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Bruce Schneier on Security Tradeoffs
Anonymous Smile writes "Business Week has an interview with Bruce Schneier on his new book 'Beyond Fear.' He talks about the tradeoffs we've made in the name of increased security. (hint: we've done a poor job so far) Bruce furthers his tradition of being accessible by the non-technical crowd."
Q: You have been critical of efforts to better secure the U.S. and the world in the wake of September 11. What do you think are the biggest mistakes we've made in those efforts? A: I think the biggest mistake is that we've made policy decisions while scared. We've passed laws that are expensive, both in terms of money and fundamental liberties, without giving us a corresponding increase in actual security. In other words, we've made bad security tradeoffs.
Hopefully some bright men in the EU parliament will consider the laws passed in the USA before they blindly try to copy them into laws applying in European countries..
Am I only one, who finds this statement somehow amusing?
Dephine URL
We've all heard the absurd stories like a woman being forced to drink her breastmilk (in bottles) to prove it wasn't some type of explosive or whatever the hell they thought it could have been.
Yet I remember reading on Michael Moore's website about how right after 9/11 he noticed that despite the fact that nail clippers weren't allowed on planes, matches and lighters were because the Tobacco industry had complained to the government that not allowing matches doesn't allow their customers to light up once they get off the plane.
Later they were put back on the list of prohibited items but it's stuff like that which makes the whole security thing seem totally absurd sometimes.
Kick in the Head
- designed the popular Blowfish encryption algorithm
- his Twofish was a finalist for the new Federal Advanced Encryption Standard (AES))
(I heard him talk about a year and a half ago)Bruce talks a great deal about security tradeoffs. Despite the fact that he's a big security guy, he states that he doesn't lock his back door, because I know the risk of burglary is slight. A security expert who cannot be bothered to turn a knob on his door... eh, what?
Well, how would he know the risk of burglary? The risk of burglary is so multifactorial, does he just go on the statistics in his city as a whole? Does he consider taking into account that maybe there's been a rash of burglaries in his neighborhood, and he just hasn't heard about it yet?
He also states that he does not think about terrorism while traveling, and that he's generally trusting of people (what about social engineering?).
That said, he makes some great points... a lot of the "security" we've put in place post-911 is truly window-dressing. He's right about reinforcing cockpit doors and training passengers to fight back (that's a MAJOR paradigm shift from what we used to tell people... "just give them what they want and let the hostage negotiators handle it." Yeah... that worked great). I can't wait until the next set of hijackers gets beaten to death by the passengers.
Even if a man chops off your hand with a sword, you still have two nice, sharp bones to stick in his eyes.
Where I think the problem in post 911 security is awareness, and this is a people problem. Bruce is right, people that are more aware of their surroundings can easily notice things out of place. Instead what do we get from Wahsington, fear mongering and freedom stifling laws and legislation. The 911 attacks more than likely could not be easily duplicated since (at least in theory) we are aware of how they did it and (hopefully) in a better position to stop it. The bigger question is what are they planning to do in the future? And putting the entire population of the U.S. in under almost continuous surveillance is not the answer. It is not unlike other intelligence efforts, who is going to analyze all of that data? It wasn't all tha tlong ago that the director of the NSA stated his staff couldn't process all of the information they were gathering. Hopefully Bruce's book points out some simple steps that will actually improve security without "breaking the bank", be more effective than most of the current measures, and that some people in Washington actually read it!
It has been a long time since I have ever seen someone who has the ability to comunicate tech ideas to those who are "non-tech." Unlike most security experts Bruce Schneier seems to use the "uncommon" common sense approach. In the interview Bruce states "There's so much stupid security out there -- in airports, in office buildings, in the government. I wanted to give people the ability to see why some things are stupid and -- to the extent possible -- how to fix them. There are many dangers in the world, both real and perceived, and it's my hope that the book gives people a realistic sense of how to deal with risks and threats." If the US would adopt this man's ideas I would not be astounded by how much money the government would save and how much more secure we would all be.
Turkeyphant
Security will never be a solved problem, because people are involved. No matter how secure a system is from a technical standpoint, people can ALWAYS circumvent it. It is a mathematical fact. But we can improve immensely, and that is the point of Bruce's book.
Not anymore....
Would somebody google his address and get back to me? I'm in the market for a new television and stereo!
quiquid id est, timeo puellas et oscula dantes.
really, the post 9-11 security craze is nothing more than a jobs program for the security industry. sure, the security here still sucks, it sucked before too. we're a (sometimes and mainly in theory) free society, but mostly an open society. we do make social exclusions, but really, we accept anyone as a neighbor (tho neighbor in another city if we don't like you, thanks, and don't forget to mow the lawn on the way out). we play security like its a game. we dodge our own security just to prove it can be done.
face it, security is an illusion. i'm more likely to die crossing the street (especially in my hood) than from a terrorist attack.
"You never want a serious crisis to go to waste." - Rahm Emanuel
St. Cloud Times 26 June 2002: 5B.
At first blush the new FBI guidelines appear harmless and reasonable. When Attorney General John Ashcroft announced on May 29 that agents would be allowed to surf the internet, use commercial databases, visit any public place, or attend any public event, my reaction was disbelief that previous guidelines prohibited such commonplace activities.
As Ashcroft noted, "even a 12-year old" can surf the web, just as any citizen can frequent public events and public places or employ databases to gather information. The FBI should have the same rights to gather information as everyone else. And the need to gather that information is greater in this time of increased threat. As President Bush indicated, "The FBI needed to change. The organization didn't meet the times."
But the first blush doesn't always coincide with the final conclusion. We might decide that the new guidelines are justified and necessary. Before we do that, however, we should examine the premises that undergird this policy change, and we should consider what the new policies imply with regard to our security and our privacy.
The new guidelines are based on two premises. The first is that we have entered a more dangerous era that justifies new investigative procedures. But have we? The threat of future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil is no greater now than it was before September 11. Perhaps, given increased security and awareness, it is less. So one objection is that neither the domestic nor foreign situations have changed enough to justify revisions in FBI policies.
The second premise is that the same standards of information collection should govern FBI agents and ordinary citizens. But significant differences exist between agents and non-agents, so that when an ordinary citizen surfs the web or attends a political meeting it is a fundamentally different activity than when an FBI agent surfs the web or attends a political meeting. The agent is in position to collect data into a file, to build a case, to set the stage for an arrest, and thus to intimidate. The history of the FBI certainly makes this fear credible.
Still it seems reasonable to allow FBI agents access to means of observation that are available to other residents of the United States. Recent polls indicate that the public is willing to concede more investigative powers to the FBI, so my hunch is that most citizens will accept the two premises I have presented here.
But even if the new guidelines are justifiable, they are still unnecessary, because the FBI may already engage in these activities. The only requirement is that they establish suspicion of criminal activity. The requirement is not stringent. Indeed, the old guidelines allow preliminary inquiries of 90 days during which the FBI can conduct web searches, engage in surveillance, utilize data collection services, and employ other investigative techniques even without indication of criminal activity. The new guidelines allow the FBI to engage in these activities for a year even if the investigation reveals no criminal activity. In sum, the FBI can now use these procedures not simply to investigate suspicions of criminal conduct, but to generate the suspicion in the first place.
So what does this mean? The FBI can document what you say in internet chatrooms or in religious and political meetings. They can ascertain what magazines you subscribe to or what books you buy. They can access your credit profile, your telephone records (made many international calls lately?), and your travel itineraries. And they can do this without any evidence of a crime or a potential crime. None of these changes in domestic policies increases their abilities to monitor international terrorist organizations. The FBI already has wide latitude to conduct foreign investigations without evidence of criminal activity. The new guidelines apply only to domestic surveillance.
MoFscker
Bruce states that the only two measures to do any help is the reinforcement of the cockpit doors and the teaching of passengers to fight back. Citizens of the US for the most part do not want to be bothered with their own security. It is the same with handguns. I own one and believe I have every right to do so. Citezens need to stand up for themselves and be be prepared to defend themselves and those close to them. The government and police cannot be everywhere all the time, not that would be good either. When you are in your home or a plane it will take some time for the protection services to show up. There is a window of 2 minutes to 2 hours where each person may be called upon to defend themselves.
Bruse Schneier's house was just broken into from the back door. The burglars apparetnly looked for his wallet, and took money and some slips of paper with passwords on them.
Make even shorter URLs - 8LN.org
it's truly a matter of providing a deterrent... "target-hardening" as we used to call it in the military. Make a task too difficult, and the perp will move on to easier pickings, it's human nature.
Many home burglaries are done by youths, or people looking for easily-fencable goods (typically to support a drug habit of some kind)... few are done by pros. Some burglars will simply go around a neighborhood, trying doors until they find one that's unlocked. A simple deadbolt would go a long way toward deterring this kind of casual thief.
The professional is a VERY different animal, whether he's a car thief, or a home burglar. The determined car thief will bring along wheel dollies and a panel truck/trailer if he really wants your car... he might even line that trailer with metal screen if he's out to defeat your LoJack transmitter. Bottom line: it's very difficult to guard against a calculating, intelligent, and determined thief.
That said, simple measures will go a long way... to not even take simple measures to secure your home might even open you up to legal liability. If you have a pool, you must provide a secured enclosure or gate, lest a neighborhood kid drown (and you would be sued, likely successfully, for not having taken such a "reasonable" measure). If you own guns, it might be argued that you had the obligation to lock your doors... I certainly wouldn't want to be sued because a gun I owned wound up on the floor of a neighborhood Stop-N-Rob, next to a dead clerk, simply because some crystal-meth user was able to simply wander into my home and steal said gun... I can think of more than a few plaintiffs' attorneys that might argue that angle in a wrongful death suit.
Even if a man chops off your hand with a sword, you still have two nice, sharp bones to stick in his eyes.
Once again, Schneier shows why he's at the top of his game. Perhaps we should petition to get him and Lessig together to do a radio show (not that either of them have any time to do this).
Geeks would be in their glory.
Rich...
Ignore Alien Orders
A colleague of mine who works for Kryptonite says in response to every smart ass (who has the great lock breaking solution) is that, with security, money is only buying you "time and noise". In other words, any detirmined thief will get in. The price we pay is to delay him and make it noisy to get in.
What I appreciate most about his interview was his balanced approach -- that security measures since 9/11 are flawed, but we should try to FIX them rather than throw the baby out with the bathwater. It seems you hear one extreme or the other -- folks are either on the Ashcroftian end of the spectrum and want to tread on all privacy rights in the name of "keeping us safe", or they are radical libertarians (small "L") who want to have absolute freedom and do things like declassify all government documents and remove all immigration barriers, which don't seem very prudent either. Bruce's approach to finding the best balance of liberty and security -- even having a concept of a "balance" of the two -- is refreshing, and I hope policy-makers take notice.
If the book is as good as the interview, in fact, I might get an extra few copies and send to my senators and congressman. Who knows, $50 spent on gift books could save millions wasted on ineffective security measures like face recognition in airports.
I read a lot of criticism about the security measures and laws that were enacted after 9/11 and although I do agree that many of the laws give the government too much power and some are just idiotic, it has not affected my life at all. I still can surf the web, including pr0n, send email, drive to work, buy groceries, ride the subway, go to the US Open...etc. More importantly there has not been another terrorist attack on our soil. Is this the new laws and surveilence working or just chance? I honestly don't know, but I have a feeling the laws we so often rip on are the same ones helping to protect innocent lives right now. Could they be better? Certainly, and I think they will get better.
We rip on the "knee-jerk" reaction, but that is how it works...it is a reflex. If you don't have reflexes, something is wrong. This is the first time something like this happened here, no one knew how to handle it, we are learning.
On the other hand, we need to keep bitching when these laws go too far. This is how people who will chance things get elected. They listen to the people and their gripes and get the votes. In essence we are watching the process that makes the US a great place. The government goes too far, the people speak out, the government backs off. So keep speaking out.
Maybe they want to hire people that are interested in reading about Bruce Schneier's work. After all, that generally means that you aren't some MCSE that only cares about programming in VB or Java or some other worthless language.
I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
Particularly when it comes to weaknesses in their security procedures. :)
www.eviloverlord.com
Rule #9. I will not include a self-destruct mechanism unless absolutely necessary. If it is necessary, it will not be a large red button labelled "Danger: Do Not Push". The big red button marked "Do Not Push" will instead trigger a spray of bullets on anyone stupid enough to disregard it. Similarly, the ON/OFF switch will not clearly be labelled as such.
Rule #65. If I must have computer systems with publically available terminals, the maps they display of my complex will have a room clearly marked as the Main Control Room. That room will be the Execution Chamber. The actual main control room will be marked as Sewage Overflow Containment.
Rule #66. My security keypad will actually be a fingerprint scanner. Anyone who watches someone press a sequence of buttons or dusts the pad for fingerprints then subsequently tries to enter by repeating that sequence will trigger the alarm system.
Go ahead. Bruce said his door was unlocked. Open it.
I agree. I'm concerned with the same things that Michael Moore is, but he's doing more of a disservice by lying through his teeth. I suppose the same people that think Moore's stuff is insightful are the same people that think Bill O'Reilly is insightful - they just have different political stripes. Half the stuff Michael Moore says about Canadians is patently false or a broad stereotype. True, I feel a lot safer up here than Americans probably feel in their country. But for crying out loud, I still lock my house's door and so does everyone else I know up here - contrary to what he may have concluded from a rigged experiment in his past movie.
The back of his previous book, 'Secrets and Lies', contained enthusiastic quotations from Mary Meeker, dotcom cheerleader at Morgan Stanley, and from Jay Walker, the founder of priceline.com. Now 'Beyond Fear' elicits yet another effusive remark from Jay Walker, now founder of U.S. HomeGuard. Is this because Schneier and Walker share the patent that invented buyer-driven e-commerce? Acknowledge the affiliation, Mr. Schneier...you aren't just slightly ashamed of this patent, are you?
They've completely lost sight of the fact that the FBI, CIA, etc. have been well known (internationally as well as locally) for their less-than-ethical ways of doing "business".
You know, the "power corrupts" comment is fairly common, but I think the issue is more complicated. Power certainly does corrupt a lot of people, but I don't think organizations like the FBI or CIA seek legislation like the Patriot Act because they are power hungry. They do it to make their job easier. Youth curfews, for example, are usually supported/sought by local police departments because it is easier for them if they can just tell a group of kids to go home. Some groups of kids will get into trouble if left unsupervised, but catching them in the act is tricky. So rather than try to catch individual acts of vandalism (or whatever), they would prefer to just keep all juveniles off the street.
Now, the argument should be whether we should allow them to make their jobs easier, and you have to address this issue on a case by case basis. I think most people would agree that not allowing weapons on board aircraft is a reasonable measure. However, I think most would agree that overarching legislation like the Patriot Act is certainly not reasonable. Both make the jobs of the enforcing agencies easier. But one is simply a deterrant, and the other allows for circumvention of judicial controls, like due process.
The problem is, a lot of enforcement agencies see due process as a hurdle they have to cross to catch criminals. Criminals can get away because you don't have a search warrant, or you don't have a wiretap warrant, or the evidence isn't sufficient.... In other words, you can't just look at somebody and say "I think he might be up to something" and throw him in jail. I think it is important for law enforcement agencies (and legislators) to realize that due process is important because, yes, people do make mistakes, and suspicious looking activity can be legitimate. So as for my original point, no I don't think this is just about a power struggle.
I've read halfway through the book so far, and I'm certain I'll finish it.
An important message I've taken away is that attacks are very rare. Schneier mentions several times how physically safe we are in open, democratic countries, and contrasts this safety to totalitarian (my word) regimes.
He also drives home that you can't spend all of your resources on a plethora of one-in-a-million or once-per-century events. Risk analysis is essential.
Read the book! An interview doesn't nearly do it justice.