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You can't waive a constitutional right.

Unfortunately, you're wrong. People waive their rights all the time. You have a right not to be searched without probable cause, but when the police ask "do you mind if I search your car?" and you say "Sure," you just waived your Fourth Amendment rights until you invoke them again.

Among other rights you can waive are your speedy trial rights, your right to remain silent, and your right to an attorney (although this last one is hard to waive.

There is an entire body of cases that discuss when a waiver is "knowing and intelligent" and therefore valid. For example, see, North Carolina v. Butler (implied waiver of Miranda rights upheld), and Edwards v. Arizona (initial waiver valid, but once defendant invoked his right to counsel, police could not question further).

What is most dismaying about these formalistic discussions of Guantanamo's legal status is not simply that they disregard the practical reality of U.S. control over the territory. They also, quite mistakenly, ignore the U.S. government's deliberate decision to place the detainees there.

This much should be clear. The detainees did not accidentally fall outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts because they ended up on Guantanamo. Rather, they were brought to Guantanamo for the very purpose of being kept beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.

FINDLAW

what a great free country you live in, i can see China has much to learn, or is that the other way round ? i forget with all the similarities between those nations

The current Supreme Court might well decide Gravel differently.

Has this ever come up before in an intellectual property context? And has it come up recently, since the expansion in intellectual property rights in the last decade?

. . . be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session . . . and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House . . . .

For example, in Hutchinson v. Proximire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), a congressman issued a press release awarding the "Golden Fleece" Award, given to projects exemplifying government waste. One of the recipients did not take kindly to receiving the award and sued the Senator for defamation. The Supremes held that the speech and debate clause offered no protection. The Senator would have been protected if he had read the award at a committee meeting or on the floor of the Senate, but the press release was not privileged.

So, why isn't Kucinch being sued? My guess - the last thing Diebold needs is more bad publicity.

However, posting excerpts therefrom should count as news reporting, giving it a boost under the fair use criteria (17 USC 107).

No, you are incorrect. The decision in Feist says facts are not copyrightable (see the decision in section II A says "This case concerns the interaction of two well-established propositions. The first is that facts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts generally are."). This would mean we're not dealing with fair use, we're dealing with something outside of the US copyright regime. As Lawrence Lessig made quite clear in his "Free Culture" speech in 2002:

Talking about fair use, this is not fair use; this is unregulated use. To read is not a fair use; it's an unregulated use. To give it to someone is not a fair use; it's unregulated. To sell it, to sleep on top of it, to do any of these things with this text is unregulated. Now, in the center of this unregulated use, there is a small bit of stuff regulated by the copyright law; for example, publishing the book--that's regulated. And then within this small range of things regulated by copyright law, there's this tiny band before the Internet of stuff we call fair use: Uses that otherwise would be regulated but that the law says you can engage in without the permission of anybody else. For example, quoting a text in another text--that's a copy, but it's a still fair use. That means the world was divided into three camps, not two: Unregulated uses, regulated uses that were fair use, and the quintessential copyright world. Three categories.

So if citing facts were fair use that would mean ordinarily citing facts is regulated activity but you're allowed to do it in certain circumstances. But since we're dealing with activity not regulated by copyright law, this means fair use is not the key to understanding why we can cite the price of Best Buy's goods any time we want without first getting permission from Best Buy. This is also a very potent rationale for FatWallet against Best Buy.

How are "consumers" defined? Members of the general public who pay money to receive these services?

That's the question. Answers vary. For example:

any persons who use goods and services....
-- www.consumerdirection.org/glos.htm

people whose wants are satisfied by using goods and services
-- www.mrc.twsu.edu/economics/passwordlessons/Lesson0 1/lesson1printgloss.htm

individuals, households, organisations, institutions, resellers and governments that purchase the products offered by other organisations.
-- wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/213/218150/glos sary.html

Those people in a market who want to exchange money for goods or services.
-- highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0072345772/student_ view0/chapter_2/key_terms.html

So, far, this is fairly ambigious. Since this will soon be under the nose of an appeal court, lets have a look at a legal dictionary's definition:

one that utilizes economic goods [if you don't pay for them are they still economic?];

specif: an individual who purchases goods for personal use as distinguished from commercial use

So, apparently, not only are email users required to pay to be covered by the lay, but they can't be organizations or business users, either.

Why do I think that isn't what congress intended?

But, as I've said before, we should fix this. Required IDs to vote, period.

Ever heard of Della Crose ??

To the extent a provision in an employment agreement purports to require an employee to assign an invention otherwise excluded from being required to be assigned under subdivision (a), the provision is against the public policy of this state and is unenforceable.

In a civil suit in the United States, when facts are at issue and more than twenty dollars are at stake, it would appear that either side has the Seventh Amendment right to demand a more expensive jury trial. However, judges do hand down summary judgments when no material facts are at issue.

Many people seem confused about the process right now. I suggest A Litigation Crash Course. Note that the SCO trial is in phase 2 presently. And here is more detailed information about depositions.

The key here is that this is a "discovery deposition" - not trial testimony. Discovery depositions do not involve judges. They can happen anywhere - living rooms, kitchens, in a field. Usually though, they happen at the office of the lawyer who called for the deposition.

In answer to your question, the subpoenas are signed by the lawyer calling for the dep - not by a judge. The only way a judge would be involved in any issues regarding the deposition, is if the people being deposed ask the judge for a protective order prior to the dep. Given Linus' central role in Linux, it's not likely a protective order would be granted. The only other potential, would involve the questions actually asked - if they are abusive and Linus' lawyer says "don't answer", they may be able to get a judge on a conference call to make a ruling, or more likely, after the dep, SCO would go to court and file a motion to compell. If granted, the deposition would be reconvened and the question asked. During the actual deposition testimony however, the judge is definitely not present.

For the most part, the subpoenas above are not discovery subpoenas. The contents of a subpoena is usually very short: "show up at X address at Y Date and time." Basically, everything else on the page is boilerplate even if it does sound ominous (e.g., You are hereby comanded to appear at ... Fail not herin at your peril). The place of the dep is usually at the office of the lawyer calling the deposition. The subpoena (when issued by a lawyer) is not signed by a judge - it is sufficient for the lawyer to sign. The only time a subpoena is going to have additional information, is when it demands that certain documentary or physical evidence be on hand for the deposition. In that case, the "stuff" is identified in the subpoena.

Many people seem confused about the process right now. Particularly the AC below who wonders if these are for a trial date way in the future. I suggest A Litigation Crash Course. Note that the SCO trial is in phase 2 presently. And here is more detailed information about depositions.

*Some* wealth is genuinely created, but most people get rich by shuffling existing wealth around, funneling it away from other people. IOW, in order to get rich in a capitalistic society, it is necessary to make other people poorer. This is done in a number of ways: Paying people less than their labor is worth; making them buy things that they don't need; making them pay unfair prices for things that they do need; usury; etc. And, of course, there's good old-fashioned crime.

It isn't "jealousy," it's vengefulness.

That's very interesting. I didn't know about the different TV rules in the UK. I think in many ways it might be preferable to have stricter rules; I often find myself quite annoyed with the lies on TV and radio here. However, I have no doubt that any attempts to require facts in advertising would be quickly struck down in the USA, unfortunately.

that allowing or condoning prison-rape only reinforces the might-makes-right, sociopathic behavior of violent criminals. Essentially, the bigger, stronger, more antisocial and more violent a criminal is in prison, the more status that person has in the strata of prison life. Quite a lesson for those who will be released from maximum-security prisons, as most inmates eventually will be, maybe into your neighborhood.

I've seen studies in some prisons that show that increased monitoring and enforcement of pro-social behavior not only makes for better parolees, but actually makes the incarceration of the baddest of the bad more miserable. In other words, in a world where the wolves are forced to act like humans, they are most unhappy.

And yes, the people being prison-raped are not the people who, in the words of the parent poster, "deserve it."

I am far from some lefty, as my previous posts will attest. But I think capital punishment, with proper due process, done in a humane way, is a lot more civilized that condoning rape of inmates.

A modern, civilized society should not condone such behavior. Certainly not by people who profess to believe in the Constitution.

Quill essentially affirms Bellas Hess.

There's a four-prong "Complete Auto" test which has been used as a criterion for the validity of state taxes on interstate commerce:

1. The tax must be applied to an activity with a "substantial nexus" with the taxing state
2. The tax must provide fair apportionment between the states
3. The tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce
4. The tax must be fairly related to services provided by the taxing state

Relevant quotes from the cases:

State taxation falling on interstate commerce ... can only be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.

... The Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail.

... If Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes.

The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.

Other references:

Annette Nellen's Home Page, especially Timeline Review of Activities Related to Discussions on Internet Taxation

Sales and Use Taxation of Internet Transactions

In other news, Barnes & Noble Inc. has offered to buy back the shares of BN.com -- could this eventually mean BN.com will have to collect sales taxes on internet sales to all states which have Barnes & Noble retail stores?

Quill essentially affirms Bellas Hess.

There's a four-prong "Complete Auto" test which has been used as a criterion for the validity of state taxes on interstate commerce:

1. The tax must be applied to an activity with a "substantial nexus" with the taxing state
2. The tax must provide fair apportionment between the states
3. The tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce
4. The tax must be fairly related to services provided by the taxing state

Relevant quotes from the cases:

State taxation falling on interstate commerce ... can only be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.

... The Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail.

... If Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes.

The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.

Other references:

Annette Nellen's Home Page, especially Timeline Review of Activities Related to Discussions on Internet Taxation

Sales and Use Taxation of Internet Transactions

In other news, Barnes & Noble Inc. has offered to buy back the shares of BN.com -- could this eventually mean BN.com will have to collect sales taxes on internet sales to all states which have Barnes & Noble retail stores?

Quill essentially affirms Bellas Hess.

There's a four-prong "Complete Auto" test which has been used as a criterion for the validity of state taxes on interstate commerce:

1. The tax must be applied to an activity with a "substantial nexus" with the taxing state
2. The tax must provide fair apportionment between the states
3. The tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce
4. The tax must be fairly related to services provided by the taxing state

Relevant quotes from the cases:

State taxation falling on interstate commerce ... can only be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.

... The Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail.

... If Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes.

The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.

Other references:

Annette Nellen's Home Page, especially Timeline Review of Activities Related to Discussions on Internet Taxation

Sales and Use Taxation of Internet Transactions

In other news, Barnes & Noble Inc. has offered to buy back the shares of BN.com -- could this eventually mean BN.com will have to collect sales taxes on internet sales to all states which have Barnes & Noble retail stores?

" WTF? Yeah, that you socialsits are putting forth loyalty oaths and making laws that force kids to say them is consistent with my assertions. You trying to be ironic? Or are you just ignorant of the history of the Pledge?"

The true irony here is that you should mention ignorance, as your own shines through like the Northern Star on a clear Winter night.

60 years ago, it was established by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette(1943) that a compulsory pledge of allegiance would be unconstitutional. Justice Jackson wrote for the majority that:

""[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."[emph mine]

Ergo, your entire argument looks all the more amusing as you complain about something which does not exist. Perhaps you should complain to the government about the space aliens that keep beeming transmissions into your mind as well?

"The Pledge of Allegience has nothing to do with the constitution"

No, but I found it amusing that some people feel the need to slam socialists in the name of patriotism when it was a socialist who authored the words they're so proud to recite. What's even more amusing is that your own assertion that every citizen has the right to possess and use the same weapons as the government sounds an aweful lot like socialist rhetoric. If I were a socialist, I too would condemn any law which allowed my government to do something I couldn't do. Happily, I'm a bit more pragmatic, while still maintaining a reasonable amount of idealism just to keep me honest.

yes, tomato is a fruit technically

Yes, botanically the tomato is a fruit. However, legally, according to the Supreme Court of the United States, tomatos are vegetables.

This article is at least somewhat amusing. The author notes that prefatory material, such as the "progress of science and the useful arts" need not limit the scope of constitutional clauses.

One example I can think of was mentioned here on slashdot, it involved someone who had managed to get a cracked copy of one of those exspensive remote desktop tools for windows systems installed on militairy webservers and other systems. If I am not mistaken these systems belonged to some sort of logistics unit, which made me wonder why people bothered to chain themselfs to the railroads to stop the shipment of US army vehicels though europe for the war in iraq only months later.

Thing is the guy got cought and the charges where available online in pdf format. They contained the IP addreses of the systems involved. It seems the document is still online here. (And I want nothing to do with those who will be checking if these are still machines running iis 3.0 with frontpage extentions on nt4.0 with sp3 or something like that) Now I am sure that the people responsible for running those mission critical windows boxes conected to the internet fixed the major holes. But apparently they managed to convince the court that those ips should not be made public anyway. (Ofcourse this is the first place blackhats look for the addreses of such systems, they just feel more at ease asking a court clerk for these documents rather then say doing dns zone transfers, networks scans and request to whois databases.)

Rather then blacking out the text by putting a black bitmap over them, here investigators used a black font with a black background color.... Ofcourse most slashdotters are already thinking of that great pdf2ascii tool, part of xpdf. There was however no need for the windows world to feel left out, copy and paste worked just fine, afterall the acrobat "rights" control system specificly allowed it ;-)

What intrigues me is that at that moment there where around three hundred >1 slashdot posts and nobody mentioned a thing. Eventhough at least a couple of people must have noticed these black parts all had diffrend lengths, just like the original ip`s. I always asumed everybody knows this and keeps it secret couse the individual person who came up with the idea of blacking out electronic text this time might learn from their mistake but by not reporting it on front pages everbody assured that there would never be a memo send around all goverment agencies explaining this problem. This would assure acces to those with sufficient interst to the black parts of documents could read them. Afterall these are documents that are already released to the public, whats to point in protecting a couple of black parts that would be left out if they where life-or-death kind of things.

I just guess even slashdot traditions die one day

So then if this ballot was so confusing, tell me, why didn't the DNC, who had the liberty to review and request changes to the ballot approve the ballot?

Might I suggest you take a look at the ballot

This was not a confusing ballot, the voters were idiots.

>But I sort of like the parent's idea, with the stipulation that you should only be able to vote on subjects you are competent on and have a license for.

First you'd have to get rid of that pesky 24th Amendment ot the U.S. Consitution.

The interstate commerce clause is how we got the civil rights legislation that we have. Here's some info on findlaw.

I hate to say this, but the Supreme Court some time ago interpreted the 10th Amendment to mean exactly what the federal government acts like it means. This link on FindLaw that explains it better (if a bit more verbosely). "Clear language" is not always so clear.

In short, Judge Rich didn't change his mind.

This is the same Judge Rich that authored the Benson panel decision. In Benson, Judge Rich concluded that claims to pure mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter under 35 USC 101 (which is still good law). However, where that mathematical algorithm is tied to an otherwise patentable process, the mere fact that an algorithm is cited in the claim does not, in and of itself, render the claim as a whole unpatentable.

In the Diehr Supreme Court footnote that you cite, the "form of the claims" was not in regard to the question of the patentablilty of an algorithm per se, but rather whether Benson applied only to claims in the form of a process, as opposed to those in the form of a machine. In other words, does the proscription of a process claiming nothing more than a pure algorithm (as opposed to an alorithm as just one element of the claim as a whole) extend to claims to a machine with the same inclusion. Judge Rich, rightly, said "Yes", the proscription of Benson to pure algorithm claims holds regardless of whether the claim is drafted as a process or a machine. That is, if the claim is drafted toward either a process or a machine, it is non-statutory if the claim as a whole is merely directed to a mathematical algorithm. This is not inconsistent with his views expressed in Benson that the claim as a whole is not rendered unpatentable by the mere inclusion of a mathematical algorithm.

In the Alappat majority decision, again authored by Judge Rich, the CAFC concluded that:

The Supreme Court has never held that a programmed computer may never be entitled to patent protection. Indeed, the Benson court specifically stated that its decision therein did not preclude "a patent for any program servicing a computer." Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, 93 S.Ct. at 257. Consequently, a computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable subject matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the other requirements of Title 35. In any case, a computer, like a rasterizer, is apparatus not mathematics.

As a related aside, this view was also expressed in Charkrabarty , where the Supreme Court cited "... The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.'" Judge Rich was the chair of that committee. Note the "made by man" part. That is the overriding restriction on patentable subject matter that Judge Rich consistently held, be it a novel microorganism or a machine or process. Neither a natural microorganism, untouched by man, nor a law of nature as expressed by a mathematical algorithm is patentable. But once the hand of "man" alters the "natural", the subject matter may become patentable.

In short, Judge Rich didn't change his mind.

This is the same Judge Rich that authored the Benson panel decision. In Benson, Judge Rich concluded that claims to pure mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter under 35 USC 101 (which is still good law). However, where that mathematical algorithm is tied to an otherwise patentable process, the mere fact that an algorithm is cited in the claim does not, in and of itself, render the claim as a whole unpatentable.

In the Diehr Supreme Court footnote that you cite, the "form of the claims" was not in regard to the question of the patentablilty of an algorithm per se, but rather whether Benson applied only to claims in the form of a process, as opposed to those in the form of a machine. In other words, does the proscription of a process claiming nothing more than a pure algorithm (as opposed to an alorithm as just one element of the claim as a whole) extend to claims to a machine with the same inclusion. Judge Rich, rightly, said "Yes", the proscription of Benson to pure algorithm claims holds regardless of whether the claim is drafted as a process or a machine. That is, if the claim is drafted toward either a process or a machine, it is non-statutory if the claim as a whole is merely directed to a mathematical algorithm. This is not inconsistent with his views expressed in Benson that the claim as a whole is not rendered unpatentable by the mere inclusion of a mathematical algorithm.

In the Alappat majority decision, again authored by Judge Rich, the CAFC concluded that:

The Supreme Court has never held that a programmed computer may never be entitled to patent protection. Indeed, the Benson court specifically stated that its decision therein did not preclude "a patent for any program servicing a computer." Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, 93 S.Ct. at 257. Consequently, a computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable subject matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the other requirements of Title 35. In any case, a computer, like a rasterizer, is apparatus not mathematics.

As a related aside, this view was also expressed in Charkrabarty , where the Supreme Court cited "... The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.'" Judge Rich was the chair of that committee. Note the "made by man" part. That is the overriding restriction on patentable subject matter that Judge Rich consistently held, be it a novel microorganism or a machine or process. Neither a natural microorganism, untouched by man, nor a law of nature as expressed by a mathematical algorithm is patentable. But once the hand of "man" alters the "natural", the subject matter may become patentable.

I have not refused to provide anything. Of course I can give citation for what I am talking about. Can you? Seriously everything you have said ths far about this subject seems to display a profound ignorance. You also do not give any evidence to support your claims that record companies give fair contracts. The artists seem to disagree with you.

John Fogerty of Creedence Clearwater Revival was sued by his previous label for subsequent songs that sounded like his previous work according to that label. His countersuit is here.

In this case, the copyrights to the songs belonged to the label and playing the originals did indeed require permission from the prior label (and payment of royalties). In addition, as was shown, they expected that if he made any future songs it must be with permission and paying the former label. Granted this is only one example of a very bad contract that led to decades of legal battles, but there are many others.

As for artists no longer owning rights to theri own name, Prince and George Michael come to mind, but there were a lot of others who could not use their name for anything because thier name belonged to the record label. How did other artists switch labels? They did not sign away rights to their name.

As for the RIAA bots, they are there. The RIAA has spiders that search for MP3s on the net. hey then sue people for distributing them and order their ISPs to shut down that person's internet conection. They do not check to see if they actually own the rights to the MP3s before doing this and have indeed cut off people for distributing their own MP3s. They have pushed for royalties to be paid to them by webcasters even if they only play music from labels which are independant of the RIAA. IN short they are claiming work that is not their own, which should not be surprising since it is their business (although it is a bit annoying that they claim all the music in the world regardless of whether the artist signs a contract with them).

I hope congress and the FCC see Viacom's threat to halt HDTV broadcast for what it is: an attempt to ursurp the governement's power.

I fail to see how a cgi variable is a 'trade secret'. The problem, as reported in Sprigmans's Legal review was an HTTP referer issue. Specifically a variable 'NID' was on the query string, and when you click on a link it got passed to other websites. How can a company claim that a CGI variable viewable in the location bar is a trade secret? Infact in trial they never tried to make a point that it was a trade secret, only that it was 'confidential information'. Again, I do not see that a CGI variable name is even close to confidential. This is something that anyone can see, something that is a normal part of the browsing experience.

Don't forget the fourth category, illegal combatants. These are people who don't wear uniforms, try to mingle in with the civilian population, but strike out at other armies. They have considerably less legal standing than the other catagories, at least under US law (reference: US Supreme Court case ex parte Quirin ). These are the people being held at Guatanamo.

It's important that we *not* treat terrorists, spies, and other illegal combatants the same as we treat legal combatants. If we treated them the way you seem to think we should, it lowers the bar for civilized warfare (oximoron, I know). There has to be a reason for armies to wear uniforms and operate openly, otherwise things would quickly degenerate more than they have. Besides, if someone chooses to hide among the civilian population, putting them at more risk, then he should pay a higher price when he's caught.

And note that I said "US law". I realize international law, such as the Geneva Convention (to which the US is a signatory) doesn't have the same distinction. But, so far as I know, there's nothing stopping us from having this distinction. If there were, and we really were violating a treaty, I'm sure the Senate would've put a stop to it long ago. Since they're the ones who ratify treaties, it would be in their best interests to make sure the executive branch was playing by their rules. You can't tell me there isn't one Senator who wouldn't've raised a fuss (a certain one from Conneticut, now running for his Party's nomination for President, comes to mind).

He's takling about the United States of America

"Made compulsory, such a pledge is worthless, meaningless and a supression of intellectual activity. It represents a repudiation of Jeffersonian ideals, as embodied in the Declaration of Independance and U.S. Constitution."

Which is essentially what Justice Jackson wrote for the majority in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette. (1943). Compulsory flag salutes and pledges of allegiance of any sort are simply not legal in these united states. Your argument, impassioned though it may be, is essentially 60 years after the fact.

"Do we get to wear armbands, too?"

If you'd like to, I suppose.

Well, the Court ruled long ago that schoolchildren cannot be forced to say the pledge.

In fact, what they said was more or less that the government can NEVER require people to proclaim any sort of mandated belief or orthodoxy. No one should ever have to pledge unless they actually mean it, and it is voluntary. Indeed -- isn't it a worthless pledge otherwise, much like a religious conversion at gunpoint?

Teaching about our history or government is fine -- but the pledge doesn't do that. It affirms a belief.

I strongly suggest that you read the relevant case on this issue and rethink your position. A copy of the Barnette case may be found here.

"You may not have to recite the pledge (although in this case, I believe pledging was compulsory; please correct me if I'm wrong)"

Ask and ye shall receive. No person may be compelled by any public official (this would include a public school teacher) to recite any sort of pledge of allegiance. The case in question is West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette(1943). The Supreme Court held that

"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."

My personal opinion of this case was most heavily influenced by the simple fact that no student can, in any way, shape, or form, be compelled to participate in either the salute to the flag or the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. My understanding, limited though it may be, is that no student could be punished for reciting the original pledge (written by a socialist, no less) which did not contain any reference to God. Some have made reference to possible "peer pressure" or other social pressures which could be brought to bear on a student who refuses to salute or recite the 'official' Pledge of Allegiance. I fail to see where in any law it is said that it is the responsibility of the government to ensure that no decision or policy is ever put into effect which may indirectly cause one or more of its citizens to experience social pressure due to their chosen cooperation, or lack thereof, with said decision or policy. Such an absurd concept would bring the entire government to a screeching halt and invalidate each and every law, policy, and decision ever put forth by our current government (as in the one that began with the ratification of the Constitution).

"Using school property to communicate a message with a distinctly theistic slant ("one nation, under God") is unconstitutional (again, see the Santa Fe v. Doe ruling)."

This assumes that any and all appearances of the word 'God' intrinsically convey a specific religious message. The phrase, taken out of context, could even be interpreted as meaning that we live under a theocratic rule. While some elements of religious morality have found their way into our laws throughout our history, most are quite simply commonly understood moral features which appear in just about every law; secular or religious. Theft, murder, rape; all of these things are against virtually every modern religion, and are all illegal in just about every modern society. Enacting a law prohibiting murder is not an endorsement of any religion; merely an expression of the rights of each individual to live.

My point here is one that the Supreme Court has made many times, and one with which I completely agree. The word 'God', along with many of the teachings of major religions can be used within a social or historical context without any sort of large religious connotation. Were this pledge compulsory, I would probably scrutinize it further, but with things being the way they are, I'm quite satisfied with the explaination that the phrase 'under God' carries more of a historical and social context than a religious one. Quite honestly, I don't believe that the phrase has any influence whatsoever in how those who recite it think or feel about any given religion, or even religion itself. The difficulty in this case is that our mostly Christian society, coming from Christian ancestry, has integrated the word 'God' in our language in such a way that it simply refers to a generalized higher power when used in a social context. That the word 'God' is used by Christians to describe their specific higher power is simply a consequence of historical and social culture. Thus, 'God', the higher power, can be Allah for a Muslim child, Yahweh for a Jewish teacher, or it could be a

In 1942 the Supreme Court ruled (WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BARNETTE, 319 U.S. 624 (1943))that students could not be required to recite the Pledge. The issue before the Court is not relating to those laws. While I appreciate the editorials fervor, it is wrong and (with regards to Slashdot) misplaced. This is a case regarding religious freedom, not freedom of association, as considered in Barnette.

If your number is unlisted people still have the right to call you (they might find you through random dialling for example..)

By what possible argument do you arrive at the existence of such a right?

Each company has the right to deliver their message to you once.

Incorrect. I can tell 'em all go to to hell, I don't have to listen to each one first. (See citations below.)

*sigh* It is well established that those "no solicitors" signs do not hold any legal weight

Incorrect. In fact, many localities expressly prohibit solicitation at a home where such a sign is displayed. (A quick Googling will confirm this.) And such provisions have been looked on favorably by the Supreme Court ( Schaumberg v. Citizens for Better Environ., 444 U.S. 620 (1980)):

Other provisions of the ordinance, which are not challenged here, such as the provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting signs reading "No Solicitors or Peddlers Invited," 22-24, suggest the availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to protect privacy.

(The case in question struck down (correctly) provisions of the ordinance that restricted who could engage in such solicitation.)

Also noteworthy is the Court's 1943 opinion in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141: "A city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant..." (With Google and FindLaw, anyone can look like a legal scholar... :-) )

The Do Not Call is currently in limbo precisely because it violates the freedom of speech.

As the above citations make clear, your freedom of speech does not include a right to disturb me after I've said sod off. And I certainly don't have to listen to you first. The DNC list does not violate free speech, and will stand.

If your number is unlisted people still have the right to call you (they might find you through random dialling for example..)

By what possible argument do you arrive at the existence of such a right?

Each company has the right to deliver their message to you once.

Incorrect. I can tell 'em all go to to hell, I don't have to listen to each one first. (See citations below.)

*sigh* It is well established that those "no solicitors" signs do not hold any legal weight

Incorrect. In fact, many localities expressly prohibit solicitation at a home where such a sign is displayed. (A quick Googling will confirm this.) And such provisions have been looked on favorably by the Supreme Court ( Schaumberg v. Citizens for Better Environ., 444 U.S. 620 (1980)):

Other provisions of the ordinance, which are not challenged here, such as the provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting signs reading "No Solicitors or Peddlers Invited," 22-24, suggest the availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to protect privacy.

(The case in question struck down (correctly) provisions of the ordinance that restricted who could engage in such solicitation.)

Also noteworthy is the Court's 1943 opinion in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141: "A city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant..." (With Google and FindLaw, anyone can look like a legal scholar... :-) )

The Do Not Call is currently in limbo precisely because it violates the freedom of speech.

As the above citations make clear, your freedom of speech does not include a right to disturb me after I've said sod off. And I certainly don't have to listen to you first. The DNC list does not violate free speech, and will stand.

pointing out that in Maryland (where at least the caller resided) it is illegal not to inform both (or all) parties about the recording. ... I am sure that the laws of other states (and countries) are different.

The US federal law permits recording by either side if they consent to it, such as me recording my home phone calls, or my employer recording phone calls if they have notified me as part of employement. 17 USC 119.

Section 2511 (2)(d)It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception

As always, a state law may further restrict your rights under law. If you are genuinely concerned, spend thirty bucks and talk with a lawyer for a half hour. Personally, if I recorded somebody on the phone and they sued me on a stricter state law, I would tell the court that I was following the federal law of which I was aware, that I was not aware of the state law, then appeal to common sense abilities like being able to record conversations to refer to it later. I'd argue on the common-sense logic of recording [or printing, if electronic] driving directions without telling them that I'm doing it, or making sure that if a telemarketer calls me under the state or federal DNC laws that I can enforce my rights. Forbidding me to record information directed to me can cause actual monetary damages (not finding a customer's home, for instance) or prevent me from defending my rights (telemarketers could deny calling me).

Finally, I would have to ask -- Does your local 911 center ask you before recording your call?

frob

You know nothing about the united states legal system and your lack of a sense of propriety amazes me. Your attitude reminds me of the Spartanburg county coroner who stated:

"He would not have had the incident happen if he hadn't been conducting illegal activity inside the store," Burnett said, "It's almost like to me if a man is drunk and runs into a tree and tries to blame the person who planted the tree for causing his injuries." [Spartanburg Herald Journal, July 28, 1995]

If you want to see some of what that great civil servant said, head over to here.

Oh and by the way, in this legal system people are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Mr. Fischer never was proven guilty because he was strangled to death outside the Best Buy by its employees before he could have a trial or even be arrested.

I am going to make this very clear for all the illiterate fucking idiots in the audience, such as BiosHakr. The United States Supreme Court case Rowan v Post Office (397 U.S. 728, 1970) specifically ruled that:

"a person may require that a mailer remove his name from its mailing lists and stop all future mailings to the householder."

I cited this case in my initial post. Go back and read it, then STFU.

BZZT. Do not pass Go, do not collect $200.

"Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its merit"
"We therefore categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another. If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient."

"Prior art" is the mass of pre-existing knowledge that an invention must distinguish over to qualify for a patent.
...
Prior art has been generically defined as "technology already available to the public," but a better definition is anything that can be cited against a patent (or patent application) to challenge the novelty or "nonobviousness" of the invention.

What am I missing?

If you were as confused as I was reading the article, check this out:

Verizon's Solution in the Napster Debate

It gives a good overview of what "compulsory licensing" means:

The scheme Verizon proposes is known as "compulsory licensing." A compulsory license forces a copyright (or patent) owner to permit someone else to use the work for a predetermined fee. Accordingly, it precludes the owner of the copyright (or patent) from refusing to license her work to other people in certain, specified circumstances.

In 1787, Mozart invented A Musical Dice Game for Composing a Minuet. Given the results of the game, I assume that one can derive the dice numbers that created it. (If not, it shouldn't be hard to modify the game to possess that property.) Now, play the game using a fixed string of bits instead of a random number generator. The result is very definitely music, and it isn't steganography.

The use of a Mozart encoder and decoder would be even more powerful than Ka-Blamo.

Umm, there's Anderson Consulting and Arthur Andersen Consulting, one's global management and tech consulting, the other's the book cookers. And Accenture used to be Anderson Consulting.

news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/ usandersen030702ind.html

I would certainly hope that the government would be able to prove this through other means -- like the IP logs. But if you peruse the affidavit submitted by the FBI to arrest Adrian Lamo, you begin to wonder. The affidavit is rife with references to articles written by Security Focus reporter Kevin Poulsen, and MSNBC.com's Sullivan, as their principal "evidence" of Lamo's guilt.

Not according to Warren Burger, Chief Justice, SCOTUS, May 4, 1970:

"Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its merit"

"We therefore categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another. If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient. That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be captives everywhere. The asserted right of a mailer, we repeat, stops at the outer boundary of every person's domain."

As US law stands, states collect no tax whatsoever from interstate commerce - not even income tax. Section 381. This looks like an attempt by the states to make an end run around existing commerce laws and snag a slice of the interstate commerce pie. I'd like for this to never make it past the House, but given the current economic problems plaguing most states it'll probably get shoved through. With any luck, it will be challenged and declared unconstititional. btw, IANAL, so if my interpretation of the above law is flawed, flame away~