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You're talking about a Supreme Court which ruled that Corporations can spend as much as they want on election campaigns. What the hell makes you think they're going to overturn software and business patents?

The fact that everyone on the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Bilski is full of crap, for starters. It was essentially a public beating of Bilski's claims.

Click here for analysis of the arguments.

Click here for the full transcript.

you're obviously a troll, but one of those things is not like the others. [/citation provided]

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf

...
Some members of the public might consider Hillary to be insightful and instructive; some might find it to beneither high art nor a fair discussion on how to set the Nation’s course; still others simply might suspend judg-ment on these points but decide to think more about issuesand candidates. Those choices and assessments, however, are not for the Government to make. “The First Amend-ment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression ofideas. The civic discourse belongs to the people, and the Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct it.” McConnell, supra, at 341 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.).

The judgment of the District Court is reversed withrespect to the constitutionality of 2 U. S. C. 441b’s re-strictions on corporate independent expenditures. The judgment is affirmed with respect to BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

We're probably never going to get rid of software patents, odious as they are;

The way the oral arguments on Bilski vs Kappos went back in November, software patents are one step away from an endangered species.

When you have every judge in the Supreme Court agreeing with one another on a subject...

Bilski wasn't a software patent, it was a business method patent. It's highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will throw out software patents. Business methods, otoh, are a much tougher sell to anyone.

We're probably never going to get rid of software patents, odious as they are;

The way the oral arguments on Bilski vs Kappos went back in November, software patents are one step away from an endangered species.

When you have every judge in the Supreme Court agreeing with one another on a subject...

Read the transcript to the recent Bilski v. Kappos arguments:

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-964.pdf

If the Supreme's repsonses are any indication, software patents do not have a lot of time left. This is a case where ALL SUPREME COURT JUSTICES WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT. How often does that happen, eh?

First off, the fourth amendment border search exemption does not include correspondence, and only applies to people or cargo coming into the country, which was the reason for my pretzel logic comment.

Actually, yes it does. The courts deem customs officials may also search "any trunk or envelope, wherever found," in which they have "reasonable cause to suspect"9 there is merchandise imported contrary to law. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted "any trunk or envelope" to include all international mail entering the United States. (Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606)

I call BS. I think you pulled that out of your ass. Specifically established exceptions to the 4th amendment did not enter into law until the Rehnquist court. Please cite specifically any other legislation or rulings that establish exceptions. I'm thinking you can't.

What is it with you and your inane lack of ability to do the slightest bit of searching for historically correct information. Now listen to me carefully, it's not hard to do a google search and you should at least attempt to find out if you are wrong before showing the world that you are.

FYI, the word regulated is the inflected form of regulate.

The phrase isn't regulate or regulated. It's "well regulated" (and you can add militia to it too), it's a prefatory clause, and it has the meaning I said. It's explained competently in the DC Heller case. I suggest you spend a few minute reading it before charging at windmills again.

When it comes to the DC gun case, Justice Stephens pretty much tore the ruling opinion apart with his dissenting opinion. Remember, this was a contested ruling. The right wing activists won 5-4.

Actually, no he didn't. I suggest you actually read it all, including all the references and citations. Justice SCALIA,addressed Justice Stephens dissent and actually supported his rejection of those arguments with citations not only in law, but state constitutions, english laws, and understood dictionaries as well as literature at the time the amendment was created. He even compared Justice Stephens' dissent with other provisions in the constitution which specifically mention a right held by the people and pointed to the absurdity of the clause if it were interpreted the same way. This isn't a left right political decision and it isn't some activist decision. You have been wrong about almost everything else and you are wrong here too. Again, read the fucking decision- all of it.

At the very least, no matter how much you say you think you know about civics and the law, I'm going to take a supreme court justices word over yours every time.

And Justice SCALIA, addressed those words competently and even showed how incompetent that analysis is when compared to other constitutional provisions and matters of law. Like I said, read the entire fucking opinion.

The bottom line is that Obama's only significant action as president concerning gun control up to now was to expand your rights.

He didn't do it of his own free will, and his past is competently indicative of his future. Or are you going to claim he was a liar until now that you somehow find one instance that he was pushed into politically advantageous?

Just ask you, you'll tell me, huh? What a laugh. You accuse ME of not paying attention that's a laugh and a half. Here is the video you linked to:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9X2V

My question is this: What is the EPA _really_ trying to accomplish with this?

They are _really_ trying to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. E.P.A., that they _must_ investigate Carbon Dioxide because it qualifies as an air pollutant that causes air pollution under the CAA. From page 30 of the decision:

Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.

The EPA couldn't make that call, so they must regulate.

I hate to resort to calling the EPA malicious, because I want to believe that they think that what they are doing is right, but, seriously, that's the only alternative.

If you hate it so much, why say it's the only alternative?

I think you are attempting to call pot black while your the kettle and there is no pot.

The supreme court has a good Idea of what the second amendment means and even said so in in the DC heller case. (PDF warning)

Here is some excepts from the front page in case you want to ignore the debate and present your opinion as fact.

1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.

(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, butdoes not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operativeclause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that itconnotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2-22.

(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physicallycapable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens' militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and beararms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved. Pp. 22-28.

(d) The Second Amendment's drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30-32.

(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court's conclusion. Pp. 32-47.

(f)None of the Court's precedents forecloses the Court's interpretation.
Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264-265, refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47-54

But I'm pretty sure that doesn't matter to you at all now does it. Why, because you know what the second amendment says and no one else right? Everyone else, even the supreme court must be presenting opinion as fact.

Fuck dude, don't sit there and tell me I don't know shit when you haven't even been paying attention in the last 2 years. This case got international coverage and was discussed everywhere, even here. There was even a poll on it which referenced the case directly.

The 44 amicus curiae briefs that have been filed so far are only those submitted in support of the Petitioners (i.e., the inventors Bilski and Warsaw) or in support of neither party. Amicus briefs in support of the Respondent (i.e., the Patent Office) will be submitted after the Respondent's merits brief is submitted, which will occur on or before September 25. Once the merits brief is submitted, amici have 7 days to submit briefs in support of the Respondent.

While I don't expect there to be quite the same volume of briefs supporting the PTO as the Petitioner, there will probably be at least a few.

Here is the the Supreme Court docket for the case.

Full Disclosure: I work for the team that wrote the brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty (he of the Diamond v. Chakrabarty Supreme Court case that established the patentability of genetically modified organisms).

going to have to read the dissent now

here: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-479.pdf

Yeah, which is why I was so surprised at this ruling. So, I looked it up...

The Constitution isn't at question here. Basically, schools (legally!) have way too much power. Guess what? If your mom wants to search your room for pot, the 4th Amendment doesn't apply to you. Sorry! And guess what? The school has, legally, basically the same rights as your parents do! Sorry again!

The school should NOT have the same rights your parents have. That's just stupid. Certain things should necessitate calling the cops, or your parents, and letting them handle it.

Clarence Thomas is insane. When you start making Scalia look like he might not be the most insane person on the SCOTUS that's impressive, but in a very bad way.

I'm not going to rush to his defense, but I have actually read his dissenting opinion (PDF).

Basically, as much as I dislike saying the majority got it wrong (because I wholeheartedly agree that strip-searching students is outrageous), they got it wrong.

Schools have way too much power. The ruling should be "You cannot strip-search a student". Period. Not "You can't strip-search students unless it's a really bad drug". That's insane... and how the hell can that be enforced, anyway? (The actual criterion they used was whether the drugs "presented a danger to students". That's just much too open-ended.)

Anyway, it sucks that this issue had to go to court, because what we need isn't a court ruling. What wee need is a new law, and courts aren't supposed to make new laws. We need a law limiting the power of schools as to what's reasonable and what's not. Searching undergarments for contraband should always be unreasonable. I don't care what you're looking for, you don't do it. You call the police and let them deal with the issue.

I was rather surprised by Thomas' dissent so I looked up the ruling. Excerpts from his dissenting opinion (most citations omitted for readability)... (sorry if it's tl;dr, I did try to omit parts that I didn't feel were necessary to make his points – in any event I'll try to summarize it after the long quotation).

08-479 Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding:

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the judgment against the school officials with respect to qualified immunity should be reversed. Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that the search of Savana Redding did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The majority imposes a vague and amorphous standard on school administrators. It also grants judges sweeping authority to second-guess the measures that these officials take to maintain discipline in their schools and ensure the health and safety of the students in their charge. This deep intrusion into the administration of public schools exemplifies why the Court should return to the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis under which "the judiciary was reluctant to interfere in the routine business of school administration, allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce rules and to maintain order." [snip]
I
"Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place." Thus, although public school students retain Fourth Amendment rights under this Court's precedent, those rights "are different . . . than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children".
[snip]
Seeking to reconcile the Fourth Amendment with this unique public school setting, the Court in T. L. O. held that a school search is "reasonable" if it is "'justified at its inception'" and "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'" The search under review easily meets this standard.
A
A "search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." As the majority rightly concedes, this search was justified at its inception because there were reasonable grounds to suspect that Redding possessed medication that violated school rules.
[snip]
Here, petitioners had reasonable grounds to suspect that Redding was in possession of prescription and non-prescription drugs in violation of the school's prohibition of the "non-medical use, possession, or sale of a drug" on school property or at school events. [snip] As an initial matter, school officials were aware that a few years earlier, a student had become "seriously ill" and "spent several days in intensive care" after ingesting prescription medication obtained from a classmate. ... the suspicion of drug possession arose at a middle school that had "a history of problems with students using and distributing prohibited and illegal substances on campus."
The school's substance-abuse problems had not abated by the 2003–2004 school year, which is when the challenged search of Redding took place. School officials had found alcohol and cigarettes in the girls' bathroom during the first school dance of the year and noticed that a group of students including Redding and Marissa Glines smelled of alcohol. Several weeks later, another student, Jordan Romero, reported that Redding had hosted a party before the dance where she served whiskey, vodka, and tequila. Romero had provided this report to school officials as a result of a meeting his mother scheduled with the officials afte

As a note, in the opinion the SCOTUS remanded part of the case in order for a lower court (9th Circuit) to determine if the school district is liable. P. 13 of the opinion; 17 of the pdf. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-479.pdf So there is a very distinct possibility there will be at least faceless accountability, if that provides any comfort.

Here is where you show me where in the petition for cert. anybody has raised constitutional questions, since according to Supreme Court's Rule 14, they won't consider it if it wasn't raised in the petition.

"Licenses", particularly the EULA kind ("here's a slip of paper we claim you must abide by if you use this software") are not contracts. They may be enforceable, but not because they're a contractual agreement.

The US Supreme Court disagrees with your claim that licenses are not contracts. See, for example, MedImmune, Inc v Genentech, Inc, 549 US 118, 124 (2007) ("We express no opinion on whether a nonrepudiating licensee is similarly relieved of its contractual obligation during a successful challenge to a patent's validity.").

Here is information for the docket for this case from the US Supreme Court's web site. Feel free to show your support by joining Join the American Civil Liberties Union.

US Supreme Court - Docket - 08-479

IANAL, For public locations, the Police need to abide by their own ROE and typically only probable cause or some other suspicion or wrongdoing is needed for the Police to search your person or vehicle (as you would NOT be located on/in YOUR 4th Amendment Protected private property but in a public location.)

There was a time when the 4th amendment protected people not places or things from unreasonable searches (Katz v United States, 1967). The court expressly held that the defendant's conversation was protected while using a public phone booth. Sadly, that view of the 4th amendment is gone by the wayside. Now, unless a "police officer" or employee acts deliberately, knowingly or recklessly with regard to your 4th amendment rights then the evidence may be excluded. If the officer is "merely negligent" or relies on a record system which does not have "widespread" errors, when he violates your 4th amendment rights you have no recourse or remedy. (Herring) http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-513.pdf

Actually, no. If you advertise virtual child pornography as real child pornography, in the eyes of U.S. law that is as bad as if it really is real child pornography, because it is the intent that matters. Someone tried to squirrel their way out of a charge on the basis that the material wasn't in fact child pornography, but it didn't work.

Their job is to decide whether a law is constitutional
Not quite. It's their job to interpret the entirety of the law, of which the constitution is the highest authority. If the law merely grants departments broad powers, in vague circumstances it does become the job of the Supreme Court to determine whether those circumstances apply. You can blame congress for passing crappy laws for that.
I too am having a hard time finding out exactly what laws this case was decided based on (without reading the whole decision). Here is some more info, admittedly in favor of the Navy.

It sounds like the actual laws being questioned changed over the duration of the trial. First they were charging that Navy hadn't filed an environmental impact study (which they hadn't although they have studied the heck out of it), which the law "requires" but the law lists no punishment for not doing so. Furthermore, the Navy already had an exemption (from at least some laws), and got another one after the trial started dealing directly with this law. It sounds like after all was said and done this turned into something like the "EPA is required to regulate CO2" lawsuit, requiring the Court to decide based on the powers and responsibilities of that agency.

I find what wasn't reported more interesting then what was. Many people still don't even know that Obama has a lawsuit against him in the Supreme Court.

Or that when Obama went to visit his grandmother on Oct 21, he had a lawsuit pending against him in Hawaii.

Maybe we should take a second and read what the Middle East thinks of Obama.

"But we were taken by surprise when our African Kenyan brother [Obama], who is an American national, made statements that shocked all his supporters in the Arab world, in Africa, and in the Islamic world.
"We hope that this is merely an elections 'clearance sale,' as they say in Egypt - in other words, merely an elections lie.

So what was it that Obama lied about to his Arab, African and Islamic brothers?

You all may call me a conspiracy theorist, and maybe I am, but my world is sure a lot more exciting. Even if these clams are extreme, aren't they at least worth looking in to? I mean, if they're false then why would supporters even care that we do?

A ruling on the pandering aspect of the protect act from may of this year

Quote:

[T]he dissent accuses us of silently overruling our prior decisions in Ferber and Free Speech Coalition. According to the dissent, Congress has made an end-run around the First Amendmentâ(TM)s protection of virtual child pornography by prohibiting proposals to transact in such images rather than prohibiting the images themselves. But an offer to provide or request to receive virtual child pornography is not prohibited by the statute. A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of the proposed transaction depicts real children. It is simply not true that this means âoea protected category of expression [will] inevitably be suppressed.â Simulated child pornography will be as available as ever, so long as it is offered and sought as such, and not as real child pornography.

From the wikipedia entry on lolicon

The Department of Justice appealed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. The case review docket is listed as 06-0694 and was scheduled for October 30, 2007 on the 2007-2008 schedule.[3] The Supreme Court heard arguments on the case and overturned the Eleventh Circuit's ruling 7-2 with Justices Souter and Ginsberg dissenting. The court stressed that virtual child pornography remained under the protection of the First Amendment, except when it was offered or solicited under the mistaken impression that actual children were depicted.[72]

In May 2008, the Supreme Court, while ruling on the PROTECT ACT, ruled that the act cannot be used to punish persons who view or make virtual child porn, provided it is not promoted as actual child porn

The damages owed by Exxon for the Valdez oil spill were recently limited and substantially reduced because the court found the original damages excessively punitive. So if it makes sense for Exxon perhaps it also makes sense to apply a similar theory of limitation of damages elsewhere.

The opinion in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker explicitly says that "[t]he punitive damages award against Exxon was excessive as a matter of maritime common law" (emphasis added). So there doesn't seem to be much precedent there. Furthermore, the issue in the RIAA cases is statutory damages, not punitive. Conservative judges (like 4.5/9 of SCOTUS) would probably argue that determining statutory damages are a matter of public policy, so courts should generally defer to the legislature's judgment.

The US is not at War. You have been fooled, along with many others, that the Iraq invasion was a result of Congress declaring war. The US Congress did absolutely no such thing.

Just because the bush administration keeps saying 'War', does not change the reality of the fact that it is not a declared war.

I guess this is just one more reason not to trust Wikkipedia and an example of how it can fool you. First, These guys seemto think we are at war, they said the AUMF does activate the president's war powers. "First, while we assume that the AUMF activated the President's war powers, see Hamdi v. Rums-feld, 542 U. S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion), and that those powers include the authority to convene military commissions in appropriate circumstances,"

The Hamdi V rumsfield case decided by the district court said "There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the "necessary and appropriate force" Congress has authorized the President to use." and "In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of "necessary and appropriate force," Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here."

Again, the look like their saying we are at war. It should also be noted that the government lost their position in this case on the supreme court level and the court still maintained that the AUMF took us to war.

Regardless of whether or not congress actually use the words "declare war", the Supreme Court is willing to give the words used the same weight as a declaration of war. It is the supreme court that will be the final arbitrators on it and regardless of the impression that wikkipedia want to give you, the SCOTUS is the correct opinion to follow.

In any case, the meat and bones of the judgment appears to be this, as stated at pages 58 and 60: The weapons protected by the Second Amendment are those that 'were in common use at the time'. However, this appears to extend to 'classes' of weapons, rather than specific designs (for example, semi-automatic and automatic firearms were not around until the middle of the 19th century, and would therefore certainly not have been 'in common use at the time' and would likely be prohibited), so essentially limits the second amendment to pistols and rifles; I am unsure how this would apply to things like submachine guns, assault rifles, and sniper rifles which likely did not even exist as 'classes' at the time; they don't really say, except to say that "It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service -M-16s and the like- may be banned..." which does imply in fact that assault rifles as a class do not survive the 'in common use' test.

But, from page 8 of the decision (page 11 of the pdf):

Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 35-36 (2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.

In the section you cite, at the bottom of page 55 (58 of the pdf), the comparison is made of small arms against tanks and bombers. It implies that the second amendment will not be extended to allowing citizens to keep and bear tanks and bombers. In the section I cite, they clearly indicate that modern advances may be bearable arms, though again the section you cite modifies this. Bearable arms appear to be something that an average citizen might reasonably have, such as a handgun, shotgun, or hunting rifle, semi-automatic or manually operated, but would not include a specifically military weapon such as a fully automatic machine gun.

In this I think they err, as on page 8 (11 of the pdf) when they define "arms" they state, "the term was applied, then as now, to weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity." However, before and after this sentence in this section they give numerous examples of "arms" that encompass all weapons and armor of offense and defense, regardless of military design and intent.

RTFD.

All of your questions are answered, if you choose to listen.

Wow.. You truly are clueless aren't you.

That does not make it an impeachable offense. What crime was committed? The president can only be impeached for Treason, high crime and misdemeanors.

Do you even know what is going on here? The EPA was taken to court by Massachusetts and a couple of other states for not regulating emissions from new cars. The EPA claimed it lacked statutory authority to regulate it or even consider to regulate it. It also said that there was no official legal definition defining Co2 and car exhaust as a pollutant covered under their statutory jurisdiction. The supreme court ruled that it met the definitions and said it had to determine if it was a pollutant. As far as I can tell, it did that. The president not looking at the email or telling them not to implement anything doesn't go against the decision. It isn't contempt of court or anything and it certainly isn't grounds for impeachment.

You see, the ruling, and you can read it here, only says that the EPA has authority by statute to regulate the emissions in question, that someone claims to be harmed by it, That the court had jurisdiction over the case (which the dissent argues against) and "On remand, EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute."

It doesn't say that the president has to except it or anything of the sorts. The EPA argued the case without him and can "ground it's reasoning for action or inaction in the statute" without implementing rules. What he did isn't what I would consider a wise move but it isn't an impeachable offense. Don't get your hopes up for something that just won't happen.

And in case your wondering what "EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute." means, I will tell you. It means that it has to determine if it is or isn't a pollutant and follow existing laws towards the treatment of it. Changing the text or actions and all, as long as it is within the governing statute's limits doesn't matter at all.

you'll hop over to the vote tally page and
see which list your representative is on. If you
disagree with their vote, contact them and let them know they fucked up.

Interestingly enough, neither Obama nor Hillary bothered to vote on this back in February.

The best we can hope for now is that maybe the Supreme Court will overturn it as unconstitutional.

You can find your representative here, and your congressman here.

Let's flood every link in this post with /. traffic. Then, let's write our Congressmen, and maybe some Supreme Court Justices.

Maybe, just maybe, that might get somebody's attention. If not, at least then they will know we are watching.

And you can know that you did something, even if it is a bit late

It clearly seems like LG was in the wrong here, but this was a case where both parties actually produce and sell goods using the patents they own. Has the US Supreme Court had anything to say about the numerous cases involving patent squatters/submarine patents? That seems like it ought to be a more serious issue.

If you look at the Supreme Court's decision (http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-937.pdf) it will be clear how it turns, first, on whether the patent license to Intel permits Intel to sell goods that practice the patents, and second, did the goods sold by Intel practice the patents. The answer to both questions was yes, triggering the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of patent rights with respect to the product that was sold. That was true even where the patent had method claims, and when those would not be completely practiced until the sold product was combined with other components. The rationale for that aspect was that the sold items practiced the patent by embodying all of the inventive matter and having in practice no other use except to practice the patent: the components left to be added were standard stuff, while all of the inventive content was in the items sold.

None of that depended in any way on the question whether the patent licensor engaged in manufacture on its own account. The court did not need to consider that. So the decision clearly applies to patent holders who grant licenses to others to sell patented products, irrespective of whether the licensors themselves do manufacturing or not.

-wb-

As the final arbiter of the law, the Court is charged with ensuring the American people the promise of equal justice under law and, thereby, also functions as guardian and interpreter of the Constitution.

Here is a link to the U.S. Constitution. And another quote.

Article 3: The judicial Branch Section 2 Clause 1: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

I'm missing the part where they make laws. I think that's the legislature's job.
Also from the constitution:

Article 1: The legislative Branch Section 8 Clause 18: To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

I've made bold the part we are talking about.

Here is the definition of Legislature

An officially elected or otherwise selected body of people vested with the responsibility and power to make laws for a political unit, such as a state or nation.

Here is the definition of Judge
And a quote:

To make a decision or reach a conclusion after examining all the factual evidence presented. To form an opinion after evaluating the facts and applying the law. A public officer chosen or elected to preside over and to administer the law in a court of justice; one who controls the proceedings in a courtroom and decides questions of law or discretion.

I read the entire page and didn't see where judges make any laws.

Here's more from Answers.com about the court system in the United States.
And of course a quote.

... judicial branches of the federal and state governments charged with the application and interpretation of the law.

Here's one from wiki.answers.com
And the quote

The United States Constitution set up a system of checks and balances whereby each branch can check the power of the other two branches while all three share in the policy and legislative making process on a daily basis. The major function of the legislative branch is to make laws. The major function of the judicial branch is to interpret the laws.

Now that's a lot of evidence for my argument that judges interpret the law the legislature makes. Now if you can give me something beyond "take my word for it" or a D&D analogy about how great a DM you are, I'm willi

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/06-694.htm

My mistake for not following up on what Wikipedia said. You are right.

I think the blog post on p2pnet gives this motion to dismiss a lot more credit than it is due. The basic crux of motion's the argument is that Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (Decision Here) raises the pleading standards for what a lawsuit must allege to a level that the RIAA's complaint, as currently written cannot meet.

The argument used does not challenge law suit on any substantive legal ground (i.e., the law underlying the complaint), but rather on procedural grounds. That basically means that the motion alleges that that RIAA/MPAA failed to meet a proper standard of proof with respect alleging enough facts to merit a suit.

I externed at a Federal Court this summer, and we saw plenty of these motions with this same argument for many different types of cases. Most of the time this procedural error was the fault of some idiot lawyer forgetting to check the validity of the case law cited in some boilerplate form complaint that the submitting firm had in their document library. The cases were usually dismissed, with leave to amend the complaint and refile one a sufficient complaint could be drafted. This is not "groundbreaking" will not stop the RIAA cold in its tracks. They will file another suit once they tweak their complaint to meat Twombly's new standard of proof.

I wish the students luck in fighting the suits against them and hope they win, but this is nothing more than a legal pothole, not the roadblock that the summary makes it out to be.

gateways to a common carrier network.

That's a widely held misconception, but at least in the United States the Internet is not a common carrier network.

As legal defenses go, that one's screwed.

(If you wanna parse the certiorari yourself, it's at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04pdf/04-277.pdf. PDF warning!)

John Jay, First Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, State Of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1,4 (1794).

True enough. USA pennies have used the phrase "ONE CENT" for more than one hundred years. If Canada's mint wants to claim "ONE CENT" as their trademark, they'll have to duke it out at the highest court in the land.

Take that, strong Canadian dollar!

The reason that "In God we trust" and "One nation under God" should be removed is because they further the "Christian Nation" myth. Christians enact laws to put their symbols and slogans on things, then point to those things and say "See? Look! Christian nation! It's on our *money*."

And the longer they're left in, the more people think you're just an "uppity atheist" for trying to get them removed (i.e.: restored to their previous, neutral state). Even in the Newdow case to get "under God" removed from the pledge, the court pointed to "in God we Trust" and said "nobody really cares about [that] anymore". (Implying: "So why are YOU making such a big deal out of THIS?")

If leaving these religious mottoes littering our government means that people think that they have the right to go even further, I'm all for ripping them out.

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/03pdf/03-55 54.pdf

As a result of this decision; ANY law enforcement officer ANYWHERE in the US can demand ID [in the US] now and you MUST produce it.

That's it. Goodnight Mr. Righi - where ever you are.

Aren't you proud of YOUR government? (sarcastic)

Is the judicial system really qualified to test for items such as obviousness in a technical field in order to dismissing a patent. For every witness that says it is obvious, I'm sure the opposing side will say it's not. Perhaps we should have a select group of technical judges just for this purpose.

Yes, both sides are usually going to find experts who will testify to what they want said -- and to at least some extent, both will usually be correct. Relatively few patents are granted for things quite as obvious as most people think -- but most aren't exactly blazing new trails into completely unexplored wilderness (so to speak) either. The most obvious patents are rarely used as the basis for a lawsuit in any case. A company that's going to try to make money off their patents wants to look invincible -- to the point that if they send you a letter saying they think you're infringing on their patents, the only reasonable reaction is to settle as quickly as possible. The last thing they want is to waste lots of time and money in court with a weak patent, only to lose the case because it's obvious, and (worse) end up looking weaker so anybody else they go after for the next ten years (or so) will fight back because they think there's a good chance of winning.

As far as obviousness goes, there's also been a fairly noticeable change in the US recently. The Supreme Court of the US (in the case of KSR v. Teleflex) recently ruled that the criteria that have been used by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit were basically flawed. The rules they had previously followed said that to show a patent was obvious, you basically needed to show where previous documents showed all the elements in the patent, and you needed to show some way in which a document suggested combining those elements into a single invention (e.g. if two elements were shown in separate documents, that a third document listed both of the first two in its bibliography).

In the KSR v. Teleflex decision, the Supreme Court ruled that it was not enough to show that the particular combination of elements you used hadn't been specifically suggested previously. Rather, you have to show that you got (for example) some result beyond what would be expected by combining those elements in that particular fashion. In case anybody cares, this ruling also discusses the criteria that had been used previously.

As far as there being a panel of judges specifically for looking at patents, that already exists: I already mentioned the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This court works almost exclusively with patent cases. It was created for more or less the reasons you suggest.

Along with ruling on things like whether a particular patent is obvious, the CAFC attempts to create criteria that give the lower courts guidance in how to make that determination as well. In KSR v. Teleflex, the Supreme Court not only changed the final ruling, but (more importantly) said that the criteria that were previously in use needed to be changed. As such, this will have a considerable effect on the rulings of lower courts in patent cases, probably for years to come.

Here is a PDF of the ruling issued by SCOTUS. The essence is that "retail price maintenance" can have a procompetitive effect, in that it fosters interbrand competition while reducing intrabrand competition. For example, Bose Stereo competes with other brands, and sellers of Bose equipment know they won't be undersold by a different price-cutting franchise. This procompetitive effect was ruled to outweigh the dangers of anticompetitive price-fixing of the sort done by cartels and monopolies.

Both cases mentioned in TFA do point to likely collusion between the wholesale buyer and the auction reseller. It looks as if the wholesalers have indeed tried to circumvent their agreements to maintain fixed retail prices. Nothing to be alarmed about here.

We can all read the SCOTUS decision: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/06-48 0.pdf

What it says is not all price flooring is automatically illegal (per se). If the pricing is used to generate services or differentiate the product within a market to be competitive then why not.

What SCOTUS is arguing is that price flooring needs to be decided on it's merits (rule of reason). They say, it is still illegal to have price flooring within a manufacturing cabal. It is also illegal to have price flooring for a monopoly (as if that makes any difference). Generally price flooring is illegal if it is anticompetitive and legal of it is pro-competive.

As to the sale of handbags, anyone can make a handbag and thousands do. In this case the manufacturer had floor pricing to maintain marketing material and consumer cache. This manufacturer wanted a small botique feel to the sale of their products and not a Walmart experience. The retailer in question just wanted to boost sales by under cutting smaller shops and make their margin on volume. The retailer had signed agreements to price floors.

In this case, I too favor the manufacturer. SCOTUS has not thrown out the Sherman act, but merely noted that price flooring in certain circumstances can be OK. I'll still buy handbags at WallyWorld.

Granular decision making: Good

I don't think it's a question of what they have to do.

These guys sent a General to the Supreme Court to argue that it's America being invaded.

No, really. You have to read the whole thing to get a sense of it, but it's worth it. Hunt up "habeas corpus" in the U.S. Constitution when you get to the part where he says

Those preconditions are "Invasion or Rebellion", and he's arguing that Congress really did "sort of, stumble" upon the suspension.

The only question is, how can we keep the damage to an absolute minimum? Silence and prayer until 2009 seems the wisest course.

No, really. You don't put out fires with gasoline.

Then Verizon shouldn't have any problem getting the patent invalidated, in light of KSR v. Teleflex. Or is the poster suffering from hindsight bias?

(c) The flaws in the Federal Circuit's analysis relate mostly to its narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry consequent in its application of the TSM test. The Circuit first erred in holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve. Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed. Second, the appeals court erred in assuming that a person of ordinary skill in the art attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those prior art elements designed to solve the same problem. The court wrongly concluded that because Asano's primary purpose was solving the constant ratio problem, an inventor considering how to put a sensor on an adjustable pedal would have no reason to consider putting it on the Asano pedal. It is common sense that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. (emphasis added)

I'd say that the Supreme Court disagrees with you, the USPTO, and the Federal Circuit Court on the definition of "obvious." From KSR v Teleflex:

(c) The flaws in the Federal Circuit's analysis relate mostly to its narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry consequent in its application of the TSM test. The Circuit first erred in holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve. Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed. Second, the appeals court erred in assuming that a person of ordinary skill in the art attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those prior art elements designed to solve the same problem. The court wrongly concluded that because Asano's primary purpose was solving the constant ratio problem, an inventor considering how to put a sensor on an adjustable pedal would have no reason to consider putting it on the Asano pedal. It is common sense that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.

There's a lot more in the same vein if you take the time to read the whole decision.

Microsoft made a statement in its recent motion for a new trial in Lucent vs. Microsoft, a patent infringement case that it lost back in February to the tune of $1,500,000,000. It argued that a jury in a new trial should have the opportunity to "hear and weigh the evidence" that Microsoft claims makes the Alcatel-Lucent patents invalid, under a new standard of obviousness recently established by the Supreme Court in KSR vs. Teleflex. Microsoft said:

KSR calls into question the very presumption of validity, since it demonstrates that the PTO itself applied the wrong obviousness test to the patents-in-suit. Had the PTO applied the KSR test, the patents-in-suit may well not have issued. While 35 U.S.C. 282 does establish a presumption of validity, it does not mandate the "clear and convincing" burden of proof. This burden of proof could and should be altered by the courts because of KSR. See KSR, slip op. at 22-23 ("We need not reach the question whether the failure to disclose Asano during the prosecution of Engelgau voids the presumption of validity given to issued patents, for claim 4 is obvious despite the presumption. We nevertheless think it appropriate to note that the rationale underlying the presumption--that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the claims--seems much diminished here."). [Note 2, p. 10, emphasis added.]

So, given Microsoft's anti-patent assertion in this case where it found itself on the wrong side of someone's patents, it would seem hard for them to ask us to presume that these 200+ patents of their own, issued well before KSR vs. Teleflex, are valid over the prior art that the Linux world will undoubtedly find in abundance once Microsoft finally has to reveal their claims. That is, if it ever actually tries to enforce them rather than blabbing away at its current "my dad can beat up your dad" playground level of discourse.

Obligatory disclaimer: I am a registered patent agent and an independent inventor, but not a lawyer. I don't provide legal advice or services to anyone regarding issued patents. And this wouldn't be legal advice even if I did.

AT&T holds a patent on an apparatus for digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech. Microsoft's Windows operating system, it is conceded, has the potential to infringe AT&T's patent, because Windows incorporates software code that, when installed, enables a computer to process speech in the manner claimed by that patent. It bears emphasis, however, that uninstalled Windows software does not infringe AT&T's patent any more than a computer standing alone does; instead, the patent is infringed only when a computer is loaded with Windows and is thereby rendered capable of performing as the patented speech processor. The question before us: Does Microsoft's liability extend to computers made in another country when loaded with Windows software copied abroad from a master disk or electronic transmission dispatched by Microsoft from the United States? Our answer is "No." The master disk or electronic transmission Microsoft sends from the United States is never installed on any of the foreign-made computers in question. Instead, copies made abroad are used for installation. Because Microsoft does not export from the United States the copies actually installed, it does not "suppl[y] . . . from the United States" "components" of the relevant computers, and therefore is not liable under 271(f) as currently written. Plausible arguments can be made for and against extending 271(f) to the conduct charged in this case as infringing AT&T's patent. Recognizing that 271(f) is an exception to the general rule that our patent law does not apply extraterritorially, we resist giving the language in which Congress cast 271(f) an expansive interpretation. Our decision leaves to Congress' informed judgment any adjustment of 271(f) it deems necessary or proper.