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Bruce Schneier on Security Tradeoffs
Anonymous Smile writes "Business Week has an interview with Bruce Schneier on his new book 'Beyond Fear.' He talks about the tradeoffs we've made in the name of increased security. (hint: we've done a poor job so far) Bruce furthers his tradition of being accessible by the non-technical crowd."
Sounds like a good read. Give me Pragmatism over Knee jerk reaction every time..
"You lied to me! There is a Swansea!"
All I know is, with these new levels of police presence, I've been entirely unable to get within strangling distance of Carrot Top, and that right there is problem enough. Just DIE down the CENTER, Carrot Top!!!
Q: You have been critical of efforts to better secure the U.S. and the world in the wake of September 11. What do you think are the biggest mistakes we've made in those efforts? A: I think the biggest mistake is that we've made policy decisions while scared. We've passed laws that are expensive, both in terms of money and fundamental liberties, without giving us a corresponding increase in actual security. In other words, we've made bad security tradeoffs.
Hopefully some bright men in the EU parliament will consider the laws passed in the USA before they blindly try to copy them into laws applying in European countries..
Am I only one, who finds this statement somehow amusing?
Dephine URL
We've all heard the absurd stories like a woman being forced to drink her breastmilk (in bottles) to prove it wasn't some type of explosive or whatever the hell they thought it could have been.
Yet I remember reading on Michael Moore's website about how right after 9/11 he noticed that despite the fact that nail clippers weren't allowed on planes, matches and lighters were because the Tobacco industry had complained to the government that not allowing matches doesn't allow their customers to light up once they get off the plane.
Later they were put back on the list of prohibited items but it's stuff like that which makes the whole security thing seem totally absurd sometimes.
Kick in the Head
- designed the popular Blowfish encryption algorithm
- his Twofish was a finalist for the new Federal Advanced Encryption Standard (AES))
(I heard him talk about a year and a half ago)Bruce talks a great deal about security tradeoffs. Despite the fact that he's a big security guy, he states that he doesn't lock his back door, because I know the risk of burglary is slight. A security expert who cannot be bothered to turn a knob on his door... eh, what?
Well, how would he know the risk of burglary? The risk of burglary is so multifactorial, does he just go on the statistics in his city as a whole? Does he consider taking into account that maybe there's been a rash of burglaries in his neighborhood, and he just hasn't heard about it yet?
He also states that he does not think about terrorism while traveling, and that he's generally trusting of people (what about social engineering?).
That said, he makes some great points... a lot of the "security" we've put in place post-911 is truly window-dressing. He's right about reinforcing cockpit doors and training passengers to fight back (that's a MAJOR paradigm shift from what we used to tell people... "just give them what they want and let the hostage negotiators handle it." Yeah... that worked great). I can't wait until the next set of hijackers gets beaten to death by the passengers.
Even if a man chops off your hand with a sword, you still have two nice, sharp bones to stick in his eyes.
Where I think the problem in post 911 security is awareness, and this is a people problem. Bruce is right, people that are more aware of their surroundings can easily notice things out of place. Instead what do we get from Wahsington, fear mongering and freedom stifling laws and legislation. The 911 attacks more than likely could not be easily duplicated since (at least in theory) we are aware of how they did it and (hopefully) in a better position to stop it. The bigger question is what are they planning to do in the future? And putting the entire population of the U.S. in under almost continuous surveillance is not the answer. It is not unlike other intelligence efforts, who is going to analyze all of that data? It wasn't all tha tlong ago that the director of the NSA stated his staff couldn't process all of the information they were gathering. Hopefully Bruce's book points out some simple steps that will actually improve security without "breaking the bank", be more effective than most of the current measures, and that some people in Washington actually read it!
It has been a long time since I have ever seen someone who has the ability to comunicate tech ideas to those who are "non-tech." Unlike most security experts Bruce Schneier seems to use the "uncommon" common sense approach. In the interview Bruce states "There's so much stupid security out there -- in airports, in office buildings, in the government. I wanted to give people the ability to see why some things are stupid and -- to the extent possible -- how to fix them. There are many dangers in the world, both real and perceived, and it's my hope that the book gives people a realistic sense of how to deal with risks and threats." If the US would adopt this man's ideas I would not be astounded by how much money the government would save and how much more secure we would all be.
Turkeyphant
Security will never be a solved problem, because people are involved. No matter how secure a system is from a technical standpoint, people can ALWAYS circumvent it. It is a mathematical fact. But we can improve immensely, and that is the point of Bruce's book.
I was just about to search Slashdot for some encryption-related stories, and up pops a Schneier article on search.pl. Call me a fanboy but that's what I love about this site: relevant and current discussions about technology.
Not anymore....
Would somebody google his address and get back to me? I'm in the market for a new television and stereo!
quiquid id est, timeo puellas et oscula dantes.
This tradeoff between security and freedom makes me remember that movie called Equilibrium, where people was prohibited to fell because felling and emotions are the cause of wars and terrorists acts.
Maybe USA wants to lead the world to a society like that, but it is appropriate to remember that USA doesn't own the Earth.
really, the post 9-11 security craze is nothing more than a jobs program for the security industry. sure, the security here still sucks, it sucked before too. we're a (sometimes and mainly in theory) free society, but mostly an open society. we do make social exclusions, but really, we accept anyone as a neighbor (tho neighbor in another city if we don't like you, thanks, and don't forget to mow the lawn on the way out). we play security like its a game. we dodge our own security just to prove it can be done.
face it, security is an illusion. i'm more likely to die crossing the street (especially in my hood) than from a terrorist attack.
"You never want a serious crisis to go to waste." - Rahm Emanuel
St. Cloud Times 26 June 2002: 5B.
At first blush the new FBI guidelines appear harmless and reasonable. When Attorney General John Ashcroft announced on May 29 that agents would be allowed to surf the internet, use commercial databases, visit any public place, or attend any public event, my reaction was disbelief that previous guidelines prohibited such commonplace activities.
As Ashcroft noted, "even a 12-year old" can surf the web, just as any citizen can frequent public events and public places or employ databases to gather information. The FBI should have the same rights to gather information as everyone else. And the need to gather that information is greater in this time of increased threat. As President Bush indicated, "The FBI needed to change. The organization didn't meet the times."
But the first blush doesn't always coincide with the final conclusion. We might decide that the new guidelines are justified and necessary. Before we do that, however, we should examine the premises that undergird this policy change, and we should consider what the new policies imply with regard to our security and our privacy.
The new guidelines are based on two premises. The first is that we have entered a more dangerous era that justifies new investigative procedures. But have we? The threat of future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil is no greater now than it was before September 11. Perhaps, given increased security and awareness, it is less. So one objection is that neither the domestic nor foreign situations have changed enough to justify revisions in FBI policies.
The second premise is that the same standards of information collection should govern FBI agents and ordinary citizens. But significant differences exist between agents and non-agents, so that when an ordinary citizen surfs the web or attends a political meeting it is a fundamentally different activity than when an FBI agent surfs the web or attends a political meeting. The agent is in position to collect data into a file, to build a case, to set the stage for an arrest, and thus to intimidate. The history of the FBI certainly makes this fear credible.
Still it seems reasonable to allow FBI agents access to means of observation that are available to other residents of the United States. Recent polls indicate that the public is willing to concede more investigative powers to the FBI, so my hunch is that most citizens will accept the two premises I have presented here.
But even if the new guidelines are justifiable, they are still unnecessary, because the FBI may already engage in these activities. The only requirement is that they establish suspicion of criminal activity. The requirement is not stringent. Indeed, the old guidelines allow preliminary inquiries of 90 days during which the FBI can conduct web searches, engage in surveillance, utilize data collection services, and employ other investigative techniques even without indication of criminal activity. The new guidelines allow the FBI to engage in these activities for a year even if the investigation reveals no criminal activity. In sum, the FBI can now use these procedures not simply to investigate suspicions of criminal conduct, but to generate the suspicion in the first place.
So what does this mean? The FBI can document what you say in internet chatrooms or in religious and political meetings. They can ascertain what magazines you subscribe to or what books you buy. They can access your credit profile, your telephone records (made many international calls lately?), and your travel itineraries. And they can do this without any evidence of a crime or a potential crime. None of these changes in domestic policies increases their abilities to monitor international terrorist organizations. The FBI already has wide latitude to conduct foreign investigations without evidence of criminal activity. The new guidelines apply only to domestic surveillance.
MoFscker
everybody seems to like this book, but the one by stallings is much better. he is kind of pompous.
Bruce states that the only two measures to do any help is the reinforcement of the cockpit doors and the teaching of passengers to fight back. Citizens of the US for the most part do not want to be bothered with their own security. It is the same with handguns. I own one and believe I have every right to do so. Citezens need to stand up for themselves and be be prepared to defend themselves and those close to them. The government and police cannot be everywhere all the time, not that would be good either. When you are in your home or a plane it will take some time for the protection services to show up. There is a window of 2 minutes to 2 hours where each person may be called upon to defend themselves.
This is the long form of "No comment."
Many times, I have seen politicians do this, and when a reporter persists repeatedly for a real answer to the question, the politician just gives him a sour look, as if to say, "Now, at this point, you're supposed to play by the 'rules,' be a good doggie and just go on to the next question, goddammit!"
They say the first thing to go is your penis. Well, it's either that or your brain. I forget which...
Bruse Schneier's house was just broken into from the back door. The burglars apparetnly looked for his wallet, and took money and some slips of paper with passwords on them.
Make even shorter URLs - 8LN.org
"et I remember reading on Michael Moore's website about how right after "
If it is said by Michael Moore, it is probably a lie. He flat-out lied during his Oscar speech, and his recent book with the racist title was a big fiction bestseller.
Sorry, nothing has changed. The FBI did this sort of spying under J. Edgar Hoover, and also during the 1990s when Clinton used it to harass political opponents.
Yes. Personally, with such expertise, I think he could and should have been a lot more ruthless in his diatribe against the Patriot Act.
Turkeyphant
it's truly a matter of providing a deterrent... "target-hardening" as we used to call it in the military. Make a task too difficult, and the perp will move on to easier pickings, it's human nature.
Many home burglaries are done by youths, or people looking for easily-fencable goods (typically to support a drug habit of some kind)... few are done by pros. Some burglars will simply go around a neighborhood, trying doors until they find one that's unlocked. A simple deadbolt would go a long way toward deterring this kind of casual thief.
The professional is a VERY different animal, whether he's a car thief, or a home burglar. The determined car thief will bring along wheel dollies and a panel truck/trailer if he really wants your car... he might even line that trailer with metal screen if he's out to defeat your LoJack transmitter. Bottom line: it's very difficult to guard against a calculating, intelligent, and determined thief.
That said, simple measures will go a long way... to not even take simple measures to secure your home might even open you up to legal liability. If you have a pool, you must provide a secured enclosure or gate, lest a neighborhood kid drown (and you would be sued, likely successfully, for not having taken such a "reasonable" measure). If you own guns, it might be argued that you had the obligation to lock your doors... I certainly wouldn't want to be sued because a gun I owned wound up on the floor of a neighborhood Stop-N-Rob, next to a dead clerk, simply because some crystal-meth user was able to simply wander into my home and steal said gun... I can think of more than a few plaintiffs' attorneys that might argue that angle in a wrongful death suit.
Even if a man chops off your hand with a sword, you still have two nice, sharp bones to stick in his eyes.
Unfortunately, some of this "obviousness" is lost on the media lately. They've completely lost sight of the fact that the FBI, CIA, etc. have been well known (internationally as well as locally) for their less-than-ethical ways of doing "business".
It needs to be restated.
- Michael T. Babcock (Yes, I blog)
Once again, Schneier shows why he's at the top of his game. Perhaps we should petition to get him and Lessig together to do a radio show (not that either of them have any time to do this).
Geeks would be in their glory.
Rich...
Ignore Alien Orders
That Bruce has absolutely no idea what is he talking about.
Maybe so, but he could at least go into more details instead of dumbly quoting Lord Acton. Most people are aware that power has a tendency to corrupt, but they would be more worried if they were given examples of how their governments abuse privileges.
Turkeyphant
Why is it when I searched google for "Bruce Schneier" the first ad on the right was "Work at Google, Google is looking for software developers..."
Does google want to hire Bruce Schneier?
hmm... for fun I enjoy launching DDoS attacks against 127.87.42.5
A colleague of mine who works for Kryptonite says in response to every smart ass (who has the great lock breaking solution) is that, with security, money is only buying you "time and noise". In other words, any detirmined thief will get in. The price we pay is to delay him and make it noisy to get in.
The problem isn't so much that convenience should be sacrificed in the name of security as opposed to technologies creating security holes that need to be fixed. For example, credit card fraud. Someone can steal your wallet and take both your credit card and your money. Someone could print money as they could create a fake credit card. However, if someone steals a receipt of yours, they won't be able to walk away with any of your money but they might walk off with your credit card number.
What I appreciate most about his interview was his balanced approach -- that security measures since 9/11 are flawed, but we should try to FIX them rather than throw the baby out with the bathwater. It seems you hear one extreme or the other -- folks are either on the Ashcroftian end of the spectrum and want to tread on all privacy rights in the name of "keeping us safe", or they are radical libertarians (small "L") who want to have absolute freedom and do things like declassify all government documents and remove all immigration barriers, which don't seem very prudent either. Bruce's approach to finding the best balance of liberty and security -- even having a concept of a "balance" of the two -- is refreshing, and I hope policy-makers take notice.
If the book is as good as the interview, in fact, I might get an extra few copies and send to my senators and congressman. Who knows, $50 spent on gift books could save millions wasted on ineffective security measures like face recognition in airports.
I read a lot of criticism about the security measures and laws that were enacted after 9/11 and although I do agree that many of the laws give the government too much power and some are just idiotic, it has not affected my life at all. I still can surf the web, including pr0n, send email, drive to work, buy groceries, ride the subway, go to the US Open...etc. More importantly there has not been another terrorist attack on our soil. Is this the new laws and surveilence working or just chance? I honestly don't know, but I have a feeling the laws we so often rip on are the same ones helping to protect innocent lives right now. Could they be better? Certainly, and I think they will get better.
We rip on the "knee-jerk" reaction, but that is how it works...it is a reflex. If you don't have reflexes, something is wrong. This is the first time something like this happened here, no one knew how to handle it, we are learning.
On the other hand, we need to keep bitching when these laws go too far. This is how people who will chance things get elected. They listen to the people and their gripes and get the votes. In essence we are watching the process that makes the US a great place. The government goes too far, the people speak out, the government backs off. So keep speaking out.
Particularly when it comes to weaknesses in their security procedures. :)
www.eviloverlord.com
Rule #9. I will not include a self-destruct mechanism unless absolutely necessary. If it is necessary, it will not be a large red button labelled "Danger: Do Not Push". The big red button marked "Do Not Push" will instead trigger a spray of bullets on anyone stupid enough to disregard it. Similarly, the ON/OFF switch will not clearly be labelled as such.
Rule #65. If I must have computer systems with publically available terminals, the maps they display of my complex will have a room clearly marked as the Main Control Room. That room will be the Execution Chamber. The actual main control room will be marked as Sewage Overflow Containment.
Rule #66. My security keypad will actually be a fingerprint scanner. Anyone who watches someone press a sequence of buttons or dusts the pad for fingerprints then subsequently tries to enter by repeating that sequence will trigger the alarm system.
Go ahead. Bruce said his door was unlocked. Open it.
Way to go Bruce. You make us all proud. Are you going to the October festivities at the campus?
Hopefully some bright men in the EU parliament will consider the laws passed in the USA before they blindly try to copy them into laws applying in European countries..
There are no bright men (nor women) in the EU parliament, nor in any other parliament or government, unless maybe you're referring to scientific advisers (they're bright, but not wise, or they wouldn't be there) or to non-political employees.
Politicians are inherently unintelligent or else they wouldn't be in the legislature, since if they could see further than their own noses they wouldn't be trying to coerce others using the universalist thinking upon which all law is based.
Oh, I'd like to get a picture of that...Oh, in bottles...forget it.
-=- Many seek good nights and lose good days.
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Of all the measures instituted to improve airline security, only two have had any positive effect: Reinforcing the cockpit door and teaching the passengers to fight back
No, you'll be much safer if you teach the populace that the state will defend them at all times, and that they should wait passively for that assistance. Most people should be meek and submissive. Denying them weapons is one step in the right direction, but it's far better if you can train even the mere inclination to defend themselves out of the masses. You wouldn't want them to hurt themselves, after all, and it might cut down on the harm some of the bad apples can easily do.
To keep all these off-topic messages from appearing at the top, why not NOT accept any post within the first 2 minutes of a new topic showing up? FP-wannabes will go away.
The back of his previous book, 'Secrets and Lies', contained enthusiastic quotations from Mary Meeker, dotcom cheerleader at Morgan Stanley, and from Jay Walker, the founder of priceline.com. Now 'Beyond Fear' elicits yet another effusive remark from Jay Walker, now founder of U.S. HomeGuard. Is this because Schneier and Walker share the patent that invented buyer-driven e-commerce? Acknowledge the affiliation, Mr. Schneier...you aren't just slightly ashamed of this patent, are you?
They've completely lost sight of the fact that the FBI, CIA, etc. have been well known (internationally as well as locally) for their less-than-ethical ways of doing "business".
You know, the "power corrupts" comment is fairly common, but I think the issue is more complicated. Power certainly does corrupt a lot of people, but I don't think organizations like the FBI or CIA seek legislation like the Patriot Act because they are power hungry. They do it to make their job easier. Youth curfews, for example, are usually supported/sought by local police departments because it is easier for them if they can just tell a group of kids to go home. Some groups of kids will get into trouble if left unsupervised, but catching them in the act is tricky. So rather than try to catch individual acts of vandalism (or whatever), they would prefer to just keep all juveniles off the street.
Now, the argument should be whether we should allow them to make their jobs easier, and you have to address this issue on a case by case basis. I think most people would agree that not allowing weapons on board aircraft is a reasonable measure. However, I think most would agree that overarching legislation like the Patriot Act is certainly not reasonable. Both make the jobs of the enforcing agencies easier. But one is simply a deterrant, and the other allows for circumvention of judicial controls, like due process.
The problem is, a lot of enforcement agencies see due process as a hurdle they have to cross to catch criminals. Criminals can get away because you don't have a search warrant, or you don't have a wiretap warrant, or the evidence isn't sufficient.... In other words, you can't just look at somebody and say "I think he might be up to something" and throw him in jail. I think it is important for law enforcement agencies (and legislators) to realize that due process is important because, yes, people do make mistakes, and suspicious looking activity can be legitimate. So as for my original point, no I don't think this is just about a power struggle.
No, this was the long form of "Buy my book." Ain't nothing wrong with that.
I don't want knowledge. I want certainty. - Law, David Bowie
I'll go a step further. This occurred to me soon afte 9-11, but it seemed impolitic and insensitive to say it. But now that people are beginning to realize how out-of-control the whole anti-terrorist thing is, I might as well speak my mind:
All these anti-hijacking measures are pointless. They might have done some good before 9-11, but they do nothing to prevent the next big terrorist act. Because it won't involve airplane hijacking. Because airplane hijacking is no longer a viable terrorist tactic. It's essentially a form of hostage-taking, and you can't take hostages if you can't control them. To control them, you have to give them the "cooperate and nobody gets hurt" line. Which lost all credibility when they murdered four plane loads of people.
Bruce furthers his tradition of being accessible by the non-technical crowd
/.!
Well then that's perfect for the blowhard readership of
Given the emergency circumstances surrounding the events of 911, the Patriot Act and our response in general was likely the best we could manage. We now have the time to evaluate what we know and what we have learned from the terrible experience. It is often helpful to look at the past when searching for the answer(s) to problems. Perhaps it would be useful for our nation to review some world history such as the events leading up to Germany passing the Enabling Act after the Reichstag burned circa 1933-1945. We may even want to have a look at the Watergate and Church Inquiries. Civil liberties are not typically lost in one fell swoop; they are lost a little at a time. Democracy is easy when times are going well. The true test of democracy comes when times are tough.
The problem with boosting confidence in this way is that people will get a false sense of security. While there is no point in causing unneccessary alarm, if people feel secure because of these measures then there is more of a problem than if these measures were not introduced because they will be less vigilant, believing they are perfectly safe as they did pre-11/09 (dd/mm, the UK way!). While it is more comforting to live in blissful ignorance the shock caused by awaking from that dream a second time could cost the American government the trust of their people.
I've read halfway through the book so far, and I'm certain I'll finish it.
An important message I've taken away is that attacks are very rare. Schneier mentions several times how physically safe we are in open, democratic countries, and contrasts this safety to totalitarian (my word) regimes.
He also drives home that you can't spend all of your resources on a plethora of one-in-a-million or once-per-century events. Risk analysis is essential.
Read the book! An interview doesn't nearly do it justice.
Bruce Schneier is great! Unfortunately, his 'slight risk of attack' may be a bit higher considering the number of drunk geeks in his town at night who think they know how to get his passwords. I agree with him but there is no point issuing a challenge to these guys right? Hard to imagine he is willfully announcing that he carries on his person at all times but maybe they are encrypted with solitaire?
"You know, the "power corrupts" comment is fairly common, but I think the issue is more complicated. Power certainly does corrupt a lot of people, but I don't think organizations like the FBI or CIA seek legislation like the Patriot Act because they are power hungry. They do it to make their job easier."
This is rather naive considering the history of these organizations and the way their abilities have been courted and abused by various powerful interests. At one time J. Edgar Hoover had most of Washington quaking in fear over how much he had on nearly all of them.
If you place unrestrained power in the hands of such organizations you end up with an actual Police State regardless of the original reasons the power was requested.
- Linus
- It's not Bruce then?
- No.
- That's gonna cause a little confusion. Do you mind if we call you Bruce?
Have Linux installed at your place in Amsterdam, for cheap
<anecdote>
So I did the natural thing -- I pulled up to the airport's departure gate, she hopped out and walked in to the rental agency's counter, and I waited outside in the car. A minute or two later, a security guard walked up and told me, in fractured English, that unless I was helping a passenger with their luggage, I could not stay at the gate. I tried to explain that I was waiting for a person at the rental desk, pointing helpfully to the one person at that desk, but he didn't care: "you have one minute, then you must leave." This is silly, so I tried to stay put, but then another security guard came along, saying "you've already been warned once, now move your car -- nobody else is idling here."
My attempt to point out that there were in fact about half a dozen cars idling at the front door with me didn't seem to help, so I obediantly pulled out, circled the airport road, and came back to the gate. The security guards & cops give me a dirty look, walking towards me until I take the hint and drive off again.
This repeated three or four times -- drive around the loop (about half a mile), come back to the gate to see if my friend is ready yet, get the evil looks from the rentacops, drive away again. Lather, rinse, vomit, repeat.
</anecdote>
This to me perfectly illustrates the problems with modern airport security procedures. In what way is security enhanced by forcing people to drive around in circles like that? All it did was give me several chances to see where different buildings were and waste some gasoline. The airport, for those that don't know it, is a small, suburban airport that didn't seem to be very busy at all -- there was no line of cars waiting to get up to the gate, and I think I only attracted any interest in the first place because I was the only car driving around at all at the time.
I really wanted to step out of the car, walk up to the cop, and politely ask if he felt that procedures like this did anything at all to make anyone safer. It was obvious though that, had I done anything like that, it would have been taken as confrontational -- and probably would have gotten me arrested.
And the rent-a-cops were even worse: it was obvious that they were low-wage, low-skill people being paid to strictly follow written procedures; independent thought was obviously not what was expected of them.
Schneier is right -- the people putting these rules into place clearly aren't thinking things through. Low-paid drones inflexibly carrying out ill-conceived orders are not, as a rule, going to do anything to help anyone. We need effective policies, and we need the people carrying out these policies to be trusted to use their good judgement -- which in turn means that we need to be willing to invest in training for professional personnel.
Money spent that way will go much farther than any half-baked technological approach like face recognition systems...
DO NOT LEAVE IT IS NOT REAL