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This copyright action arises from a termination notice sent by the appellant to the appellee, seeking to recapture rights to various characters created by her grandfather, Alan Alexander Milne, who authored the "Winnie-the-Pooh" children's books. Milne originally granted various rights in those works to the appellee in 1930. Then, in 1983, due to a change in copyright law in 1976, Milne's heirs considered terminating the 1930 grant outright, but instead entered into a new agreement that revoked the original grant and re-issued rights in the works to the appellee. The appellant seeks to invalidate the 1983 agreement based on 1998 legislation. The 1998 legislation only authorizes the termination of copyright agreements executed before 1978. Because the 1983 revocation and re-grant were valid, we affirm the district court's decision.

With this case, it might be better to read the court's opinion (PDF warning), see how they came to their decision, and then decide whether you agree with it.

"We conclude this case is distinguishable from Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), a Ninth Circuit case upon which Snow relies heavily. In Konop, plaintiff Konop created a list of Hawaiian Airlines employees who were eligible to access the website. Id. at 872. To gain access, one had to enter an eligible employee's name, create a password, and click "SUBMIT" indicating acceptance of the terms and conditions, which prohibited users from disclosing the website's contents and prohibited viewing by Hawaiian Airlines management. Id. at 872-73. In contrast, Snow alleged that registrants needed only to create a password and acknowledge that they were not associated with DirecTV or another prohibited entity. Konop's website, unlike Snow's, required users wishing to view the electronic bulletin board's contents to have knowledge (an eligible employee's name) that was not publicly available."

Here's the full text of the Frederick v. Morse case...typical legalese, but it also provides links to the cases which set the precedents. IANAL, but my impression after reading the case decision all the way through is that Frederick's speech was considered protected under the 1st and 14th Amendments based on its political (albeit dumb-humor and ill-timed) message...a message which Morse took umbrage to because of who he was and where he was at the time.

I don't think the courts will use the Frederick case as a precedent, but I'm pretty certain the kid's attorney will use Tinker and its precedents to support the case.

If nothing else comes of this, though, I do hope the school unbends enough to shuck out for the kid's therapy. After this, he's definitely gonna need it, whether he needed it or not beforehand.

Just my two cents' worth...save up the change for a root beer or something...

1. That 17 USC 602(a)(2) by its own language is limited to the import prohibition in subsection (a); the prohibition in subsection (b) remains in force.
2. That copies and phonorecords are defined in 17 USC 101 as being material objects, which means that no physical object in Russia can be moved to the US via the Internet, making section 602 a red herring.
3. That the courts have stated that unauthorized downloading of copyrighted works is an infringement of the reproduction right of the copyright holder. See e.g. Napster and Intellectual Reserve.
4. That the courts will generally assign liability for the reproduction infringement to the downloader, barring unusual circumstances, like downloads that were in fact caused by a hacker, and not the user of the computer. See e.g. Netcom.
5. That the standard of proof used in a civil copyright case (e.g. one brought by the RIAA) is the preponderance of the evidence standard, which results in the defendant being liable if thinks that there was as little as a 51% chance that he actually did it, even if they entertain reasonable doubts (e.g. the presence of an open WAP, that there are other people able to use the computer).
6. That 17 USC 1008 is inapplicable, because it does not cover downloading. See e.g. Napster and Diamond. Also see the important definitions in sections 1001 and 101 and what the law would require if 1008 were applicable to computers, per sections 1002 and 1003.
7. That just because RIAA has not sued someone yet does not mean that they cannot or will not. See e.g. the suits against Napster (which started in 1999) and the suits against users (which started in 2003). Tactical concerns, such as how to use the limited budget for legal action in the most effective way, or which

1. That 17 USC 602(a)(2) by its own language is limited to the import prohibition in subsection (a); the prohibition in subsection (b) remains in force.
2. That copies and phonorecords are defined in 17 USC 101 as being material objects, which means that no physical object in Russia can be moved to the US via the Internet, making section 602 a red herring.
3. That the courts have stated that unauthorized downloading of copyrighted works is an infringement of the reproduction right of the copyright holder. See e.g. Napster and Intellectual Reserve.
4. That the courts will generally assign liability for the reproduction infringement to the downloader, barring unusual circumstances, like downloads that were in fact caused by a hacker, and not the user of the computer. See e.g. Netcom.
5. That the standard of proof used in a civil copyright case (e.g. one brought by the RIAA) is the preponderance of the evidence standard, which results in the defendant being liable if thinks that there was as little as a 51% chance that he actually did it, even if they entertain reasonable doubts (e.g. the presence of an open WAP, that there are other people able to use the computer).
6. That 17 USC 1008 is inapplicable, because it does not cover downloading. See e.g. Napster and Diamond. Also see the important definitions in sections 1001 and 101 and what the law would require if 1008 were applicable to computers, per sections 1002 and 1003.
7. That just because RIAA has not sued someone yet does not mean that they cannot or will not. See e.g. the suits against Napster (which started in 1999) and the suits against users (which started in 2003). Tactical concerns, such as how to use the limited budget for legal action in the most effective way, or which

Deb can preach the myriad benefits of DRM from her 'bully pulpit' as much as she likes...the fact is that the FCC has no authority on this matter, so her preaching won't go beyond establishing her personal views on the issue. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals made the limits of the FCC on this issue quite clear when they struck down the Broadcast Flag (PDF warning).

That's nice, but it would not be your choice.

A jury can decide on the matter of whether or not there is liability. And if there is liability, they get to decide on the matter of how much to award. But if they are awarding damages, they only have a choice within a window. This window runs between $750 and $30,000 per work infringed. It can go up to $150,000 per work infringed if they find that the infringer acted intentionally. It can go down to $200 per work infringed if they find that the infringer didn't know and had no reason to know, that they were infringing. (Obviously the range could only be $200 - $30,000 or $750 to $150,000, since the findings for raising or lowering the range are mutually exclusive)

A jury cannot go outside of this range. If they try, all that will happen is that they will be scolded by the judge, and the case will be tried again with a new jury. (This is because additur, which is when a judge increases an award because the jury decided too low, is not allowed in federal court)

So you'd just end up wasting everyone's time and money, without otherwise accomplishing anything.

Some sample jury instructions can be found here.

Also, your math is wrong. You left out twelve cents.

It's not worth $0.08 per page for you to sign up yourself?

I wonder how this case is going to deal with existing ruling by U.S. District Judge Patricia Seitz in the 2002 case Access Now and Robert Gumson v. Southwest Airlines Co. (pdf) stating that Southwest did not have to redesign its website to be more accessible to the blind.

The 11 Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in 2004.

I have to say that I'm very much against these rulings. Making websites accessible to the blind is trivial if the website is designed properly in the first place. It's only difficult if you mash the damn thing up with bad flash and poorly coded javascript.

Yes, but not in full since the SCOTUS appeal was declined; and again, IAmNotALawyer; I'm just a bright layman.

Thus my point about jurisdiction. Purposeful availment = some other interaction that lets you know that the person you're dealing with is coming from that community. It's pretty clearly more than just putting something on a website.

Thank you! The Toys & Zippo cases referenced by the 3rd C. are quite enlightening. On the plus side, they seems to imply to my lay ears that if you're running a free public gallery, with content available to anyone who visits, there is no purposeful jurisdictional availment; which ergo may benefit ars gratia artis (and porna gratia pornae).

On the minus side, it still seems to require that any adult e-commerce site become familiar with the particular local community standards for every person who asks to subscribe, since even one customer in the jurisdiction has the potential to meet the test. Thus, we go right back to the unknowable multiplicity of applications that the Nitke plaintiffs seem to be arguing.

As you originally said, it's a little bit of help, at least for those not out to make a buck. I've only rarely felt a need to pay for porn, given the free abundance. (Which may be tied to commercial market conditions, but anyway....) Also, given the unarousing crap that is becoming prevalent on many commercial sites, perhaps getting porn production back into purely amateur, er... hands?... might be a good thing. =P

Subsequently, Dirmeyer used an assumed name and sent in $55 along with an executed application form to the AABBS. Defendant Robert Thomas called Dirmeyer at his undercover telephone number in Memphis, Tennessee, acknowledged receipt of his application, and authorized him to log-on with his personal password. Thereafter, Dirmeyer dialed the AABBS's telephone number, logged-on and, using his computer/modem in Memphis, downloaded the GIF files listed in counts 2-7 of the Defendants' indictments.

The mere fact that an entity operates a commercial, interactive Web site does not, without more, subject that entity to jurisdiction anywhere in the world. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003).

No it is defined in it's legal terms with in the court system it is used, Litigant Filing Without Counsel http://www.id.uscourts.gov/pro-se.htm, any other definition would be out of context.

I didn't know what the term pro se in TFA meant...

I know you're trying to be funny, but Google is your friend:

Query:

define:pro se

Definitions of pro se on the Web:

* A person who does not hire a lawyer and appears for himself/herself in court.
http://clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/glossary.asp

* To act on one's own behalf; appearing for oneself; representing oneself; to represent oneself in a court action without an attorney.
http://www.courts.mo.gov/osca/index.nsf/0/8b69295b 674dde2186256e15004ea27f

* Acting without the aid of an attorney; representing yourself.
http://www.oah.wa.gov/Glossary.htm

* Representing oneself. Serving as one's own lawyer.
http://www.uscourts.gov/journalistguide/glossary.h tml

* When the defendant is not represented by counsel, as he or she has waived the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding, or is otherwise not represented in a civil proceeding.
http://mova.missouri.org/cjterms.htm

* A person who does not have an attorney to represent him or her and who appears on his or her own behalf before the Court.
http://www.gaappeals.us/cguide/glossary.php

* Latin phrase ("in one's own behalf") applied to defendants who waive the right to counsel and act as their own lawyers in criminal cases.
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/LocPubs/crimglossary.h tm

* A Latin phrase that means "for himself." A person who represents himself in a legal matter alone without the help of a lawyer is said to appear pro se.
http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/glossary.aspx

* A person appearing without representation by an attorney for himself; in his own behalf; in person.
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/prose_man/glossary.ht ml

* When a person who chooses to act as his or her own attorney in a legal action.
https://www.co-childsupport.com/elpaso/glossary/gl ossary.htm

* When a party is not represented by a lawyer but is representing himself.
http://www.courts.state.mn.us/districts/fourth/Gen eral/LegalTerms6.htm

* Without the benefit of counsel; the act of speaking or representing oneself in a court of law.
http://www.alqlist.com/glossary.html

* A debtor who is not represent

I didn't know what the term pro se in TFA meant...

I know you're trying to be funny, but Google is your friend:

Query:

define:pro se

Definitions of pro se on the Web:

* A person who does not hire a lawyer and appears for himself/herself in court.
http://clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/glossary.asp

* To act on one's own behalf; appearing for oneself; representing oneself; to represent oneself in a court action without an attorney.
http://www.courts.mo.gov/osca/index.nsf/0/8b69295b 674dde2186256e15004ea27f

* Acting without the aid of an attorney; representing yourself.
http://www.oah.wa.gov/Glossary.htm

* Representing oneself. Serving as one's own lawyer.
http://www.uscourts.gov/journalistguide/glossary.h tml

* When the defendant is not represented by counsel, as he or she has waived the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding, or is otherwise not represented in a civil proceeding.
http://mova.missouri.org/cjterms.htm

* A person who does not have an attorney to represent him or her and who appears on his or her own behalf before the Court.
http://www.gaappeals.us/cguide/glossary.php

* Latin phrase ("in one's own behalf") applied to defendants who waive the right to counsel and act as their own lawyers in criminal cases.
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/LocPubs/crimglossary.h tm

* A Latin phrase that means "for himself." A person who represents himself in a legal matter alone without the help of a lawyer is said to appear pro se.
http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/glossary.aspx

* A person appearing without representation by an attorney for himself; in his own behalf; in person.
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/prose_man/glossary.ht ml

* When a person who chooses to act as his or her own attorney in a legal action.
https://www.co-childsupport.com/elpaso/glossary/gl ossary.htm

* When a party is not represented by a lawyer but is representing himself.
http://www.courts.state.mn.us/districts/fourth/Gen eral/LegalTerms6.htm

* Without the benefit of counsel; the act of speaking or representing oneself in a court of law.
http://www.alqlist.com/glossary.html

* A debtor who is not represent

I didn't know what the term pro se in TFA meant...

I know you're trying to be funny, but Google is your friend:

Query:

define:pro se

Definitions of pro se on the Web:

* A person who does not hire a lawyer and appears for himself/herself in court.
http://clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/glossary.asp

* To act on one's own behalf; appearing for oneself; representing oneself; to represent oneself in a court action without an attorney.
http://www.courts.mo.gov/osca/index.nsf/0/8b69295b 674dde2186256e15004ea27f

* Acting without the aid of an attorney; representing yourself.
http://www.oah.wa.gov/Glossary.htm

* Representing oneself. Serving as one's own lawyer.
http://www.uscourts.gov/journalistguide/glossary.h tml

* When the defendant is not represented by counsel, as he or she has waived the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding, or is otherwise not represented in a civil proceeding.
http://mova.missouri.org/cjterms.htm

* A person who does not have an attorney to represent him or her and who appears on his or her own behalf before the Court.
http://www.gaappeals.us/cguide/glossary.php

* Latin phrase ("in one's own behalf") applied to defendants who waive the right to counsel and act as their own lawyers in criminal cases.
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/LocPubs/crimglossary.h tm

* A Latin phrase that means "for himself." A person who represents himself in a legal matter alone without the help of a lawyer is said to appear pro se.
http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/glossary.aspx

* A person appearing without representation by an attorney for himself; in his own behalf; in person.
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/prose_man/glossary.ht ml

* When a person who chooses to act as his or her own attorney in a legal action.
https://www.co-childsupport.com/elpaso/glossary/gl ossary.htm

* When a party is not represented by a lawyer but is representing himself.
http://www.courts.state.mn.us/districts/fourth/Gen eral/LegalTerms6.htm

* Without the benefit of counsel; the act of speaking or representing oneself in a court of law.
http://www.alqlist.com/glossary.html

* A debtor who is not represent

I am somewhat torn on the issue, so first my argument against him...

The data on the laptop belonged to IAC, not the employee. It wasn't personal emails to his wife or his personal credit card information. It was data gained during his employment and deleting those files was a malicious act taken after his employment ended. Would anyone here really say it is OK for someone to login to the server on their last day and wipe the company's customer database when they don't have a backup? What about a bank employee deleting financial records? Once you agree that those occurences of deleting data would be wrong, it's just a matter of scale to determine how wrong his actions were.

On the other hand, his contract specifically let him return or delete the data on his laptop. They probably didn't anticipate him leaving this way, and maybe he was supposed to backup those files to the company server or store them there in the first place. I don't think it matters though. When you have a contract (like his employment contract), you HAVE to take the plain meaning of it's words. The judge in the opinion tried several different ways to explain how IAC may have been thinking when they created the contract, but you can only argue that if the actual words of the contract are ambiguous. That is why lawyers make so much money, they are supposed to catch things like that. Saying that he can delete the data before returning the laptop is pretty plain to me. In either case, if the employement agreement was a standard employment contract for the company with minor modifications, any ambiguities must be decided against the drafter. If he has some say in the wording of the contract and had things changed from the first draft that wouldn't be the case though.

Also note that th

Of course, take this all with a grain of salt as I am not a lawyer...

. . . but the Judge is not. If one reads what the court wrote, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/R31AIRTM.pdf , then it is pretty clear that the court understood how machines work. If I put a $10,000.00 database on a laptop and give it to a guy to use and he erases it, how is that any different from hacking into my network and erasing the same data base? This is a short (7 pages) and clear opinion. Perhaps one should read it before declaring the sky is falling.

FTFA:
"Jacob Citrin was once employed by International Airport Centers and given a laptop to use in his company's real estate related business. The work consisted of identifying "potential acquisition targets."

Essentially the product of his job was the information about which properties to acquire.

From the Judges decision (PDF here: http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/R31363C0.pdf ):
"decided to quit IAC in violation
of his employment contract, he resolved to destroy files that
incriminated himself and other files that were also the
property of his employer"

He apprently deleted the files containing the information he had been hired to collect after violating what sounds like a non-compete clause in his employment contract because he wanted to go into business for himself doing the exact same thing he'd been hired to do.

Poor analogy: As a surveyor for a mining company, it's my job to find mineral deposits for my employer. Using company time and equipment, I find such a site, but fail to disclose the location because I decide I want to start my own personal Survey firm. I'd say they'd have a pretty darn good case against me.

I also don't think the case from TFA is going to get laughed right out of court.

existence of some type of policy -- regardless of what that policy actually is -- is now enough for companies to eschew any liability for leaking consumers' data.
That's a ridiculous statement.

Indeed. The SecurityFocus article is very chicken-littlish. One almost wonders whether they read the actual decision, or only heard about it.

Reading the actual decision, one sees that the judge's decision didn't say anything remotely like what the article claims. It was plaintiff, not the judge, who chose to argue that Brazos violated its own policy.

Guin argues that Brazos failed to comply with the self-imposed [duty] in Brazos's privacy policy -- that Brazos will "restrict access to nonpublic personal information to authorized persons who need to know."

Okay, so I actually read the opinion, at The court's site. The substance of it is that there's no question that google is infringing a copyright (makes sense), because it is redisplaying images that are strictly for sale, and while the images are smaller, P10 itself sells images of that size, and the smaller resolution is still a form of reproduction. Google tries to rely on fair use, but fails because the court considered a "consumptive use" because google's ad service renders furnishing the image a commercial use, and since the reproduction is essentially identical to the image (though smaller), and the smaller image is actual for sale on the site. It's pretty much a slam-dunk for P10.

People on /. need a heaping helping of knowing what the law means. (Hint: It's not "what my favorite company is doing is fine" or "what I think is right")

More than that, there are rumours going around that he might secretly be black.

Don't know if anyone's posted this link to the ruling on the District Court of DC website:

http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/opinions/2006/Hogan/20 06-MS-11~11:4:55~2-7-2006-a.pdf

Just goes to show how chicken little the left really is on this subject.

Let me get this straight, wiretaps have not EVEN DOUBLED since 911, despite the war, despite so called invastions of privacy, and you want to cry more about it?

Personally, sounds like they have not done enough wiretapping, I would have expected a doubling or tripling of wiretaps.

Instead I find they are very restrained in their requests.

FYI: here is the baseline for 1999 and why they were tapping. 890 were for narcotics, and only 45 landed in the "other" catagory that was not a criminal investigation.

http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/2000_rep ort/table300.pdf

in 2004, 1308 were for narcotics, so there is the growth of 44 percent. Other grew to 64, also an approximately 44% increase.

http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap04/Table3-04.pdf

64 people in a population of 250 million. THAT is restraint, not taking peoples liberty.

Yes I know that does not include the so called "illegal wiretaps" by the President. I am not too worried unless the taps were not on inbound international calls from known terrorists calling people here in the US. If that is what they are, then there is no crime in doing that.

Anything else and they have to explain it.

From the full opinion: "'[A] request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.' INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). Rather, '[a]n individual is seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' United States v. $25,000 U.S. Currency, 853 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th Cir. 1988)." So, even if we assume that the airlines are governmental actors for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, there's no search/seizure going on, because Gilmore was free to walk away at any time (which is what he actually did).

The ninth amendment ONLY applies when there isn't a law authorizing the government entity to restrict something, but in this case there clearly and obviously is. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s)(1)(C), the Transport Security Administration has the authority to issue secret regulations regarding security procedures at airports.

If you read the sources provided, it becomes abundantly clear that not only does the TSA have authority to issue regulations, but that (DUH) they have regulations requiring ID unless you're willing to go through other more thorough searches (which Gilmore was offered as a "Selectee").

Did you honestly think that there weren't laws in place authorizing the TSA to issue such policies? You'd have to be a moron, especially if you're a paranoid conspiracy nut, to not realize that such policies would exist.

These were all enforced by Southwest and United Airlines employees. They required ID even before these regulations anyway and constitutional rights don't apply to private organizations so it would be a moot point anyway.

Applicable here are the TSA identification policy, CAPPS and CAPPS II, and No-Fly
and Selectee lists.

Here is some information obtained from an official court document (linked below):
*"The airline security personnel could not, according to the Government, disclose to Gilmore the Security Directive that imposed the identification policy because the Directive was classified as "sensitive security information" ("SSI")."

*3. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s)(1)(C) (2005), the Under Secretary of the TSA "shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out security . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation." This information is called "sensitive security information." 49 C.F.R. 1520.5(a) (2005). The Under Secretary classified as SSI "[a]ny security program or security contingency plan issued, established, required, received, or approved by DOT [Department of Transportation] or DHS [Department of Homeland Security], including . . . [a]ny aircraft operator, airport operator, or fixed base operator security program, or security contingency plan under this chapter" and "[a]ny Security Directive or order . . . [i]ssued by TSA." 49 C.F.R. 1520.5(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(i) (2005).

4. The No-Fly and Selectee lists are Security Directives. They were issued by TSA pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(A) (2005), which authorizes the TSA Under Secretary to issue Security Directives without providing notice or an opportunity for comment in order to protect transportation security.

Sources:
-Gilmore v. Gonzales CV-02-03444-SI Opinion [pdf]
-TSA: How the Process Works
-TSA: Passenger Security Checkpoints
-The Status Of The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II)

The Government contends that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this action
because, under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a), Gilmore's claims can
only be raised by a petition for review in the courts of appeal.
Defendants also contend that Gilmore lacks standing to chal-
lenge anything other than the identification policy, such as
the Consumer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
("CAPPS") and so-called No-Fly and Selectee lists.

After reviewing the
sensitive security information materials that the Government
filed with this court ex parte and in camera, we agree with the
Government that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that
Gilmore had standing to challenge only the identification pol-
icy.

• A U.S. citizen has been denied standing to challenge government policies affecting him
• The court system apparently doesn't have an issue with ex parte proceedings, wherein only the court and one party are involved. If you can't see why this is bad...
• No citizen, including the plaintiff in this case, can be informed as to what the in camera/ex parte material (the secret laws) say.

Linky

Before everyone freaks out, kindly RTFOpinion. Then you can freak out intelligently.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A6 AE4C85241C517C88257101007B72EB/$file/0415736.pdf?o penelement

Yes, some blithering idiot of a government employee told Gilmore there was a secret law. And yes, at trial, the government lawyers - in an act of stupidity unparalleled since Michael Brown was appointed to head FEMA - refused to admit or deny that the law existed. However, the FAA subsequently acknowledged that the law existed.

What's troubling is that Gilmore had to litigate up to the court of appeals to get the government to admit the regs existed.

If the whole point of not having secret laws is so the public is aware of the process by which the government governs, then not disclosing them until you're several years into litigation doesn't really help, does it?

The government plays a sort of shell game here - no access to the rule, no access to object to the rule because it is disclosed during litigation. Sort of like how the government tried to game the federal courts by transferring Padilla - they manufacture mootness to avoid review.

I think the 9th Circuit should have refused to let the government off here, but they did - dismissing the whole secrecy issue in a couple of footnotes. It may be that Gilmore's lawyers didn't argue that because they thought those arguments were weaker. But in the end, that's what bother me - and far more so than the identity requirement.

With 20-20 hindsight, perhaps he should have initially sought to compel production of the secret regs, and pinned the government down on that first, and then litigated its constitutionality.

But the whole right to travel argument is thin. I mean, Gilmore never tried to travel any other way? Did he take a Greyhound? Amtrak? NO! Also, Gilmore was told he could fly without ID if he subjected himself to a search. Not that it makes it any better, but still, it is not as absolute as presented.

Ultimately, this isn't as bad as Hiibel, the case that precipitated the whole "papers please" concern. In light of domestic wiretapping and civilian espionage, its clear that this administration is absurdly cavalier about civil rights (no, really, trust us... we're good guys... Four legs good, two legs bad, yada yada). The idea that this restricts Gilmore's right to travel is dubious.

And government victories over weak claims like this are what future injustices will be built upon.

Ok. Here's one. I don't know too much about insidehighered.com, but I doubt it's a front for the aryan brotherhood.

In summary (because this is /., so RTFA is right out. ;->), white female candidate was one of the finalists for a job. Employer's EOO ADDED a male african-american candidate to the finalist pool. White female came in second from the top[1], while african-american came in second from the bottom. University gave the job to the african-american "candidate". Here's a link [pdf, you've been warned] to the decision by the seventh circuit to allow the case to proceed. So does she sound like she qualifies as "one good man or woman"?

Then there is the case of University of California Regents v Bakke[2]. Where it was held that the UC system had discriminated against a white applicant by admitting lesser-qualified minority applicants. Yeah, that's academic reverse discrimination as opposed to employment. And it was back in the 70's so it's completely irrelevant... Except that the exact same issue came before SCOTUS again in 1996. Unless you think PBS is an angry blogger. There have been a host of similar decisions handed down over the last few years, btw.

In a more general way, this site [3] points out in #12, that "less than 2 percent of the 91,000 employment discrimination cases pending before the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission are reverse discrimination cases." Working on the assumption (because I'm too lazy to mine for the actual numbers :-P) that the number is between 1% and 2% (If it were under 1%, I would have expected the site to say so), it appears that there are between 910 and 1819 [less than 2%, after all ;->] reverse discrimination claims working thier way through the EEOC at the moment.

I don't really have a dog in the fight, and to the best of my knowledge have never been passed over for a job based on either my race or my gender. Nor do I know anyone IRL who has claimed to have been so discriminated against. But you asked for proof of "even one" example. While implying that such was a high burden. Btw, google is your friend.

A now await the flames and downmods. /me dons asbestos suit.

[1] I'm personally curious where #1 fits into all this, but that's another issue.
[2] I don't think that Findlaw counts as an angry blogger-especially as it is just the literal SCOTUS decision.
[3] Which appears to be dismissive of the idea of reverse discrimination, btw.

As you note, creativity can still prevent a compilation from being in the public domain, if there's some significant original creativity involved. One of the interesting bits of Assessment Technologies v. WIREdata was the requirement to hand over even the bits which might be copyrightable - the database structure - so that the data would be available.

There's more discussion of the general principle at Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, which contains a fair overview of this aspect of US copyright law.

Sure thing. Here's a link to the judges decision in the Dover ID trial. It's a PDF, and somewhat long, but a very good read. The basic finding was that the school board was motivated not by a desire for free debate but by their own religious beliefs.

I'm not putting words in anyone's mouth. It's very enlightened how you read the bible, and I'm personally very proud of you for your open-mindedness. However, the ID "camp" sees evolution as a clear contradiction of their religious beliefs, and have chosen to fight it through the creation of a fictitious scientific movement.

As stated, our conclusion today is that it is unconstitutional to teach ID as an alternative to evolution in a public school science classroom.

You really need to get a hold of the full text of the judgement. It's quite an interesting read.

Wrong.
Ruling, Page 136:

In making this determination, we have addressed the seminal question of whether ID is science. We have concluded that it is not, and moreover that ID cannot uncouple itself from its creationist, and thus religious, antecedents.

QED.

Check the order at the end of the 139 page ruling:

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65, Defendants are permanently enjoined from maintaining the ID Policy in any school within the Dover Area School District.

I'm sure teachers could still discuss intelligent design should they be so included.

I presume you mean "inclined", not "included". I will note that the prime defendant was the "Dover School District"; since the teachers are employees of the Dover School District, that would likely be deemed to violate letter as well as spirit of the order. I also refer you to the section begining page 64:

After a searching review of the record and applicable caselaw, we find that while ID arguments may be true, a proposition on which the Court takes no position, ID is not science.

Even if new science teachers come in who are willing to touch this turd with an eleven foot pole (unlike the current batch; check out p. 127), they would be facing major legal problems if they tried teaching it in science class. (Unless, of course, merely presenting it as an example of something that ISN'T science....) On the bright side for the religious right, the Judge expressly did not take a position as to whether ID was the Truth. Not that anyone but religious moderates will be able to see that as a bright side.

I strongly suggest you read the ruling before further comment; it's in fairly plain English; if you take the legal citations to mean "because the Courts have already said so", it's even easier.

It is ironic that several of these individuals, who so staunchly and proudly touted their religious convictions in public, would time and again lie to cover their tracks and disguise the real purpose behind the ID Policy.

We find that the secular purposes claimed by the Board amount to a pretext for the Board's real purpose, which was to promote religion in the public school classroom, in violation of the Establishment Clause.

Repeatedly in this trial, Plaintiffs' scientific experts testified that the theory of evolution represents good science, is overwhelmingly accepted by the scientific community, and that it in no way conflicts with, nor does it deny, the existence of a divine creator.

Judge John E. Jones III commenced his service as a United States District Judge on August 2, 2002. He is the 21st judge to sit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Judge Jones was appointed to his current position by President George W. Bush in February, 2002, and was unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate on July 30, 2002.

Wow, he really delivered a much needed shit kicking to ID. Here are some excerpts from the decision.

ID aspires to change the ground rules of science to make room for religion, specifically, beliefs consonant with a particular version of Christianity.

The evidence at trial demonstrates that ID is nothing less than the progeny of creationism.

We find that ID fails on three different levels, any one of which is sufficient to preclude a determination that ID is science. They are: (1) ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and permitting supernatural causation; (2) the argument of irreducible complexity, central to ID, employs the same flawed and illogical contrived dualism that doomed creation science in the 1980's; and (3) ID's negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific community.

In making this determination, we have addressed the seminal question of whether ID is science. We have concluded that it is not, and moreover that ID cannot uncouple itself from its creationist, and thus religious, antecedents.

That's gold Jerry, gold!

Anyways, say goodbye to ID and say hello to the Discovery Institute's next legal strategy, "sudden emergence theory", or some such bollocks.

Those who disagree with our holding will likely mark it as the product of an activist judge. If so, they will have erred as this is manifestly not an activist Court. Rather, this case came to us as the result of the activism of an ill-informed faction on a school board, aided by a national public interest law firm eager to find a constitutional test case on ID, who in combination drove the Board to adopt an imprudent and ultimately unconstitutional policy. The breathtaking inanity of the Board's decision is evident when considered against the factual backdrop which has now been fully revealed through this trial. The students, parents, and teachers of the Dover Area School District deserved better than to be dragged into this legal maelstrom, with its resulting utter waste of monetary and personal resources.

Whoops let me fix that link
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/RACER2/recent_opinion s.cfm?judge=Kennelly

http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/RACER2/recent_opinion s.cfm?judge=Kennelly
First on the list (as of this posting)

A judge with lifetime tenure could really care less about the business interests. If the business interests were so powerful, then they could have prevented the law from being passed in the first place, but clearly other interests weighed against them. The decision was based on an interpretation of the First Amendment. Read the full court opinion yourself to see. http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/RACER2/recent_opinion s.cfm?judge=Kennelly

This almost certainly varies by jurisdiction, but where speech crosses the line to "incitement", or a "true threat" then it can become illegal. IANAL, but I believe the standard for "incitement" is that the speaker is intended to cause imminent unlawful action, and is likely to produce the action. And, for a "true threat" a statement which, in context, would be interpreted as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm.

So instruction on sniper shooting combined with, say, the home address of one person, pictured with a crosshair over his head, and inflammatory material linking him to something controversial like, for instance, providing abortions, could cross the line.

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A3 AC4A8F164DA30288256BBA0080B31D/$file/9935320.pdf?o penelement

(An apology in advance, I kinda started to rant and ramble at the end, so you can skip this post if you want.)

Well, now that most of my Thanks is given, I've had a chance to review your supports for the ongoing ACLU assault on Christian's rights.

Your words:
HOWEVER, I believed it because of the ongoing assault on Christian's rights from the ACLU which I have seen again and again:
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/11/01/desert.cross .ap/
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/27/ten.commandments /
http://www.aclu.org//religion/tencomm/16298prs2000 1012.html
http://www.kotv.com/main/home/stories.asp?whichpag e=1&id=91429

Let me get these done first.

First one, a large permanent cross in a national park. This one was filed by the ACLU/SC (SC for Southern California, this group was founded by Upton Sinclair). I don't know if you know anything about his views on religion, his bibliography should give you an idea (here's a link from Google's beta book search, neat stuff, well if you hadn't heard, he was a pretty big critic of the organized religion and later became a socialist). Anyhow, I can respect the loose assertion that the ACLU/SC reflects on the ACLU in the same way that say, Catholics reflect on Christians. Each is a smaller group that affiliates with a whole. If you let me judge you by the actions of Catholics, then you can judge the ACLU by the actions of ACLU/SC -- i.e., the fallacy of generialazation. But getting past that -- the park didn't even try to fight it, it never even went to court, everyone involved just rolled over, because they knew that the anonymous ranger (that haha, "claimed to be Catholic") that sought the ACLU/SC's help would have won in court. Damn those courts.

Second one, Glassroth v. Moore. I am not a lawyer, but if you are I'd be interested to know why you believe both courts were wrong. Further, the ACLU was not a plaintiff in this case. The only relevant case that the ACLU was a plaintiff in was ACLU v. Rabun County (11th Circuit) in 1983. Was the U.S. "intolerant of Christian views" back then? I don't recall. But further, if you look up the opinion http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/20021670 8.pdf, the money quote is on the bottom of page 34: "Clearly erroneous they [the district court's previous findings of fact] are not. Moreover, even if we were free to review the determination de novo, having examined the record ourselves, we agree with the district court that it is "self-evident" that Chief Justice Moore's purpose in displaying the monument was non-secular. Given all of the evidence, including the Chief Justice's own words, we cannot see how a court could reach any other conclusion." So, basically open and shut. After Moore's appeal was rejected it should have been clear that his next step wasn't to get suspended in an act of civil disobedience but to obey the court's decision (what? a judge with contempt for the court?!) and used his only recourse, get the Constitution amended. It's laughable to consider the First Amendment to be an "assault on Christian's rights" so maybe you offered this example by mistake.

Third one, Montanna's Custer county officials roll over and settle in a similar year-2000 case involving another Commandments monument and a "seasonal nativity". I don't know what this shows us as far as assaults or tolerance go (because it didn't go to court and apparantly the Christians in power that put them there agreed to more/r

After doing a little research, I found a trustee information page, where the same Gregory A. Akers is listed as a Trustee for Chapter 7 bankrupcies. Now, if the old owners of the company went kaput and filed C7, it's quite possible that they don't have anything left and that the sale to the new owner was for assets (including the name) only. However, something that's definately still worth looking into.

Having done a bit of research into purchasing small-biz companies myself, just about every thing that I've read says to purchase the assets, not the company for reasons just like this (and letting you out of past liabilities that may have been incurred). FYI: IANAL, so TIFWIW.

Given the contact information on the site regarding previous warranties, I suspect that they filed bankruptcy. Case number 03-03874-JM7 looks suspiciously like a bankruptcy code.

In order to meet creditors, they would have liquidated assets, which would have included the name, the business records, customer lists, etc. However, the new company that took over the name would be a brand new corporation. A bankruptcy filing with liquidation would have wiped out any such debts.

Confirmation: Greg Akers, as listed, is a Chapter 7 trustee.

Check USBC Southern District of California's site for more information.

With the case code, you should be able to pull up records of the bankruptcy, as well.

Here's a link to the EFF's Broadcast Flag work.

Here's a PDF link to [then] Circuit Judge Edwards' decision in ALA v. FCC.

Thanks for pointing that out, I did that search and found statistics which completely contradict the figures you gave. In other words, you lied.

The google search took me to an official government website. There were only 1,710 authorized wiretaps in 2004, which is much less than the figure that you made up (3500). There are also no statistics on that official website on how many requests were denied.

Source: 2004 WIRETAP REPORT

So I have to ask you: why are you so insecure with yourself that you a) can't cite your source, b) have to make up numbers and c) have to insult people to humiliate you?

Many years ago, we (Meow Media, Inc - parent company of Persian Kitty's Adult Links) were sued by Jack Thompson in what later became a landmark sixth circuit court of appeals first amendment case. Granted, we were vindicated after two years of legal expenses... but it still cost us several hundred thousand dollars in attorney fees, expert witness fees, and appeals fees (which required a second set of attorneys).

While Jack Thompson's lawsuit was grinding its way through the court of appeals, another copy-cat attorney by the name of John DeCamp decided to sue us (Meow Media) for the Columbine shootings!

Soon, every attorney with expensive car payments was jumping on the bandwagon, in [what I perceive as] an effort to collect a "nusiance" settlement from us and other defendants. In fact, this practice became so common and popular that PBS FrontLine ran a feature story on our collective plights.

Fortunately, when the Court of Appeals ruled in our favor on the Paducah lawsuit (and reaffirmed this when they rejected the appeal for reconsideration), the other defendants were quick to drop their lawsuits, else face an action sounding in tort. However, that too required attorney fees and retainers for each case, in each particular venue.

For those of you who have not yet gone through lengthy and cumbersome litigation... there is not much you can do to recover the costs involved with defending yourself from most tort litigation. Sure, we could turn around and sue the families of the deceased children who were killed by the shooter... but that's not exactly good publicity, nor does it make for a sympathetic jury.

So here I sit today, a few hundred thousand dollars poorer, watching history repeat itself.

Dear Mr. *,
I would like to voice my concern in dire opposition to any sort of broadcast flag implementation legislature. I am writing to inform you of a new possible push to subvertly pass this special interest legislation as an attachment to the Digital Television (DTV) bill. Similar language might also be included as an amendment to the House Energy and Commerce Committee's version of the bill.

This is canonical special interest, anti consumer legislation, spearheaded by the MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America) and the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America). With only a handful of large-scale entertainment companies backing it - and no consumer support, it is ridiculous such a proposal is even given merit, especially after its repeated defeat in multiple incarnations and a unanimous decision against it by the DC Court of Appeals in ALA v. FCC.

A broadcast flag mandate will essentially strip my fair use rights and severely cripple any of my or your constitutes future electronics purchases. I would like to know that I will have your continued support in protecting my rights and that you will actively vote against any such legislation.

Sincerely,
*

It's decent enough, use it - better than nothing. A link to ALA v. FCC: http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinion s/200505/04-1037b.pdf