Domain: aviation-safety.net
Stories and comments across the archive that link to aviation-safety.net.
Comments · 72
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Re:Essentially a human problem
The problems arising from the "doors" solution are "pressurization" and "structural integrity at altitude".
Actually, big planes have plenty of emergency doors, and they very rarely go "pop." According to https://aviation-safety.net/ai... a boeing 747-400 has 10 exits that can be used in emergency, plus a cockpit hatch.
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Re:This is absolute bullshit
Here's another good article on a study of what sort of damage could be caused to commercial aircraft from hitting drones:
https://news.aviation-safety.n...
Notably:
Non-birdstrike certified helicopter windscreens have very limited resilience to the impact of a drone, well below normal cruise speeds.
The non-birdstrike certified helicopter windscreen results can also be applied to general aviation aeroplanes which also do not have a birdstrike certification requirement.
Although the birdstrike certified windscreens tested had greater resistance than non-birdstrike certified, they could still be critically damaged at normal cruise speeds.
Helicopter tail rotors are also very vulnerable to the impact of a drone, with modelling showing blade failures from impacts with the smaller drone components tested.
Airliner windscreens are much more resistant, however, the study showed that there is a risk of critical windscreen damage under certain impact conditions:
It was found that critical damage did not occur at high, but realistic impact speeds, with the 1.2 kg class drone components.
However, critical damage did occur to the airliner windscreens at high, but realistic, impact speeds, with the 4 kg class drone components used in this study.
The construction of the drone plays a significant role in the impact of a collision. Notably, the 400 g class drone components, which included exposed metal motors, caused critical failure of the helicopter windscreens at lower speeds than the 1.2 kg class drone components, which had plastic covering over their motors. This is believed to have absorbed some of the shock of the collision, reducing the impact.
The testing and modelling showed that the drone components used can cause significantly more damage than birds of equivalent masses at speeds lower than required to meet birdstrike certification standards.
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Re:Computer checks pilot
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Re:Massive and stupid
I think your argument is invalidate by the fact that a group of normal people did fight back, even in the exact instance that is being referred to.
This. Before 9/11 - stay in your seat and cooperate. During and after 9/11 - take down the terrorists at any cost. Here's proof:
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Re:It was an app on a WORK-Issued Phone!
List of aircraft accidents caused by pilot suicide. Definitely more than once in all recorded history, unless you are a pedant for it having to be "into a mountain".
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read your NOTAMs, bitches!Aerostats are a real thing. They have the normal aircraft warning lights.
This one time, an unalert pilot managed to hit the lottery and fly into the tether line of an aerostat. Darwin ensued (better formatted for easier reading here). One time. Ever. I'm not too concerned about those odds. Don't drink & fly. Alaska has enough bush pilots go missing already, who's going to notice one more?What do we do now sir?
We die. -
Re:Better ideas anyone?The FAA web site has a really nice page describing the incident. There are some good quality images on that page showing the missing window both from the exterior and interior. Note that there is no fuselage damage in the immediate vicinity of the window. Yes, there is other fuselage damage elsewhere.
Regardless (and to further digress), I hadn't thought about your premise that the passenger may have been struck by a piece of debris. I suppose it'll never be known for sure. Ugh. Makes one want to think twice about sitting in line with a jet's fan blade or a propeller's plane of rotation. I can think of two other incidents where passengers were gruesomely killed by flying engine parts.
One was a Convair incident in Brainerd, Minnesota in January 1983 where a propeller blade separated from the hub and entered the cabin killing one and injuring another.
Another was Delta Air Lines flight 1288 in July 1996. An uncontained failure of the engine killed 2 passengers and injured 5.
And, of course, none of this has anything to do with the original article.
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More info on above
Pictures and official description at
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19869999-1
The explanation given is not exactly correct and likely is the narrative the pilot gave to keep from losing his license/job, or perhaps other consequences given the nature of the regime at the time. The pictures appear to have been taken some time after the accident (rust on panels) and it is likely not the original location. Looks like it was dragged away.
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Re:Forget the ejection seat.
... The Airstair makes the 727 one of the few airliners that it's possible to parachute from without the risk of being hit by the engines, wing or tailplane - a person known as "Mr Cooper" proved this was possible in 1971.
Ly Tong jumped out of an Airbus A310 over Saigon in 1992.
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Re:Well...
According to the accident report, this was for National Geographic's Seconds from Disaster. http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=145323
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Re:Okay, fineThe two types of error aren't equally important. Lumping failure modes together leads to worst case analysis, which is safer than best case analysis. You're worried that people will be overconfident from passing a worst case analysis? As opposed to what? Being reasonably confident from passing a best case analysis instead? (Getting things exactly right isn't realistic, do you think otherwise?). I'd argue that confidence is less important than actual physical measures that are ready when needed.
For the case at hand, limiting population density near the runway will not in any way address the terrorist case. They will go wherever the density is anyway. It would address the case of short landings and failures on takeoff. The question is, just how often do those happen a mile away.
Well, at around 150mph it would take about 25 seconds to reach a mile. If the airplane takes off and has a fatal failure around 12 seconds into the climb, then by symmetry a rough estimate is that the crash will occur a mile from the takeoff point. This page has data on accidents during the initial climb phase. Clearly this is not a negligible probability, even though it is aggregated over many airports.
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Re:Some things have changed. Others have not.
A 747 overshot a runway in 1999 due to hydroplaning. That can be considered a "crash" by some standards, but it wasn't a flight into terrain situation, and nobody was injured. Other airlines have lost planes and had fatalities in similar situations, which is why you could consider it a crash, though in large part it depends on the airport: that was in Bangkok, which has a large overshot area. A more recent incident of losing a plane, for example, was when Air France lost an A340 in 2005 in Toronto, Canada, in a very similar incident, because Toronto has a very short overshot area, followed by a ravine. Nobody was hurt in the Air France incident either, but because the plane fell into the ravine and caught fire, it was lost.
Actually, the only injuries Quantas has had since 1988 were caused by an autopilot failure in October 2008, which caused the plane to suddenly descend twice (losing about 1000 feet altitude total), in which 13 people were injured. The plane was still able to land safely, and had minor damage.
http://aviation-safety.net/database/operator/airline.php?var=4842
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Re:Qantas never crashed... until now.
Not fatalities, true. However, there have been mishaps: http://aviation-safety.net/database/operator/airline.php?var=4842
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Not a problem?
Of course, your cell phone, laptop, whatever aren't interfering with aircraft avionics or comm systems. Or we'd be seeing numerous instances of aircraft dropping out of the sky.
What you don't see is the occasional 'squak' that a GSM phone can generate or the 'tick, tick' noise that WiFi equipment produces on a receiver in the cockpit.
In most cases, the occasional burst of interference is no more than an annoyance to the flight crew. Maybe they'll have to request a transmission be repeated. That's nothing you'd notice, so there's no problem. Right. One of the deadliest aircraft disasters occurred at Tenerife in part due to garbled radio traffic between ATC and a flight crew.
So please, turn your fucking iPhone off. If you can't be without it's continuous companionship, then don't fly. And seek help.
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Re:Only a week
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Re:Only a week
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Re:Only a week
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Re:Only a week
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Re:Aloha airlines flight 243
This is a much better resource:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19880428-0
Note you can search by registration number here:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/registration/I'd suggest doing so before boarding an airline. You can either ask for the number (might get you some looks or an enhanced patdown) or just look out the terminal window.
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Re:Aloha airlines flight 243
This is a much better resource:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19880428-0
Note you can search by registration number here:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/registration/I'd suggest doing so before boarding an airline. You can either ask for the number (might get you some looks or an enhanced patdown) or just look out the terminal window.
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Re:Spoof - who publishes this
Not quite. The Spoof has an article with fake quotes talking about the crocodile attempting to pilot the plane. It was published on October 22nd, 2010.
Other sources include more details, and appear to be legitimate. Some predate the Spoof article.
It's not the incident that The Spoof fictionalized. It's just the details.
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Re:I don't blame them. I ditched the industry too.
Feel free to google the newspaper stories on the pilots.. A real "valley girl" in the right seat... And a moron in the left
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Re:Good luck with that
If the pitot tubes are blocked, the sensor will think that the aircraft is moving at 0 knots and will DIVE IT. Since it still does not know the speed, it will continue to dive it faster and faster until stress ripped the plane apart.
You mean like this? Or like this? This is why partial panel training and a little understanding of basic physics is so critical. Pilots get confused too. The DC-10 in Iowa was controlled by the guy working the throttles. Control input was completely futile. As was an Airbus that was hit by a missile and lost all hydraulics in Iraq. Fly by wire sounds scary, but control system failures are much rarer now. Composites on the other hand...well that's another story.
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Re:Good luck with that
If the pitot tubes are blocked, the sensor will think that the aircraft is moving at 0 knots and will DIVE IT. Since it still does not know the speed, it will continue to dive it faster and faster until stress ripped the plane apart.
You mean like this? Or like this? This is why partial panel training and a little understanding of basic physics is so critical. Pilots get confused too. The DC-10 in Iowa was controlled by the guy working the throttles. Control input was completely futile. As was an Airbus that was hit by a missile and lost all hydraulics in Iraq. Fly by wire sounds scary, but control system failures are much rarer now. Composites on the other hand...well that's another story.
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Re:Nagoya crash
And the First Officer shouldn't have pressed the Take Off/Go-Around button just before landing, and the pilot should have then gone through with the go-around instead of forcing a landing.
The pilot did attempt a go-around, but the computer thought it knew better and ignored him at that point.
Do you even read the sources you are quoting? It clearly says that the autopilot was told to do a go-around, and the pilot still tried to force a landing - which is a clear no-no.
And that's the point: The computer overrode pilot input to the control system because it believed it knew better than the pilot what to do with the plane.
Excuse me? If the autopilot had overridden the pilots actions, it would have done a go-around. Instead the pilot reduced throttle and forced the plane down, overriding the auto and causing a stall.
It's a philosophical choice in system design, and one which (as a Programmer) I would *never* make myself.
But Boeing-fanboism is a philosophical choice you did make.
But it's Airbus's call how they program their flight computers, not mine. There are probably counter examples of where a plane has been saved by ignoring incorrect input from a pilot... But I'm at a loss to think of any.
Bullshit, as has been pointed out a million times by now. You could point to errors made by Airbus, including lacking indicators of what the autopilot was doing - but the crash was not caused by the autopilot overriding the pilot, but instead by the pilot overriding the auto including the final "save everyones ass" Alpha-Floor function. http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940426-0
BTW: Boeing 767 crash at Schiphol : So much for Boeings and TOGAs.
FTA... "The aircraft, a Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800..." Do you even read your sources? They were not executing a TO/GA. In fact, had they executed a TO/GA the plane would probably have saved itself.
This was not a case of the computer overriding pilot inputs... This was a case of the crew not bothering to watch their airspeed. Any aircraft will do stupid things if you let it run on autopilot with faulty sensors and don't bother to pay attention to what it's doing. Only Airbuses (allegedly) will ignore your attempts to correct the plane's mistakes...
Oooh, sorry, I actually typed 767 instead of 737 - that must mean I was wrong. Anyway, this was the case of a Boeing crashing after the pilots had disabled autopilot and had "full control" of the plane - clearly a sign of Boeing's superior quality.
The verdict what actually caused the crash is still out, but it's certainly not as simple as the Boeing fanbois would want it to: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20090225-0
At approximately 900 feet, the flaps were selected to 40 by the crew and the speed continued to decrease. At approximately 770 feet, the crew set the selected airspeed to 144 knots. At that moment the actual airspeed was 144 knots. The autothrottle system should have maintained the speed selected by the crew but, with the thrust levers at idle, speed continued to decay. Because the auto pilot wanted to maintain the glide scope, the automatic flight system, in response, commanded increasing nose up pitch and applied nose up stabiliser trim.
The stick shakers activated at approximately 460 feet, warning the crew that the angle of attack (AOA) was too high. The data of the digital flight data recorder show that the thrust levers were immediately advanced but moved back to idle. When the thrust levers returned to idle, the autothrottle was disengaged. Whether these actions we
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Re:Nagoya crash
And the First Officer shouldn't have pressed the Take Off/Go-Around button just before landing, and the pilot should have then gone through with the go-around instead of forcing a landing.
The pilot did attempt a go-around, but the computer thought it knew better and ignored him at that point.
Do you even read the sources you are quoting? It clearly says that the autopilot was told to do a go-around, and the pilot still tried to force a landing - which is a clear no-no.
And that's the point: The computer overrode pilot input to the control system because it believed it knew better than the pilot what to do with the plane.
Excuse me? If the autopilot had overridden the pilots actions, it would have done a go-around. Instead the pilot reduced throttle and forced the plane down, overriding the auto and causing a stall.
It's a philosophical choice in system design, and one which (as a Programmer) I would *never* make myself.
But Boeing-fanboism is a philosophical choice you did make.
But it's Airbus's call how they program their flight computers, not mine. There are probably counter examples of where a plane has been saved by ignoring incorrect input from a pilot... But I'm at a loss to think of any.
Bullshit, as has been pointed out a million times by now. You could point to errors made by Airbus, including lacking indicators of what the autopilot was doing - but the crash was not caused by the autopilot overriding the pilot, but instead by the pilot overriding the auto including the final "save everyones ass" Alpha-Floor function. http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940426-0
BTW: Boeing 767 crash at Schiphol : So much for Boeings and TOGAs.
FTA... "The aircraft, a Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800..." Do you even read your sources? They were not executing a TO/GA. In fact, had they executed a TO/GA the plane would probably have saved itself.
This was not a case of the computer overriding pilot inputs... This was a case of the crew not bothering to watch their airspeed. Any aircraft will do stupid things if you let it run on autopilot with faulty sensors and don't bother to pay attention to what it's doing. Only Airbuses (allegedly) will ignore your attempts to correct the plane's mistakes...
Oooh, sorry, I actually typed 767 instead of 737 - that must mean I was wrong. Anyway, this was the case of a Boeing crashing after the pilots had disabled autopilot and had "full control" of the plane - clearly a sign of Boeing's superior quality.
The verdict what actually caused the crash is still out, but it's certainly not as simple as the Boeing fanbois would want it to: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20090225-0
At approximately 900 feet, the flaps were selected to 40 by the crew and the speed continued to decrease. At approximately 770 feet, the crew set the selected airspeed to 144 knots. At that moment the actual airspeed was 144 knots. The autothrottle system should have maintained the speed selected by the crew but, with the thrust levers at idle, speed continued to decay. Because the auto pilot wanted to maintain the glide scope, the automatic flight system, in response, commanded increasing nose up pitch and applied nose up stabiliser trim.
The stick shakers activated at approximately 460 feet, warning the crew that the angle of attack (AOA) was too high. The data of the digital flight data recorder show that the thrust levers were immediately advanced but moved back to idle. When the thrust levers returned to idle, the autothrottle was disengaged. Whether these actions we
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Re:Irresponsible headline, summary
That'll be Flight 140 in 1994.
Imagine being the pilot when this happens to you!
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940426-0
For the record, I'm in favour of the computer over the plane driver.
J1M. -
Re:Irresponsible headline, summary
since a human pilot cannot react quickly enough to changing terrain heights
Sytems can be fooled into improper reactions, see infamous A320 crash in Mulhouse-Habsheim.
PROBABLE CAUSES: "The Commission believes that the accident resulted from the combination of the following conditions: 1) very low flyover height, lower than surrounding obstacles; 2) speed very slow and reducing to reach maximum possible angle of attack; 3) engine speed at flight idle; 4) late application of go-around power. This combination led to impact of the aircraft with the trees. The Commission believes that if the descent below 100 feet was not deliberate, it may have resulted from failure to take proper account of the visual and aural information intended to give the height of the aircraft."
Besides, a passenger aircraft is hardly a combat helicopter.
CC. -
Re:Nagoya crash
For anyone interested in details of the crashes:
Nagoya, Japan
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940426-0Mulhouse-Habsheim, France
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19880626-0 -
Re:Nagoya crash
For anyone interested in details of the crashes:
Nagoya, Japan
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940426-0Mulhouse-Habsheim, France
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19880626-0 -
Pan Am Flight 214 lightning / fuel tank explosion
I am reminded of the Pan Am Flight 214 crash of a Boeing 707 in Elkton, MD, in December, 1963.
The CAB found the probable cause as "Lightning-induced ignition of the fuel/air mixture in the no. 1 reserve fuel tank with resultant explosive disintegration of the left outer wing and loss of control."
There was a similar lightning-induced fuel tank explosion of a Iranian 747 near Madrid in
Here is a report on airplane fuel tank explosions.
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Re:Possibly another example?
Well, for what it's worth, this crash is listed here:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19880626-0 -
Re:Bad statistics
The DC-10 (all types) was grounded after having its type certificate suspended by the FAA following the crash of N110AA. Grounding a fleet of aircraft is not unique to the Concorde.
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Re:747s have broken the sound barrier
The China Airlines 747 was severely damaged and nearly had to be scrapped. Not due to supersonic flight loads, but due to damage from the high-G pullout required to recover from the out of control power dive towards the ocean.
Among other things the landing gear locks pulled out of their fuselage mounts and the gear extended partly during the dive pullout, damaging the gear and gear doors.
The pullout encountered 5.1 and 4.8 G peaks, which exceed the normal structural limits, and the aircraft's wings were permanently bent upwards 2-3 inches.
The horizontal tailfins also were partially shredded - see pictures and more incident data at:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19850219-0Also NTSB report available at:
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/ChinaAir/AAR8603.html -
Re:We ran out of frontiers
OK from wikipedia[1] ( don't know how reliable it is ):
The 747-200B (1971):
Empty weight (EW) = 174 tons
Max take off weight (MTOW) = 378 tons.
MTOW - EW = 204 tons
Max fuel = 199 kilolitres
Max range at max take off weight = 12,700km.
cruising = 893 kphComparison with 777-300ER (2004):
Empty weight = 167 tons
MTOW = 351 tons
MTOW - EW = 184 tons
Max fuel = 181 kilolitres
Max range at MTOW = 14,685 km.
cruising = 905 kphYes it's more efficent (15% further on 10% less fuel), but hey that's like 33 years difference... Are we that close to the theoretical max efficiencies already?
As for boring, yes I like uneventful when it comes to flying.
So hopefully the 777 will far surpass the 747's safety record ( 20+ fatal incidents in 40 years out of 1,400+ aircraft sold).
The 777 is doing pretty good so far ( http://aviation-safety.net/database/dblist.php?Type=107 ).
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Re:Moral of the story?
Fly Boeing instead of Airbus.
Absolutely. Airbus has a growing history of computer glitches already. But even the triple 7 has at least one known incident
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Re:Because You're Terrorism's Dream Date?
In a Cessna, I feel perfectly safe. I can just open the window and toss the thing out. One of these things in the cargo hold can lead to things like this. Fire in an airplane is just not cool.
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Here's fact-based coverage; data from Nasa's ASRS
By way of contrast, I thought I would spice things up a bit with a few links to actual data.
Nasa, via a program called the ASRS, maintains a database of all aviation "safety occurrences" since the 40's - this is online and somewhat searchable. Good architecture in action. :)
http://aviation-safety.net/database/
A report about "safety incidents" related to the use of Portable Electronic Devices (PED's) based on their data was released a while ago.
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/report_sets/ped.pdf
This seems to be the result of a search; it includes everything from frightening incidents with malfunctioning instrumentation that have been associated with PEDs, to "1st class passenger won't turn off his cell phone" reports. But in the end it's clear that there are some worrying issues with PED interference - or at least the waters are muddied enough that I wouldn't expect relaxation of PED use restrictions to be entirely safe without costly equipment upgrades and testing.
And why, really, should this money be spent? So your call doesn't have to wait a few hours?
But TFA does make one critical point - if planes are fragile enough for consumer devices to interfere with them, this isn't about passenger convenience - this is a major security problem. Plane electronics do need to be properly shielded, or it's a matter of time before someone begins deliberately attempting to exploit the vulnerability. The debate about whether cell phones should be allowed in flight in general is less interesting to me, personally.
For those curious, there have been some more determined efforts to explore the problem by more professional trade journalists:
http://www.issues.org/19.2/strauss.htm
http://www.popularaviation.com/ListNewsArticleDtl. asp?id=80 -
Re:funny, most inseatphones are not active.
Is it still 1993? Hellooo! It is now 14 years later.
That was the last time that people were injured or killed. Minor incidences that don't result in injury and don't make the papers still abound. To know for sure, I'll have to check air worthiness directives and service bulletins. For something a little more recent, the 777 at least one minor control problem also. They can't wait for "Patch Tuesday". These are new machines. Let's see how they age. If we have a more rapid turnover where we are use these things for only 10 years instead of forty, then great, I can have faith that I'm not riding in a "one-hoss shay". If they try to keep 'em flying for 40-50 years, then I'm keeping my feet on the ground. I have much more faith in old hydraulics than I do in old electronics. We already know what happens when the wiring gets old I feel much safer in a Piper Cub. No wiring at all, and no surly stewardesses and drunken passengers to deal with either. -
Re:funny, most inseatphones are not active.
Is it still 1993? Hellooo! It is now 14 years later.
That was the last time that people were injured or killed. Minor incidences that don't result in injury and don't make the papers still abound. To know for sure, I'll have to check air worthiness directives and service bulletins. For something a little more recent, the 777 at least one minor control problem also. They can't wait for "Patch Tuesday". These are new machines. Let's see how they age. If we have a more rapid turnover where we are use these things for only 10 years instead of forty, then great, I can have faith that I'm not riding in a "one-hoss shay". If they try to keep 'em flying for 40-50 years, then I'm keeping my feet on the ground. I have much more faith in old hydraulics than I do in old electronics. We already know what happens when the wiring gets old I feel much safer in a Piper Cub. No wiring at all, and no surly stewardesses and drunken passengers to deal with either. -
That's an urban legend.
That crash seems to have been the result of several problems including human error, but there was no remote control involved, see:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id= 19880626-0&lang=en
http://www.airdisaster.com/investigations/af296/af 296.shtml -
Re:Let's not get all technical nowActually that video has no relation to remote control flight - it's video from the rather infamous demonstration flight crash of an Air France A320 at Mulhouse-Habsheim in France.
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id
= 19880626-0&lang=enPurely attributable to Pilot error. You may be getting confused with the fact that the A320 is fly-by-wire.
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Thank you Canada!
Thank you Canada for going soft on terror before/after 9/11. Thanks to you, the perpetrators of Air India bombing got away scot-free after a slap on their wrists. Every Canadian should read the cockpit voice recorder transcripts and decide for themselves how proud they are of their country, which is on par with Libiya in protecting terrorists. Thanks for reading.
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Re:The Yukon/Alaska Black Box
Gee. That's the Geilenkirchen NATO airport (ETNG/GKE).
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Re:More noteworthy...
Boeing reports:
Accidents by primary cause
Hull loss accidents - worldwide commercial jet feet (incl. Airbus and others):
56% aircrew
17% aircraft
The following eight examples graphically illustrate this.
a) Boeing 737-2A8 16 AUG 1991 "The accident occurred by reason of a grave error on the part of the Pilot-in-Command .." Fatalities: 69
b) Boeing 737-2A8 26 APR 1993"Pilots' error in initiating late rotation and following wrong rotation technique .." Fatalities: 55
c) Boeing T-43A (737) 03 APR 1996 ".. combined with errors made during the flight made by the aircrew" Fatalities: 35
d) Boeing 737-4Q8 07 APR 1999 "..crew failed to recognize the cause of an erratic airspeed indication" "crew failed to use other cockpit indications for control and recovery of the airplane" Fatalities: 6
e) Boeing 737-204C 31 AUG 1999 ".. crew tried to take-off without selecting the flaps .." Fatalities: 64
f) Boeing 737-2A8 17 JUL 2000 "The cause of the accident was loss of control of the aircraft due Human Error (air crew)"
g) Boeing 737-3Q8 16 JAN 2002 "The flight crew's reported actions to restart the engines and APU however, were contrary to the procedures contained in the Boeing 737 Operations Manual"
h) Boeing 737-2T4 06 MAR 2003 ".. and the Captain, the PNF, taking over control of the airplane before having clearly identified the problem" Fatalities: 102
From http://aviation-safety.net/index.php -
Just look at the statsSee the Aviation Safety Network database to see some hijackings which happened after 9/11.
You sound a bit like you think the world is like a Hollywood movie - where the people flying in the cabin know everything that's going on just like the person sitting in the cinema and seeing both the control tower, the cockpit and the hero hiding on the landing gear.
Terrorist attacks do not play out so dramatically like in the movies, man.
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Re:No, it was an Airbus
The pilot had made a slow pass over the field, and when he tried to pull the plane up, the computer overrode his commands thinking he was trying to land, and that is why they crashed into the forest.
While there some conspiracy theories, as with many catastrophes, the generally accepted story differs very substantially from the above.
The aircraft was flown at maximum angle of attack (AOA) at about 30-35 ft above the runway during an air show, with passengers on board. The pilot disconnected the autothrottle system, as its "alpha-floor" system would have automatically increased the engine thrust, preventing him from slowing the aircraft as much as he wanted. The aircraft eventually ended up at about 30-35 ft above the runway, with the engines at idle, and at the maximum allowable AOA.
The co-pilot noted that the obstacles ahead were higher than the aircraft, alerted the pilot, who pushed the thrust levers (i.e. throttles) ahead, and pulled back on the controls. The flight control system did not allow the pilot to raise the aircraft's nose, as that would have required increasing the angle of attack, and the wing would have stalled. The only way out of the hole he dug was to get more thrust. The faster you go at a given AOA, the more lift the wing produces. The fact that lift is now greater than the weight means the flight path starts to curve upwards, and the nose rises, even at the same AOA. But, it takes about 7 seconds for a modern high-bypass ratio turbofan engine to accelerate from idle to full thrust (the regulations allow 8 seconds), and they hit the trees 5 seconds after he pushed the thrust levers forward.
The flight control system's AOA limiting function prevented a much more serious accident, as if the wing had stalled the aircraft would have went out of control. As it was, it hit the trees in controlled flight, and only three people died.
After that, an emergency pilot override was placed in AirBus jets.
There is no emergency override in the Airbus jets. The pilot can manually turn off enough flight control computers to put the flight controls in Direct Law, where there are no longer any artificial limits on what he can do, but this would not have prevented this accident. He would have crashed much earlier in the sequence if he had tried to do the same thing in Direct Law.
The Boeing 777 can takeoff and land automatically.
The Boeing 777 cannot takeoff automatically. It can land automatically, as can all the other modern large airliners, including Airbus A320, A330 and A340.
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Re:Simple direct solution...
wtf are the pilots going to do when they need to get out during an emergency? Falling out the window really sucks arse, it's a long way down. Oh I suppose we'll just build another external door for the cockpit!
The cockpit already has emergency exits: http://aviation-safety.net/photos/exits/990028-E-
d -2-500.jpgMoron.
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Re:You are correct.
Indeed, the A320 is not so sophisticated that - when a Russian pilot let his 13 year old son 'take the wheel' - it could prevent him flying it into the ground from 25,000 feet.
Actually, the crash you are refering to was an A310, which is not fly-by-wire; crashes of the A320 series can be found here. -
Re:You are correct.
Indeed, the A320 is not so sophisticated that - when a Russian pilot let his 13 year old son 'take the wheel' - it could prevent him flying it into the ground from 25,000 feet.
Actually, the crash you are refering to was an A310, which is not fly-by-wire; crashes of the A320 series can be found here.