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And while I agree that Apple users have not been able to take advantage of every little micro-improvement in performance, what they make they make well, and capable enough, to mire than cover 90-95% of use-cases.

But what is being pointed out here is that Oculus won't be on the Mac because they don't make decent systems for gaming. Even their highest spec system that would be the closest to a decent gaming system is rubbish for gaming (yes we all know it wasn't "designed" for it). So Luckey's point is perfectly correct, Apple makes no good computers for gaming.

But perhaps with the introduction of the "Metal" API in OS X and iOS, Apple is trying to change that.

You can use a 16x lane PCIe 3 in a breakout box now? Remember, we're talking about modern high-end GPUs, which will "work" in a PCIe 2.0 slot, but the performance would be roughly equivalent of simply sharing the faster 16x PCIe 3.0 connected GPU already in the machine. For reference, Thunderbolt 1 and 2 offer the same two 4x lanes, Thunderbolt 2 simply allows the lanes to be combined and used as an 8x lane. Whoops, I guess you can't do that, then. You could in the towers, but then, the best of those only supported PCIe 2.0 and, thus had the same problem. In fact, the new Mac Pro 40GB/sec of PCIe bandwidth, of which 32GB/sec will be used by the two FirePro GPUs leaving, at best, a single 8x lane. Even if Apple's claimed 40GB/sec is after the GPUs (which are in a crossfire configuration so no, you can't deditate one to one VM andthe other to another), you still can't get around Thunderbolt's 8x lane limitation, nor can you duplicate its internal setup (which is two 16x PCIe GPUs in a crossfire configuration) in one. On a multi CPU Xeon system (and I've personally seen systems with 4), there are enough 16x lanes to do this 8 times over (16 GPUs) in a proper tower; though, admittedly, you may run into issues finding a motherboard and case to support it. Too bad you can't run OS X on that, though. But even not going that high-end, a dual-CPU Xeon PC could support 8 16x PCIe 3.0 GPUs in 4 crossfire or SLI pairs, something you just can't do with any Mac. Oh, and proper cooling so the system doesn't throttle itself under extended periods of high load, such as those a proper workstation in the hands of someone who actually needs that level of compute power will see on a regular basis.

This isn't a stab at Apple, either, just a cold statement of fact. I wish it weren't true, I wish I could get the performance out of a Mac that I can get out of a PC, but I simply can not, so I have to use a PC for such things. Even on the laptop side of things, I can't buy an Apple product today that competes with the MSI gaming rig I picked up in November, a model that is a combination of slightly thinner, somewhat lighter, roughly half the price, and faster overall (and without the thermal throttling that my Retina MBP experiences under load; neigh the hottest this machine gets under extended full load is just barely warmer than the rMBP at idle) than the fastest laptop Apple offers. That's without mentioning that the 970M with 6GB of GDDR5 absolutely eats the lunch of anything Apple offers, with the exception of the Mac Pro, which can be configured with GPUs that will outperform it (and admittedly by a large margin) for certain tasks.

Again, I wish the above weren't true, but there you have it. Facts are facts and Macs aren't for heavy lifting; even Photoshop and other Adobe apps that used to absolutely run better on a Mac have been better off on a mid-range (and much cheaper) PC for some time now.

Apple has a target market and they serve it very well. I'm simply not in that market and, as I have interest in getting actual work done, won't attempt to shoehorn myself into that market. Nobody else with any knowledge and a need for true performance would, either. They're great consumer machines, I have one (that I don't use for work), and I hope to see them completely dominate that market, but lets be real here, they haven't sold a true workhorse of a system (with proper cooling and the ability to run full-tilt for a few minutes, let alone hours or days, without throttling) since Jobs died; the last refresh of the Mac Pro tower was a joke, with hardware one generation newer than the last refresh but still a generation behind.

> Seems like trying to solve a problem that doesnâ(TM)t exist.

Maybe not to you, but when I have a GTX 980 Ti in my Windows box and a (weak) GeForce 750M in the MacBook Pro the ability to use an external GPU in a standardized way would be godsend to us graphics / shader guys. I guess you never play around with ShaderToy on a laptop.

Anyways, you're missing the fundamental problem:

GPUs in laptops suck (for high performance).

I understand the heat + space + energy concerns but when you have to resort to hacks of the PCI Express then having a standard connection makes WAY more sense.

Now if only Apple would quit dragging their ass and support OpenGL 4.3+ ...

The metadata of all files in the file system is encrypted with a random key, which is created when iOS is first installed or when the device is wiped by a user. The file system key is stored in Effaceable Storage. Since it’s stored on the device, this key is not used to maintain the confidentiality of data; instead, it’s designed to be quickly erased on demand (by the user, with the “Erase all content and settings” option, or by a user or administrator issuing a remote wipe command from a mobile device management (MDM) server, Exchange ActiveSync, or iCloud). Erasing the key in this manner renders all files cryptographically inaccessible.

So - if you copy that key - that one key that's, "not used to maintain the confidentiality of the data", then prevent the erasing system from working its magic.

No. https://www.apple.com/business...

It is not as easy, the iPhone have FIPS 140-2 crypto processor that stores the key, you can not copy that data, and you can not emulate it. Or force attack the secure crytpto processor... I think the aproach of copy the hard disk is not posible, take a look to Apple documentation. https://www.apple.com/business... I am not sure even if is posible to release a new iOs without the retry password and time limits, It shouldn't be possible if the design is well done as it seems.

...I guess it's time for Apple to update its law enforcement compliance guide:

I. Extracting Data from Passcode Locked iOS Devices

[...]

For iOS devices running iOS versions earlier than iOS 8.0, upon receipt of a valid search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, Apple can extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices. Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Appleâ(TM)s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (âoeuser generated active filesâ), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media. Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 through iOS 7. Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, iMessage, MMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party app data.

Why is the above downmodded? People may come to expect that OpenGL is the right choice for cross-platform 3D gaming but the fact is that only applies if by "cross platform" you mean Windows PCs and Linux PCs. Consoles do not use OpenGL. Mobile systems that support OpenGL actually use the mobile variant called OpenGL ES, Apple platforms have been lagging in OpenGL/OpenGL ES support for a while and have now moved to focussing on Metal instead.

What purpose does it serve to keep propagating the idea that OpenGL is the cross platform choice when that is clearly not the case?

I find it odd that so many people on a tech news site like this would not know this, I find it even more bizarre that some would actively try to suppress the information.

Why is it the government can't desolder the flash chips from the phone, put them into a custom circuit, extract the encrypted data then brute force attack the data until they guess the key, all without even using iOS? They can tap into undersea fiber optic cables but can't do this?!? Something smells fishy to me.

It's worse than that!

Apple already GAVE the FBI the iCloud Backup of the Phone (see "Is there any other way you can help the FBI?"). But the Numbnutz FBI couldn't wait to change the iCloud Password, and so now, even APPLE can't Decrypt the Backup.

However, there is absolutely NO reason the Gummint can't get a few hundred of their Quantum computers working on that encrypted backup; but nobody EVER talks about that, do they?

Wonder why?

Ohh, they sell targeted advertisements. How is that not people as a product?

iAd is being Discontinued as of June 30th.

DO try to keep up.

Ohh, they sell targeted advertisements. How is that not people as a product?

iAd is being Discontinued as of June 30th.

DO try to keep up.

People travel, people change citizenship, and people don't deserve different ethics. The objection shouldn't hinge on whether one likes Apple or not. The argument should hinge on what Apple has done and how it treats its customers. Apple has long been a censor regardless of the country in which it does business, see the section labeled "Apple practices censorship. Here are a few examples.", and given how long it takes to fix security issues it knows are being exploited one can't say the company cares about user's security either, see the section labeled "Apple spies on its users, and helps others spy on them.". If Apple cared about "protect[ing] our customers' personal data" as it claims to Apple wouldn't distribute proprietary, user-subjugating software to its users.

Ohh, they sell targeted advertisements. How is that not people as a product?

Apple has never said that its impossible for the data to be revealed, they have just said that they refuse to assist the FBI.

But if its possible to write software to decrypt the phone's data, then its not actually cryptographically secured - or at least the key is available. In any case, if apple doesn't do this task for the FBI, NSA/CIA will do it at greater cost.

Actually, they HAVE categorically, and repeatedly, stated that anything running iOS 8 or later CANNOT be hacked, even by Apple.

Your comparison would only make sense if the warrant included disassembly and confiscation of all contents of the house and the structure of the house itself, including coercing the builder of the house to tell the authorities how to disassemble it.

Not at all. In this case, the FBI wants to try to crack the phone by repeatedly entering passcodes without the phone bricking itself. No disassembly, confiscation or disassembly is required.

They already supplied the FBI with an (encrypted) backup of the phone (see "Is there any other way that you can help the FBI"?). It's now up to the gummint to decipher what they've got.

Notice that THAT factoid isn't getting any "Press"...

Apple even makes available for free a detailed manual on how to centrally manage Apple devices purchased by, "managed" by and assigned by an organization to its employees. With that, the control is always retained by the central admin. and there's no such thing as a lockout.

https://itunes.apple.com/mx/bo...

But did the San Bernardino County IT Dept., owner of the device in contention, (or even the FBI, for that matter) bother to educate themselves before doling out iPhones willy-nilly? Of course not, it would have required at least a few functional braincells. Now, Apple is supposed to come rescue them from their incompetence AND screw the rest of iGadget owners worldwide as a bonus, for free. Beautiful.

It would be trivial for Apple to disable all IPSW image installations without a unlock code making what the FBI requested technically impossible, however if the FBI were to prevail in court the Judiciary is likely to take a dim view of Apples actions

That's assuming that you are booted in the OS.

All iPhones have a BootRom that is programmed to only accept a next-stage bootloader that is properly signed by Apple. At that stage of the game, the phone does not have access to the passcode in order to perform a verification, nor does it have a GPU driver to display a prompt or a touch-screen sensor to read user input. And this BootROM is available at any time on your phone by holding down a magic button combination.

Protecting the phone in the attack scenario where the DOJ can compel Apple to use their signing key to authorize an arbitrary bootloader (and by extension the rest of the stack, since it's a chain of trust) is non-trivial. It will require cooperation from the ROM to entangle the file encryption keys, the bootloader identity and the user's passcode in a highly non-trivial way. This is doubly so when the update process (when the user consents) needs to be bulletproof.

Well, its your lucky day. Every iPhone with an A7 chip or better implements the timer in the secure enclave.

https://www.apple.com/business... on page 12.

Apple iPhones are very close to being Conflict Material Free, if that's your bag...

Just sayin'.

How is this company auditing suppliers?

Kudos to you for engaging the tech part of this story - you know, how to build a massively successful consumer technology product while trying to ensure your supply chain does not contribute to war (Apple). Shocker, the klansmen of /. enraged at the mere mention of the words "social justice."

If you actually look at the links (I know, I must be new here) you'll see Fairphone doing some interesting auditing work by partnering with an outfit called Solutions for Hope (http://solutions-network.org/site-sfhtantalum/), who has posted their entire process online complete with links to independent auditing (http://solutions-network.org/site-sfhtantalum/event/baseline-due-diligence-conducted/). Not sure how this differs from Apple but that would be an interesting comparison.

Interestingly Solutions for Hope's plan seems to be to engage where conflict minerals actually are being sold and divert that labor and supply to non-conflict mines, transforming war economies into tech supply economies (http://solutions-network.org/site-sfhtantalum/factsheet/). This is a pretty cool idea that all of us techies should be on board with. Sad that white racists are as vocal as they are on /. It's a shame when something cool like this is happening in your industry and all you can do is crack jokes about how the liberal-fag-monsters are threatening to hug you to death. +5 Insightful, here we go /s

Apple iPhones are very close to being Conflict Material Free, if that's your bag...

Just sayin'.

How is this company auditing suppliers?

In the customer letter that Apple released http://www.apple.com/customer-... they said

"Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation."

If the phone is locked how can Apple install a new operating system on it?

How about just making them wait a few hours after 10 bad passwords - perhaps increasing that delay after each 10 bad tries until the correct password has been entered.

Um because that's exactly how an iPhone security works. After the 5th bad attempt, the phone will delay a minute. The delay increases incrementally with each attempt until is it 1 hour after 9. After 9, phone will delay to user's setting of delay time or erase data. It is up to the user.

A normal update does require you to unlock the phone to accept the update. They're talking about leveraging recovery mode which can be used to force load an image onto a phone that might be otherwise unusable. See here - https://support.apple.com/en-u...

Yes. That's the exact Apple support page that worries me. It says "iTunes will try to reinstall iOS without erasing your data." Updating iOS in this way needs to either require my passcode or erase my data. I expect that it will in a future version version of hardware (because only doing it in software isn't enough).

I have gone through this process, so can speak from experience. My wife changed her passcode, then promptly forgot the new one. The only option according to Apple is to reinstall. But if the phone is previously synced to a computer, it has exchanged cookies that allow the computer to still access the phone's contents (this is one of the reasons why the FBI wanted to find that hard disk). When I did the reinstall, it first read the contents out like a normal backup, then installed a fresh OS, then restored the data from the backup. I think this is what they mean by "try to reinstall iOS without erasing your data." It does get erased, but is restored, so effectively not erased.

About six months later she did the same thing, except this time, she tried rebooting the phone. When I hooked it to the computer, the system was unable to access the phone, so the restore could only put back the data saved during the latest backup (about a month before). She was bummed since she lives off her phone's calendar and doesn't trust it backing up to iCloud.

A normal update does require you to unlock the phone to accept the update. They're talking about leveraging recovery mode which can be used to force load an image onto a phone that might be otherwise unusable. See here - https://support.apple.com/en-u...

Yes. That's the exact Apple support page that worries me. It says "iTunes will try to reinstall iOS without erasing your data." Updating iOS in this way needs to either require my passcode or erase my data. I expect that it will in a future version version of hardware (because only doing it in software isn't enough).

A normal update does require you to unlock the phone to accept the update. They're talking about leveraging recovery mode which can be used to force load an image onto a phone that might be otherwise unusable. See here - https://support.apple.com/en-u...

There's no cryptographic way to secure a 4 digit passcode, or a 6 digit passcode. It's physically impossible.

Then you cite:

Good fucking grief. https://www.apple.com/business... [apple.com] "The class key is protected with the hardware UID and, for some classes, the user's passcode"

Yes, and what that tells you is that the passcode is, in fact, not the cryptographic key.

Yes, it's part of the crypto system. Yes, choosing a real one makes it secure and choosing a shitty one means you are trusting other parts to prevent brute force.

Correct. And the way that works is that the passcode is not used as a cryptographic key, but as a token for people to identify themselves to secure cryptographic hardware (either key storage or an encryption subsystem).

A four digit key would not be cryptographically secure, but a four digit passcode is, when properly implemented. Apple failed to implement the passcode system properly.

You obviously didn't understand this when you wrote your first few postings, and now that it dawns on you how it works, you're backpedaling.

> the pin you use to access the phone is the password or key used for encrypting the data

Good fucking grief.
https://www.apple.com/business...

"The class key is protected with the hardware UID and, for some classes, the user's passcode"

Yes, it's part of the crypto system. Yes, choosing a real one makes it secure and choosing a shitty one means you are trusting other parts to prevent brute force.

It's not "getting past the lockscreen". That implies this is a software control. There is a master key that is encrypted by a combination of the user passphrase and some hardware specific stuff. That master key is used to unwrap all the file specific AES-128 XTS keys (or possibly AES-256 CBC keys- I'm not 100% sure which is used on that version of hardware).

https://www.apple.com/business...

So to reiterate, this is NOT a software guard, or "getting past the lockscreen". If you forced your way past the lockscreen, you couldn't access any of the data, which is meaningless. What the FBI needs is to get around the logic that wipes the key, and on this older hardware that's still possible (and possibly on the newer hardware as well), thus allowing many tries. Once many tries are enabled, you are relying on the crypto itself, which, like any crypto, is total shit if you just have a 4 digit fucking PIN.

the Error 53 thing has been disabled, and now, as long as you have an electronic copy of someone's fingerprint, you can pretty much unlock their device.

Sorry to burst your bubble, but:

If Touch ID on your device didn't work before you saw error 53, the feature still won't work after you update or restore your device. Contact Apple Support to ask about service options for Touch ID.

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205628

Also see virtually every other site that reported the error 53 fix.

TL:DNR: Disabling Touch ID when an unauthorised repair is made was intentional and hasn't changed. Bricking the entire phone so you couldn't even unlock it with your passcode was a bug, which is what has been fixed.

https://support.apple.com/kb/PH12519?locale=en_US

If I'm reading that right, SMS is backed up.
Is there any reason why Apple can't at least change the guys password? Then restore the backup to a new iPhone using the same account?

Like what else is on an iPhone that ISN'T backed up nowadays? Presumably the FBI have got his Gmail account compromised, I'd assume they've got his Apple account?
Heck even the photos are backed up.

In these instances, with a death certificate and FBI Warrant info, surely resetting a password is ok, or no? I'm all for privacy and glad Apple encrypt things but I'm curious why a restoration won't provide them with a heap of information they are already after?

So, my understanding is that Apple is refusing to create a version of iOS that would allow FBI to crack encryption on this one phone because then it can be used to do the same on other phones, right?

In A Message to Our Customers Apples Tim Cook described the software ordered by the judge as a "backdoor" and explained that "once created, the technique could be used over and over again". What exactly he means by "technique" is unclear: It seems to suggest that any weakened version of iOS Apple supplied to the FBI might be installed on other phones. Some observers have suggested that even if the software checks the phone's hardware ID, it might still be compromised. There is merit in this argument given the difficult job of designing and verifying highly secure software coupled with at least one new potential channel (hardware ID spoofing) for attacking these iPhones.

However, I think Cook's argument is actually broader: That the larger risk is the Pandora's box opened by setting a precedent forcing them to undermine the security of their product. If the United States succeeds here, how long will it take for other countries to demand the same access? I find the international implications on the privacy of journalists, dissidents, etc. acting in (even more) repressive countries very worrisome indeed.

OK. Three more things. First, we have good reason to believe that the US National Security routinely lies to the American people and our elected representatives about the value of their security intrusions. "Terrorism!", "think of the children", never mind that the FBI acts illegally (spying on congress, anyone?, Stingray surveillance?) and openly desires to routinely thwart our electronic security. Second, Apple has a lot to gain by proving the security of its products through this fight. Trust in products from US electronics companies is falling due to revelations of pressures to add backdoors (among other things), and the FBI's failure to access this phone is the best kind of evidence that Apple has not compromised it. Third -- and this is complete speculation on my part -- it is entirely possibly that Apple has previously received even worse orders to compromise security, but secretly, under the auspices of a National Security Letter, and that this is really a proxy fight against a secret court with no appeal process.

The encryption key gets securely erased when you wipe the device. If you do that, you'll never recover the data. This stuff is well thought out. There may be a side-channel attack on iPhones with TouchID but direct attacks are impossible unless there's a backdoor that we don't know about. You won't go after this via brute force. https://www.apple.com/business...

https://support.apple.com/en-a...
Recovery mode ?

The latest version of iOS is in fact 9.2.1—but it was released on 19 January 2016. (Screenshot for archival reference.)

I highly recommend some of you read this paper: http://www.apple.com/business/...

Sorry, no. Everything sent to Apple is encrypted. The iCloud backup is encrypted. I'm too lazy to Google for the multiple, multiple references to this, but here's one.

Not quite, the FBI is asking for help on this particular phone... for which it may or may not be too late. I'm pondering future cases, where if you end up say on the no fly list, the FBI orders Apple to opt you into the low-sec update patch which supports pre-emptive monitoring & trivial encryption bypassing if your phone happens to end up with the FBI during an investigation.

Yes, quite. Apple's Tim Cook said it best:

"Some would argue that building a backdoor for just one iPhone is a simple, clean-cut solution. But it ignores both the basics of digital security and the significance of what the government is demanding in this case.

In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece of information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that knowledge."

http://www.apple.com/customer-...

Since this is an old iPhone 5c with the A6 SoC, you are mostly correct. This is not true of the newer phones with A7+ SoC's that have the Secure Enclave.

when is the last time Apple admitted a security flaw?

January 19, 2016.

Source: https://support.apple.com/en-u...

That's not actually true. The current default is a 6-digit numeric passcode, 4-digits on older models. But you have the option of setting a longer passcode and to include alphanumerics and special characters. In ye olden days, that option used to be hidden. But by the time of the iPhone in question, the 5c, I'm pretty sure it was available in the standard settings app.

If you want to make complex passcodes mandatory... say if you're managing them for a business... Apple offers a free tool: Apple Configurator. With it, you can create a device profile that will enforce password complexity, minimum length, aging, and history. You can even drop the maximum number of failed unlock attempts before the iPhone wipes itself down to only two tries. There're various other settings and restrictions you can enforce for convenience, security, or simply to be a BOFH.

Note also, you don't have to be an enterprise customer or utilize any other MDM tools to get and use the configurator. It's free to anyone who wants it.

You can't do the latter. The encryption key is split into fragments, baked into silicon in multiple chips, and the exponential timeout and wipe features are enforced by hardware.

iOS may be a walled garden, but damn, the walls go down to the bedrock.

See apple's own ios 9 security whitepaper or this fellow's succinct summary buried deep in the comments on techdirt.

There is something that does not add up in Apple's discourse at http://www.apple.com/customer-...

Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.

The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor.

I read what the FBI asks as: install a piece of code that allows the phone's content to be examined. I see no middle ground between

1) running such piece of code (probably: after getting it signed by Apple) is possible without the owner's passcode; the iPhone is in fact already backdoored, with Apple holding the key, the FBI wants Apple to exploit the vulnerability/open the backdoor, and Apple does not want to bow, because that's against their policy.

2) running a piece of code signed by Apple also requires he owner's passcode; then the solution pushed by the FBI just can't work.

If the facts where 2, Apple could just state this to the FBI, showing the source code as proof. The FBI would have no choice but take it as fact (perhaps they would ask a change in the future, but it would not help immediately for this iPhone). I conclude the true story is 1, and Apple slightly misrepresents things stating the FBI wants the creation of a backdoor, when there's already one, only well locked and never previously used for nefarious purposes.

No, they want Apple to create a "one-off" insecure version of iOS. Source: I was personally told this by Tim Cook.

Well, OK, he wrote me a letter.

Well, OK, he wrote a lot of people that same letter and has probably never heard of me or had me in mind when writing it. But he is a person, and he did tell me this via said open letter, so that counts as being personally told this by Tim Cook right?

They don't need to go that far. They just need to update the iPhone's operating system with an insecure version. The iPhone will update itself with whatever software Apple tells it to.

Tim Cook has made it clear that this is both technically possible and something Apple absolutely refuses to do. I have to say I think they're making a praiseworthy stand.

I've put this elsewhere in the thread but Apple seems to think they can provide plenty of stuff from icloud to law enforcement. The icloud stuff is encrypted with a passcode known to Apple:

http://www.apple.com/privacy/d...

This LEO guide seems to back that up:
http://manhattanda.org/sites/d...

So if it was in icloud, presumably they have it already, because Apple says "we can give you the icloud stuff, because we can access it". The locally encrypted stuff is locally encrypted, however- so presumably they want access to that.

Why are you assuming that the phone isn't encrypted with a passphrase as apple recommends: https://support.apple.com/en-u...

It's the first link when searching for "touch id fingerprint sensor" so it's not hard to find.

Of course that would be assuming that you actually want to know what you're talking about and not just make snarky comments.

https://www.apple.com/business...

I really need to read that. It sounds incredibly interesting. Still, I don't think anyone suggested that decrypting 256 bits would be easy or even remotely reasonable. The previous was more focused on, if you could create a way to replicate the environment and keep trying 4 digit codes, but it seems that Apple has dotted their I's fairly carefully. (A microscope level analysis of the residues on the glass might yield which 4 digits, if not their order.) If it really is that good, I'm half surprised they were allowed to sell it, since what I'm hearing is essentially very easy to use unbreakable encryption in consumer devices. Of course, Apply may internally know the weak points that could be used for a more realistic attack against the secure key storage, or at least where to point the specialist when they go digging for the key physically layer by layer through the silicon. That being said, who pays for the reputation damage if it gets out that Apple had a way to attack their own hardware?

It sounds like the best approach is just to somehow modify the actual hardware very very carefully to stop the key wipe and then disable or trick the timer. That sounds like very specialized skills requiring a lot of highly specialized knowledge.

Of course, if the phone's owner was still alive, then apple could probably send a "important update" that improves phone (in)security, by making sure the next backup is encrypted under a chosen key, and then of course enable that backup.

Yeah, you have no idea how Apple implemented this, so of course it should be easy.

The amount of tries you get has an ever-increasing delay between that is hardware enforced by the secure device that holds the key, and that device cannot have it's storage copied. That device cannot be removed from the phone, as the processor contains part of the key's salt burned in, so they must be paired. And, it's possible that the default behavior of wiping the device, which is accomplished by wiping the key, happens after 10 incorrect tries. A better explanation from someone above: http://yro.slashdot.org/commen...

So, if you want to do what you're suggesting, which is to image the device and then try to brute force the AES-256 key to decrypt the image, have fun. We'll get the results of that somewhere between now and after the Sun consumes the planet as it turns into a red dwarf. Either way, it is very improbable that anyone who would see the phone unlock would be born yet, or care about a very limited event in history from so many years ago from their point of view.

More info: https://www.apple.com/business...

Apple devices from the iPhone 5s and onward use a "Secure Enclave" which is basically tamper-proof hardware key management.

This phone in question is the 5c, so Apple might actually be able to attack it. Unfortunately, this will make the judge think any iPhone can be attacked by Apple.

Although, I'm really not clear under what authority the Judge believes he has the power to compel Apple to do all this work against their business interests. It used to be they'd have to threaten, in secret, to put the CEO in prison to get this kind of cooperation. Now a judge just commands it? #ussa

Go to http://www.apple.com/iphone/co... and search for "Power and Battery" section...