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IETF to Look at Spam

m00nun1t writes "CNET has an article about the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) looking at what they can do about spam. According to the article, many of the proposals seems to "require changes in basic e-mail technology", which presumably means SMTP (and about time!). Maybe they are looking beyond just SMTP - anyone have any insights here?"

200 comments

  1. It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Scoria · · Score: 5, Insightful

    If an alternative to SMTP were developed, the protocol would not be likely to disappear immediately subsequent to the creation of its successor. The transition would be gradual, as reverse-compatibility could remain necessary for several years afterward. As suggested by the release of Apache 2.0, for instance, not every server administrator adopts a "technological improvement" until it becomes an adequately proven and stable product.

    --
    Do you like German cars?
    1. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by frenchinengland · · Score: 1

      The transition to an alternative of SMTP can't be compared to the release of Apache 2.0. Apache 2.0 does the same job to previous versions except better, ie serves web pages via HTTP 1.0/1.1.

      A new version of SMTP could require updating all E-Mail related software (client and server) and that's not a small chore.

    2. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by blibbleblobble · · Score: 1

      "If an alternative to SMTP were developed, the protocol would not be likely to disappear immediately"

      The problem would be: do servers accept connections from legacy SMTP connections (which means spammers can just connect on SMTP and take advantage of the lack of identification), or do servers refuse to accept connections from legacy SMTP connections (which means that either everyone has to upgrade at once, or people using SMTP software have their connections dropped)

    3. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Mad+Bad+Rabbit · · Score: 2, Insightful
      The problem would be: do servers accept connections from legacy SMTP connections (which means spammers can just connect on SMTP and take advantage of the lack of identification), or do servers refuse to accept connections from legacy SMTP connections (which means that either everyone has to upgrade at once, or people using SMTP software have their connections dropped)

      Presumably AMTP servers (a name I'm making up, A for authenticated) would accept connections from legacy SMTP servers, but prefiltered with various ad-hoc spamblock techniques we use now (Bayesian filtering, limits on connection rates, etc.)

      --
      >;k
    4. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Skapare · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Adopting a new protocol is very different than upgrading to a new version of an implementation of a protocol. In the case of a new protocol, there might be two different kinds of things going on at the same time, either with the same MTA, or different MTAs. In the case of Apache 2.0, you can't have the same web site available under the new version at the old version at the same time. With a new protocol, you can easily have a transition period because of the window of concurrency. With a new version of an implementation of the same protocol, deployed for a single instances of usage (e.g. a domain), it's basically one or the other. You can run Apache 2.0 on www.test-site.example.com while Apache 1.3 still runs www.example.com. But you can't have www.example.com running both very easily.

      --
      now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
    5. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by metlin · · Score: 1


      On a related note, here's an interesting proposal written by cygnusx which I believe has been/will be submitted to the IETF.

      For some odd reason, my name features there too :-)

    6. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Scoria · · Score: 1

      As indicated by this comment, I was merely attempting to indicate that the adoption rate of Apache 2.0 is lethargic. My statement was not intended to compare two processes. I concur; migrating to another protocol entirely would be arduous and intensive.

      --
      Do you like German cars?
    7. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      then what need for a new standard anyway?

    8. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by bafu · · Score: 1

      I concur; migrating to another protocol entirely would be arduous and intensive.

      Actually, his point seemed to be that actual adoption of a new protocol is simpler than upgrading your webserver since you can just add support for the new protocol without removing support for the old one. Presumably support for the old one wouldn't go away until some critical mass of [nonspam] email volume had moved from the old system to the new. If the servers were set up to receive both kinds but to only send the new kind (when dealing with a recipient that accepted the new kind), that determination would be pretty straightforward, and adoption wouldn't be very scary.

      Anyway, the rate of Apache upgrade is mainly determined by a mental calculation of perceived downtime risk to a perfectly-fine existing installation versus the perceived benefit of running 2.0 instead. It's too idiosyncratic to be a very useful predictor for even other product upgrades in general, much less for adoption of a method of processing email in addition to the not-perfectly-fine current system.

    9. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by MoogMan · · Score: 1

      Indeed, and as long as this new protocol is back-compatible with SMTP, spammers will still set it to legacy mode and carry on their usual business.

      Back-compatibility therefore wont solve our problem

    10. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by FyRE666 · · Score: 1

      Apache 2.0. Apache 2.0 does the same job to previous versions except better,

      You've obviously never tried developing anything serious with Apache2+PHP then. The fact is, perfectly usable code has to be rewritten to overcome problems, it uses more system resources, and is far from stable. I had a server running PHP + MySQL scripts that would be thrashing swap within 6-7 hours of light usage (the apache server would have to be restarted every few hours to "fix" this). The exact same scripts are now running fine back on Apache 1.3.27.

      I'd advise ANYONE not to use Apache 2 if they are considering PHP. It's just a bad idea...

    11. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      i like new standards. they are fun.

    12. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Ancil · · Score: 1
      A new version of SMTP could require updating all E-Mail related software (client and server) and that's not a small chore.
      Actually, a lot of clients (Eudora and the like) could be left alone. For the most part, these are configured to relay mail through a local SMTP server, rather than resolving MX records and delivering mail directly.

      Because these clients should already be configured as relay-approved by their local SMTP server, the server could silently give them a pass on whatever new, anti-spam checks are in SMTP 2. Foreign servers would have to jump through whatever hoops the IETF comes up with. A foreign server is any server which you wouldn't be willing to relay for.

    13. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If u want to know how to kill spam go to http://nirelan.f2o.org/blog/.

    14. Re:It wouldn't be adopted instantaneously. by Skapare · · Score: 1

      Yes, that was indeed my point. Thanks for the clarification.

      --
      now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
  2. IETF to look at spam? by onthefenceman · · Score: 3, Funny

    Maybe their address got used as a reply-to in the latest "$1000 per week from home" letter...

    --
    Have you seen my stapler?
  3. IM2000? by dialt0ne · · Score: 2, Informative

    Although I'd find it hard for the IETF to swallow djb's personality, there's always IM2000.

    http://cr.yp.to/im2000.html

    --
    Replicants are like any other machine, they're either a benefit or a hazard. If they're a benefit, it's not my problem
    1. Re:IM2000? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Software engineers who are swayed by personality should be fired.

    2. Re:IM2000? by slamb · · Score: 1
      I hadn't seen this before. It's interesting, but I don't think I like this reversal for several reasons:
      • I don't like giving the sender that much information about where I'm reading my mail from, when I'm reading it, etc. If I connect to their server when I want the whole message, I have to. Unless I automatically pull everything right away to my server...but then it's not really a pull model, just an overly complicated push.
      • This is a big fat lie: "In IM2000, the receiver's ISP can keep notifications in memory." If the notification is lost, the message itself might as well be unless you check that store frequently. The only situation in which I could actually see that being true is something like a mailing list where it's extremely likely I'll get another message soon from the same place.
      • With the old systems, once the sender sends a message, it can't be changed unless they also control the receiver's system. I like that. Here they can change it up until the point the receiver actually fetches the message. Even afterward unless the receiver caches it locally, so I think receivers always will.
      • It's only marginally true that people can only fetch messages if they aren't interested in them. If they know based on the store that they aren't interested, sure. But to really know you aren't interested, likely you need to see more information than the simple notification that a message is available. At least the headers will need to be sent.
      • It doesn't answer the question of how the receiver should authenticate to the sender when pulling the message. That's an important one.

      Really, the only problem I really see this absolutely solving is the mailing list one. I'm not willing to abandon a favorable model for everything else just so mailing lists are better. They can either cope or use a separate protocol without dragging everything else along with them.

      I'm much more in favor of a new, authenticated push protocol. I think much of the spam problem could be eased by a more reliable way of knowing who sent a message.

  4. Re:wheres the first post trolls by Scoria · · Score: 0, Offtopic

    Perhaps they are deleting "penis enlargement" spam.

    --
    Do you like German cars?
  5. First Dupe! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Funny
    1. Re:First Dupe! by Mr.+Droopy+Drawers · · Score: 1

      Does Taco not read Slashdot?

      If the staff doesn't why do I?

      Oh, Dupes as a sport.

      Didn't think of that....

      --

      To Copy from One is Plagiarism; To Copy from Many is Research.

  6. Good effort but will ultimately fail by FlynnMP3 · · Score: 0

    This is another attempt to have technology police human behavior. It hasn't worked in the past, why should it work now? I agree that SMTP could be made a lot more secure for the commercial Internet

  7. Weak article by virtual_mps · · Score: 1

    The article didn't say much beyond "gee whiz, there's a spam problem!" -- not exactly a revelation. It does hint at technical solutions to the spam problem, but I wonder if that's an approach that will ever work. I think at the heart this is a problem that can only be fixed with legislation (like it or not). Something along the lines of making it illegal to send spam with forged headers would help a lot.

    1. Re:Weak article by gmuslera · · Score: 1

      But did say that IETF is willing to get involved in developing (technical) measures, probably making/suggesting changes on the base protocols, and that is stronger than any particular trying to do the same.

    2. Re:Weak article by rock_climbing_guy · · Score: 1

      You mention that it might help if there were laws against forging headers on e-mail. Does anyone who reads this board know if there is any law concerning the return address on postal mail that might be something to compare that to?

      --
      Wh47 d1d j00 541, 31337 15n't t3h r0xor5 ne m0r3???
  8. You can sign up for the mailing list here: by Saint+Aardvark · · Score: 3, Informative
    https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/asrg

    Among many, many others, I saw Vernon Schryver, the guy behind Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse, on the list. It's been pretty high volume, though, and I haven't had a chance to really spend some time reading it yet.

    1. Re:You can sign up for the mailing list here: by metlin · · Score: 1

      A piece of warning that I have adhered to from a few members of the list - it sees about 200 messages and odd a day, and I guess you join only if you really know what you're doing.

      Another thing is that the list is supposed to be populated by discussions surrouding a lot of filtering techniques, which really aren't the way around spam.

      I feel that if you propose to truly eliminate spam, a protocol level change is what would be needed.

      My 0.02.

  9. It's about time? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    which presumably means SMTP (and about time!).

    Maybe you should change TCP, UDP, and IP while you're at it? Maybe we could switch every 6 months or so just to make sure developers are "keeping up."

    For the sarcasm impaired that means... nevermind, you're perfect.

  10. Postfix sender verification by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Take a look to Postfix Sender verification system. It can help little bit among other measures.

    1. Re:Postfix sender verification by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This would be the system that calls back to a sending domain and tries using a pending sender as the recipient, right?

      Such a system might help a little - IF the people implementing it had a clue. I had some guy sign up for lists hosted here, and he was running that stuff. Every time my list delivered something to his box, his system hit mine with a check.

      It didn't take long for me to unsubscribe him just to keep that crap out of the logs. Verifying is one thing, but cache the results already!

      It's actually a pretty poor hack. All it does is force the spammers to use addresses that are deliverable. Guess what - spammers generally have a deliverable list already: it's their destination! All they have to do is start using that same list as the source, and now your scheme is worthless.

      In fact, it's already happening. I've watched systems mail my users with addresses that are very similar. If my user was bob-smith@example.edu, then he might get mail from bob-jones@example.com. This particular spammer looks for another address that has the same first 4 characters.

      The only reasonable sender verification system involves a handshake scheme ala TCP - shoot cookies (think 'sequence numbers') around to verify that the sender actually can receive mail at a given address. If it checks out, let it through.

  11. The really interesting thing about dupes by astrashe · · Score: 2, Offtopic

    The really interesting thing about dupes is that they tend to suggest that there are large numbers of readers who pay more attention to the site than the guys running it.

    If I was running slashdot, I'd probably push the people who had the power to approve stories to read each and every story that gets approved. It seems like a reasonable minimal committment to the community even for volunteers, and presumably some of these guys are drawing actual paychecks for the work they do here.

    The dupes show that the guys approving the stories don't really care enough to take the time to do that.

    1. Re:The really interesting thing about dupes by 6169 · · Score: 1

      I'm sure they *do* read each of their own postings, but it is extremely difficult to read every story/article posted on Slashdot, and even then the sheer volume would cause people to forget and post dupes anyway. Why not just code a simple hook in Slashcode that automatically searches for fairly recent articles containing the same URLs, or submitter name, or just scans for repeated words that don't show up all the time in normal language. It would run and show matches (if any) after *anyone* puts a story in the queue. I doubt it would miss many obvious dupes, of which we have many at present.

    2. Re:The really interesting thing about dupes by astrashe · · Score: 1

      I don't know -- how many stories get posted in a day? I don't think it would be that much harder than reading a newspaper. I doubt it's harder than what you have to do for your job, or for what most people have to do for their jobs.

      I'm not suggesting that people ought to be blamed for not remembering a story from 3 months ago -- but 3 days ago seems reasonable.

      I don't believe that an automated system to detect dupes would be simple or effective. There are often different articles about the same thing, and often dupes come through someone submitting a completely different article. I don't think that it's usually from the same submitter (although I haven't checked that), and repeated word scans seem to be something that would be very difficult to pull off.

    3. Re:The really interesting thing about dupes by 6169 · · Score: 1

      Alright, I will grant you that reading every /. story (or at least the summaries and a brief look at the URL like everyone else does) is certainly possible for the editors.

      The thing about an automated system is that there is still a human to check the output...the system could just find a few uncommon words in the story (example: 'IETF') and then just use the existing code search function to display the summary of the best (or most recent) hits. The editor just glances at them and should be able to tell in seconds if he's posting a dupe or not (humans are good like that). If it catches 50% that's still a good improvement with little effort, and there is plenty of room for improvement (bayesian filters?) Just a thought. That's what the comment system is here for, right

    4. Re:The really interesting thing about dupes by Quantum+Skyline · · Score: 1

      The really interesting thing about dupes is that they tend to suggest that there are large numbers of readers who pay more attention to the site than the guys running it.

      If I was running slashdot, I'd probably push the people who had the power to approve stories to read each and every story that gets approved. It seems like a reasonable minimal committment to the community even for volunteers, and presumably some of these guys are drawing actual paychecks for the work they do here.

      The dupes show that the guys approving the stories don't really care enough to take the time to do that.


      OK, I've been reading Slashdot for almost a year now, and I constantly see complaints about duplicates. Lets ask the Slashdot editors policy about duplicates.

      So, eds, do you do it because you don't care? Or because some people miss a story and think the dupe may be the first time the story is posted? Or are daily readers of Slashdot too critical? Does it vary from editor to editor? Or from story to story?

      Email me a reply or post a reply, I don't care. I want to know what the people who take all kinds of abuse about this think and why they think that way.

    5. Re:The really interesting thing about dupes by Lodragandraoidh · · Score: 1

      What they need is some software that can take care of this for them as they are going through the stories; just rewrite SLASH to take care of it (I would, but I am up to my eyeballs in greased potbelly pigs atm).

      --

      Lodragan Draoidh
      The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it. - Mark Twain
  12. Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by wackybrit · · Score: 5, Informative

    Someone posted a response to another spam story a few weeks ago, sadly I can't find it, but they described an interesting mail delivery system they'd created.. and it sounded, to me, as if it could certainly be the future of mail delivery.

    They said that when someone sent a mail, it simply went to the local server, and no further.

    It sounded like a 'reverse IMAP' style system to me. That is, your outgoing mail simply went to a folder on your server, which allowed you to edit and even delete mails BEFORE they were picked up by the recipient. The recipient's e-mail server would only receive a 'notice' that someone had mail for them.

    When the recipient went to collect their mail, their own mail server would then have a basic list of where the e-mails for the recipient are, and then it'd go ask for them from the remote servers and feed them through.

    So, how does this help spam?

    It allows spam to be truly filtered on the OUTGOING rather than the incoming!

    Why's that a great thing? Well, it means that if you're an AOL or MSN user, you're not going to lose 80% of your mail simply because of over-zealous filtering by your ISP. Instead, spam mail will not even be sent, let alone received!

    Of course, bad eggs could always set up servers with no filtering systems on them and send their spam that way.. but BECAUSE e-mail will be picked up FROM the senders server with this system, it means blacklisting is a whole lot easier! You just ban a server and you know you've got rid of the bad eggs.. whereas the current SMTP system allows open relays and all sorts of 'trickery' to get around filtering systems.

    So.. the conclusion is.. make e-mail stay on the sender's server until it's time for it to be collected. It allows you to edit or delete mail before the recipient collects it, it stops spam, and it reduces bandwidth(!) -- if someone never collects their mail, then the mail has never gone across the net.. it's still on the sender's server.

    I hope the original poster of this idea will pop up here again and correct me if I got his ideas wrong, but he was certainly on to something.

    1. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by andyveitch · · Score: 5, Informative

      This is Dan "Qmail" Bernstein's Internet Mail 2000.

      --
      Open Source Email Response Management http://www.logicalwa
    2. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by ccady · · Score: 3, Insightful

      This system has some flaws:

      1) If a person sees an e-mail in their inbox, then they can read it, and they are happy. Can you imagine the hordes of people who would now see that they got an e-mail, but could not get it for one reason or another? This makes e-mail *seem* fragile. Please explain to my step-father why he can see that he has e-mail, but he cannot read it on the plane. This is not a technical issue, but a psychological one, which is much harder to program around :-)

      2) By what criteria could you filter the email? If you have not received the e-mail, you probably won't have enough information to tell if it is spam or not. The only information that you could go on is what is in the "notice" message.

      Nice try.

      --
      J'aime mieux les méchants que les imbéciles, parce qu'ils se reposent. -- Alexandre Dumas
    3. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by kirkjobsluder · · Score: 1

      I see some flaws with this from the user end. Would mail clients have to negotiate a connection for every mail message? One of the things I like about email is that if a message appears in my mailbox, it is there ready to download (via IMAP). One of the things I dislike about pull technologies such as HTTP is that I never know when I request a page if the page will be available.

      In addition from a user end it can make things more confusing because of the need to negotiate different policies for how long messages are retained. What happens when I need to grab that 6 month old bit of administrivia that I didn't bother to read then but became less trivial in the last hour? Having the sender control the duration and content of email can be a problem for things like email invoices.

    4. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by LostCluster · · Score: 1

      1) If a person sees an e-mail in their inbox, then they can read it, and they are happy. Can you imagine the hordes of people who would now see that they got an e-mail, but could not get it for one reason or another? This makes e-mail *seem* fragile. Please explain to my step-father why he can see that he has e-mail, but he cannot read it on the plane. This is not a technical issue, but a psychological one, which is much harder to program around :-)

      Just like his e-mail sits on a POP3 server until he downloads it at which point its possible to store it locally if desired. Once the transaction completes, it can still be on his local HD.

      2) By what criteria could you filter the email? If you have not received the e-mail, you probably won't have enough information to tell if it is spam or not. The only information that you could go on is what is in the "notice" message.
      The server on which the the e-mail is stored according to the notice is info enough. If you trust that server, you'll accept that they have already done the spam filtering and canceling for you. If you do not trust that server, you simply ignore all notices from that server. Servers that are ignored by large chunks of the population suddenly become an undesirable place to send from.

    5. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by JamesSharman · · Score: 4, Insightful

      This sounds perfect, And here is how it can be implement with backwards compatibility

      It's implementation could also be made rather interesting. Rather than a completely new protocol that is totally impractical (since it would require everyone upgrading simultaneously) this kind of scheme could be implemented in a completely backwardly compatible manner. Allow me to describe what I mean.

      Your email server has been upgraded to the new system and you send an email. Your outgoing server store the email and forwards a very simple email message onto the recipients email server, this small email contains the appropriate subject line and an extra chunk (with appropriate mime type) containing the information necessary to retrieve the full email message (ie: Server details, email id and probably an authentication token of some sort). Your client software supports the new standard it receives the stub email and retrieves the full message appropriately. This stub email is not an extra compatibility thing; we are simply using the existing smtp infrastructure to tell the recipient that they have a piece of email.

      But what if the recipient has not yet upgraded, here comes the clever bit. Html email works as an extra mime chunk that enabled clients automatically decode and show the reader, non enabled clients see the standard plain text version of the message that is also present in the message, this mechanic can be used to our advantage here, the normal text or html portion of the stub email contains a hyper link back to the sending server which a url designed to bring up a basic web mail page with the recipients message.

      Using this implementation scheme it would be possible for the sender who upgraded from day one to send an email to anyone with the complete confidence that they would be able to read the full text of the message. The only proviso here is that the recipient had access to a web browser.

      In addition I can see one other advantage to your proposed scheme that has not been mentioned, the email system becomes inherently more secure. Since the sending server must actively hand over the email it can record that this has been done and tell the recipient if the message had been read before. Although as with anything else strong cryptography would be required to ensure to ensure that nobody could get hold the authentication token (and thereby read the email) it would be possible for the sending server (providing you trust it) to tell you authoritatively that nobody else had retrieved the message contents.

    6. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by LostCluster · · Score: 2, Insightful

      This would likely be made invisible to the user.

      When the checking-mail process begins, the client would go to the receive-side server to get the list of notifications received. It would first apply any local filter rules to strike out unacceptable notifications, then go one-by-one to the servers to confirm that they sent the message the notification claims, that the server is still offering the message, and than ask for the message itself.

      If the message has been declared spam by the server operator, then the server will intentially pull the message from availablity and essentially vaporize it before it hits a majority of inboxes. Server owners have an incentive to do this... because it'd be extremely easy to add server owners who don't into a local blacklist.

      Yeah, a verbose log file can be made available for the geeks that wanna know what happened under the hood, but the average end user wouldn't see the message pop into their Inbox until the message has been sucessfully cleared and transmitted. Once its in the Inbox, it's a local object that the user can do what they want to.

    7. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by Art+Pollard · · Score: 2, Informative

      Yes, this is correct. The end user would never even know that they have received the spam. It would go into the bit-bucket (if it was spam) before it ever appeared in their in-box if the sending server (or for that matter the senders themselves) canceled it before it was picked up. So it would be totally transparent to the user and this avoids having confused users wondering where their mail is.

      Since most spam affects 100's if not 100's of 1,000's of people, using a local blackhole list would create allow e-mail to be self moderating. After 1 or N people had reported a given server or server/user as a source of spam, they would be automatically added for a period of N days and this would last until the spam barrage was over. So while yes, some spam would get out, only very few would ever see it before it was canceled by the originating ISP or by others who recived the spam before you did.

      -Art
      Pollarda@lextek.com
      Lextek: Suppliers of High Performance Text Retrieval Engines.

    8. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by kirkjobsluder · · Score: 3, Insightful

      When the checking-mail process begins, the client would go to the receive-side server to get the list of notifications received. It would first apply any local filter rules to strike out unacceptable notifications, then go one-by-one to the servers to confirm that they sent the message the notification claims, that the server is still offering the message, and than ask for the message itself.

      The big problem I see with this is that it would work very well over robust, high-speed networks where all servers have 24/7 reliability. How well will it work over less robust or fast networks? The latency involved in querying and fetching 100 messages adds up pretty darn quick.

      If the message has been declared spam by the server operator, then the server will intentially pull the message from availablity and essentially vaporize it before it hits a majority of inboxes. Server owners have an incentive to do this... because it'd be extremely easy to add server owners who don't into a local blacklist.

      I think a much better option would be to stop it before it becomes submitted. But I see significant power issues involved with giving sysadmins the power to retroactively nuke messages by content. Yeah, it helps to stop spam but it also gives the sysadmin the power to nuke political content as well.

      In addition, I can see how such a system can be technically circumvented by spammers. Set up a server to broadcast bogus notifications and just send a single file out. Blacklists are not effective then for the same reason they are not effective now, the costs of setting up on a new IP is trivial.

      Yeah, a verbose log file can be made available for the geeks that wanna know what happened under the hood, but the average end user wouldn't see the message pop into their Inbox until the message has been sucessfully cleared and transmitted. Once its in the Inbox, it's a local object that the user can do what they want to.

      Ok, the initial description just sounded like some kind of a distributed peer-to-peer imap where instead of storing the messages on the recipient server the messages are fetched as they are read. But I disagree that this process will be transparent to the user because of the added latency as the recipient server authenticates each individual messages. Checking my mail with IMAP, I know what is available within a second after I open a connection (using local mailboxes is even quicker). I don't see how a "pull" system that authenticates, verifies and fetches for each mail message can match that performance.

    9. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by ccady · · Score: 1

      Just like his e-mail sits on a POP3 server until he downloads it at which point its possible to store it locally if desired.

      With POP3, until that point, the person has no knowledge of the e-mail, so from their point of view they do not have it. If the user chooses to download it onto her hard drive, you've now defeated the purpose of IM 2000.

      The server on which the the e-mail is stored according to the notice is info enough.

      I suppose just knowing that it comes from yahoo, hotmail, or the IRS is enough, eh? :-)

      --
      J'aime mieux les méchants que les imbéciles, parce qu'ils se reposent. -- Alexandre Dumas
    10. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by John+Hasler · · Score: 1

      Your ISP's server would already have authenticated, verified, and fetched the messages and put them in your IMAP directory.

      --
      Warning: this article may contain humor, sarcasm, parody, and perhaps even irony. Read at your own risk.
    11. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by freestyle-fiend · · Score: 1

      > With POP3, until that point, the person has no
      > knowledge of the e-mail, so from their point of
      > view they do not have it. If the user chooses to
      > download it onto her hard drive, you've now
      > defeated the purpose of IM 2000.

      I assume that mail is stored on the sending server until you look for it, at which point you move it, either to an IMAP like mailbox, or to your disc. The crucial thing is that you don't have to download it to filter it.

      > I suppose just knowing that it comes from yahoo,
      > hotmail, or the IRS is enough, eh? :-)

      In order to be trusted, Yahoo and Hotmail will have to filter outgoing mail. Hopefully this will put spammers off using their services (or open relays). Mail from senders which do not filter will not be read, so spammers will be put off this too.

    12. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If the message has been declared spam by the server operator, then the server will intentially pull the message from availablity and essentially vaporize it before it hits a majority of inboxes.

      And how do we prevent abuse (either intentional or accidental) of the filtering system? How do we handle false positives, or sysadmins with a personal agenda?

    13. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by Bug-Man · · Score: 0

      What about a mailing list?

      Suppose you're responsible for sending out a legitimate weekly newsletter, and you have 500,000 recipients. Currently, you send out that email address to newsletter@mydomain.com, and your list software then sends it out to those 500,000 recipients.

      With what you're suggesting, at let's say, 10k per newsletter, we're talking a lot of bytes that are being queued on the server. And what of those users who never pick up their email? Does your email expire? That's extremely dangerous, especially with important email.

      Discussion lists are even worse, because you have to store possibly hundreds of messages per day, for possibly hundreds of recipients! It is definitely a system that encourages a *lot* of wasted disk space at the sender's end.

      If I was setting up a server that was setting up a large volume mailing list (or series of them!) I would definitely prefer the current version of SMTP, because I already know my server isn't going to be used to send out spam, unless there's an exploit.

    14. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by Micah · · Score: 1

      > How well will it work over less robust or fast networks? The latency involved in querying and fetching 100 messages adds up pretty darn quick.

      Indeed that's a minor drawback. But we're talking about stopping spam here (or at least the vast majority of it). It is WORTH a bit of pain to get this problem behind us!

      Having said that, I doubt this would really be that big a deal. It would be like loading 100 web pages, except that e-mail is far smaller than a web page and hopefully the server would be optimized to respond quickly. Also, the mail client could be threaded, so the bandwidth could usually be maxed out, not just sitting around waiting for servers.

      > but it also gives the sysadmin the power to nuke political content as well.

      Someone's ISP already has the power to do that to web pages. I don't see how them having that power with e-mail is really that much more of a problem. And any reputable ISP won't meddle with peoples' mail until they are suspected of being spammers.

      There are trade-offs to anything, but overall, I think this proposal solves far more problems than it causes, and that's a pretty good deal if you ask me. :)

    15. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by evilviper · · Score: 1

      Bad... Bad... Bad... Idea.

      For the most part, I don't like Online anything, eg. the WWW, and all the things that have been pushed into a WWW interface. What this does is to take e-mail, and REQUIRE online reading. If it resides on the sender's server, you have to depend on the sender's server to remain online, and you have to be online yourself. Forget about archiving mail... As soon as that server goes down, all your e-mail sent from it will be gone.

      Of course, you COULD have the e-mail downloaded locally, but guess what... you've just turned it back into SMTP again.

      Sorry, it just doesn't work.

      --
      Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
    16. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by kirkjobsluder · · Score: 1

      Indeed that's a minor drawback. But we're talking about stopping spam here (or at least the vast majority of it). It is WORTH a bit of pain to get this problem behind us!

      I disagree. Any spam solution that offers any reduction in performance over current technology for legitimate users is not a "solution". In fact most of the arguments for a peer-to-peer pull solution can be rolled into existing "push" server technology. It should not be a big deal to implement sender-side filtering (perhaps with a challenge/response system for suspicious messages), especially given that in excess of 95% of spam involves malformed mailheaders. Throttling mail servers that automatically deny relaying to ip numbers that make a suspiciously large number of requests can serve the same purpose.

      Having said that, I doubt this would really be that big a deal. It would be like loading 100 web pages, except that e-mail is far smaller than a web page and hopefully the server would be optimized to respond quickly. Also, the mail client could be threaded, so the bandwidth could usually be maxed out, not just sitting around waiting for servers.

      Frequently I find latencies of greater than 3 seconds is not unheard of, even of fast, well-connected networks. Compared to a typical IMAP connection, this is unsatisfactory. The issue is not volume, but negotiation.

      There are trade-offs to anything, but overall, I think this proposal solves far more problems than it causes, and that's a pretty good deal if you ask me. :)

      Well, as far as a solution to spam, I think it would be extremely easy to circumvent for a bunch of reasons.

      1: This is based on the naive assumption that spammers would use sender-side servers that store a copy of every message sent. It would be a trivial task to create a server to send bogus notifications, then reply with to requests for messages with a dynamically generated message. All it takes is an IP number.

      2: It suffers from the same flaw that makes spam a problem with SMTP, a dependence on paranoid sysadmins. It is relatively trivial for a good sysadmin to prevent spam relaying, the problem is the large number of bad sysadmins who don't care.

    17. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by LostCluster · · Score: 1

      1: This is based on the naive assumption that spammers would use sender-side servers that store a copy of every message sent. It would be a trivial task to create a server to send bogus notifications, then reply with to requests for messages with a dynamically generated message. All it takes is an IP number.
      That's why this plan would still require blacklists of IP numbers that aren't behaving. The difference now is that spammers would have to have their own server behind that IP address... getting an open relay to do their bidding for them just isn't going to be an opition.

      2: It suffers from the same flaw that makes spam a problem with SMTP, a dependence on paranoid sysadmins. It is relatively trivial for a good sysadmin to prevent spam relaying, the problem is the large number of bad sysadmins who don't care.
      Yes, but now it's much easier to identify servers run by bad sysadmins and nuke them. By putting some authentication into the From: field, you now know for sure that message from Spammer@yahoo.com really passed through Yahoo's hands... and my guess is that's not going to be often.

    18. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by Micah · · Score: 1

      > Any spam solution that offers any reduction in performance over current technology for legitimate users is not a "solution".

      Of course, remember that if you're downloading 100 messages, many will likely be spam. Getting rid of most of those will automatically improve the performance some.

      > In fact most of the arguments for a peer-to-peer pull solution can be rolled into existing "push" server technology.

      I kind of doubt that. There are a LOT of advantages to this scheme. I'm sure you can put some band aids on the existing protocols to make them work better, but overall I think this solution has more advantages.

      > Frequently I find latencies of greater than 3 seconds is not unheard of, even of fast, well-connected networks.

      Right. Like I said, though, the mail client should be threaded, so many of these three second waits can happen at the same time. :)

      > 1: This is based on the naive assumption that spammers would use sender-side servers that store a copy of every message sent. It would be a trivial task to create a server to send bogus notifications, then reply with to requests for messages with a dynamically generated message. All it takes is an IP number.

      The other reply addressed your two points, but to add to this ... it's not a problem at all that this type of thing would be allowed! In fact I believe Bernstein pointed out that listservs would behave this way.

      The advantage is that there is more accountability and spam is more easily nuked or blacklisted before most recipients get it.

      If you can think of a specific way to amend the current system so that it has all these advantages, please suggest it! I'm open to considering any idea, but right now I think this is one of the best!

    19. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by kirkjobsluder · · Score: 1

      That's why this plan would still require blacklists of IP numbers that aren't behaving. The difference now is that spammers would have to have their own server behind that IP address... getting an open relay to do their bidding for them just isn't going to be an opition.

      I don't see blacklists as an effective solution because they occur after the fact. (By which time, the spammer has moved on.)

      Yes, but now it's much easier to identify servers run by bad sysadmins and nuke them. By putting some authentication into the From: field, you now know for sure that message from Spammer@yahoo.com really passed through Yahoo's hands... and my guess is that's not going to be often.

      Um, PGP and digital signatures have been around for how many years without substantial changes to email protocols? Authentication does not require changing email from a push to a pull technology. (It does require standardizing on an authentication protocol.)

    20. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by LostCluster · · Score: 1

      Blacklists become more effective under this scheme because there would be a two chances to apply them after the deed has been done. Once at client-side, and even a chance for the sender-side server to revoke the message before a majority of the victims even know what hit them.

      And the problem with PGP is an issue of needing a "root of trust". That is, my PGP key represents me because, uhm, I say so. But that still doesn't give you any information as to whether I can be trusted. Relating the message back to FooBar isn't going to help you much if you never met FooBar. However, if you can relate it to FooBar@aol.com, you would then have the reputation of AOL on the line too, and AOL would have an incentive to keep e-mail originating from its domain spam free.

    21. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by kirkjobsluder · · Score: 1

      Of course, remember that if you're downloading 100 messages, many will likely be spam. Getting rid of most of those will automatically improve the performance some.

      For some jobs I was fielding 100+ legitimate messages as soon as I logged on in the morning, it is not that uncommon.

      I kind of doubt that. There are a LOT of advantages to this scheme. I'm sure you can put some band aids on the existing protocols to make them work better, but overall I think this solution has more advantages.

      Such as? Sender-side filtering of spam can be done with current protocols, as can authentication, and blacklists, all without the performance hit of a peer to peer solution.

      Right. Like I said, though, the mail client should be threaded, so many of these three second waits can happen at the same time. :)

      Still, even with dialup checking my email using current push technology requires less than a 1 second wait (in fact sorting my messages takes longer than getting the list of available messages.) When I'm working on console with local mailboxes the time delay is insignificant. Any alternative method must offer a similar level of performance.

      If you can think of a specific way to amend the current system so that it has all these advantages, please suggest it! I'm open to considering any idea, but right now I think this is one of the best!

      Ok, one of the big problems I see with this method is that if your server gets turned into a spam box you are basically up the creek without a paddle. Full file system and a possible blacklist. One technical way to stop spam at the source is to use a throttling server. Relay requests are limited to X per IP address per second (the actual number depends on the type of service you are offering). If you exceed that number, the server starts denying relaying to that IP address for increasingly harsher lengths of time.

      One of the big problems with any mail scheme is identifying spam. About 95% of the spam I get has some form of malformed header information. This can be handled by sender-side filtering where the headers are checked for sanity as the message is submitted. Failing the sanity check blocks the message. Failing multiple sanity checks in a short period of time results in a "time out" for the IP address.

      The third problem, authentication, can also be accomplished without switching from a push to a pull system. The simplest form would be to have all servers in route keep a record of the message ID field. The recipient at the end of the chain has the option of querying the server of origin. "Did message ID from username originate from your system?" The server of origin can then disavow either the message, the username or both. A more complicated method could involve digital signatures or challenge-response sequences.

      A basic issue with the peer-to-peer scheme is that it takes place on MY time. When I check my messages, I have to sit and twiddle my thumbs while the server authenticates and fetches all of the messages (and some of my mail gets pretty darn big) in addition to a hefty network load spike. In contrast, I want for the authentication to occur on the message's time. If the message is sent at 3 am, I want for it to be authenticated and delivered when I check my mail at 8 am.

    22. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by curunir · · Score: 1

      I think HashCash does a much better job of moving the onus to the sender. It requires that the mail server sending the message burns a certain amount of CPU cycles. For messages sent to one or two recipients, the computations necessary to send the message are small and unobtrusive. For SPAM messages sent to a couple of hundred thousand people, the necessary CPU power to complete the calculations would be more costly than the revenue that the SPAM would generate.

      It also has the advantage that it can be implemented into the SMTP protocol in such a way that individual admins could decide whether they only want to accept HashCashed messages. ISPs could decide to whitelist the servers they know are not open relays and have effective AUPs (other ISPs) so that they don't have to burn CPU cycles on their mail servers unnecessarily.

      --
      "Don't blame me, I voted for Kodos!"
    23. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by Micah · · Score: 1

      > Any alternative method must offer a similar level of performance.

      MUST? Let's say a new mail protocol came out that pretty much eliminated spam, yet it took (on average) 30% longer to check your e-mail. Would you really oppose it? Considering the enormous problem of spam, I still think that would be an excellent trade-off. After all, you can do other things while mail is downloaded. :)

      > Ok, one of the big problems I see with this method is that if your server gets turned into a spam box you are basically up the creek without a paddle. Full file system and a possible blacklist.

      If you're a legitimate ISP, people will be able to filter by *user*, not just domain/IP. If your box isn't a legitimate ISP, you might have some trouble, but then, you're probably a spammer!

      Actually I don't think the FS would fill up. It should be possible to store a mass-mailing only once on the server, and it would stay there until all the recipients picked it up. That is how listservs would work. Of course, a user might still send separate messages to each person, but that is what quotas are for...

      > One technical way to stop spam at the source is to use a throttling server. Relay requests are limited to X per IP address per second (the actual number depends on the type of service you are offering).

      Where is this throttling server, and who is in charge of it? For example, would it be owned and operated by a large netblock owner, just before the message gets to the Net backbone? Just trying to understand you here, so more details please...

      > This can be handled by sender-side filtering where the headers are checked for sanity as the message is submitted.

      Done by the throttling server? Can't really trust the spammer himself, if he has his own box, to do that.

      > The recipient at the end of the chain has the option of querying the server of origin. "Did message ID from username originate from your system?"

      Ok, that would help. But at that point the spam has already been sent.

      > A basic issue with the peer-to-peer scheme is that it takes place on MY time. When I check my messages, I have to sit and twiddle my thumbs while the server authenticates and fetches all of the messages (and some of my mail gets pretty darn big) in addition to a hefty network load spike.

      It doesn't *necessarily* have to be this way. The local server actually could do the retrieving at times you specify (or as soon as a message arrives!), then you could log in with POP or something similar to pick them up, just as you do now. Certainly, the most flexibility is offered when the client retrieves the mail, but this system could be flexible enough to offer a choice!

    24. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by kirkjobsluder · · Score: 1

      Well, lets go back and review the arguments:

      1. The first argument is a reduction in reading performance is justified by a reduction in spam. Yes even a 30% reduction in performance reading messages (a figure I find overly optimistic given my own cocktail napkin calculations) is unacceptable to solutions that offer 0% reduction in performance in reading messages. (What I have now with procmail and spamassin.) From an end-user point of view, the major work should be done before the spam arrives in my mailbox, not when I open my inbox. In addition, there are the considerable transition costs involved in that a p2p system would be radically incompatable with existing systems.

      2. The second argument for p2p is that it holds spammers accountable because each additional message fills up a finite ammout of disk space. This can be defeated by custom spamming software that uses only one copy of the spam on disk. In fact, I would argue that spammers can take advantage of a p2p system by flooding the network with thousands of low-bandwidth notifications in the hopes of maximizing the number of downloads that occur before a blacklist in invoked. (in fact, this tactic is already used by image url spam.) If the spammer targets the daylight hours when many people leave their mail clients open to download mail, quite a bit of spam can get through.

      We can't control how spam software uses resources like disk space. However, we can control the bandwidth that is used for spam. This is where a throttling server comes in (which I would argue should be deployed whether we are using p2p or SMTP). Designing mail servers to automatically embargo hosts that experience sudden spikes in activity can reduce not only spam, but mail virus attacks at well. So for example, a spammer runs a script that floods a major midwestern university with messages to likely usernames generated from the city phonebook. The majority of the attack can be averted if, responding to certain conditions (large number of bad usernames, large number of connections from a specific host) the mail server automatically embargoes the ip number where the spam came from.

      3: A thrid argument for a p2p mail system is that it enables send-side filtering. The scenario runs along the lines that our intrepid sysadmin magically discovers that a user of his system is sending spam, bans the user, and removes the spam before it reaches all of the recipients. A more likely scenario is that overworked sysadmin runs bogofilter or spamassasin on outgoing mail queue every now and then. I don't see a reason why send-side filtering requires a p2p model. Pipe both incoming and outgoing mail through a spam filter. Provide a one-time password system by which legitimate mail that looks like spam can be resubmitted.

      4: Client-side authentication. Advocates of p2p mail argue that it automatically authenticates the server of origin. However, this can be done either via plaintext by sending the username and message ID back to the server of origin requesting confirmation, or cryptographicly through digital signatures or challenge-response sequences. This would reduce "spoofing".

      It doesn't *necessarily* have to be this way. The local server actually could do the retrieving at times you specify (or as soon as a message arrives!), then you could log in with POP or something similar to pick them up, just as you do now. Certainly, the most flexibility is offered when the client retrieves the mail, but this system could be flexible enough to offer a choice!

      Of course, autmatic downloads pretty much eliminate any of the advantages you describe.

    25. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by hoggoth · · Score: 1

      You are missing the point of IM2000.
      The spammer has to pay the expense of storing millions of outgoing emails on HIS OWN servers.
      He can't just drop them on someone else's servers.
      That eliminates "hit-and-run" spamming. As soon as his ISP detected too many outgoing emails they could be stopped before they were picked up.
      A spamming service would have to have the expense of storing all the spams on their own servers.

      This changes the cost of spam so that one gullible customer per 1,000,000 spams is no longer cost effective.

      --
      - For the complete works of Shakespeare: cat /dev/random (may take some time)
    26. Re:Move the onus from the recipient to the sender. by ccady · · Score: 1

      I am not missing any points.

      1) The e-mails do not need to be physically stored. People would certainly work around this by making the content of the IM2000 mail server be dynamic, thus relieving themselves of the burden of storing 1,000,000 pieces of mail. If anything, this could make it *more* cost-effective to send spam!

      2) The recipient does not know whether the e-mail is spam or not, thus they or their software will grab the spam anyway.

      3) This is how those annoying HTML e-mails which grab images from other sites work now. Is that stopping spammers? I don't think so. They *like* to send spam this way!

      Bottom line: You are not going to stop spam by just looking at the server from which it came. Granted, you can make some 80% valid judgments, but very few people are going to accept an 80% correct spam filter.

      --
      J'aime mieux les méchants que les imbéciles, parce qu'ils se reposent. -- Alexandre Dumas
  13. How about a global crackdown by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    All the (legitmate ISP's in the world should come together and make a global blacklist of (rouge) isps. Along with distributed baylasien filtering, and reject emails with forged headers a different reply-to attribute (to stop joe jobs), should stop all most the most commited of spammers.

    Linux users tend to get less spam because there are less security holes to "extract" your e-mail address, a lot of spammers deliberatley take advantage of microsofts flawed software selling "evidence erasers", "spam blockers" (ironicly), "pop up lockers", and "computer cleaners", of course these software packages are visual baisc applications which open up smtp relays on your computer.

  14. Super Duper by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Redundant

    Yet another dupe. Sigh. There have been way too many duplicate articles lately. Are /. editors not reading their own site?

    1. Re:Super Duper by supergiovane · · Score: 0, Redundant

      Yet another dupe. Sigh. There have been way too many duplicate articles lately. Are /. editors not reading their own site?

      --
      Signatures are for stupids.
  15. break down the spamming practices by handybundler · · Score: 0

    Make the changes to what is wrong with the sytem that allows for things like Email parsing to occur, or random address creation, etc etc..

    Possibly, make those practices illegal, or more enforcable if they already are illegal.

    I'm still one for the 'beat-spammers-severly-about-the-head-and-face-are a' option myself, but that doesn't fly in todays non eye-for-an-eye society.

    --


    a/s/l here. Sorry, adding domain tags to your s
  16. Sender Pays! by LostCluster · · Score: 4, Informative

    The fundemental diference that protects most communication systems from Spam-like abuse is that the sender is responsible for a majority of the costs of the message. Yeah, there are telemarketers and junk postal mail, but the are seriously limited by the fact that there is a noticiable cost assosciated with each additional message they send. The fact that it costs money to send such communications makes it impractical to bother people with offers with an extremely low reponse rate.

    SMTP/POP3 e-mail presently leaves the cost of holding the message during the wait for the intended reader to be available on the receive-side server. The spammer doesn't even have to maintain a constant and consistant Internet connection.

    Under the current system, a sender can send 100 MB of messages in an hour without penalty. However, a receiver who gets 100 MB of messages in an hour usually will find any other messages sent to them bouncing.

    Requiring the message be held on a sender-side server instead would transfer the costs of sending a large volume of e-mail onto the sender, and therefore discurages the practice better than any law ever could.

    1. Re:Sender Pays! by addaon · · Score: 1

      I don't get it. Presumably, a spammer is sending out a million copies of the same e-mail. So he sends out a million 'hey, pick up your mail' notices to these new mail servers... and when the people go to check their mail, their servers go and talk to the spammers, which stored it remotely. Now, why does the spammer's server need to store more than one copy of the e-mail? Where is the increase in cost?

      --

      I've had this sig for three days.
    2. Re:Sender Pays! by soundofthemoon · · Score: 2, Informative

      It's not just the storage space for the message. It's also the bandwidth costs. That's the nice thing about this approach. It doesn't bother ordinary users, but is death for spammers. Instead of making a send raid on a few SMTP servers, they have to keep their servers running while a million readers all come calling. It's like they have set up a DDoS attack on themselves. It would be fine for non-spam businesses like amazon.com to do that, as they maintain some whompin big servers. But it would kill the small spammer, as the capital outlay for spamming would go up a lot.

    3. Re:Sender Pays! by LostCluster · · Score: 1

      Because the spammer server would have to transmit the million payload messages over a course of a few days rather than a hit-and-run instant. The spammer now has the responsilbity of keeping his server online, and can't exactly rely on an somebody who carelessly left open relay anymore.

      Moreover, it's likely that in the first few seconds 1000 or so of the million will see that e-mail, identify it as spam, and a few dozen of that 1000 will put that server on multiple blacklists. To the 900,000 remaining people who subscribe to any one of those blacklists, their software drops the notification into the bit bucket, and the payload never makes it.

      So now, an attempt to reach 1,000,000 people only connects with 11% of that... and 90% will not even bother with anything more from that sender (be it the username/domain combo or the whole domain depending on the blacklist listing) again until the blacklist operators say otherwise.

    4. Re:Sender Pays! by Ben+Hutchings · · Score: 2, Informative

      Currently the spammer is likely to be sending a few thousand copies of the email to someone else's mail server, each specified as being for a few hundred recipients. The mail server expands this to a million copies.

    5. Re:Sender Pays! by WG55 · · Score: 1

      This is an excellent suggestion, and I wish that people would take it more seriously. The typical person sends so few e-mails that at five cents per e-mail one will only be spending a few dollars a month. That is an acceptable price to me to cut down on spam.

      The only question I have is how one is to deal with mailing lists.

    6. Re:Sender Pays! by dwsauder · · Score: 1
      Many spammers send just an image in an HTML email. In many cases the image is stored on a web server somewhere. Therefore, just a small message is sent, and the spammer pays for the cost of the web server that serves the image.

      If we move to an IM2000-type mail system -- where the sender pays for the storage -- then that situation is not much different from the current situation where a spammer sends a link to an image. The difference is, that currently spammers use the technique to make it more difficult for spam filters to stop them. In an IM2000 mail system, spammers would have no choice.

  17. hooray by collapser · · Score: 2, Interesting

    at last I will know to where in Nigeria I should go!

    seriously tho. even if it is all legal-ified and I'D correctly, there will still be such things as ticking the little box to say you dont want any spam from service X,Y, and Z.
    In fact, the way online revenues are going i can see recieving /solicited/ spam as being the only way you will be able to read salon. if it's still going by then.

    it would be nice(?) to have a better system but I never forget the age old adage of no system being tamperproof. Lots of enterprising folks enjoy anonymity for non-spam purposes, so naturally some form of workaround should emerge fairly quickly.
    oh lord i'm sounding like Toffler.

    --
    <B>note to self:</B> <I>post as html</I>
  18. Cookies by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    Why don't we have a system deliver a kind of cookie for a permanent or reply only privileged contact? That would help a lot by ensuring no known important mail would get filtered.

  19. Internet Mail 2000 by oohp · · Score: 3, Informative

    Dan Bernstein has a project called Internet Mail 2000, ment to design a new Internet mail infrastructure which makes mail storage the sender's responsibility.

    1. Re:Internet Mail 2000 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      doesn't really solve anything. i mean, with disk space at $1/gig, what's this going to do? make they spend an extra $10 or something to send all their spam?

    2. Re:Internet Mail 2000 by Micah · · Score: 1

      This has been explained before, but people still don't get it, so I'll keep trying.

      > doesn't really solve anything.

      It solves just about *everything*. Seriously, think it through!

      > i mean, with disk space at $1/gig, what's this going to do?

      It's not about the cost of the disk space. It's about accountability and stopping abuse.

      It will eliminate the forged header problem. Only a notification is sent to the recipient's mail server, and when the recipient connects, his mail client checks the notification and knows exactly where to go to get the message.

      It would be much easier to blacklist, since there would be no more open relays. You would be able to blacklist by domain, by IP address, or down to the USER name (for domains like AOL and Yahoo).

      If someone sent hundreds of thousands of spams from any reputable ISP, that ISP would be able to *cancel* the spam BEFORE it was accessed by most users. If it was through a rogue spam friendly place, like I mentioned, it would be much easier to blacklist.

      This new protocol idea also has a lot of advantages for listservs. Seriously, read it!

      I'm amazed that there are so many people picking nits with this idea. We've all (mostly) said that we want to find a technical solution to spam, instead of getting the government involved. Well, this is precisely the technical solution we've been looking for. Let's get off our arses and implement it!

  20. Yes, I agree. by Scoria · · Score: 1

    The adoption of another protocol is certainly a momentous proposition. However, considering the lethargic rate at which Apache 2.0 is being adopted, we can only hypothesize regarding a new email standard. Optimistically, I believe that it would require several years of dedicated effort on behalf of the Internet community.

    --
    Do you like German cars?
  21. What's the point by Nintendork · · Score: 1
    After all, we know how law-abiding spammers are. And how effective the government is in combating computer criminals. I really don't think this will make a difference.

    That statement is original and in no way related to a comment on another totally unrelated article. *grin*

    -Lucas

    1. Re:What's the point by LostCluster · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Laws might not be able to stop spammers, but protocols have a better shot.

      Simply put, it's too easy to create spam over the SMTP protocol. The from, and reply to fields are completely free text, and have no requirement that they must be a reflection of the actual sender of the message.

      However, if SMTP were to fall out of favor for a new protocol, that new protocol could start the rules over and require that the server that is named in the from field must confirm that the username provided actually sent the message. Spoofing for the use of spam would then become practically impossible.

      Once we have a confirmed from address, it puts a responsiblity to stand behind each e-mail sent through a server. Moreover, once spam use has been detected a really reputable server operator could simply stop authenticating that sender's e-mail.. causing auto deletion before its presented to a user.

      If you can't make it illegal, try to make it impossible...

    2. Re:What's the point by 1nv4d3r · · Score: 1

      ...new protocol could start the rules over and require that the server that is named in the from field must confirm that the username provided actually sent the message. Spoofing for the use of spam would then become practically impossible.

      To me, trying to stop spam is like trying to keep people from copying digital media. There is always a way around it.

      When you think about it, the two concepts "I'll let anyone try to send me mail" and "I'll only actually get the mail I want to get" are not very compatible at all.

      I think most of slashdot understands this. The only reason there aren't a bunch of "wonder how long before Spam gets through whatever they come up with" mails is that we hate Spam, and want to believe it can be stopped.

  22. TMSP by dolo666 · · Score: 2, Funny
    How one Microsoft employee gets promoted to VP of E-services Technology:
    "I propose we go with TMSP protocols instead of SMTP, because it will allow us to move goal posts, get on the same page, keep ahead of the game, reach out and manage expectations. Also, e-services facilitate gap analysis that is goal directed to overcome security contingencies in a consumer driven brand-limited distrobution channel. TMSP is also client-centric."
  23. AOL, Earthlink, MSN, etc. by Scoria · · Score: 1

    Convincing "larger ISPs" to implement an alternative standard would also require prodigious effort.

    --
    Do you like German cars?
    1. Re:AOL, Earthlink, MSN, etc. by bafu · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Convincing "larger ISPs" to implement an alternative standard would also require prodigious effort.

      Actually, the more mail your site receives, the more interested you tend to be in stopping the flow of spam. If you consider how much in resources they spend dealing with spam in terms of capacity (for storage, bandwidth, processing volume, and filtering) and user complaints, it isn't that surprising. If a workable implementation ever comes out of this, you can expect the larger ISPs to have test servers up pretty quickly.

  24. Authenticated SMTP by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

    The technology exists, off the shelf, today.

    There is a SMTP command called STARTTLS which will enable SMTP over SSL. It's defined in RFC 2487. Sendmail supports it with a compile-time option, and so do most other MTAs. It's backwards compatible with normal SMTP.

    You will need a certificate, of course.

    This has 2 big effects:

    - encryption of email in transit between SMTP servers (a nice bonus)
    - authentication of SMTP servers

    Since sending spam isn't illegal in most jurisdictions, knowing WHO sent the spam (or relayed it) allows you to contact them and complain, threaten and retaliate (mailbomb, portscans, DDOS, etc.)

    If you receive email from a host authenticated by versign (or whoever), you apply little filtering.

    If you receive email from a host not using ssl, it goes into a queue for maximum filtering.

    Much of the spam I receive today is from DSL customers who spew directly.

    Downside:
    - there will be additional CPU load for all the email servers
    - cost of certificates

    1. Re:Authenticated SMTP by MrLint · · Score: 1

      Only problem here is that if you require a certificate you have to subsidize the broken monopoly that is verisign.

    2. Re:Authenticated SMTP by Skapare · · Score: 1

      I get almost no spam from DSL customers. That's because I block the DSL connections. And to be sure I don't get stuck having to keep a list of DSL IP addresses updated all the time as those pools are changed, I do the blocking based on the domain name. What this does is allows the ISP some actual control. For example, they can separate their centralized email servers (that legitimate mail is supposed to relay through) from their direct DSL lines, based on domain name (most ISPs are smart enough to put the DSL lines in subdomains, just like they did for dialups). Dedicated connections that just happen to be using DSL technology can simply have reverse DNS set up to identify the mail server hostname within the customer domain name. If a customer sends spam, then I can block that customer by their domain name (instead of by an IP address which might end up being used by someone else later, without my knowledge).

      Still, using a certified method of sending mail can help, whether it is by STARTTLS in SMTP (certifies the sending mail server), or a certificate in the message itself (provided I allow the SMTP session to get as far as the "DATA" command, which might not happen on those untrusted servers like the generic DSL ports).

      --
      now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
    3. Re:Authenticated SMTP by theCoder · · Score: 1

      Well, I guess you won't be receiving any email from me anytime soon (unless you don't block cable as well). I don't know why there are so many people who feel that those without T1 lines (or better) shouldn't be able to send and receive email without going through a 3rd party. Maybe it's just elitism ("I have a T1 so I won't be affected") or they really do get lots of spam and actually think blocking average people will help their problem.

      But here's my suggestion: if you don't want to get email, don't operate a public email address. A public email address means that anyone (including spammers and other people you don't want to talk to) will be able to send you an email. That's the way it is. Spam is a problem, but it's a social one, not a technological one. And it's very hard to solve a social problem through technology (go ask the RIAA/MPAA).

      It looks like you've somewhat chosen to not have a public email address. And that's your choice. I just hope you aren't in a position to force that on others. I also hope you don't try to pass off your private email address as a public one.

      Personally, I like the ideal of the ability to communicate freely with others on the Internet (well, relatively, bandwidth costs money). Sure, spam is annoying, but only for the .1 seconds it takes me to detect and delete it (autopreview in *gasp* Outlook is great for detecting spam -- this is a feature I haven't seen in any other mail reader). And even then, I get very little spam, even on addresses I've had for more than 4 years.

      So, by all means, continue blocking me. But remember that not all people on lesser connections are spammers. Some are just Linux users running their own mail servers (the way email was MEANT to be).

      All that said, however, one solution might be some sort of trust based system (provided it's relatively free). If you could authenticate my server and tell that I'm not a spammer (because I'm not :), then you would receive email from me. And this would be a lot more robust than your current system of banning all those with consumer connections. The implementation would be key, though, and it would have to be available to everyone (not just those with money), or it'll never work.

      --
      "Save the whales, feed the hungry, free the mallocs" -- author unknown
    4. Re:Authenticated SMTP by ddent · · Score: 1

      Cost of certificates? Fortunately, the verisign monopoly is dead :).



      Free email certificates are available. Yes, the page says they are for outlook, but that is more of a reference to the fact that the ability to use them is built into outlook already.

    5. Re:Authenticated SMTP by Skapare · · Score: 1

      It has nothing to do with whether you have a T1, a DSL, a dialup, or a cable modem. It has everything to do with identity and authentication. Were there to be a good infrastructure of authentication in SMTP already, and I knew how to identify you in it, I could let it pass. Or there might be a means to have it look up your history of spamming, and finding 0, let it pass.

      Is your IP address STATICALLY assigned? If so, I can whitelist it.

      The last-mile technology is not relevant. I can't tell what it is. I can guess perhaps from the name. But there are some ISPs that give T1 lines the same treatment (bogus reverse DNS) that they do for DSL. And there are other ISPs that give DSL as well as T1 a competent service (proper identification via reverse DNS with matching forward DNS). Get the latter if you're running a mail server, or learn how to "smart host" forward through your ISP.

      Sure, spam is a social problem. But there are generally no practical solutions to any social problem. To the extent that my spam blocking narrows the scope of who can send me mail, it is a private address. It's just that most people can still send to me. So yes, I am applying a technological solution to a social problem. The reason is that it is not practical to carry out the necessary social solution.

      Interestingly, spam experiences do vary greatly. I obviously get far more than you do. Here is how much spam I got recently:

      2002-07 - 6646

      2002-08 - 10336

      2002-09 - 11467

      2002-10 - 6535

      2002-11 - 12001

      2002-12 - 36760

      2003-01 - 30261

      2003-02 - 19205

      That looks like a rather public address to me. Actually it covers several addresses.

      And remember, I'm not blocking you, per se. I'm blocking an ability to identify that it is really you, or a least really someone willing to be identified (at connection time, e.g. reverse DNS). If you're stuck on DYNAMIC IP addressing, I'm sure you can figure a way around the problem.

      --
      now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
  25. Missed opportunity by gmuslera · · Score: 4, Funny

    If any mail infrastructure reorganization were done before the finding this mount of this sendmail hole , that would have been be a good way to have a mostly forced deploy of compliant mail servers around the world.

    1. Re:Missed opportunity by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      We discovered this sendmail flaw a long time before it was posted, but not for it's "hackability" but for it's "spamability".

  26. Taskforce yes, but more like SWAT! by dark-br · · Score: 0

    Creating laws, regulations, and whatnot will come nowhere near solving the problems. Sure, if a spammer lives in the US then maybe this would work; but what about all these scams from Europe, Australia, Britain, etc. Just because laws exist in one jurisdication, it doesn't mean that others will play ball. And even having laws does nothing if they're not enforced. Why not have a group of IT police hunt down spammers? After all, they're already guilty of theft and fraud (think bandwidth people). Why not prosecute under existing laws and treat spammers like the theives they are. Even though you won't catch spammers outside your legal jurisdicition, you'll help. And every country that helps would quickly be eliminating the spam problem we live with.

    1. Re:Taskforce yes, but more like SWAT! by Highwayman · · Score: 1

      Unfortunately the Department of Justice's cybercrime outfit is busy busting the real criminals and putting a stop to warez and bong sites. Once they get done with those, I'm sure they will move on to those sites callously putting Britney Spears' virginal head on pr0n star bodies and other such travesties of justice. I'd be happy if they would just update their website which I suspect may have been put together as a junior high school computer class project.

    2. Re:Taskforce yes, but more like SWAT! by Legolam · · Score: 1

      I was thinking the same thing in reverse: The European Union has drafted an anti-spam directive which is IIRC due to come into force later this year. Hurrah!... Except of course that every bit of Spam I recieve here in the UK where I can identify the source has originated from somewhere in the US, so any EU directive is of no use to me. The EU seems to be doing its bit for your SWAT taskforce, could you ask the US government to catch up? Ta.

  27. Changing SMTP by arvindn · · Score: 5, Insightful
    It think it is possible to move to a different protocol than SMTP by building a protocol over it, rather than throwing it out.

    The article notes that one of the major problems is the filtering of genuine mail due to agressive spam filters necessitated by cleverer spammers. Consider this analogous to dropping some packets at the network layer. Just as the transport layer handles this problem, we can build a higher level protocol to handle filtered mail.

    Note that having a mechanism to handle dropped mail allows us to employ agressive filtering: one that is sure to stop 100% of spam.

    What I have in mind is as follows: when Bob receives a mail from Alice (i.e, it has passed through Bob's filter) the client software sends a confirmation mail back to the Alice. This is not a regular mail that the Alice will see in her inbox; it has a special header flag that marks it as a confirmation. Alice's client software keeps track of the confirmation messages; by looking at her "sent-mail" folder she can see which of her messages have not been confirmed (and are hence likely to have been mistaken for spam).

    Finding that Bob has filtered her mail, Alice can either re-word it and send it again or do something like (assuming that Bob knows Alice): "Hi Bob, this is me, Alice. Your filter blocked this so I've rot13'd it to get past the filter. rot13 what follows to read my mail." Another option is to encrypt the mail with Bob's public key (assuming that spammers' scripts won't be clever enough to get your public key from your web page). Note that 99% of the time the mail is going to get through. You have to make that little effort to prove you are a human only once in a long while.

    There is minor problem with requiring the receiver to send a confirmation message: Bob might check his mail only after a couple of days, during which time Alice may assume that her mail was blocked. There are 2 solutions: either Bob runs a script to filter his mail regularly, or else has his ISP implement his filter for him.

    Note that this won't work if you have the receiver send a reply whenever the message did get blocked: the reply could itself get blocked etc. (This is called the red army - blue army problem in networking).

    1. Re:Changing SMTP by dnoyeb · · Score: 1

      A very simple partial (90%) solution is to reject email that has a forget header.

      Then you know _exactly_ where your spam came from.

    2. Re:Changing SMTP by You're+All+Wrong · · Score: 1

      "
      by looking at her "sent-mail" folder
      "

      $ for i in 1 2 3 4 5 ; do ./someprogram $i | mail -s "results from run $i" me@wherever.com ; done

      What's a "sent-mail" folder?

      --
      Your head of state is a corrupt weasel, I hope you're happy.
    3. Re:Changing SMTP by Jordy · · Score: 1

      It think it is possible to move to a different protocol than SMTP by building a protocol over it, rather than throwing it out.

      SMTP has evolved over the years for goodness sakes. It isn't like they wrote RFC821 and stopped.

      Since The original SMTP RFC, there has been:

      RFC 1425 - SMTP Service Extensions
      RFC 1426 - SMTP Service Extension for 8bit-MIMEtransport
      RFC 1427 - SMTP Service Extension for Message Size Declaration
      RFC 1652 - SMTP Service Extension for 8bit-MIMEtransport
      RFC 1845 - SMTP Service Extension for Checkpoint/Restart
      RFC 1869 - SMTP Service Extensions (ESMTP)
      RFC 1985 - SMTP Service Extensions for Remote Message Queue Starting
      RFC 2554 - SMTP Service Extensions for Authentication
      RFC 2821 - SMTP (Latest version of SMTP Apr 2001)
      RFC 3207 - SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security

      And it goes on and on and on and on.

      Spam is tricky, but the average person can block most spam by filtering all messages from users not in their address book since the average grandma doesn't get messages from anyone but people she knows.

      --
      The world is neither black nor white nor good nor evil, only many shades of CowboyNeal.
    4. Re:Changing SMTP by jeremyp · · Score: 1

      Another option is to encrypt the mail with Bob's public key (assuming that spammers' scripts won't be clever enough to get your public key from your web page).


      How about all e-mail addresses have a public key associated with them? This causes some pain in that SMTP messages can no longer have multiple recipients (because the body for each recipient will be different) but infinite pain for spammers who have to send 10,000 individually encrypted messages instead of one message with 10,000 envelope recipients.

      Non-encrypted messages result in a response from the server behind the MX record which says "please resend your message using the attached public key" with the public key of the recipient as a MIME attachment.

      This means that unsolicited mail has to give a legit return address to obtain the public key and as stated before it has to be encrypted differently for each recipient. Furthermore, the solution is completely backward compatible with the existing e-mail infrastructure.

      --
      All I want is a secure system where it's easy to do anything I want. Is that too much to ask ~~ Randall Munroe
  28. Keep it simple... by ccady · · Score: 4, Insightful

    World of Ends, recently discussed on Slashdot, discusses why the simplicity (or stupidity) of the Internet is so useful. "The Internet isn't a thing. It's an agreement," they say.

    That same argument applies to e-mail. Following their logic, it is best to leave SMTP alone. Simpler protocols are better. Leave the "value-added" pieces to the edge, and let the simple message transfer protocol alone.

    --
    J'aime mieux les méchants que les imbéciles, parce qu'ils se reposent. -- Alexandre Dumas
    1. Re:Keep it simple... by LostCluster · · Score: 1

      The Internet was with base-level protocols that assumed everybody using the network would not abuse the network because they would always have something to lose, their jobs.

      Therefore, a base assumption was made that every message sent would be a message the marked recipient would want to get. Clearly, that's not the case once you let untrusted public users onto the network... and DDOSes, Spam, and other unpleasantries result.

    2. Re:Keep it simple... by awfar · · Score: 1

      On the money...

      A technical solution (throwing out SMTP, etc.) won't change the problem as it is a "management" (or people) issue.

      Laws and accountibility will ultimately fix this problem, if ever, but a technical solution will be worked around, as always.

      SMTP should be augumented with certs, but that is only to enhance -its- trustworthiness, not filter or eliminate spam, which is something altogether different.

  29. Authentication... by Dukebytes · · Score: 2, Insightful
    I hope that it involves authentication of some sort or another. IANAP - but they only way I can see to get rid of spam is to tell the SMTP server that you will allow mail to be delivered to you. If someone sends you an email - and you "unsubscribe" - they have to remove you from the list - the SMTP just hops it. If the SMTP servers themselves maintained a list of "unsubscribed" or blocked addresses - they couldn't send you an email.

    I know - I don't write code - and this probably sounds stupid. But I don't really see any way of forcing someone to quit sending you email. SMTP is short and sweet - but it can't continue to just hop mail. It has to be checked somehow. And it would slow down the mass emailers a lot. Hopefully someone a lot smarter than I in this area can come up with something.

    Duke

    --

    FreeBSD: Nothing runs like a daemon with a pitch fork.
  30. Power grab by TBTB by acceleriter · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Watch for any attempt to impose digital certificates or other revenue generating schemes--wouldn't Verisign love it if now not only those who wanted SSL to work without presenting dire warnings to customers but everyone who wanted to be able to send email at all had to pay Verisign's extortion money for a certificate recognized by MSIE.

    --

    CEE5210S The signal SIGHUP was received.

  31. But this doesn't help by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    Yes, leaving the email on the sending server essentially makes the sender pay for outgoing emails, but how does it solve the spam problem?

    If I recieve an email from Foo@bar.com, how do I know that it's not from one of my friends who are using the Bar cybercafe or from someone on a mailing list I'm on? Most spam filters rely on actually reading the contents of the email. It would be nice if I could tell the Bar.com server, "please filter out this spam using this filter" but it ain't going to happen and if it does there's no way I'm going to trust them to do it.

    So basically, the only way to be sure it's not spam, is if I filter it in my own system.

  32. Backward compatibility by dpbsmith · · Score: 4, Insightful

    email is by far the most widely used of all Internet services. I belong to an organization many of whose members are retirees are on fixed incomes, and it is only within the last two years that the number of people with email has grown to a critical mass (about 2/3 of the membership).

    Of members of the lay public who regularly use email as a means of communication do not have the level of technical comfort that most Slashdot readers take for granted.

    Of people who use email, the percentage who know how to use a web browser is much less than 100%. The percentage who can google for information is much less than 100%. The percentage who can successful extract and decode an email attachment is much less than 100%. The percentage who can view a government form or a corporate brochure in PDF format and read it with Acrobat is much less than 100%.

    And the average age of their computers and operating systems is much more than three years--and they're not likely to update their email programs.

    Whatever is done needs to be 100% backward compatible with existing email clients, not requiring even simple upgrades, or an astonishing proportion of real-world Net users will be disenfranchised.

    (And please, let's not have any facile expressions of contempt for AOL users or webtv clients or people who bought email appliances (that includes one of the retirees I mentioned).

    1. Re:Backward compatibility by bafu · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Whatever is done needs to be 100% backward compatible with existing email clients, not requiring even simple upgrades, or an astonishing proportion of real-world Net users will be disenfranchised.

      Whatever is done needs to be able to deliver email while effectively correcting the system of incentives that encourages spamming. Any other considerations, like it or not, can only addressed insofar as they don't interfere with acheiving that goal. The current email system is broken and an ever-increasing amount of noise is flooding into that system. The end result is that the delivery system (which, as you have pointed out, is important to so many people) is in the process of collapsing. You talk as if the choice is between a healthy email system and some new one that we don't really need, when it's really a choice between a system that will inevitably be rendered useless by spam volume and a new one. And that new one has to include whatever features are required to avoid a repeat performance.

      If the best solution is all server-side (and some proposals are) they may be able to also get the kind of backward-compatibility that you feel is required. But, make no mistake, we aren't doing anyone any favors if we don't actually fix the current system, even if the fix does eventually require a client upgrade when the last parts of old system are finally phased out. If it is any comfort, I would expect that "AOL users or webtv clients or people who bought email appliances" will be the least-effected since their providers understand that market and have control of both ends of that particular client-server implementation.

    2. Re:Backward compatibility by Eskarel · · Score: 1

      Nearly everyone regardless of how little computer knowledge they have knows someone who has enough knowledge to fix the problem. Your organization obviously knows the e-mail patterns of its members as well as what they're using(based on the fact that you know there's one e-mail appliance), and so it wouldn't be too difficult for the organization to find someone to go around and fix everyone up(possibly you). On another note, it might not be a horrible idea for people of that kind to be disenfranchised from e-mail. The kind of people who are incapable of updating their e-mail client, assuming of course that people were made appropriately aware of the change and the process was simple enough, probably shouldn't be getting e-mail. These are the same people who will continue to open and forward attachments and who fail to keep their systems even remotely up to date(windows update on a non networked machine is a no brainer) and who by doing so allow for the spread of the various worms and viruses which have been making everyones life unpleasant for a while now, and if you believe the reports are costing lots of money.

    3. Re:Backward compatibility by Spy+Hunter · · Score: 1

      The end-user never sees SMTP. SMTP can be thrown out the window as long as we still use POP3 and/or IMAP to retrieve the mails. Any solution that replaces SMTP could still provide POP3/IMAP mail retrieval for backwards compatibility.

      --
      main(c,r){for(r=32;r;) printf(++c>31?c=!r--,"\n":c<r?" ":~c&r?" `":" #");}
  33. 192.168.0.0/24 routing by axxackall · · Score: 0, Interesting
    Look at the subject. Sounds crazy? It is crazy - the traffic from/to virtual IP addresses is not routed. Even inside your proprietary networks. The only way to route it is to translate address to some real one from the list of non-anonymous addresses. Thus, every packet in Internet is identified by its source. Just in case of NAT the source points to that local ISP.

    Same thing must be done in email business. All messages must have correct From field, and all must be signed with key identified by From field. All keys must be signed in a public (well known and trusted) CA. The router should relay only messages with verified signature keys.

    No more anonymous email!

    It is not a business of the router to watch the content of the message. But the header (let's think that the sig is the part of the header) must be checked. Specifically, the key of the sig must be verified in CA for being non revoked. Of course the revoke list can be cached on the router side for performance reasons.

    Then it will be very easy to create a report gathering center (it could be a DB at the same CA), where you can send the fingerprints of bad guys. Once the key collects more than N (specified) bad reports, the key is revoked, and all messages with key won't be relayed anymore.

    Of course, inside the interprise you can have "old-style" non-signed email. But in order to relay the message into outside of theintranet, it must be signed. That can be done automatically by the enterprise relay on behalf of corporate users. Even using the corporate key - remember NAT for IP?

    Have this infrastructure on the place and it will often unnecessary to presecute spammers: their keys will be revoked after N bad reports.

    By the way, how to send a bad report? Simple. Remember Y!Mail UI? They have a link in the message header area: "Report as a spam". Same button should be in every MUA UI: "Report the key a spammer's one". As well as another button: "Bleck messages with this key" - you still can do blocking (or any other filtering) of messages locally based on the key (ID).

    Why a key is better than a return address? You must have a valid key. That's the key :)

    Can you generate new keys with the same speed as you can generate your return addresses? I don't think so. And if you still can generate enough of key to keep your business profitable, then let's change your profit calculation forumal. From now on, the spammer has to pay big penalties for revoked keys.

    Am I am asking too much?

    --

    Less is more !
    1. Re:192.168.0.0/24 routing by alansz · · Score: 3, Insightful

      You are asking a little too much in a few ways.

      Computationally, that's a lot of public key encryption in action. For sites that process large amounts of email, this is going to hurt. But let's say we can throw money and CPU at that problem. And I suppose we can do the same for the problem of the tens of millions of key/address pairs we'll need to store centrally. Not so bad, then.

      Socially, the existence of anonymous email may be important and valuable. But I suppose anonymous remailers could appear and use their own corporate keys to signed messages in your scheme.

      Practically, you'd need a way to prevent denial of service attacks against someone's email by generating sufficient fradulent 'bad reports' to cause their key to be centrally revoked. This seems bad.

      Nothing totally insurmountable, but still pretty annoying to deal with.

      (P.S. No packet on the internet is truly identified by its source in most cases. IP addresses can be forged fairly trivially. This doesn't really bear on your proposal, but thought you should know.)

    2. Re:192.168.0.0/24 routing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Am I am asking too much?
      Yes.

    3. Re:192.168.0.0/24 routing by axxackall · · Score: 1
      About "denial of service atack"... i am not sure I understand you clearly. but I can predict the stuation when the "reporter" will send the same fingerprint again and again even when s/he's got only one message with signed by that key. In order to prevent such sorts of situations a very simple thing could be done: when the message is send originally, it's got assigned a message ID. So, when you report a bad fingerprint you attach also a message ID and thus CA cannot count twice the same fingerprint when you've got actually only one bad message.

      But if you mean DoS as a real DoS for CA... With my proposals or without it CA servers must be rotected against DoS atack right?

      About a human right to send the anonymous message. Anounoymous means "some part or all your persoanl identification is hidden". Hidden from whom? When you meet me on the street I have my right to refuse your request to know my name. Unless you are a cop. This is essential in any civilization: there are authorities for whom you must comply and identfy yourself if they ask for it. Of course only if they are asking. Of course they cannot share your information. And of course if you don't have your ID then immigration service (INS) may give you many troubles upto to suspending many of human rights and freedoms.

      Same in email. If you wanna send anonymous message then take some sort of anonymous from CA (without actual name on it, but still unique and with backtracking to your actual ID). Until you are doing anything wrong (like spam) - nobody will guess who is behind the key. But once your key is revoked then some authorities may come (using backtracking info about your actual ID when you have originally ordered that annymous key) and ask you to pay for what you've done.

      Speaking about money: make a good spam penalties and return all investments soon. Of course many spammers will shutdown the business. But the others will adapt. Good, dynamic and flexible, optimization of N (trigger theshold to fire the penalty) and penalty amount will keep money flow. From the other side, use some part of internet taxes. That's the way we pay cops, right? We do the business, we pay taxes, cops get some money from it and keep our business safe (at least they are trying to do so).

      --

      Less is more !
  34. A possible solution?... by 26199 · · Score: 0

    All mail accounts should use whitelists enforced by the ISP.

    The only way to get on a whitelist is to send an email:

    Subject: Request to join whitelist
    From: ...
    Reason: ...(100 chars max)...

    Any emails from people who are not on the whitelist must be of this format or they are automatically rejected at the ISP. Mail clients recognise request mails and notify the ISP of the user's choice.

    Mail clients can also automate the process of requesting to be added: 'you haven't emailed ... before. Please say a few words to persuade them to accept your emails, e.g. introduce yourself.'

    Unfortunatley the age-old problem crops up: this is only a good solution if everyone adopts it. (Then, for example, mailing lists can mail out requests to new members...)

    1. Re:A possible solution?... by Fuzzums · · Score: 1

      whitelists are only interesting for personal mail.
      how about companies. for them this is no solution.

      --
      Privacy is terrorism.
    2. Re:A possible solution?... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Please say a few words to persuade them to accept your emails, e.g. introduce yourself.'

      I have a Great Deal for you today.... Make money from your home!!!! Just go to.....

      Now we just have a different form of ads.

    3. Re:A possible solution?... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Try this approach:

      Alice wants to mail Bob. They don't know each other and have never communicated before. Let's say Alice wants to file a bug report for Bob's IM client.

      Alice fires up a feature in (her mailer | an auxiliary program) that generates an outgoing "request to initiate communications" with Bob as the recipient. It also includes a brief subject: "BobIM 4.5.1: bug report".

      Alice's mail server sees this request going out to Bob and makes a note of it. It passes it along as usual (normal SMTP) to Bob's server. Bob's server is similarly clued, and recognizes the mail as a incoming request and keeps it for itself. It logs the basic information and generates a response including a unique key - a cookie.

      Alice's server gets this response back and looks it up in local storage. It says "aha, we're trying to talk to this guy", and replies to that cookie from Bob's server. This acknowledgement is then returned, and now Bob's server is happy. Since the cookie matched, it knows Alice's address is valid.

      Bob's mail server now puts through the initial request to Bob's mailbox. It says something along the lines of "Alice wants to talk to you about BobIM 4.5.1: bug report." The mail then includes either URLs or other instructions for accepting the incoming transmission, or rejecting it, and so on.

      The important part is that choosing "accept" whitelists Alice, so she can now mail Bob without any further verification. The most obvious way to do this is a literal u@h whitelisting, but doing it with PGP keys would be much better.

      Obviously, spammers can do this "handshaking" stuff too, but that's where reputation lists come in handy. Today, you call them blackhole lists or DNSbls. The original was the RBL, and many more have appeared in recent times.

      If a network has a bad reputation, you might choose to not accept anything from them. This is no different from what people do now.

      The only thing handshaking will do is establish that a given e-mail address really exists and is actually trying to mail you. It gives you a firm idea of where the mail is coming from, so you can block that whole area in the future if they turn out to be unwanted.

    4. Re:A possible solution?... by 26199 · · Score: 1

      Good idea... handshaking would cut down on abuse of requests...

    5. Re:A possible solution?... by 26199 · · Score: 1

      Hence the limit on the character length. Mail clients could also kick out anything but plain text, making it impossible to include hyperlinks, images or script.

      Such spam would be far less of a problem, IMHO...

    6. Re:A possible solution?... by 26199 · · Score: 1

      Er... why not?

      I can see manual systems being a pain ('Oh, so I have to send another email to get anything from these guys... I'll take my business elsewhere')... but if the system I described was universally used, how would it be a problem?

  35. Re:Spammers too smart for this. by 1nv4d3r · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Hi, arvindn, it's me, 1nv4d3r. Your spam filter blocked my mail, so rot-13 this to see what I sent you.

    TEBJ LBHE CRAVF OL FVK VAPURF, VS LBH URYC ZR FZHTTYR ZBARL SEBZ AVTREVN.

    (not to mention that return token let's them know that you at least look at your mail.)

  36. Spam can be avoided without protocol changes. by Krapangor · · Score: 0, Troll
    You just grab spam by its very nature.
    Spam is highly redundant commercial advertisement. And we don't want it. So the basic approach would be to exploit this redundancy to filter from the original message streams. However highly localized approaches like personal mail filters will always fail due to the high variety of spam.
    How would your personal mail filter know Japanese or Chinese spam ? Not at all, it would just let the spam mails through.
    So we can only solve this problem by a worlwide highly sophisticed effort. And the key component will be again the identification of redundancy.

    The idea is to build up redundancy signatures of email messages. The global network of SMTP servers exchange these signatures by a grid orientated P2P network. When the distribution of a special signature is worldwide too high then it's identificated as spam and destroyed everywhere [1]. Note that a distributed annealing algorithm can do this in O(log(log(n)))+theta(n) operations (theta(n) a blotzmann distribution due to the annealing process).

    Building up these signatures is a little more complicated, something like MD5 checksum won't be sufficient. After some preparsing we have to project the text into a suitable banach space for further operations. Cleckerson and Allman have proposed an infinite dimensional Lie group for this task, surely any Diffeomorphism group over a Hardy space will do [2]. In this space we can build unique (!) singnatures using a simple frequency domain transformation. However we can't of course exchange an infinite amount of data, so an approximation will have to do it. Reseach any Valdpornik and Rosé has shown that there are decent approximations for this task [3]. So we can use these thing to build up our signatures and the whole stuff works indeed.

    However the highly numerical approach requires DSP coprocessors in mail servers. But I think that Intel and AMD will throw in a DSP core to their server processors in a few years anyway, so that's not a big issue.

    --
    Owner of a Mensa membership card.
    1. Re:Spam can be avoided without protocol changes. by WolfWithoutAClause · · Score: 2, Insightful
      Spam is highly redundant commercial advertisement. And we don't want it. So the basic approach would be to exploit this redundancy to filter from the original message streams.

      No. Not all redundant mail is spam. There are plenty of legitimate distribution lists out there.

      However highly localized approaches like personal mail filters will always fail due to the high variety of spam.

      Yes. However, if a high enough % of people point at an email message and say 'spam' then it's spam. People are very good at spotting spam- so a mechanism that records what people think about the mail and not deliver it to anyone that hasn't already read it would be very successful. If 90% of the first few thousand people to read an email say it's spam, the other million need never see it at all.

      --

      -WolfWithoutAClause

      "Gravity is only a theory, not a fact!"
    2. Re:Spam can be avoided without protocol changes. by Skapare · · Score: 1

      Not all commercial advertisements are spam. Not all spam is commercial advertisements. One problem we have in finding a solution is defining the problem. One question is what is spam. And we can't seem to even agree on that. To me, spam is unsolicited bulk email. Or perhaps it is unsolicited impersonal email. Or just impersonal email. If it isn't a message being sent as part of a personal relationship, I don't want it, and therefore it is spam.

      As for redundancy, spammers are already figuring out how to make each mail different. Systems that depend on checking for duplication in the world will just be part of a "tit for tat" arms race with spammers who will find more clever ways to evade these techniques, quite possibly using AI techniques to generate the wording of the message.

      The real solution is to catch who sends the spam and make them sleep on those carpet chairmats turned upside down.

      --
      now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
  37. RSS by brunnock · · Score: 1


    We've kind of taken that approach with our own MLM by storing the outgoing messages on our own server and delivering notifications via RSS. Subscribers can read the actual message by visiting our web server.

    1. Re:RSS by Angry+White+Guy · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The only problem with this is scalability. Sure SMTP has had its problems, but the nice thing about SMTP is you control the server. You control how fast mail comes in, from who it comes in, how fast people can give you e-mail, and how fast you give it out to subscribers/recipients. All of these schemes seem to remove that control from your machine.

      Instead of adding a band-aid solution to spam, let's sit down and list what we need for an a-mail server. Scalability, reliability, fault tolerance, expandability and distributed servers top my list. I'm sure that there are other better ones out there too. If you're going to revamp the protocol, try to get everything in the first time, and let's try to get it right.

      --
      You think that I'm crazy, you should see this guy!
    2. Re:RSS by Micah · · Score: 1

      Actually I think this is far more than a "band aid". Tactics like filtering are "band aids". This idea pretty well gets to the heart of the problem!

      I agree with you though -- if we're going to redesign the e-mail protocol, let's be sure to do it right!

  38. Dr. Jeffery Race's proposal on NANOG by djmitche · · Score: 3, Informative
    A participant in the NANOG (North American Network Operators' Group) mailing list recently posted a Best Current Practice proposal regarding spam to that list. He was fairly heavily flamed by some of the frequent posters on the list, but his idea (which has a basis in sociology) does have some merit.

    He uses the idea of emergent structure. To quote, " if all (or even most) players expect other players to act in a certain way, a predictable pattern of behavior emerges which becomes compelling for all players. This is the way all organizations work."

    1. Re:Dr. Jeffery Race's proposal on NANOG by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      There is a corollary to this (the Bad Apple theory). In any community (the distributed resource called the Internet counts as such), it only takes a couple people pissing in the pool to begin its destruction.

      In communities small enough for everyone to know each other, it is extremely difficult to be a Bad Apple. The anonymity of large communities brings out the bad apple in borderline cases and therefore you see a higher apparent percentage.

      The answer is to silently identify and block bad Apple behavior. In small communities, ostracism works well. Ostracism has been tried on the net with RBL et al but is difficult due to the anonymity (the bad guy simply moves on to a different IP leaving behind a bunch of blocked innocents).

      Identify bad behavior and block it at the relay level. It is the only way to preserve the openness we have now.

  39. *Barf* by Keebler71 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Replace "IETF" with "Microsoft" and you have thisslashdot story a whopping two weeks ago. Of course the slant then was how evil Microsoft was for daring to make people pay for email (which of course was not true... the article was about email accountability to reduce spam).

    --
    "It takes considerable knowledge just to realize the extent of your own ignorance." - Thomas Sowell
    1. Re:*Barf* by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This has been thought about with HashCash. Do a search for Slashdot and Google for it.

  40. Re:Spammers too smart for this. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    But you would have a valid email address of the
    spammer. Which means it is much easier to shut
    him down or sue him or whatever you think is
    appropiate.

    But there already exists something similar to
    the idea the problem is that it isnt any
    mail client that has somehting built-in.

    I would like something like this:

    1. You receive email. Mail client check if
    this somebody you have in your addressbook
    , you sent an email to him before or you accepted
    an email from him before. If so pass it through
    and happy ending. Other wise go to 2.

    2. Mail client returns mail with some specific
    format and ask for confirmation mail. It the
    other client supports it can autogenerate a
    confirmation. Client would only autogenerate
    response if it knew it sent email for the
    requested confirmation.

    3. If you receive confirmation pass the mail
    through.

    I am sure this would reduce spam substantially
    since they would have to have a valid email address. And all this without filtering.

  41. Disadvantage of the current internet by sabri · · Score: 2, Insightful

    When the protocols we all use now were developed, everybody trusted each other. There wasn't a real need for advanced security options. Nowadays, with the current commercialization of the net (which also provides me with my income) it looks as if the commercials are winning. By commercials I mean those who have absolutely no respect for other peoples right or bandwith. Let's not forget that spam isn't the only problem: dos attacks are a real threat too.

    Due to the original designs being not real secure, I'm quite sure that the spam problem can not be solved without fundamental changes in the way we use email nowadays. Perhaps the policy regarding blacklisting can be changed: at this moment most people accept mail from everybody, but not from a few blacklisted sites. It's likely that this will be changed: we don't accept your mail unless we know who you are. Unfortunately, even then there will always be people who will abuse it. Hopping from one account to another, or sue-ing every single ISP that has the guts to disconnect their connection after spamming. In short: it's not simply a technical matter, their will be a need of *globally equal* legislation too. Legislation alone won't do the trick either. No, it's time for Mr Geek to marry Miss LawAndOrder.

    Don't forget that the IETF is not the first to attempt to find a solution. RIPE has its anti-spam workgroup for example.

    --
    I'm not a complete idiot... Some parts are missing.
  42. YAES (Yet another e-mail solution) by gozar · · Score: 1

    Why can't the current SMTP servers keep a list of trusted servers, and anything that is not trusted it severly limits the delivery rate (maybe 1 per second (minute?) and then increase the rate).

    It wouldn't eliminate SPAM, but it would slow down its propagation.

    --
    What, me worry?
  43. Been Done Before by 1nv4d3r · · Score: 1

    IETF to Look at Spam

    I've been looking at spam for years. In fact, I can honestly say that I look at it more every year. Hasn't helped at all.

    Come on, IETF, try something we haven't done yet! Like get congress to declare Spam an act of Terror.

  44. Maybe... by pr0c · · Score: 1

    Maybe with the knowledge that filtering is imporving and new protocols, proggies etc are on the way spammers will just stop spamming.. LOL

    So in a nutshell you could handle it this way (i didn't think of this my self i read the story and links and other messages)...

    Mails are not auto delivered they sit on the server so any fake emails looking like they came from someone else will not get delivered.

    So.. Fag Spammer sends mail looking like it came from cowboyneal@slashdot.org and the client sees (automatically) that there is email to pick up from cowboynea@slashdot.org and then requests the mail, cowboyneal's postoffice responds no such message and then deletes the notification... boom spam stopped. At this point in time this would stop 90% of spam dont' you think? Its such a simple solution.. a big undertaking maybe but simple.

    And this would cause email to come from real addresses only or atleast real servers. But then you have the same problem... blacklists, you'd have to either setup your own blacklist or *GASP* assume someone elses blacklist aint gonna fuck up your mail. On the other hand you know the real server so its easier to talk to the datacenter/isp the spammer is using and have their box shut down before that spam is picked up and since it was never delivered the whole time.. just ready for pickup i guess a lot of spam is still stopped.

  45. Novel use of SMTP by vrmlguy · · Score: 0
    Here's an idea that uses existing SMTP to accomplish much of what's been suggested, while avoiding certain drawbacks.

    Someone's server connects to yours and sends the MAIL TO and RCPT FROM commands. Your server checks this info, along with the originating IP address), against a list of pre-authenticated sites (your employer, your family, etc) to decide if it will accept the DATA command. If so, you get the mail; otherwise the connection is severed. The sender should then start retrying deliveries intermittently over the next few days.

    Meanwhile, you get a message from your server telling you that mail is available from so-and-so addressed to such-and-such. You use a canned reply: DENY, to keep rejecting the mail until the server gives us, ACCEPT ONCE, to accept the next message with that description, or ACCEPT FOREVER, to add the description to your permanent acceptance list.

    Note that "important" stuff gets fully delivered immediately, so you can check your email offline later, while potential spam is held at the sender's expense, not yours.

    Also note a simple variation on this idea: your SMTP sever could decide to accept the DATA commnand, but then read the mail headers, evaluate them, and then decide whether to break the connection prior to accepting the body of the message. This would give you enough data to perform stochastic filtering on the message. (I've seen reports that indicate that the headers are the most useful data when applying spam filters.)

    --
    Nothing for 6-digit uids?
    1. Re:Novel use of SMTP by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's MAIL FROM and RCPT TO, not other way around. Look at this: ORDB.

  46. That should be Internet RESEARCH Task Force by notonymous · · Score: 5, Informative

    Actually, it's the IRTF -- not the IETF -- that is undertaking this work. To quote from the IRTF home page - "[Mission] To promote research of importance to the evolution of the future Internet by creating focused, long-term and small Research Groups working on topics related to Internet protocols, applications, architecture and technology."

    Don't expect a quick fix from this initiative.

  47. Make the sender pay by Catamaran · · Score: 1

    See for example hashcash and camram

    --
    Test 1 2 3 4
  48. Re:Spammers too smart for this. by 1nv4d3r · · Score: 1

    2. Mail client returns mail with some specific
    format and ask for confirmation mail. It the
    other client supports it can autogenerate a
    confirmation. Client would only autogenerate
    response if it knew it sent email for the
    requested confirmation.


    As an added benefit, it would also send a huge amount of extra traffic to spoofed aol.com return email addresses. A new DOS attack is born every day!

    This sounds better than the first post, where Alice tries to send mail again manually. In this setup, it sounds like Alice's mail gets through after the confirmation step.

    Couldn't this be built in to the internet mail servers? They could always do this step, and stop forwarding mail that the return addresses don't think they sent?

  49. Here's my long-winded solution... by sethadam1 · · Score: 1

    I thought about it one day and just rambled on on my weblog...

    http://firsttube.com/weblog/viewcomments.php?cID =1 046736931

    --
    Adam

  50. Summary of IETF ASRG discussions by wayne · · Score: 5, Informative
    Four days ago when this was mentioned on slashdot, I posted the following summary of what had been discussed. Sadly, this summary is still pretty complete.

    From what I take from all this discussion is that the only "solution" to spam is to do the types of things that we have been doing for years, but to do more of it and quicker. Use well run DNS blacklists (Spamhaus SBL, ordb, dsbl, etc.), use good content filters (bayesian filters, etc.), use bulk mail detectors such as DCC or vipul's razor, etc.) and per-user whitelists and blacklists.

    Or, combine all of the above techniques by using SpamAssassin

    --

    I've been subscribed to the list since near the beginning and have been following it fairly closely. Much of the discussion has been rehashes of old topics such as "what exactly is spam?", "make the sender pay something, either money or CPU", etc.

    The most interesting discussions that I've seen so far are:

    • Mail transfer programs (MTA) such as sendmail, exim, qmail, etc., should keep track of sender-recipient pairs. The first time the sender-recipient pair shows up, sendmail (or whatever) should issue a "temporary delivery failure". This will force the sending mail transfer program to queue the mail and resend it later. This is completely backwards compatible and doesn't require end users to do anything.

      Most spam specific programs will not queue and retry, and thus the spam will be dropped.

      Spammers that use real mail transfer programs or open relays will need to be able to hold all their outgoing spam for a while, increasing the spammer's costs and slowing down the delivery of spam. Legitimate email will not be thrown out, it will only be delayed and only for the first time.

      Of course, you don't really want the databases to remember every sender-recipient pair forever, nor do you want to remember pairs that were added by spam so this really isn't a "first time" database, but it is close.

      Apparently the "canit" program already does this, but I had not heard of this technique before.

    • Spam filtering really needs to be done while the email is being received. Sendmail can already do this with the milter filter, but other MTAs should also. Most mail servers are I/O bound, not CPU bound so this really isn't much of a burden on the server.

      If you filter during the email receive process, you can make the sending MTA do the bounce. This means that you will not have to deal with spammers forging "from" and "reply-to" headers. You won't have to clean up bounces that never succeed, nor will you be responsible for bouncing spam to another victim that the spammer selected for the "from" or "reply-to" headers.

      Also, false positives will recieve a bounce message instead of just disappearing. This reduces the danger of important email being lost.

    • There are also several proposals to deal with ways of verifying that email being sent from a given IP address and claiming to be from a certain domain is actually authorized to send email claiming it is from that domain.

      Right now, there are DNS records that tell you which IP addresses are valid to try and send email to for a given domain (the MX records), but many ISPs have different machines for sending and recieving email. There are currently no DNS records to tell you which tell you which IP addresses a domain will send email from.

      The problem with this kind of proposal is that there are many people who think they have legitimate reasons to forge "from" or "reply-to" addresses. It also forces ISPs to make sure that every time they add a new outgoing mail server, they need to update the list of valid IP addresses. If they forget to do this, then only bleeding edge spam filters will detect a problem.

    --
    SPF support for most open source mail servers can be found at libspf2.
    1. Re:Summary of IETF ASRG discussions by Animats · · Score: 1
      If "temporary delivery failure" was an end-to-end message, that would be effective. But it only goes back one hop. So open relays will resend their queued spam.

      Worse, the spammers who send their messages multiple times will still get through.

    2. Re:Summary of IETF ASRG discussions by t · · Score: 1
      I think the solution is simple, you use the spammers method of operation against them. You first have all your good email accounts, to which you add several spam addresses. Upon receiving all email from all addresses, you look for messages that are (roughly) duplicates and treat them as spam. Why does this work? Because spammers are indiscriminate, chances are highly likely you'll get the same spam mail at multiple addresses.

      This has the bonus that "broken" systems which fail to unsubscribe you can be taken care of by simply subscribing with one of your spam addresses.

      This way desired mass mailings would never be considered spam. No bayesian filter can do that.

      I know that there are groups attempting to start collections of spams for a similar purpose but they have drawbacks. First one man's spam may not be spam to others. Also, this system would increase the costs to the spammers simply by increasing the number of email addresses. You could even have software to pull the links and such in the spams to flood the spammers with false hits.

    3. Re:Summary of IETF ASRG discussions by mihai · · Score: 1

      It's simple for ISPs to receive mail on the machines they use to send mail; they may just do NAT or port forwarding for port 25 to the actual receiving machines. This can be done at the router, no server modifications are necesary.
      So we may start only receiving mail from IPs that are listed as MX for the sender domain, and have a valid reverse DNS name.
      ISPs that don't follow best practice can be automaticaly notified ( at the address block admin contact address for example) by the MTA, and their mails can be subject to agressive filering and/or temporary rejected for -say- a day.
      Also their upstream providers and/or registrar can be automaticaly notified also, as they may have more leverage to get things fixed.
      To keep such notifications managageable, they may be agregated/sumarized for a period of time -say one day- in a single message.

  51. Not enough by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    > The server on which the the e-mail is stored
    > according to the notice is info enough.

    Is it?

    > If you trust that server, you'll accept that
    > they have already done the spam filtering and
    > canceling for you. If you do not trust that
    > server, you simply ignore all notices from that
    > server.

    Some of my friends use hotmail.com and yahoo.com. Filtering based on servers isn't enough. I'm on some mailing lists and I often recieve legitimate email from unknown servers.

    This solution doesn't stop spam. We can already do the "I don't accept emails from this server" today without a special protocol. We can already "accept email from only a few people on your list". Several ISPs allow you to set your own spam blocking on the ISP server so you don't see spam.

    1. Re:Not enough by Micah · · Score: 1

      > Some of my friends use hotmail.com and yahoo.com. Filtering based on servers isn't enough.

      If I understand the proposal correctly...

      1. If someone *did* try to send spam through hotmail/yahoo, the techies would be able to delete the spam from those servers BEFORE most recipients got to it. That alone is a huge advantage. All reputable ISPs would likely do that.

      2. No forging of headers/server names. If the notice said it came from hotmail, your e-mail client would ONLY go to hotmail to pick it up!

      > This solution doesn't stop spam.

      Maybe not 100%, but I think it would eliminate the bulk of the spam *problem*. It's better than any other ideas I've heard. Do you have a better idea? If so let's hear it!

  52. In the mean time... by stinkykitten · · Score: 1

    Until the ultimate fix for spam is created why can't mail servers just limit the amount of mail that is sent by any user?

    Is it possible to setup sendmail and such to limit the number of emails sent to a quantity over time? If there was a limit of say 1 email every 5 minutes for generic users (obvoiusly, some algorithym that would allow for small bursts would make sense), that would effectively stop someone from spamming from a regular account. If a person wants to setup a mass mailiing account they will have to pay for it.

    If this was implemented then even the hijacking of a server would be pointless as the server would normally run in restricted mode. If spammers were to hack or create a false unrestricted account then they would be opening themselves up for far more than just spamming violations, creditcard fraud would make spamming a much larger risk.

    Why do so many people keep looking for the next answer before they use the tools they already have?

    1. Re:In the mean time... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      WONT WORK - for the timple reason that spammere forge their "username" - there is no lonk to that specific spammer, because the next time they spam you, another user would be given (as well as another mail gateway), so you have NO idea then next spam could come from the same user.

  53. If they are reinventing SMTP, might as well... by Istealmymusic · · Score: 5, Insightful

    ...allow binary transfers. I can't tell you how much CPU time has been wasted by base64 encoding binaries, sending them over an inefficient protocol, and decoding them on the other end. yEnc does a good job but the whole encoding shenanigan is a major pain for anyone trying to send family photos or the latest AFI album. Please, IETF, make a better 8-bit clean push protocol, because SMTP is the only one we have.

    --
    "The lesson to be learned is not to take the comments on slashdot too literally." --Vinnie Falco, BearShare
    1. Re:If they are reinventing SMTP, might as well... by hey · · Score: 1

      Yes, MIME wastes some space and cycles but its
      fantastic that you can open any mail in vi
      and basically understand it. Also you can
      say "Content-transfer-encoding: 8bit" -- ie binary.

    2. Re:If they are reinventing SMTP, might as well... by valdis · · Score: 1
      RFC3030 SMTP Service Extensions for Transmission of Large and Binary MIME
      Messages. G. Vaudreuil. December 2000. (Format: TXT=23405 bytes)
      (Obsoletes RFC1830) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)

      Complain to your vendor. The BDAT ESMTP extension has been out for a while now - RFC3030 is an update of RFC1830, from 1995.

      For the record, a number of vendors, Sendmail included, don't support BDAT yet because of a rather annoying corner case. It's unclear what you should do if you are a mail gateway, accept a message via BDAT, and then find that the mail server that you need to pass it along to doesn't support BDAT. Or to quote section 3 of RFC3030:

      If the receiver-SMTP does not support BINARYMIME and the message to
      be sent is a MIME object with a binary encoding, a sender-SMTP has
      three options with which to forward the message. First, if the
      receiver-SMTP supports the 8bit-MIMEtransport extension [8bit] and
      the content is amenable to being encoded in 8bit, the sender-SMTP may
      implement a gateway transformation to convert the message into valid
      8bit-encoded MIME. Second, it may implement a gateway transformation
      to convert the message into valid 7bit-encoded MIME. Third, it may
      treat this as a permanent error and handle it in the usual manner for
      delivery failures. The specifics of MIME content-transfer-encodings,
      including transformations from Binary MIME to 8bit or 7bit MIME are
      not described by this RFC; the conversion is nevertheless constrained
      in the following ways:

      1. The conversion MUST cause no loss of information; MIME
      transport encodings MUST be employed as needed to insure this
      is the case.

      2. The resulting message MUST be valid 7bit or 8bit MIME. In
      particular, the transformation MUST NOT result in nested Base-
      64 or Quoted-Printable content-transfer-encodings.

      Note that at the time of this writing there are no mechanisms for
      converting a binary MIME object into an 8-bit MIME object. Such a
      transformation will require the specification of a new MIME content-
      transfer-encoding.

      So we have options (1) and (2) that *may* work sometimes and have no existing standard method of implementation, and option (3) to drop back 10 and punt. Gives you warm-and-fuzzies about its reliability, doesn't it?
    3. Re:If they are reinventing SMTP, might as well... by dwsauder · · Score: 1
      I doubt that would happen. Base64 encoding is very efficient CPU-wise. But besides that point, base64-encoded content is very robust in an environment that is not friendly to binary content. The two big problems are (1) end-of-line characters and (2) NUL characters. As long as there is a difference between Windows and Unix systems, there will always be a problem with CR LF vs. LF. Make the conversion on an MP3 file, JPEG image, or what-have-you, and you corrupt the file. Allow message content to contain embedded NUL characters, and you break all kinds of text processing applications.

      BTW, it's not just SMTP that has a problem with binary content. It's also POP3, IMAP4, and NNTP.

      Yes, we should have an 8-bit clean email system. But 8-bit content is different from binary content. I can see everything eventually moving to 8-bit content, including unencoded UTF-8 text (which doesn't contain NUL characters). But base64 encoding for binary content will be with us for a long time to come, probably until Unix/Linux/C drops '\n' as the end-of-line sequence. And XML/SOAP may breath new life into base64 encoding.

  54. I was the original poster ... by Art+Pollard · · Score: 3, Informative

    I was the original poster. You got it basically right in your synopsis too.

    To recount, my idea is for when someone sends a mail message, the message itself goes onto the local mail server and the header for the message would go to the recipient. The recipient's mail client would then download the message. However, it would be possible for the mail server to delete the message _before_ the mail client ever sees it in which case, the mail server tells the client this and the client would then throw away the header and the end user _would_never_even_know_ that the mail (spam) had been sent. This would be totally transparent. It would also allow of course, for sender of the mail to be able to tell if / when a mail message had been picked up. (Not read but simply picked up.)

    One of the big advantages of a system such as this is that you know for 100% certainty where the spam (or other e-mail) is coming from. You don't have to spend time looking through forged headers etc. in order to send a complaint to the ISP.

    ISPs on the other hand would be capable of canceling spam after it had been sent and before it was picked up by the end user. For example, someone send's 100,000 spams from an AOL account. Somebody notifies AOL that they received spam from the offending person, AOL looks and AOL then is capable of cancelling all unpicked up spams -- before they are ever delivered to the end user. Alternatively, AOL could also simply look on their servers and say: "hey, we have 100,000 messages that are waiting to be picked up, we had better look into this" and then make a determination from that point as to whether the mail should be canceled -- again before anybody (or very few) sees the spam.

    Blacklists could easily be created too where the site is blacklisted for only a certain period of time. So after three days (for example) the blacklisting would go away automatically. This avoids the problem that many ISPs have where they get blacklisted due to a single user and then they can't figure out how to get off the blacklist. Using this approach, the blacklisting would only last for as long as the spambarrage continued.

    Blacklists would easily be able to be created within certain organizations or groups of people who have similar "moderating" views rather than trying to make one (or very few) blacklist(s) meet everybody's needs as is now the case -- and often hurting people's ability to send and receive legitimate mail.

    The protocol could not only specify what server the mail came from but also the user. So, for example, if someone were spamming from AOL, it might not be a great idea to blacklist AOL but only that user from AOL. This would work for mail systems where you know it is a legitimate business but with a few unruly users.

    So, using this technique, it would be possible for a spammer to get a few spams out but it would be nearly impossible for them to spam very many people before it was caught by their ISP and canceled or the user/ISP was blacklisted for a period of time.

    -Art
    Pollarda@Lextek.com
    Lextek: Suppliers of High Performance Text Retrieval Engines

    1. Re:I was the original poster ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I still fail to understand how this is going to stop spammers. In order for this to work, then EVERYONE who has a mail gateway, would have to deploy this method. But there are zillions of mail gateways out there. It's going to take a very long time to migrate over into this system. But as a long term solution, this might be very feasable. The EITF meeting in SF on the 20'th might be the start of a good forum to bring this up of course.

      But there is just ONE session (Tues Morning), and it costs $~600 to attend... hardly worth it for just one session.

      The ASRG (earlier mentioned here in /.) looks to be a really good forum for bringing out these ideas.

      There appears to be no short-term solution, other then spam filtering or better spammer tracking tools.

      But if we can pull this off, you have MY 100% support.

  55. I DO NOT WANT TO PAY TO SEND EMAIL! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ... and neither does any of the other millions of friends and family members out there who don't give a rats ass about spam.

    Where would the money go?

    How would I pay for a "stamp?"

    Which company/government body is going to manage my account for "stamps?"

    I get just as much junk mail in my physical P.O. Box as I do in my e-mail box. Cost to send is NO deterrant.

    This is not a solution.

    1. Re:I DO NOT WANT TO PAY TO SEND EMAIL! by LostCluster · · Score: 1

      There's no need for "stamps", just a protocol that requires the sender-side server have a more involved role in standing behind the message.

  56. Tempfailing first time email by wayne · · Score: 1
    If "temporary delivery failure" was an end-to-end message, that would be effective. But it only goes back one hop. So open relays will resend their queued spam.

    Yes, using a tempfail for first time email is not a perfect solution, but it does help. In particular, making an open relay queue lots of spam will make the open relay's problem much more noticable to them.

    Worse, the spammers who send their messages multiple times will still get through.

    You shouldn't really tempfail the "first" time you see a sender-recipient pair, you should consider any pair that you have seen "recently" (weeks? months?) to be effectively a "first time". You should also tempfail any emails from a "new" pair for the first hour or two.

    This will give you an hour or two warning about potential spam, giving spamtraps and blacklists a chance to kick in.

    Remember, any email from a working mail server will still get through, it is just the first time there will be a slight delay.

    --
    SPF support for most open source mail servers can be found at libspf2.
    1. Re:Tempfailing first time email by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      It's an excellent idea, and I've been running it since November. It also has the nice side-effect of destroying dictionary attack wankers, since they all tend to "hit and run" more than most.

      In the nearly 5 months it's been running, there has been only one snag. Some twit with a Lotus mail server couldn't send mail to anyone unless she sent it twice. That's right - her mail server was treating 4xx errors as permanent failures.

      Personally, I don't see that as a problem, but I wanted to warn anyone who was thinking about doing something similar.

  57. Moderators on drugs? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    > IP addresses can be forged fairly trivially

    Why would such a wild claim get moderated upward? UDP can be spoofed, but TCP's three-way handshake is hard to spoof if the OS of the machine you're connecting to is smart when picking sequence numbers. We're talking about e-mail, which uses TCP. You could spoof TCP connections with some difficulty when many OS's used predictable sequence numbers, but that's a problem that has been fixed for years. Hello moderators?

  58. And switch to UTF-8 by GCP · · Score: 1

    And make the default text encoding UTF-8. The Linux Standards Base will soon make UTF-8 the default system encoding for Linux (well, the major ones that follow the LSB). Win & Mac are now Unicode-based. XML is UTF-8 by default.

    Having the full character set in use by the OS (Unicode/ISO 10646) includable in a default email with no corruption or additional processing would certainly be a great feature.

    This would allow even English speakers to have an enormously increased range of characters they can include in their text: math symbols, musical symbols, the full text of a Time Magazine article (professional publishers go way beyond Latin-1 in the characters they include in an article, and an email version these days usually corrupts the original to some extent), as well as mixtures of any other languages of interest.

    XML in default form (UTF-8) could be included as simple text without corruption and without requiring that it be converted to an attachment.

    If it's the default, UTF-8 will be quickly adopted by modern (non-abandoned) email clients and servers, meaning that they can all talk to each other in any language without reconfiguration.

    I think this would be a major win.

    --
    "Those who have never entered upon scientific pursuits know not a tithe of the poetry by which they are surrounded."
  59. Retard. by edunbar93 · · Score: 1

    You might get as much junk mail if the sender pays but you know what? You won't get the same quality of spam. You will get ads from your local grocery store instead of "MAKE MONEY FAST!!!!!!!" and "Add 12 inches to your penis!!"

    Spam largely consists of cheap bullshit products, scams, porn, and crap that appeals to the insecurities of stupid people. Do you know why this is?

    It's because the individuals who "run" the "businesses" in question are getting something for nothing. In other words, they're all just running scams. If you were to charge $0.05 for every e-mail sent, then it would become a cheap way to advertise, rather than a *free* way to advertise. Suddenly, sending out 5 million e-mails costs you $250,000 instead of $250 (if you include your own labour). For the paltry 0.01% (or less... I don't know what kind of numbers spammers get) response rate, suddenly it becomes a big losing game for everyone that's selling Viagra and porn and pyramid scams. That advertising would be replaced by people selling cars and groceries and books, and while they may still be capitalist scum, the products they're hawking are orders of magnitude less offensive than the crap that's currently being hawked by e-mail.

    $0.05 per e-mail isn't going to break the bank for us regular joes - a couple hundred e-mails a month comes out to all of $10.00. Don't forget that it actually costs money to run an e-mail server, and it would be the people running that server that would be collecting the postage. It might even be a good idea to hand the whole system over to your friendly neighbourhood national post office.

    Personally, I think this would be a small price to pay for vastly improving the quality (not to mention stemming the quantity) of the advertising in my mailbox. I'll also be happy with the fact that the people doing the advertising would be paying to support the e-mail system instead of working hard to bring about its collapse. As far as I can tell, this is a simple, elegant solution.

    --
    "No problem. I have the capacity to do infinite work so long as you don't mind that my quality approaches zero."-Dilbert
  60. Would paying really BE more expensive? by NetSettler · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I've been using email on the net for 20+ years and have been as grateful as anyone that it hasn't cost.

    However , of late, with other people making such gross abuse of the world's mail systems that I feel I am (and all of us are) paying anyway, it might be worth revisiting this question. I'm not 100% convinced that paying per piece of mail sent would be more expensive than, effectively, paying (in both time and in dollars spent on ISP infrastructure) per piece of mail received. I send a lot less mail than I receive, and I bet most people do.

    --

    Kent M Pitman
    Philosopher, Technologist, Writer

  61. Art is right by wackybrit · · Score: 1

    Incase anyone's wondering, yeah, Art Pollard was the original poster, the name rings a bell now :-) Thanks Art!

    The original post is still available to read.

  62. Keep it simple.... by dousette · · Score: 1

    ... and just ban all HTML email. Bouncing it with a notice that says "Hey, I don't accept HTML email because of all the viruses and SPAM that spread that way... write me back again in Text." You could also put instructions for Outlook Express and other major email programs on how to switch it over.

  63. This scheme is flawed by Mustang+Matt · · Score: 1

    It only leads to more problems. Email should never cost per email. I can only imagine the fraudulent behavior that would follow.

    --
    The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. - Benjamin Franklin
    1. Re:This scheme is flawed by LostCluster · · Score: 1

      There's no need to charge per e-mail sent...

      Right now we're on a receiver pays system because if somebody sends you an e-mail... you're the one responsible for paying somebody to hold that e-mail until you're ready to pick it up. If you were to get 20 MB of e-mail in a day, most ISPs will cut you off.. you won't be able to get any more until you sign on and clear out your mailbox.

      If the sender is responsible for keeping a server online and keeping up with the bandwith associated with what they've sent, then they've got to pay for the volume of e-mail they send.
      Now, if you're a typical user and only send out a handful of e-mails a day, you'll be fine. But if you send an outragous volume of e-mails, it's going to be your disk quota that fills up first and you'll have to retract some of your undelivered e-mail to send more.

  64. Insights by Phroggy · · Score: 1
    I've collected a few.
    • Our existing e-mail protocols are outdated and need to be replaced. We need a new protocol that will be secure - that's the only way to stop spam.
    • Spam is a social problem that we shouldn't have to fight with technical means, and the only solution is to go through the courts.
    • Whitelists are the only way; I never get spam because nobody can e-mail me except my closest friends.
    • You may find it inconvenient, but spam is protected by the First Ammendment, and we have no right to restrict it.
    • I don't see why everyone doesn't just install SpamAssassin and quit whining.
    • How else would I find penis enargers, herbal viagra and low mortgage rates?

    How many did I miss?
    --
    $x='S24;r)>63/* h@<5+oZ)32"5cz';$me='phroggy'x$];
    $x=~y+ -xz+\0-Tx+;print$_^chop$me for split'',$x;
    1. Re:Insights by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Spam is NOT protected by the first amendment. The First Amendment reads, in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."

      The emphasis is on Congress, the two legislative houses of the United States Government.

  65. Quick recap of every technical idea posted here by nakaduct · · Score: 1
    Addressing each post from top to bottom, your idea is:
    1. Stupid.
    2. Unworkable.
    3. Diminished, by your not knowing what spam is.
    4. Fucking stupid.
    5. Diminished, by your not knowing what e-mail is.
    6. Brilliant, assuming an advanced alien race will donate their old computers to us.
    7. Equivalent to replacing the e-mail infrastructure with CGI web-forums, and therefore fucking stupid.
    8. Already implemented.


    Hope this helps!
  66. Another advantage by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If you change your mind about what you sent, you can yank your mail before it is read. AOL already does this between members command "Unsend Mail"

  67. Mod parent up! by Micah · · Score: 1

    So Bernstein isn't the most socially adept in the world, but his ideas are brilliant. Is anyone seriously considering implementing this?

    It seems as though this could stop the spam problem overnight. (Or, at least over as many nights as it takes to get people to switch. :) )

    1. Re:Mod parent up! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Every time a spam story is posted, someone posts about IM2000. Once again:

      If IM2000 was implemented, then you still get spam - you just have to "call back" to fetch it rather than having it dumped on you.

      People are always worrying about "bugs" in their e-mail - well, the braindead ones who use mailers that understand HTML, at least. What better way to verify that an address is valid by having them call back and fetch the mail? If someone connects to your server to grab the mail, that address obviously exists.

      Must I go on?

    2. Re:Mod parent up! by Micah · · Score: 1

      > If IM2000 was implemented, then you still get spam - you just have to "call back" to fetch it rather than having it dumped on you.

      How much have you thought this through?

      Yes, you might get SOME, but the vast majority of it, I believe, would quit. It would be MUCH easier to blacklist by rogue ISP, or by USER of a legitimate ISP. Forged headers would be impossible.

      > What better way to verify that an address is valid by having them call back and fetch the mail?

      I hadn't actually thought of that point before, but I believe it's well compensated for by the additional tools this would give us to control spam.

      Overall, it solves far more problems than it causes, and to me that's a pretty good deal!

  68. From: spam@hotmail.com != went through hotmail.com by guardian-ct · · Score: 1

    Hotmail.com or Yahoo.com in the headers of an email doesn't mean it came anywhere near those servers. I've gotten more than several spams that were apparently sent through open relays in China, Russia, or almost any other country, with hotmail.com or yahoo.com in the "From" field, but none of them actually touched either company's servers. Forging email is still surprisingly easy, if you can find a badly configured email server. How easy is it to do that? Just check some of the spam mail you get.

    I finally went to popfile.sf.net, and though I still download the junk email, at least I can filter it out much easier. Other interesting spam filters include Mozilla(1.3beta+), and CRM114, though I haven't tried that.

    None of this filtering is a real solution to the spam problem, and I think it will take something like the IETF or some standards org to get it right.

  69. No need to "extract" a real email address by guardian-ct · · Score: 1

    I've seen many spams that basically go to "every word in dictionary" at each ISP. I've seen a few that obviously tried "every 3-letter combination" as a login name (26 cubed=17576). It took spammers about a month to find a test 3-letter loginname on a medium-sized ISP, though I don't get many on it yet. There's no real need for any spammer to steal your email address from your own computer, unless your address is not found in the spammer's dictionary.

    Currently, 73% of my email (by number of messages, not size) is spam. I did have my ISP turn off their "spam filter", because it tended to junk the wrong email (some relatives couldn't send me email), but still, 73% is a bit much.

  70. no by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Spammers use their own desktop mail programs, usually bypassing the ISP. These programs are specifically written to maximize output speed. Therefore, changing the ISP's SMTP server will have absolutely no effect on the spam transmitted thru the ISP.

  71. Quick and easy solution by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Given that opensourced MTA's like Sendmail, Postfix and exim dominate the landscape, we would all get a *quick* relief from spam if the three MTA's chose a throttling/prioritisation mechanism based on hashcash and/or authenticated senders for relaying mail, enabled it as the default installation and backport it to be released with the next bug-fix.

    Initially, this would not cause the users any ill-effects as all users would be equally disadvantaged. However, as the smarter users wisen up, they'd add hashcash headers to get priority mail sent, and this would eventually cause spammers to lose out.

  72. Another Name for this: Re:Authenticated SMTP by jlrowe · · Score: 1
    I already I use it everyday effectively.

    The other name? Lotus Notes.

    Unfortunately, not open source. However the server does run on Linux, and mail can be read with a web browser. Also, authentication AFAIK is only between Notes servers.

  73. Re:Summary of *IRTF* ASRG discussions by keithmoore · · Score: 1

    Sadly, this summary is still pretty complete.

    As other people have pointed out, this is not an IETF working group - it's an IRTF research group, and as such its purpose is to try to understand the problem and the solution space rather than to propose a concrete solution for standardization. Many of the folks in the group don't seem to have figured this out yet either. As a result there have been a number of naive proposals for how to solve the problem, along with a huge number of arguments of the form "your proposal is broken in X way".

    But the group just got started a few days ago, and is only barely starting to move in any particular direction. Trying to make any predictions about the group's eventual output from what has been discussed so far is probably not a useful exercise.

  74. What about mail quotas? by NtroP · · Score: 1
    I see a BIG problem with this. Currently, I, as the mail administrator on my mail server can limit each user to X amount of mail storage. People who don't properly police their email will stop receiving email because they are over quota.

    In the system you propose, I have potentially tons of mail on my system because someone else isn't checking their mail often enough. Does this mean that I just send a message to the sender saying that their email to "so-and-so" is too old and is being deleted?

    Currently, I can send a message to someone, see it delivered (with a return receipt) and if they have room for it there, it will sit indefinitely until they check their mail. With your proposal a "busy" mail server may have very little room for the amount of mail storage necessary for sending due to the lag between sending the "header" and mail being checked. I suppose implementing a "send quota" might be an idea, but, again you are at the mercy of people who aren't checking their mail often enough - which may mean every few minutes if you have a small quota and send a lot of (or large) mail messages.

    Also, what do you do about people who see the subject line, say "OH, I know what that's about" and delete it without ever retrieving the message? How long does the sending server sit on a dead message that will "never" be picked up?

    Send quotas may be a way to stop spammers, but if I have, say a 10MB sent-mail limit and I have several emails with 2 or 3 MB attachments waiting to be picked up filling up my out-box, what can I do? Call them on the phone and say - "hey, pick up yer damn mail"? Kinda defeats the purpose of email.

    I don't see any fool-proof way of avoiding spam. If I know your email address and want to send you something, I can do it. And as long as there are "free" email services where I can temporarily set up shop, spam 'till I drop and then move to another account without repercussion, you can't stop me short of running a manual whitelist-only system where only mail from people you're expecting mail from, and have listed as legit, will be accepted.

    I administer a mail system that has several thousand users and processes a tremendous amount of mail daily. I have implemented spam control measures including blacklisting and heuristic scanning at the server level. dealing with spam takes an inordinate amount of my time, bandwidth and computing power. I'd love to blacklist every korean ip out there except that we have users who correspond with people in that part of the world.

    I sure don't have any answers. I hate the thought of trying to legislate anything, because you can't. Korea won't give a crap if the USA says spam's illegal. What are we going to do?

    Perhaps if there were a method of autogenerating server-wide mail rules where every message that arrived was tagged by the receiving server with a "Do you wish to block mail from this person?" link in it it might help. But then again spammers just use randomly generated addresses anyway. I don't have the answer, but I don't think this solution is it either. Interesting concept though.

    --
    "terrorism" and "pedophilia" are the root passwords to the Constitution
  75. Internet Mail 2000 by critterfidget · · Score: 1

    Anyone looked at the DJ Bernstein proposal for Internet Mail 2000?

  76. Because spammers own their own mail servers. by NFW · · Score: 1
    Because spammers own their own mail servers, and configure them for maximum throughput. Or they use someone else's open relay. An open relay is basically a misconfigured mail server.

    If "we" (the internet community, for lack of a better phrase) cannot stop idiots from putting open relays on the net, there's no way we're going to persuade every mail server admin to actually implement rate limiting.

    --
    Build stuff. Stuff that walks, stuff that rolls, whatever.
  77. One stone, two birds. by NFW · · Score: 1

    Your message summarizes the ASRG mailing list quite nicely. Too nicely, actually. On ASRG, most responses aren't as polite as yours.

    --
    Build stuff. Stuff that walks, stuff that rolls, whatever.
  78. It's firstly a contract-law problem by bill_mcgonigle · · Score: 1

    I once argued that fighting spam is firstly a contract law problem, because we need to allow our computer systems to automatically enter into ad-hoc contracts in order to eliminiate spam. Once we can do that, the technically cards all fall into place.

    --
    My God, it's Full of Source!
    OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
  79. Last Post! by alpg · · Score: 0

    "Has anyone had problems with the computer accounts?"
    "Yes, I don't have one."
    "Okay, you can send mail to one of the tutors ..."
    -- E. D'Azevedo, Computer Science 372

    - this post brought to you by the Automated Last Post Generator...