Congressman: Court Order To Decrypt iPhone Has Far-Reaching Implications (dailydot.com)

Patrick O'Neill writes: Hours after Apple was ordered to help the FBI access the San Bernardino Shooters' iPhone, Rep. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.), a Stanford University computer-science graduate, wondered where the use of the All Writs Act—on which the magistrate judge based her ruling—might lead. "Can courts compel Facebook to provide analytics of who might be a criminal?" Lieu said in an email to the Daily Dot. "Or Google to give a list of names of people who searched for the term ISIS? At what point does this stop?"
Apple, so far, has vowed to fight the order that it decrypt the phone of San Bernadino shooter Syed Rizwan Farook, in no uncertain terms.

Comments

Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

If you go through the legal process and get a court order that is the system working as intended. It's when they want backdoors and unregulated access to your information that it's a problem.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Errol backfiring]

And if you read the article, you see that Apple states that this is a backdoor.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

What if a non-US government orders it on a US citizen's phone ?

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

If you go through the legal process and get a court order that is the system working as intended. It's when they want backdoors and unregulated access to your information that it's a problem.

If Apple can circumvent the protection of the private data, anyone with the right tools/data can do so. That's a backdoor by definition.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

the correct action would be to cooperate fully right now, and patch the back door. That way current case proceeds, and future similar situations are not feasible because the backdoor doesn't exist.

they'll have to open up a very public case "forcing" Apple to put in a back door, where apple would have a lot firmer leg to stand on as opposed to not cooperating with this investigation.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

Totally. This approach worked on A4 and earlier processors due to a bug.

They are explicitly asking Apple to degrade the security of the device and wind back the security clock to the 3GS.

Re:Don't see the problem

[bytesex]

It's a phone. State actors already have that capability. (although, in this case, the US apparently doesn't, or they're trying the easy way first). It all hinges on that 4-digit PIN. If this is some sort of smartcard, then Apple can't help you either. If this is software based, you can help yourself: just copy the contents of the phone to another medium, have an implementation of the crypto, and run your brute-force from there. With 10000 combinations, it should take about a minute.

Re:Don't see the problem

[rickb928]

Or a vulnerability.

Same effect, more precise terminology.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Holi]

Cooperating fully would mean implementing a backdoor, not patching one that already exists. Kind of kills your line of reasoning.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Rockoon]

Cooperating fully would mean implementing a backdoor

I wonder who you think that this is cooperating with that is also pertinent. The judge has not ordered Apple to implement a back door.

Re:Don't see the problem

[gtall]

Gee, and the FBI didn't think of this? You should tell them, I'm sure they'd be pleased to get this information.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

Technically they have. They've asked for a system to remove the passcode limitations to allow brute force attacks.

This screams backdoor...

Re:Don't see the problem

[Dog-Cow]

The key that needs decrypting can't be copied from the hardware, at least without several (hundred) million in specialized equipment.

Re:Don't see the problem

[nucrash]

While this would be where we insert slippery slope argument, this is probably one of those rare places where slippery slope is best represented. Say they release a patch, patch finds itself in the wild, patch is reverse engineered, new patches can be used and built off of future versions of iOS.

Re:Don't see the problem

[rickb928]

Government (U.S. government, to be clear) has not always had the ability to intercept any of my communications;

- Walking in a field, writing notes to a companion, who eats the note after reading it. I reciprocate. We shield these notes from being viewed overhead.

- One-time pads, sufficiently complex, are virtually unbreakable. I still have a working OTP email client, and can distribute it to a correspondent securely (in person) to establish an email method that will deny even state - level decryption. The publisher advises me I need to expand the recommended seed from 8 bytes to 24 bytes to be reasonably secure. Done.

I'm pretty certain there are other methods, including current iPhone encryption, apparently...

While the court system in this case is working as intended, I'll bet that the Federal government has already issued a FISA request, and we are unaware of it. Working as intended. But I do not believe FISA courts should operate entirely in the dark. I just don't know how to handle these requests.

Knowing that a former Secretary of State operated their own email server in a manner that a fairly knowledgeable system administrator would recognize as vulnerable to the known capabilities of state-sponsored attempts to compromise it and extract the contents, it's almost disingenuous for the government to claim security is both essential and working at the highest levels, when they knew or should have known that a Cabinet officer was subverting that security. They just were. Reasonable people and those skilled in the art cannot avoid coming to that conclusion baaed on the publicly known evidence.

Our government isn't very good at protecting our rights, nor at its own operations. Good enough reason to limit our government to essential activities only.

And I pray Apple actually tries to break their own encryption and fails. Security shouldn't be reserved to the few. In a nominally free society we will not have perfect security, but we will have, hopefully, more freedom than not.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

the correct action would be to cooperate fully right now, and patch the back door.

The correct action would be to protect your company market share fully right now and not let the competition point out to your potential international customers the flaws of your product.

Re:Don't see the problem

[jellomizer]

The problem as I see it. Apple made their products so they cannot hack into their own devices. Making a back door, even for the government, means there is a spot for the non-government and other government which can get in.

When I do my job right, the products I make is made so without access I cannot get in unless I am setup as a user.

 

Re:Don't see the problem

[Attila Dimedici]

You do not see the problem with the government co-opting your labor?

The court has ordered Apple to create a new OS for the iphone that can be placed on this phone (and any other iphone) to bypass the security features. Would you be OK with the court ordering a local mechanic to repair a totaled car so that the police could recreate what happened in a car crash?

This is not just a matter of ordering Apple to turn over something they have in their possession. It is an order requiring Apple to devote however many man hours are necessary to develop something they have never considered creating and which has no value in the legitimate market.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Rockoon]

Technically they have.

Lets see if you got the use of the word 'technically' right here.

They've asked for a system to remove the passcode limitations to allow brute force attacks.

..nope, you didnt get the use of the word right.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

You are assuming the user only used 4-digits...

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

I love how you think it is only a 4 digit pin, Iphone will allow you to use a 50 character passphrase.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

That's not what the order says. Nobody is requiring them to work unlimited hours until it's cracked. There is literally a line about "reasonable" cooperation.

Re:Don't see the problem

[drunk_punk]

This is pretty good. The government ORDERING a private company to build something (in this case a compromised iOS). Red flags should be going up every damn place.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

With 10,000 combinations, it'll take far less than a minute to try the 10 times needed to wipe the phone as the phone in question is set up. That's why the FBI wants Apple's help in getting past this limit so that they can brute force it.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

If you go through the legal process and get a court order that is the system working as intended. It's when they want backdoors and unregulated access to your information that it's a problem.

Once the TPP comes into effect, the legal process will probably be "this court order interferes with our business model, so we are ignoring it and suing you".

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

You can't do the latter. The encryption key is split into fragments, baked into silicon in multiple chips, and the exponential timeout and wipe features are enforced by hardware.

iOS may be a walled garden, but damn, the walls go down to the bedrock.

See apple's own ios 9 security whitepaper or this fellow's succinct summary buried deep in the comments on techdirt.

Re:Don't see the problem

[DaHat]

However the law (as well as the judge) compels Apple to assist with law enforcement investigations.

While Apple has designed things so far in a way that makes it rather hard for the government to unlock a phone after it's been seized, one has to wonder at what point they attempt to compel Apple to deploy a modified version of the OS (without all of the safeguards) to subjects who are under investigation... and with a warrant in hand.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

If you go through the legal process and get a court order that is the system working as intended.

No, you're missing the point.
Apple is not on trial here. Apple is not part of the investigation or under investigation. Apple made a phone, and now the government wants to FORCE Apple to help them access the information on it. Because apparently the FBI is incompetent and the NSA apparently won't help them. You know, two agencies with massive operational budgets who exist specifically to be experts at this kind of shit.

Re:Don't see the problem

[DaHat]

You realize this is nothing new, right? Telephone companies for ages have been required to install mechanisms that allow law enforcement the ability to tap your line. The same has existed for many ISPs & online services as well.

The whole Microsoft battling the US government over data stored in Ireland is just one notable example of this.

Re:Don't see the problem

[wcrowe]

I think the argument that Apple is making is that they are being ordered to build something that doesn't exist and/or offer a service that is outside their normal business practices. It's like forcing conscientious objectors to kill people; or forcing citizens to give room and board to soldiers; or forcing a typewriter manufacurer to make firearms; or forcing a chemical manufacurer to make "death gel".

I could certainly see this going to the supreme court.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Alumoi]

What if a non-US government orders it on a US citizen's phone ?

Then it's a state of war between good old US and that country.
Only the mighty US can impose its will upon other countries and their citizens. Didn't you get the memo?

Re:Don't see the problem

[TheCarp]

No, he has asked them to create a trojan firmware that can be loaded onto the phone as if it were a normal one. A trojan which could easily be reused on any phone, once the FBI get their grubby hands on it, and then there will be jack all that anyone can do about it.

They are asking Apple to do something which will effectively give them this same access in the future without a warrant, because the process will be repeatable. Even if Apple loads the rom themselves, the FBI will make a copy. They will expend great effort to make a copy, probably even enlisting the NSA for help.

If that rom file should ever be leaked or stolen, then it can be used by anyone.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

If Apple can circumvent the protection of the private data, anyone with the right tools/data can do so. That's a backdoor by definition.

No, that's not the definition of a backdoor. That term indicates intent, if the access mechanism was placed there intentionally then it's a backdoor, if it's a result of poor design, accident, oversight, incompetence, etc. then it's not a backdoor.

But again, you're completely missing the point. We have the FBI and the NSA to do this kind of shit, backdoor or not, and if they can't do it then a) they've got no business FORCING Apple to do it for them, and b) why the fuck are we paying them?

Re:Don't see the problem

[stealth_finger]

the correct action would be to cooperate fully right now, and patch the back door. That way current case proceeds, and future similar situations are not feasible because the backdoor doesn't exist.

they'll have to open up a very public case "forcing" Apple to put in a back door, where apple would have a lot firmer leg to stand on as opposed to not cooperating with this investigation.

The problem is the FBI then have this version of iOS with stripped out security that they can then theoretically install on any iphone they want to grab all the data. They say it will only be used this one time for this one thing but if you believe that there's a lovely bridge I have for sale.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

In case you hadn't noticed, the court has ordered that Apple must create a back doored version of iOS.

As you said - it's when they want backdoors that it's a problem ;)

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

There's no need to talk about slippery slopes. This is already it. This is the government asking for a fully back doored version of iOS to exist. Once that happens, it's only a matter of time before some set of bad guys (be that overzealous gvmnt employees without a court order, or criminals wanting to break into any iPhone they pick up off the street) gets hold of the back doored version, and exploits it.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Asgard]

Being pedantic, but there is no 'sufficiently complex' about a one-time pad. Either the pad is actually random or it is not, and either it is used properly (ie never reused), or it is not.

If it is actually random and never reused, the cipherhtext is beyond virtually unbreakable -- it absolutely unbreakable. The message can be decoded with equal probability into anything.

seed from 8 bytes to 24 bytes to be reasonably secure.

This is not a OTP, it is something else. Your seed is the input to a pseudorandom number generator which is creates the encryption key. Since it is a PRNG it does not achieve the perfect security of a true random OTP. http://crypto.stackexchange.co... describes the issue with trying to generate a OTP with a PRNG.

Given your statement about seed strength but not knowing what tool it is, I'd be very concerned that your effective key strength is significantly less than commodity GPG offers.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

If apple can make a backdoor, and install it on a phone, without an authorized user accepting it, then clearly there is already a back door.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

At least with a 4 - 4 verdict, no precedence will be made.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

The problem is the FBI then have this version of iOS with stripped out security that they can then theoretically install on any iphone they want to grab all the data.

Well, not necessarily. If they make a custom firmware, they could make it only work with that phone. First, it could be inflexible and fail to run on slightly different models (i.e. other production runs with different hw patchlevels.) Second, they could tie interesting features to that particular phone's serial number. FBI makes a copy, it doesn't work on other phones. Of course, there is the chance that their experts figure out this particular trick.

Re:Don't see the problem

[MachineShedFred]

The court order is to create a version of iOS that has a back door, which could then be loaded onto the device. Do you really think the US Government would use this one time, and then destroy all copies of it, or do you think that a copy might get "accidentally" transmitted to the CIA / NSA and used whenever the fuck they want?

Re:Don't see the problem

[MachineShedFred]

The one thing that might stop them is if Apple uses their firmware signing stuff, and then revoke the signing afterward. But that would only be a temporary stop until someone at FBI / NSA figures out how to man-in-the-middle the signing mechanism within their lab.

Re: Don't see the problem

[JaiWing]

The point is, Apple doesn't have this data. The phone contains the data. The phone is in the possession of the FBI, not Apple. The FBI (most likely) NOT allow Apple to posses the phone.
So, the only solution is for Apple to create an OS for the phone that bypasses the security wipe feature, allowing a brute force attack to be carried out. Why Apple would want to create, at their expense (I am a taxpayer, and I don't want to pay for this), a product with no value to the public.
Effectively, a court ordered them to do exactly that.
Now another, unlikely, solution is for the FBI to place the phone in Apple's possession, Apple then applies the newly developed OS to the phone then runs the brute force attack to decrypt the phone then changes the pin then reinstalls a factory OS and then returns the phone to the FBI along with the new pin. All at Apple's expense. Unlikely for many reasons.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

A dumb suicide bomber doesn't use a 50 character passphrase.

The strange thing is that they require this PIN. De-solder the flash memory, read it in a simple reader device. Do a string search. This is something hobbyists used to do. These days the don't, because you need special soldering equipment for today's mega-chips. But not that special, you'll find it in any well-equipped electronics lab. Something the FBI (or any electronics company - including the small ones) can afford. So hire a few electronics guys for this job, buy the equipment. Equipment can be used for the next case too, of course.

Re:Don't see the problem

[MachineShedFred]

It's hardware based encryption, where half of the key comes out of a value burned into the CPU during manufacturing (and not recorded anywhere) combined with a value burned into the "Secure Enclave" during manufacturing (and not recorded anywhere). You take the storage image off the device, you lose half the key and you're fucked. You attempt to crack the PIN on device, you get 10 tries before the secure enclave overwrites the key with a new one, and you're fucked. If the auto-wipe was disabled by the user (it's on by default), then you get an ever-increasing time delay enforced by the hardware in between PIN attempts. It would take upwards of a year to brute-force a 4-digit PIN unless you get very lucky.

Oh, and the setting for the automatic wipe as well as the half of the key generated from sensor entropy is cryptographically stored in the Secure Enclave, which you cannot image or change values of. The crypto key for that is the user's PIN / password.

Is this impossible to break? Given near infinite resources, no. Is it hard enough that you could use the Theory of Limits from calculus to make it equal to impossible? Probably.

Re:Don't see the problem

[bitingduck]

Knowing that a former Secretary of State operated their own email server in a manner that a fairly knowledgeable system administrator would recognize as vulnerable to the known capabilities of state-sponsored attempts to compromise it and extract the contents, it's almost disingenuous for the government to claim security is both essential and working at the highest levels, when they knew or should have known that a Cabinet officer was subverting that security. They just were. Reasonable people and those skilled in the art cannot avoid coming to that conclusion baaed on the publicly known evidence.

Our government isn't very good at protecting our rights, nor at its own operations. Good enough reason to limit our government to essential activities only.

And I pray Apple actually tries to break their own encryption and fails. Security shouldn't be reserved to the few. In a nominally free society we will not have perfect security, but we will have, hopefully, more freedom than not.

Don't overlook the Office of Personnel Management data breach, in which the OPM had such bad security that they effectively released to hackers the entire collection of background check information for all government personnel and contractors who need access to gov't facilities for everyone who filled out the forms from about 2000 to 2015. It wasn't just the form data (name, SSN, lists of associates to use for references, foreign travel history) - it was all the follow up data, too. Including responses from references, clearance interview details. It even included images of fingerprints if you went through the process since the PIV-II cards came into use. All of that information is now basically free on the internet. Forever. It's a phisher's (and foreign extortionist's) wet dream-- a complete set of collated, validated data, including associations and relationships, as well as potential dirt, on everyone who has worked for the US gov't (including many many contractors) for the past 15 years.

Re:Don't see the problem

[MachineShedFred]

Well, that's exactly what they've asked Apple to do - create a version of iOS that allows for electronic entry of the unlock code, so they can have a computer hammer thousands of codes through it. Apple doesn't even want to create such an image, because it *will* leak out and be used more than this once. Someone will hand it off to CIA / NSA / whoever, and that's the ball game.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Feyshtey]

A court order to investigate an individual is one thing. A court order demanding a private business that is under no suspicion create a thing that makes the company's products less secure for their customers (and quite possibly less valuable to them) is another entirely. Put aside that it's the court tell the company they have to create something, and how ludicrous that statement is alone. The creation of this tool cannot be specific to the one users who is the subject of the search. It presents the possibility that every customer's information could be more subject to inspection, and by more than just the government entity requesting the creation of it. The simple act of creating the access announces to every hacker that the access is possible.

Re:Don't see the problem

[i_ate_god]

But for this specific case only.

I don't understand why this can't be in a temporary fashion, specific to this particular iphone, and only for this specific case. It's not clear to me why if Apple does this work, it suddenly invalidates whatever security measures are in place on current and new iphones.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Obfuscant]

Apple states this is a backdoor, which THEY PUT INTO THE SYSTEM just so they could support customers who forget their encryption keys. They did this of their own free will, and they have no problem using it when a customer asks. They even have no problem using it when the employer of a customer asks. A friend of mine passed away, and Apple happily unlocked his Macbook so the employer could look through all his files for anything work related.

But when a court issues the appropriate warrant regarding one person's phone, who is under indictment for a mass-shooting incident of many innocent people in a disability assistance facility, they say "no way". It becomes a case of unwarranted government surveillance and eavesdropping on everyday citizens, and we certainly cannot have that. "What's next", some mass intrusion into the daily lives of Mom and Pop and little Billy for searching for the word ISIS on Google? No, what's next is the next warrant for the next alleged criminal to look at one phone for evidence of that specific crime.

Apple is in the wrong on this.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Archangel Michael]

FYI slippery slope is a logical fallacy, not because it isn't true, but rather because it isn't always true (logical arguments require certainty). Slippery Slopes are a valid argument when dealing with progressive changes towards an end goal, in this case tyranny. The story of a a fog in a pot of water slowly heating up is a "slippery slope" argument.

Knowing that Slippery Slopes are a valid argument, just not valid in logic proofs is important. We're not dealing with a logical proof here, therefore slippery slopes MAY be useful here. I would postulate that the camel's nose is in the tent (another slippery slope example)

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

De-solder the flash memory, read it in a simple reader device. Do a string search. This is something hobbyists used to do. ...

Maybe that would work on the kind of hardware I bet you would design, but Apple has smart people working there.

The PIN/Passcode isn't in memory, and in fact isn't even stored on the device. Like most modern operating systems, the result of the passcode processing is what is stored (like the password hash on *NIX), and on the iPhone it is stored in a secure enclave inside the CPU chip, and even then that code is encrypted with yet another code stored in a different part of the hardware, and neither code ever leaves the CPU.

Reverse engineering to recover the codes would require physical destruction of the device, which would defeat the purpose here.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Archangel Michael]

The last bastion of liberty is the defiant citizen saying "no" to government overreach. However, when sufficient numbers of people become compliant to the whims of the ruling elite, tyranny is at hand.

Regardless of the circumstances of the case, I admire Tim Cook's stance. My only hope is that he remains standing firm on those convictions.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Gr8Apes]

Apple states this is a backdoor...

Apple is in the wrong on this.

Read the actual order - it's absolute the first statement, and they are not wrong. The order asks for far more than you imply. It asks Apple to

• 1) disable the auto-erase function
• 2) allow access via multiple protocols to attempt to break into the phone
• 3) create a new codebase to allow unlimited cracking attempts on the phone. This last is a "root kit", and it does not exist today.

As for your friend's macbook, anyone can unlock a macbook as long as file vault is not enabled. If it's enabled, not even Apple (AFIAK) can unlock it without resorting to brute force or some other truly black hat worthy exploit.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Gr8Apes]

The key that needs decrypting can't be copied from the hardware, at least without several (hundred) million in specialized equipment.

Last I checked, the NSA's budget wouldn't even notice that expenditure.

Re:Don't see the problem

[AmiMoJo]

The court order says that Apple should hard code the ID of the target phone into the software so it can't be used elsewhere. Of course they need to sign the binary so the FBI can't just tweak a few bytes. However, that still means:

1. The FBI can say it's much less work next time, just change a few bytes and sign the binary! The "undue burden" defence goes away, unless Apple invests more time and energy in creating new undue burden.

2. Maybe the FBI or NSA has Apple's signing keys, or knows a way to circumvent the signing requirement.

Re:Don't see the problem

[DaHat]

Not quite, the FBI is asking for help on this particular phone... for which it may or may not be too late. I'm pondering future cases, where if you end up say on the no fly list, the FBI orders Apple to opt you into the low-sec update patch which supports pre-emptive monitoring & trivial encryption bypassing if your phone happens to end up with the FBI during an investigation.

Re:Don't see the problem

[bkr1_2k]

It's a precedent they're trying to set. Of course they have the tools to do this themselves with a brute force attack, that's not the point. If they can force companies to provide the backdoor then they no longer need to use the appropriate channels to get the information. They'll have the ease of use that anyone at the FBI who wants access to the data can easily get that access, without drawing any unwanted scrutiny. They're trying to backdoor the process as much as the hardware/software.

Re:Don't see the problem

[codeAlDente]

'Slippery slope' cannot be a logical fallacy because it is not a logical proposition.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dunkindave]

If the auto-wipe was disabled by the user (it's on by default), then you get an ever-increasing time delay enforced by the hardware in between PIN attempts. It would take upwards of a year to brute-force a 4-digit PIN unless you get very lucky.

Actually, there is a hack for that. I saw a demonstration of a device that uses the USB interface to try a small number of PINs, then resets the device before it records the failures, then tries another small number of PINs, and so on. It takes a few hours to a day to break a 4-digit PIN. Of course, my 12 character passcode would take somewhat longer. :)

The more common way for law enforcement to break protected iPhones is to gain access to the computer the phone is synced with, since to sync they exchange cookies which allows the computer to still access the device even when locked. Of course, I saw an article about the FBI scouring a lake for a hard drive so maybe that wasn't an option in this case.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

FBI didn't actually ask for the code involved though. They said Apple could do this at their facility as long as the FBI have remote access to do their brute force after the patch/update/backdoor was applied.

Re:Don't see the problem

[kheldan]

You can't have 'backdoors' in encryption without rendering the encryption worthless! Any method of enabling an end-run around the encryption itself is like having the best lock in the world on your front door then leaving a window wide open. At the point where government requires such things you may as well just ban ALL encryption outright and force everyone to have Red Data. Then at least you'll know who the criminals and terrorists are, because they will be using encryption.

Re: Don't see the problem

[rickb928]

The seed process is deceptively simple. I enter (now) 24 characters, the client the first pad, I send the hash generated to my recipient, exchange encrypted messages, and we stay in sync via hash exchanges embedded in the encrypted messages. Simplistic explanation.

The most vulnerable part of this is the initial exchange. If I don't pay a little attention, I could accidentally accept a response from the intended recipient, but my first message to them would fail, bad pad. Then retry the exchange. It worked when I last used it.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

The backdoor doesn't exist yet, that's the issue. Apple currently can't help the FBI without creating one. A Macbook isn't an iPhone and isn't designed to be as secure as one. You probably could've unlocked your friend's computer yourself with the recovery disc. This is not a similar situation. But don't let facts get in your way.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Etcetera]

Cooperating fully would mean implementing a backdoor, not patching one that already exists. Kind of kills your line of reasoning.

The maker of a physical safe can implement a physical backdoor with a couple of hours, some high-precision blow torches, and a very large mess.

The problem with all-electronic/virtual back doors is that they can be easily hacked remotely, en masse, and surreptitiously. If a physical back door exists that requires a team of specialists, a couple hours with a scanning electron microscope, and a couple of hundred thousand dollars to disassemble a chip, followed by a court order to get the maker to release the combination key on top of it, I'm perfectly fine with that. That's, indeed, showing that the system can work.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Etcetera]

The problem as I see it. Apple made their products so they cannot hack into their own devices. Making a back door, even for the government, means there is a spot for the non-government and other government which can get in.

When I do my job right, the products I make is made so without access I cannot get in unless I am setup as a user.

There should always be a manual override. The question is how difficult that manual override is to access.

In the case of a high-value safe, a couple of hours with trained experts and some precision blow torches can usually accomplish the job. You might need a contractor to help with repairing the room the safe is in though.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Etcetera]

If you go through the legal process and get a court order that is the system working as intended.

No, you're missing the point.
Apple is not on trial here. Apple is not part of the investigation or under investigation. Apple made a phone, and now the government wants to FORCE Apple to help them access the information on it. Because apparently the FBI is incompetent and the NSA apparently won't help them. You know, two agencies with massive operational budgets who exist specifically to be experts at this kind of shit.

You seem to fail to understand that that's perfectly allowed by both case law, and common law tradition. In some counties in some states, it's a crime to fail to assist a Sheriff in the making of an arrest, so long as the instruction is reasonable.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Etcetera]

You can't have 'backdoors' in encryption without rendering the encryption worthless! Any method of enabling an end-run around the encryption itself is like having the best lock in the world on your front door then leaving a window wide open. At the point where government requires such things you may as well just ban ALL encryption outright and force everyone to have Red Data. Then at least you'll know who the criminals and terrorists are, because they will be using encryption.

Not if there's a physical lockout. If getting access to the key to decrypt requires physical access to (and destruction of, like in the case of a real, physical safe) the device, expert care to prevent damage to the contents, and about $200K of physical gear to get to, that's a bit different than a back door password or single key discoverable and exploitable by Romanian script kiddies.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

A private business that created a device designed to defeat LEO is very different than a private business that is unconnected, and yes, the court most certainly can. This is no different, in principal (though it is in law) to executing a search warrant on someone connected with a criminal.

Re:Don't see the problem

[TylerJWhit]

It is a logical proposition, and one that's fallacious in it's execution. Slipper slopes work on the premises that (a) is morally gray/lesser evil/not morally objectionable, and if allowed, will most assuredly lead to (b), a morally reprehensible outcome. Therefore, the conclusion is that (a) should not be allowed.

Re:Don't see the problem

[kheldan]

As if something like that can't also be reproduced. A built-in vulnerability is still a vulnerability. Also, letting the government (or corporations) have access to whatever they want, whenever they want. No thanks. Either strong encryption or NO encryption, not some half-assed broken thing.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Thundercleets]

It would be nice to think that Apple was somehow concerned with users privacy but the evidence is to the contrary as Snowden showed they are in it for the money. The information and access the feds are looking for is something they want to be reimbursed for. Usage data and access is seen as the next big thing by everyone in tech which is why they are all getting into the act.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Sloppy]

It is not clear to me that this is going to be done with trojan firmware merely uploaded. It's conceivable that Apple might have to fab a custom IC for this, scrape epoxy off of the existing IC and board to replace the IC, etc. If the FBI's problem can be "fixed" with mere software, then Apple's product wasn't any good anyway, and it was already waiting for any and all attackers to come "fix" it. Somehow I suspect that's not the case.

One of the reasons they might be complaining about the order, is that it's going to cost them so much money. And if the order stands, it could be seen as intimidation. ("My my my, this is an expensive process we made you go through. It sure would be a shame if it happened to you thousands of times per year, now that we have discovered a magic power to force you to do things for us. You know, if you just made future phones a little easier to subvert, you wouldn't have to worry about each of them turning into tens of thousands of dollars of labor later..."

Re:Don't see the problem

[jafiwam]

But for this specific case only.

I don't understand why this can't be in a temporary fashion, specific to this particular iphone, and only for this specific case. It's not clear to me why if Apple does this work, it suddenly invalidates whatever security measures are in place on current and new iphones.

You are confused about two things.

1) a program "for that specific phone" is what the judge ordered, however if that program works on one phone, it will work on others regardless of the desires of Apple

2) The phone in question is an iPhone 5c with specific and outdated security features. Compromising this phone will open up the ability to compromise all 5cs and any phone before that. iPhone 6 cannot be compromised in this manner.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Etcetera]

As if something like that can't also be reproduced. A built-in vulnerability is still a vulnerability. Also, letting the government (or corporations) have access to whatever they want, whenever they want. No thanks. Either strong encryption or NO encryption, not some half-assed broken thing.

How are you going to "reproduce" physical access to a device, and destruction of the chip, to apply that to more than one device?

Re:Don't see the problem

[macs4all]

Apple happily unlocked his Macbook

That is QUITE a different animal.

It has ALWAYS been possible to "Reset Password" on an OS X device. All you need is the Install Disk/Partition. Start the Install Utility, and choose "Reset Password". Choose NEW Password. DONE!

But, I am NOT sure whether this will gain you access to a FileVault-Protected Drive. Someone else will have to weigh-in on that one. My feeling is "No".

However, iOS is different. The Secure Enclave (SE) chip holds the key (literally), and no one, not even Apple, can cause the SE to disgorge said key.

So, your original premise is flawed; because iOS != OS X.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Feyshtey]

The device was not created to defeat law enforcement. It was designed to defeat thieves. That's why people buy phones that can be secured. Ironically the features the government is demanding by circumvented are features the government also demands be on federally issued mobile devices, depending on the type of use. Requiring the creation of a method to break these features actually reduces the security of federal systems and data.

That aside, you're still missing the underlying distinction. While I agree that the court may certainly order a landlord to provide the keys to an establishment in which a tenant was a suspected criminal, it would be ridiculous to suggest that if that tenant had changed the locks and installed high security features that the landlord would be required to dismantle the building so that law enforcement could gain entry. Hell, even if the landlord installed the high security features and as part of the lease agreement forfeited all keys, he STILL shouldnt be held accountable for the methods, let alone costs, of gaining access.

Re:Don't see the problem

[macs4all]

You realize this is nothing new, right? Telephone companies for ages have been required to install mechanisms that allow law enforcement the ability to tap your line. The same has existed for many ISPs & online services as well.

The whole Microsoft battling the US government over data stored in Ireland is just one notable example of this.

Not exactly "Ages". Only since the CALEA was signed into law by Pres. Clinton in 1994.

Re:Don't see the problem

[SuiteSisterMary]

This assumes that the failed count isn't stored in the Secured Enclave somewhere. Which it presumably is.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

I say if they need to have physical access to the device to load it then go ahead and create it but if it can be loaded remotely without the knowledge of the owner of the device then no they shouldn't

Re:Don't see the problem

[nanoflower]

Because it never works that one. Once various governmental agencies know that Apple has a way around their security they will continue to ask for Apple to help them break the security. So even if it was possible to do a one off patch just for this phone (and I doubt that is possible) the burden will be upon Apple to continue doing this forever going forward.

Also it won't be long before there are actual legal demands for Apple to put something in permanently once people know that Apple can do it. Right now Apple can say it isn't possible and use that to fight off those efforts but if they show it is possible (even if it is just to make it possible to brute force attack the phone) then it won't be long before Apple will have to implement a way in for all governmental agencies.

Re:Don't see the problem

[mbkennel]

| Apple is not on trial here. Apple is not part of the investigation or under investigation.

Yet.

What's to stop DOJ from charging Tim Cook, and everybody down the line in the iOS group with federal crimes such as felony obstruction of justice, or even giving material support to terrorist organization, unless they comply?

Could the gov. engage in asset seizure of the iOS division in a civil action?

Re: Don't see the problem

[Asgard]

Can you name the tool?

In any case, the system described is not a OTP.

Re:Don't see the problem

[93 Escort Wagon]

Well, not necessarily. If they make a custom firmware, they could make it only work with that phone.

Given the FBI would have that firmware, it's likely they'd find it trivial to remove that sort of arbitrary limitation.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

1) a program "for that specific phone" is what the judge ordered, however if that program works on one phone, it will work on others regardless of the desires of Apple

Not if Apple hard-codes the firmware to boot on only a single device with a single set of hardware IDs. And thanks to the hardware requiring firmware by Apple's key, nobody but Apple has the ability to make such firmware work on other devices.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

Oops. Typo caused by over-editing. I meant to say "And thanks to the hardware requiring firmware signed by Apple's key, nobody but Apple has the ability to make such firmware work on other devices."

Re:Don't see the problem

[JesseMcDonald]

Actually, there is a hack for that. I saw a demonstration of a device that uses the USB interface to try a small number of PINs, then resets the device before it records the failures, then tries another small number of PINs, and so on.

This is why you should record the attempt first, before checking whether the PIN is valid. Resetting the device at any point in the authentication process before the attempt has been recorded should not yield any additional information about the PIN.

Re: Don't see the problem

[rickb928]

P-OTP.

From a while ago.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

Not if Apple hard-codes the firmware to boot on only a single device with a single set of hardware IDs.

Replying to myself because I just realized that such changes are probably unnecessary. As I understand it, IPSW firmware binaries are already signed by Apple for use on a specific device at installation time. As far as I know, it isn't possible to pre-sign an IPSW for use on arbitrary devices. If Apple tells their signing servers to sign the IPSW only for use on a specific device, it will do so. More importantly, if Apple tells their signing servers to stop signing that firmware binary, it won't be possible for anyone to install that firmware on any device in the future even if they already have a copy of that firmware, though if they already have a signed copy, they could reinstall it on that same device, I think.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

However, iOS is different. The Secure Enclave (SE) chip holds the key (literally), and no one, not even Apple, can cause the SE to disgorge said key.

This is an iPhone 5c. The secure enclave wasn't added until the iPhone 5s. Even if it existed, as I understand it, it is possible to read both the secure enclave's NAND flash and its hardware ID using electron microscopy.

Note, however, that obtaining that data would likely involve completely destroying the secure enclave (uncapping the chip and removing layers of wiring), which will render the device permanently unusable. This means that you would have to scrape the encrypted data off the external flash chips directly and use a separate computer for doing the actual decryption. More importantly, it means that the device would be a brick afterwards. For post-crime forensic purposes on a device that doesn't need to be returned to its owner, that's not necessarily a show-stopper, but it is probably impossible/infeasible to do this surreptitiously to a confiscated phone and then return the phone (functioning) to its owner.

Re: Don't see the problem

[JesseMcDonald]

Well, that probably beats ROT-13, though I wouldn't care to stake anything important on it.

However, it is most definitely not a one-time pad. Despite being provably unbreakable when implemented correctly, OTP is perhaps the simplest of all encryption algorithms. There is no hashing, key-stretching, chaining, etc., just a message and a true-random pad of the same length. To encrypt or decrypt you just XOR the message and the pad.

The difficulty, of course, is in the key exchange. You have to arrange for both parties to securely share the same random pad, and any given bit of the pad can only be used to communicate one bit of message. Moreover, every pair of endpoints requires a different pad—there is no OTP equivalent of public-key cryptography.

This is where quantum cryptography really shines, as it employs quantum effects to negotiate random pads in real time between two endpoints without risk of undetected eavesdropping. The encryption algorithm in quantum cryptography is really just OTP; the novel part is the solution to the key exchange problem.

Re:Don't see the problem

[KlomDark]

Lawful Evil much?

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

That's true on the iPhone 5s and later. This is an iPhone 5c, which lacks a secure enclave. AFAIK, the key is stored on the external flash part, and I think the passcode is entangled with a hardware ID, but that can be obtained by the OS (by definition) without knowing the passcode. So all that is necessary to crack one of these is to remove the code that wipes the key upon a certain number of failed attempts, along with the code that progressively increases the time between failed attempts.

And really, you don't even need those changes, as long as you're willing to unsolder the flash parts, clone them, and resolder them, then repeat this process in the reverse direction every time it wipes the key or the delay gets longer than the time it takes to unsolder, reflash, and resolder the chips.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

That analysis would be correct if this were an iPhone 5s or later. It isn't. It's an iPhone 5c, which doesn't have a secure enclave, making the entire analysis incorrect.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

It's hardware based encryption, where half of the key comes out of a value burned into the CPU during manufacturing (and not recorded anywhere) combined with a value burned into the "Secure Enclave" during manufacturing (and not recorded anywhere).

Not on the iPhone 5c. That was added in devices with the A7 CPU and later. The iPhone 5c uses an A6 and thus lacks a secure enclave. I'm pretty sure that you can also tell whether a device has a secure enclave by looking for the fingerprint reader. No fingerprint reader, no secure enclave.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

The iPhone 5c doesn't actually have a secure enclave, so yes, you can safely assume that the failed count is not stored in one.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Etcetera]

Lawful Evil much?

Blame the English: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hue_and_cry

Re:Don't see the problem

[Tjp($)pjT]

The backdoor is a future possibility. The iPhone they want to break into is in the present. Under the conditions that the iPhone in question has hardware encryption capabilities (3G or later) and is running iOS 8.x or later, which is likely, the cryptography key(s) needed are stored and used on a piece of silicon meant to be secure. Apple from outside that chip still has no means to extract the keys. If the iPhone is set to wipe itself after numerous failed attempts all it need do to accomplish this is wipe out the key itself stored on the secure silicon. What the court is asking is that Apple provide a means to go backwards in time. Apple cannot using conventional hardware technology or software technology recover the encryption key ... What they could attempt to do is grind the secure chip casing and try to probe the silicon directly. Good luck with that.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Tjp($)pjT]

You can actually lockup the boot on EFI macs so it requires a password to do anything. Even then the passcode is more discoverable as it isn't in secure silicon.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Asgard]

Could they subpoena the signing key somehow?

Re:Don't see the problem

[mysidia]

They want to compel Apple to make a special digitally-signed version of iOS that has the "Wipe device after 10 incorrect PIN numbers" feature disabled and provide this to the authorities, to help them with their investigation of this case (But, of course, nothing blocks them from holding onto the code and making more use of it in other cases, or using it for other purposes that would not be worthy of the order).

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

If you read the article closely, you see the following:

"Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession."

The fact that they are capable of creating the back door after someone encrypted the disk means that their current security claims are false. The encryption on the phone was supposed to be a function of a secret, randomly generated key present and unique to every processor on every device and which can not be extracted, only used (something like an HSM) with a key derivation function tuned to be extremely inefficient based on the computational power of the CPU itself, which *should* be the only computer on earth capable of decrypting the device's filesystem. If the design of the system allows Apple to gain access to encrypted data on the system more efficiently than the FBI case, then they lied about the absence of a back door because they would be making use of one to pull off the attack.

Re:Don't see the problem

[mysidia]

Not if Apple hard-codes the firmware to boot on only a single device with a single set of hardware IDs.

They can reverse engineer the patch and remove the restriction.

thanks to the hardware requiring firmware by Apple's key, nobody but Apple has the ability to make such firmware work on other devices.

That's not a problem. The next writ will order Apple to digitally sign their blob of choice.

Re:Don't see the problem

[mysidia]

is that it's going to cost them so much money.

Apple would be entitled to cost reimbursment for subpoena compliance.

Re:Don't see the problem

[mysidia]

Given the FBI would have that firmware

Distribute as an encrypted blob which loads a standard firmware, and then after loading, the device downloads another encrypted digitally signed blob from Apple's HTTPS URL, and it applies the second update in RAM only.

Apple's servers will only deliver the second blob to the correct Device ID, and only for the few months while the investigation is in progress.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

Actually no, what the FBI wants is for Apple to create a new version of the iOS that *has* a backdoor in the system. The issue is not that Apple is refusing to allow the FBI to use an existing backdoor. Apple is refusing to *create* a less secure version of the iOS that has a backdoor available for use. Apple's customer letter posted at http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ covers the issue fairly well.

Re:Don't see the problem

[david_thornley]

From what I read, it is a request for software applicable to that particular phone that will be installed. That would mean that Apple would have the capability to break in, and could be ordered to do so for any other phone. That's better than giving the FBI a universal key, but still not good. AIUI, Apple would not be required to hand over the software, provided the FBI was allowed to do a brute-force PIN attack afterwards. However, what Apple is requested to do may not work in iPhones 5S and later, since there were security architecture changes between the 5 and the 5S (the 5C was the 5 with a colored plastic case and maybe a few other changes).

Re:Don't see the problem

[kheldan]

You'd be surprised what intelligent, talented, creative, driven, and completely amoral people can come up with. There is no such thing as 'totally secure', there is only 'slowing down the determined'.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Gr8Apes]

I haven't futzed with the EFI passwords. BIOS passwords were bad enough if you forgot them. But, IIRC, they could be reset or disabled, although it's been a while. Might have swapped motherboards. It was too long ago.

Re:Don't see the problem

[david_thornley]

It may make the chip unusable before anyone can get the key. Apple probably has a few protections built in to wipe the key under certain physical attacks on the SE chip. They've been getting more determined about security, and do have zillions of dollars to spend on the design.

Re:Don't see the problem

[mysidia]

unless Apple invests more time and energy in creating new undue burden.

They should put a second lockout counter on a hardware chip, in addition to the OS attempts counter, Or put a "Virtual chip" implemented in the system, that is excluded from the normal firmware update process, and the virtual chip will self-destruct if its own code is changed (Due to a side-effect of losing something when Firmware changes, not a self-destruct process in the code itself); requirement to update the "Virtual Chip" image using a specialized Update process requiring the phone to be unlocked first.

The Chip whether Hardware or Virtual should contain some vital piece of information required to unlock the phone, which will be zapped and re-generated in case of too many attempts.

Also, the Chip never reveals the information it stores..... an obfuscated hash of the passcode requested has to be presented to the Chip every login attempt, and if it approves, then the Chip performs a crypto operation that generates one share of the crypto keys required to unlock everything.

Oh right.... to prevent a software Virtual Chip's firmware from being changed: the module itself gets saved as a separate program on the phone. It contains a digitally signed program portion, the execution stub, and a self-modifying portion, which works like the Bytecode execution engine in the DVD or BlueRay DRM standards..... executes inside a sandbox and is initially all 000s in the firmware, But gets replaced when a passcode is set.

Receives the PIN number, modifies it to produce a challenge response (The challenge response will be incorrect iff the PIN number is incorrect), and updates persistent memory registers occurs within the self-modifying portion.

The self-modifying program contains unpredictable elements, and is randomly generated bytecode that is created when the user first sets their passcode, so the program is dependent on the user, and its exact content is dependent on the PIN number. Also, this section is encrypted, gets decrypted only by the execution stub, and the encryption is specific to the device and e-mail address.

But for sure:
A number of persistent registers are presented to the program
Some of the persistent registers are used to save values required to properly answer challenges and calculate the current secret value.
Some of the persistent registers are used to save 'canary' values to detect tampering
Some of the persistent registers are related to the number of failed PIN attempts since last success.
Some of the persistent registers will store hashes of the other persistent registers
Some of the persistent registers will store hashes of the self-generated code segment
Some of the persistent registers will contain random data
Some of the persistent registers will be based on the current timestamp, timestamp of last success, fail, etc.

Some of the code blocks inside the bytecode will detect for signs of tampering on any counter, or any section of the self-generated code area.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

But for this specific case only.

I don't understand why this can't be in a temporary fashion, specific to this particular iphone, and only for this specific case. It's not clear to me why if Apple does this work, it suddenly invalidates whatever security measures are in place on current and new iphones.

this particular iphone is running the same software right now as every other iphone. there can be no specific solution to decrypt this iphone that wouldn't work on every other iphone.

Re:Don't see the problem

[SuiteSisterMary]

Yes, with it being an iPhone 5c, all of this discussion is academic; it's probably fairly straightforward to crack.

Apple should still not be required to provide any form of technical assistance or tools for this.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

So if Apple refuse to use their backdoor (under a Court Order), which they put in (and is public knowledge), then Apple support terrorism.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

The last bastion of liberty is the defiant citizen saying "no" to government overreach. However, when sufficient numbers of people become compliant to the whims of the ruling elite, tyranny is at hand.

This is exactly what I said about mandatory drug testing. The response I got from everybody resembled crickets chirping.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

sure, then we can sue the gun manufacturers for building the weapons used in terrorist activities; and Ford for building the SUV they took off in afterwards..

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

Hopefully Apple will remove some security code and add code which limits the code to one specific device.

There is no reason to put out a non-device limited tool.

Re: Don't see the problem

[sonamchauhan]

That's like opposing the technology behind wiretaps because taps can be illegally placed.

Apple's being a worm here. Did Ma Bell and the old telcos behave the same way?

Re:Don't see the problem

[drunk_punk]

Yeah man, I realize this is nothing new. I'm just glad this is seeing the spotlight. You have to admit that this is going to set a serious precedent. What happens when China (whatever their security agencies are) asks for the same thing? Still feel happy about Apple complying?

Re: Don't see the problem

[tagput]

Why doesnt this happen... Apple takes the phone and privately disables the passcode limit, brutes the password, moves the decrypted files to another device, then gives that to the fbi. Apple destroys the phone so no one can reverse engineer the hack.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

You can't downgrade iOS.

Re:Don't see the problem

[x_t0ken_407]

Not quite, the FBI is asking for help on this particular phone... for which it may or may not be too late. I'm pondering future cases, where if you end up say on the no fly list, the FBI orders Apple to opt you into the low-sec update patch which supports pre-emptive monitoring & trivial encryption bypassing if your phone happens to end up with the FBI during an investigation.

Yes, quite. Apple's Tim Cook said it best:

"Some would argue that building a backdoor for just one iPhone is a simple, clean-cut solution. But it ignores both the basics of digital security and the significance of what the government is demanding in this case.

In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece of information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that knowledge."

http://www.apple.com/customer-...

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

A backdoor is a method of access that already exists but is hidden from view. What they want is for Apple to add a new front door, and only to one specific device.

The issue is that the phone's software limits the attempts to crack it, so they want new software. This is somewhat as if you'd written an encryption program which used 4-digit PINs, but was "secure" because it would delete its 256-bit encryption key if the wrong code was entered ten times in a row. Would anyone claim that writing software to try different PINs without deleting the key was "creating a backdoor?" No, they'd just be screaming that the design was never secure to begin with, and that all the new software does is make that insecurity obvious. No new flaw was added, just an existing flaw was exploited.

Apple is just fighting the issue to save face. If the system were truly secure, Apple wouldn't be able to "remove the passcode limitations to allow brute force attacks" and so there wouldn't be a story.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

Apple is doing the right thing, and the government is worms.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

Once this hack exists, why wouldn't the govt compel Apple to use it against each and every future phone they can't get into for whatever reason they can think of? That is the problem with that argument.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

That is only true on the newest phones. This is an older phone that doesnt have that level of security.

Re: Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

A mechanism that 'slows you down' to the point that it would take longer than the universe will exist is secure enough to be considered 'absolutely secure' in most people's books. And that is the goal of properly implemented encryption.

Re:Don't see the problem

[codeAlDente]

It is a pronoun. It has been used here to refer to a phrase that is not a logical proposition.

Re:Don't see the problem

[lsatenstein]

In the future, let NSA provide the encryption module as a compatibile binary module to the cellphone or other communication product vendors.
There algorithm is unknown, the responsibility to protect financial institutions, governments, police would rely on their own with the consequences if the method of breaking the encryption was discovered.

If the cellphone was built like a tpm, then opening the cover would also destroy the contents when power is next applied.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Plumpaquatsch]

FBI didn't actually ask for the code involved though. They said Apple could do this at their facility as long as the FBI have remote access to do their brute force after the patch/update/backdoor was applied.

Ahh, so what exactly would then prevent them from accessing the modified OS that is running on that iPhone they have full remote access to?

Re:Don't see the problem

[Plumpaquatsch]

A dumb suicide bomber doesn't use a 50 character passphrase.

But he somehow uses top-secret encrypted messaging software to communicate with every single member of ISI, Al Qaeda and Hamas, and the FBI could read all of his communication if they just had that 4-digit code. But not any other way.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

The correct action would be for a nubile girl to bend over and let me patch her back door with my erect penis.

Re:Don't see the problem

[MachineShedFred]

Well, the OS updates have been delivered over the air since iOS 5 or so. Which means that if this backdoored OS image exists, you're one man-in-the-middle attack from having it on your phone without your knowledge.

That is exactly the issue here.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Plumpaquatsch]

I forgot to mention: if the dumb terrorist only uses a 4-digit passcode, why would he care to enable the ten-attempts-auto-destcruct? And if he is smart enough to erase all the computers in his possession (which the FBI claims) - why the hell wouldn't he also wipe his iPhone, easily done over the web on the Find-my-iPhone site?

Don't they do this?

[Anonymous Coward]

Or Google to give a list of names of people who searched for the term ISIS?

They don't do this already? That data is owned by a third party so they don't need a warrant.

They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[hawkeyeMI]

This is the only good explanation I've seen of what the order is about: https://www.techdirt.com/artic... As long as Apple can install a signed update on the device without decrypting it first, this will be possible. They need to remedy that quickly.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[bigpat]

This is the only good explanation I've seen of what the order is about:

https://www.techdirt.com/artic...

As long as Apple can install a signed update on the device without decrypting it first, this will be possible. They need to remedy that quickly.

Yes, Apple has all along insisted that they can't break the encryption on the phone. But the FBI apparently knows they can and wants them to do it. That means there is already effectively a back door and they just need Apple to sign the software update. So Apple has been lying.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[ausekilis]

My first thought is that the owner should be compelled to unlock their phone. They have reasonable evidence that these folks are guilty of something, so I don't think the 5th amendment would slide here... Anything they find not directly correlated to the crimes they are charged are inadmissible, after all. The owners refusal to cooperate should just levy additional charges, like obstruction of justice or whatever.

For Apple to do this would open up a whole new can of worms. Similar orders would rise up for Android phones, for any encrypted drive manufacturers, or other security vendors that make any sort of privacy guarantee. I am curious if this new backdoor install could bring about a class action lawsuit against Apple for "bait and switch", since they advertise user privacy and this would certainly break that.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[rickb928]

Don't they have to force the installation? It's not like they can open the phone and accept a download...

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Rockoon]

Exactly.


Last I checked, the State isn't Apple and Brute Force isnt a Back Door.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[AmiMoJo]

They should have built the wipe-after-10-failed-attempts functionality into the hardware. Most secure storage subsystems have some kind of dedicated processor and ROM (i.e. can't be updated, it's burned into the silicon) that enforces access control to the secure memory. Often the functionality to wipe when a certain number of incorrect attempts is made is built in to that sub system, and thus can't be overridden or bypassed by a software update, or even turned off.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[moronoxyd]

The owner of the phone is dead. Reading TFA does, indeed, sometime reveal relevant information.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

This is the only good explanation I've seen of what the order is about:

https://www.techdirt.com/artic...

As long as Apple can install a signed update on the device without decrypting it first, this will be possible. They need to remedy that quickly.

Yes, Apple has all along insisted that they can't break the encryption on the phone. But the FBI apparently knows they can and wants them to do it. That means there is already effectively a back door and they just need Apple to sign the software update. So Apple has been lying.

No, it just means that the folks at the FBI, don't believe anything Apple is saying. Given that the FBI in general is technically illiterate, I wouldn't put any stock
in Apple having the ability to decrypt.

However, the encryption is only as good as the key entered by the user. Given the general level of technical ineptitude of the general public, the key is probably relatively short and could probably be brute forced in less 100,000 attempts, which is where Apple is in trouble. iOS considers more than 10 attempts to be an attack and clears the phone. Good security practice, but if Apple does install a work around for that, it won't be that long before the bad guys figure out how to do it as well.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[TheCastro1689]

Well, the owners are dead, so they can't. And it does go against a recent court ruling stating that unlocking your phone, even under court order means it's inadmissible. Even if everyone "knows" your guilty, you still don't have to incriminate yourself.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

Isn't the owner dead?

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Lumpy]

Then they should try waterboarding the body.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

The problem is, the owner of The iPhone is dead by the governments own hand. Therefore the government put itself in this position, assuming the iPhone had a touch sensor. It's already been determined that you can be forced to unlock your own phone using the fingerprint sensor, so if the government hadn't been so trigger-happy, they would already have a means to access the data in the phone. But they were too busy being vigilantes to think of that.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[jabuzz]

One imagines that the iPhone7 or more likely the iPhone8, as one suspects the iPhone7 design is too far advanced to add this will come with such a feature.

Quite what the FBI are thinking I don't know.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[roman_mir]

The feature they are asked to turn off is the wiping off the disk after 10 unsuccessful attempts to guess the password by brute force. Personally I think 10/times is too few, it should be 100 times. I entered passwords wrong 10 times before I think, wouldn't want to lose all darlta because I forgot the exact capitalisation...

In any case (pun not intended), this is not a backdoor in itself. It does not break the password, does not break into the device. It does however mean that the data is not deleted when the phone is attacked by brute force, so it helps to provide a method for a backdoor ( if a brute force attack is a backdoor,I think technically it is not, but when we are talking about a government... Every single thing we give them is used against us, they should be denied everything).

Government is the terrorist, government creates terrorism and terrorists, government is the backdoor and the front door that destroys our freedoms, government needs to be backdoored and annihilated. That is my position, like it or hate it. I do not see government as my representative under any circumstances and I do not want any representatives. I want to deal with free people, trading in the free (from government) market in money not manipulated by government, doing business without this not so silent 'partner' forced on me, who robs me if I succeed while I take all the risks a 'partner', who has legal ability to steal from me, to kidnap me and to murder me. No other private party can argue legal or moral authority for such terroristic behavior, only governments cwn. All governments are an affront to human freedom and to healthy economy and society. They should be given nothing.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

You mean like in the iPhone 5s and later, which do exactly that ?

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[c]

But the FBI apparently knows they can and wants them to do it.

... and the FBI has provided proof of this to the court? I'm fairly certain that if the FBI had proven that Apple actually had a known backdoor the news spin would be very, very different.

I think Apple *could* crack one of their own devices given enough time and motivation. No system is 100% secure. Apple has all the design details and source code, plenty of examples to test against, and the people or means to hire the people who could come up with a crack. But I suspect they don't already have suck a backdoor outside of developer devices and I'd be surprised if they can legally be compelled to produce one. It'll have to go to the Supreme Court for that verdict, though.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

Then they should try waterboarding the body.

How about waterboarding the iPhone? I'm sure it will crack if you follow that up with a threat to install Android.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Dixie_Flatline]

It's worth noting that this wouldn't work on any device that has a Secure Enclave and TouchID. The Secure Enclave can't be updated or tampered with without it erasing its keys, leaving the phone permanently encrypted. If the SE isn't modified, it imposes delays on responding to passcode requests so that after the 9th request, there's a delay of 1hr before you can try again.

This article goes into more detail: http://blog.trailofbits.com/20...

The phone in question is a 5c, so yes, Apple could theoretically do what is being asked of them. But the phones after that--no.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

ARM TrustZone. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...

If they've implemented it fully, which I believe they have, and done it properly. It's the reason you can't just suck out the flash chips and mount an off-line attack.

OTOH you may well want to provide legitimate OS updates that include increasing the capabilities or fixing discovered bugs in the TZ-world implementation. And if you can do that, you likely have the ability to subvert existing controls within the TZ world. (Unless you decide that any update which modifies the TZ world is *also* going to pre-wipe they keystore, which is the secure thing to do, but many people might be surprised that a "normal" upgrade requires a full backup/restore or just loses all their shit.)

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

They did, in the iPhone 5s and later. It's part of the secure enclave that's present in all iOS devices with touch sensors (the wiping functionality can be disabled, but only once the device is already unlocked, and it's enabled by default). The phone in question is a 5c, which doesn't have that hardware.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

Of course Apple is lying. They create a phone for idiots, and idiots forget their PINs and then need to take it to the Genius Bar at the Apple Store to get their phone unlocked.

The idea that Apple doesn't have a backdoor already to break the PIN is ludicrous. Of course they do, they need it to let the idiots that they cater to back into their phones after they've forgotten their PIN is their birthday for the eighth time.

Yep, that's it. There's a way to reset the PIN that tens of thousands of Apple retail employees know about yet Apple has managed to keep it completely secret. It's obvious, really.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

Well, the owners are dead, so they can't. And it does go against a recent court ruling stating that unlocking your phone, even under court order means it's inadmissible. Even if everyone "knows" your guilty, you still don't have to incriminate yourself.

In the US. Elsewhere (e.g., UK), it may be different:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law

Given the number of countries Apple does business in, they may be trying to be circumspect. If they allow the FBI in, then the KGB/FSS and PSB/MSS may make similar requests.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

All governments are an affront to human freedom and to healthy economy and society. They should be given nothing.

You're utterly delusional.

Unless you think you want to live in a world of utter anarchy, the world you describe cannot possibly exist.

And only a moron like you would believe otherwise.

Governments are a necessary fact of modern life, without which "society" would cease to exist, and despite what you doomsday prepping idiots think, it would get messy.

But, of course, you'll say that's not your problem ... in which case you are the enemy of every human on the planet because you figure they need to fend for themselves.

The stupid shit you believe is beyond comprehension, and none of it will actually every work in reality, no matter how much you wish it was true.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

The licensee of the phone is dead.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[MachineShedFred]

If this was ever needed in a slashdot discussion, it's now:

[citation needed]

Go ahead, take a locked iPhone into an Apple Store and ask them to help you unlock it. They'll politely tell you that they can't, and that all they can do is reset it, and you'd better have a backup.

Take your ignorant fucking screed and shove it up your ass. Don't you think that if the hundreds of Apple Stores out there had the means to do what you say, that the FBI wouldn't already be in that phone right now?

New Slashdot Owners: This is an example of why we need new moderation categories, such as -1, Wrong.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[MachineShedFred]

It doesn't have the fingerprint sensor. If it did, they could have unlocked it right there on the spot with the finger attached to the corpse.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[MachineShedFred]

It is built in, now. The iPhone 5C is the last model without the "Secure Enclave" which stores the key, arbitrates all access to it, and wipes it after 10 attempts unless told not to.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[ai4px]

The licensee is dead.
Long live the licensee.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[stealth_finger]

My first thought is that the owner should be compelled to unlock their phone. They have reasonable evidence that these folks are guilty of something, so I don't think the 5th amendment would slide here... Anything they find not directly correlated to the crimes they are charged are inadmissible, after all. The owners refusal to cooperate should just levy additional charges, like obstruction of justice or whatever.

They can load whatever charges they want on to the owner with a billion years in prison, don't think it will help...

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[AmiMoJo]

The article you linked to has been updated to point out that Apple has indeed issued updates to the Secure Enclave that increased the delays between passcode attempts without wiping phones in the past, so they apparently can modify it without wiping keys.

That is a huge security flaw. Most secure memory implementations use a non-upgradable ROM to prevent just this kind of attack. The ones used in CPUs on high end Android devices work that way, as do TPM chips in PCs and tablets (the specification actually requires this).

Can anyone confirm that Apple has altered the firmware in their Secret Enclave? That's huge if they have, a gaping security hole.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

You apparently do not realize that Touch ID is an option.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

As far as I know, you can only update the SE after it is unlocked. So you could not do it on an locked phone.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[bigpat]

It's worth noting that this wouldn't work on any device that has a Secure Enclave and TouchID. The Secure Enclave can't be updated or tampered with without it erasing its keys, leaving the phone permanently encrypted. If the SE isn't modified, it imposes delays on responding to passcode requests so that after the 9th request, there's a delay of 1hr before you can try again.

This article goes into more detail: http://blog.trailofbits.com/20...

The phone in question is a 5c, so yes, Apple could theoretically do what is being asked of them. But the phones after that--no.

Thanks that is what I was getting at. Good info.

So the next question is whether they can target this specific phone with a patch to disable the ten password attempt limit and therefore allowing the FBI to continue a brute force attack on the pin number... which would be relatively simple. It sounds like the answer is yes, that they could probably do so if they brought the phone in house and updated the firmware like they would when they test new firmware updates.

As much as it pains me, I think the FBI is right on this one. It sounds like it would be reasonably simply for Apple to take this device in-house and install firmware with a patch on this older device to remove the 10 attempt limit. But if the only way to get around this limit would be to install a back door on all devices, then I think that Apple is right to fight this. The devil is really in the details.

The question for Apple is what kind of can of worms this opens up since there are so many of these devices still in use.

This is also an important technical discussion because if the ten password limit can be bypassed with a firmware update then a brute force on a 4 digit pin is relatively simple and users should be aware that their devices are not really as secure as they might have thought.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[painandgreed]

Then they should try waterboarding the body.

How about a Speak with Dead spell?

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Archangel Michael]

It'll have to go to the Supreme Court for that verdict, though.

I have no faith in either the (R) (Trump/Cruz/Rubio/Bush ..) or Obama to appoint someone that would rule in favor of privacy/security over government intrusion.

Quite frankly, people who say there is a difference between the two parties, need to wake up and smell the coffee.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

The owner of the phone is dead

Irrelevant. There is a court order compelling the corpse to speak. If he doesn't he'll be in a lot more trouble!

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Lumpy]

There's an app for that....

http://www.livescience.com/387...

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

The owner of the phone is not dead. The user of the phone is dead. The owner of the phone is the organization they worked for.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[orlanz]

Uh, no. Just because you are guilty doesn't mean you can further self-incriminate. The obtained evidence can't be used against you; whether correlated or not. And in such situations where you already have evidence that they are guilt, it wasn't needed anyway; no need to erode defense or private property rights. Of course there could be (proven) information on there that could save someone, but that still doesn't command you to unlock. In such situations, you would just be charged with accessory to crime or non-cooperation or similar.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[93 Escort Wagon]

The problem is, the owner of The iPhone is dead by the governments own hand.

While this statement is technically true, what you seem to be trying to imply by making it is ridiculous. The phone's owner was doing his best to kill the police at the time - they'd certainly have preferred to take him alive.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Dixie_Flatline]

So in a very narrow sense, I suppose we could probably argue that for this one phone, the FBI is right. The problem is that this isn't just about one phone--whatever happens here sets precedent. If the FBI can compel Apple to go along with things here, we have to know that without some other significant change of law, they'll be able to come after private phones and private data again. In this case, the perpetrator is almost certainly guilty and also happens to be dead, so they can't fight back. It's a situation that the FBI can press on because most people will be willing to abrogate the rights of a probable murderer that's dead anyway--his right to privacy may not even exist anymore. (I honestly don't know; I'm not American and I'm not a lawyer--it seems like even American lawyers have it out over topics like this all the time.)

The FBI's staff aren't dummies. This is an opportunity for them to crack a nut wide open, and they're going to take advantage of that as best they can.

(As for why I care about this at all given that I'm not American--not only do American politics set expectations in countries like mine, Canada, I'd rather that I don't have to think about this sort of thing when I cross the border. Border guards have a surprising amount of power to seize property, and I feel like I deserve my privacy, even if I've done nothing wrong.)

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[bigpat]

The issue here isn't this particular person's right to privacy. In this case there is a criminal investigation and the FBI has a legal right to access the phone as they would in any other criminal investigation where they have gotten a warrant. One of the issues here is whether Apple can be forced to assist the government to gain access to the phone's data. This has more to do with what is reasonable.

If as it has been said that Apple has designed a phone that they themselves cannot circumvent the encryption then I don't think there would be an issue at all because it would not be reasonable for the court or government to require Apple's assistance. But that doesn't seem to be the case here. Apple does in fact have the technical means to help hack this one particular phone because it is an older model that is less secure.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Fnord666]

So does the 5s have the secure enclave built in?

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[david_thornley]

This isn't a real back door, it's a vulnerability that Apple had not fixed before the 5S, and it takes a good amount of work to exploit it. All complicated devices have vulnerabilities, and Apple is working at eliminating as many of them as possible. It's really, really hard to have an easy-to-use device that is not vulnerable to compromise when the attacker has physical possession of the device and no obligation to keep it intact.

Apple can't break the encryption on the data. Nobody can. They need to recreate the key, and Apple has a lot of safeguards against doing that. However, in the 5 and 5C, enough of these safeguards were in software to allow this attack. Apple did a lot of work, and has a much more secure hardware solution for the 5S, 6, and 6S. This trick won't work on them (although other tricks may).

In short, Apple wasn't lying, although you were.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[david_thornley]

What you seem to be saying is that there is no difference between candidates of one party and the sitting President, who is of the other, in one particular thing. I'll note that one of the frontrunners for the Democrat nomination is not likely to appoint justices that favor government access over personal privacy.

Then you generalize it to say that there's no difference between the parties. That does not follow.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

Personally I think 10/times is too few, it should be 100 times.

How many times could it really take you to get your passwords right? Everyone knows that all the passwords you use are derived directly from your favorite scriptures. It shouldn't take 100 tries to guess which one for any given password.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[david_thornley]

The owner cannot be legally compelled to unlock the phone, ignoring the fact that the owner can't be anything anymore. The Fifth does not cease to apply because a suspect is probably guilty of something or other. You cannot be compelled to testify against yourself under any conditions, and adding charges like obstruction of justice is unconstitutional.

Last I looked, the US courts were not entirely sure about whether requiring people to hand over passwords was requiring self-incrimination, but in the cases I know of where it was ruled acceptable it was because of specific information already known to be on the devices. The law is nowhere near settled here. If you're in that situation, consult your lawyer.

Someone could file a lawsuit against Apple for advertising privacy and not providing perfect security in the face of a court order, but then someone could also file a lawsuit against Apple for providing aid and comfort for the lizard men. IANAL, but I believe that making something a class action suit requires that it is a halfway plausible suit, so it wouldn't be a class action suit. Remember that making an easy-to-use device that will resist compromise while in the physical possession of a large and wealthy organization with access to all the technical details isn't actually easy.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[david_thornley]

: The fingerprint sensors are supposed to guard against the old dead-finger trick. I don't know how effective that would be, given the problems found in fingerprint sensors in the past, and that Apple wants people to be able to use their devices easily. I assume the FBI can spoof fingerprint sensors, but that won't work after two days, as the iDevice requires the PIN if it's gone two days or one system upgrade without one.

If you don't want the FBI to go through your phone after you commit a few heinous crimes, don't use anything before a 5S, turn off the fingerprint unlock feature, use a PIN (it's not nearly as clumsy as I thought it'd be), and make sure the wipe after ten failed tries is enabled.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[bigpat]

Being able to disable the failed login attempt limit on a 4 digit pin is effectively a back door.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

> Unless you think you want to live in a world of utter anarchy

I think that's kind of what he means by "government needs to be backdoored and annihilated."

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[david_thornley]

It's a vulnerability. Back doors are ways to breach security that are designed in, as opposed to where security fails. The break-in is possible because it's really hard to design a device that can resist attacks if the attacker has full physical access. Apple designed it to be even more secure in the next model.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Anonymous Coward]

Not entirely true. The encryption system on a 5c is firmware based. Encryption on future models became hardware based.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[rsborg]

It'll have to go to the Supreme Court for that verdict, though.

I have no faith in either the (R) (Trump/Cruz/Rubio/Bush ..) or Obama to appoint someone that would rule in favor of privacy/security over government intrusion.

Quite frankly, people who say there is a difference between the two parties, need to wake up and smell the coffee.

I think Bernie might well tell the security state to go do it's job instead of leaning on the phone manufacturer. I'm not sure, though. The MIC is strong.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[MachineShedFred]

Yes. Anything with the TouchID fingerprint scanner has a Secure Enclave.

Re: They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Plumpaquatsch]

It doesn't have the fingerprint sensor. If it did, they could have unlocked it right there on the spot with the finger attached to the corpse.

Yeah, unless they didn't use the correct finger three times in a row. Even terrorists have more three fingers before blowing themselves up.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[q4Fry]

The "owner" of the phone is San Bernardino County, and they are totally on board with whatever the FBI wants to do. The "owner" is not the dead asshole who set the password.

This is kind of like having a work laptop that the IT department issued you. If you use the laptop to commit a crime, the company is well within their rights to log in and poke around. The Fourth Amendment stuff about your personal effects doesn't apply. Now in this situation, IT issued a device without giving themselves a login. Instead of going after San Bernardino County's IT department for incompetence, the FBI is telling the manufacturer that they are the de facto IT support. Do I like it? No, I hate it, but that's the situation.

The FBI has picked a pretty good case to do their grandstanding.

Throughout history...

[Anonymous Coward]

...government always had the physical ability to open your mail or tap your telephone conversations. Privacy was protected only by the restraint of public officials to act within the confines of the law. But that was horribly repressive so we definitely need a system whereby any evil crackpot can be utterly beyond the reach of the law. That privacy hipsters can keep their secret beard recipes safe from prying eyes. The end. Love, Legal.Troll.

Re:Throughout history...

[Impy the Impiuos Imp]

If they stuck to specific warrants like they were supposed to, people would have less problem.

As for your idea, there are billions around the world who do not share your joy at government officials being able to read their stuff, limited only to their self-decided limits of appropriateness, like Russia, China, and the Mid East.

We must forbid building the 1984-like tools of tyrrany.

Re:Throughout history...

[_UnderTow_]

...government always had the physical ability to open your mail or tap your telephone conversations. Privacy was protected only by the restraint of public officials to act within the confines of the law.

Privacy was never protected by the restraint of public officials. It was only ever protected by the sheer volume of mail that would have to be opened, or calls to be listened to by actual humans. It was protected by technological limitations. As computers get faster, those limitations are disappearing. Restraint of public officials is a laughable concept.

Re:Throughout history...

[OhPlz]

There was also nothing stopping people from talking in code over the phone. The feds wouldn't be able to compel the phone company to crack whatever code words were being used.

Re:Throughout history...

[david_thornley]

Privacy was also protected by the requirement to get warrants. With a good enough organization, opening millions of pieces of mail and examining them for sedition or something isn't that hard. Getting a judge to sign millions of warrants a day is significantly harder.

Some of your questions may already have answers.

[xxxJonBoyxxx]

>> "Can courts compel Facebook to provide analytics of who might be a criminal?...Or Google to give a list of names of people who searched for the term ISIS?

Facebook already publishes a guide for law enforcement: https://www.facebook.com/safet...
Google does too: https://www.google.com/transpa...

Republicans

[Anonymous Coward]

Trump would never allow this.

Re:Republicans

[Anonymous Coward]

Allowing citizens autonomy and privacy is the way of their kind.

Re:Republicans

[Anonymous Coward]

They want us to be free.

Re:Republicans

[Anonymous Coward]

Trump would never allow this.

No one knows what Trump would allow - probably not even Donald himself.

As far as the rest of the candidates, I'd think only Cruz might be against this ruling. All the others would like it for some combination of "It's for the CHILDREN!", "TERRORISTS!", or just downright love for the power of the state over the individual.

Re:Republicans

[Anonymous Coward]

They just want your children (to pay their taxes).

Re:Republicans

[MerlynEmrys67]

Actually,
Trump has told Apple they should just decrypt the phone already. As far as I am concerned - he can say that as soon as I have seen the content of his decrypted phone - love letters to Sarah Palin and Nancy Pollocci and all

Re:Republicans

[Anonymous Coward]

Donald Trump, a leading candidate for his party's nomination to run for president on Nov. 8, said on Wednesday that unlocking the iPhone is "common sense."

"Who do they think they are?" the billionaire developer said of Apple in an interview on Fox News. "We have to open it up."

"I agree 100 percent with the courts," he said.

http://www.reuters.com/article...

Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[Anonymous Coward]

Why would Apple want to shield the communications of mass murderers and their accomplices whom the FBI is trying to track down? A court of law ordered it. Seems to me a good reason to unlock the phone. Fine Apple $1 billion a day until they comply.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[Anonymous Coward]

1. Because demonstrating that the security features of their phone aren't real is bad for business and damages their brand.

2. They CAN'T

.

As pointed out in a few places the pin code is NOT the key used to encrypt the phone's storage. The phone is encrypted using AES-256. The only thing the code does is get the Secure Enclave to cough up the actual encryption key. The SE is designed such that the key is not retrievable by external tampering and won't even function correctly if not paired with the phone's original processor.

Now the FBI could try brute forcing the key code, there are only 10k combinations. The problem is that the SE imposes a delay everytime you get the code wrong. And then on top of that if further security is enabled (I don't know if it's default) after 10 incorrect attempts the SE will burn the key completely.

What the court order is demanding is that Apple somehow update the firmware of the phone to remove the key code attempt restrictions. If that is actually possible without unlocking the phone in the first place I will be shocked.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[moronoxyd]

This isn't just about two terrorists.
Once Apple complied and build the tools necessary, the tool can and will be used elsewhere.

And what the LEOs don't understand or willfully ignore, is that if a backdoor exists, pretty much everybody can use it. If Apple creates this modified firmware for the US government, other governments around the world will demand access, too. And sooner or later, this firmware will get in the hand of non-government actors with criminal intend, too.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[kilfarsnar]

Why would Apple want to shield the communications of mass murderers and their accomplices whom the FBI is trying to track down?

Mass murderers? Has someone been convicted?

What we have here are people being accused of murder. To my knowledge no one has been convicted. So let's not go throwing out the presumption of innocence just because you saw something on TV.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[jabuzz]

If it the "Secure Enclave" is done correctly it's implemented in hardware and can never ever be changed. If it is currently not done like this one imagines that the iPhone 7 or possibly iPhone 8 dam well will have it implemented in hardware and close the loophole that the FBI are trying to use.

Of course give Apple are going to "fight it" one presumes that it is not currently implemented in hardware, because otherwise they could just turn up to court with some of their engineers who would under oath explain that what the FBI wants is technically impossible.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[Anonymous Coward]

Why would Apple want to shield the communications of mass murderers and their accomplices whom the FBI is trying to track down? A court of law ordered it. Seems to me a good reason to unlock the phone. Fine Apple $1 billion a day until they comply.

Two sided coin. If someone can recover the info, then someone can plant info. So, the whole premise of the American society is that it is better to let a 1000 criminals go free than to punish an innocent person.

Thus, if you make an encrypted system easy to break, it will be broken and abused by criminals of all sorts... those without a badge and those with a badge.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[Anonymous Coward]

Why would Apple want to shield the communications of mass murderers and their accomplices whom the FBI is trying to track down?

Mass murderers? Has someone been convicted?

What we have here are people being accused of murder. To my knowledge no one has been convicted. So let's not go throwing out the presumption of innocence just because you saw something on TV.

Technically a moot point, as both parties in question were killed rather than apprehended. What the gov't is after is their circle of friends who might contain the next perpetrator.

Said information can probably be recovered by other means, but other means are more time consuming, so the Feds being the lazy sort don't want to do it. Do what you ask? Get a warrant, present it to the cell service provider for all records pertaining to the phone and then dig through all the numbers.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[Anonymous Coward]

Because the alternative is to make all the data of all iPhone users available to all mass murderers and other criminals.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[MachineShedFred]

Because in this case, the "shielding the communications of mass murderers" is indistinguishable from "shielding my financial data from identity fraud." What makes you think that if they make this tool for the FBI to use, it will only ever be used this once, on this one device? Are you really that naive, or are you just an Apple hater using the excuse du jour to express your irrationality?

Once a hole is added, it can't be filled again. And, setting this legal precedent won't just affect Apple. It will have far-reaching effects on the entire concept of digital cryptography.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[MachineShedFred]

On the device in question (iPhone 5C) it is not implemented in hardware. It's the last model where it wasn't. 5S, 6, and 6S all have the Secure Enclave, and what the FBI is asking is impossible.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[sims 2]

What sort of timeline are you thinking? I'm thinking within the next 2 years probably less. Its not like these things haven't happened before.
http://tech.slashdot.org/story...

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[painandgreed]

Why would Apple want to shield the communications of mass murderers and their accomplices whom the FBI is trying to track down? A court of law ordered it. Seems to me a good reason to unlock the phone. Fine Apple $1 billion a day until they comply.

Because they are also shielding our President, congressmen, and military personnel.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[Anonymous Coward]

Why would Apple want to shield the communications of mass murderers and their accomplices whom the FBI is trying to track down? A court of law ordered it. Seems to me a good reason to unlock the phone.

That's because you are a fucking moron.

Hundreds of millions of lives were ended specifically for the cause of creating a nation where law abiding citizens can forge their own destiny.

Just because you claim 14 (or a couple thousand if you want to include 9/11) lives were taken to remove the entire concept of a law abiding citizen, is literally not a blip on the radar in the reasoning to do so.

Come back to me when a few thousand 9/11's worth of people have died. Then you might have some teeny tiny claim to undoing centuries of progress of civilization.

Or why not just move yourself to a country with no rule of law, if you really want that so badly.
That way you can be murdered, oh sorry I meant legally killed by the authority brutes, and be dead so YOU are happy, and the rest of us in this country can keep rule of law so WE are happy.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[kilfarsnar]

Fair enough. I'm just distressed at the erosion of the presumption of innocence. It seem all that's required these days for someone to become a criminal or terrorist is for someone in authority to label them as such. The media dutifully report it, and it gets put into the public consciousness. So I push back against such thinking by pointing out that people must be convicted to be labeled a criminal or terrorist. In this case, you're right, it's kind of moot.

All Writs Act of 1789

[lazarus]

'The All Writs Act is a United States federal statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. 1651, which authorizes the United States federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.'

"On October 31, 2014, the act was used by the U.S. Attorney's Office in New York to compel an unnamed smartphone manufacturer to bypass the lock screen of a smartphone allegedly involved in a credit card fraud."

Looks like there is a precedent. Mind you Apple has lots of money for lawyers to make sure this doesn't happen.

Thanks Apple

[Anonymous Coward]

I'm not an iPhone user but I appreciate you standing up for people's privacy. I have a better chance of winning the lottery than dieing at the hands of a terrorist. Why would I want to lose my privacy over those odds.

Re:Thanks Apple

[Anonymous Coward]

While I don't have any fear of dying by terrorist, I know others will. They're the ones I want to save.

Everything has costs and benefits, strong encryption included.

Re:Thanks Apple

[firewood]

I have a better chance of winning the lottery than dieing at the hands of a terrorist. Why would I want to lose my privacy over those odds.

One of those odds is an individual risk. The other is a systemic risk that can also end up in the death of many of your family, friends, coworkers and bystanders. So relating the two odds sounds statistically intelligent, but is really a form of systemic risk blindness.

Re:Thanks Apple

[Dixie_Flatline]

In that case, the risk of you or your family dying in a motor vehicle accident--the same kind of systemic risk that you're talking about--is orders of magnitude higher than the risk of dying in a terrorist attack. Similarly with dying from domestic gun violence. That's with laws in place to mitigate those risks. The reality is that terrorism is a really marginal cause of death, and to spend too much time and money worrying about it (certainly any time and money beyond the enormous amounts we're already spending) is madness.

Re:Thanks Apple

[Anonymous Coward]

Seems to me that the two things you mentioned are very low probability events, while losing one's privacy (by having their phone breached / unlocked) is a rather high probability event. All the court case does is expose that it is possible, it is the secondary exploit (people invest more time and effort into tasks they know are possible) that won't immediately go advertised that will do the true harm (admittedly, I do not see most court orders as resulting in true harm, rather they are temporary inconveniences in the pursuit of keeping the protections we enjoy. Remember without the need for a court order, the activity would be permitted 100% of the time).

Re:Thanks Apple

[firewood]

The number of thousands that die per annum due to motor vehicle accidents and domestic violence is a tiny fraction of the population that no one expects to double next year. Thus these risks to you are not systemic. You confuse these highly predictable risks with systemic risks that cannot be so easily bounded. The Chernobal dead zone is larger than many countries, and similar events do not have good consistent per-annum statistics.

Re:Thanks Apple

[Anonymous Coward]

> The other is a systemic risk that can also end up in the death of many of your family, friends, coworkers and bystanders.

Still pretty fuckin' low.

Unless Apple Lied

[Holi]

If Apple was telling the truth, the court order should not matter. Apple has already claimed that they cannot decrypt the phone.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Dcnjoe60]

If Apple was telling the truth, the court order should not matter. Apple has already claimed that they cannot decrypt the phone.

That was my thought -- unless Apple isn't telling the truth.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

The court isn't asking for Apple to decrypt the phone, but for them to provide a special signed firmware that disables certain features meant to protect the encrypted data against brute-forcing.

If the crypto is up to snuff and a strong key was used then brute force will fail anyway, so I don't understand why this is such a big deal to Apple.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

You obviously didn't bother to read Apple's response to this. They are not asked to decrypt the phone, they have been asked to 1.) remove firmware protection that wipes the device after 10 unsuccessful access attempts, if enabled, and 2.) provide firmware that somehow circumvents the built-in progressive delays so that brute forcing the password is possible by hooking up some device to the phone.

Basically, they are asking Apple for custom firmware/OS that renders security features useless that would make attacks on the PIN codes or passphrase impractical. It is Apple's position that once Apple has created this custom firmware/OS combo, then they are virtually guaranteed that they will be forced to provide it again and again, thereby essentially creating a government backdoor.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

The article states that the government is requesting that Apple install a version of IOS on the recovered phone that has backdoor capabilities.

"Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation."

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Attila Dimedici]

The court is ordering Apple to write a new OS for the iphone which does not contain the feature which wipes the encrypted data after a certain number of attempts to brute force the password. Apple has never said that was impossible, just that they do not currently have such an OS.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

Why is it even possible to flash firmware if the device is locked?

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

If the crypto is up to snuff and a strong key was used then brute force will fail anyway, so I don't understand why this is such a big deal to Apple.

It's they don't want to brute-force the encryption key, but the passkey used for the lock screen (which usually isn't a very strong key).

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[ugen]

It's a big deal because complying with *any* request to modify software for use of LEA now will mean that they (and other manufacturers) will have to comply with *all* requests to modify software in the future. In the eyes of the law there is no difference in what technical capability is being implemented, only that some sort of technical capability can be implemented at the direction of LEA. Once open, this door cannot be closed.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

Because firmware is just bits on a chip. Since they have the device, they can connect to the chip and write whatever they want.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

Apple has already claimed that they cannot decrypt the phone.

Judge: Obviously you are mistaken. In that case I'll just let the CEO sit in jail until the phone is decrypted, NOT just when the Apple security-defeat patch was added. Would you like 1 roommate, or 3?

After all, law deals in facts, not truth. And the FACT is you will decrypt this phone.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[torkus]

And just to pound the point home, both are true:

Once the legal door has been opened (it becomes OK to require companies build back doors)...
Once the technical door has been opened (backdoor to firmware)...

Open either door and there's no closing them. What's truly ironic is there was a huge uproar a year or so about backdoors in network gear coming out of china ... and now the US is literally asking for the same thing to be created for them.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

The court could also order Apple to install a signed firmware that decrypts the phone automatically, (for any phone that was updated to IOS 8.) or they could install a signed firmware that acts as a keylogger / ram debugger and uploads anything the phone is used for to the court. (Hint, once your devices are taken, let them have it. You have no idea what they've done to it while it was out of your possession.) Basically, the court is saying: "Yeah, that's a nice promise to your users, but it's inconvenient for us, so you can't uphold it."

This will be the case with any device going forward. "Oh, the device is locked? Get the vendor to install a backdoor / keylogger remotely.", "Oh, the user used some downloaded app to encrypt a portion of the phone? Have the vendor sign this fake update for it that gets pushed out to this user only. (Possible because the app devs must have a signed cert from the manufacturer to publish to the official app stores.)" "Oh, the user tried to prevent the download using a custom firmware? Require the hardware manufacturers to use our backdoor-ed bootloader, that will install anything we send it via the baseband modem."

So long as your security is handled by someone else, you are vulnerable to them.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[wisnoskij]

What I heard was that the key is required to be a 4-6 length pin. So not only do we know that it is either 4, 5, or 6 characters long, but all characters are 0-9. Which, is ridiculously weak.
That is only slightly over 1 million possible passwords. It would probably take under a second to brute force this password.
Compare this to the general accepted wisdom of 8 alphanumeric characters with punctuation and other special characters. Which comes out to 95^8, or 6 million billion passwords. or 6*10^9 times better.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anubis IV]

No, they claimed that they cannot decrypt their current phones (i.e. ones with TouchID + Secure Enclave running iOS 8 or 9). This model is an iPhone 5c (i.e. three generations old) that lacks the protections of their current phones and thus is susceptible to the sort of attack being proposed by the FBI. Apple has pointed out that complying with this order would jeopardize their business by making it seem as if they're lying about the security of their current phones, since the public won't understand the distinction. Your comment is evidence in support of their concern.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

Open either door and there's no closing them. What's truly ironic is there was a huge uproar a year or so about backdoors in network gear coming out of china ... and now the US is literally asking for the same thing to be created for them.

Backdoors are only bad when "bad people" use them. The US are the "good guys", and so it's okay. (Never mind the Church Committee's findings.)

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[whoever57]

They are not asked to decrypt the phone, they have been asked to 1.) remove firmware protection that wipes the device after 10 unsuccessful access attempts, if enabled, and 2.) provide firmware that somehow circumvents the built-in progressive delays so that brute forcing the password is possible by hooking up some device to the phone.

And Apple knows that, if this is possible, the FBI will send the firmware to every FBI office, the CIA, NSA, etc.. Eventually, it will leak, compromising the security of all Apple phones.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[gstoddart]

And, the US (and US made products) will irrevocably cease to be trustworthy.

Once the US does this, everyone in the world MUST assume these companies have built this in, that the US government can access it, and that Apple will be forced to roll over for any other government.

I'm not sure people understand just how much of a global clusterfuck of undermining rights and freedoms the US is doing here -- it's time to stop pretending to be champions of freedom and liberty when you have actively decided to do the opposite.

If Apple caves on this, every piss-pot dictator will insist on the same access.

What the FBI is demanding is full Big Brother status.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[eth1]

It's a big deal because complying with *any* request to modify software for use of LEA now will mean that they (and other manufacturers) will have to comply with *all* requests to modify software in the future. In the eyes of the law there is no difference in what technical capability is being implemented, only that some sort of technical capability can be implemented at the direction of LEA. Once open, this door cannot be closed.

What's even more interesting is if the government can compel a company to develop code due to a court order, can they be compelled to produce perfect, bug-free code? How do you tell the difference between a bug, and a developer putting in an obfuscated "bug" that keeps any brute force attempts from actually working? It's enabling brute force attacks, so it would be difficult to determine that it actually isn't working in the first place (you'd have to exhaust the entire key space).

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

Because if it wasn't, then any locked device with broken firmware on it would immediately be a brick.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[SvnLyrBrto]

That's not actually true. The current default is a 6-digit numeric passcode, 4-digits on older models. But you have the option of setting a longer passcode and to include alphanumerics and special characters. In ye olden days, that option used to be hidden. But by the time of the iPhone in question, the 5c, I'm pretty sure it was available in the standard settings app.

If you want to make complex passcodes mandatory... say if you're managing them for a business... Apple offers a free tool: Apple Configurator. With it, you can create a device profile that will enforce password complexity, minimum length, aging, and history. You can even drop the maximum number of failed unlock attempts before the iPhone wipes itself down to only two tries. There're various other settings and restrictions you can enforce for convenience, security, or simply to be a BOFH.

Note also, you don't have to be an enterprise customer or utilize any other MDM tools to get and use the configurator. It's free to anyone who wants it.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[MachineShedFred]

That particular phone, they can. It's an iPhone 5C, which doesn't yet implement the hardware encryption and secure enclave that they cannot decrypt. It's the last model where they can technically perform what the FBI is asking for.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Actually, I do RTFA]

On the other hand, complying with this order makes it less likely that Congress will pass any kind of "no strong encryption" bill. And future, less reasonable requests can always be fought.

If Goldman Sachs/Morgan Stanley can pay 4-7 billion in fines, without admitting guilt or setting a (legal) precedent, I think Apple's lawyers can too.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[wisnoskij]

Ah, thanks for the clarification. But it is extremely unlikely they would of used anything past the default. Also, presumably the phone would remember what option you picked and boot in the the appropriate keypad/input field so anyone could tell if they needed to input numbers of alphanumeric.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[MachineShedFred]

Except for three things:

1. The PIN is not the encryption key for the file system. It is a PIN that is used to get the security subsystem to cough up the actual key, which is generated from several different pieces of information, including sensor entropy.
2. The file system is actually encrypted with AES-256. So good luck brute-forcing that.
3. The phone doesn't allow for electronically entering the PIN, so it will take substantially longer to try all 10000 or more combinations. This is what the FBI is trying to get Apple to change for them.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[SvnLyrBrto]

Not just Apple, but Cisco, Juniper, F5, Riverbed, and the like are all completely screwed if this goes through. Apple, ultimately, is just a consumer products company. But this ruling would completely destroy any and all trust in much of the internet's vital infrastructure. Cisco took bad enough of a hit when it was discovered that the US government was intercepting shipments of their hardware and adding the backdoor themselves. If this ruling against Apple is allowed to stand, what international customer would buy *ANT* kit from a US-based company?

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[gstoddart]

Oddly, my first sentence was "And, the US (and US made products) will irrevocably cease to be trustworthy.".

If this ruling against Apple is allowed to stand, what international customer would buy *ANT* kit from a US-based company?

That was kind of my point.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

The government was already doing this with Cisco products going to china without cisco permission. They literally grabbed the items in customs and altered them on export.

http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2014/05/21/nsas-hardware-tampering-may-alter-global-product-flow/

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

I'm not up to speed on the tech I guess, but if the problem is the data on the phone is encrypted and the software on the phone detects more than X attempts at the key, it deletes the data, then what's to stop the FBI from doing a clean room tear down of the device and copying said data (still encrypted of course) to another device and trying to break the encryption from there?

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[shawn2772]

Why is it even possible to flash firmware if the device is locked?

So devices can be upgraded.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[macs4all]

If Apple was telling the truth, the court order should not matter. Apple has already claimed that they cannot decrypt the phone.

That was my thought -- unless Apple isn't telling the truth.

I believe Apple was speaking of iOS devices with the Secure Enclave chip, which began with the iPhone 5s. From what I have heard, this was an iPhone 5c, which did NOT have the SE chip. Therefore, Apple MAY actually be able to hack this particular phone.

So, Apple wasn't lying, it was simply talking about the phones it has been manufacturing for the past few years.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[macs4all]

What I heard was that the key is required to be a 4-6 length pin. So not only do we know that it is either 4, 5, or 6 characters long, but all characters are 0-9. Which, is ridiculously weak. That is only slightly over 1 million possible passwords. It would probably take under a second to brute force this password. Compare this to the general accepted wisdom of 8 alphanumeric characters with punctuation and other special characters. Which comes out to 95^8, or 6 million billion passwords. or 6*10^9 times better.

iOS Passcodes can be up to 50 characters of Alphanumeric + punctuation. So, they CAN be quite complex to brute-force.

Having said that, most people use 4 to 6 numeric chars. But that's on them.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Kernel Kurtz]

And, the US (and US made products) will irrevocably cease to be trustworthy.

I've pointed this out before with much derision, but notwithstanding the fact they are all built in China, I am probably better off buying a phone designed and engineered in China as well.

If the Chinese have a backdoor and are spying on me, oh well it is not like they can do much with that info anyway. They don't have cops that can break down my door. They can't mess with my bank accounts. The Chinese don't really care about Joe Western Citizen.

My own government, OTOH, is quite capable of doing bad things based on such spying, and also have a far greater interest in spying on every Joe Citizen. China is much more concerned with spying on their own citizens (for exactly the same reason). Obviously this only applies to typical consumers - businesses with intellectual property to protect or potential military targets are a different argument.

Honestly, I'd rather the Chinese know who I called or where I had dinner every day. Enjoy. Knock yourself out.

It's sad state of affairs when I trust my own government less than them.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[david_thornley]

The technical door has been closed. This trick won't work on an iPhone 5S or later. There are doubtless other vulnerabilities, but the hardware security improvements on the more recent iPhones are impressive.

Now, my privacy technique is partly to be so boring no FBI agent will look through all my private stuff anyway, but that's not for everyone.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[david_thornley]

The law says "reasonable", and asking for perfect code that's actually useful is unreasonable. Moreover, since Apple doesn't have to do it on their own dime, and getting near-perfect code requires NASA levels of expense, even the FBI is likely to get discouraged.

In this case, it's easy to see whether the code works: if the FBI runs through the possible PINs, and can do so in reasonable time without the encryption key getting wiped, the software worked.

In general, the court system doesn't produce stupid or ignorant rulings, and most of those can be dealt with with an appeal. It does produce what I believe to be wrong rulings sometimes, but not from lack of understanding the issues.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

I'm not sure people understand just how much of a global clusterfuck of undermining rights and freedoms the US is doing here

One of the bitter sweetnesses of growing older is being able to see the silver lining here- The US has been fucking over the rest of the world for so long, that seeing them surpass us will not be entirely unpleasant.

How Many Combinations?

[sycodon]

Nine quadrillion, nine hundred trillion combinations...if I worked that web calculator correctly.

Perhaps they should try 1,2,3,4.

Re:How Many Combinations?

[Anonymous Coward]

No, it's only 10,000 combinations assuming a four-digit numeric pin.

Re:How Many Combinations?

[Anonymous Coward]

Nine quadrillion, nine hundred trillion combinations...if I worked that web calculator correctly.

Perhaps they should try 1,2,3,4.

You didn't. There are only 10,000 combinations of a 4-digit pin.

Re:How Many Combinations?

[Dcnjoe60]

Nine quadrillion, nine hundred trillion combinations...if I worked that web calculator correctly.

Perhaps they should try 1,2,3,4.

As others have pointed out, there are only 10,000 combinations using a four digit numeric pin. Of course, with an iphone, you only get to try ten of them incorrectly before it wipes the phone.

Re:How Many Combinations?

[kilfarsnar]

Nine quadrillion, nine hundred trillion combinations...if I worked that web calculator correctly.

Perhaps they should try 1,2,3,4.

As others have pointed out, there are only 10,000 combinations using a four digit numeric pin. Of course, with an iphone, you only get to try ten of them incorrectly before it wipes the phone.

I have a 7 digit PIN on my iPhone. The default is 4, but you can have up to 50 AFAIK.

Re:How Many Combinations?

[Anonymous Coward]

I guess that, unlike Climate Scientists, he doesn't pretend to know statistics.

Re:How Many Combinations?

[Rain2]

You can also have a password. Which makes things harder.

Re:How Many Combinations?

[Holi]

Assuming that they used a 4 digit pin.

Wondering where it... might lead???

[Anonymous Coward]

... wondering where [it] might lead. "Can courts compel Facebook to provide analytics of who might be a criminal?"

Uhhh if you think we aren't years beyond that point you probably came to the wrong website. You are looking for something more along the lines of Huffington Post or The Economist.

Yawn...

[Anonymous Coward]

Next time build a product where creating a version of iOS that creates a backdoor is irrelevant, because there should be no way to get this software to run on a phone that has been adequately protected. There should be no way to load software onto a locked phone. I get that there may be physical ways of stripping a chip and making a hardware connection, but that would not be something that Apple has any expertise in doing.

Re: Yawn...

[Anonymous Coward]

They already did , and all recent iphones use it

No uncertain terms?

[Anonymous Coward]

If I read Apple's "customer letter" correctly, they very well have the ability to create the software that is demanded of them, and decrypt that phone. Whether that software already exists or not is immaterial. If it is possible to create the software and use it on existing devices, then for all intents and purposes the backdoor is already there. Apple just doesn't want to open it, because they rightly fear losing the trust of their customers - trust which, following this interpretation, is unfounded.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[TheCastro1689]

You can't force a company to spend money and man hours making something that doesn't exist so that you can use their product they way you want to,

Re:No uncertain terms?

[Anonymous Coward]

If you can compel someone to do something, you can compel a company to do something. You may have to reimburse them, but that's certainly not going to stop anyone. Besides, that's missing the point. If the phone is designed such that it can be modified without the owner's permission, and subsequently be decrypted, then it is already backdoored. The software would just use that backdoor, not create it. Apple is in a situation where they can not say "it's impossible". They can only say "we don't wanna".

Re:No uncertain terms?

[Anonymous Coward]

s/permission/cooperation/

Re:No uncertain terms?

[SecurityGuy]

I guess you missed the whole CALEA thing, then?

Re:No uncertain terms?

[FlyHelicopters]

Part of the court order included an order that Apple provide an estimate of their time and charges to be reimbursed for their efforts.

The court is not asking Apple to do this for free, the FBI would be expected to pay Apple for their time and trouble.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[OhPlz]

Like Cablecard? The cable companies certainly didn't want that.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[rahvin112]

They can compel them, but Apple could submit preliminary costs. I suggest they submit an invoice to the court and FBI demanding about 10 billion dollars to create this software, this would include the cost of the damage to their reputation. That will be enough that the FBI could not conceivably pay the amount. This will tie the issue up in court for a decade while they fight over costs such that by the time the FBI prevails (if they do) the 5c and versions like it will be long gone.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[Solandri]

I tend to see these things in terms of reciprocity. If the company feels they should be able to do things on their own to a product after you've bought it from them, then yes I do believe you have the right to force the company to spend money and man hours doing reasonable things you want on the product.

Basically, if you buy a product, you own it and the manufacturer no longer has any rights to do anything to it. But if the company insists on still retaining rights to do things to the product, then you haven't really bought it. You're merely leasing it. And as the "owner" the manufacturer has a duty to maintain the product in working order to the satisfaction of the lessee.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[SomePoorSchmuck]

You can't force a company to spend money and man hours making something that doesn't exist so that you can use their product they way you want to,

Why not? I can be forced to spend money (and therefore the man hours necessary for me to earn that money) in order to consume a product -- health insurance -- so why can't a company be forced to spend money and man hours making a product?

In the 21st century we've already established that the government can compel behavior whenever it suits the public interest. Everything else from here on out is just a temporary quibble over details, until all regulations are permitted.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[david_thornley]

You are asking that stuff you buy is perfect. Apple is able to take care of a security vulnerability here, one which they closed in the next generation, and one which is hard to close.

Security isn't binary. You need to define the threat. If I wanted to stop Mom from reading a document easily, I could put it on a computer. If I want to stop the NSA from reading it at any time in the next century, I have to do different things. In this case, Apple is producing an easy-to-use device, and is trying to make sure the NSA can't compromise it when it's in their physical possession. The first efforts fell short, in that a large dedicated software effort could compromise the phone. That doesn't work on any iPhone that Apple lists as for sale currently.

If you think that's grounds for distrust, you need to distrust everyone, because nobody is going to be able to get that security feature quite right.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[Anonymous Coward]

People have been warning about the abuse potential of automatic update procedures for much longer than Apple has been making iPhones. Apple does not get to feign ignorance on this one. Neither does Microsoft, which made updates compulsory with Windows 10.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[david_thornley]

One good thing about Apple is that updates are not automatic. When a new iOS version comes out, I get a popup with buttons that allow me to install it, answer later, or stop that popup from ever appearing again. As new iPhones get better than the old, there frequently comes a time when upgrading to the latest iOS is a bad idea, and Apple supports that (although perhaps not with enough warning).

I think our opinions on compulsory updates are very similar. You're against them, aren't you?

Re:No uncertain terms?

[Anonymous Coward]

the real question is if it is already there, if the fbi can put their hand on the knob, turn it, and open the door themselves, then why the circus about making Apple open the door for them? Sounds like we need a deft move by John Galt exposing the barrel of the gun to the camera and the nation to me.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[rsborg]

Part of the court order included an order that Apple provide an estimate of their time and charges to be reimbursed for their efforts.

The court is not asking Apple to do this for free, the FBI would be expected to pay Apple for their time and trouble.

Apple should reply with an on-sided 8 for both figures.

Basic question

[Dcnjoe60]

I have a basic question. The phone in question is encrypted. How is Apple supposed to un-encrypt it without the key, which they state they do not have? Apple goes on to say, that for the future, they would have to create a back door program to do that which is an entirely different discussion. So, unless the backdoor already exists (and Apple wants to keep it secret), how can this "request" be fulfilled?

Re:Basic question

[Anonymous Coward]

From my understanding, they cannot access the keys and there are software limitations to ensure that if you enter the wrong key 10 times the device self wipes. The FBI is asking for the boot loader which wipes the device to be modified so that it will no longer wipe the device and also remove the timeout delay for when you enter the wrong PIN. Now, I hope the decryption key is stored in a piece of hardware where you input the password and it outputs the key and after X wrong attempts it deletes the key, as that would be properly implemented security and would make it so Apple didn't have the ability to write a software patch to disable those features the FBI is asking to be disabled, but if this functionality is instead implemented in a piece of boot time firmware that can be updated, then this would be an effective backdoor.

Re:Basic question

[Attila Dimedici]

Answer: the court order is for Apple to write such a backdoor program.

Re:Basic question

[Dcnjoe60]

Answer: the court order is for Apple to write such a backdoor program.

Yes, I know, but such a program won't work retroactively to unencrypt the already encrypted data because Apple doesn't have the key. It would only work going forward. As such, the government's appeal to the courts is bogus. The back door still won't get them the unencrypted data.

Put differently, the government already has the data from the phone in question. To access the data in unencrypted form, there is nothing that Apple can do that they, themselves cannot do. If Apple acquiesced, then for future cases of terrorism where an iphone might have been involved, then the data might be accessible if the user didn't take some further measure to protect it. There are a lot of "mights" in that scenario. Of course, none of it would apply to the CA attackers because the backdoor, as far as we are being told, is not in existence.

Re:Basic question

[Anonymous Coward]

Presumably in this older phone the OS/Firmware isn't encrypted, only the user data/partition/whatever. So they update the OS to allow unlimited fast password entries and then the FBI/whomever then proceeds to try and brute force entry to the user data.

Re:Basic question

[Attila Dimedici]

No, you are not paying attention. The court is ordering Apple to write a software update which can be loaded onto this phone which disables the limit on the number of times someone can enter a bad password before the phone wipes the data. Of course, once it is written, the government intends that the software can be loaded onto ANY iphone to allow the same thing.

Re:Basic question

[Anonymous Coward]

The idea is that apple would "update" the phone with new software that is vulnerable to decryption.

Apple is capable of updating the software on the phone.

The software would have to be written, tested, and sent to this specific phone. This has a real, measurable cost.

There is also the harm that performing these actions will cause to the apple brand/reputation. These costs are much harder to quantify and bill for.

Re:Basic question

[Anonymous Coward]

How can an encrypted phone be made to install the "update"?

Re:Basic question

[david_thornley]

Wrong. The software cannot be loaded onto any iPhone 5S or later without already knowing the PIN. The software is only useful on the 5/5C and earlier. Apple is not currently selling phones vulnerable to this. If you want perfect security on an easy-to-use device that falls into the physical possession of the US Government, you're probably going to have to pay more than $600 for it.

iPhone, choice of terrorists worldwide.

[Anonymous Coward]

Is this what is between the lines?

a lot of news

[Geoffrey.landis]

A lot of news and commentary on this one.
https://www.washingtonpost.com...
http://www.usatoday.com/story/...
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyli...

Backdoors for everyone

[sjbe]

If you go through the legal process and get a court order that is the system working as intended.

Not when the court doesn't really understand the full ramifications of what they are ordering. You can have due process and end up with a terrible ruling if the court is clueless. Hopefully it will be sorted out in due course. Apple is clearly correct in their position as far as I can tell.

It's when they want backdoors and unregulated access to your information that it's a problem.

In this case the court is apparently ordering Apple to CREATE a backdoor since one supposedly does not currently exist. This is a terrible idea for reasons too numerous for me to mention here. You cannot create a backdoor for one party without creating it for ALL parties. If you don't see how that is a problem then I can't help you.

They want to brute force the PIN.

[Anonymous Coward]

The way I read the court order, the FBI wants Apple to provide a method to brute force the device's pin.

Is what the FBI ask Apple feasible, or not ?

[fgrieu]

There is something that does not add up in Apple's discourse at http://www.apple.com/customer-...

Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.

The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor.

I read what the FBI asks as: install a piece of code that allows the phone's content to be examined. I see no middle ground between

1) running such piece of code (probably: after getting it signed by Apple) is possible without the owner's passcode; the iPhone is in fact already backdoored, with Apple holding the key, the FBI wants Apple to exploit the vulnerability/open the backdoor, and Apple does not want to bow, because that's against their policy.

2) running a piece of code signed by Apple also requires he owner's passcode; then the solution pushed by the FBI just can't work.

If the facts where 2, Apple could just state this to the FBI, showing the source code as proof. The FBI would have no choice but take it as fact (perhaps they would ask a change in the future, but it would not help immediately for this iPhone). I conclude the true story is 1, and Apple slightly misrepresents things stating the FBI wants the creation of a backdoor, when there's already one, only well locked and never previously used for nefarious purposes.

Re:Is what the FBI ask Apple feasible, or not ?

[Punko]

There is a technical description below. Its not a matter of replacing a bit of code. i.e. not just a software issue, its hardware

Re:Is what the FBI ask Apple feasible, or not ?

[MountainLogic]

Can Apple really push an OS update to a locked phone and then force an update? Is the data stored in a separate flash chip from the processor? If so, then the problem is just attaching to the SPI port, reading out the crypto text the decrypting it. Decryption is a much less problematic issue for a NSA server farms loaded with custom hardware than it is for most of us. Who needs keys when you can afford brute force? If they can physically gain access to even the crypto text, as I assume that they can, then could this may all be theater to disguise their existing access? They must already have access to the users call records, emails and social media, so what is so interesting that is left on the phone? If this order stands I pity Apple as every lawyer in an employment dispute, car wreck or divorce will show up in Cupertino with a writ demanding the same service.

Tim Cook's wrong you know

[Thud457]

1. In this case, we have a lawful order from a court. Legally and morally, Apple should comply.
2. Seems to me the SDK would include a way to dump the contents of a phone and a simulator. So it's just a simple script to spin up a virtual image, enter a passcode and repeat until the phone unlocks. Are you telling me the Apple developer's kit doesn't have that functionality? I bet the NSA developer's kit does.

Re: Tim Cook's wrong you know

[Anonymous Coward]

It does not. What you describe is an emulator , not a simulator.

eg iOS Simulator actually runs Intel binaries, not ARM

Re:Tim Cook's wrong you know

[Anonymous Coward]

Legally, and per the court order itself, Apple has 5 days to declare that the order is "overly burdensome" and push back against it. As such, and rightfully so given the implications of following the order, they are doing exactly that.

Re:Tim Cook's wrong you know

[mark-t]

1. In this case, we have a lawful order from a court. Legally and morally, Apple should comply.

How can Apple comply with an order that they have no ability to follow? The court order is for Apple to help decrypt a specific phone, not to change how they make phones.

2. Seems to me the SDK would include a way to dump the contents of a phone and a simulator.

Believing in something does not mean that it is true.

So one is then left with a choice of taking one of three options: Either 1) learn the mathematics behind why breaking strong encryption is hard; 2) take Apple's word for it that they have no more ability to break the encryption than anyone else would; or 3) blindly believe without any basis whatsoever that the people who are saying that they cannot break the encryption on the phone are lying.

Re:Tim Cook's wrong you know

[JesseMcDonald]

In this case, we have a lawful order from a court. Legally and morally, Apple should comply.

Legally, perhaps. The order may well be unlawful; compelling a third party not under investigation to produce brand-new software to circumvent existing security measures and sign it with their seal of approval as an approved software update is well outside the bounds of what these order are normally used for.

Morally, even if the order turns out to be legal, Apple should refuse. Regardless of its legality, the order itself is immoral and should not be followed. Following the order would be harmful to the security of every iPhone 5c owner, the vast majority of whom are innocent bystanders and not accused of any wrongdoing.

Because politicians believe in magic...

[gestalt_n_pepper]

There Is No Such Thing as Magic. If there is a known backdoor, it will be found and exploited. This can't be prevented, and honestly (Take not, politicians)...

That means that the content on anyone's phone can be stolen. Not just anyone's phone, but the phone of every politician in the world.

Be careful what you wish for.

Re:Because politicians believe in magic...

[Thelasko]

That means that the content on anyone's phone can be stolen. Not just anyone's phone, but the phone of every politician in the world.

If politicians want to put a back door on our phones, those politicians need to use those same phones.

Which brings up another point. The US Federal Government can hack the German Chancellor's Iphone, but not the Iphone of some nut in California?

Re:Because politicians believe in magic...

[Kjella]

Which brings up another point. The US Federal Government can hack the German Chancellor's Iphone, but not the Iphone of some nut in California?

Presumably the Chancellor's phone was hacked while it was running. Just like using full disk encryption doesn't protect you from getting a trojan while surfing, but if your laptop is turned off and gets stolen it will. It's only a strong lock on the door, it doesn't prevent nasty things from slipping in when it's open.

Preaching to the choir

[bangular]

Head over to NY Times and Washington Post websites and look at the comments. You joke, but many people there are actually saying things like this. I see comments calling for Tim Cook to be charged with treason, saying Apple shouldn't be able to do business in the U.S., etc. The reason shit like this flies in the U.S. is not because of slashdoters, it's people like that who vote congress critters into office.

Re:Preaching to the choir

[halivar]

You joke, but many people there are actually saying things like this. I see comments calling for Tim Cook to be charged with treason, saying Apple shouldn't be able to do business in the U.S., etc.

To be fair, you see these same exact comments on Slashdot; just for different reasons.

Re:Preaching to the choir

[painandgreed]

Head over to NY Times and Washington Post websites and look at the comments. You joke, but many people there are actually saying things like this. I see comments calling for Tim Cook to be charged with treason, saying Apple shouldn't be able to do business in the U.S., etc. The reason shit like this flies in the U.S. is not because of slashdoters, it's people like that who vote congress critters into office.

They seem to forget that this also means that we put backdoors in the phones of all the military personnel, congressmen and Presidents as well. This case may be Apple, but it will apply to all phone companies, and other electronic devices, in the US. That leaves the government to order or build their own secure phones and devices, or trust a foreign supplier who says they have them.

Re:Preaching to the choir

[david_thornley]

Congresscritters with some exceptions (*cough*Bachmann*cough*) tend not to fly off the handle and say too incredibly stupid things. (Yeah, I am in Minnesota's Fifth District. She was elected from Minnesota's Sith District. At least that's what the radio announcer seemed to be saying, and it does fit.) Frightening as it may seem, Internet commentators say even more extreme things. Ignore them, and go placidly in the knowledge that there will be idiots out there no matter what you do.

Apple is not the good actor

[Anonymous Coward]

a) Apple is advertising this as a tool to protect criminals. They accept some (not complete) liability and responsibility in that choice.
b) Apple has included this functionality EXCLUSIVELY to protect the walled garden. This is not, in any way, to protect you, just them.
c) Apple has already caved, quietly, in China. This is a PR stunt, not an ethics-based decision.

Re:Apple is not the good actor

[Anonymous Coward]

d) I will send $100000.00 to each of your home addresses tomorrow, just reply to me here...

Making up bullshit is a load of fun.

One method

[Anonymous Coward]

Dear FBI,

If you really want to decrypt the data you could always back the data off the device, run it inside a virtual machine and continue to try different unlock combinations. Certainly the federal government contains the necessary expertise to enable this sort of action. Given the necessary resources no hardware is impervious to physical attack.

The irony is that this is another variation of the likes of trying to hack a gaming console or DRM disc standard ala Xbox, PlayStation, DVD and/or blu-ray.

Another analogy

[bangular]

Government to Apple: "Develop the atom bomb. It will only be used just this once and then you can throw away the technology. Also, develop it on your dime."

Re:Another analogy

[xxxJonBoyxxx]

>> Government to [Company]: "Also, develop it on your dime"

This is why businesses hate regulations in general.

Re:Another analogy

[Actually, I do RTFA]

Also, develop it on your dime

Bullshit. Apple is allowed to charge reasonable rates to comply with the Writ. And reasonable rates can be determined by something as simple as cost of the employees' time and any materials required, plus overhead. They'll even recoup their electricity for the computers. They'll probably make a nominal profit on the work.

Re: Another analogy

[Anonymous Coward]

Yeah, and I, as a taxpayer don't want them using our valuable resources in this manner.

Re: Another analogy

[Anonymous Coward]

Then you support terrists. Why u hate America??

Re:Another analogy

[Anonymous Coward]

My company does business with the Legislative branch (I know, I know). From time to time, they modify the contract to say "You have to provide this additional service and you aren't allowed to charge us for it." It literally has an Amendments section that says "We'll try to notify you in a 'timely' manner of any changes we want to make."

I am altering the deal. Pray I don't alter it any further.

It's an example reacharound

[Anonymous Coward]

The bombers are dead, and who they contacted is a CDR record held by the Telcos and the NSA.

So this is really about compelling the Apple backdoor than investigating the crime. It seems they chose this as a suitable 'good cause' that they could leverage the right to demand back doors.

If the bomber was alive, then we'd be asking if the right to self incriminate is worthwhile, as they'd be demanding the accused unlock the phone.

Re:It's an example reacharound

[MachineShedFred]

Unless they contacted people by way of an app that uses encrypted messaging. Which is quite possible, as the phone in question ships with such an app pre-installed.

Re:It's an example reacharound

[OhPlz]

Yea, I used to work for a telco. We were subpoenaed constantly for CDR. The feds have certainly already done that. What they're looking for is data on the phone or any trace of non-voice call communications made with the device.

As if ...

[Anonymous Coward]

... they did not already access the data. All this is posturing, Apple pretending not to suck up to the government.

"At what point does this stop?"

[Anonymous Coward]

When you kick the Jews out of your country, that's when.

How fucing stupid do have to be

[Anonymous Coward]

To think if the FBI cant Apple can.
Perhaps in the future you have to take people alive instead of cowboy killing everyone.
If you want to get their passwords.

Decrypting nearly impossible

[Anonymous Coward]

Re-quoting this informative comment:

You mistake an iPhone's unlock code with the iPhone's encryption key. the iPhones do typically use a 4-6 digit pin as an unlock code. The user also has the ability to create a full alphanumeric password for the unlock code as well. However, that is simply the code that's used to unlock the actual full encryption key that is stored within dedicated crypto hardware. Apple uses a dedicated chip to store and process the encryption. They call this the Secure Enclave. The secure enclave stores a full 256-bit AES encryption key.

Within the secure enclave itself, you have the device's Unique ID (UID) . The only place this information is stored is within the secure enclave. It can't be queried or accessed from any other part of the device or OS. Within the phone's processor you also have the device's Group ID (GID). Both of these numbers combine to create 1/2 of the encryption key. These are numbers that are burned into the silicon, aren't accessible outside of the chips themselves, and aren't recorded anywhere once they are burned into the silicon. Apple doesn't keep records of these numbers. Since these two different pieces of hardware combine together to make 1/2 of the encryption key, you can't separate the secure enclave from it's paired processor.

The second half of the encryption key is generated using a random number generator chip. It creates entropy using the various sensors on the iPhone itself during boot (microphone, accelerometer, camera, etc.) This part of the key is stored within the Secure Enclave as well, where it resides and doesn't leave. This storage is tamper resistant and can't be accessed outside of the encryption system. Even if the UID and GID components of the encryption key are compromised on Apple's end, it still wouldn't be possible to decrypt an iPhone since that's only 1/2 of the key.

The secure enclave is part of an overall hardware based encryption system that completely encrypts all of the user storage. It will only decrypt content if provided with the unlock code. The unlock code itself is entangled with the device's UDID so that all attempts to decrypt the storage must be done on the device itself. You must have all 3 pieces present: The specific secure enclave, the specific processor of the iphone, and the flash memory that you are trying to decrypt. Basically, you can't pull the device apart to attack an individual piece of the encryption or get around parts of the encryption storage process. You can't run the decryption or brute forcing of the unlock code in an emulator. It requires that the actual hardware components are present and can only be done on the specific device itself.

The secure enclave also has hardware enforced time-delays and key-destruction. You can set the phone to wipe the encryption key (and all the data contained on the phone) after 10 failed attempts. If you have the data-wipe turned on, then the secure enclave will nuke the key that it stores after 10 failed attempts, effectively erasing all the data on the device. Whether the device-wipe feature is turned on or not, the secure enclave still has a hardware-enforced delay between attempts at entering the code: Attempts 1-4 have no delay, Attempt 5 has a delay of 1 minute. Attempt 6 has a delay of 5 minutes. Attempts 7 and 8 have a delay of 15 minutes. And attempts 9 or more have a delay of 1 hour. This delay is enforced by the secure enclave and can not be bypassed, even if you completely replace the operating system of the phone itself. If you have a 6-digit pin code, it will take, on average, nearly 6 years to brute-force the code. 4-digit pin will take almost a year. if you have an alpha-numeric password the amount of time required could extend beyond the heat-death of the universe. Key destruction is turned on by default.

Even if you pull

"Bad cases make good law" (sometimes)

[DutchUncle]

This particular phone's owner deserves no mercy. But that's not the point, or at least not the whole point. If Apple can do this to one phone, they can do it to any phone; and if the government can make Apple do it to the phone of a dead murderer who doesn't deserve legal protection, then the government can make Apple do it do it to the phone of a live whistleblower who DOES deserve legal protection. My title comes from an era of free speech rights debates inspired by porn cases; the fact that a particular image is disgusting, like the fact that a particular case involves a murderer, does not justify changing our checks and balances for "just this case", because the precedent will be used to justify many more cases.

Re:"Bad cases make good law" (sometimes)

[Anonymous Coward]

Apple can do this to one phone. So they can do it to any phone. That horse is already out of the barn.
Justice Dept can already make them do this to a whistleblower who DOES deserve legal protection. They actually do that fairly typically. Justice department makes mistakes all of the time. So does Apple. That doesn't mean anyone gets to ignore a lawful warrant or court order.

The government has not asked for a 'backdoor'. People keep abusing that term. The generic ability to break encryption is not a 'backdoor'.
Apple assembling a tool to decrypt the data from a phone in their possession does not mean a 'backdoor' will be installed in all phones.
No one has asked for that. And if Apple could do that for all anyone knows they already have done.

The government has asked Apple to decrypt the data for a single phone in compliance with a lawful court order in a transparent manner to assist in an ongoing criminal investigation. The same as if they had asked a safe manufacturer to open a safe for them that they can not.

Arguing that if they open this safe then all safes are in peril is not a particularly well reasoned defense against the court order.
If that is their primary reason for refusing to comply with the court's order they are going to lose.

They have several other reasonable lines of argument but in this case 'slippery slope' is unlikely to be persuasive to the court.

Re:"Bad cases make good law" (sometimes)

[Anonymous Coward]

This particular phone's owner deserves no mercy.

This particular phone owner is *dead* and roasting in h*ll. That said, there is still no justifiable need to crack the phone. Contact metadata, illegally available from either the NSA or their brethren 3 letter spy agencies, or legally subpoenaed from the telcos, should more than suffice to track down any associates.

Re:"Bad cases make good law" (sometimes)

[Anonymous Coward]

One problem: As noted in a previous /. post, the (alleged) murderer is *not* the phone's owner -- their most recent employer is.

Also, IMO, no matter how despicable the person or act, one fundamental principle of a liberal society is that every person deserves full and equal legal protection. In other words, "presumed innocent until proven guilty," "due process," etc.

I agree that the specific person in question does deserve no mercy. Even so, they deserve justice pursued in a just manner.

Re:"Bad cases make good law" (sometimes)

[david_thornley]

They can't do it to my iPhone, or any iPhone Apple is currently selling. Mine is the version after the one in the case, and is not vulnerable to that attack. It's probably vulnerable to something else, being a complex piece of technology, but that's how life works.

Old southern saying

[bangular]

Can't put the shit back in the horse

Re:Old southern saying

[Bob the Super Hamste]

Can't put the shit back in the horse

Sounds like you haven't done much surfing on the net.

Re:Old southern saying

[Anonymous Coward]

On the internet liberals use shit for toothpaste so there's that. Personally I prefer the horse comment.

Re:Old southern saying

[dyslexicbunny]

Thanks for the laugh.

Re:Some of your questions may already have answers

[Anonymous Coward]

http://lmgtfy.com/?q=ISIS I just ran that search standing next to the building you are in... so what is the response time on drone strikes these days?

NSA can't do it?

[Rastl]

If the freakin' NSA can't get to the data and break the encryption then what the heck are we paying them for?

The phone is working exactly as it was designed and marketed to do - protect the user's data.

The owner is dead and can't be forced to give their password. They can't brute force the password because it will wipe the data. Sounds like they're SOL on getting information out of that phone. They don't like it but that's what it is.

Re:NSA can't do it?

[AHuxley]

Re "If the freakin' NSA can't get to the data and break the encryption then what the heck are we paying them for?"
This is in public, it makes the brand look like every device sold will be US spy ready with a new trapdoor OS thats federal, state and city gov friendly. Extracting your phones contents becomes a few GUI clicks. Any nations phone network ships with an OS thats wide open to any US contractor or other nations ex or former staff that worked with the US and kept the "method". In open court with the press reporting that is bad optics globally.
Thats why PRISM invited all the big US brands in but the wider public still kept its academic and private sector encryption fantasy.
Now a new fantasy after PRISM has to be sold to the global tech media.
Buy the cell phones, load up your daily data, its still safe, look even the courts cant get in and "trust" us.

Apples and oranges

[rgcombs9117]

Re: "Can courts compel Facebook to provide analytics of who might be a criminal?" Lieu said in an email to the Daily Dot. "Or Google to give a list of names of people who searched for the term ISIS? At what point does this stop?"

There is a vast difference between that kind of broad fishing expedition and this particular case, which seems to fit the 4th Amendment requirement of "probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." I think the probable cause requirement is fully met.

Now, whether Apple can or should provide what the government is asking for is a different issue, and I don't know enough to form an educated opinion about that. (Yeah, I know, this is /., so why should that stop me? :-) )

Apple post makes it clear it is possible?

[cfalcon]

The Apple post seems to make it clear that this attack is doable. This implies that the San Bernadino phone is set to gobble up an update signed by Apple or something. This sounds like Apple is fully capable of creating a signed malicious operating system into the phone, and is now refusing to do so. Nothing in the article implies that this is *impossible*, merely *really unwise*.

Of course it is unwise. But the fact that it is POSSIBLE belies a second security flaw- that installing a new OS is possible to anyone without the PIN. That's a security flaw, and it means that breaking any iphone is now a matter of cost and willingness, not possibility.

I could be reading this wrong, and its not directly stated, but that's the implication, at least?

Re:Apple post makes it clear it is possible?

[Anonymous Coward]

That's a security flaw, and it means that breaking any iphone is now a matter of cost and willingness, not possibility.

Breaking *anything* is a matter of cost and willingness.

Re:Apple post makes it clear it is possible?

[cfalcon]

> Breaking *anything* is a matter of cost and willingness.

AES-256? Serpent 256? Twofish 256?

The goal of crypto is to make something unbreakable. It seems it has generally succeeded, as best we know, as it appears impossible to do it. Brute forcing a 256 bit key is not a matter of cost. Getting into some hardware probably is, coercing software (if the ability to push the install remotely exists) absolutely is.

Re:Apple post makes it clear it is possible?

[Etcetera]

> Breaking *anything* is a matter of cost and willingness.

AES-256? Serpent 256? Twofish 256?

The goal of crypto is to make something unbreakable. It seems it has generally succeeded, as best we know, as it appears impossible to do it. Brute forcing a 256 bit key is not a matter of cost. Getting into some hardware probably is, coercing software (if the ability to push the install remotely exists) absolutely is.

You're thinking only of encryption technologies, not physical access. Using only encryption technologies, if you break one you immediately break all that are using the same key. If to break a given device you need to disassemble it, rip apart the chip, and physically burn a hole through two layers at position 3254234138 x 4535332 and then attempt to scan for the nano-etching on the wafer that had part of the key inscribed, then having a remote key doesn't give you any access at all.

Re:Apple post makes it clear it is possible?

[Anonymous Coward]

This is the crux of the argument.

Apple CAN push updates to any iphone at any time.

The malicious updates do not currently exist -apple would have to create and test them before they could push them to the phone in question. This would have costs both tangible (engineers time cost money) and intangibly (harm to their reputation costs future sales.)

Re:Apple post makes it clear it is possible?

[david_thornley]

By "cost and willingness", I assume you are thinking of a major commitment from a Kardashev Type III civilization, since current iPhones are not vulnerable to what Apple's supposed to do for the terrorist phone.

Re: Apple post makes it clear it is possible?

[Anonymous Coward]

Apple writes a bad ios that fails to issue a blank command after ten tries, and fails to mandate the several second delay. This means it can issue requests at every 80ms. The password is known to be a 4 digit PIN. They sign and deliver the bad ios, via some method that appears to be possible, at least on the 5c.

Then a couple minutes later, you have the AES key and the device is decrypted.

It seems like the 6 is not vulnerable to this, as the 10 tries thing was moves to the secure enclave.

Re: Apple post makes it clear it is possible?

[david_thornley]

Why do think it a bad iOS? It did not cover all security vulnerabilities, such as vulnerabilities that could be exploited by using some mechanism to change the OS. Putting security features into software can be bypassed if there's any way to change the software. That's why the features were moved into tamper-resistant hardware with the 5S and later.

But ISIS is a great routing protocol!

[Anonymous Coward]

Why would Google be compelled to report on who is looking for configuration examples? ;)

Backdoor ONLY applicable on older phones

[Muntzsky]

"...the FBI wants Apple to create a special version of iOS that only works on the one iPhone they have recovered. This customized version of iOS (*ahem* FBiOS) will ignore passcode entry delays, will not erase the device after any number of incorrect attempts, and will allow the FBI to hook up an external device to facilitate guessing the passcode. The FBI will send Apple the recovered iPhone so that this customized version of iOS never physically leaves the Apple campus." "Even with a customized version of iOS, the FBI has another obstacle in their path: the Secure Enclave (SE)...a separate computer inside the iPhone that brokers access to encryption keys for services like the Data Protection API (aka file encryption)..." "...the recovered iPhone is a 5C. The 5C model iPhone lacks TouchID and, therefore, lacks the single most important security feature produced by Apple: the Secure Enclave." Source: http://blog.trailofbits.com/20...

Choose

[BrendaEM]

In this country, our freedom from warrant-less searches is specifically protected in our Constitution; your personal safety, however is not.

If you stay, you might be killed by terrorists, but if you don't like that prospect get off your sorry coward ass, pack your bags, and leave!

But if you choose to stay, obey they U.S. Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.

Find myself in a moment of Apple Admiration

[BrendaEM]

Well, one Apple-Hater hates a little less.

What this (probably) means to you!

[cfalcon]

The order implies that Apple is capable of delivering a remote update, or that forcing an update locally is possible if you have physical access. It also implies that portions of the security models are enforced by software that is vulnerable to "update", such as the wipe-after-ten-tries (presumably that code will be replaced with a no-op) and the code entry delay in excess of that which is enforced by hardware.

Whether Apple is compelled to do this or not, the natural concern is "well how much of my data is shielded by math, how much by hardware, and how much by software"?

You can't bargain with math, you have a devil of a time working out hardware, and software along is meaningless as a defense.

It appears that your best bet for security is either:

1)- A multi-character password that is easy to enter (and you'll remember it if its your phone password, lol), but reasonably short. This is if you trust that the 80ms hardware delay can't be broken. This precludes the use of 4 and 6 digit PINs, as a 4 digit PIN will usually fall after a few minutes of this treatment, and a 6 digit PIN after around half a day. An 8 digit password consisting of a completely random set of just the visible lowercase letters (aka, no actual english words) at this rate is hundreds of years, and adding stuff that's harder to enter quickly (capitals, numbers, special characters) makes it much more secure, as does lengthening the password slightly. The challenge here is that passwords are usually chosen to be words, greatly reducing the entropy. And again, this assumes that the 80ms hardware delay is not defeatable.

2)- A fully secure crypto passhprase. This is the level of drama you would go through to password protect a drive or something you take very seriously, and as such it would be a lot more than 8 characters. Your passphrase is long, contains several unpredictable parts, and makes use of more than just a statistically predictable subset of words and characters. You can set this on the iphone, of course, but this kind of protection is not trivial to type in. In this case, you are trusting the math only, however, and assuming that the software will be compelled by the government, and the hardware will be owned by a team skilled in this matter.

Going forward, Apple should probably move the "erase after 10 tries" into the secure portion of the phone, such that it has a protected portion that can't be overwritten without access to the PIN. This will also make them immune to this sort of order in the future.

Re:What this (probably) means to you!

[eth1]

or

3) A two-level system. A simple PIN that unlocks the phone enough to make calls, send texts, take pictures, etc., and provide access to the last X hours of call/text/pic/etc. history. Going back any further in time would require a more complex passphrase. Apps could be grouped into ones usable with PIN, and ones only usable with the passphrase. A panic button on the lock screen would flush all data to the more protected area, and require the more complex passphrase to unlock anything.

Re:What this (probably) means to you!

[cfalcon]

No. This is not one of your best bets or security, because it doesn't mean this TO YOU. The premise of my post is what you, iphone owner, can do now that we find that it's possible for Apple to be coerced into writing (or for the Chinese government to write and sign with Apple's key) a malicious ios. You don't have the ability to implement this excellent two-stage security solution, so it's not something useful to you. You can choose a quick to type 8-ish character passphrase (not using words, of course) and get in and out of your phone about as easy as with a PIN, and then you are safe as long as the hardware doesn't fall, or you can choose a seriously real passphrase like you would for full disk encryption, and then you are safe as long as their implementation isn't shit.

That would be a wicked cool design though.

Re:What this (probably) means to you!

[Anonymous Coward]

Apple has already done what you suggest. The phone in question has 4-year-old hardware in it and is not an example of current security features. Of course, you'd know that if you'd read any of the other threads on this subject.

Re:What this (probably) means to you!

[david_thornley]

I believe (but don't know for sure) that the ten-tries-and-wipe functionality is in the hardware security on all phones of a later model than the one being examined. I'm not saying that the 5S and later iPhones are completely secure, but they're a lot better than the 5C the terrorist was using.

Re:What this (probably) means to you!

[Anonymous Coward]

For such a threatening foe, you'd think they could afford a couple of iphone 6s...

"Terrorist plot undone because terrorists did not upgrade to latest iPhone, news at 11"

Copy memory data directly?

[seven of five]

So... the iPhone's memory cannot be copied directly either (by opening the case and clipping to the appropriate chips)? If the FBI could suck the bits out, they could decrypt it at their leisure.

Re:Copy memory data directly?

[SuiteSisterMary]

It could be, but it would come out encrypted. To unencrypt, you need both the user's passcode, *and* the unique code in the security chip. Which you can't extract from the chip short of maybe an electron tunneling microscope; it has no interface that will return it's code.

Re:Copy memory data directly?

[Anonymous Coward]

No. As has been explained at least a dozen times in this thread, that memory, even if you could access it that way, is encrypted.

San Bernardino shooting story shot full of holes .

[Anonymous Coward]

San Bernardino Shooting Story Shot Full of Holes, False Flag?

But "reasonable" is a nebulous term.

[Chas]

What the court (and the idiot sitting in the big chair) see as "reasonable" may not be reasonable to Apple, or anyone else.

Additionally, such a nebulous term is horribly susceptible to "moving goalposts". Apple decides to cave, gets so far, and doesn't think it reasonable to go any further. But now that they've caved, the government and the idiot in the big chair come back with "Well, you've gotten THIS far, you may as well see it through!"

The appropriate answer to this is "There is no technical way to do this." And when asked or told to devise one on their own dime, they should be told "There is no legitimate business use for this, if it is even possible." and fight it to the bitter end.

My guess at the first unintended consequence

[cellocgw]

If the gov't actually prevails over Apple, I predict (or, at least hope) that there'll be a rebirth of "dumb phones" which store nothing more than phone numbers. Remember-phone numbers and conversations are all accessible at the cellular network providers' servers, so this is "open info." People will have to carry yet another digital device: the dumb phone and a separate pocket-size computer with cellular interface built in (which is what 'smart phones' really are in the first place).
This won't stop the gov't from continuing to break all security, but at least it'll separate your digital phone calls from the rest of your digital world.

removing lockout / wipe is not a real backdoor and

[Joe_Dragon]

removing lockout / wipe is not a real backdoor and having setup to be only for requested phones with a custom rom makes it so that hackers can't easy use it.

Just WTF is going on here?

[WaffleMonster]

After reading the following quotes I'm left scratching my head.

"Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software â" which does not exist today â" would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone's physical possession.

  The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control."

Either Tim Cook and or the FBI is hopelessly confused or all this supposedly secure data on the iPhone is in fact protected by nothing more than hopes and dreams.

How is it possible to retroactively install an image that bypasses security and recovers data if said data is already encrypted with key of useful entropy? Something has to be structurally broken for such a scheme to succeed. Even if you rely on security chip to stretch a weak key known only to a rotting corpse if reasonable query limits are enforced by software rather than hardware offering key protection then what is the point?

At least the FBI seem to have successfully forced the issue of iPhone security being a sham otherwise building a custom image would be pointless... I assume the FBI has not even bothered to spend any resources on a side channel attack against secure enclave and instead have elected to spend their time and money on a "going dark" propaganda campaign.

Wouldn't be surprised if NSA already has one cooked up and they just don't want to waste capability on something with relatively little value.

who pays?

[Anonymous Coward]

Who is going to pay for this "Tool"? By that I mean the judge who does not understand encryption.
Apple can assign an intern to work on it. Whenever it gets done, well so be it.
The Government is asking for something that does not exist.
Maybe they should ask Master to give them a key to all locks?
How about a remote that would open all garages and cars?
Just have a judge sign the order.

No such thing as a one time back door

[sjbe]

But for this specific case only.

There is no such thing as a single case back door. Either the software is secure for all or it isn't secure at all. There is no middle ground here.

I don't understand why this can't be in a temporary fashion, specific to this particular iphone, and only for this specific case.

Because once you develop the software you can't un-develop it and it WILL be used again. The government is ordering Apple to develop what amounts to a backdoor. Apple is (very sensibly) fighting against this because it is a terrible idea with far reaching consequences. Once they develop the software then you can be certain as the sun rising tomorrow that the government would order it to be used in the future. Furthermore 2/3 of Apple's sales come from outside the US and if other countries governments/citizens believe Apple to be beholden to the US government it could very easily hurt their sales very badly.

Basically there is no upside for this for anyone except the investigators in this case. That is not sufficient justification for Apple to demolish everyone's privacy.

Re:No such thing as a one time back door

[Cederic]

Either the software is secure for all or it isn't secure at all. There is no middle ground here.

[...]

The government is ordering Apple to develop what amounts to a backdoor

So by your very logic the software is already not secure - if it were, Apple wouldn't be able to retrofit a backdoor.

It's inherently insecure already and Apple are merely being asked to hack it.

If it's secure then Apple can't introduce a backdoor, as the secure software prevents this.

I'm sorry but your assumptions precipitate a paradox.

Decrypt one phone = decrypting all phones

[sjbe]

How can Apple comply with an order that they have no ability to follow? The court order is for Apple to help decrypt a specific phone, not to change how they make phones.

A distinction without a difference in this case. Presuming the request is technologically possible, asking Apple to decrypt one phone is tantamount to asking them to decrypt ALL phones. The process would be the same and you can be sure it would not be the last time it would be used.

Re:Decrypt one phone = decrypting all phones

[mark-t]

My point is that the request (to decrypt the existing phone or any existing phone that is using the encryption they have said that they have no ability to decrypt) is *NOT* technologically possible. We're not talking ww2 codes here.... this is comparatively strong encryption, and the mathematics involved is not simply a version of what was being used before that only requires more computing power to be thrown at it now, but operating on fundamentally different premises from what they used back then.

Apple has said previously that they do not have the ability to decrypt the phones running certain versions of IOS or later. As I said.... one can either take their claim at their word, assuming that the experts at Apple might know someone that one does not, come to the utterly baseless conclusion that they are lying about the notion that they have no more ability to crack the encryption than anyone else does, or else learn for oneself the underlying mathematics of what makes it hard to break in the first place (and in turn why it is unreasonable to expect compliance with). The last choice is hard, and most people aren't interested in doing it, although it is ultimately the only way to objectively prove their position.

Everyone should have Apple's back on this!

[KlomDark]

Apple is in the right and Google and Microsoft should be backing Apple on this one.

And I say this as a long time hater of all things Apple. I own nothing from Apple. Never have. I fucking detest Apple. Look at any post of mine here on /. for almost 20 years and you will see that this is the very first post I have ever made here saying ANYTHING positive about Apple.

But they are so in the right on this one. Our devices are our own personal data archives on a level way beyond our houses or safes. It is an extension of our brains. While we may not have the technology just yet, imagine if a court ordered you to have your personal memories residing in your physical brain extracted. This is the same thing. People put info on their phones with a full expectation of privacy, regardless of if that expectation is realistic. If you think it's acceptable for the government to demand access to your most personal inner sanctum of being (your brain), then a brain extension like a personal phone or computer should also be inviolate.

This is so completely disgustingly wrong of anyone in government to expect such a thing, for any reason. Even for this reason. Extra ludicrosity because this is an after-the-fact demand, no matter what happens this will not bring one person back from the dead.

If you are about freedom in any way, then you should be completely against this horrid precedent ever being set. Your thoughts are your own, always.

It's realy nice they're letting Apple fight it

[HeckRuler]

I presume that some congressman pushed the FBI to make this request out in the open just for the purpose of fighting it in court. All in all it's a good thing. Defending civil rights and all that.

But if the FBI ACTUALLY wanted this information they would have simply given Apple a gag order along with it. Or asked the NSA to do that for them. It's even their purpose, fighting terrorism, right? This falls SQUARELY under the domain of shit they've strong-armed and gagged companys into helping them with. The fact that we're even hearing about it has to be some sort of process manipulation.

Re:It's realy nice they're letting Apple fight it

[david_thornley]

There are limits on gag orders. They automatically (and not necessarily constitutionally) come with National Security Letters, but there's limits as to what an NSL can require. In this case, they want Apple to create something Apple doesn't want to create.

Re:It's realy nice they're letting Apple fight it

[HeckRuler]

That already happened in 2014 . They did something for someone and were gagged into not saying anything about it because they got an NSL. Their warrant canary died.

An NSL is compulsory. Their government is forcing them to comply. What Apples "wants" doesn't factor in much.

The limits of an NSL is that it can only be for non-content information. Call history, browsing history, but not the content of a call. And the gag order part must be signed by the FBI director who certified that it, among other things, doesn't interfere with a counter-terrorism investigation. Which it certainly would if these nutjobs asked Mr. McJihadPants how best to go pew pew and he heard the FBI was trying to get their phone history. He'd be SO GONE.

THIS order from the FBI is being made in the public space though. And it makes me wonder why. Hey, could be they just want the full phone call transcription. (But the NSA already does all that contrary to what their leaders claim)

Re:It's realy nice they're letting Apple fight it

[david_thornley]

The order is not from the FBI, it's from the court, and that makes a lot of legal difference, if not necessarily much practical difference. AFAIK, an NSL letter can require a party to hand over certain information that's available to the party receiving the letter, but I don't know how far it can go in requiring the party to do work to create a tool that would make information available.

Brute Force

[Anonymous Coward]

As far as I know, the PIN is merely 4-6 digits. Six digits is only one million possible combinations. If you can test one per second, you can brute force the PIN in, worst case, eleven days.

Any XYZ servomechanism (think a cheap 3-D printer) can be rigged as an automatic PIN testing machine.

And THIS is why things like delays after too many failures and wiping the phone after too many failures is essential security when you have such small password space.

AC

Smokescreen?

[MooseTick]

What if all this is a smokescreen to make everyone think you can't decrypt an iPhone, yet the NSA or whenever really can?

Then all the bad guys will use them and feel safe while in reality, the freedom loving USA patriot force can peruse phone data at will.

I have thought for a while that the best intelligence scam going would be to create a company that keeps information safe to the point where the government fights it, while in reality the information is readable and the company is actually in cahoots with the government.

If you don't understand technology, then maybe...

[Brannon]

don't have such strong opinions on a technology.

Apple DOES NOT unlock iPhones for its customers on request, they don't have the ability to do that because THEY DON'T KNOW YOUR PASSCODE OR ENCRYPTION KEY. Please try to keep up or find a different website.

Tim Cook, CEO Apple, Murder At Large

[Anonymous Coward]

Mr. Cook can now by adding and abetting the terror act and murders in San Bernardino, California, and by adding and abetting ISIS can spend the rest of his days before execution in a Federal Prison.

Bit a SNAFU for Apple's March "Event".

Ha ha

All locks can be picked eventually

[sjbe]

So by your very logic the software is already not secure - if it were, Apple wouldn't be able to retrofit a backdoor.

If the software does not currently exist to backdoor the device then it IS secure - for now. The fact that it might be possible to change that is a separate issue.

It's inherently insecure already and Apple are merely being asked to hack it.

This presumes that Apple can hack the device. It has not been conclusively established that this is possible. But let's presume that it is possible for argument's sake since if Apple can't do it then it isn't worthy of discussion. If Apple is able to hack into the device to retrieve the data then in theory the device is insecure in the same sense that a lock that can be picked is insecure. However the tools to hack the device (allegedly) do not currently exist so as things stand the device IS secure. If it wasn't then the FBI would not have any need to ask Apple to hack the device.

If it's secure then Apple can't introduce a backdoor, as the secure software prevents this.

That's like arguing that a lock is insecure because the technology exists to develop lock picks for it. Security is never absolute particularly when a party has physical access to the device. Apple should in principle have the best idea how to go about picking this particular "lock" just like one would expect the maker of a safe to have the best idea how to circumvent the security features of their own product.

I'm sorry but your assumptions precipitate a paradox.

Hardly. A device can be entirely secure today with full knowledge of how it can be made insecure tomorrow. The point is that asking Apple to facilitate this action would have the knock on effect of making ALL devices immediately insecure today instead of theoretically insecure tomorrow.

Re:All locks can be picked eventually

[Cederic]

But you said yourself: Either the software is secure, or insecure. The existence of code to exploit it is irrelevant to its security

I could write a new application tonight and claim it's secure, because nobody's ever written a hack for it. We both know that would be complete nonsense.

A device can be entirely secure today with full knowledge of how it can be made insecure tomorrow.

I see the issue now. You and I have very different definitions of the word 'secure'.

Apple is the i-thority

[cyberspittle]

Yep you heard it first. We now have a new i-word. Ithority. :-D

Make them pay

[Tjp($)pjT]

Commercial companies charge for such services. Apple can just say that it requires a brute force attack to accomplish then charge per hour for trying to break into it. I'd put a mac mini on the job and just let it churn. Charge $280 an hour for the computer and other technical equipment use, hire a contractor to watch the monitor, and charge $300 an hour for the operators time. Oh and charge $250,000 to develop the software you'll need to develop to brute force it. Present this proposal to the court and request the invoicing information. Don't negotiate on price. In fact point out the pricing commonly used in the industry for fortune 500 companies providing consultants. I was billed out at $700 an hour (not making even 1/10 that myself) in the 80s. IBM has charged over $1100 an hour for their consultants in the past. Let the court know results are not guaranteed in a timely manner, or if ever, cite the probable nature of timing the solution such that a LEO or the sun going nova are possible interruptions to the task beyond Apple's control.

The court may then understand that based on the current mathematics and computer resources it is not a feasible solution by any means. Then if they are mercenary state that of course the solution may be discovered in the first hour or sooner, though statistically very unlikely.

how does Apple encode a unique device ID on chips?

[supernova87a]

My question is a side one. Apple has described that for every secure enclave in its iPhones (region of the core processing chips), they inscribe a unique ID -- completely unknown and irretrievable by Apple or its suppliers -- that serves as a private key during encryption operations. This way you cannot unlock an iPhone's contents without the correct passphrase/passkey and the phone's unique ID in your possession.

How does a chip manufacturer inscribe a unique code into every chip? As I understand it, chips are produced by successive masks (film) with the circuit pattern layered on each mask.

Is one of the masks getting printed with the unique set of codes? Are the masks printed and changed with every wafer, after the unique codes are changed and discarded? Seems like a very intense way of having to put a unique code on each chip.

Or, if you remember film cameras from like the 80s/90s, where they could burn a date into the corner of the negative, do IC making masks have the ability to dynamically burn a changing code during exposure of the wafer??

Thanks for any knowledge you can offer on this point!

Bad planning on the terrorist's part...

[Anonymous Coward]

While I fully support Apple's position on this issue, even though it pains me to support the privacy of a known terrorist...

What I simply can't figure out is how on earth the terrorist's phone was captured intact. Surely, if you were thinking clearly at all (and obviously these two were not) you would destroy all electronic records and devices you used before any attack was initiated.

If I went on a spree of shooting and violence, I can guarantee you that you would NOT locate my cell phone, as it would likely be at the bottom of the ocean (we've got quite a number of very deep chasms that are conveniently located on ferry routes here). I would take apart my phone, piece by piece, and not only would I destroy it beyond all possibility of recovery, but I would then dump the parts into the ocean across a wide variety of locations.

But I'm not a terrorist, so maybe the brain state one has to be in to be a terrorist precludes logical thinking.

Never let a perfectly good crisis go to waste!

[mileshigh]

This particular case is just the excuse the FBI's been waiting for. They've been all hot & bothered about unbreakable encryption, been lying in wait to make their move. This is it.

They picked an infamous case and are milking it like it's 911 all over again. In reality, the perps are very dead so we're reasonably sure there's no imminent danger from them, and the police has already subpoenaed the phone company for calling records to find any associates. What are they hoping to find -- a recipe for hummus?

The real prize for the FBI is that, once Apple creates this hack, the FBI will either have a handy decoder to use at will in the future, or they'll have a handy legal precedent for forcing computer manufacturers' hands. Either way, the FBI wins big if Apple loses.

Speaking of Apple losing: I wouldn't bet on it. Even in the traditional "lawyers, guns & money" match-up, Apple wins hands-down in 2 out of 3. Then add
- Motivation: Apple stands to regain or lose the trust of the entire international market over this, worth $billions & billions. The stakes for Apple couldn't be higher.
- Public image & trust: let's just say that Apple is a very strong brand name...
- PR/communications savvy: not even a fair fight
- Public sentiment about the "authorities": something's driving voters to Trump & Bernie, and it ain't their hair styles.
- Tim Cook: outspoken member of a community that's hyper-aware that you've gotta fight for your rights

I'd have picked a weaker adversary.

Re:Never let a perfectly good crisis go to waste!

[MoaDweeb]

Let's help out the FBI then:

Basic Hummus recipe

Serves 6-8 as a starter
2 x 400g cans of chickpeas (reserve the liquid and a few chickpeas for decoration)
4 tsp tahini
2 garlic cloves, crushed
1 tsp crushed sea salt
6 tbsp quality extra virgin olive oil (plus extra for drizzling)
3 1/2 tbsp freshly squeezed lemon juice
Paprika (optional)
Coriander or parsley leaves (optional)

Rinse the chickpeas in cold water and tip into the food processor. Add the tahini, crushed garlic, salt, lemon juice and seven tablespoons of the reserved liquid from the cans. Turn on the food processor and slowly pour in the oil while it runs.
When the mixture is fully combined and smooth, tip it into a serving dish. Drizzle with some more extra virgin olive oil and decorate with a few whole chickpeas. Sprinkle with paprika and finely chopped coriander or parsley leaves, for colour.

There... no backdoor needed.
Please note this uses grams and may cause confusion for those who use imperial measurements only.

Don't they have one of the perps?

[Anonymous Coward]

A real time brain scan while talking about possible unlock codes might provide the code without breaking Apple's marketing strategy.

Without breaking the constitution, not so mush.

USA is trustworthy ...

[Anonymous Coward]

hahahahaha, you're a funny fucker !!!

since WHEN was the USA considered "trustworthy" by anyone OUTSIDE of the USA ?

I'm over 50, and I can't recall EVER thinking that the USA political, judicial and administrative systems were close to "clean".

And after SOPA, TTIP, TTPA, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya ... (only recent cases) ... I can guarantee that not a ONE of us think the US is "trustworthy".