for a long time doesn't factor into that.

Do you think Ms. Dery, who is 87 years old and lives in the house she was born in will be compensated for value of that? She only will be compensated for the value of the house assuming it was sold for profit.

The FCC limits 802.11 power so buying expensive access points isn't going increase your range.

Power isn't the only thing money can buy. It can also buy a receiver with better sensitivity which translates into being able to close a radio link with a weaker signal.

Mostly, it's all about the antennas. In some experimetns I've read about, directional antennas have enabled signals to broadcast and receive across several kilometers (line of site). Check out these guys to see what's available as far as antennas go.

Related to this the FCC regulates EIPR. Effective Isotropic Radiated Power. Using a more directional antenna will increase your EIRP, so that's not really a legal answer. See FCC Title 47, Part 15.247. This does (perhaps incorrectly) assume you live in the US.

Yes.

http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_04/47cf r95_04.html
(See everything numbered 95.4xx)

Prohibited communications: http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/12feb20041 500/edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2004/octqtr/47cfr95 .413.htm

Announcement of Intent To Initiate the Process To Remove Aeronautical Information From Public Sale and Distribution

You're wrong!

This case has nothing at all to do with the Internet or e-mail. But don't take my word for it, listen to Justice Stevens. "The question on which we granted certiorari is narrow: 'Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.'" Illinois v. Roy I. Caballes, No. 03-923, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2005) (citation omitted). The Court says that official conduct that does not compromise any legitimate privacy interest is not a 'search' for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and that possession of contraband is not a legitimate interest. Id.

The Supreme Court is specifically talking about drugs when they say 'contraband'. The Court cites U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), which involved someone who mailed cocaine via private courier. The package was damaged en route, and the supervisor and office manager opened it up as part of the routine insurance process. Id. at 111. They found white powder inside, and called the Feds who determined it was coke. Id. at 111-12. They looked at the address on the package, went there, and arrested the people waiting for their drugs. Id. at 112.

The discussion is nowhere near the Internet or email. Now that we're not panicked, the Court points out that even some searches of contraband are illegal. It cites another case in which it held that using infrared imaging to search a house for pot plants is unlawful. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

The entire opinion is less than five pages long, and really quite straightforward. Justice Souter, on the other hand, spends eight pages to say that even the accidental detection of drugs by dogs should be an unlawful search. Caballes, slip op. at 1 (Souter, J., dissenting). His main reason, stated right up front: drug-sniffing dogs are fallible. Id. In a footnote, he cites Kyllo to explain that the government can't use a tool to get information on things for which they would otherwise require physical intrusion. Id. at 4 (footnote 3).

Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which Justice Souter joins, is nine pages. She worries about, among other things, police walking through parking lots and down sidewalks with drug-sniffing dogs, conducting sweeps without prior suspicion of guilt. Caballes, slip op. at 6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

While the opinion is a fascinating study on the balance between our desire to catch crooks and our desire for personal privacy, it has absolutely nothing to do with the Internet or email.

(b) The maximum peak output power of the intentional radiator shall
not exceed the following:

...

(3) For systems using digital modulation in the 902-928 MHz, 2400-
2483.5 MHz, and 5725-5850 MHz bands: 1 Watt.
(4) Except as shown in paragraphs (b)(3) (i), (ii) and (iii) of this
section, if transmitting antennas of directional gain greater than 6 dBi
are used thepeak output power from the intentional radiator shall be
reduced below the stated values in paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this
section, as appropriate, by the amount in dB that the directional gain
of the antenna exceeds 6 dBi.
(i) Systems operating in the 2400-2483.5 MHz band that are used
exclusively for fixed, point-to-point operations may employ transmitting
antennas with directional gain greater than 6 dBi provided the maximum
peak output power of the intentional radiator is reduced by 1 dB for
every 3 dB that the directional gain of the antenna exceeds 6 dBi.

So, the limit is 30 dbm (1000 milliwatts), most wireless cards are about 15dbm, which gives us 15 dbm of slack. 24dbi exceeds 6 dbi by 18, so this would be illegal for a point-to-multipoint topology. However, if it was a point-to-point link, that 18dbi of excess gain results in a reduction of only 6dbm of permitted power, so you could use a 24dbm radio (or a little over 200mw) legally. (Though ianal or an rf engineer, so take this with a grain of salt.)

The FCC certainly does have a say-so in this. WiFi operates in the 15.247 unlicensed ISM bands, and there are very specific rules that your transmitter must pass to sell equipment for those bands.

Certainly, the ultimate resposibility lies with the operator, but the FCC demands that you make it difficult for the user to break the rules. For example, many pieces of ISM gear have either integrated antennas or really funny antenna connectors. That's not an accident. If you sell ISM gear to the general public, the FCC mandates that they can't easily strip off your antenna and mount a 12-foot dish.

HAM gear is just as subject to FCC rules. Most of the commercial HAM gear for sale today is "locked out" (at least by software) from transmitting outside of the HAM bands. Yes, most radios are modifiable, but they can't be shipped from the factory as open boxes.

Check it out!
Mars orbject: http://a52.g.akamaitech.net/f/52/827/1d/www.space. com/images/h_opportunity_rock0113-1_01.jpg
Orb: http://theoasis.com/brisco/episodes/images/ep1-bri sco-orb.jpg

Am I the only one that thinks that the picture of this object:

http://a52.g.akamaitech.net/f/52/827/1d/www.space. com/images/h_opportunity_rock0113-1_01.jpg

looks like a hacked-up pre-PhotoShop tabloid cover photo???

-JT

It is absolutely untrue that unlicensed transmitters at 100mW or less are legal in the FM broadcast band in the U.S.

Well, actually, it is true that some unlicensed transmitters at 100mW or less are legal in the FM broadcast band. But only those that operate at far, far less than 100mW.

I'm really surprised that the person who wrote the original article (i.e., the one who posted on technocrat.net) admits to being a ham operator, but then seems to know nothing about part 15 of the FCC regulations. If you want to know all about the limitations on unlicensed operation, you need to know part 15 -- no excuses. And the 100mW limitation applies ONLY to unlicensed transmissions in the AM broadcast band, and NOWHERE ELSE. Instead, each band in which any kind of unlicensed transmission is permitted is subject to its OWN RULES.

See: FCC rule regarding unlicensed operation in the band 88-108 MHz (Note that although this document is served by akamaitech.net, the source of the document is the U.S. Government printing office)

FCC PDF document with all you ever wanted to know about unlicensed operations under Part 15

Ramsey Electronics kit page with FCC information regarding lawful use of low power transmitter kits

American Radio Relay League (ARRL) information on part 15 of the FCC rules (The ARRL is the largest national organization for ham radio operators)

Note that the actual permitted field strength for unlicensed operation translates into the a signal of only a few nanowatts -- around the single digit range -- certainly not anything even remotely resembling 100 milliwatts!

Thus, the immediate parent of this comment should be modded WAY down -- it certainly isn't "informative." If anything, it is perpetuating misinformation that could get someone into serious trouble.

Since 1951, America alone has devoted more than $17 billion [on fusion]

Currently the page says:
> Estimated cost of clean up to prevent further toxic leakage is millions of euros.

Millions of euros is small change.

However, the actual article says: Strand said it will take billions of dollars (euros) to clean up.
Since the source is ABC news, I assume that they use the American billion (10^9).

Now that is a whole different story, considering the fact that the projected revenue for the Russian Y2005 budget is only ~92 billion Euros.

A conservative assumption of single digit "billions" results in something like 10% of the total budget revenue.

Just for comparison, this would be akin to the US spending 200 billion dollars on a similar task.

There are no statutory minimum hours for solo privileges (I soloed after eleven hours, some do it in as little as five), but the rest of your info is correct. You can solo as soon as you receive training in all of the required knowledge areas, pass an informal written exam, and get an endorsement from your instructor. The relevant regulation is 14 CFR 61.87.

IANAL, but I did read up on this case pretty heavily (the "Under God" one).

The Supreme Court ruled on the case, and overturned the appellate's decision on a technicality. The analysis I read (not my own) was that this could likely be used in another juristiction to force the issue directly to the supreme court on merits. Hence we have the (certainly unconstitutional and probably meaningless) Pledge Protection Act which is supposed to remove the issue of the Pledge from the eye of the court.

Now, it seems to me that this case is certainly going to be one which will go before the Supreme Court just because it is an important legal controversy.

My own opinion (layman) is that the Supreme Court will rule, as they did in case of Hamdi and the Guantamamo Bay detainees, that executive power cannot be removed from judicial oversight. Of course, they could also rule as they did in Padilla that the case was improberly brought before the court and send it back on a technicality. My layman's opinion though with the Padilla case is that Hamdi represents a strong enough precident to essentially challenge the constitutionality of Padilla's classification, so the technicality doesn't really give the government much wiggle room once the Habeus petition is properly filed.

Now to the case in question. Hamdi is of particular importance because in my analysis of how the court will rule (Layman's analysis IANAL, etc) because it exposes deep divisions within the Court with regard to the level of executive and legislative authority allowed within the framework of the War on Terror. In the opinion of the Court, even the fact that Hamdi was detained in the theater of operations of an armed conflict did not deny him the right to at least a minimum due process of law and some form of judicial check under Habeus petitions. Notably, the Opinion of the Court was only endorsed by 4 justices (Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Breyer) though Souter and Ginsberg's dissenting opinion eventually endorses the action of the court but under protest.

4 Justices in two dissenting oppinions in Hamdi actually held that the detention of Hamdi was in fact illegal, and that it was not enough to simply allow him to challenge his "enemy combatant" classification. The opinion of Souter and Ginsberg was that the detention was not properly endorsed by Congress and was therefore illegal. They did not, however, challenge the plurality opinion that Habeus Corpus and due process could be observed by merely giving Hamdi a chance to present an alternative view before the judiciary.

Scalia and Stevens dissented, arguing that *any* detention without charge or trial is a violation of due process and habeus corpus rights and can only be done in the event where Congress suspends Habeus.

Only Thomas suggested that the government should be able detain Hamdi indefinitely without trial.

The decision is available at the Supreme Court's Web site here. This link is included so that other laymen can read the opinions and reach their own conclusions.

If Hamdi is any indication of the court's responses to the question of judicial oversight in the war on terror, it seems that the 8-1 opinion is that the court *must* have strict oversight in such a way as to ensure that the Constitution and rights of the citizens are adequately protected. Of course, it could be vacated on a technicality, but this would still, I think, provide a powerful case for even individuals in other circuits. I don't at this time see the court doing anything differently.

The .gif file on the Space.com webpage is taken from the video. Eleven minutes compressed into about 6 seconds.

Actually, the prohibition on cell phones on airlines comes from two places:

a) The FCC says you can't use them. (47CFR 22.925)
b) The FAA says the Pilot in Command of the aircraft can prohibit the use of portable electronic devices. (http://www2.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidanc e_Library%5CrgFAR.nsf/0/5D4AEFD672582D15852566CF00 6135DC?OpenDocument">FAR Part 91)

You're playing the "what if" game. It's a lazy game, and there's no need for it when the answers are all right in front of you.

The entire cost of retooling, manufacturing, and manufacturing waste disposal is all factored into the retail price of the unit, as is usually the case in a competitive and free market. The manufacture of CFL lighting is, AFAIK, not government-subsidized - all of the costs are displayed right up-front in the form of a shelf tag at Wal-Mart.

So, they're definately not giving the things away. Money is being made here, else the things would not be feasible to sell, and we'd only have incandescent lights on store shelves.

Thus, it is just so simple:

I recently spent about $8 on a set of four Feit Electric 13-Watt compact fluorescent bulbs. Each is fitted with a standard American screw-in base, thus requiring no modifications to my fixtures. These are about equivilent in light output to a convential 60W incandescent bulb. Feit says these guys are good for 8000 hours, which is near the low end for a CFL.

I also recently spent about $2.00 on four 60-Watt Phillips incandescent bulbs, which I have to use on some wasteful electronically-dimmed fixtures that I own and enjoy. Standard base, no modifications required, etc. Phillips says these particular bulbs are good for 1500 hours, which is a good bit longer than what most other manufacturers say about their incandescants.

So, all said, the compact fluorescents currently cost four times more to design, produce, package, market, sell, and profit from (including the energy to required for each of these steps), or an extra $1.50 per bulb, over a comparable conventional unit.

All we have to determine, then, is whether or not the CFL bulb will save $1.50 in electric energy cost over the course of its life. (We're going to, quite conveniently, ignore disposal costs of the bulbs and their packaging. I throw everything away, as a rule, and I pay a flat rate for trash removal at my house. But you'll soon see that it just doesn't fucking matter.[1])

Using some grade-school math, and the average cost of electricity at $0.086/KWh (according to the Federal Register) we can deduce the following:

My 1500-hour 60-Watt bulb will cost $7.74 over the course of its life, or about 86 cents per week of continuous operation.

My 8000-hour 13-Watt bulb will cost $8.944 over the course of its much longer life, or about 19 cents per week of continuous operation.

Or, we can break this down another way:

8000 hours worth of 60-Watt incandescent lighting, including bulbs and energy for all steps of generating this light, costs $43.94.

8000 hours worth of 13-Watt CFL lighting, including bulbs and energy for all steps of generating this light, costs $10.94.

Over 8000 hours, that is a savings of $33 just by using a different light bulb. Put another way, that's 1,650.00% ROI in less than a year.

A wise investment, indeed.

[1]: At $33/year in savings, who gives a fuck if they might cost a few cents more for someone to dispose of?

ps. pls stop lightbulb fud. thx.

Dye color is a different phenomenon. The energy carried by one photon of visible light (h*nu) is sufficient to move electrons from one orbital to another. The energy in one photon of 1.5MHz RF is far less; there is eight and a half orders of magnitude difference: 5.3e-20J for light at 600nm (480THz), 1.6e-28J for RF at 200m (1.5MHz). Compare this to Boltzmann thermal energy: kT = 4.1e-21J at 300K. A photon of light exceeds thermal energy by an order of magnitude; the 1.5MHz RF photon is seven and a half orders of magnitude less than thermal energy. One visible light photon is sufficient to change chemical bonds stable at room temperature (thus extended exposure to bright light fades the dye). But one RF photon has negligible probability of causing such a change (a 1K temperature increase is much more significant). Thus a large flux of RF photons (high power density) is needed to accumulate enough energy to have a measurable effect, whether by thermal or postulated non-thermal means.

The reason wavelength matters is because the human body is a more effective "receiving antenna" for wavelengths where body features are near 1/4 wavelength, 1/2 wavelength, etc. That's why the FCC exposure limits http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010 800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2002/octqtr/pdf/47c fr1.1310.pdf are lowest between 30MHz (10m) and 300MHz (1m). Higher exposure is allowed at frequencies where the body is a poorer antenna (549V/m at 1.5MHz vs. 27.5V/m at 30-300MHz). Current, voltage, and resulting heat within the body are higher (for a given field strength) at wavelengths where body parts form resonant antennas; bulk absorption is not the only mechanism at work at those wavelengths.

I don't think that standing next to a 50 kW transmitter is very healthy.

Agreed! The usual textbook formula (R=sqrt(30*EIRP)/E, MKS units) isn't valid in the near field of the transmitting antenna, and may provide a false sense of security. For AM broadcast transmitters, the near field is about 30-100m radius. 100m also is about as close as you should get to a 50KW (EIRP) FM broadcast antenna.

Since we have this notion of someone being "innocent until proven guilty," I can see why having a webcam on while someone is being *booked* can be a problem.

Actually, that's an especially good time for it. Arrests must be public. Yes, it's horribly embarrassing to be arrested, and I will feel ashamed if I am ever arrested, but secret arrests are tyrannical.

Your signature reads "The cure for 1984 is 1776." Well, why does the fourth amendment to the US constitution prohibit unreasonable seizures? It's because the british used arbitrary and secret arrests to lock up troublemakers (arguably they did so as well against the IRA). How can you have habeas corpus (or look here -- warning pdf) if you don't know who was arrested? (sorry, another pdf)

Once you've been convicted (or even once you're booked) it seems unreasonable though I agree with the poster who said he'd like it for his own protection!

To all those saying Space flight is too expensive:

According to this http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/7/255/2422/02feb20041 242/www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/pdf/budget/tab les.pdf/ this

US Govt Spending in 2003:
Social Services: $102.4 Billion
Space & Sciences:$20.6 Billion

Its just a matter of where our priorities lie.

Actually it's part 15, not 13, and there is only a single sentence ( 15C 15.204(c)) which might make it illegal to modify the antenna on a part 15 device. I would have to see the actual new sections to see exactly how the rules are changing, but my guess is that they are authorizing all antenna's with less gain then the highest gain antenna tested with that particular unit. This is a GOOD thing since rarely would a lower gain antenna alter the signal in a manner that would make it more likely to interfere with adjacent spectrum. Btw this will have zero negative effect on the variety of antenna's, right now for an antenna to legally be sold as compatible with a wireless device it must be tested as a bundle with that device and the antenna swap must be performed by an authorized installer.

so they struck 15C 15.204(c) which is the only provision which might even potentially make it illegal to use an additional antenna (all other regulations are about sale, distribution, and marketing). Besides which 15C 15.23(b) already hinted that you could build/modify your own equipment so long as you made a good faith effort not to interfere.

so they struck 15C 15.204(c) which is the only provision which might even potentially make it illegal to use an additional antenna (all other regulations are about sale, distribution, and marketing). Besides which 15C 15.23(b) already hinted that you could build/modify your own equipment so long as you made a good faith effort not to interfere.

Here's the actual decision in .pdf at the US Supreme Court.

Here. It's a long read, but even in skimming you can get far more detail than any Fox or CNN report. In fact, find more detail than the government or media really wants you to know at: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/. The relevant link ('Recent Decisions') is near the top just above the pretty picture of the courthouse itself.

Did you even read my post? Did you look at the sources I cited? Half my post was cited directly from the Case Documents, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada , ET AL.

I know, I know... don't feed the trolls...

Actually, While I hate to be a tin foiler- the court had it's collective head so far up it's own ass it was examining it's tonsils, as clearly shown by the majority opinion, Here: Dumbass decision.
Note that while the court specifically states that Mr Hiibel was not required to show his Identification- All he had to do was state his name, yet the Officer was clearly asking for his ID, rather than just his name.
The court harps on that specific point, and then ends up sounding like mental defectives by immediately contradicting both itself and the several instances of past precedence they state in the same opinion.

Relevant quotes:
"This statute is narrower and more precise. In con-trast to the "credible and reliable" identification requirement in Kolender, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the instant statute to require only that a suspect disclose his name. It appar-ently does not require him to produce a driver's license or any other document. If he chooses either to state his name or communicate it to the officer by other means, the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs."

(This in reference to how this differs from kolander, which was declared unconstitutional specifically because of the requirement to produce "credible and reliable" Identification, interpreted as an ID or driver's license)

Followed by:
"The officer asked him if he had "any iden-tification on [him]," which we understand as a request to produce a driver's license or some other form of written identification."

And then again:
"("The suspect is not required to provide private details about his background, but merely to state his name to an officer when reasonable suspicion exists")."

WTF?
Rough transaltion: "He's not required to produce ID, but even though that's what they asked from him and we agree that that's unconstituional, we're going to throw this out because somehow, what the officer really meant, way, way deep down in the cockles of his heart (or maybe even lower, in the sub-cockle region) Was really , "Hey, what's yer name, buddy?" (Which we know because of our amazing psychic powers, which, though amazing, were nevertheless not enough to keep us from contadicting ourselves multiple times in our own official opinion, and thus sounding like five mammoth tools. Yay us!)

Another very bad judgement by the court was made today. A prisoner was tricked by a judge into giving up his right to file habias patitions in federal court. This opinion should be getting more attention.

Same thing, but hosted by Akamai9 (faster).

1. Taxiing trials 1.1Mb
2. Takeoff 2.1Mb
3. Flying 3.35Mb

1. Taxiing trials 1.1Mb
2. Takeoff 2.1Mb
3. Flying 3.35Mb