Domain: defcon.org
Stories and comments across the archive that link to defcon.org.
Stories · 43
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Police Bodycams Can Be Hacked To Doctor Footage, Install Malware (boingboing.net)
AmiMoJo shares a report from Boing Boing: Josh Mitchell's Defcon presentation analyzes the security of five popular brands of police bodycams (Vievu, Patrol Eyes, Fire Cam, Digital Ally, and CeeSc) and reveals that they are universally terrible. All the devices use predictable network addresses that can be used to remotely sense and identify the cameras when they switch on. None of the devices use code-signing. Some of the devices can form ad-hoc Wi-Fi networks to bridge in other devices, but they don't authenticate these sign-ons, so you can just connect with a laptop and start raiding the network for accessible filesystems and gank or alter videos, or just drop malware on them. -
Researchers Use Machine-Learning Techniques To De-Anonymize Coders (wired.com)
At the DefCon hacking conference on Friday, Rachel Greenstadt, an associate professor of computer science at Drexel University, and Aylin Caliskan, Greenstadt's former PhD student and now an assistant professor at George Washington University, presented a number of studies they've conducted using machine learning techniques to de-anonymize the authors of code samples. "Their work could be useful in a plagiarism dispute, for instance, but it could also have privacy implications, especially for the thousands of developers who contribute open source code to the world," reports Wired. From the report: First, the algorithm they designed identifies all the features found in a selection of code samples. That's a lot of different characteristics. Think of every aspect that exists in natural language: There's the words you choose, which way you put them together, sentence length, and so on. Greenstadt and Caliskan then narrowed the features to only include the ones that actually distinguish developers from each other, trimming the list from hundreds of thousands to around 50 or so. The researchers don't rely on low-level features, like how code was formatted. Instead, they create "abstract syntax trees," which reflect code's underlying structure, rather than its arbitrary components. Their technique is akin to prioritizing someone's sentence structure, instead of whether they indent each line in a paragraph.
The method also requires examples of someone's work to teach an algorithm to know when it spots another one of their code samples. If a random GitHub account pops up and publishes a code fragment, Greenstadt and Caliskan wouldn't necessarily be able to identify the person behind it, because they only have one sample to work with. (They could possibly tell that it was a developer they hadn't seen before.) Greenstadt and Caliskan, however, don't need your life's work to attribute code to you. It only takes a few short samples. -
Crestron Touchscreens Could Spy On Hotel Rooms, Meetings (wired.com)
An anonymous reader quotes a report from Wired: The connected devices you think about the least are sometimes the most insecure. That's the takeaway from new research to be presented at the DefCon hacking conference Friday by Ricky Lawshae, an offensive security researcher at Trend Micro. Lawshae discovered over two dozen vulnerabilities in Crestron devices used by corporations, airports, sports stadiums, and local governments across the country. While Crestron has released a patch to fix the issues, some of the weaknesses allowed for hackers to theoretically turn the Crestron Android touch panels used in offices and hotel rooms into spy devices.
Lawshae quickly noticed that these devices have security authentication protections disabled by default. For the most part, the Crestron devices Lawshae analyzed are designed to be installed and configured by third-party technicians, meaning an IT engineer needs to voluntarily turn on security protections. The people who actually use Crestron's devices after they're installed might not even know such protections exist, let alone how crucial they are. Crestron devices do have special engineering backdoor accounts which are password-protected. But the company ships its devices with the algorithm that is used to generate the passwords in the first place. That information can be used by non-privileged users to reverse engineer the password itself, a vulnerability simultaneously identified by both Lawshae and Jackson Thuraisamy, a vulnerability researcher at Security Compass. There were also over two dozen other vulnerabilities that could be exploited to do things like transform them into listening devices. In addition to being able to remotely record audio via the microphones to a downloadable file, Lawshae was also able to remotely stream video from the webcam and open a browser and display a webpage to an unsuspecting room full of meeting attendees. "Crestron has issued a fix for the vulnerabilities, and firmware updates are now available," reports Wired. -
Amateur Drone Lands On British Air Carrier, Wired Reviews Anti-Drone Technology (bbc.com)
Long-time Slashdot reader mi quotes the BBC: The Ministry of Defence is reviewing security after a tiny drone landed on the deck of Britain's biggest warship. The Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier was docked at Invergordon in the Highlands when an amateur photographer flew the drone close to the giant ship. When the aircraft sensed a high wind risk, it landed itself on the £3bn warship. The pilot told BBC Scotland: "I could have carried two kilos of Semtex and left it on the deck... I would say my mistake should open their eyes to a glaring gap in security."
Meanwhile, tastic007 shares Wired's footage of anti-drone products being tested (like net guns, air-to-air combat counter-drones, and drone net shotgun shells) -- part of the research presented at this year's DEFCON. -
Salesforce Fires Red Team Staffers Who Gave Defcon Talk (zdnet.com)
Josh Schwartz, Salesforce's director of offensive security, and John Cramb, a senior offensive security engineer, have been fired by the company after they gave talk at the Defcon security conference talk in Las Vegas last month, reports ZDNet. Schwartz and Cramb were presenting the details of their tool, called Meatpistol, a "modular malware implant framework (PDF)" similar in intent to the Metasploit toolkit used by many penetration testers. The tool, "pitched as taking 'the boring work' out of pen-testing to make red teams, including at Salesforce, more efficient and effective", was anticipated to be released as open source at the time of the presentation, but Salesforce has held back the code. From the report: [...] The two were fired "as soon as they got off stage" by a senior Salesforce executive, according to one of several people who witnessed the firing and offered their accounts. The unnamed Salesforce executive is said to have sent a text message to the duo half an hour before they were expected on stage to not to give the talk, but the message wasn't seen until after the talk had ended. The talk had been months in the making. Salesforce executives were first made aware of the project in a February meeting, and they had signed off on the project, according to one person with knowledge of the meeting. The tool was expected to be released later as an open-source project, allowing other red teams to use the project in their own companies. But in another text message seen by Schwartz and Cramb an hour before their talk, the same Salesforce executive told the speakers that they should not announce the public release of the code, despite a publicized and widely anticipated release. Later, on stage, Schwartz told attendees that he would fight to get the tool published. -
Samsung Pay Hack Lets Attackers Make Fraudulent Payments (theverge.com)
jmcbain writes: The Verge reports that a security researcher at DefCon outlined a number of attacks targeting Samsung Pay, Samsung's digital payment system that runs on their smartphones. According to the article, the attack "[focuses] on intercepting or fabricating payment tokens -- codes generated by the user's smartphone that stand in for their credit card information. These tokens are sent from the mobile device to the payment terminal during wireless purchases. [They expire 24 hours after being generated and are single-use only.]" In a response, Samsung said that "in certain scenarios an attacker could skim a user's payment token and make a fraudulent purchase with their card," but that "the attacker must be physically close to the target while they are making a legitimate purchase." -
Hotel Experience With Android Lightswitches (dreamwidth.org)
jones_supa writes: The hotel in which Matthew Garrett was staying at, had decided that light switches are unfashionable and replaced them with a series of Android tablets. In his tour to the system, one was quickly met with a glitch message "UK_bathroom isn't responding." Anyway, two of the tablets had convenient-looking ethernet cables plugged into the wall, so MacGyver began hacking. He managed to borrow a couple of USB ethernet adapters, set up a transparent bridge and then stick his laptop between the tablet and the wall. Tcpdump showed traffic, and Wireshark revealed that it was Modbus over TCP. Modbus is a pretty trivial protocol, and does not implement authentication. The Pymodbus tool could be used to control lights, turn the TV on/off, and even close and open the curtains. Then he noticed something. His room number was 714. The IP address he was communicating with was 172.16.207.14. They wouldn't, would they? Indeed, he could access the control systems on every floor and query other rooms to figure out whether the lights were on or not, which strongly implies that he could control them as well. -
DEF CON Advises Feds Not To Attend Conference
tsu doh nimh writes "One of the more time-honored traditions at DEF CON — the massive hacker convention held each year in Las Vegas — is 'Spot-the-Fed,' a playful and mostly harmless contest to out undercover government agents that attend the show each year. But that game might be a bit tougher when the conference rolls around again next month: In an apparent reaction to recent revelations about far-reaching U.S. government surveillance programs, DEF CON organizers are asking feds to just stay away: 'I think it would be best for everyone involved if the feds call a "time-out" and not attend DEF CON this year,' conference organizer Jeff Moss wrote in a short post at Defcon.org. Krebsonsecurity writes that after many years of mutual distrust, the hacker community and the feds buried a lot of their differences in the wake of 911, with the director of NSA even delivering the keynote at last year's conference. But this year? Spot the fed may just turn into hack-the-fed." -
NSA Chief To Address Hackers At DEF CON
wiredmikey writes "Later this week, the NSA's organizational leader and head of the U.S. Cyber Command – General Keith Alexander — will address an audience of hackers at DEF CON. News of General Alexander's talk at Def Con broke on Friday. Up until that point, the 12:00 Track 1 slot was kept secret, leaving attendees to the world's largest hacker conference to speculate. The buzz was that it would be something interesting – if only because this year is Def Con's 20th anniversary. General Alexander will be giving a talk titled 'Shared Values, Shared Responsibility,' which is outlined as a presentation that will focus on the shared core values between the hacker community and the government's cyber community. Namely, the vision of the Internet as a positive force, the fact that information increases value by sharing, the respect and protection of privacy and civil liberties, and the opposition to malicious and criminal behavior." -
Book Review: Securing the Clicks
brothke writes:"The book Digital Assassination: Protecting Your Reputation, Brand, or Business Against Online Attacks says businesses that take days to respond to social media issues are way behind the curve. Social media operates in real-time, and responses need to be almost as quick. In a valuable new book on the topic, Securing the Clicks Network Security in the Age of Social Media, Gary Bahadur, Jason Inasi and Alex de Carvalho provide the reader with a comprehensive overview on how not to be a victim of social media based security problems." Read on for the rest of Ben's review. Securing the Clicks Network Security in the Age of Social Media author Gary Bahadur, Jason Inasi and Alex de Carvalho pages 368 publisher McGraw-Hill Osborne Media rating 9/10 reviewer Ben Rothke ISBN 0071769056 summary Definitive guide around social network security Social media is now mainstream in corporate America, and even though it is hot, the security and privacy issues around it are even hotter. In the past, many firms simply said no to social media at the corporate level. But as Natalie Petouhoff of Weber Shandwick has observed, that will no longer work, as "social media isn't a choice anymore; it's a business transformation tool".
The main security and privacy issue around social media is that users will share huge amounts of highly confidential personal and business information with people they perceive to be legitimate. Besides that, issues such as malware, vulnerabilities (cross site scripting, cross site request forgery, etc.), corporate espionage, phishing, spear phishing and more; are just a few of the many security risks around social media that need to be taken into consideration.
In the book, the authors detail a framework for analyzing the corporate threats that arise from social media. The book uses the H.U.M.O.R methodology (Human resources, Utilization of resources and assets, Monetary considerations, Operations management, Reputation management) a matrix that outlines a systematic approach for developing the necessary security plans, policies and processes to mitigate social media risks.
At 325 pages, the books 5 parts and 18 chapters provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of all of the critical areas around social media secure, that can be used to safeguard its assets and digital rights, in addition to defending their reputation from social network-based attacks. The book covers all of the core topic areas, from assessing social media security, to monitoring in the social media landscape, threat assessments, reputation management: strategy and collaboration and more; the authors provide the reader with an enlightening overview of all of the core areas.
In chapter 1 the authors astutely note that no company today is immune to the many threats posted by a single individual, let alone a socially engaged and networked population. No firm should engage in social media before they fully understand the security and privacy risks that are being introduced. This book not only effectually does that; it also provides an all-inclusive framework around social media security.
As to the notion of the inherent security risks around social media, this was recently proven when Chris Hadnagy (author of Social Engineering: The Art of Human Hacking) and James O'Gorman detailed in their Social Engineering Capture the Flag results from Defcon 19 observed that information leakage via social media is a difficult problem to solve due to how it is used and the frequency it is used in today's society. Having access to social media from computers and cell phones means that people can update their accounts instantaneously, from anywhere. The ease of which an employee can share data can contribute heavily to information leakage.
Chapter 4 on threat assessments provides an exhaustive list of the different types of attackers and threat vectors that need to be considered when using social media. The attacks in the social media space are often different from typical IT attackers. As to threat vectors, there are a number of different vectors, both internal and external that can impact an organization. The chapter lists those vectors and details them.
Chapter 9 – monetary considerations – strategy and collaboration– is a fascinating chapter in that it notes that in many firms, IT security budgets have not yet clearly defined the line item for social media security. In addition, trying to retrofit the IT security budget by assuming that tools already purchased for data loss prevention will also cover social media security concerns will likely be inadequate.
Chapter 11 deals with reputation management – which has the goal to build and protect a positive Internet-based reputation, and not let it get subterfuge via social media. This is a significant issue as the risk to a firm's reputation is significant and growing with the increased use of social networks.
One very helpful feature of the book that effectively brings home the message is numerous real-world case studies in every chapter. One fascinating example in chapter 13 is about the Cooks Source infringement controversy and the nature of how notto respond to a social media issue.
The book also lists numerous amounts of tools. Chapter 13 has a comprehensive list of monitoring tools and the appendix has a list of nearly 100 tools for activity tracking, analytics, geolocation, plagiarism checking and more. These lists are extremely helpful, and the reader can start using many of these tools to get an initial pulse on the level of security around how their firm uses social media.
Chapter 14 provides excellent guidance on how to execute social media security on a limited budget. The authors suggest the use of free or inexpensive software and other resources that can be used to help a company monitor the impact of their social media infrastructure. The chapter also details how social media security can be executed on a bugger budget, via the use of more sophisticated tools that can be used to secure manage the data flows within an organization.
It will not be long until Facebook has its 1 billionth user. Given that a New York court recently referred to a user's reasonable expectation of privacy on sites like Facebook and MySpace as wishful thinking, the importance of Securing the Clicks Network Security in the Age of Social Media can't be overemphasized.
For those firms that are looking to securely use social media, and not get abused by it, this book should be required reading.
Ben Rothke is the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Securing the Clicks Network Security in the Age of Social Media from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page. -
Jailbroken Devices Compromised By Charging Stations
mask.of.sanity writes "Data can be stolen from Windows, Android and Apple devices by unassuming power charging towers. In an attack demonstrated at the Defcon hacking conference, mobile phone charging units were rigged to pull data from phones plugged into them. Researchers found many jailbroken and modified devices activated USB functions when they were plugged in, or simply rebooted." -
Silent, Easily Made Android Rootkit Released At DefCon
An anonymous reader writes with news that security experts from Spider Labs released a kernel level rootkit for Android devices at DefCon on Friday. "As a proof of concept, it is able to send an attacker a reverse TCP over 3G/WIFI shell upon receiving an incoming call from a 'trigger number.' This ultimately results in full root access on the Android device." The rootkit was developed over a period of two weeks, and has been handed out to DefCon attendees on DVD. -
Cell Phone Interception At Def Con
ChrisPaget writes "I'm planning a pretty significant demonstration of GSM insecurity at Defcon next week, where I'll intercept and record cellular calls made by my attendees, live on-stage, no user-input required. As you can imagine, intercepting cellphones is a Very Big Deal in the eyes of the law; this blog post is an attempt to reassure everyone that their privacy is being taken seriously despite the nature of the demo. I'm not just making it up either — the EFF have helped significantly with the details." -
Feds At DefCon Alarmed After RFIDs Scanned
FourthAge writes "Federal agents at the Defcon 17 conference were shocked to discover that they had been caught in the sights of an RFID reader connected to a web camera. The reader sniffed data from RFID-enabled ID cards and other documents carried by attendees in pockets and backpacks. The 'security enhancing' RFID chips are now found in passports, official documents and ID cards. 'For $30 to $50, the common, average person can put [a portable RFID-reading kit] together,' said security expert Brian Marcus, one of the people behind the RFID webcam project. 'This is why we're so adamant about making people aware this is very dangerous.'" -
The Internet's Biggest Security Hole Revealed
At DEFCON, Tony Kapela and Alex Pilosov demonstrated a drastic weakness in the Internet's infrastructure that had long been rumored, but wasn't believed practical. They showed how to hijack BGP (the border gateway protocol) in order to eavesdrop on Net traffic in a way that wouldn't be simple to detect. Quoting: "'It's at least as big an issue as the DNS issue, if not bigger,' said Peiter 'Mudge' Zatko, noted computer security expert and former member of the L0pht hacking group, who testified to Congress in 1998 that he could bring down the internet in 30 minutes using a similar BGP attack, and disclosed privately to government agents how BGP could also be exploited to eavesdrop. 'I went around screaming my head about this about ten or twelve years ago... We described this to intelligence agencies and to the National Security Council, in detail.' The man-in-the-middle attack exploits BGP to fool routers into re-directing data to an eavesdropper's network." Here's the PDF of Kapela and Pilosov's presentation. -
The Low-End Approach To Wireless Hacking
Adrian writes "Zack Anderson, an MIT student, created a solution to wardriving on a budget: warcarting. The Warcart is a shopping cart retrofitted with just about every sort of wireless sniffing device available. It has pivoting antennas and a smoke grenade launcher. It can even dispense infected USB flash drives. It's part of a talk about subway fare-collection-system vulnerabilities that will be given at Defcon 16 in a few days." "Mostly as a joke," says the site — but only mostly. -
VoIP Numbers Stations were Social Experiment
IO ERROR writes "The mysterious phone number stations appearing on Craigslist for the last three months, which resembled their shortwave radio cousins, and which Slashdot reported on in June, were an experiment devised by security researcher Strom Carlson and a group of Los Angeles hackers to determine if encrypted messages could be passed using unwitting third parties to foil traffic analysis by hostile intelligence agencies. Carlson and the hackers presented their findings at DEFCON earlier today and gave away CDs with "Make your own Mein Fraulein station" kits and posted one final number station for people to try to decrypt." -
Defcon 14 Full of Amazing Hardware Hacks
nTrfAce writes "Defcon 14 is taking place right now in Las Vegas. You know it's serious when you see things like an IPV6 enabled refrigerator with an IP address of 1337:sec:badd:a22:DEF:C012::14. And of course using a rocket for war driving, er WarRocketing. And Joe Grand has created the absolutely coolest Defcon badge ever out of a PCB, PIC, and LEDs." -
Defcon 14 Full of Amazing Hardware Hacks
nTrfAce writes "Defcon 14 is taking place right now in Las Vegas. You know it's serious when you see things like an IPV6 enabled refrigerator with an IP address of 1337:sec:badd:a22:DEF:C012::14. And of course using a rocket for war driving, er WarRocketing. And Joe Grand has created the absolutely coolest Defcon badge ever out of a PCB, PIC, and LEDs." -
Defcon 14 Full of Amazing Hardware Hacks
nTrfAce writes "Defcon 14 is taking place right now in Las Vegas. You know it's serious when you see things like an IPV6 enabled refrigerator with an IP address of 1337:sec:badd:a22:DEF:C012::14. And of course using a rocket for war driving, er WarRocketing. And Joe Grand has created the absolutely coolest Defcon badge ever out of a PCB, PIC, and LEDs." -
Defcon 14 Full of Amazing Hardware Hacks
nTrfAce writes "Defcon 14 is taking place right now in Las Vegas. You know it's serious when you see things like an IPV6 enabled refrigerator with an IP address of 1337:sec:badd:a22:DEF:C012::14. And of course using a rocket for war driving, er WarRocketing. And Joe Grand has created the absolutely coolest Defcon badge ever out of a PCB, PIC, and LEDs." -
DEFCON Coverage Round-up at Make
ptorrone writes "If you couldn't get to Vegas this year for the annual DEFCON Conference, we have a special spot on MAKE Magazine with all the project centric activities from DEFCON, enhanced audio, images, posts and more. It was a logistically challenging event to cover, but we hope you enjoy what we were able to capture." -
Stealing the Network: How to Own an Identity
Scott Pinzon writes "Writing sonnets, screenplays, or an epic poem in your third language is a breeze compared to the toughest of art forms, didactic fiction. That might explain why the various chapters of Stealing the Network: How to Own an Identity range from appalling to exciting. Whether you see the glass of STN: Identity as half empty or half full depends on whether this is your cup of poison -- but on a technical level, it rocks." Read on for the rest of Pinzon's review. Stealing the Network: How to Own an Identity author Raven Alder, Jay Beale, Riley "Caezar" Eller, Brian Hatch, Chris Hurley (Roamer), Jeff Moss, Ryan Russell, Tom Parker, Timothy Mullen, Johnny Long pages 336 publisher Syngress rating 6 reviewer Scott Pinzon ISBN 1597490067 summary Fiction that teaches about network security
Slashdotters have a distinguished history of calling b.s. on fiction authors who get technical details wrong. (My recent favorite is Jeffrey Deaver's jargon-in-a-blender paragraphs in The Blue Nowhere, where a computer expert can't break a hacker's defenses because "I can't decrypt his firewall!") But what happens when the problem is reversed? Can authors with awesome technical credentials, but little literary background, teach by using story?
And these authors do have impeccable Internet security cred. Many of them are stars circling the firmament of Black Hat and Defcon; senior penetration testers; former consultants to No Such Agency; authors of popular books on security; and so on.
Thus, STN: Identity describes attacks with accuracy and depth. The light veneer of fiction gives the networking tips real-world context. (On this point, I agree with Blain Hilton, who reviewed the first STN volume for Slashdot.) Sure, you've heard of all kinds of hacker tools, but do you know exactly when an attacker would use, say, Metasploit Framework, and not Knoppix? Chris Hurley's chapter, "Saul on the Run," stands out in this regard, showing how a black hatter uses social engineering and numerous tools to get a valid birth certificate for someone else, and exactly how an attacker can intrude on a secured wireless residential network to explore private information.
Another stand-out chapter is Johnny "Google Hacker" Long's "Death by a Thousand Cuts." This rambling episode follows, in part, a forensic cop's efforts to make a disc image of an iPod found at a crime scene. The trouble is, Apple's drivers spring into action whenever the iPod senses it has connected to a computer. If the driver activity changes anything in the iPod, all evidence on it will be inadmissible in court. In unraveling this challenge, STN became so fascinating, I couldn't put it down. Which made showering awkward.
Brian Hatch's chapter, "Bl@ckTo\/\/3r," stood out to me, also, but for the opposite reason: almost all of it went over my head. I thought I had accepted Unix into my heart, but I'm not disciple enough to keep up with Hatch's treatise on X11. Where I thought Hatch was talking only to himself, I had a more senior network security expert read the chapter, and he considered it well written. YMMV.
Other chapters cover basic crypto and code-breaking; how to forge cards that will fool magnetic stripe readers; the dark side of biometric authentication; uses of a Faraday cage; making a QWERTY keyboard type Dvorak letters, and just lots and lots of good undergroundy badness. The technical lessons hold tightly to the stated theme of identity theft. Any network administrator could learn a lot about the enemy's techniques from this volume; and, because of the story-driven format, probably even remember them.
But I've been dodging my opening question: does the fiction part work? Before I answer, I should mention that I've written a lot of fiction. I've had four books of fiction and 60 short stories published, and studied under the editor who removed 500 pages from Stephen King's The Stand. I'm not saying I'm good at writing fiction; I'm just saying I respect the craft. So, can STNs authors write fiction? No. No, they cannot.
STN: Identity reads like a catalog of beginning-fiction-writer mistakes, from misspellings and homophones (from Chapter 5: "He called me a Windows administrator, and it wasn't a complement") to characters with no feelings or personality. In Chapter 8, where college students decide to 0wn Hushmail's DNS servers for a man-in-the-middle attack, they work 36 hours straight without a smart remark, a crabby comeback, or, really, any dialog except ad hoc lectures on network architecture. Fiction-wise, it's as if Nancy Drew or the Hardy Boys tried hacking. And a couple of the chapters go so far past "wordy" that they're almost the verbal equivalent of running in place. If you're in a hurry to get to the technical meat [Jedi hand wave], these are not the authors you want. With that said, I admit that some of the chapters clamber all the way up to "adequate." But remember, fiction that teaches is hard for anyone to pull off.
Maybe none of that matters. Is anyone looking for deathless prose when picking up a book subtitled "How to Own an Identity"? Nah. What matters is, the various authors lay down some seriously tricky attacks. If you are more geek than lit critic, the coolness factor is off the charts. If you like to spend your time reading and thinking about network security and hacking, this is for you. And if you still buy into the "romance" of hacker shenanigans, STN can be your little Defcon-away-from-Defcon.
So is this wildly uneven book worth the price? For fiction lovers, no. For white hat security aficionados, yes. For black hat security aficionados, buying it will be the last purchase you make on your own credit card -- so hell yes. #
Full disclosure: I am not personal friends with any of the authors, but I've interviewed a few of them, including the book's technical editor, Timothy Mullen, for my day job. I may also suffer from envy that my own attempts to fictionalize network security have been ignored by most of the world except German Tom's Hardware.
Scott Pinzon, CISSP, is Editor-in-Chief for WatchGuard's LiveSecurity Service, and writes about network security on the free RSS news feed WatchGuard Wire. You can purchase Stealing the Network: How to Own an Identity from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page. -
Spysats Keeping Watch on the U.S.
Anonymous And Slightly Nervous Coward writes "USA Today is carrying an AP story that claims three years' worth of domestic satellite surveillance courtesy of a DoD agecy called the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Their work includes getting cooperation from entities pointing cameras onto private property such as hotels (all you HOPE and Defcon attendees, please wave for the camera). The agency seems to be taking the aw-shucks line on what they know and to what extent they evaluate the data they get, but it's clear that their mandate is seriously overpowering the oversight structures that would normally be watching it." -
Defcon 12 Running Man Contest
LiveSecurity writes "Contests involving Wireless Access Points have been a staple of Defcon for a few years now. This year at Defcon 12, three reporters from WatchGuard Technologies followed contestants in the Running Man mini-contest. Five teams had one hour to find a roving, low-power AP serving up a picture of Arnold Schwarzenegger. Add hundreds of hackers, 104-degree F. desert heat, and stir. The report on WatchGuard's Web site is officially sanctioned by the contest's designer, Frank Thornton, who mirrors the story. Long but good geeky fun!" -
Network Attacks Via DNS
Iphtashu Fitz writes "Without DNS the internet wouldn't be all that useful. Despite being a ubiquitous part of the internet it is overlooked by many as a potential security hole. At this weekends Defcon 12 conference in Las Vegas, security researcher Dan Kaminsky warned that DNS can open up seemingly secure networks to attack. Because most firewalls and other security devices treat DNS requests as harmless it provides an excellent conduit for transferring covert data in and out of otherwise protected systems. At Defcon, Kaminsky demonstrated some software that allows a server to act as a communications hub using DNS. This let him transmit instant messages and even audio streams over an encrypted connection carried by spoofed DNS requests.""Because the data looked like typical DNS traffic it wouldn't be detected or logged by firewalls or intrusion detection systems. He also pointed out that monitoring DNS could help in other unrelated ways: because the recent MSBlast worm did lookups on windowsupdate.com infected machines could have been detected by simply monitoring DNS server logs."
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Network Attacks Via DNS
Iphtashu Fitz writes "Without DNS the internet wouldn't be all that useful. Despite being a ubiquitous part of the internet it is overlooked by many as a potential security hole. At this weekends Defcon 12 conference in Las Vegas, security researcher Dan Kaminsky warned that DNS can open up seemingly secure networks to attack. Because most firewalls and other security devices treat DNS requests as harmless it provides an excellent conduit for transferring covert data in and out of otherwise protected systems. At Defcon, Kaminsky demonstrated some software that allows a server to act as a communications hub using DNS. This let him transmit instant messages and even audio streams over an encrypted connection carried by spoofed DNS requests.""Because the data looked like typical DNS traffic it wouldn't be detected or logged by firewalls or intrusion detection systems. He also pointed out that monitoring DNS could help in other unrelated ways: because the recent MSBlast worm did lookups on windowsupdate.com infected machines could have been detected by simply monitoring DNS server logs."
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Combining Port Knocking With OS Fingerprinting
michaelrash writes "Port knocking implementations are on the rise. I have just released fwknop; (the Firewall Knock Operator) at DEF CON 12. Fwknop implements both shared and encrypted knock sequences, but with a twist; it combines knock sequences with passive operating system fingerprints derived from p0f. This makes it possible to allow, say, only Linux systems to connect to your SSH daemon. Fwknop is based entirely around iptables log messages and so does not require a separate packet capture library. Also, at the Black Hat Briefings, David Worth has released a cryptographic port knock implementation based around one-time pads." -
DefCon WiFi Distance Competition Calls For Entrants
ASLRulz writes "The Adversarial Science Laboratory is running the Wi-Fi Shootout this year at DefCon and we are inviting people to come out and try to beat last years record of 35 miles. Register here. Hope to see you there." -
Two Wheeled Wi-Fi Sniffing Robot
paulnuyu writes "ZDNet/MSN has an article about a robot that detects Wi-Fi vulnerabilities and intrusions. The two wheeled robot made by the Shmoo Group cruised around the DefCon convention in Vegas last Sunday, picking up telnet and POP passwords. Though still a prototype, the shipping version is projected to have autonomous steering capabilities." -
DefCon WiFi Shootout Winner Announced
devn2k writes "At the first annual WiFi Shootout at DefCon in Las Vegas, Adversarial Science Lab won the contest to shoot a wireless signal across the Nevada desert, with a distance of 35.2196 miles. The antenna was built from metal poles, window screen mesh, cardboard, duct tape, and aluminum foil! According to the official contest page, the antenna was designed the night before the contest, its component parts were purchased for $98 at Home Depot, and the next day it was built completely from scratch in the desert, on the side of the mountain, in the rain." -
Adobe Still Ignores Elcomsoft-Discovered Holes
evenprime writes "In 2001, Dmitry Sklyarov described vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat and Adobe Acrobat Reader while giving a talk at Defcon 9. As has been previously mentioned, Dmitry was arrested the day after this talk. He and his company Elcomsoft were charged with violating the DMCA. Now Elcomsoft have announced that Adobe, two years later, has still not patched these bugs." -
Fyodor Answers Your Network Security Questions
You asked nmap creator Fyodor many excellent questions, and his answers (below) are just as excellent. You'll want to set aside significant time to read and digest this interview, because Fyodor didn't just toss off a few words, but put some real time and energy into his answers.1) Interesting stories involving nmap?
by NeologicNmap has obviously become a huge success in the *nix world. I would wager that practically all sysadmins and security folk use nmap. With this sort of use by such creative and lazy people, there must have been some interesting stories involving nmap, perhaps unusual uses of it, or funny anecdotes. Are there any you would like to share?
Fyodor
The coolest use ever was undoubtedly when Trinity used it to try and save the human race :). But the use I find most gratifying are the Chinese students and residents who have written me about how they use Nmap to locate open proxies. These proxies allow for surfing the uncensored Internet, including the news, educational, pornographic, religious, open source software, government, political, search engine, and human rights sites that are blocked by the Great Firewall of China.
Many of the best features in Nmap came from the user community in ideas if not implementation. For example, the protocol scan (-sO) determines what IP protocols (TCP, UDP, GRE, etc.) a host is listening for. I had not thought of this, but the idea and patch came out of the blue one day in an email from Gerhard Rieger. On another day, a guy named Saurik sent a patch called Nmap+V that allows Nmap to do basic service/version fingerprinting against open ports. It has attracted a cult following, and I plan to add similar functionality to Nmap this year. The initial Windows port by eEye arrived similarly. Despite all these great suggestions, certain other user-contributed ideas are not on the agenda.
Then there are a small handful of users who detect problems nobody else would ever notice, like 4 byte/host memory leaks. They send me error messages with notes saying the bug happens "about once per 700,000 IPs". I have no idea what these guys are up to, but some have been sending me this kind of mail for years. They can't be spammers, as they are intelligent and also use more sophisticated scan techniques than you would need to just find SMTP servers.
2) Recent increases in anal-retentiveness...?
by ZerielThere's been a marked increase in system administrators thinking that anything even remotely resembling a network scan is eeeeevil (case in point, last year I almost got kicked out of college for scanning port 80 on my dorm subnet looking for interesting websites to read)...
What do you think can be done to make scanning IP addresses/ports have less of a negative stigma? This is in the same sort of category as legit vs. illegit uses of anything else (P2P, whatever)--what's the rationale for punishing something that could maybe lead to criminal activity, and how can we make network scanning tools have practical uses again?
Fyodor
That is an excellent question, and one that concerns me as well. But first, I think your final statement is too extreme. I would guess 90% of network scanning is non-controversial. You will rarely be badgered for scanning your own machine or the networks you administer. The controversy comes when scanning other networks. There are a lot of (good and bad) reasons for doing this sort of network exploration. Perhaps you are scanning the other systems in your {dorm, department, cable LAN, conference LAN} to look for publicly shared files (FTP, SMB, WWW, etc.). Or perhaps your just trying to find the IP of a certain printer. Maybe you scanned your favorite web site to see if they are offering any other services, or because you are curious what OS they run. Perhaps you are just trying to test connectivity, or maybe you wanted to do a quick security sanity-check before handing off your credit card details to that ecommerce company. You might be conducting Internet research, or be bored on a rainy afternoon. Or are you conducting reconnaissance in preparation for a breakin attempt?
The remote administrators rarely know your true intentions, and do sometimes get suspicious. The best approach is to get permission first. I've seen a few people with non-administrative roles land in hot water after deciding to "prove" network insecurity by launching an intrusive scan of the entire company or campus. Admins tend to be more cooperative when asked in advance than when woken up at 3AM by an IDS alarm claiming they are under massive attack.
You compared Nmap to P2P tools in having a "negative stigma". In both cases, one effective way to fight the stigma is to limit your own use to "legitimate" purposes. Use BitTorrent to download RedHat ISOs, but not Matrix Reloaded. Use Nmap to secure and monitor your computers, but not to attack other networks. And if you decide to attack other networks anyway, please be courteous and set the evil bit.
Now I'll admit that I don't always obtain explicit permission before scanning other networks. I don't believe (but IANAL) that a simple port/OS scan of a remote system is or should be illegal. Any machine connected to the Internet will be scanned so often that most admins ignore such "white noise" anyhow. But scan other networks often enough, and someone will eventually complain. So my advice would be:
- Don't do anything controversial from your work or school connections. Even though your intentions may be good, you have too much to lose if someone in power (boss, dean) decides you are a malicious cracker. Do you really want to explain your actions to someone who may not even understand the terms "port scanner" or "packet"? Spend $10 bucks a month for a dialup or shell account. You didn't really violate this rule, as scanning your dorm subnet for just port 80 should not even be remotely controversial!
- Target your scan as tightly as possible. If you are only looking for web servers, specify -p80 rather than scanning all 65,535 TCP ports on each machine. If you are only trying to find available hosts, do an Nmap ping scan. Don't scan a /16 when a /24 will suffice. The random scan mode now takes an argument specifying the number of hosts, rather than running forever. So consider -iR 1000 rather than -iR 10000 if the former is sufficient. Use the default timing (or even "-T Polite") rather than "-T Insane".
- Nmap offers many options for stealthy scans, including source-IP spoofing, decoy scanning, and the more recent Idle Scan technique. But remember there is always a trade-off. You will be harder to detect if you launch scans from an open WAP far from your house, with 17 decoys, while doing followup probes through a chain of 9 open proxies. But if anyone (such as Tsutomu Shimomura) does track you down, they will be mighty suspicious of your intentions.
I occasionally consider adding some sort of "notification packet" prior to a scan that would give hosts the chance to respond and opt-out. This would be like the /robots.txt directives currently used to control polite Web robots. Perhaps the format could even include a text string that IDS systems could log, like: nmap -sS -p- -O -m "Direct questions about this scan to ops at x3512" 192.168.0.0/16 nmap -sS -p- -O -m "mY n4m3 iZ Zer0 |<00L and I'll 0wn j0o%#@" targetcompany.com/24 Of course Nmap would have an option to omit the notification or to send it and ignore any negative responses. Some scanners, such as ISS Internet Scanner already send out NetBIOS popup messages to scanned hosts by default, and other scanners use syslog. I won't be adding any features like this to Nmap unless I see substantial demand and the obvious issues are worked out.
3) OS fingerprinting
by neoThothWhat are the latest advances in fingerprinting networked devices that seem most promising to you? I have started reading papers on HTTP fingerprinting and such and wonder how these will figure into the NMAP architecture. What are the most elusive OS's that aren't on the NMAP OS fingerprint database?
Fyodor
There are a number of OS detection techniques I hope to add this year. One is to guess (or calculate) the initial TTL of response packets, since this varies by OS. Some operating systems also "reflect" your own chosen TTL under various circumstances. Then there are some newer TCP options, such as selective ack that I might test for. Explicit Congestion Notification (RFC 2481/3168) also shows promise. I'll probably add all of these at once later this year, after discussions with the Nmap-dev list. If you wish to participate, you can join that list by sending a blank email to nmap-dev-subscribe@insecure.org. There is also a low volume, moderated list for announcements about Nmap, Insecure.org, and related projects. You can join the 15,000 current members by mailing nmap-hackers-subscribe@insecure.org [archives].
While adding new fingerprinting techniques is fun and exciting, improving the signature database often ads more value. The DB now contains more than 850 signatures, from the Acorn RISC OS and Aironet wireless LAN bridge to the ZoomAir wireless gateway and Zyxel Prestige routers. We're talking gaming consoles, phones, PBX systems, PDAs, webcams, networked power switches, you name it! New fingerprints are submitted daily.
Application level fingerprinting (including HTTP) is coming. I usually regret stating dates, but I hope to develop this functionality within the next 3 months.
4) Stepping into a network security career
by Anonymous CowardI'll be graduating this month with a shiny new BS in Computer Science. I've done plenty of Unix sysadmin work throughout college and even deployed some high-interaction honeynets. I'm very interested in network security and systems programming. Do you have any advice for people in my situation who want to head into a career in network security?
Fyodor
Congratulations on your graduation! Unfortunately (for newcomers), the security field is one that often expects substantial experience and references. This is partly because these jobs require extraordinary trust, and also because of an aversion to mistakes. Everyone makes mistakes, but they can be extraordinarily costly in security and neophytes tend to make more of them. But don't lose hope! Talented security minds are still in very high demand, just be aware that you will have to work even harder to prove yourself.
Here are my suggestions for anyone starting out in network security, whether for fun or profit:
Step 1: Learn everything you can
- You may wish to start with reading a general overview of security, such as Practical Unix and Internet Security 3rd Edition.
- Reading alone won't teach you much. Hands-on experience is critical, so I would set up at least a basic test network. At the very minimum you should have a Unix box or two and a Windows machine (because these are very common in the real world). You can use very cheap machines, or even emulate a large network with virtualization software such as VMWare.
- Next you should learn more about how attacks are performed. Take a look at the excellent and free Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM). This document aims to provide a comprehensive framework for security testing. But it mostly lists tasks to perform, without specifying how to do so. You will gain a lot from this manual if you research the tasks you don't know how to complete, and if you actually try performing the tasks on your test network. If this manual is too curt or hard to follow, you could try a more verbose book on vulnerability assessment, such as Hacking Exposed 4th Edition.
- Now that you understand many of the general security ideas, it is
time to get current. This is one area that has actually become easier
in the last decade. The thinking used to be that vulnerability
information should only be distributed to well-known and trusted
administrators and security researchers through private digests such
as Zardoz. This was a disaster
for many reasons, and the full disclosure movement was born. In the
last couple of years things have started to shift toward more limited
("responsible") disclosure and there is also a disturbing
pay-money-for-early-disclosure trend. But information is still much more
available than it used to be. Most of the news is carried on mailing
lists, and I archive the ones I consider the best at Lists.Insecure.Org. You
must subscribe to Bugtraq, and I would also highly recommend
pen-test, vuln-dev, and security-basics. Read at least the last 6-12
months of archives. Choose other lists that correspond to your
interests. SecurityFocus also
offers a security-jobs list which is an excellent resource for finding
jobs or just understanding what employers desire.
There are two major reasons for reading Bugtraq. One is that you must react quickly to new vulnerabilities by patching your servers, notifying your clients, etc. You can get this by simply scanning the subject lines or advisory summaries for bugs that directly apply to you. But then you will miss out on another crucial purpose of Bugtraq. Actually understanding a vulnerability helps you defend against it, exploit it, and identify/prevent similar bugs in the future. When you are lucky, the advisory itself will provide full details on the bug. Check out this excellent recent advisory by Core Security Technologies. Note how they describe exactly how the Snort TCP Stream Reassembly vulnerability works in detail and even include a proof-of-concept demonstration. Unfortunately, not all advisories are so forthcoming. For bugs in Open Source software, you can understand the problem by reading the diff. The next step is to actually write and test an exploit. I would recommend writing at least one for each general class of bug (buffer overflow, format string, SQL injection, etc.) or whenever a bug is particularly interesting.
Be sure to read the latest issues of Phrack and the research papers posted to the mailing lists. Send your comments and questions to the authors and you may start interesting discussions. Read well-regarded books on the security topics that interest you most.
I can't emphasize enough that you should intersperse hands-on work with all of this reading. Install unpatched RedHat 8 (or whatever) and run Nmap and Nessus against it. Then compromise it remotely, maybe via the latest Samba hole. Start out with a prewritten exploit from Bugtraq, which isn't quite as easy as it sounds. You may have to modify the 'sploit to compile, brute force the proper offset, etc. Then break in again using a different technique, and your own exploit. Install Ethereal and/or tcpdump and ensure you understand the traffic on your network during both your exploitation and normal network activity. Install Snort on an Internet-facing machine and watch the attacks and probes you'll experience. Wander around your neighborhood with Kismet, Netstumbler, or Wellenreiter on your Laptop or PDA to look for open WAPs. Install DSniff and execute an active MITM attack on an SSH or SSL connection between two of your computers. Take a look at my Top 75 Tools List and ensure you understand what each does and when it would be useful. Try out as many as you can.
- Take a vacation, or at least a weekend camping! You deserve it! The steps above would probably take at least 3-12 months full-time, depending on your motivation level and the depth and breadth of your research.
Now you have learned enough to be dangerous. At this point, you would have little trouble obtaining most certifications, after studying the specifics of each topic. If your main goal is to find a job quickly, perhaps adding these extra feathers to your cap might be worthwhile. But I think your best bet is to prove your knowledge by joining and contributing to the security community. While this does indeed help others, it isn't an entirely selfless act. It improves your skills, leads to important contacts, and demonstrates your knowledge and ability in a constructive way. The latter is important if securing a career is one of your goals. These steps should also be fun! If not, perhaps you should keep looking at other fields. Here are some ideas:
Start participating with insightful comment and answers on the mailing lists. This is very easy and serves as a great learning experience, way to meet people, and garners some name recognition. If a security manager with a stack of 60 resumes recognizes your name, that is a huge win!
When a new worm or a big new vulnerability comes out, everyone wants to know the details. If you stay up all night disassembling the worm/patch and write the first comprehensive analysis, many folks will find that valuable. And you will learn a lot. Let your first priority be quality - if someone beats you to it, just compare your results with theirs to see if you (or they) missed (or misinterpreted) anything. You can also post your own exploits, although that is more of a political hot potato.
Attending security conferences is a great way to learn, party with fellow hackers, and network (in every sense of the word). Much better is to speak at these conferences. This field changes rapidly so there are always new topics and technologies to discuss. You don't have to be a well-known expert with a long history - just learn your topic well and put in the effort for a quality presentation. You could present at Defcon, at one of the more commercial events, or at a smaller regional con like ToorCon, CodeCon, Hivercon, etc. Among other advantages (often free admission/travel/hotel), this is a great way to meet people with similar interests. I spoke at the latest CanSecWest and have submitted a proposal for the next Defcon.
Now that you've seen and understand a wide variety of software vulnerabilities from your Bugtraq research, start finding your own. You can start by downloading any PHP app from Sourceforge. Most of those are hopelessly vulnerable to Cross-Site-Scripting, SQL injection, and/or remote code execution by "remote include" directives. Many (if not most) Windows shareware daemons are also vulnerable to simple buffer overflows and format-string bugs. Notify the authors and then write an advisory. After a few of these "easy targets", try breaking some more widely deployed programs.
Write a security tool! I could list some suggestions, but by this point you will have many of your own ideas as to what is needed. Scratch an itch.
I hope this helps. If you want more suggestions, Ask Slashdot. From that story, I found this post particularly insightful, especially the emphasis on "people skills". I don't claim to have any, but understand the value :).
5) Have you ever been tempted to use your gifts...
by Tim_F...in a negative manner?
Have you ever hacked into someone else's computer? Have you ever considered it? What would cause you to think of doing this? Would your tools (nmap, etc.) be enough to allow you to do this?
And if you haven't, why is that the case?
Fyodor
I never do script-kiddie style "hack any random vulnerable box on the Internet" cracking. But sometimes I will launch targeted attacks at specific companies. I'll usually start with just a web browser and various search engines to learn everything I can about my target. I need to understand what the company does, who it partners with, and whether it has any corporate siblings, subsidiaries, or parents. Beyond that, posts by individual employees can be a gold mine. Besides providing names and titles for social engineering and brute force password attacks, the IPs in the mail/news routing headers can be very valuable. One of the reasons I run my own mailing list archive is to maintain access to the raw mail folders which contain the routing info and X-no-archive posts that web archives strip out. Another advantage to locating employees is that you can send them trojan executable attachments, which can be a very effective way into the network.
Next I'll gather known IP network information on the companies via DNS, whois, regional registries like ARIN, routing info, Netcraft, etc. Then comes the scanning (I tend to use Nmap), application-probing, vulnerability discovery, and exploitation stages.
Of course, I only do this when the company is paying me to do so. Performing these pen-tests offers several advantages over blackhat activity:
- You don't go to jail (If you've worded your contract carefully.)
- Instead of having to keep your übertechniques secret to avoid prosecution, you get to demonstrate them to management.
- They actually pay you for this! And you are helping to protect them and the privacy of their customers.
Now some people might ask how you gain these skills without practicing on other networks first. Cheap hardware and the evolution of free UNIX operating systems have made this much easier than in the past. See the previous answer for some suggestions. And remember that you can always work together with friends, or participate in hacking contests like Defcon's Capture the Flag.
6) You'll have seen a lot of breakins.
by HulverDuring your time running Honeypots, you'll have seen a lot of compromised systems. Is there any incident that's really stuck in your mind because of the audacity of the attempt, or the stupidity of the person attempting the breakin.
Fyodor
On the humorous front, one attacker was was running a public webcam during his exploits, so we were able to watch him crack into our boxes in real time :). I will resist the urge to link a screenshot. His rough location was determined when we noticed Mrs. Doubtfire playing on his TV and correlated that with public schedule listings. He was working with a Pakistani group, but was actually on the US East Coast.
In the "disturbing audacity" front, this year we found that a group of crackers had broken into an ecommerce site and actually programmed an automated billing-sytem-to-IRC gateway. They could obtain or validate credit card numbers by simply querying the channel bot! Expect a more detailed writeup soon.
7) What makes a honey net enticing?
by corniceIt seems that many of the honey nets that the average hobbyist would run are built to attract a lesser cracker. What I mean is that ports are left open that normally would not be left open. Services are running that normally should not, etc. I think that a really smart fish would see this as nothing but a cheap lure and refuse the bait. Do you think it's possible to fool the really smart fish? Is is possible to bait with something enticing enough without tipping off the big fish? Does publication of your work make this task more difficult?
Fyodor
Excellent question, and I had many of the same concerns upon joining the project. Then I remembered that most of the attacks and real-world compromises are committed by these marginally skilled script kiddies. So there is still a lot of value in understanding their tools, tactics, and motives. Despite this apparent limitation, I have been surprised by some of the sophisticated things we have found. For example, the first known "in the wild" attack using the Solaris dtspcd vulnerability was caught by one of our honeynets and resulted in this CERT advisory. Then one of our Honeynet Alliance members had their Win2K honeypot compromised and joined into a botnet with 18,000 machines! Attackers on such a grand scale won't even know all of the companies they have compromised, much less whether any of the systems are honeynets.
I do believe baiting the "smart fish" might be possible, but I have never done this. Is not legally entrapment, as we aren't any sort of police force, but I am not very comfortable with the idea. If someone attacks my box that is just unobtrusively sitting on the network, I believe the attacker should have no expectation of privacy for his activities on the system. Things become more complex if I try to lure the attacker.
8) IPv6
by calumlDo you think that with the very large address space of IPv6 that random scanning for a certain port will die off? (I notice nmap doesn't support random IPv6 address scanning - maybe you've already come to the same conclusion?) Simply put, the chances of finding a machine if it's not advertised anywhere will be very much reduced. Will this make people lazy and complacent, trusting on the large numbers involved to protect them?
Fyodor
Finding a machine by by pinging a completely random 128-bit address will probably never be effective. Fortunately, we won't have to! Nmap does not even do that for 32-bit IPv4 addresses - it is smart enough to skip huge blocks of address space that are unallocated or used for private (RFC1918, localhost) addresses. We will also see patterns emerge for IPv6. For example, they may often be allocated sequentially so that finding one leads to many others. I am waiting until adoption rises and we start seeing these patterns emerge before I can implement them appropriately in Nmap. Certain new DNS features may also prove useful for locating IPv6 machines and networks.
9) standalones and small home nets
by zoggerit seems like most of the emphasis is on enterprise networks, but that still leaves millions and millions of home machines and small home networks just stuck. What do you see as some of the trends and solutions for those people? Their data and system integrity is just as important to them as any corporations is, and usually not having the appropriate skill set, is even harder to implement.
Fyodor
I am afraid the focus by security companies on enterprise networks will continue, as that is where the money is. The good news is that securing small home networks is far easier. But that doesn't make it simple, nor mean that many people will bother. I would categorize the risks into 3 categories:
Traditional network server vulnerabilities: Your average home user doesn't need to run any network daemons or have any TCP/UDP ports open to the Internet. Most of the time they only have 1 IP, used either by a standalone PC or a NAT device (e.g. "broadband router") in front of their small network. This is a good configuration, as it limits what attackers can reach directly. But you need to be sure that the IP doesn't have any unnecessary ports open. You can verify this by running 'netstat' on the Windows or UNIX machine using the IP. I would also recommend confirming using a port scanner such as Nmap. Here are example commands:
nmap -p- -sS -T4 -v -O [your IP] nmap -p- -sU -v [ your IP ]
The TCP and UDP scans could be combined into one execution, but are listed separately since the TCP scan may go much faster. Remote UDP scans are also less reliable against some heavily filtered hosts. You may have to rely on the netstat info or configuration details in this case.Any open ports found should be evaluated with extreme prejudice. Unless clearly necessary, close Windows file sharing, external NAT device admin ports, and everything else found.
Don't forget the wireless backdoor! Blocking the Internet link from your private machines is insufficient if anyone can hop on your open WLAN and attack your machines. WEP isn't perfect, but the 104-bit (so-called 128-bit) version should at least keep people from accidentally connecting to your network or sniffing your data. Be sure to set a good password and upgrade to recent firmware for your WAP and other network devices.
Subscribe to the security advisory lists for all the operating systems (and devices, if available) you run. Major vendors such as RedHat, Debian, FreeBSD, Mandrake, and Microsoft all offer these. Most even offer automatic updates if you desire that.
Client vulnerabilities: Once you close the services you don't need (ideally all of them), client vulnerabilities must be addressed. Keeping your web browser and mail reader up-to-date is particularly crucial. Also harden them as much as possible. For example, IE is full of holes but at least has a good interface for site-by-site security policies (Tools -> Internet Options -> Security). Go through and neuter the "Internet zone" settings by disabling ActiveX and Java. In the rare case that sites need this, find an alternative site or add them to the trusted zone. If your are really serious about security, neuter "trusted sites" and "local intranet" privileges as well. Many recent IE vulnerabilities trick the browser into using the wrong zones. Consider using a different browser. Also configure your mailer to disregard HTML and JavaScript.
Remember to pay careful attention to security warnings, whether they come from IE, Mozilla, your ssh client, or anything else. Don't just click OK. And don't shoot yourself in the foot when configuring your apps. It is hard to entirely blame the vendor when users tell P2P apps or Windows filesharing to share their whole drive without any password. Failing to change default passwords or enable basic restrictions on X Window or FTP servers is only slightly more forgivable. All of these errors happen frequently! The apps/devices should be secure by default, but you have the ultimate responsibility for protecting your data.
Malware: This is what I consider the biggest problem on desktops: people running applications they can't trust. Email borne viruses, worms and trojans are an obvious example. Be very careful what you click on. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to know what to trust. Mail is trivial to forge, and even the "proper" installers for many P2P applications infest your computer with loads of invasive spyware. Even Intuit TurboTax was caught writing to customers' boot information track.
What can you do? My honest suggestion is to run peer-reviewed open source applications on a free OS such as Linux or FreeBSD. You still have to be careful, but these problems are far less prevalent on UNIX platforms, which also have better tools and procedures to deal with them.
What if dumping Windows is not an option? Run NT/2K/XP instead of Win9X/ME, and try to run everything you can as an unprivileged (non-administrator) user. Be extraordinarily careful about what you install and run, and make frequent backups. You might also want to look into a personal firewall such as Zone Alarm (limited free version.
10) What is your favourite tool?
by NoryungiI have just read your top 75 security tools list. Thank you for posting all this information, which I am going to study very carefully.
One question though: in all these tools, which one is your personal favourite? (This excludes Nmap, of course).
Fyodor
I have far too many favorites among this great group to choose just one! But here are a few developers and tools that are particularly worthy of mention:
One of the people I most admire in the security field is Solar Designer. He is a guru in networking, security, and low level kernel/assembly/architecture details. He has also created many tools that security professionals use daily. Yet he never exhibits the arrogance, elitism, and egotism that sadly characterizes so many "stars" of the security community.
Among SD's tools is John the Ripper, my longtime favorite local password hash cracker. It has been around forever, but was written with a flexible and powerful interface while keeping extensibility in mind. So it is still as useful in these days of shadowed password files and MD5/Blowfish hashes as it was back in the days of crypt() and unprotected /etc/passwd. Lately SD has been working on the Owl secure GNU/Linux distribution, which can be installed on disk for hardened systems like firewalls, or booted and run from CD as an easy way to run security tools such as John and Nmap.
Another of those "brilliant yet still nice" security developers is Dug Song. Even after the seminal "Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service" paper by Ptacek and Newsham, many IDS vendors continued to ignore the problem. When Doug released Fragrouter (now fragroute), which implements some of these attacks, vendors finally took notice! He has also written the excellent libdnet library, but my favorite of his tools is DSniff, a suite of tools for advanced network sniffing and "monkey-in-the-middle" attacks. It even handles ARP poisoning and other techniques for sniffing hosts on a switched LAN.
While I'm on this topic, let me also give "mad props" to the Hping2 packet prober, Kismet wireless stumbler, Ethereal packet decoder, Netcat, recent THC releases, Snort IDS, the Nessus vulnerability scanner, and all the other great Open Source tools out there!
I would also like to thank Slashdot for granting me this interview and to everyone who asked such excellent questions. I only wish I had time to answer more of them. Then again, I have probably rambled on enough. Now it is your turn to ramble in the comments :).
Cheers,
Fyodor -
Worldwide WarDrive Aftermath
wardriver writes "The event took place on August 31st 2002, people from around the world took part in the effort to document and make known wireless access points as a group. Some people go WarDriving everyday, so this was just like an normal day for many who attended any of the world wide events as documented on the results page. Hardware ranged from laptops, to car mounted computer systems, to handhelds all equipped with GPS devices to accurately map the spots. Cars were marked with )(WarDriver stickers and people were sporting their wardriving is not a crime t-shirts. All in all the event went well and with enough pressure and requests to chris it may happen again." And in a related story, Dr_Marvin_Monroe writes "Wardrivers be warned---- A Practical Approach to Identifying and Tracking Unauthorized 802.11 Cards and Access Points includes information on locating rogue access points and intruders." -
Defcon X - Live in Las Vegas
Navisto writes: "DEFCON X gathering has begun in Las Vegas already as everyone begins to prepare for the start of Friday's event at the Alexis Park. The hacking convention is in its' 10th year and this is said to be the largest yet. This year there are dozens of speeches happening ranging from wireless, .Net security all the way to Mac OS X AppleScript security issues and hacks. Gathering in Las Vegas brings all the hackers together. This year the official events of Defcon include DC Shoot, Capture the Flag,Hacker Jeopardy, Scavenger Hunt, and this year's first WarDriving Contest. When Live Streams are activated the information will be posted on defcon.org and on the Defcon Forums... PS - E-Mail the Alexis Park letting them know their site isn't cross-browser compatible. Not everyone uses IE and NS ;)" -
Defcon X - Live in Las Vegas
Navisto writes: "DEFCON X gathering has begun in Las Vegas already as everyone begins to prepare for the start of Friday's event at the Alexis Park. The hacking convention is in its' 10th year and this is said to be the largest yet. This year there are dozens of speeches happening ranging from wireless, .Net security all the way to Mac OS X AppleScript security issues and hacks. Gathering in Las Vegas brings all the hackers together. This year the official events of Defcon include DC Shoot, Capture the Flag,Hacker Jeopardy, Scavenger Hunt, and this year's first WarDriving Contest. When Live Streams are activated the information will be posted on defcon.org and on the Defcon Forums... PS - E-Mail the Alexis Park letting them know their site isn't cross-browser compatible. Not everyone uses IE and NS ;)" -
Defcon X - Live in Las Vegas
Navisto writes: "DEFCON X gathering has begun in Las Vegas already as everyone begins to prepare for the start of Friday's event at the Alexis Park. The hacking convention is in its' 10th year and this is said to be the largest yet. This year there are dozens of speeches happening ranging from wireless, .Net security all the way to Mac OS X AppleScript security issues and hacks. Gathering in Las Vegas brings all the hackers together. This year the official events of Defcon include DC Shoot, Capture the Flag,Hacker Jeopardy, Scavenger Hunt, and this year's first WarDriving Contest. When Live Streams are activated the information will be posted on defcon.org and on the Defcon Forums... PS - E-Mail the Alexis Park letting them know their site isn't cross-browser compatible. Not everyone uses IE and NS ;)" -
Defcon X - Live in Las Vegas
Navisto writes: "DEFCON X gathering has begun in Las Vegas already as everyone begins to prepare for the start of Friday's event at the Alexis Park. The hacking convention is in its' 10th year and this is said to be the largest yet. This year there are dozens of speeches happening ranging from wireless, .Net security all the way to Mac OS X AppleScript security issues and hacks. Gathering in Las Vegas brings all the hackers together. This year the official events of Defcon include DC Shoot, Capture the Flag,Hacker Jeopardy, Scavenger Hunt, and this year's first WarDriving Contest. When Live Streams are activated the information will be posted on defcon.org and on the Defcon Forums... PS - E-Mail the Alexis Park letting them know their site isn't cross-browser compatible. Not everyone uses IE and NS ;)" -
DEF CON "Capture the Capture The Flag" Data
pablos writes "Each year DEF CON hosts the famed Capture The Flag contest. Hackers from all over the world duke it out on the network for 72 hours, hacking for the title. The Shmoo Group diligently logs every packet for posterity, we "Capture the Capture The Flag." Now is your chance to download by far the most interesting, 'sploit ridden, 5.8GB of intrusion collusion ever published. Free for the bandwidth endowed, this is the ultimate IDS testbed." -
Capture The Capture The Flag
bgp4 writes: "During DefCon 8, the Shmoo Group sniffed all the Capture the Flag network traffic. For those that don't know, Capture the Flag is weekend long hacking contest held at DefCon each year. The network dumps have now been posted and are available here. Hopefully by making this data available to the public, software developers will become more aware of how vulnerable their software really is and fix the root of the problem. Better intrusion detection isn't the answer ... Secure software is. We're looking for mirrors, so if you'd like to host the data, please let me know." -
Super Shielded PC Cases
mvw sent us an amusing link for the super paranoid. These cases claim to be all shielded, all filtered, and emit none of the stuff those snoopers like to listen to. Plus it looks like it could be dropped from a low flying jet and keep ticking. -
DEF CON 7.0 Begins, and NYT Coverage
Slaab writes "The New York Times covers the upcoming DEF CON 7.0 hackers' conference in Las Vegas here. Notice, they are careful to make the correct distinction between "hackers" and "crackers". " If someone had told me two years ago that the NYT would be covering defcon seven, I would have laughed till I cried. It's a different world. The convention starts this evening. -
DefCon 6.0
The Lockster writes "Reminder - DEFCON 6.0 is coming up in a week! Now the largest hacker convention in the states, we're expecting 2,000 people this year. It's being held at the Plaza Hotel in old downtown Las Vegas. Dates: 7/31-8/1 (Fri-Sun) URL: link info/questions: dtangent@defcon.org ". Hmm, I wonder if DefCon has been a victim of its own success, or if those 2,000 people really know what they're talking about. It also looks like some the CPIO people will be there, as well as well as Ian Goldberg and Winn Schwartau. Not to mention the now-infamous Hacker Jeopardy.