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Ok, not to be whiny, but I didn't like this particular summary, as it mentions the panel's conclusion that NASA's current path is unworkable, but doesn't make any mention of the alternative paths forwarded presented by the Committee (and discussed in the article). Here's an alternative summary, with some links to the actual report summary (which I suspect none of the commenters so far have actually read):

A summary of the Augustine Committee's upcoming report on the future of US spaceflight has been submitted to the White House and NASA, and made available to the public. The committee's analysis found that NASA's current plans for a human lunar return by 2020 are unworkable, with NASA's status quo not likely to place them on the moon 'until well into the 2030s, if ever'. Raising NASA's budget by $3B/year opens two primary options: 'Moon First' with a lunar return and possible base-building starting in the mid-2020s, or 'Flexible Path,' which would initially focus on building an in-space architecture for supporting progressive exploration, starting with Lagrange points and Near-Earth Objects (asteroids and comets) in the early 2020s, and exploring the moons of Mars or Earth in the mid-2020s. Options for a heavy-lift launcher were also outlined: NASA's current plans for an Ares V, a less costly 'directly Shuttle-derived' vehicle, or the least costly (but politically most difficult) 'new way of doing business' of purchasing launches on an upgraded EELV. Other key findings are that the ISS should be extended to 2020, that developing in-space refueling would benefit all of NASA's options, that NASA should make use of commercial crew transportation, that NASA should revive its space technology development program (which had largely stagnated in past decades), and that while Mars should be the ultimate destination for human exploration, it is not the best first destination. The White House and NASA will review the report and announce NASA's forward path in early October.

NASP was vapourware.

The causes of the X-33 program failure are the subject of considerable debate. Here are several good sources of information. You can see that the program received criticism from the GAO, and other sources. I've seen several references to the DoD effort to fund the flight test program, and that request being over-ruled by the Bush administration. I can't recall if these sources below include that claim or not, but you can probably find one or more if you use Google.

excellent X-33 overview
X-33 VentureStar what really happened?
New Mission for Lockheed Spaceplane?
X-33 and NASA's Proposed 2001-2005 Space Launch Initiative
GAO: SPACE TRANSPORTATION Status of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle Program
GAO: SPACE TRANSPORTATION Progress of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle Program
NASA Defends Itself Against X-33 Critique

I don't know anything about the internal NASA management bureaucracy, but I do know about bureaucracy in business and government agencies. It is by no means guaranteed that Mr. Cook is responsible for the failures of the projects that he managed. He might well be, but it certainly does not automatically follow. Bureaucracies excel at separating authority from responsibility (in fact, it can be argued that this is a core purpose of a bureaucracy, although personally I would disagree with that goal). Mr. Cook might well have known, for example, how to salvage on or more of those projects. Many of the failures to complete R&D on next-generation launch technologies were due to the budget over-run problems of the Space Shuttle program, which left the other programs continually starved for and competing for limited funding pools which were stretched too thin. NASA didn't have the budget flexibility to sustain an R&D program like X-33 through to completion.

The relatively well documented failure of the X-33 VentureStar project, for example, is known to be in part due to a project requirement (a cryogenic carbon fiber composite H2 tank) that the Lockheed Martin engineers identified as a risk (due to immature materials technology). Yes, it was NASA who insisted on taking the risk without proper scheduling and funding for risk reduction, and that is a failure of project management.

However, the internal NASA politics that led to this may be pretty complicated, and I haven't seen any discussion of that. Mr. Cook might well have fought on behalf of the engineers, but lost. It's also possible to look at the X-33 program and decide that it was on the verge of success. The project was under-funded, but the problems appeared to be reasonably clear engineering and materials science problems, which also appeared to have pretty clear solutions paths available (for a fee). The ramp for the aerospike engine was too heavy, and the carbon fiber tank technology was immature. Both of those are materials technology problems where the solutions could be had. In fact, it appears that the tank problem was solvable with current tech (aluminum-lithium alloy, like the modern version of the Space Shuttle external tank) and improved carbon fiber technology, which was apparently demonstrated after the cancellation of the X-33 program. The aerospike ramp weight also could be solved. Meanwhile, the heat shield technology developed was apparently impressive, and the aerospike engine work was also viewed in retrospect as pretty successful.

Another thing I've observed is that government agencies, at least under the Bush administration, were literally obsessed with talking about "lessons learned" from failed projects. Unfortunately, they tended to learn the wrong lessons, often because the real lessons were not politically or organizationally acceptable. Here's an article on the X-33 as an example: Lesson in Failed X-33 Bid, New Engine Promising. The real lessons: doing something useful (reducing the cost of payload to LEO) is hard work, the X-33 was close to achieving the difficult objectives the project was assigned, and yes, it would have been well worth an extra $1 Billion to complete the project and demonstrate the suite of useful technologies developed. Instead, NASA senior management internalized a false "lesson" because they don't need to admit management failure when they simply throw up their hands and blame the concept of a reusable LEO launcher.

Read this for most of what you want to know. There is more, but not on-line.

This wasn't in the summary, but it's also worth noting that in his 19 years at NASA, Steve Cook was also manager of the failed X-33, X-34, and Delta Clipper (after it was transferred to NASA). I'm trying to find validation, but I think he was also manager for the failed ISS Propulsion Module project as well.

In fact, I've been earnestly looking, and I can't find a single example of a project he managed which didn't end overbudget and in utter failure. The only possible exception I can think of is the Delta Clipper, which actually started under somebody else's management, experienced some success, and was killed off so NASA could focus on the X-33 (also managed by Steve Cook).

The following post by a (now-former) NASA engineer does a great job of summarizing what Steve Cook was like as a manager, although Deger blames it more on NASA management culture than Steve Cook himself:

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=18523.msg467693#msg467693

My cut is: the story was "The stick is safe in every way". This made the program not look at problems with the stick that could have been taken care of with some careful engineering design work. Thrust Oscillation, Vibro-acoustics, and SRB disposal all have engineering design solutions, but the party line up front was "none of these are a problem". Any engineer that attempted to fix these problems was removed from the program and made into what the Japanese call a window watcher. I was one of them for trying to get the program to realize the stack was going to be not healthy after an abort and this fact needed to taken care of. I even had a simple design solution to the problem, to take care of it.

I have heard many people that tried to fix TO [thrust oscillation] were removed. I bet the same happened to the first people that recognize vibro-acoustic were an issue that need to be dealt with.

I am in the process of doing my best to design solutions to these problems. It may not be possible because there is no performance margin left.

And to this day, the requirements have not still not been defined.

Danny Deger

Edit: And none of this was caused by Mr. Cook. He did his job exactly as he was trained to do by NASA.

South Korea bumbled its way into the Asian space race Tuesday...It seems that the KSLV-1 first stage, developed by the experienced Russians, worked perfectly. However, the rocket's Korean-made second stage, which was supposed to carry and push the satellite into its place, apparently had some issues.

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2009/08/129_50676.html

In a video session disclosed only to a limited number of reporters Wednesday, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), the country's space agency, revealed footage taken from two built-in cameras planted on the KSLV-1 second stage...The second-stage tumbled back to Earth, and the satellite soon followed, as the remaining fairing was heavy enough to prevent the rocket from achieving desired speed and pushing the satellite to a speed faster than 8 kilometers per second that was required for the spacecraft to remain in orbit,'' Park Jeong-joo, who heads KARI's KSLV systems unit, said.

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2009/08/129_50747.html

Russian officials cited by "Interfax" are claiming the vehicle failed during second stage flight.

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/08/south-korea-launch-of-kslv-1/

Engineers from the project claimed that NASA directed the carbon fiber tank exploration in X-33, over the objections of the engineers. (This should sound familiar. This type of bureaucratic snafu created problems on the Shuttle program.) The program goals could have been achieved with a (low-risk) aluminum-lithium tank, apparently. Furthermore, Lockheed Martin funded additional R&D on the carbon fiber tanks after the cancellation of the X-33. Although the technology wasn't quite ready at the time the X-33 was cancelled, it was relatively close at hand, certainly as compared to long range projects like scramjets. X-33: What Really Happened.

Regular readers of my comments will know that I'm highly critical of NASA. However, it's important for enthusiastic supporters of space exploration to understand that private industry, left to its own devices, is not likely (is, in fact, extremely unlikely) to fund the R&D required to build the next generation of space transportation system. Getting to LEO is a big, big project. Much bigger than the trans-continental railways. Private corporations do not have the vision required for long term investment on this scale. They have quarterly numbers to meet, impatient and risk averse investors and managers.

The entire global investment in privately funded launch programs, if combined into a single program, is probably still a bit shy of appropriate funding for a single modern system, say, the Skylon program.

What we need is rational, visionary, intelligent and consistent policy, with consistent and rational funding to back it up. Governments, funding the next generation of launch systems required to get to orbit more reliably and more cheaply (through agencies like NASA, or maybe DARPA) will need to be involved.

But they need to be directed and funded to do the job, and do it with the right goals in mind. The X-33 VentureStar program had the right goals and the right plan for reaching them. (Skylon's goals are similar.) Private industry (Lockheed Martin) was instrumental in helping to define those goals, by the way. The original long range plan for the X-33 program involved a privately operated fleet of launch vehicles, VentureStar. NASA's role was to fund initial risk reduction (technology development) in the X-33 program, and probably subsidize the initial construction of the vehicle fleet at some level (through guaranteed purchases of payload delivery).

X-33 Venture Star (discussion archive in which X-33 engineers participated)
X-33 Venture Star (more archived discussion)

A smart approach would be to fund development of both Skylon (about 12.5 tons to LEO) and X-33/VentureStar (about 25 tons to LEO). The systems are designed to fit different parts of the launch market. They should be developed jointly, so they can use common subsystems, such as compatible payload support for example. The combined systems would begin to create a private launch market, with a much more flexible delivery of payload to space.

Regular readers of my comments will know that I'm highly critical of NASA. However, it's important for enthusiastic supporters of space exploration to understand that private industry, left to its own devices, is not likely (is, in fact, extremely unlikely) to fund the R&D required to build the next generation of space transportation system. Getting to LEO is a big, big project. Much bigger than the trans-continental railways. Private corporations do not have the vision required for long term investment on this scale. They have quarterly numbers to meet, impatient and risk averse investors and managers.

The entire global investment in privately funded launch programs, if combined into a single program, is probably still a bit shy of appropriate funding for a single modern system, say, the Skylon program.

What we need is rational, visionary, intelligent and consistent policy, with consistent and rational funding to back it up. Governments, funding the next generation of launch systems required to get to orbit more reliably and more cheaply (through agencies like NASA, or maybe DARPA) will need to be involved.

But they need to be directed and funded to do the job, and do it with the right goals in mind. The X-33 VentureStar program had the right goals and the right plan for reaching them. (Skylon's goals are similar.) Private industry (Lockheed Martin) was instrumental in helping to define those goals, by the way. The original long range plan for the X-33 program involved a privately operated fleet of launch vehicles, VentureStar. NASA's role was to fund initial risk reduction (technology development) in the X-33 program, and probably subsidize the initial construction of the vehicle fleet at some level (through guaranteed purchases of payload delivery).

X-33 Venture Star (discussion archive in which X-33 engineers participated)
X-33 Venture Star (more archived discussion)

A smart approach would be to fund development of both Skylon (about 12.5 tons to LEO) and X-33/VentureStar (about 25 tons to LEO). The systems are designed to fit different parts of the launch market. They should be developed jointly, so they can use common subsystems, such as compatible payload support for example. The combined systems would begin to create a private launch market, with a much more flexible delivery of payload to space.

Cash for Clunkers was originally funded at $US 1 Billion. Congress is negotiating this week to add an additional $US 2 Billion to the program. The original intent of the program was to stimulate the auto industry, encourage consumers to buy more fuel efficient cars, while removing older less efficient cars from the roads permanently. Key provisions of the program were compromised during its initial passing, which result in only slight gains with respect to carbon emissions, particularly when the carbon cost of producing the new vehicle is accounted for.

Three billion bucks would have purchased a revived X-33 program, starting over from scratch if necessary. Since the technology developed for the X-33 is still around, it's likely that $3 Billion would get you through the complete construction and flight testing of the X-33, and then started building the first full scale VentureStar vehicle. They would probably cost about $1 Billion each, if you built four or five. We should plan to build these like airplanes. Build one set or "block" of maybe 2 or 3 craft, then do a round of design improvements, retool and build a second block of improved vehicles, say 7 or 8, for a total of 10 vehicles in the fleet.

X-33 / VentureStar : What Really Happened

VentureStar

This would make sense, if the goal were to actually build a more reliable and less expensive access to space. Unfortunately, NASA continues to optimize for unfathomable bureaucratic goals, and misguided attempts to recapture perceived glory of Apollo.

Isn't there a fourth option? Namely- use Soyuz to transport people from now on

Without Shuttle to provide the cargo upmass and reboosts - there isn't a fourth option. Soyuz and Progress can't do it, ATV won't fly often enough, and HTV is still largely in the vaporware category [...]

Except that actually most ISS reboosts are done by Progress, and the Shuttle in fact is pretty useless for them.

Quoting http://www.thespacerace.com/forum/index.php?topic=1476.0 :

"Most reboosts use the Progress attitude control thrusters, however larger burns are done using the Progress main engines.

When there is no Progress docked to the Service Module (SM) aft, the SM's two (or just one of the two) main engines could also

be used to perform a reboost. Finally, the Orbiter [i.e., the Shuttle] does generally perform a reboost of ISS during a docked

mission. Due to the fact that a majority of the Orbiter's thrusters cannot be used when docked (due to concerns of plume impacts

on ISS), they don't really get much more delta V out of the Orbiter than they do the Progress or SM. The largest benefit is

that it uses Orbiter propellants, not the limited supply that is maintained on ISS."

Or, if you don't like that source, nasaspaceflight.com:

"Generally ISS reboosts are performed by the Progress resupply ship thrusters"

So no, a lack of Shuttle flights will not result in a lack of ISS reboosts. And now that they can recycle their water,

fresh water isn't that high a priority for cargo flights any more either. It'll mean a couple more transporter flights (and,

someone will have to pay for those of course) but the ISS can survive without any Shuttle flights at all without any problems.

I want option #4 and screw the US if they don't agree.

Isn't there a fourth option? Namely- use Soyuz to transport people from now on

Without Shuttle to provide the cargo upmass and reboosts - there isn't a fourth option. Soyuz and Progress can't do it, ATV won't fly often enough, and HTV is still largely in the vaporware category [...]

Except that actually most ISS reboosts are done by Progress, and the Shuttle in fact is pretty useless for them.
Quoting http://www.thespacerace.com/forum/index.php?topic=1476.0 :

"Most reboosts use the Progress attitude control thrusters, however larger burns are done using the Progress main engines.
When there is no Progress docked to the Service Module (SM) aft, the SM's two (or just one of the two) main engines could also
be used to perform a reboost. Finally, the Orbiter [i.e., the Shuttle] does generally perform a reboost of ISS during a docked
mission. Due to the fact that a majority of the Orbiter's thrusters cannot be used when docked (due to concerns of plume impacts
on ISS), they don't really get much more delta V out of the Orbiter than they do the Progress or SM. The largest benefit is
that it uses Orbiter propellants, not the limited supply that is maintained on ISS."


Or, if you don't like that source, nasaspaceflight.com:
"Generally ISS reboosts are performed by the Progress resupply ship thrusters"

So no, a lack of Shuttle flights will not result in a lack of ISS reboosts. And now that they can recycle their water,
fresh water isn't that high a priority for cargo flights any more either. It'll mean a couple more transporter flights (and,
someone will have to pay for those of course) but the ISS can survive without any Shuttle flights at all without any problems.

For those interested, the third and final meeting will be broadcast Thursday, running from 8am - 4pm EDT:

http://www.ustream.tv/channel/NASA-TV-HD
http://www.hobbyspace.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=14237
http://twitter.com/search?q=%23nasahsf

I think the Thursday meeting will be the most interesting one, as it'll include the presentations from the "Exploration Beyond Low Earth Orbit" subgroup. Some options the subgroup is studying include not just the "Moon Base" plan, but also plans for going directly to Mars ASAP, as well as a "Flexible path" option which would involve manned trips to destinations in shallow gravity wells, like L1, asteroids and Phobos.

The videos from the Tuesday and Wednesday meetings aren't available yet, but you can find out much of what's been discussed already at the following links:

HSF Committee Public Meeting in Alabama - Reviews
HSF Committee Public Meeting in Houston - Reviews
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=17962.0

You're absolutely right that space travel is inherently dangerous and that shouldn't necessarily deter us from engaging in it despite the risks.

However, that shouldn't excuse the disaster-waiting-to-happen that is Ares I. Particularly when there are better, cheaper, and safer alternatives. In particular, a recently released study finds that EELVs would absolutely be a safe, cheap alternative to the Ares I.

We definitely need to take risks in space travel, but not stupid dangerous risks of strapping humans to SRBs that cannot be controlled or turned off in any way and have a history of failing spectacularly.

Critics say it's a waste of money with no scientific value whatsoever. So why did we put it up there in the first place?

That's the interesting part. Originally the thing was intended to enable a fair bit of "real science" and not just be an expensive engineering play toy and tourist attraction. Unfortunately the modules intended to enable this were never launched. I guess putting craters in the desert and violating pregnant women at the airport were greater priorities. How can they expect science to be carried out if the preoccupied astronauts can't even perform acts of a personal nature. In all seriousness though, I am heartened to see that the U.S. congress put AMS back on the launch manifest albeit delayed. CAM certainly deserved better though.

The knob that was stuck between the dashboard and windshield of Atlantis (discussed here two weeks ago) was succesfully removed using dry ice, a pressurized orbiter, and "hand pressure to manipulate it loose". The window subsequently passed inspection. Recall that window replacement could have caused a six month delay.

The knob that was stuck between the dashboard and windshield of Atlantis (discussed here two weeks ago) was succesfully removed using dry ice, a pressurized orbiter, and "hand pressure to manipulate it loose". The window subsequently passed inspection. Recall that window replacement could have caused a six month delay.

Nasaspaceflight.com is reporting the Slashdot comments on one of it's forums http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=3318.msg428367;topicseen#new there are many NASA insiders and astronauts who comment there. They seem to be skeptical about the whole story.

The [SSMEs] are removed after every flight and taken to the Space Shuttle Main Engine Processing Facility (SSMEPF) for inspection and replacement of any necessary components.

A leading goal of the RS-68 program was to produce a simple engine that would be cost-effective when jettisoned after a single launch. To achieve this, the RS-68 has 80% fewer parts than the multi-launch Space Shuttle main engine (SSME). Simplicity came at the cost of lower thrust-efficiency versus the SSME: the RS-68's thrust-to-weight ratio is significantly lower and the RS-68's specific impulse is 10% lower. The benefit of the RS-68 is its reduced construction cost: To build an RS-68 for the Boeing Delta IV program costs about $14 million, compared to $50 million for the SSME. While the SSME's higher costs were designed to be spread across multiple launches, the larger, less-costly, more powerful (50% more thrust) RS-68 was a more cost-effective engine for an expendable launch vehicle.

From http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/12/ssme-ares-v-undergoes-evaluation-potential-switch/:

The regenerative nozzle of the SSME may have an advantage over the ablative RS-68 by providing a more resistant nozzle in the extreme environment of the core stage cluster.

Of course all of this is moot because I failed to recognize that we were talking about SRBs as opposed to SSMEs.

Maybe it has something to do with cooldown times for components exposed to liquid hydrogen at -423 F.

According to a Mission Management Team memo (not officially published, but there happen to be a couple outlets good at getting details), it's torquing issue. Here's the specific quote I was referencing:

In the reinstallation of the flight seal, there is a 30 hour retorque requirement, that pushes us to a Monday launch. The team is looking to examine if there is some wiggle room in the 30 hr torque requirement, then we could potentially get a Sunday launch attempt.

Cooldown is part of the overall filling process and done during the countdown at T-6 hours. It lasts about two hours.

Does any sat or cable co have NASA TV HD? or do they not have it as it is very part time and then nasa should make it 24/7 HD.

NASA does not have a 24-7 HD channel that cable/DBS companies could distribute. They (NASA) just put it up on-demand, like for this feed. During the last shuttle mission they had it up for the whole 3 weeks of countdown, mission and landing, and I expect that will continue (next launch is Feb 12th). I'm tracking the status of NASA TV HD here on a nasaspaceflight.com forum. I link here to a specific comment that answers some FAQs, but you should read through the whole thread to get the whole picture.

Yes, that's pretty much what I gathered from looking at the design, especially the odd-shaped, untapered outlets for the Sabre engines and the fact no other nozzles appear anywhere on the ship.

The engine saves weight by using the same combustion chamber during both modes of operation and in air breathing mode it only cools the oxygen to it's vapour point (as opposed to full liquidization) which greatly simplifies the engine design.

This sounds like quite an effort. Would like to see if it works out. Recently, I was discussing a scramjet design with the internet:

tnphysics: The key to a gas-and-go SSTO RLV IMO is airbreathing engines-somewhat like the Forerunner V business jet proposed somewhere on the forum (afterburning ultra-high-bypass turbofan to Mach 8, then LNG scramjet to Mach 15, then switch to LH2 to Mach 20), with a small rocket added for EOI. A metallic TPS should be used.

At the time, I recommended reducing the complexity of the vehicle by eliminating the air-breathing turbofan at the start and using the rocket instead to get the vehicle up to scramjet speeds. The Sabre engine sounds like a more effective way to do that. It could boost the vehicle up to Mach 8 with a combination of air breathing and rocket modes, switch over to the scramjet for that phase of the acceleration, and then switch back to the sabres for the final acceleration to orbit in vacuum. Still overly complex, but the Sabre is a good fit for the launch profile.

If anyone bothered to read this far, this is a comment on the NSF forums from someone who was at the event where Griffin apparently "yelled" at the transition team: http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=14928.msg343718#msg343718/ Note that forum is filled with NASA and Aerospace people. This whole thing is a smear campaign from someone who has an Agenda against Ares and Griffin... The fact that it made it to national news outlets is a shame.

Jupiter is still very much alive, and the team is busy making presentations to and reports for all the interested parties in this situation. Take a look at this thread over at nasaspaceflight for the latest rumblings: http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=12379.3250

The key thing to know is that the Ares I conveniently keeps ATK Launch System's workforce employed. That's the only explanation that makes sense for how the Ares I was chosen and implemented. Here follows a list of rookie mistakes that shouldn't have happened:

• The Ares I was selected on the basis of a 60 day study, the ESAS (Exploration Systems Architecture Study). There was no serious deliberation on the options past that study.
• The criteria was slightly out of reach for the EELVs (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle), the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets. The manned capsule was originally (as I recall) about 10-20% too heavy for the Delta IV Heavy. I believe this was deliberate to throw the decision in favor of the Ares I.
• The safety numbers on the two options that used ATK's SRMs (Solid Rocket Motors) were IMHO greatly exaggerated with estimated loss of mission (which is not the same as loss of crew!) being roughly 1 in 400 (for a 5 segment SRM first stage and J-2S second stage) to 1 in 500 (4 segment SRM and SSME second stage). The key problem is that the failure rate in the SRMs alone is probably worse than 1 in 400. As far as I can tell, there's been around 300-400 SRM firings, either on a Space Shuttle or in tests. I understand there's been failures in test firings and of course, the Challenger accident (one of the solid rocket boosters (SRB) burned through on launch, destroying the vehicle and killing the crew). That yields a failure rate of more than 1 in 400 although I don't know how much worse.
• Meanwhile the risk of using the EELVs (somewhere around 1 in 100 chance of loss of mission) was calculated based on their current trajectories to orbit. The problem here is that the two launch platforms use a riskier trajectory today for launching the current unmanned payloads. The trajectories lack abort options in various parts of the flight (these are called "black zones"). But for manned launches, neither launch vehicle would use trajectories with black zones. That means risk for the EELVs was overstated in the ESAS.
• Economics of launch vehicles was not considered. Ares I launches maybe six times a year, Ares V maybe three times a year. Atlas V and Delta IV both are launching now. What that means is that the fixed costs of the EELV rockets can be split across NASA, the Department of Defense and anyone else who uses these rockets. Meanwhile the Ares I is a NASA-only vehicle. Fixed costs must be borne completely by NASA.
• The mass margins on the Ares I are too small. Henry Spencer does an excellent job of describing a similar situation during the Apollo program. Then the person, Wernher von Braun, in charge of designing the rocket, the Saturn V, had the authority to overdesign the Saturn V and he used it. Spencer speculates that even if a current manager anticipated the creep in mass requirements, they wouldn't have the authority to do anything about it.
• The solid rocket booster first stage is severely restricted by the physical dimensions of the motor. This contributes to the mass margin problem above. The motor is already as wide and as tall as it can be. That means no performance improvement can be had from the first stage as it currently is designed. The width is constrained by railroad tunnels between the Utah manufacturing facility and Florida. I see this as another indication of why the Ares I was chosen. While it'd be an expensive undertaking, NASA could move ATK's facilities to the other side of the Rockies, particularly somewhere on the coast. Or NASA could have used a liquid fueled first stage from the EELV makers. But that wouldn't employ Utah voters.
• The Orion capsu

SpaceX Falcon launch is tenatively scheduled for this and next week with launch window closing on august 9th, some are saying its further delayed until end of August already. most up to date news here prolly

The ESAS study is known to many at NASA as flimsy peice of work. Mike Griffin had his pre-conceived ideas of what a moon architecture should be like, and imposed it on the Shuttle infrastructure. Ares V can be made to work. Ares I can be made to work. I do not doubt this - NASA engineers are dome of the best in the world. But NASA must operate in a financial and political environment. In current conditions, Ares V will be so expensive - as a program - that a sustainable lunar exploration program can never be built around it. The very real danger is that NASA will succesfully fly the Ares I, and then be denied the billions more needed to build the Ares V. Thus condemning America to Low Earth Orbit for another 30 years

As for this study that you question, you can ask some of the people who have seen it. They post on http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/ and if you spend the time, you will find just how this proposal is not hacked together by crazy armchair rocket fans, but by actual NASA engineers, at every level in the organisation.

The Ares V is not being super-sized because it's the best way of getting back to the moon. This rocket is the result of NASA administrator Mike Griffin's desire to build the biggest mofo rocket ever built. It is so big, much of the Kennedy Space Center infrastructure will have to be rebuilt. This will cost billions more. The main fuel tank is much wider than the shuttle tank. This requires a new production line, transportation barge and infrastructure at the cape. The 'extended' solid boosters require extensive design work and are not cheap either.

Meanwhile, the Ares I is ,undersized. At every design review, it is struggling to meet the thrust requirements for getting the Orion capsule into orbit. The Orion itself is suffering as a result, having to be stripped back to the bones before safety systems are carefully added back in.

So, instead of designing two badly sized, expensive rockets that has almost no hardware re-used from the Shuttle, NASA could be building a direct evolution of that hardware. Luckily, such a design already exists. It's been proposed by NASA engineers twice in the past - after the fatal Shuttle accidents. The idea is simple: Retain the existing Shuttle tank and solids. Place engine on the bottom of the tank. Place a payload on top of the tank. This concept has been around for years, but today it's being promoted as DIRECT.

http://www.directlauncher.com/

lots of discussion here: http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=12379.0

This architecture will meet all the lifting requirements for getting back to the room whilst being: Cheaper (by many billions), and Sooner (the 'flight gap' after shuttle retirement is reduced from 6 years to 2. This retains all the technical staff that would otherwise be layed off. A similar brain drain after Apollo did massive damage to NASA and we don't want that to happen again

I could go on and on. It is obvious that DIRECT is the better option. They are actively lobbying congress and have plenty of support within NASA. In fact, an internal NASA study found that DIRECT was superior to Ares in every way, but this study was squashed by management. With DIRECT, the next president can have astronauts back in space in his administration. But only if his NASA administrator cancels Ares and Chooses DIRECT.

I've been seeing heat related issues, some component manufacturers have removed the lead but their parts do not hold up to the heat required for no-lead reflow and wave soldering. We're having parts not only fall out during testing but getting field failures back. This is for non-electrolytic capacitors a ceramic surface mount type and a through hole mylar type.

I've been seeing some units that were done with no-lead less than a year ago where parts are falling off the board. These were some of our early no-lead units so they'll just warranty them and replace the boards.

As to the tin whisker problem NASA has a lot of information on it.
http://nepp.nasa.gov/WHISKER/

But I can't see where they're following their own advice if it means it's a 'show stopper'
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=4537

The "hatch first" story is already in doubt, latest info says separation of the entry module was delayed, it entered sideways and computer thus went to ballistic mode after a certain time and was in said mode when it finally separated.

I just read a forum where knowledgeable people translate from a reliable known guy on a russian forum. Not much official has yet been revealed.

Details here

Not what I hear. The operation of the station is heavily dependent on both the US and the Russians. The US has provided a lot of the critical components of the system. For example, a considerable portion of the hardware comes from NASA, the communication system comes from the US, NASA has a "small army" on the ground maintaining the ISS. Further, the US may remain responsible for the station's deorbit even if they hand off operations to another.

400 GPa

Well :
1) Well, it most likely doesnt have any RTGs, because they are expensive and not very powerfull when compared to solar arrays in earth orbit.
2) Possible hazards - hydrazine propelant. But the tanks will most probably burst during reentry, fracturing the sat so it will burn up even more evenly.
Momentum wheels - well, just a solid metal wheel falling at 200 km/h :) There can be 4 of those :)
3) The sat has been dead from launch in 2006, and because it is in LEO, it just must come down soon or later, no surprise here.
4) Its 4-5 tons max, you dont put much more on the Delta II on which it was launched.
5) For accurate info: http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/forums/thread-view.asp?tid=11627&start=1

Before we go on, read this post. It's tangential to the topics here, but it is by far the best reply to your posts and discusses why SpaceShipTwo is important and does extend the state of the art.

Successful joyrides mean more money thrown at joyrides. Soyuz (and later Dragon) are a test of orbital space tourism.

Let us not forget that the point of SpaceShipTwo is ultimately to put people in orbit. That's not "joyrides".

SpaceShipTwo is state of the art in rocketplanes that go ~850 m/s instead of the 7,800 m/s needed for orbital rocketry (and remember, it's an exponential challenge to get more velocity, not a linear one).

SpaceShipOne, the predecessor to SpaceShipTwo delivered around 2250 m/s of delta v out of roughly 9500 m/s needed to get to LEO (including gravity losses). In a nasaspaceflight.com thread, I calculate the actual delta v of SpaceShipOne. Another poster corrects me with the 9500 m/s needed to get to LEO. Here's what I posted:

Ok, this is off topic, but I'll make an attempt to figure out the various components of delta v here for the SpaceShipOne launch. SpaceShipOne started at about 15 km up and peaked out around 100 km (to barely get into space). In the absence of atmosphere, that's a delta v of roughly 1300 m/s to get that high. Googling around, it appears that the engine fired for 65 seconds straight up. That means that in addition to providing velocity, it had to partially resist gravity for 65 seconds (subtract 640 m/s from the vertical component of velocity). At the top of the peak it had a horizontal velocity of roughly 1200 m/s (mach 3.5).

So in summary 1200 m/s horizontal velocity and roughly 1900 m/s verticle velocity make up the delta v. That's roughly 2250 m/s overall. Some air resistance had to be overcome, but it's probably pretty low (starting at high altitude). Probably less than 50 m/s at a wild guess. Initial velocity was probably much less than 340 m/s (mach 1), but we still get minimum delta v of 1900 m/s from the motor. In comparison, barely attaining a useful orbit is around 9500 m/s plus say 1500 m/s for gravity and air resistance losses. So just launching the motor from the ground would by my calculation at least 17% of the delta v. Air launch brings that to just over 20% of the necessary delta v to get in a good orbit.

As I mentioned before, I was in error about how much delta v it takes, including gravity losses, to get in orbit, 9500 m/s instead of 11km/s. So about a quarter of the necessary delta v was provided by the motor and a further 300 or so m/s by the plane. Given that SpaceShipTwo goes a bit higher and has more downrange than SpaceShipOne, it probably has a little more delta v. So you're too low by at least a factor of 2 in your delta v estimate. And there's still higher ISP fuels. For example, they can use liquid oxygen in their hybrid to boost ISP. And higher mass ratios will obviously be needed. But I see no reason orbital delta v can't be reached. I'll just mention that since the vehicle will likely be less dense than the Shuttle, its TPS needs will be significantly easier to achieve. Maybe this "feathering" can work for reentry from orbit (at least once you get to dense enough atmosphere.

NASA considers SpaceX's last launch a success, as does SpaceX, and as do most observers. All of their systems were flight qualified, which was the purpose of the launch. The only problem they had was a slightly early cutoff in the engine due to sloshing, which is a pretty trivial problem to solve (all you need is a baffle in the tank). Q1 will see a Falcon 1 with a higher performance, regeneratively cooled Merlin launch its first payload, and the first Falcon 9 will be in June. In general, SpaceX's stat

Notice that the service module diameter is smaller.

I think that you might find this intesting if you have not seen it before. It might be interesting on /. as well.

Waoouw. A 1-year old dupe.
So, if the 'new' story link is slashdotted, try this one from the 'old' news: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=4888.

Which is why they are not relying on calculations. They actually grabbed some tiles, gouged them in the exact same form from the measurements taken in orbit and then put them in a hot wind tunnel (The Arcjet facility) to check what will actually happen
see here
And:
here (with pictures).

The tests at Arc Jet used a set of tiles, with identical damage drilled on to a test article. This was then put through the heat of a simulated re-entry, to test how the damaged area performed, along with the gathering of thermal data.

'The Arc Jet test using the damaged test article was completed, initial assessment did not identify structural burn through,' noted one encouraging memo, with data showing that the heating remained 50 degrees below the baseline requirement for the underlying structure.

And those articles are from the preliminary results. They were supposed to do an additional test with the repaired tile.

Which is why they are not relying on calculations. They actually grabbed some tiles, gouged them in the exact same form from the measurements taken in orbit and then put them in a hot wind tunnel (The Arcjet facility) to check what will actually happen
see here
And:
here (with pictures).

The tests at Arc Jet used a set of tiles, with identical damage drilled on to a test article. This was then put through the heat of a simulated re-entry, to test how the damaged area performed, along with the gathering of thermal data.

'The Arc Jet test using the damaged test article was completed, initial assessment did not identify structural burn through,' noted one encouraging memo, with data showing that the heating remained 50 degrees below the baseline requirement for the underlying structure.

And those articles are from the preliminary results. They were supposed to do an additional test with the repaired tile.

Here's a non-sensationalist summary of the situation that's not just yanked from AP:

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5195

The damage is likely minor, but the media loves jumping on these things.

linky

This whole thing was a lot of fud. Scott Lowther finally talked to GD, and there was NOTHING wrong with the content on his site ... and they know NOTHING about shredding at KSC. Furthermore, the only reference to shredding at KSC is a second-hand anonymous quote. It was probably an isolated incident, if even...

And shame on /. for not doing even the slightest bit of research ... no other news source was carrying this stuff, the only place you could find it were two postings by Lowther on forums.nasaspaceflight.com and alt.space.history. But of course, when kdawson saw the reference to Karl Rove, he just couldn't help himself.

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/forums/thread-vie w.asp?tid=8902&posts=59&start=1 http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/forums/thread-vie w.asp?tid=7868&posts=1197&start=1

With an intelligent plan of action, NASA could retire the Shuttle, build an even better replacement using the best parts of the Shuttle stack, go to the moon, and STILL have money left over for lots of good basic science. Unfortunately, because of cronyism and corruption, ATK-Thiokol will be getting the lions share of NASA's budget for the next several years.

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/forums/thread-vie w.asp?tid=8902&posts=59&start=1 http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/forums/thread-vie w.asp?tid=7868&posts=1197&start=1

With an intelligent plan of action, NASA could retire the Shuttle, build an even better replacement using the best parts of the Shuttle stack, go to the moon, and STILL have money left over for lots of good basic science. Unfortunately, because of cronyism and corruption, ATK-Thiokol will be getting the lions share of NASA's budget for the next several years.

NASA ain't hiding anything. All the information is available.

Look at the documentation that resulted from the investigation after Columbia. It is understood, that because of the design of the Shuttle, that impacts will continue to occurr for it's lifetime. What's important, is that these can be minimised, so that we don't encounter damaging impacts like with Columbia, and when they do occur, repair techniques have been implemented.

If you look on the NASA website, all the photos from the RPM as Atlantis approached the station are available. There are photos hilighting the damage. A raised thermal protection blanket on an OMS pod. There are photos of engineers investigating repair techniques. In the third space walk today, you can watch them repair the damage on NASA TV. This is not hidden from you.

Photos of repair techniques being tested are in the link below. If you go forward a page or two, there's a photo of the blanket in question, and earlier pages show high res photos from the RPM.
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle /sts-117/ndxpage16.html
This was all covered in a press conference too.

If you look at other sites than NASA's, or you watch the press conferences, again broadcasted on nasa tv, you can get even more information:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5129
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5133

Nothing is hidden. Nothing is amiss. The real information is under your nose and available.

NASA ain't hiding anything. All the information is available.

Look at the documentation that resulted from the investigation after Columbia. It is understood, that because of the design of the Shuttle, that impacts will continue to occurr for it's lifetime. What's important, is that these can be minimised, so that we don't encounter damaging impacts like with Columbia, and when they do occur, repair techniques have been implemented.

If you look on the NASA website, all the photos from the RPM as Atlantis approached the station are available. There are photos hilighting the damage. A raised thermal protection blanket on an OMS pod. There are photos of engineers investigating repair techniques. In the third space walk today, you can watch them repair the damage on NASA TV. This is not hidden from you.

Photos of repair techniques being tested are in the link below. If you go forward a page or two, there's a photo of the blanket in question, and earlier pages show high res photos from the RPM.
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle /sts-117/ndxpage16.html
This was all covered in a press conference too.

If you look at other sites than NASA's, or you watch the press conferences, again broadcasted on nasa tv, you can get even more information:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5129
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5133

Nothing is hidden. Nothing is amiss. The real information is under your nose and available.

Post-launch in-orbit inspection has revealed a potential problem. There is a small four-inch tear or bunching of a thermal blanket on the OMS pod near the tail. It's not clear at this time if this will be an issue on re-entry. This area of the orbiter receives less heating on re-entry, but thermal protection is still important. NASA will probably release more details later today.

Article: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5127

Image: http://www.cfnews13.com/uploadedImages/Media/Video /0037(4).jpg

For a look at a real community-driven effort to improve the way NASA will spend roughly $300 billion over the next 30 years on manned space exploration, please look at the Direct Launcher proposal by a group of NASA insiders, other aerospace engineers, and space enthusiasts. Send copies to your congresscritter, and your fellow geeks.

See http://www.directlauncher.com/ for the original proposal, and
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/forums/thread-vie w.asp?tid=5016&start=1683 for the current, very active discussion around this concept.

Now the shuttle could stay in space during the year end roll over, it's just not sure if they're ever going to need to do so:

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5026

These are normal development issues. Here is a good summary. Also it is not the Ares I launch vehicle that is overweight, but the Orion CEV.