Columbia Accident Investigation Board: Final Report

ssclift writes "After nearly 7 months the Columbia Accident Investigation Board has released its final report into the February 1st loss of the Shuttle Columbia and all 7 crew members. This is more than a technical assessment of the immediate causes of the accident. Once again, sadly, the world's flagship space agency gets a thorough and grim review. Press briefings will begin at 11:00 EDT along with a webcast."

Comments

The "Culture of NASA"????

[tha_mink]

I actually read that they are blaming this accident on the "Culture of NASA". Meaning, that if you were some small fry in the organization and you saw a problem with a process, you would be afraid to approach the 200 suits. Even though they stand there and say "Anyone have a problem with what we're doing?" "Our doors are always open.."

Sound familiar anyone?

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[the MaD HuNGaRIaN]

Where I work, the doors are always open...it's the ears that aren't.

I suspect it's the same situation at all large organizations.

You can lead a manager to an idea, but you can't make him/her think.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[Frymaster]

Sound familiar anyone?

of course. now how would you or anyone build a system that was more open? even the japanese "tan" system has failed...

the suits will always be there and they will always want "yes men".

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[cybercuzco]

There is a culture of NASA. I had a professor tell me a story about how they came up with the toilet on the shuttle. Aparently they already had a perfectly good toilet design from skylab, and it actually worked nearly as well as a conventional toilet, you didnt have to strap yourself down or anything. Just hold on and a centrifugical pump in the bowl takes care of everything. At any rate, it was designed at Marshall Spaceflight center. Of course the shuttle was beign designed at Johnson Spaceflight center (or maybe it was the other way around, dont quite remember) At any rate, Johnson couldnt use ANYTHING that had been designed by Marshall (and vise verse) So Johnson deisgned a completely new toliet, at very great expense to the program (~$10mil) When they could have used an existing design for much cheaper(probably still ~$1mil, but hey thats 10 times less). Similar thing happened with the flooring of the ISS. Again same two center, but reversed in stupidity. Skylab had an "isogrid" flooring system which basically was a bunch of aluminum triangles. You put a rubber triange on somebodys boot and voila, you canstand wherever you want and work without floating away by jamming your boot into the floor. Well that wasnt designed where the ISS was being designed so that was out the window. I think they use some sort of seat restraint system and velcro on the ISS now. Velcro is fine but it wears out over time, and of course seat restraints are more expensive than the floor you have to put in anyways. NASA needs to get rid of the Not Invented HERE (tm) syndrome and use the best ideas available and not whatever will boost a certain centers prestige.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[Marc2k]

The visible difference being that most large organizations are not funded by the government, and do not strap men and women to tons of explosives and try to get them back without any danger to the astronauts or the people of Earth.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[smittyoneeach]

More generally, there is a coefficient of organizational friction to overcome.
See Kuhn, (and I am not shilling for Bezos).
The only irony in all of this is the hidden assumption that propeller-head organizations differ somehow from private sector ones. Sorry, all: peeps is peeps.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[Gulthek]

Sorry. False.

"Fisher did ultimately develop a pressurized pen for use by NASA astronauts (now known as the famous "Fisher Space Pen"), but both American and Soviet space missions initially used pencils, NASA did not seek out Fisher and ask them to develop a "space pen," Fisher did not charge NASA for the cost of developing the pen, and the Fisher pen was eventually used by both American and Soviet astronauts."

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[L0C0loco]

First a disclaimer: I work for NASA.

The small fry is not afraid of 200 suits, just two or three in the level or two of management above them. There are many levels of management in NASA and it is likely that someone somewhere in that chain of management (I was going to call it command, but frequently the managers high up have insufficient command/knowledge of the topic they manage) will not want to pass bad news along. They'll either decide to report nothing or spin it into something less distasteful. Generally there are two concerns: Somebody goofed or We need more time/money to do it right. The latter is not acceptable since NASA has a fixed budget and congress is already unhappy about the growing cost over-runs in some programs. It all really boils down to too much to do with too little resources. Just look at the way things worked under the moon program or the way it works under the dark side of DOD where money was/is frequently no object. Nowadays, everybody underbids to get the contract and then tries to do what they can with the money (not necessarily what was promised). Yes, checks and balances would help a little a few years down the road once the short-comings are caught and exposed, but by then any last shred of confidence in NASA by the public will have evaporated.

Bottom line here is that you get what you pay for.
Congress and the voters have to decide what they want to do given realistic costs. The costs are frequently adjusted by managers trying to get the program to boost their self esteem or pay-grade with little regard as to what will happen to the likelhood of success. The underlings are all too eager to try and make do for similar motivations. Now toss in contracting functions out to the lowest bidder and you're really asking for trouble.

Sorry if this borders on being a rant for some.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[DrMorpheus]

The visible difference being that most large organizations are not funded by the government, and do not strap men and women to tons of explosives and try to get them back without any danger to the astronauts or the people of Earth.

When or not a large organization is or is not funded by the government makes no difference whatsoever, market arguments notwithstanding.

The key is, children, it's a large organization. Being so it's relatively immune to external forces, or rather it's got internal resources to withstand any outside pressures to change. Again, this is true whether or not it's a government body or a corporate body. Local government bodies, like town councils are much, much more flexible than their equivalent in state or federal levels.

This holds true in private organizations too where small businesses, or ones with a thin layer of management are much more responsive/sensitive to outside pressures than are those from hugh behemeths like Microsoft, etc.

That same flexibility is also a weakness in that when a small organization has a good idea, government body or not, and faces a hostile environment it's not likely to succeed in implementing that idea relative to a larger organization so it's a trade off. Small and responsive, but also vulnerable and weak versus large and strong, but also insular and bullying.

Bottom line is, there's no single organizational structure that works in all circumstances for all times.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[PW2]

I think your link needs to be added to every story about US in space

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[EvilTwinSkippy]

If you want a good read on organizational dynamics, especially in regards to Engineering, take a flip through The Mythical Man Month by Frederick P. Brooks, Jr.

The book is a series of Essays that illustrate the problems inherent in trying to use techniques for managing unskilled labor on a skilled workforce. The book is primarily structured around Software design, but it's teachings are readily adapted to most Engineering disciplines. It's chock full of un-intiuitive facts of life in engineering projects:

• There is a point in a project where adding more people pushes the project even further behind schedule. It takes time to bring new people up to speed on a project, doubly so on a project that is mostly completed.
• Engineers need to be structured like a surgical team, with definite roles and supporting functions to play. They aren't like day laborers that can be dropped in a cubical and hammer out equations.
• Projects need to constantly go back to the original vision.
• Development work is often like carrying a baby. Assigning 9 women to the task will not make it take any less than 9 months.
• A clear line in the sand needs to be drawn between the Architecture and the Implementation. The Architecture should leave Implementation details fuzzy. Implementors have a practical experience that often allows them to meet needs in creative and ingenious ways unknown to the Architect. Architects also need to listen to Implementor's when told a particular feature will require a tremendous number of resources to bring to fruition, and adjust accordingly.
• It is far better to let a schedule slip than to try to hurry it up. Hurrying up introduces mistakes, added expense, and more often than not an unsatisfactory product.
• (At least in software) 1/2 of the project is testing (1/4 component testing and 1/4 systems integration testing). 1/3 is planning. Only 1/6 should be spent on the actual design and fabrication.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[BigBir3d]

When or not a large organization is or is not funded by the government makes no difference whatsoever, market arguments notwithstanding.

I have to dis-agree with you here. It is not just a matter of office politics (a factor in all big organisations), but also national and international politics.

The problem with NASA is that the geeks and nerds are no longer in control of the big decisions. Most responsible scientific minded people are horrified by the nature of NASA today. Most people my age that could have gotten a job there, chose not because of the atmosphere there.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[Moofie]

Dealing with graphite particles, eraser particles, and wood shavings in a closed, microgravity environment are all non-trivial problems.

So it's not as cut-and-dried as you would like to believe.

At least they admit it...

[LordYUK]

"On Monday, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe told CNN's Miles O'Brien that the agency missed signs of trouble that led to the accident.

"This was a case where we missed it. Just flat missed it," he said of the significance of the foam strike. "

At least they arent trying to cover it up. Now they can move forward, and hopefully we'll continue to explore space even more proficiently than before.

Who knows, maybe our grandkids (or their grandkids) will get to land on mars!

Re:At least they admit it...

[Ciderx]

I think Sean O'Keefe is already on Mars, after all, he thinks he's having a conversation with the teleportation expert from Star Trek, Miles O'Brien, eh?

A rare opportunity

[TopShelf]

I wouldn't say that it's "sad" that NASA gets a thorough review. Quite the contrary, I think it's a rare opportunity to make the case that cost-cutting measures involve tradeoffs that have a significant impact on how an organization like NASA operates. What is sorely needed is a public champion to advocate for increased NASA funding, as part of a commitment to keep America at the forefront of technological leadership worldwide. Particularly as other countries are stepping up their space efforts, this is going to be a growing concern in the years ahead.

Not having followed the eeaaarrrrllly presidential campaigning, are there any strong proponents for NASA out there?

Re:A rare opportunity

[RevMike]

What is sorely needed is a public champion to advocate for increased NASA funding....

I don't think it is a budget issue, though. Throwing money at this sort of problem rarely solves anything. The problem is a cultural one.

Organisations frequently have an upward focus. Too many people concentrate on what their boss wants to hear, instead of what needs to be said. Everything is about satisfying one's boss by helping them satisfy their boss, by helping them satisfy their boss, ad nauseum. It is more important that things look right the most senior administrator than that they are right.

An organisation that depends on highly skilled highly professional people at relatively low levels needs to have a downward focus. The most senior people need to focus on how they can help their direct reports do their job, and those people need to focus on helping their direct reports do their jobs, ad nauseum. In the end, this type of culture helps the engineers and technicians actually do their job.

The US military went through this kind of transition in the early 1980s. More and more command and control was moved lower and lower in the hierarchy. Tactics were left to the people on the scene. The senior personnel focused on strategy and logistics, coordinating and supplying, which enable the local personnel to do their jobs effectively. Taking out a machine gun nest is a job for a sargeant or lutenant on the scene - not a general in Washington.

Re:A rare opportunity

[ImpTech]

I dunno... seems to me if you wanted to make sure the US was the leader in space technology, the first thing you'd do is tell NASA and their funding to promptly go to hell, or maybe make them into a regulatory agency. I mean c'mon... they've been pushing this whole "space shuttle" thing way too far. Smarter people than me will tell you it was an abortion of an idea to start with, and its STILL being used despite its exorbitant cost and inefficiency for most tasks. Some would say that if NASA had more funding they could build something better, but thats what they were supposed to be doing when they designed the shuttle in the first place. Seems to me there's no pressure on NASA to be practical or cost efficient, which is whats really needed.

Re:A rare opportunity

[cybercuzco]

Unfortunately, I think NASA is pretty low on every candidates radar. Things here on earth tend to take precedence. So NASA makes an easy target for people who need a few million dollars here and a few million dollars there. Same thing happens with foriegn aid. People think its alot more than it is, and nobody really corrects them, so when candidates say "slash foriegn aid" people think its ok. (Americans think that 15% of the budget goes to foriegn aid, and it should be around 5%, wheras in reality its more like .4%)

Re:A rare opportunity

[cK-Gunslinger]

Another thing I think NASA needs to do is make the public more aware of just how much *good* it does, especially commercially.

I think they should produce quarterly/yearly results of their findings/discoveries, commercial applications, patents, etc along with thier respective monetary implications. Then maybe people like my dad will stop complaining about the "hundred of millions" of dollars wasted by some people just "floating around in space" and can see some of the more tangible benefits of space exploration.

I think the public in general doesn't have any idea how much comes from NASA's experiments. They probably still think the only things to come out of it are Tang and the pen that writes upside down!

Also, I would like for someone to simply give them a fixed budget for 3-5 years, saying "Here's all the money you are getting for a while. In 5 years, I want a fully detailed report on how you spent it. If you don't operate at X level of efficiency, you're getting budget cuts." Something like that in order to force NASA to think lean and aggressively, instead of trying to spend every dime they get in order to look like they really need it all. No more $10 million toilet re-designs! Force them to think more like a private company (but without the whole 'stepping on anyone who gets in their way' attitudes.)

Re:A rare opportunity

[Mr_Matt]

Seems to me there's no pressure on NASA to be practical or cost efficient, which is whats really needed.

Not only does this pressure exist, it has been listed as a contributory cause to both the Challenger and the Columbia accident. Chapter 5 and 6.2 of the CAIB final report goes into this in great detail.

"An Agency Trying To Do Too Much With Too Little" seems to sum up these sections. Keeping in mind that NASA's budget varies between one-half and one percent of the national budget, that's not to far afield. By way of comparison, NASA's budget is comparable to what the U.S. spends on food stamps. We spend ~30 times as much money on Social Security as we do on the entirity of NASA, with much, much higher expectations on safety and mission success. Don't even get me started on the ratio of DoD funding to NASA's. :)

Seems to me there's too much pressure on NASA to be practical and cost efficient given the dearth of resources we give them. Frankly, it's a miracle we fly in space at all.

The future of NASA

[Liselle]

NASA appears to have fallen from a great height. I wonder if this means that the space program is going to become more and more privatized. It also makes me curious: if there was more public interest in space program in general (ie: more tax money for NASA), would this sort of thing still happen, or would it just be on a larger scale?

Summary:

[RealityProphet]

"A terrible accident occured. It's nobody's fault, really. These things happen. We'll try to be more careful in the future. But, spaceflight is risky business, we can't make any guarantees."

Re:Summary:

[applemasker]

What I find most distressing is how the mission managers and program managers have all run for cover. There are people to blame, starting with the folks who never followed up on the previous foam issues; the managers who squelched engineers requests for imagery; and the mission team who met a handful of times during the flight (even though the regs require daily meetings) and never thought of what might happen if the foam had hit the RCC. Come on, it IS rocket science guys.

So, what they're saying is...

[gowen]

What they're saying is that

for a successful technology, reality must take precedence to public relations, for nature can not be fooled.

Well, surprise, surprise. Thats what Richard Feynman said is his minority report on the Challenger accident.

Plus ca change...

Accident Report

[JeffWhitledge]

"The total blame for the Colombia accident rests squarly on the shoulders of Kim Johnson of Springfield, MO." Ever have one of those days?

Failure is not an Option?

[tinrobot]

Funny how the History Channel special on the early space program came out this week. After watching it, I realized how much different NASA is today. They have no fire in their belly, seems like they're more interested in keeping their jobs than anything. If we want to continue sending men into space, we had better start doing it right once again.

Re:Failure is not an Option?

[The Original Yama]

I don't blame them. Since the end of the space race with the USSR, NASA funding has been continually eroded over time. Understandably, NASA personnel have become more conservative and focused on keeping their jobs rather than taking risks. NASA isn't the problem, it's politics that's retarding their progress.

Re:Failure is not an Option?

[stratjakt]

I realized how much different NASA is today. They have no fire in their belly, seems like they're more interested in keeping their jobs than anything

You know this how? You work at NASA? You were in mission control when Columbia went up?

About the only thing that's changed is that there's a no smoking rule. I live only a stones throw away from Gottard, and know dozens of people at various levels within NASA.

They are all extremely passionate about their work, and they all took Columbia very, very personally.

Dont make overly broad statements about a group of people you know absolutely nothing about.

Re:Failure is not an Option?

[urbazewski]

They have no fire in their belly,

I agree that NASA seems to be wandering rathering than striding forward. I personally think the primary cause is lack of a clear goal. I worked as a contractor at the NASA Ames Research Center for several years, and I had a look at NASA's 'mission statement' which came out in a very glossy 25 page booklet. (This was when Dan Goldin was Chief Admin.) It had a vision statement, key values, crosscutting procedures, about 10 significant questions, which all had subquestions, as well as some goals. My overall impression was "this could only have been produced by an organization that has no idea whatsoever what it's trying to do." A bit of an overstatement, but I think that the individual researchers and engineers (including myself) had plenty of drive but not enough direction.

Not to mention, NASA had its share of PHB type memos, particularly the ones Goldin used to send around about 'safety'. Worse was the requirement for each group to have a 'safety marshal' to give little talks on 'safety'. Alas, no shiny plastic badges or hats were issued with the job.

Looks like it's going to take a while...

[NerdGirl82]

...for anyone to RTFA.

Not another boring space launch!

[yoshi1013]

"So how's the shuttle doing?"

"Hmm, I don't know, all this equipment is for measuring TV ratings"

:P

Feynman said exactly this 16 years ago

[Alrocket]

I don't seriously believe that the culture of NASA will change as a result of this report. Feynman noticed all of these issues and made sure that he met the engineers alone, without any management, when he needed to find out the real answers.

It didn't change since then, it's not going to change now.

Re:Feynman said exactly this 16 years ago

[ChuckDivine]

Sadly, you could be right about NASA not changing.

There are, however, some hopeful differences. Let me list a few:

• There have been a lot more obvious blunders committed in the public eye. Consider Hubble's focusing problems, the crash on Mars of probes because one group was using metric and the other English units, space station woes, the X-33 failure.
• Compared to 1986 there are more people with real knowledge about the agency who are willing to speak up about the agency's problems. In 1986 extremely interested people were far more willing to cut NASA a break. That's not true anymore.
• Significant politicians (e.g., Mikulski) are more aware of the problems and are willing to take action.
• The CAIB's citing of a "culture" problem marks an important step. People are no longer looking just at technology, but at the organization that creates and uses the technology.

This event is being viewed as NASA's Vietnam. That's a real wake up call.

Yes, things could still go wrong. There are plenty of well entrenched people who have turf to protect. But that's going to be much harder now.

And, I suspect, a lot of the good people who still manage to work in aerospace are also going to work to change things.

Time to shrink NASA

[chroma]

I used to be a big believer in the NASA Myth: that they were the only ones capable of doing big space launches and that space access for humans was inherently expensive.

Then I heard Jerry Pournelle speak a couple years ago at a convention. He said something that shook me: NASA has many good people and does many good things but needs to get out of the business of launching people and robots into space. It surprised me because here is a guy who is in favor of space exploration but against NASA.

NASA as an organization doesn't really care about cheap, reliable space launches, because that would mean that their budget would be cut! The shuttle accidents are a symptom of bureaucratic mentality. Think on this: the Russian space agency will charge you about $15M for a trip to the space station. It costs between $500M and $1 billion just to do a shuttle launch.

NASA does a great job building Mars rovers and such, let's keep them doing that. But we should turn everything else over to private industry.

Re:Time to shrink NASA

[stratjakt]

Turn what over to private industry?

Theres nothing to turn over, private industry can just go ahead and launch stuff into space, and do, as they shroud our planet in satellites.

Thats like saying the Air Force should stop researching new airplane technology. Let private industry develop the SCRAM jet.

Private industry isnt interested - they're motivated by profit. There's no money to be made studying the effects of 0 G on lima beans.

Re:Time to shrink NASA

[geekoid]

whew, I guess that explains why there budget doesn't get cut all the time... hmmmm

Private industry can not take up the flag for space exploration until a cheaper way is found to get there. In order for that to happen there must be central agency that focuses on this, and the agency must get government funding.
Nasa needs to keep doing what it has been doing, and it needs to be able to explore other RnD efforts.

The only company the could do priovate space launch successfully would be microsoft, and even there 40+billion wouldn't ge them far.

Actually, it doesn't have to get cheaper, but it oes have to get profitable.

once private companies do start backing manned space exporation, we had be damn sure there is a controlling body for safty, and launches. I do not want the space equivilent of baby bells.

Re:Time to shrink NASA

[gclef]

Wait, you're using the fact that a totally government-supported group (Russian space agency) will do something cheaper than a public-private consortium (shuttle) as evidence that the *private* sector does this better? Funny, your example seems to prove the exact opposite.

Re:Time to shrink NASA

[solarlux]

How this parent get modded to 5?

> NASA as an organization doesn't really care about cheap, reliable space launches, because that would mean that their budget would be cut!

NASA has quite a few projects under research and development. See NASA Projects -- NASA is researching cheaper ways to conduct space launches. Believe me, it behooves them to do so. Cutting costs in ANY area leaves more to apply to additional research. Congress doesn't ask NASA for bill based on the "cost of exploring space" -- they toss whatever crumbs they can spare from the budget. Granted, congress monitors how the money is spent, but to say cost savings = budget cuts is a massive oversimplification.

Re:Time to shrink NASA

[solarlux]

See this News Article for information about NASA's Space Launch Initiative program.

"The reusable space plane, equipped with crew escape and automatic landing systems, would be far safer than the shuttle, officials said Tuesday in unveiling 15 design concepts. It also would be much cheaper to operate, they promised."

*sigh*

[rwven]

It's interesting that the first thing they said about it was that there was only a tiny chance that the foam had anything to do with it. It's weird how things turn around like that.

I think the bottom line behind all this is most likely money. They have cut so many budgets as far as space goes and forced them to do fewer and fewer pre-flight inspections that something like this was almost guaranteed.

"Confidential interviews with shuttle workers at NASA and its contractors, 'from line technicians all the way through management', found no one who believed that preflight safety inspections were adequate, a member of the independent board investigating the loss of the Columbia has said." Linkage (and more of the same): http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/29/10541776 72378.html

It's sad that it had to come to something like this for a wakeup call to be heard, but i guess all they can get out of it is to be more careful and not let it happen again. what else can ya get i guess... :-/

change of mindset

[mks180]

It seems to me that somewhere along the way NASA has changed from an operation mode where you had to prove that something was safe to proving that something is not safe.

It's Huge!

[Jeremy Erwin]

Look's like a 10 megabyte pdf-- you can download chapters individually,but unless you're piqued by soul inspiring names such as "Chapter 3", Chapter Nine", and "Chapter Seven", it's a bit of a black box.

So, for handy reference, here are the chapter titles.

PART ONE THE ACCIDENT
Chapter 1 The Evolution of the Space Shuttle Program
Chapter 2 Columbia?s Final Flight
Chapter 3 Accident Analysis
Chapter 4 Other Factors Considered
PART TWO WHY THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED
Chapter 5 From Challenger to Columbia
Chapter 6 Decision Making at NASA
Chapter 7 The Accident?s Organizational Causes
Chapter 8 History as Cause: Columbia and Challenger
PART THREE A LOOK AHEAD
Chapter 9 Implications for the Future of Human Space Flight
Chapter 10 Other Significant Observations
Chapter 11 Recommendations
PART FOUR APPENDICES
Appendix A The Investigation
Appendix B Board Member Biographies
Appendix C Board Staff

Managed by accountants rather than engineers

[hughk]

In an engineering led process any engineer has the right to say "stop, I believe we have a problem". The problem may be proved to be non-existant, but someone must address it and escalate it.

Regrettably, many organisations insist that you be "Part of the solution" not "Part of the problem" (I think this was an AC buzz-phrase). This meant that unless you could deliver a problem with a solution, you were associated with failure. At the bottom engineers may gripe but unless the PHBs supervsing them help the problems be escalated, nothing will happen.

In the end if we want public money spent responsibly, then projects have to be managed and accountants must count the beans. However, engineering must have a voice that is equal to that of the manager and the accountant. It is right that an experimental program takes risks, but they must be informed.

Lastly, the space program has provided some very good examples of the managed delivery of quality projects. With Columbia and Challenger we have two major counter-examples. It is both useful and a good memorial to those who died if everyone, both inside and outside NASA learned from this.

Reminds me a lot of Apollo 1 disaster

[MtViewGuy]

The final report on the loss of Columbia reminds me a lot of the Apollo 1 fire that killed three astronauts in January 1967. =(

It appears that NASA frequently ignored safety warnings about the fragility of the shuttle tiles, and it appears that in a way that the switch to a more environment-friendly external tank foam material in 1997 may have contributed to the accident due to the fact the new foam had a tendency to shed material at an alarming rate. It reminds me a lot about the issues that caused the Apollo 1 fire in the way NASA engineers tacitly ignored the serious fire dangers of exposed wiring, flammable materials and 100% oxygen atmosphere on the ground.

Re:Reminds me a lot of Apollo 1 disaster

[i_really_dont_care]

Now I don't know anything about NASA, but I think with projects of this scale, project management is more difficult than one might think at first.

If you ever have participated in a bigger industry project you will have noticed that every specialist involved has a _lot_ of objections to how things currently are done. Yet, the optimum solution is often not feasible due to cost constraints. As a result, project managers constantly get a lot of emails in their inbox with people bitching around that this-or-that is not secure enough or that this-or-that should be built more stable or this-or-that software module should please use the Perl programming language. In such a scenario, shit happens, and warnings do get lost.

Re:Lessons learned

[sphealey]

Hopefully there can be some valuable lessons learned from this tragedy. Hopefully something like this will never happen again.

While no one is in favor of needlessly throwing away life, do consider that the bones of a good percentage of the settlers who tried the Oregon Trail can still be seen along the sides of that trail today. For the ones who made it, Oregon was a good life. But quite a few did not make it, and that is the nature of exploring/pioneering.

Also consider that that same week 90 people were roasted/squashed to death while attempting the life-altering experience of seeing "Great White" live on stage. Seems to me that space exploration is worth a bit more risk than that event.

sPh

NASA is no longer a flagship

[Mahrin Skel]

NASA hasn't been the leader in space technology for a long time. They spend too much, accomplish too little, and paradoxically they make it *too* safe. If we were throwing up a launch every other day, and losing a bird a year, we'd get used to it. Astronaut would be just another dangerous profession, like "test pilot", "commercial fisherman", or "underground coal miner".

But because we've lost only 3 crews, and spend over a billion on every launch trying to bring it to zero (and therefore don't get a lot of launches), people are able to delude themselves into thinking that space travel should be safe. So when we do have a problem, everyone looks for someone to blame, NASA writes a few more books of safety procedures, launches get more expensive and less frequent.

You know why we lost the Columbia? Because NASA regulations didn't allow anyone to go out and look at the damned wing in orbit without specific orders. If the astronauts weren't treated as remote voice-controlled drones by the ground crews, and the shuttle commander had the responsibility and authority that goes with that title in any other field, somebody would have put on a suit and taken a look. But an EVA requires the input of hundreds of desk jockeys, and an "emergency" EVA requires authorization from the agency director. What kind of bullshit way to run a railroad is that?

Disband NASA, turn over civilian spaceflight regulation to the FAA (after first burning every regulation NASA ever wrote), turn the shuttle over to the Air Force and unmanned launches over to the civilian companies that really run them already. Otherwise, get used to the idea that the good old USA is no longer a space-faring nation, and other countries with the stomach for it are going to take the lead.

--Dave

Re:NASA is no longer a flagship

[stratjakt]

Because NASA regulations didn't allow anyone to go out and look at the damned wing in orbit without specific orders

There was no way to do so even if they had an idea there might be something wrong. It's impossible to be crawling around the underside of the craft in orbit.

It had nothing to do with regulations. It was simply not possible.

Re:NASA is no longer a flagship

[introverted]

You know why we lost the Columbia? Because NASA regulations didn't allow anyone to go out and look at the damned wing in orbit without specific orders.

They didn't have the necessary maneuvering equipment (a "rocket pack" if you will) for an EVA that would allow them to look under the wing. An astronaut going outside without one would have no way of moving around to look at the shuttle's lower surfaces. An EVA under those circumstances would have been useless.

Another "obvious" options that wouldn't have worked would have been to go to the ISS for a lookover. The problem there are that ISS is in a different orbit and they didn't have enough fuel to make that orbital change. And even if they did, they'd still have had no way to get aboard the ISS - Columbia had no docking equipment and the lack of EVA equipment would have left them with no way of making the transit. (Jumping between ship and station is nicely dramatic for the movies, but not a terribly good idea in real life.)

The one option they could have used would have been to ask the Military to redirect one of their telescopes and take a look. Sadly, at the time, nobody seems to have thought the foam impact was likely to have caused significant damage.

Re:NASA is no longer a flagship

[Mahrin Skel]

Airlines fly planes with a safety record that exceeds that of automobiles. Hundreds of nuclear facilities have operated for decades with only 3 significant accidents, the only one of which that had an effect outside the facility (and that one would never have happened under the regulations the rest of the industry operated under). Thousands of chemical plants and refineries operate with an acceptable safety record.

Fine, there was no MMU. Why? Wrong question, there was no MMU because after studying it to death NASA decided there didn't need to be an MMU, and it wasn't safe to make the inspection by going out on a tether. NASA's current culture is that if you plan well enough, anticipate thouroughly enough, you can make space flight safe through sheer force of brainpower. Their reaction to *this* is going to be to study the problems more, implement more safety regulations, slow down the launch schedule more, increase the cost of each launch.

Here's a concept NASA doesn't culturally comprehend: Acceptable operating loss. At some point, the gains from additional safety measures exceed the value gained from taking those measures. Why does it cost a billion a shot to launch a vehicle that costs less than $100 million each to build? Because NASA studies every damned thing to death. Right now the failure rate of the shuttle is about 1 vehicle and crew every 50 launches. Let's say that throwing the regulations out the window and boosting them up as fast as we could would increase the failure rate to 1 in 25 missions, at a cost per launch of $100 million (including 4% amortization for the expected loss rate of the vehicles). We'd lose a couple of shuttles (and their crews) per year, get 10 times as many launches, and learn what we really need to know in order to build safer spacecraft. We'd also be able to constantly increment the quality of the designs and integrate new safety features, as we'd be building them all the freaking time.

In a few decades, we'd have systems that failed about as often as commercial aircraft, and the cost-per-pound to orbit would be a tiny fraction of what it is now. Pay astronauts high salaries to go with the high risk and you'll have no shortage of crew (like fishermen and deep coal miners, you think those guys do it for *fun*?).

But we don't have the balls, and NASA isn't going to get out of the way. The Chinese, or the Russians, or *somebody* who is willing to do what it takes is going to fulfill the dream. But it won't be us, not at this rate.

--Dave

Re:NASA is no longer a flagship

[introverted]

If there is a perceived life-and-death situation there are a lot of makeshift solutions people would try that you wouldn't consider acceptable under ordinary circumstances...

Ah. There's the rub. We have the advantage of looking back on the accident and saying, "Well, they should have done such and such and they'd be OK." Put yourself in the position of someone who doesn't know there's a gaping big hole where the foam hit. They only know two things. (A) A piece of foam hit the shuttle during the ascent. (B) In the past, pieces of foam have hit the shuttle without doing significant damage. Knowing what they knew then, there was no perception of a life-and-death threat.

Re:NASA is no longer a flagship

[lone_marauder]

Your first three paragraphs are brilliant. The fourth, when taken in context of my experience as a student pilot, is not.

The report has some nice pictures.

[Snags]

This document has some beautiful photos of Columbia and Challenger in it, especially at the beginning of each Part. These pics are add a nice memorial feel to the report, in addition to the let's-not-let-it-happen-again tone.

Privatized space exploration

[greygent]

Fuck all this talk about privatizing space exploration, you people HAVE seen the Aliens films, right?

Oh so familiar...

[RetiredMidn]

NASA's problem is a reflection of the institutional behavior I have seen at my last 4-1/2 employers (the least recent morphed into a pathological organization while I was there); it has become more important to appear to have a product or strategy (or quality) than to actually have it. Nothing Scott Adams hasn't been saying for years.

BTW, the mindset did not start within NASA. In the 60's, the mandate was to spend what was necessary to build the best solution that could be conceived; starting in the 70's, it was all about compromises.

It Would Be Nice if NASA could be given a mandate and execute on it in such a way to once again set an example on How It Should Be Done, but I think we ultimately need to fix our broader culture about the standards of how we conduct business.

Re:Oh so familiar...

[pmz]

In the 60's, the mandate was to spend what was necessary to build the best solution that could be conceived...

And the 60's was also the era of the moon missions, the SR-71 Blackbird, and lots of other projects that modern engineers look back on with total amazement. Remember that 3GHz 32-bit CPUs hadn't even been dreampt of, yet--these engineers did things in their minds and with slide rules (yes, boys and girls, that is possible without Matlab and Pro/ENGINEER!).

Re:Oh so familiar...

[abolith]

Thats is what a professior of mine had been saying for years, and he always made us use either a) slide rule or B) or heads and some paper, no calculators or computers allowed...... and I'll be damned if I didn't kick the shit outta other classes by using his time-tested and true methods.

Re:Oh so familiar...

[EvilTwinSkippy]

Let us also not forget that the goal of these projects was to go out and do. They had budgets, and constraints of technology. But folks were willing to spend money. Now, if you tell a supervisor you will need $50,000 and 5 people to complete a project you will get $25,000 and 3 people.

And it's not exactly like we are getting a whole lot of benefit from these "optimizations." All we end up with is a system that is either never completed, or is only a slight improvement over its predicessor.

Wait, I'm seeing a pattern...

Re:Oh so familiar...

[EvilTwinSkippy]

Don't forget:

• Modern weapon systems can detect, target, and prosecute a target before the pilot can even see it.
• An F-15 can carry more bombs (by weight) than any aircraft in WW-II.
• Modern aircraft have to fly well both below and above the speed of sound, which requires substantial ly more design and testing for the controls.
• WW-II aircraft were plagued with problems, to the point that crews created the legendary Gremlins to explain them.
• The most famous aircraft of the War took years to develop:
  • The B-29: 4 years (1940-Dec 1943)
  • The Spitfire: 4 years (1934-1938)
  • P-38 Lightning: 5 years (1937-1942)
  • Japanese Zero: 2 years (1937-1939)

  Given the increased complexity of modern fighter jets, 10 years for an F-22 seems about par for the course.

Using a BETA product for Production

[Uncle Op]

The second speaker, who was charged with reviewing the history of how the accident could have come about, observes that it's dangerous to use beta tools for a long time as if they are production ready.

The shuttle is and was an experiment. It's effectively a very functional prototype, but the completion - or at least the ongoing refinement - of the shuttle program has been in stasis for too long. We're not driving Model-T's anymore for a reason.

Starved for money and lacking direction

[fmaxwell]

NASA is no longer the pride of the nation as it was in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo days. We no longer have a goal as we did after JFK's challenge to land a man on the moon. The budget at NASA has been cut over and over so that they now have far less purchasing power than they did decades ago -- despite the commitment to build the International Space Station. Starting with Reagan, NASA has increasingly been viewed as a way to orbit and service military payloads.

Want NASA to prosper?

1. Provide an inspiring goal. Choose one that average people can relate to. Landing men on Mars would be a good one.

2. Stop all use of NASA for military work. Pass legislation prohibiting NASA from military missions. It's demoralizing and tends to many of those who are excited by the exploration of space.

3. Fund NASA adequately. We've spent far more in IRAQ and Afghanistan than NASA has seen in recent years. Wouldn't you be more proud of your country if it put a man on Mars rather than bombing a third-world country?

4. Scrap the Space Shuttle. It's 1980's technology that was disappointing in its performance the day it was first launched. Even using NASA's own very low cost-per-flight figures in the 1980s, the cost to put a pound of payload into orbit on the shuttle was $6,000. That compares to an inflation-adjusted figure of only $3,800 for the Saturn V expendable launch vehicles that carried men to the moon.

NASA needs The Right Stuff in order to be something more than just another government bureaucracy.

Re:Starved for money and lacking direction

[fmaxwell]

all your answers are wrong....

No, all of my answers are right and yours is a great addition to them.

your first step is to get all the asshats out of washington DC that are intent on killing NASA...

GWB is one of them.... most of cingress is the other place to start....

That would be a great first step, but whoever replaces the "asshats" should seriously consider the steps that I've outlined in order to resuscitate the ailing agency.

Key excerpts from Executive Summary

[Ridgelift]

This is a little long, but it gets to the heart of the accident and why it happened:

Executive Summary: Paragraphs 2,3 and 4

The Board recognized early on that the accident was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted to some degree in NASAs history and the human space flight programs culture. Accordingly, the Board broadened its mandate at the outset to include an investigation of a wide range of historical and organizational issues, including political and budgeary considerations, compromises, and changing priorities over the life of the Space Shuttle Program. The Boards conviction regarding the importance of these factors strengthened as the investigation progressed, with the result that this report, in its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, places as much weight on these causal factors as on the more easily understood and corrected physical cause of the accident.

The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel number 8. During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and breakup of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to survive.

The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Programs history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight. Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organizations rules.

Re:Lessons learned

[Urkki]

Hopefully something like this will never happen again.

Yes sure. But something like this inevitably will happen again. I just hope it won't deter us from continuing with manned space exploration. (There might be other reasons to have a pause in manned space exploration, but fear of loss of life should never be one.)

Reduced Engineering Staff at NASA and Contractors

[LoneStarGeek]

I am a former Software Developer for a NASA contractor. In 2000, I left this job due to inpending cuts by the agency. I saw many talented developers, engineers and scientists do the same thing. NASA seems to cut the budget like this about every 10 years (once a decade). They are attempting to shift a lot of the day to day operations over to contractors and alleviate the need for in-house staff to handle the load. Unfortunately, with a reduced technical staff and unapproachable executive style directors they have let launch safety slip on the Shuttle once again. I am sad at the loss of the astronauts onboard this doomed craft and pray for the famlies that have lost more than NASA can repay.

Time to get out the broom and clean the house.

Re:Lessons learned

[SpamJunkie]

Hopefully something like this will never happen again.

That's what we said last time. Spaceflight is a risky business and will be for a while.

Re:NASA seems to mean...

[stratjakt]

Private industry may do things cheaply and efficiently, but no way do I believe they will do it more safely. They'll adhere to whatever safety guidelines the government sets up.

They wont do anything that doesnt generate a profit. And safety in industry is directed by the legal department, a la "will this 'we are not responsible for blah blah..' disclaimer hold up in court?" This will be true so long as lawyers are cheaper than R&D.

I'd rather go to the moon with NASA than Amtrak or Delta, thanks.

Private industry leaves a 50 year old transmission grid unrepaired, leading to the largest blackout in US history. Private industry lets a 30 year old Concorde fly when its riddled with stress fractures.

give the engineers/commanders some autonomy

[snooo53]

I would hope that NASA already operates like this, but the gist of what I'm getting is that mgmt. in NASA are "big picture" people and don't really understand how to effectively let the people who know what's going on and how to solve problems do the actual work. With something that complex, understandably you should have 2nd, 3rd and 4th opinions, but the engineers and commmanders need a little autonomy to do things like go on EVA's and bring to light any problems. Like you said Dave, they should be paid to do their jobs as part of a team, not as drones following orders.

From what I understand it seems like everyone is so wrapped up in procedure, that they're scared to bring up problems and/or deviate from that procedure. Just from working in an office or at home you know that you can't stop and micromanage every little thing without getting overwhelmed. And it's so easy to be afraid to bring a potential big problem to management when there's the possibility it isn't one. I think the solution is to give people more responsibility over their respective areas. Inform the desk jockeys/management what's going on, but give them a chance to do their jobs!! Let the MBA's there run the PR dept and leave the engineering to the Engineers, and the commanding to the Commanders.

We don't need more funds....

[nlinecomputers]

per se. We need a real goal! Putting men into space just to have them there is a great waste of money with little return. If we set our sights on Mars then we would have a workable goal. As it is now we just have a big pork barrel that we shove into space 6 times a year. What science was on that last shuttle mission that couldn't have been done on the space station?

Chapter 10 is a must read for R&D engineers

[TNN]

p.217: "In the years since the Shuttle was designed,NASA has not updated its engineering drawings or converted to computer- aided drafting systems.The Board's review of these engineering drawings revealed numerous inaccuracies.In par- ticular,the drawings do not incorporate many engineering changes made in the last two decades."

p.219: "While ISO 9000/9001 expressed strong principles, they are more applicable to manufacturing and repetitive-procedure industries, such as running a major airline, than to a research-and-development, non-operational flight test environment like that of the Space Shuttle"

And it goes on with interesting points regarding maintenance documentation, procedures, design flaws, and managerial training.

Once again...

[TastyWords]

We see a situation whereby engineers feel (maybe can't substantiate it at the moment) or know something "isn't right". They pull the rip cord and are made to feel like an idiot, usually instigated by a herd of PHBs. There were stories of this happening in this story. Engineers thought something wasn't right but were afraid to stand forward. Unfortunately, this likely helped cause the loss of the mission. Sure, the engineer(s) should have stood their ground, even to the point of their job(s)/reputation(s), but...suppose they'd hit the red button and nothing bad happened?

Secondly, Look at the missing tiles, et alia? They're applied manually, one-by-one. Do we need sensors (e.g., a filament) on every one of them so we know which ones are still there (or not)? The same goes for all of the other sections of the shuttle. Sensor mesh ingrained to various parts of the body, inside & out, learning to know "what's normal" and "what's not"? We take a lot of chances simply because we've gotten away with it. (It's good if it works - not unlike the software industry) If we had to make another landing on the moon, could we do it (and return safely) without a lot of flights to start over, just as we did in the 60s (for those reading this who were alive in the 60s) to get us "ready" for such a trip? How long will it be before we have a real-life "Capricorn One" (including OJ Simpson in the cast) and this is the twenty-fifth anniversary of that movie: Capricorn One There really wasn't any science in this movie - it's the suspense from finding out what happens with a doomed flight to Mars and the fact the public can't be told it fails. (Let's hope no schlockmeister gets the opportunity to remake it just as they did with other classic such as RollerBall.) Seriously, Capricorn One is worth the rental or late-night viewing.

No news

[EinsteinWasRight]

My family has had several of its members working for NASA for the past 30 years. We have seen NASA locked in the same vicious cycle for the past 7 presidents, it goes something like this:

1. Congress tells NASA to cut budget.

2. Congress says no Centers, no matter how useless can be closed.

3. Directors of centers give actual job of cutting budget to middle managers(Who haven't done any engineering in decades)

4. Middle managers vote to fire everybody but themselves(What a surprise!) that is fire all the engineers under them and farm out the actual engineering to contractors.

5. Make wild claims of success

6. Repeat after next election cycle.

This has been repeated now so many times that NASA doesnt do any actual engineering any more. Furthermore many of these MMs farm out even the writing of the specs!

It is the opposite of what private industry does which is to fire the MMs and keep the engineers(Flatten the organizational chart, keep the Indians fire the chiefs, etc.)

There are so many reasons why this is bad that I wont list them all here (the average Slashdot reader knows them anyway) but the most devastating effect is zero accumulation of organizational knowledge. Constructing space vehicles is very technique oriented; the devil is all in the details. That is the difference between success and failure may be knowing that the lubricating grease on the control moment gyro needs to be of a specific viscosity and quality. (Speaking hypothetically, no slur to ISS, really). Going outside of these parameters means that the CMG fails which means that the spacecraft cant change attitude which means that you have a 100 M dollar piece of junk.

This has been has been documented at NASA ad nauseum but the basic organizational structure prevents accumulation of knowledge. Which means that we pay to reengineer every time will build something.

Now add in ?Low bid always wins? and see what happens. An experienced contractor who has built spacecraft now knows that they have NASA over a barrel because they are the only ones who know how to build what they want. So they jack up the price. The bid then is won by the inexperienced contractor who now has to learn everything all over again. Repeat.

The solution? Do the same thing private industry does: Keep the Indians, fire the chiefs. Prevent the loss of organizational knowledge at all cost. Begin the slow process of knowledge accumulation so that eventually the price of space vehicle construction will come down.

Naaah, makes too much sense.

EWR

Re:No news

[Dominic_Mazzoni]

It is the opposite of what private industry does which is to fire the MMs and keep the engineers(Flatten the organizational chart, keep the Indians fire the chiefs, etc.)

I don't know what dreamworld you're living in, but most of the time in private industry it's the engineers who are fired when there's a budget cut, not the managers. I've been working for NASA for two years and my impression is that it's no worse at NASA - and potentially better: JPL just created a new fund specifically to pay the salaries of people who are too smart or too important to lose but don't currently have a good assignment at the lab. Clearly they're trying to retain as many of their best and brightest as possible.

Is shuttle fligh safe?

[kurtkilgor]

People are commenting that if 100 flights took place in a year instead of 4, we wouldn't worry about safety so much. But I think what's frustrating about the Columbia and the Challenger accidents is that they were caused by seemingly simple problems which were known before the accident occurred. Not a single astronaut has been killed by any of the things that make space dangerous: asteroids, radiation, etc. They have been killed by essentially terrestrial things that we expect to happen on a passenger car (leaky seals, cracked body panels) but not a multi billion dollar spacecraft. It's like sailing out of a storm alive and then drowning as you step off the boat.

I am NOT a rocket scientist

[the_flatlander]

IANARS, but... Can anyone imagine what airplanes would look like today if the early pioneers had had to answer to Congress? Does anyone have any idea how many of those innovators died? (I don't have the numbers, but it was a whole lot of them. From bad equipment, bad weather, bad technique, bad luck.) Early flight was new technology. It was very risky. And because of all those folks risking their necks, we now enjoy all the safety the airline industry possesses. Space flight, while it is not being carried out by individual crack-pots and geniuses, as early flight was, is still very risky, and very new. All the astronuats understand that, I am sure. We've flown all those missions; landed on the moon, all that, and we've lost 17 astronauts all told. I do not mean to trivialize it. (And I am certain that their families and friends miss them greatly.) But could we have a little perspecitve here? What did the U.S. lose on the highways yesterday? Probably about 80 people. In one day. (Figure about 30k people/year.) But no one is calling for Congessional Oversight of all the idiots that get drivers' licesnses. If you attempt to squeeze all the risk out of spaceflight you will almost ceertainly squeeze all the reward out as well. Get over it. Did we learn anything from this mistake? Did we learn anything from the mission _before_ the ship and valliant crew were lost? Then call it an expensive set of lessons and let's keep going. For the record, I LIKE "wasteful" spending on Manned spaceflight, it keeps money away from, for example, the other uses to which the military puts money. (Who needs "better" H-Bombs anyway?)

Re:I am NOT a rocket scientist

[sceptre1067]

Yes but...

Just like the last disaster this one was caused by ignoring a problem and then assuming the problem was normal operating procedure.

To explain... The o-ring issue (of burn through due to cold temps) had been observed serval times before (including when the boosters were tested.) But a full burn through never happend so it was assumed the o-rings were safe, then tragedy number one happened.

It has been observed numerous times that foam insulation would come off and hit the shuttle (this was admitted to early on.) But since the damgage caused was always minor, it was assumed that the situation was never really criticle. Yes, well determine damage after launch, but nobody ever said gosh should this be happening to begin with.

Both situations speak of engineers that are not, imo, taking enough responsibility. Hence a culture issue that has not changed since the last disaster.

To put a twist on it... a pressure seal on a 747 (I believe I'll have to double check) faild and people died. When the Boeing engineer who had designed it found it it was a design fault caused by him, he comitted suicide. Not that I believe engineers should commit seppuku when things go wrong, but... in NASA's case it may be the only thing that will get them to wake up and fix things.

Transportation fatalities

[Smallpond]

Here's the relevant figures for various dangerous modes of transportation. Based on this I would say its not about how dangerous it is to life and limb, its about the money, period.

Fatalities per 1 million passenger miles

Auto: 110
Urban transit: 83
School bus: 14
Shuttle: 0.006

Shuttle data so you can check my math

Total fatalities: 7 on Challenger, 7 on Columbia
Total passengers: over 600
Total time on orbit: 19179 hours
Avg orbital period: 90 minutes
Total miles: 329 million
Avg crew: 7
Total passenger miles: 2304 million

Re:Transportation fatalities

[Rick Richardson]

You really ought to compare fatalities per million passenger-minutes. Its a more reasonable measure in this game of how to lie with statistics.

If you do that, the quick back of the envelope calculation has cars at about 100, urban transit at about 45, school bus at about 10, and shuttle at about 2.

However, it only makes sense to use shuttle passenger-minutes (or passenger-miles on the orbital track) if you consider it a pleasure craft with the goal being to circle the earth.

If you consider that it has an actual orbital destination that is about 200 miles from where it started (400 miles round trip), then you should compare fatalities per million passenger-miles based on a 400 mile round trip for the shuttle. This works out to about 44, worse than a school bus, but better than a car or urban transit.

-Rick

Re:Physics question about foam impact

[crawling_chaos]

The foam stopped accelerating with the Shuttle as soon as it broke off and began to fall. Meanwhile, the Shuttle kept accelerating, thus increasing the relative velocities. The difference in velocity was measurable by looking at the time it took for the foam to strike the wing. The distance is known, and the time could be captured from the film. Of course, it was a bit approximate, but the foam strike test that did so much damage was well below the maximum velocity determined from the tape. The tests were conservative.

From the Executive Summary

[podperson]

The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Program?s history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight.

Emphasis mine.

NASA Has been in trouble for a while

[EvilTwinSkippy]

NASA more or less fell flat with the decision to persue the Space Shuttle. They did not have the backing to do the project right, so they ended up selling their soul to multiple competing interests and clodged together a camel of a spacecraft.

It was a big hauler for the Military, which required so much tweakage to the engines that they require complete rebuilds between flights. It contains parts made from congressional fiefdoms scattered around the country. For example, the O-Rings were needed because the boosters are built in Minnesota and flown in chunks to Florida. The size of the shuttle and short shrift Congress paid to its budget led to useful items like atmospheric propulsion for landing to be scrapped during development.

The best thing NASA can do for itself is to just let the Shuttles sit in a hanger. They cost too much to launch and keep running. If the money that went into keeping the fleet running went into R&D they could have a replacement in a few years.

What sort of replacement? The shuttle has 3 almost mutually exclusive roles.

• A manned orbital shuttle, needing proven engines, endless testing, and tons of life-safety equipment for takeoff and landing.
• A high-performance heavy-lifter, where every pound is accounted for.
• An orbital space platform for short term experiments.

NASA has no shortage of heavy lift rockets. What they can't hurl into space, the Russians surely can. The ISS is in orbit 24/7, it can take over the "can ants in space sort tiny screws" experiments. So the only the part that NASA needs is the getting people to and from orbit part.

Once you strip the need to carry cargo, the shuttle suddenly shrinks. Every pound you don't have to launch is 3 pounds of propellent. You also save weight on the structure of the craft itself, it's landing gear, brakes, etc. The engines can be de-rated back to a range where they don't tear themselves apart every liftoff. Or better yet, just design them to use a cheap, quickly replaced, and disposable motor.

Since you are not riding the edge of performance, you can also utilize easier to handle hydrocarbon based fuels like aircraft Kerosene. Sure it's not as efficient, but it is readily available and simpler to store.

Even though you do have a permanent orbital platform, I do see some merit to keeping the ability to orbit for several weeks, not to mention the robot arm. EVA protocols will have to be adapted working without the cargo bay, but it could be done.

In short, by reducing the requirements of the shuttle you end up with the very simple spacecraft NASA had originally intended.

Re:NASA Has been in trouble for a while

[EvilTwinSkippy]

Actually satellite repair and retrieval were the primary design requirements for the Shuttle. The problem is, once launched most owners of satellites don't want them back. They are obsolute after a few months, and it's cheaper to de-orbit a malfunctioning satellite and launch a replacement than to send a shuttle after it.

The shuttle has retrieved 2 satellites (STS 51-A), and repaired 2 satellites in orbit: Canada Telecom's Syncom IV (STS 51-D) and The Hubble space telescope (STS 61, STS 82, STS 103, STS 109.) Aside from the Hubble, the last time the Shuttle fixed or retrieved a satellite in orbit was in 1985.

And for your information there are several systems that have performed all of the mission of the shuttle. The most direct was the Saturn V used in the Apollo and SpaceLab programs.

Actually, looking through 100 missions the missions for the shuttle break down as follows: (My spreadsheet crashed during tabulation, here's the jist)

• Space Technology Evaluation: 6
• Orbital Experiment Platform: 30
• Satellite Launches: 30
• Space Station Construction: 10
• Space Station Support: 10
• Satellite retrievals/repairs: 6 (4 for hubble)
• Secret Squirrel DOD Projects: 10

Most shuttle missions where either launching a satellite or puttering in orbit to perform experiments. Very late in the day, it hoisted parts up to the ISS.

Off the top of my head I can tell you one other system that can hoist stuff into orbit and shuttle people in relative safety: The Russian Proton rocket (for lifting) and the Soyuz for people transport.

Nasa funding and Pentagon

[wimbor]

In the previous comments, a lot of people made the argument that NASA costs to much for the results it achieves. I don't have an opinion on this, since I do not know all the facts. There are important factors to consider though if you want to have an opinion on this.

A BBC program (I think) recently touched on the fact that the Shuttle has been made a lot larger (and hence more expensive) than originally designed by NASA because the Pentagon wanted the craft to be able to launch heavier (military spy)satellites, and apparantly the Shuttle also harbours some other non-specified defense technology. I lost the name and original air date of this program, but you can trust me on this. :-) I may believe previous writers that NASA is too large/bureaucratic/whatever/..., but not all blame for the Shuttle program should be laid on NASA. The Pentagon also has a responsibility here.

NASA's budget may be huge... but its total budget is only as large as three DAYS of budget of the Pentagon... Maybe the US government should change something there, and jumpstart the space program: exploring space instead of other countries...

Before I get flamed, please consider this: Let's admit it, ONE of the reasons why the US likes the Army is because it generates jobs, not only directly (soldiers) but also indirectly in the defense contrators that supply the Army. The Army has a huge impact on the US economy. I can understand that the US doesn't want to cut the budget, certainly not in economic troubled times.

Changing the budget from the Pentagon to NASA would have the advantage that have all those clever defense contractors and engineers work for benevolant technologies (hopefully) for the benefit of all mankind. At the same time the effect to the US economy and workforce would be limited... In the long run new technologies and discoveries could even strenghten the economy.

Columbia was lost no matter what

[Spamalamadingdong]

You know why we lost the Columbia? Because NASA regulations didn't allow anyone to go out and look at the damned wing in orbit without specific orders.

And if they had looked and did find a hole in the wing, then what?

Same outcome, one way or another. Either they try to de-orbit regardless and crash, or they don't de-orbit, run out of power and oxygen and then lose the Orbiter when it comes down due to air drag. There was no place to park it and no way to rescue the crew on orbit. Screwed.

All the orbiters should have been in museums by now. The whole Shuttle system should have been replaced long since. Our failure to do so is testament to the triumph of inertia and pork over concrete goals.

Re:Columbia was lost no matter what

[Alomex]

BS. Once the breach had been identified, any number of out-of-the-box solutions could have been worked out to go and rescue the astrounats... E.g.

- resuply with a Progress ship
- rescue with a Long March
- send space-age duct tape with an Atlas
- send more fuel to the escape pod in the SS, then use the scape pod to ferry astrounats from the shuttle to the SS
- dust off an Apollo re-entry capsule from the Smithsonian and send it on an Ariadne 5 to be used as re-entry pod

and on and on... With so many options available chances are we could have found a way...

Re:Columbia was lost no matter what

[tmortn]

Resupply with progress.... intresting notion but progress can't make Shuttle's primary orbit which is where Columbia was. That is the reason for ISS's odd orbit, it is the compromise position between shuttles ability and soyuz.

Rescue with long march... ummmm they havn't even sent a person up yet that I know of in a long march. Also questions about orbital inclnation possibilities.

SPace age duct tape.. right let me go down to wally world and pick some up. It dosn't exist. Tile is custom fitted and fixing the projected hole on orbit ad hoc simply wasn't an option. Docked at ISS with full EVA and both arms ( SHUTTLE and STATION ) would be almost as useless. Vacume and conditions in space make it extremely difficult to effect repair operations. COuld they weld, could they apply fixatives in the temprature environment, could they seal and control the temprature at the necesarry areas to do so ? These are questions that have been around for ages regarding space construction and they have no answer as yet.

Escape pod in the SS ???? What the hell are you talking about ?

Dust off an Appollo. feasible but problematic. One is time to 'dust off', two is docking, three is can you fit 7 people in one much less how to get any of them at all.. probably 8 seeing as a truly dusted off Appollo module would likely have ot have at least a pilot to even try to rendezvous lets not even talk about the fact the quesiton of who the hell would fly it. perhaps Jim Lovel or another one the Appollo era who are the only remaining people trained to fly the thing ?

From a Can do attitude the best option was Atlantis, possibly with a docking node and a spare node to install on columbia ( no idea if thats possible ) with a canada arm. Possibly loaded with payload assist modules to boost to ISS orbit.. not sure if the delta V needed would be possible to achieve, I know its out of the question with a fully charged OMS system once your on orbit.

If you could launch and install a docking collar on orbit and carry enough boost capacity in one form or another to match ISS orbit what you do is install the docking collar transfer the crew and boost Columbia to ISS orbit if possible and dock it there while you try to figure out what to do with it. Everyone else returns on Atlantis. If ISS is impossible then you use assit modules to boost the shuttle to as high an orbit as possible and figure out what to do with it later, or do a planned re-entry ditch.

In either case launching Atlantis incurrs the exact same risk that Columbia had just run afoul of. To launch Atlantis you risked having two injured birds and even more crew loss. I would choose to launch the rescue had we known Columbia was incapable of re-entry and had at least a real snowball's chance in hell of succeeding. However, thats becasue I think trying to rescue and fialing is easier to deal with than some chilling dcision to cut losses.

Reminds me of sports fans

[ianscot]

Thank you.

This reminds me of sports fans, only obviously it's much more serious and real and consequential with NASA.

A guy across the cube divide from me here rants about his favorite Major League team not trying hard, having bad morale, being a bunch of overpaid, soft millionaires, and so on. He's a Red Sox fan. From back in the day, when I followed baseball, I could suggest six or seven much more curious opinions about what's ailed them over the years -- Fenway and the "Devil's Theory of Park Effects" being one of my favorites -- but he'd much rather blather on about how the whole team just doesn't care. Sure, guy. How many people who made it to the highest level in professional sports have you met? They just don't want to compete, huh? No fire in the belly, I guess.

God, what a barge of cliches people trot out to explain complex systems and events. They used to have the right stuff, but now they don't -- we just need to encourage that can-do attitude. And so on. You'd think curiosity would be more appealing than this sleepwalker's version of things, but I guess attributing laziness and self-interest to others can be pretty reassuring to your average Joe.

Slipstream is fast, foam is light

[Spamalamadingdong]

Granted, the foam would have slowed due to friction with the air, but why hundreds of miles per hour? Can someone explain?

Because the slipstream in the neighborhood of the bipod ramp was transsonic or even supersonic, and the foam had a huge amount of surface area for its mass. The combination of high velocity air and high area made the force quite high, while the low mass increased the acceleration (a = F/m, by Newton). If I understand correctly, the size of the foam piece and its speed were measured more or less directly from the film; the mass of the foam was computed based on the calculated area, which determined the drag force on it.

Re:Physics question about foam impact

[Crispen]

I remember a NASA PowerPoint slide from a few years ago that said that the impact resistance of the RCC was something like 16 inch pounds. A 2 pound piece of foam travelling 500 MPH exerts slightly more than that (KE=1/2 MV^2).

I've always believed that one of the contributing factors to the loss of the orbiter and crew was that not one engineer remembered the (high school) equation for kinetic energy.

What's *right* with NASA.

[Unknown Kadath]

For my senior thesis, I helped design a proposed Mars mission. I was working at Johnson when Columbia broke up, but I've since graduated and am no longer associated with NASA, and can speak freely.

I'm not sure to start on what's wrong with NASA. Many other posters have covered that in detail, and I think many of them are spot on.

But there is one thing very, very right--the people. From janitors and groundskeepers, all the way to the directors of the various centers, NASA employees are passionately devoted to the job they do. Losing Columbia hurt like losing members of their families, hurt their professional pride, hurt that part of their souls where they keep their their dedication and hope. They will continue because there is still work to be done, because the journey is still unfinished, because that's what their fallen comrades wanted. This spark is fundamental to NASA--the institutional culture cannot extinguish it, but I fear that it may become impotent.

Space travel is costly and risky. It will be centuries before we can consider it routine. The people of NASA have the expertise and the will to carry on, but will they be permitted to do so? I say, Stand aside and let your scientists and engineers work. Let your astronauts fly. They may greatly fail, but it will be because they have greatly dared.

We've forgotten courage, I think.

-Carolyn

The wrong solutions to the wrong problems

[Shadowmist]

1. Bush tried the inpiring goal bit with his announcement of a "Mission to Mars." Which lasted until he was presented with the price tag on the order of $450 billion dollars. The Mission to Mars did not survive the ongoing crusade of "Tax Freedom", not to mention the expense of the war of Iraq and new military adventures in a "War on Terrorism" which has no forseeable end.

2. NASA's separation from the military is nothing more than a relic of Cold-War propaganda. If you check much of the pre-60's literature, you'll notice a prevailing assumption that the first craft on the moon would bear a USAF emblazon. (all of the Mercury-Gemini-Apollo commanders were Air Force.) For a long time there was government sentiment to simply fold NASA into the Air Force and be done with it. The main reason this was not done was as a PR counter to the Soviets' space program which made no pretense about it being anything but an arm of it's military.

3.What's adequate? The big question is what are you willing to pay for and what do cut? The Apollo and Shuttle programs are chump change compared to the kind of bill a Manned Mars program will run up. And contrary to popular belief, the orginal space program did not return it's monetary value in spinoffs. It paid for itself in delivering our greatest symbolic victory over the Soviets, but not much beyond that. The United States is awash in red ink, trade deficits and social and physical infrastructures which are going to pot, and we have severe energy and economic issues which continue to be deferred. Can you honestly tell the American people that we have a half trillion dollars to throw away on a Mars program with no expectation of significant return?

4.One of the best comments I ever heard about the moon shot was one describing it as a "21st century feat done with 20th century technology." The Shuttle is very much like that. The problem with the Shuttle is very much that of the International Space Station, both very high tech expensive projects looking for missions to solve. ISS was fought by critics that new it would become an orbital White Elephant. What does the Shuttle do that an expendable rocket can't? Ferry large parts up for ISS assembly. What does the ISS do? No one really seems to have come up with an answer that justifies the price tag.

In the end, NASA's mission needs to be defined, or better yet, redefined in today's terms, in realistic manageable goals, based on the pot we're willing to bring to the table. Where we can, we should take advantage of the work of other parties to avoid needless duplication. Invite the China, Japan, and India to participate as partners as we already have with the Russians and the European Space Agency. And maybe recognise that some goals should be left to our children or grand children and devote the resources and leadership to ensure that they have the means to work on their aspirations when they inherit what we leave behind.

Our foremost responsibility as a civilisation and a species is to leave an inheritance worthy of the future. The scorn that we otherwise deserve shall not lighten the consequences if we come up short in this.

More than just NASA

[pudknocker]

I was actually fortunate enought to work at KSC for the Shuttle prime contractor (UnitedSpaceAlliance)in the late 90's.

After seeing the way they did software development--no formal testing, no design reviews, some groups didn't even use configuration management! This was on the system that stored and distributed the Shuttle telemetry. I actually worked up the nerve to take advantage of an opportunity to speak with a top level manager about my concerns.

Now, maybe I'm not the most persuasive speaker. I was just a guy in the trenches with some experience from the "real world" that new how to do some things better. It took all the gumption I had to pursue the issues for as long as I did, speaking with various people in all of the levels of management. Since no one else saw things as I did, I was just the guy "crying wolf".

Most people don't realize that most of the people working in the Shuttle program are not NASA employees, but contractors--most working for USA. So it's more than just a NASA culture issue, it's also the NASA contractors and their management.

Here's a question on a related topic: How many times has NASA tried and failed to replaced the launch control system and failed. (Hint: the last one was called CLCS!). Here's some info

Answer: 2 (that I know of)

Recommendation: Machine-Gun the Management,. .....

[smcdow]

... and let the engineers do their jobs.

Just read through the report. Once again, management gets it wrong when the engineers (at least those that hadn't been brainwashed by mgmt) had it right.

I swear, if someone had explained to me (when I was an engineering undergraduate student) that most of my career would consist of having to deal with PHBs, I would have majored in music. Or something. Too bad Dilbert wasn't around in the early '80s.

Read chapter 6

[Animats]

Much of the report is background, filled out with huge glossy pictures from the NASA PR department. Read chapter 6, though, for what actually went wrong in the organization. The whole process of organizational denial is laid out in detail.

The basic problem, of course, is that the Shuttle's foam insulation flakes off and the thermal protection tiles are too fragile. Both of those problems have been known for decades, but not fixed. The only reason this didn't happen earlier is that a big piece of foam hadn't happened to hit a weak tile in a vulnerable spot. Big pieces of foam have fallen off before, they've hit tiles before, and they've caused damage before. Twenty years ago, foam caused serious tile damage. The damaged tile just happened to be covering an antenna mounting plate, so there was extra metal there to protect the structure. So that shuttle survived.

Buran, the USSR space shuttle, had a better tile design. (Buy surplus Buran tiles here.) The designers of Buran had the advantage of doing it after the US, and Buran has some advantages over the US shuttle. It's sad that Buran was retired so early.

Linux is better Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[WolfWithoutAClause]

Not using other's work? Not a problem Linux has.

You see, with Linux we just rip off other people's work (hi SCO).

;-)