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California Grills Diebold Over E-Voting Foul-Ups
orthogonal writes "Electronic voting machine producer Diebold admitted today that 'thousands' of voters were turned away from the polls during the Super Tuesday Presidential Primary because of flaws in Diebold's machines. Diebold Election Services Inc. president Bob Urosevich said 'We were caught', and answered 'yes' when asked 'Weren't [California voters] actually disenfranchised?' Today, California officials may recommend decertifying some or all of Dielbold's machines for the November General Election." Reader TargetBoy adds: "Diebold knowingly used uncertified software in California elections. Especially interesting is the comment that, 'The law firm's memos reflect a corporate defense firm on a $500,000-a-month campaign to protect Diebold.' Wonder how much it would cost to just fix the problems?" Apparently India is having evoting problems of its own: purple writes "The world's largest democracy is in the midst of a 4-month election marathon. Except this time around the whole thing is run electronically. And, surprise surprise, things seem to not be working perfectly. Some polling booths have been ordered to re-poll due to malfunctions in the electronic voting machines. In another article, 191 voting booths were ordered to re-poll. Other polling locations seem to be operating on voter lists from 2001. I suppose the good news is that these errors were caught before they could have really screwed things up."
The simple fact is that, while Diebold does indeed care about producing accurate voting results, they are more concerned with making money. If Diebold is forced to choose between increasing their profit and making the system better, they'll choose profit.
If you put voting machines in the hands of the private sector, the private sector will try to maximize profit. Corners will be cut. There simply isn't any way to avoid this, so long as the people making the machines are doing so to make money off the venture.
So long as the design and development of voting systems is left to the private sector, voters will be disenfranchised for the sake of profit. That's all there is to it.
Obliteracy: Words with explosions
I have some very good friends over at the Los Angeles Voters' office. Oddly enough, they've been somewhat in the dark about all this. I've been sending them updates as I get them. I cannot believe that a voting system would be considered acceptable without extensive testing. (This in addition to the woeful concept of usng MS Acess as the back end database.)
The Kai's Semi-Updated Website Thingy
Did India outsource its voting machines? Seems like maybe it's not just a matter of incompetent programmers. Maybe e-voting is actually hard to accomplish.
"We're sorry for the inconvenience of the voters," Urosevich said.
Nothing about apologizing for the problems with the product, or the fact that they didn't work. He appologizes for getting caught.
Papaer Ballots..
Complication does not equal sophistication. Sometimes, a number 2 lead pencil really does work best.
See, the sick part about all of this is that nothing will actually happen. Diebold will stall and complain and fling their influence around, The Governator will promise to look into it and do nothing.
"The general election is too close to fix anything now! If ONLY we'd learned about it sooner!"
Doesn't ANYONE use Sound Software Engineering Methodology any more?
It's pathetic, really, that these companies can't get it right. I can't tell if it's due to their own incompetence, or because governments are so fearful of technology that they over-compensate by making the requirements too demanding.
I mean, heck, you'd think the governments would WANT flawed software, to increase their chances of getting elected. Or perhaps, if you were conspiracy inclined, you'd think that the governments want the public to THINK the software is flawed, so they can return to the tried-and-true election rigging tactics.
Either way, the solution is to use proper software engineering principles - most likely with a strict formal specification.
I mean with all the problems I have been hearing about how some county's voting problems vary from county to county.
Here in Texas, we have communities hand counting, some use optical scanning, and some even used the punch cards. We don't have to worry about shipping the votes though the Pony Express anymore, so why has there never been any effort to make standardized, open standard machines for everyone? Is it just because the states don't want to lose that power?
Machine voting isn't the problem, Diebold is. They've created a horrible, insecure system. It's simple enough to create a more secure system that it's hard not to believe Diebold is deliberately enabling fraud.
A system where votes were printed to a machine-readable piece of paper, verified by the voter, then deposited in a secure box, would be simple and secure. By printing votes you create a self-verifying system -- voters can check their vote is correct, and an audit can easily verify that votes were recorded as voters intended. Management of the printed records would be just like the ballots we already are using, but without the reliability problems of punch-card systems. Tallying could be done mechanically, as a barcode could accompany the printed text.
The whole system is very simple. Even if they just used an ATM style of security (printing to an internal paper log) they would be far superior to Diebold. But using logic is difficult in this case, because Diebold is clearly making absurd claims, and it's difficult to refute absurdity.
EVM 2003 is trying to create a complete open source voting system (not just machine). I wish them the best of luck. This is more than just philosophy about copyright and IP, it's the defense of democracy from those that want very much to take away even the slight accountability that currently exists. They've already made it into office with one fraudulent election (2000), and very possibly kept control of congress with another (2002, with many states being won with unverifiable votes that didn't match up with predicted results).
Decertifying some (or all) of the machines is an ok start. What about fines? Criminal charges for violating state election laws?
Maybe if the company and the persons who run it were actually held responsible for their actions it might make others more likely to comply with the law.
All in all though, I'm glad California is aware of the problems and hasn't just ignored them.
Personally I don't really care about glitches, crashes and other problems with the machines. What I do care about is the use of uncertified software and the fact that these companies are more or less getting away with it. It sets a bad precedent for the future. Who cares if a few voting machines get decertified if you get to rig an election as a result? Any use of uncertified software should bar that company from ever producing voting machines in the US again. Do we really have to wait until someone is caught rigging a major election before real efforts are undertaken to stop it?
On whether to punish Diebold. This will be accomplished with an electronic vote using Diebold equipment. Diebold is confident they will be found not guilty, unanimously.
I wish submitting absentee ballots was a sure-fire way to overcome this electronic-voting madness. Here in Hawai'i they get counted, but in other places they may not even be counted at all if the results aren't close enough. I'm a deputy registrar here in Hilo and I'll probably be working the polls on election day. I have to say I'm relieved, in that although we'll have one of these proprietary democracy-destroying machines at all polls, we'll also have the older, more reliable paper ballots in all precincts. If someone approaches me asking which method they should use, I won't hesitate to state my personal preference for analog.
Once again, I have to ask - what is the big goddamned rush to get election results that requires electronic voting machine? Why are people so frickin' hard to get the results of an election, like, on election day.
People should just chill, let a team of little old ladies count PAPER BALLOTS marked in PENCIL or PEN, and get the VERIFIABLE RESULTS a week or so later.
Mod down people who tell people how to mod in their sigs
Also, while I feel bad for the folks who are having their ability to vote without assistance taken away from them, it has to be better than having broken machines at which no voting at all can take place.
Your mileage may vary, but mine is constant.
Alameda County is basically the "East Bay", ie. across the Bay from San Francisco, including Berkeley, Oakland, Fremont, etc.
The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
Allin all, how difficult would this --really-- be? At least getting the part right about who's allowed and who's not allowed to vote? I'm a programmer, I've studied cryptography, I understand the problems associated with voting, but what if they made an open system, hired good programmers, and hired other good programmers to check the first programmers work, without having a private company do the work. (or at least force the private company be open).
.... test in in some *local* elections for a few years, and when those work, start moving it up to larger (ie: statewide) elections ....
Lave the code open, let people look at it themselves, fin problems or what not
Jesus, people have created some insane stuff back in the day, what's the problem now?
Black Box Voting and Bev Harris have led the fight against Diebold and ES&S hijinks for a while now, lots of good reading at that site to get you up to speed on the issues
Sehr geehrter Toilettenbenutzer!
Maybe e-voting is actually hard to accomplish.
I don't know about that. Seems to me, if you put the right people in charge, and keep the system as open as possible, you're far less likely to have the sorts of problems that a private firm will run into. Just like any other kind of software. More proof needed? Well, electronic voting seems to be working just fine in Brazil.
When I first heard, early on election day, the nature ofthe problems they were having, I guessed what was going on. They were using machines running Windows CE as the OS. The application code itself was in a flash memory, but they were relying on some kind of shortcut in the volatile system RAM to execute that code when the machine was turned on. The trouble was, when the poll workers were trained, they were given the machines to take home with them. SOme of them sat for long periods without power, so their batteries ran down and the RAM got erased, wiping out whatever it was that was supposed to execute the code automatically. The poll workers weren't trained for that contingency and had no clue what to do. Many of the polling places had voters, off the street, trying to help them diagnoe the problem and boot the software.
This whole thing was a fiasco from the beginning. Not only did they use known-uncertified code, they let poll workers take the machines home, protected only by a peel-off sticker for "security". They then had a bunch of unqualified and unvetted civilans being given access to try to fix the problems. Unbelievable.
>Today, California officials may recommend decertifying some or all of Dielbold's machines for the November General Election.
Sadly, this will include the Diebold optical scanners used in my county. Like much associated with this issue, this would be JPFN. The optically scanned ballots are much like the machine scored tests used in university classes everywhere. You fill in a bubble with a black felt pen to vote for a candidate. Simple, quick, readable with either the optical scanner or the Mark I eyeball in the event of a power failure.I am totally at a loss to understand this rush to electronic voting. As a citizen, I demand that my vote be:
- Secret
- Subject to verifiable recount
- Free from fraud
I realize that these are the ideal and that abuses have occurred under all forms of balloting yet used. However, the paper ballot and voting lists have stood the test of time. Reducing costs is not be a valid reason for mucking about with the very foundation of the democratic process.Some mornings it's hardly worth chewing through the restraints to get out of bed.
San Mateo County went to mark-sense machines years ago, and has had very little trouble. The ballot boxes consist of a lid with a scanner locked to a big plastic bin, so every ballot scanned is locked inside the ballot box should a recount be necessary. At the end of the election, the scanners are plugged into a phone line and transmit results to election HQ. They can be re-read later, and the ballots counted and matched against the scans if necessary, one ballot box at a time.
Other than generating huge amounts of paper, there seem to be few problems with this.
What about a system the combines computer voting stations with optical scanning:
1) Voter uses touch screen computer voting station to select candidates
2) Voting station prints a paper ballot
3) Voter checks ballot and;
a) If correct, inserts the ballot into the slot and presses an ACCEPT BALLOT button, the ballot is fed into a storage bin, and votes are stored electronically
b) If incorrect, inserts the ballot into the slot and presses a CHANGE BALLOT button, and the ballot is shredded and process repeats from 1)
After the election a random X% of the electronic records are compared with the corresponding paper ballots and if they don't match all paper ballots are recounted.
If God had had a computer it would have taken him 7 months to create the earth...if he even bothered to do it at all.
The problem isn't directly with Debold (although they definitely are culpable).
The fault lay with the requirements produced by California (and any other state trying E-Voting). That is to say, none. They just said "Give us E-Voting, whatever that means"
The agencies should NOT be allowing the machine producers to define the voting method. They will invariably produce a mechanism that maximizes profit potential. How do you test the machines once you get them. You don't even understand the process since you didn't develop it. As a developer I can tell you NEVER let development produce the requirements. We miss everything and when you think you found a bug we just say "it works as designed".
The various election agencies need to come up with a definitive set of requirements for what an E-Voting machine should do. The level of detail should be excruciating.
The agencies also need to define and publish policy and procedure around these devices as well. You don't actually need to devices to do this. If they are built to your requirements then the procedures can be followed.
The kinds of requirements need to cover things like:
A paper receipt must be produced by the voting machine with human and machine readable type. If the machine readable type is not the same as the human readable type, the code produced must not be unique per voter or voter session (i.e. I can't transcribe the code and use it to prove who I voted for or you cant prove who I voted for)
The executing code must be certified (Open or not) and must then be cryptographically signed. The certified cryptographic checksum must be published 30 days before the election and each voting machine must display the checksum at all times during operation in a place that is visible to voters (i.e. I can write down the checksum and verify that the machine I'm using is using the correct version of the software)
When setting up a voting area each machine must be checked for the proper software checksum. (potentially a matching of software checksum and hardware specification, a use for Trusted Computing perhaps?)
Each machine must be able to produce test ballots for every candidate and the test ballots must be accepted by the designated reader machine. The test ballots will be conspicuously marked in a human and machine readable way. The reader will display the candidate indicated on the test ballot when reading (could be a screen, 7-seg display code, whatever).
Lots more, in much more detail that I went into...
=Shreak
Here in germany we draw marks into circles next to the names of the candidates. The votes are counted by hand. The results are faxed to a central bureau where they are aggregated.
This system has several advantages:
What ever happened to good, old fashioned testing? I've seen the problem with companies rolling out software into production before it has been fully tested and ended up paying the price. I've had to clean up the mess of other engineers who didn't test something and told them about it every time. I asked if they tested it. They answer "No, it should work. It always has before." When I ask if they are always 100% confident that nothing was missed, they say yes, but obviously this isn't the case. When it comes to something as important as an election, in my opinion, there is no excuse not to test, fix problems, repeat ad infinitum, then roll it out once everyone is satisfied there are no errors. If this takes 20 years, fine. Just make sure it works correctly before rolling it out.
But why is the rum gone?
We're using eVoting machines here in Brazil for a couple years without major problems. It's better for many people here are iliterate and eVoting machines carry photos and speak the name of the candidate. I see many saying that paper can be trusted more and computers, but hey, we're talking about humans and voting here, at least in Brazil, nothing was more fraudable (does this word exists in english?) than paper, all it takes was a huge shotgun, a corrupt landlord with an easy tone: "mark here..." At least eVoting is making it harder here for fraud.
-- Por mais que eu ande no vale das trevas e da morte, meu PowerMac G4 Não Travará!!!
ITAA has "gone on the e-voting offensive" to protect the industry. If Diebold is so concerned about producing voting accuracy, why did they go and hire a lobbyist like Harris Miller to protect their image?
And the services aren't cheap...." annual dues are calculated (they range from $600-$44K, depending on a company's sales. "Deliverables" will cost up to $200,000+". Why not pour that cash into securing their systems instead of their image?
So, Diebold gets off with a half-assed apology, sorry about yer democracy, Mate! My bad!
And nobody on the federal level is making a fuss because...hmm, now I wonder why?
And it'll probably just tool along all status quo-y until...what? Massive, undeniable fraud? Some kind of grassroots "Hack the Vote" movement?
I think it was Heinlien that said, "It may be rigged, but it's the only game in town."
So keep the pressure on, and hope it makes a difference before November.
(Where's my EFF renewal form...)
What were you expecting?
Security? So what! The softwar is shit ANYWAY!
People like to harp and harp and harp on how insecure the Diebold system is, and this is very important. But put that aside for the moment and look at where the actual problems have been: software crashes that prevent people from voting, software glitches that produce false data. I don't care how "secure" the system is; if it produces garbage it can be Fort Knox, and who cares! The whole issue of "security" while conceptually important for voting software is in a way irrelevant here until they can make software that produces accurate data while not being tampered with.
"Who are in control, they are not in control of anything - they don't even control themselves!" - Glen Beck
I live in Brasil. We have had voting machines in the last 12-14 years (yes, twelve to fourteen -- it depends the size of the city you are in). For the Brazilians here: the first election here in Belo Horizonte to use the machines were the mayoral (and city council, state representation, governor, house and senate) before FHC was elected (as I count it, 2 years + 8 years + 1 1/2 = 11,5 years). I know it, because I was "mesário" (election "table" official? election "clerk"? what is a good English translation?) in the previous election, and in the two subsequent elections). IIRC, there were electronic ballot boxes in Rio and Sao Paulo in the election before that (the only two cities larger than Belo Horizonte). ... when you get your first job. If you are a mandatory voter (literate person from 18 to 65) you have to go to Electoral Court and register to vote. In the process of registering, you receive the "Título de Eleitor" (voter id), in which you have the number of you voting section. To change jobs, and specially to get a government job, you have to prove you are a registered *and* *regularized* voter (you voted in the last election, or regularized your voting situation after it).
Our voting machines are mainly of three different (internally) models: (a) the old ones, that use VirtuOS (*) as the OS, (b) the new ones, that use WinCE as the OS, and (c) the newest and deprecated ones that have the second printer to print your vote, show it to you inside a clear acrilic case, and mix it with others inside the machine.
Externally, all of them look roughly the same: a box similar to the old "portables" of the eighties, with a 5-6" diagonal LCD and a big numerical keypad in the right side of the screen, that has, besides 0-9 keys, "confirma" (ok), "erro" (cancel), and "branco" (white).
The electoral process (from the point of view of the voter) begins
In the election day, you scan the newspapers (or the Superior Electoral Court website), search for the address of your section, and go there. No, there is no transit vote, you can only vote at that address. If you can't get there, you'll have to "justify" your absence.
At the section, you will present your voter id to one the "mesários", and if you don't have it on you, you can still vote (you can show other valid id), but will be delayed. The mesário will search for your name in the vote-ticket sheet, and annex it to your id while you vote. You will sign a receipt in a sheet, and proceed to the voting "booth". Another "mesário" will type your voter id # in a remotely connected keypad, setting the machine in the "ready to vote" mode.
The voting "booth" is really a desk with the voting machine over it, facing nobody else in the room, and sometimes with a cardboard "cover" around it. You will "dial" the numbers of the candidates, in order. when you dial all the digits of one candidate, a star-trek-like chime rings, his/her face will show up in the screen, and if you digited it right, you hit "ok". otherwise, you hit "cancel" and start over. After typing all the candidates, you hit "ok" one last time, the machine chimes again, and goes to "stand by" mode. You have voted. If you don't want to vote for nobody, you can hit "white" instead of the candidate ## (accounted as a "white vote", or "none of the above" -- this is the equivalent of putting your paper ballot in the box without marking anything), or if you really want to protest you can type 9999 or other non-existent-candidate-#, and your vote will be accounted as a "null vote", or "I'm really pissed of" (the equivalent of drawing pictures or writing "improper expletives" in a paper ballot)
Then, you get your id back, your ticket (keep it together with your voter id!!), and you go home. Ah, bars do not open (theoretically) in the election day, so hope you have bought your beer in the day before).
From the point of view of election officials, things are more complicated. The machines arrive to the Electoral Judge (yes, a Judge of Law) pre-prepared one to two months
It's better to be the foot on the boot than the face on the pavement. ~~ tkx Kadin2048
I am of the opinion that machine voting IS the problem. Voting is too critical to not have on the spot, verifiable with your eyeballs 1- an empty ballot box on poll opening (easily checked by anyone there), and 2-a count that anyone who can add can perform and check at the end of the period. And we have an archaic short voting time period, it needs to be 24 to 48 hours. I have seen and heard of too many examples of people who simply can't make the polls, typically blue collars who are required to be at work from much earlier than "business hours" until let go in the evening. I once had to QUIT a job and walk off to go vote, they would not "allow" me to come in late, nor leave early, and that day we had overtime I wasn't expecting. And lastly, instant runoffs, no more "voting for the lesser of evil" styled voting, people will have a lot more incentive to vote their REAL first choice in elections.
I love computers, but with voting, nope, I want to be able to verify it with a paper ballot, not even punch cards,a mark in the bubble ballot is quite sufficient. And I don't mean a receipt from some black box voting machine, either, this is just thousands of dollars a precinct busy work with electronic voting. More government waste (and kickbacks),easier fraud potential and inefficiency. Selling the smell and the sizzle, not the steak, typical advertising crap.
If it is not readable by any human who chooses to poll watch or if there's a dispute immediately and a human can't read it, then it is not secure, and I don't care what "guarantees" they give. "They" ALREADY swore up and down that "it was secure and worked properly", and they have been proven to FAIL IT in not a very long time.
Government and government connected contractors have a long history of being liars and crooks, and with something like voting, using computers??? WAY too much temptation there to ignore, after all, what is it woreth in potential dollars and power over other humans to "adjust" who wins?
This is just another way for that to happen,a much easier way, and as you can see it has happened, exactly like it was predicted by folks like me several years ago when it was being discussed, and I remember the arguments then that it "would just work and be better". Phooie. I was right, they were wrong.
"Computerised Voting" came pre-broken and crooked right out of the box. And with a real voting period and not this half a day deal we got now,and some sort of instant runoff deal,and third parties being covered in the news, we might see more people voting. the way it is now is 50% voting roughly, that is not any sort of success figure. It would reduce lines and the wait,the longer period, and not discrimnate against workers who can't make it to the polls, or people who have emergencies come up they have to go deal with, etc. and "counting" is a normal human thing, I doubt there's any precinct out there that lacks people who can count. Yes, there's trouble with that too, but stricter enforcement of the laws on the books with severe penalties could knock that down considerable.
And then MAYBE if the paid off FCC can see fit to REQUIRE the networks to cover third parties and candidates in their day to day so-called "news" reports and in the so-called "official national debates" we might not only get more votes, we might get more voting enthusiasm and some constructive change in this nation, instead of this "new and improved and it's so shiny!" scheme which will only go to elect the same tired old parties and candidates who have caused all the mess in the first place. And FUNNY it was *their idea* to switch to "computerised" voting. I certainly don't recall seeing any private citizens approaching me with some petition to beg the government to please switch us to computers, because it didn't happen. It was shoved down our throats and sold to us just like beer or cornflakes on the TV. The "controllers" wanted computerised voting because it's more hackable than the old original system.
Hard tech is great, I love it, for SOME things, but in other circumstances, you can't replace normal human actions.
Never never never smoke crack before geometry class!