California Grills Diebold Over E-Voting Foul-Ups
orthogonal writes "Electronic voting machine producer Diebold admitted today that 'thousands' of voters were turned away from the polls during the Super Tuesday Presidential Primary because of flaws in Diebold's machines. Diebold Election Services Inc. president Bob Urosevich said 'We were caught', and answered 'yes' when asked 'Weren't [California voters] actually disenfranchised?' Today, California officials may recommend decertifying some or all of Dielbold's machines for the November General Election." Reader TargetBoy adds: "Diebold knowingly used uncertified software in California elections. Especially interesting is the comment that, 'The law firm's memos reflect a corporate defense firm on a $500,000-a-month campaign to protect Diebold.' Wonder how much it would cost to just fix the problems?" Apparently India is having evoting problems of its own: purple writes "The world's largest democracy is in the midst of a 4-month election marathon. Except this time around the whole thing is run electronically. And, surprise surprise, things seem to not be working perfectly. Some polling booths have been ordered to re-poll due to malfunctions in the electronic voting machines. In another article, 191 voting booths were ordered to re-poll. Other polling locations seem to be operating on voter lists from 2001. I suppose the good news is that these errors were caught before they could have really screwed things up."
The simple fact is that, while Diebold does indeed care about producing accurate voting results, they are more concerned with making money. If Diebold is forced to choose between increasing their profit and making the system better, they'll choose profit.
If you put voting machines in the hands of the private sector, the private sector will try to maximize profit. Corners will be cut. There simply isn't any way to avoid this, so long as the people making the machines are doing so to make money off the venture.
So long as the design and development of voting systems is left to the private sector, voters will be disenfranchised for the sake of profit. That's all there is to it.
Obliteracy: Words with explosions
I have some very good friends over at the Los Angeles Voters' office. Oddly enough, they've been somewhat in the dark about all this. I've been sending them updates as I get them. I cannot believe that a voting system would be considered acceptable without extensive testing. (This in addition to the woeful concept of usng MS Acess as the back end database.)
The Kai's Semi-Updated Website Thingy
Did India outsource its voting machines? Seems like maybe it's not just a matter of incompetent programmers. Maybe e-voting is actually hard to accomplish.
"We're sorry for the inconvenience of the voters," Urosevich said.
Nothing about apologizing for the problems with the product, or the fact that they didn't work. He appologizes for getting caught.
Papaer Ballots..
Complication does not equal sophistication. Sometimes, a number 2 lead pencil really does work best.
I think it's disgraceful that people forfeited their right to vote because of "foul-ups" Let's just hope that, if they plan to use these machines in the presidential election, that all the bugs would have been ironed out.
The Erogenous Zone
Computers are cool and all, but its VERY difficult to screw up just going to the ballot box and putting your form in. Software can have bugs, hardware can have bugs but generally, ballot boxes don't. Then again, it's easier to fiddle with votes on papa er ... until someone figures out how to break 128 bit encryption.
HAH! I just wasted a second of your life making you read this, but I wasted a minute of mine thinking it up. DAMN.
See, the sick part about all of this is that nothing will actually happen. Diebold will stall and complain and fling their influence around, The Governator will promise to look into it and do nothing.
"The general election is too close to fix anything now! If ONLY we'd learned about it sooner!"
Doesn't ANYONE use Sound Software Engineering Methodology any more?
It's pathetic, really, that these companies can't get it right. I can't tell if it's due to their own incompetence, or because governments are so fearful of technology that they over-compensate by making the requirements too demanding.
I mean, heck, you'd think the governments would WANT flawed software, to increase their chances of getting elected. Or perhaps, if you were conspiracy inclined, you'd think that the governments want the public to THINK the software is flawed, so they can return to the tried-and-true election rigging tactics.
Either way, the solution is to use proper software engineering principles - most likely with a strict formal specification.
I mean with all the problems I have been hearing about how some county's voting problems vary from county to county.
Here in Texas, we have communities hand counting, some use optical scanning, and some even used the punch cards. We don't have to worry about shipping the votes though the Pony Express anymore, so why has there never been any effort to make standardized, open standard machines for everyone? Is it just because the states don't want to lose that power?
Machine voting isn't the problem, Diebold is. They've created a horrible, insecure system. It's simple enough to create a more secure system that it's hard not to believe Diebold is deliberately enabling fraud.
A system where votes were printed to a machine-readable piece of paper, verified by the voter, then deposited in a secure box, would be simple and secure. By printing votes you create a self-verifying system -- voters can check their vote is correct, and an audit can easily verify that votes were recorded as voters intended. Management of the printed records would be just like the ballots we already are using, but without the reliability problems of punch-card systems. Tallying could be done mechanically, as a barcode could accompany the printed text.
The whole system is very simple. Even if they just used an ATM style of security (printing to an internal paper log) they would be far superior to Diebold. But using logic is difficult in this case, because Diebold is clearly making absurd claims, and it's difficult to refute absurdity.
EVM 2003 is trying to create a complete open source voting system (not just machine). I wish them the best of luck. This is more than just philosophy about copyright and IP, it's the defense of democracy from those that want very much to take away even the slight accountability that currently exists. They've already made it into office with one fraudulent election (2000), and very possibly kept control of congress with another (2002, with many states being won with unverifiable votes that didn't match up with predicted results).
Decertifying some (or all) of the machines is an ok start. What about fines? Criminal charges for violating state election laws?
Maybe if the company and the persons who run it were actually held responsible for their actions it might make others more likely to comply with the law.
All in all though, I'm glad California is aware of the problems and hasn't just ignored them.
Personally I don't really care about glitches, crashes and other problems with the machines. What I do care about is the use of uncertified software and the fact that these companies are more or less getting away with it. It sets a bad precedent for the future. Who cares if a few voting machines get decertified if you get to rig an election as a result? Any use of uncertified software should bar that company from ever producing voting machines in the US again. Do we really have to wait until someone is caught rigging a major election before real efforts are undertaken to stop it?
On whether to punish Diebold. This will be accomplished with an electronic vote using Diebold equipment. Diebold is confident they will be found not guilty, unanimously.
I wish submitting absentee ballots was a sure-fire way to overcome this electronic-voting madness. Here in Hawai'i they get counted, but in other places they may not even be counted at all if the results aren't close enough. I'm a deputy registrar here in Hilo and I'll probably be working the polls on election day. I have to say I'm relieved, in that although we'll have one of these proprietary democracy-destroying machines at all polls, we'll also have the older, more reliable paper ballots in all precincts. If someone approaches me asking which method they should use, I won't hesitate to state my personal preference for analog.
Once again, I have to ask - what is the big goddamned rush to get election results that requires electronic voting machine? Why are people so frickin' hard to get the results of an election, like, on election day.
People should just chill, let a team of little old ladies count PAPER BALLOTS marked in PENCIL or PEN, and get the VERIFIABLE RESULTS a week or so later.
Mod down people who tell people how to mod in their sigs
Also, while I feel bad for the folks who are having their ability to vote without assistance taken away from them, it has to be better than having broken machines at which no voting at all can take place.
Your mileage may vary, but mine is constant.
Alameda County is basically the "East Bay", ie. across the Bay from San Francisco, including Berkeley, Oakland, Fremont, etc.
The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
Allin all, how difficult would this --really-- be? At least getting the part right about who's allowed and who's not allowed to vote? I'm a programmer, I've studied cryptography, I understand the problems associated with voting, but what if they made an open system, hired good programmers, and hired other good programmers to check the first programmers work, without having a private company do the work. (or at least force the private company be open).
.... test in in some *local* elections for a few years, and when those work, start moving it up to larger (ie: statewide) elections ....
Lave the code open, let people look at it themselves, fin problems or what not
Jesus, people have created some insane stuff back in the day, what's the problem now?
OMG this is so stupid. How fucking hard can it be to make a distributed database and client software to increment a couple hundred variables? You don't see these kind of problems with web polls. Sure there are different candidates in different elections, but if you split the problem along the lines of particular races, other than the shiny happy interface to use a snazzy hi-tech touch screen to touch the face of your fav candidate, it really comes down to a VERY simple database call to increment a count for each candidate. I could do this whole system with one single database table for results.
Seriously, I could put together a system to increment a couple hundred variables in non-realtime over a weekend reliably enough to stake my life on it's accuracy. Most of us could.
The classic example of stable, solid transactions would be the ATM machine. Maybe if some of the rocket scientists at Diebold would talk to someone who had actually worked on an ATM machine they would know how addition works in computers, even across globally distributes databases, and learn how to do things like paper receipts, reliable atomic transactions...
Huh? Diebold already makes ATMs? Oh..
Black Box Voting and Bev Harris have led the fight against Diebold and ES&S hijinks for a while now, lots of good reading at that site to get you up to speed on the issues
Sehr geehrter Toilettenbenutzer!
hmmmmm....maybe items such as these make them that way perhaps?
Come on now, insist on accuracy in both the census AND vote counting.
Agreed.
Sehr geehrter Toilettenbenutzer!
Maybe e-voting is actually hard to accomplish.
I don't know about that. Seems to me, if you put the right people in charge, and keep the system as open as possible, you're far less likely to have the sorts of problems that a private firm will run into. Just like any other kind of software. More proof needed? Well, electronic voting seems to be working just fine in Brazil.
Spell Check
The elections in Brazil are electronic.
In a country with dimensions comparable to USA the electronic ballots are being used in the last elections, and here voting is mandatory.
paper ballots are used only for back-up (energy failure, ballot faillure and goes on).
In a south american country frauds are always a concern and electronic ballots helped to minimize frauds (there was a saying, in some rural areas, when the illiterates couldn't vote that was like that: in the elections the ones who vote are the dead literates and the living unliterates, due the forgery of vote registers of dead persons)
now the illiterates can vote (optional, not mandatory)... well, the politicians need to compensate the fraud...
the results of a presidential election is given in 24 hours, with partial tallys running all the day for public review.
When I first heard, early on election day, the nature ofthe problems they were having, I guessed what was going on. They were using machines running Windows CE as the OS. The application code itself was in a flash memory, but they were relying on some kind of shortcut in the volatile system RAM to execute that code when the machine was turned on. The trouble was, when the poll workers were trained, they were given the machines to take home with them. SOme of them sat for long periods without power, so their batteries ran down and the RAM got erased, wiping out whatever it was that was supposed to execute the code automatically. The poll workers weren't trained for that contingency and had no clue what to do. Many of the polling places had voters, off the street, trying to help them diagnoe the problem and boot the software.
This whole thing was a fiasco from the beginning. Not only did they use known-uncertified code, they let poll workers take the machines home, protected only by a peel-off sticker for "security". They then had a bunch of unqualified and unvetted civilans being given access to try to fix the problems. Unbelievable.
>Today, California officials may recommend decertifying some or all of Dielbold's machines for the November General Election.
Sadly, this will include the Diebold optical scanners used in my county. Like much associated with this issue, this would be JPFN. The optically scanned ballots are much like the machine scored tests used in university classes everywhere. You fill in a bubble with a black felt pen to vote for a candidate. Simple, quick, readable with either the optical scanner or the Mark I eyeball in the event of a power failure.I am totally at a loss to understand this rush to electronic voting. As a citizen, I demand that my vote be:
- Secret
- Subject to verifiable recount
- Free from fraud
I realize that these are the ideal and that abuses have occurred under all forms of balloting yet used. However, the paper ballot and voting lists have stood the test of time. Reducing costs is not be a valid reason for mucking about with the very foundation of the democratic process.Some mornings it's hardly worth chewing through the restraints to get out of bed.
This should really be compared to what used to happen with ballot boxes: every Indian election has a few repolls, I'm not sure of typical numbers but 191 isn't a huge number given the size of the exercise (670 million voters, each polling station deals with around 1500 voters, you do the math). With the machines, at least you don't have the problem of thugs taking over smaller/more remote stations and "stuffing" the ballot boxes: the electoral officer can simply disable the machines.
Other polling locations seem to be operating on voter lists from 2001.
This has nothing to do with the voting machines. The machines don't contain the voter list.
...Oh, wait... ...these machine don't provide a means for a recount, do they?
Never mind
"How to Do Nothing," kids activities, back in print!
San Mateo County went to mark-sense machines years ago, and has had very little trouble. The ballot boxes consist of a lid with a scanner locked to a big plastic bin, so every ballot scanned is locked inside the ballot box should a recount be necessary. At the end of the election, the scanners are plugged into a phone line and transmit results to election HQ. They can be re-read later, and the ballots counted and matched against the scans if necessary, one ballot box at a time.
Other than generating huge amounts of paper, there seem to be few problems with this.
What about a system the combines computer voting stations with optical scanning:
1) Voter uses touch screen computer voting station to select candidates
2) Voting station prints a paper ballot
3) Voter checks ballot and;
a) If correct, inserts the ballot into the slot and presses an ACCEPT BALLOT button, the ballot is fed into a storage bin, and votes are stored electronically
b) If incorrect, inserts the ballot into the slot and presses a CHANGE BALLOT button, and the ballot is shredded and process repeats from 1)
After the election a random X% of the electronic records are compared with the corresponding paper ballots and if they don't match all paper ballots are recounted.
If God had had a computer it would have taken him 7 months to create the earth...if he even bothered to do it at all.
The problem isn't directly with Debold (although they definitely are culpable).
The fault lay with the requirements produced by California (and any other state trying E-Voting). That is to say, none. They just said "Give us E-Voting, whatever that means"
The agencies should NOT be allowing the machine producers to define the voting method. They will invariably produce a mechanism that maximizes profit potential. How do you test the machines once you get them. You don't even understand the process since you didn't develop it. As a developer I can tell you NEVER let development produce the requirements. We miss everything and when you think you found a bug we just say "it works as designed".
The various election agencies need to come up with a definitive set of requirements for what an E-Voting machine should do. The level of detail should be excruciating.
The agencies also need to define and publish policy and procedure around these devices as well. You don't actually need to devices to do this. If they are built to your requirements then the procedures can be followed.
The kinds of requirements need to cover things like:
A paper receipt must be produced by the voting machine with human and machine readable type. If the machine readable type is not the same as the human readable type, the code produced must not be unique per voter or voter session (i.e. I can't transcribe the code and use it to prove who I voted for or you cant prove who I voted for)
The executing code must be certified (Open or not) and must then be cryptographically signed. The certified cryptographic checksum must be published 30 days before the election and each voting machine must display the checksum at all times during operation in a place that is visible to voters (i.e. I can write down the checksum and verify that the machine I'm using is using the correct version of the software)
When setting up a voting area each machine must be checked for the proper software checksum. (potentially a matching of software checksum and hardware specification, a use for Trusted Computing perhaps?)
Each machine must be able to produce test ballots for every candidate and the test ballots must be accepted by the designated reader machine. The test ballots will be conspicuously marked in a human and machine readable way. The reader will display the candidate indicated on the test ballot when reading (could be a screen, 7-seg display code, whatever).
Lots more, in much more detail that I went into...
=Shreak
The Federal Election Commission has a FAQ About The National Voluntary Voting System Standards. According to the FAQ, "[a]s of April 2001, the following States have adopted the FEC's voting system standards *OR* require the testing of systems against the standards by independent testing authorities (ITAs) designated by the National Association of State Election Directors":
The National Association of State Election Directors has, among other things:
(1) a List of NASED Certified Systems;
(2) an Updated List of NASED Certified Systems; and
(3) an Overview of the Certification Process.
Only Women Bleed (Sex, Sharia remix)
Here in germany we draw marks into circles next to the names of the candidates. The votes are counted by hand. The results are faxed to a central bureau where they are aggregated.
This system has several advantages:
What ever happened to good, old fashioned testing? I've seen the problem with companies rolling out software into production before it has been fully tested and ended up paying the price. I've had to clean up the mess of other engineers who didn't test something and told them about it every time. I asked if they tested it. They answer "No, it should work. It always has before." When I ask if they are always 100% confident that nothing was missed, they say yes, but obviously this isn't the case. When it comes to something as important as an election, in my opinion, there is no excuse not to test, fix problems, repeat ad infinitum, then roll it out once everyone is satisfied there are no errors. If this takes 20 years, fine. Just make sure it works correctly before rolling it out.
But why is the rum gone?
We're using eVoting machines here in Brazil for a couple years without major problems. It's better for many people here are iliterate and eVoting machines carry photos and speak the name of the candidate. I see many saying that paper can be trusted more and computers, but hey, we're talking about humans and voting here, at least in Brazil, nothing was more fraudable (does this word exists in english?) than paper, all it takes was a huge shotgun, a corrupt landlord with an easy tone: "mark here..." At least eVoting is making it harder here for fraud.
-- Por mais que eu ande no vale das trevas e da morte, meu PowerMac G4 Não Travará!!!
Technology wins our wars, so it must be flawless.
We have a permanent hard-on for technology. Just look at Slashdot, for crying out loud. We're a country that worships technology for its own sake.
If it's newer, sleeker, faster, shinier, and eliminates interaction with people, we're all for it. We want a permanent state of newness. We don't care about history, or precident, or any of that bullshit.
Ready, fire, aim! It's the American Way.
Read the EFF's Fair Use FAQ
ITAA has "gone on the e-voting offensive" to protect the industry. If Diebold is so concerned about producing voting accuracy, why did they go and hire a lobbyist like Harris Miller to protect their image?
And the services aren't cheap...." annual dues are calculated (they range from $600-$44K, depending on a company's sales. "Deliverables" will cost up to $200,000+". Why not pour that cash into securing their systems instead of their image?
So, Diebold gets off with a half-assed apology, sorry about yer democracy, Mate! My bad!
And nobody on the federal level is making a fuss because...hmm, now I wonder why?
And it'll probably just tool along all status quo-y until...what? Massive, undeniable fraud? Some kind of grassroots "Hack the Vote" movement?
I think it was Heinlien that said, "It may be rigged, but it's the only game in town."
So keep the pressure on, and hope it makes a difference before November.
(Where's my EFF renewal form...)
What were you expecting?
...from selling voting equipment in the State of California. They have violated the public trust. The ban should be in effect for a time not less than five years.
Start Running Better Polls
I suppose the good news is that these errors were caught before they could have really screwed things up.
Okay, but how many errors didn't get caught?
$8.95/mo web hosting
outsource the electoral process to india, and we in return will outsource our politicians to you :)
Security? So what! The softwar is shit ANYWAY!
People like to harp and harp and harp on how insecure the Diebold system is, and this is very important. But put that aside for the moment and look at where the actual problems have been: software crashes that prevent people from voting, software glitches that produce false data. I don't care how "secure" the system is; if it produces garbage it can be Fort Knox, and who cares! The whole issue of "security" while conceptually important for voting software is in a way irrelevant here until they can make software that produces accurate data while not being tampered with.
"Who are in control, they are not in control of anything - they don't even control themselves!" - Glen Beck
Just do a slashdot poll on John Kerry and George Bush and get it over with.
The whole system is very simple. Even if they just used an ATM style of security (printing to an internal paper log) they would be far superior to Diebold. But using logic is difficult in this case, because Diebold is clearly making absurd claims, and it's difficult to refute absurdity.
It appears that at least some of the Diebold machines DO have internal printers, but Diebold has been notably coy about mentioning that, and indeed has been strangely resistant to the whole idea of verifiability. Makes me stop wondering. (tinfoil hat = ON)
"My strength is as the strength of ten men, for I am wired to the eyeballs on espresso."
One million dollars is worth a lot more than the vote to most people, not to mention the sharks with laser beams on their heads.
By the way, for you smart-alecky types out there, I did NOT intentionally draw a parallel between politics and billion-to-one odds.
Give me a fish, I shall eat well for a day. Teach me to fish, and I will eat well until some idiot patents it.
I live in Brasil. We have had voting machines in the last 12-14 years (yes, twelve to fourteen -- it depends the size of the city you are in). For the Brazilians here: the first election here in Belo Horizonte to use the machines were the mayoral (and city council, state representation, governor, house and senate) before FHC was elected (as I count it, 2 years + 8 years + 1 1/2 = 11,5 years). I know it, because I was "mesário" (election "table" official? election "clerk"? what is a good English translation?) in the previous election, and in the two subsequent elections). IIRC, there were electronic ballot boxes in Rio and Sao Paulo in the election before that (the only two cities larger than Belo Horizonte). ... when you get your first job. If you are a mandatory voter (literate person from 18 to 65) you have to go to Electoral Court and register to vote. In the process of registering, you receive the "Título de Eleitor" (voter id), in which you have the number of you voting section. To change jobs, and specially to get a government job, you have to prove you are a registered *and* *regularized* voter (you voted in the last election, or regularized your voting situation after it).
Our voting machines are mainly of three different (internally) models: (a) the old ones, that use VirtuOS (*) as the OS, (b) the new ones, that use WinCE as the OS, and (c) the newest and deprecated ones that have the second printer to print your vote, show it to you inside a clear acrilic case, and mix it with others inside the machine.
Externally, all of them look roughly the same: a box similar to the old "portables" of the eighties, with a 5-6" diagonal LCD and a big numerical keypad in the right side of the screen, that has, besides 0-9 keys, "confirma" (ok), "erro" (cancel), and "branco" (white).
The electoral process (from the point of view of the voter) begins
In the election day, you scan the newspapers (or the Superior Electoral Court website), search for the address of your section, and go there. No, there is no transit vote, you can only vote at that address. If you can't get there, you'll have to "justify" your absence.
At the section, you will present your voter id to one the "mesários", and if you don't have it on you, you can still vote (you can show other valid id), but will be delayed. The mesário will search for your name in the vote-ticket sheet, and annex it to your id while you vote. You will sign a receipt in a sheet, and proceed to the voting "booth". Another "mesário" will type your voter id # in a remotely connected keypad, setting the machine in the "ready to vote" mode.
The voting "booth" is really a desk with the voting machine over it, facing nobody else in the room, and sometimes with a cardboard "cover" around it. You will "dial" the numbers of the candidates, in order. when you dial all the digits of one candidate, a star-trek-like chime rings, his/her face will show up in the screen, and if you digited it right, you hit "ok". otherwise, you hit "cancel" and start over. After typing all the candidates, you hit "ok" one last time, the machine chimes again, and goes to "stand by" mode. You have voted. If you don't want to vote for nobody, you can hit "white" instead of the candidate ## (accounted as a "white vote", or "none of the above" -- this is the equivalent of putting your paper ballot in the box without marking anything), or if you really want to protest you can type 9999 or other non-existent-candidate-#, and your vote will be accounted as a "null vote", or "I'm really pissed of" (the equivalent of drawing pictures or writing "improper expletives" in a paper ballot)
Then, you get your id back, your ticket (keep it together with your voter id!!), and you go home. Ah, bars do not open (theoretically) in the election day, so hope you have bought your beer in the day before).
From the point of view of election officials, things are more complicated. The machines arrive to the Electoral Judge (yes, a Judge of Law) pre-prepared one to two months
It's better to be the foot on the boot than the face on the pavement. ~~ tkx Kadin2048
An inaccuracy of as much as a few percentage points is not going to result in better/worse government. Once you're within a few percentage points, the only clear thing is that a clear decision has not been made. We desperately need to start asking "why"? Are the two sides really that close in appeal or is something being rigged (whether intentionally or as a side effect of the system is not really relevant)?
Candidates that win by a few percentage points haven't really won, they've just survived the election process. They still have a huge portion of their constituency unrepresented... No, actually unrepresented isn't right because in many cases today, those the vast majority of those that didn't vote for the candidate that won are in fact diametrically opposed to the candidates views. So, they aren't unrepresented. Instead they are actively misrepresented or, even attacked by their representative.
What our system is missing is a means to force a progression beyond this 50/50 stage.
One of the problems is accountability. It is hard to progress when someone can represent themselves one way during the election process and then act another way when in office. I think the primary problem with this is that the platform they run on is never proven or disproven. So, it can be brought up again and argued about again without being able to point back at facts.
Another major issue is that the platforms are incomplete. Candidates are running on the basis of what they will do about a couple dozen problems and then going off and making decisions on 1000s of problems. Their decisions on the side issues frequently don't match up to what you would think. Basically, I believe the issue here is that the debate is over issues instead of principles. If you could elect on the basis of a detailed knowledge of a candidate's principles and then have some means of holding them accountable to those principles at least in a broad sense, you'd be doing much better.
So, my hypothesis is that as long as there are no candidates (and no means in the system to force those candidates to come about) that can present a clear belief system and be trusted to follow that in their governing regardless of pressures placed on them by supposed constituents that often really don't have any real care about the principles of government, the system for electing them is irrelevant because we can't have a stable and progressing debate and discovery of who is right and who is wrong. Real progress will be elusive.
I'd like to see a "another choice please" option added to the ballots. If "another choice please" wins, I think the position should be left open with no provision to temporarily fill it. At least the representatives left after the initial fallout are the clear choices of SOMEBODY!!! I believe that most people would rather not be represented at all than be misrepresented to the degree that they are today.
Simply adding this option to the ballot and handling it in the specified way would likely force a major change very quickly. I think that we'd find the majority of the country unrepresented in the first election. But, that would be good, because it is already the truth, just one that the current system glosses over. Bringing it out would show the naked truth, our system of government has departed from representing the people to such an extent that our government has in fact failed.
An interesting side question to ask is "who is running our government"?. Ultimately, the answer is "whoever chose the representatives" because they are who the representatives answer to. Some think that the choice is by the people. They are wrong as long as the choice is from a rigged pool of candidates. My answer is "whoever is rigging the pool of candidates", because the fundamental differences in what the candidates from the supposedly different sides are doing in Washington has mostly disappeared. From a long term view, all of the candidates are taking power and money away from the people and cent
[...] they were instructed to charge HIGH to add [print] capability, if it came to it.
I don't see this as (necessarily) a huge conspiracy to avoid an audit trail. This is likely a simple matter of Diebold achieving vendor lock-in with a limited feature set and then charging outrageous prices to add to that feature set.
Another non-conspiracy explanation: Printers have lots of moving parts and are highly subject to failure. That's especially true if they are used intermittently, with months of storage between uses. Now deploy thousands of them, with the entire corps of news media breathing down your neck over every glitch, and you have an enormous PR disaster in the making.
Given that other voting systems that have been in service for years (such as mechanical voting machines) leave no audit trail, they might have thought that the risks from the printers were far worse than the risks from bad PR over the lack of an audit trail.
That's doubly true because there are a LOT of places - not just the machines themselves - where the count might be corrupted, maliciously or through bugs. Without the trail such corruption wouldn't be detected, with the trail it almost certainly would, and would become big news. Build in a scandal-magnet and you need extra bucks to weather the resulting scandals and achieve the same risk-reward ratio.
But I, for one, am VERY glad to see the conspiracy theories circulate - and that they're naming Republicans. Because IMHO they're likely to lead to increased pressure (especially among Democrats, who otherwise could care less) to add the audit trail - and thus make elections even harder to rig than with the previous, non-electronic systems.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
Once again, I have to answer - election officials see a number of advantages to electronic voting technology, none of which have anything to do with speed of reporting (which isn't currently an issue):
1) Accuracy. The main reason that everyone is junmping on the e-voting bandwagon is fear that they could preside over the next broward county, with significant numbers of voters being disenfranchised because it is impossible to be sure for whom they are voting. (Significant = greater than the margin of victory.) There is a perception that e-voting machines are more accurate then current voting systems.
2)Access. DRE machines can often be fitted to easily display and count ballots in multiple languages, and can provide audio or raised button (Braille) for the blind. As the first article mentions, currently voters with special needs don't actually have a secret vote. As governments expand excessibility requirements in all areas, electronic voting becomes more attractive.
3) Second-chance voting and error checking. Some electronic voting systems require that the voter check their votes and show any errors (accidently voting yes and no on the same referendum, or skipping a race). Second-chance voting is a good thing that is attractive to a number of voter advocate groups. (Its my understanding that the [leadership of the] League of Women Voters really likes electronic voting for this reason).
I'm not argueing for electonic voting. In fact I'm working with a number of groups opposed to e-voting. However informed debate on the topic requires that e-voting skeptics understand the reasons that election officials choose these technology. If you really are interested in this, I'd suggest that you have a look at a document called Myth Breakers for Election Officials produced by Voters Unite
The government did demand it, they were promised it, and Diebold lied about it.
Perhaps the government claimed they demanded a quality product, that doesn't mean they really did. If they had, then as soon as they discover the evidence to the contrary they will at least stop doing business with Diebold and at most sue Diebold for failing to live up to their claims and/or contracts. Have you ever bought a grossly faulty product and then continued to patronize the same company regularly afterward? The government does, all the time, and unless hell has frozen over they're going to continue doing so with the Diebold machines which will be filling voting booths in November.
The private sector doesn't work because private companies are miraculously more industrious and efficient than public agencies, it works because there are usually redundant companies supplying the same service, so selfish consumers avoid the companies who do a poor job of it, so selfish companies try to do a good enough job to keep some customers. If companies discover a big stupid customer with deep pockets who will be happy no matter what, how do you expect them to behave?
Once again, I have to answer
... speed of reporting (which isn't currently an issue)
Thank you. Much abliged.
Maybe it's not an issued because results are issued on the same day. If the entire country went to paper ballots, as I advocate, you can bet it would become an issue, toot sweet.
There is a perception that e-voting machines are more accurate then current voting systems.
Excellently qualified, and a good point.
Some electronic voting systems require that the voter check their votes and show any errors
Personally, I think if someone is dumb enough to mark both 'yes" and "no" on a question, and cannot even properly mark a ballot, their reasoning abilities and the ability to decide an issue or select a candidate are highly suspect. Their disenfranchisement for that ballot should not be bemoaned.
However informed debate on the topic requires that e-voting skeptics understand the reasons that election officials choose these technology.
You are a gentleman and a scholar and I salute you.
Mod down people who tell people how to mod in their sigs
I am of the opinion that machine voting IS the problem. Voting is too critical to not have on the spot, verifiable with your eyeballs 1- an empty ballot box on poll opening (easily checked by anyone there), and 2-a count that anyone who can add can perform and check at the end of the period. And we have an archaic short voting time period, it needs to be 24 to 48 hours. I have seen and heard of too many examples of people who simply can't make the polls, typically blue collars who are required to be at work from much earlier than "business hours" until let go in the evening. I once had to QUIT a job and walk off to go vote, they would not "allow" me to come in late, nor leave early, and that day we had overtime I wasn't expecting. And lastly, instant runoffs, no more "voting for the lesser of evil" styled voting, people will have a lot more incentive to vote their REAL first choice in elections.
I love computers, but with voting, nope, I want to be able to verify it with a paper ballot, not even punch cards,a mark in the bubble ballot is quite sufficient. And I don't mean a receipt from some black box voting machine, either, this is just thousands of dollars a precinct busy work with electronic voting. More government waste (and kickbacks),easier fraud potential and inefficiency. Selling the smell and the sizzle, not the steak, typical advertising crap.
If it is not readable by any human who chooses to poll watch or if there's a dispute immediately and a human can't read it, then it is not secure, and I don't care what "guarantees" they give. "They" ALREADY swore up and down that "it was secure and worked properly", and they have been proven to FAIL IT in not a very long time.
Government and government connected contractors have a long history of being liars and crooks, and with something like voting, using computers??? WAY too much temptation there to ignore, after all, what is it woreth in potential dollars and power over other humans to "adjust" who wins?
This is just another way for that to happen,a much easier way, and as you can see it has happened, exactly like it was predicted by folks like me several years ago when it was being discussed, and I remember the arguments then that it "would just work and be better". Phooie. I was right, they were wrong.
"Computerised Voting" came pre-broken and crooked right out of the box. And with a real voting period and not this half a day deal we got now,and some sort of instant runoff deal,and third parties being covered in the news, we might see more people voting. the way it is now is 50% voting roughly, that is not any sort of success figure. It would reduce lines and the wait,the longer period, and not discrimnate against workers who can't make it to the polls, or people who have emergencies come up they have to go deal with, etc. and "counting" is a normal human thing, I doubt there's any precinct out there that lacks people who can count. Yes, there's trouble with that too, but stricter enforcement of the laws on the books with severe penalties could knock that down considerable.
And then MAYBE if the paid off FCC can see fit to REQUIRE the networks to cover third parties and candidates in their day to day so-called "news" reports and in the so-called "official national debates" we might not only get more votes, we might get more voting enthusiasm and some constructive change in this nation, instead of this "new and improved and it's so shiny!" scheme which will only go to elect the same tired old parties and candidates who have caused all the mess in the first place. And FUNNY it was *their idea* to switch to "computerised" voting. I certainly don't recall seeing any private citizens approaching me with some petition to beg the government to please switch us to computers, because it didn't happen. It was shoved down our throats and sold to us just like beer or cornflakes on the TV. The "controllers" wanted computerised voting because it's more hackable than the old original system.
Hard tech is great, I love it, for SOME things, but in other circumstances, you can't replace normal human actions.
Never never never smoke crack before geometry class!
Michael Shnayerson writes Vanity Fair, April 2004, p.158.
You don't. There is a "contingency plan" for every possible failure.
If one machine does not work, you have 2 or 3 backup machienes for each 100 or so; if they don't work, also, you do paper ballot voting in the section that machine, call in the party officials and the scrutinizers, make the count by hand (remember, each box does not have an awful lot of votes).
If your floppy goes bad, you (the Electoral Judge, I mean) writes by hand in a Superior Electoral Court program the results from that box, signs a report that the computer emits saying "this data was entered by hand, it's my responsability", and affix it to elections papers.
If you lose connectivity, you get the car/boat, and take the disks to the neighboring electoral zone (=set of sections), with police escort. And the list goes on and on.
It's better to be the foot on the boot than the face on the pavement. ~~ tkx Kadin2048