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Open Source a National Security Threat
n3xup writes "Dan O'Dowd, CEO of Green Hills Software, suggests that open source software has the capability of being sabotaged by foreign developers and should not be used for U.S. military or security purposes. He likened Linux with a Trojan Horse- free, but in the end a lot of trouble. O'Dowd thinks that unfriendly countries will attempt to hide intentional bugs that the Open Source community will have no chance of finding."
Understand the source perspective before you draw opinions. Green Hills is under threat from Linux due to the embedded software being integrated in more Government system. GreenHills is (was?) a large player in government based Embedded Operating Systems. I imagine you will see a similar stance by WindRiver maker of the popular Realtime Embedded OS VXWorks.
The threat comes from the length of time on some large government projects. Some systems have been around longer than you and me. In the proprietary world, your whole project is dependent on a set of companies staying in business for 30+ years. Now with Linux, you're no longer dependent on that string; you can leverage off the community providing updates or if necessary you as the developer can make the changes. Most people fail to say this with Linux; everyone just says hey it's free and cheap. But if you really want to sell Linux, try saying that your entire project doesn't fall on another proprietary solution, we will have the source code in hand - people will listen.
It's easy to retort GreenHills FUD by saying all changes will be baselined and a change control board will review any updates (easy enough huh).
Shouldn't this article immediately point back to other articles on
m l
how governments OUTSIDE the US are choosing open source for exactly
the same reason (who knows what M$ + NSA put in the closed windows
source that might hurt other nations)?
[World Govs Choose Linux For Security & More]
http://slashdot.org/articles/01/12/11/0132213.sht
Some embedded Linux providers even outsource their development to China and Russia.
GASP! Some XYZ providers even outsource their development to ABC and DEF (insert your favorite company and terrorist sponsoring country where necessary).
It would be incredibly naive to believe that other countries and terrorist organizations would not exploit an easy opportunity to sabotage our military or critical infrastructure systems when we have been doing the same to them for more than 20 years!
I think it has been proven that closed-source development doesn't help to change the possibilities that a "mole" has been planted or that a "hole" will be discovered.
One of the greatest misconceptions about Linux is that the free availability of its source code ensures that the "many eyes" with access to it will surely find any attempt at sabotage. Yet, despite the "many eyes," new security vulnerabilities are found in Linux every week in addition to dozens of other bugs. Many of these flaws have eluded detection for years. It is ridiculous to claim that the open source process can eradicate all of the cleverly hidden intentional bugs when it can't find thousands of unintentional bugs left lying around in the source code.
And it is ridiculous to claim that a closed development enviornment will make it any different.
In addition, under the internationally recognized Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (ISO 15408), Windows has been certified to Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4), a higher level of security than the EAL 2 that Linux has achieved.
According to this article, obtaining EAL2 certification typically costs between $400,000 and $500,000. Looks like it is more money than security. In their infancy, why would Linux vendors decide to shell out large sums of money when the government wasn't interested in using Linux anyway?
This whole article is FUD. He's annoyed because Linux is making leaps and bounds and will possibly affect his market-share in the lucrative Defense and Aerospace industries. At least he came out and said it on his own legs and not by paying off a third party to "investigate" the "problems" with Linux and post their results to the world.
Governments should not use OS without a proper security audit. Once you can verify the nature of the code, there should be no obstruction to using it.
Downmix - The Artscene News Source!
...with really big glass windows. All you need do is open your eyes to see what's inside.
IIRC, China has seen the source code to Microsoft Windows, whereas the U.S. government hasn't.
I think that's a pretty large security threat right there...
InThane
What if a terrorist gets a job at a software company? Where's the hope of catching the bugs then? It seems to me that closed-source software is more susceptible than open-source.
Now then.. last time I checked alot of the new bugs found in Windows were revealed by geeks... the type of geeks who make open source in many cases.
I think I'd rather put my trust in someone doing it for the pure love (hate) of (bad) software, then someone doing it for money and no love at all.
I like muppets.
Dan O'Dowd, CEO of Green Hills Software, suggests that open source software has the capability of being sabotaged by foreign developers and should not be used for U.S. military or security purposes.
Urmm , so what operating system do you use then Dan O'Dowd? and which newspapers and websites do you read?
You're obviously using a closed source operating system that is free of viruses, worms, holes and other security problems. What might this mystery closed source operating system that you are using that doesnt pose a threat to the nations security?
Electronic Music Made Using Linux http://soundcloud.com/polyp
And it doesn't have to be in the Linux kernel. The classic example (at least 10 years old) is to hack up gcc so that it examines the code it's compiling, and if it decides that it's compiling /bin/login to do things a little differently, inserting a back door where there was none before.
However, while he does have a point, it's a very myopic point. Closed source software has exactly the same vulnerabilities, except for one critical difference -- only people within the company in question have a chance of detecting the problem -- the end user will never get to see the source and see if it's compromised. Granted, most open source users do not review all the source code that they use, but at least the option is there, and for the people where security is absolutely essential (like the NSA) they almost certainly use it.
Also, for a closed source company, the problem is even worse. The backdoor (or whatever) could be introduced when the code is finally compiled for distribution, and never get checked into whatever source control system they use. So the binaries get shipped out, but NOBODY has reviewed the source code in question (except our cracker friend) and once the bug does come to light (if it ever does) the company will look at the source code and scratch it's head -- it won't even have the source code in question to look at.
Isn't the problem described much larger for commercial outsourcing? These days most software used in the U.S. is partially written outside the U.S. At least with the open source software people concerned about security can build from source and perform an inspection on the source. With commercial software, no such precautions are available.
When you can't compete, FUD.
The gauntlet is thrown down. I challenge this man to come up with a demonstrable "trojan horse" in an OS piece of software that cannot be found in a reasonable period of time by a security audit (the kind the government does of OS software to be used). Such fear mongering should be laughed at with, torn up, and spit upon whenever you see or hear it. It reminds me of Ridge getting up and saying, well, there's a threat around the election, but we have no evidence of it. Be scared (and vote for Bush). Yea . . . right. I didn't just fall off the turnip truck.
Get a life, and make better products, jerk!
...tizzyd
The cornerstone of open source is that it is OPEN SOURCE. The government is free to view and evaluate all the packages to their little, demonic hearts' content.
If I were a terrorist, I'd think I would penetrate a closed-source house (say, Microsoft or Green Hills) and hack some little nasties into their source.
But,, maybe that's why Dan O'Dowd isn't a very good terrorist.
:wq
I wonder if they also consider shareware and freeware as a possible threat.
You know, it's easier to hide funcionalities in Shareware/Freeware than in OSS - you can't look at the code and observe them at one glance. I wonder if it would not be easier to spread malicious code in PaintShopPro and others.
Al.
With the knowledge that Linux is going to control our most advanced defense systems, foreign intelligence agencies and terrorists can easily infiltrate the Linux community to contribute subversive software.
And proprietary software is safer, how? It is just as easy, if not easier, to infiltrate a specific closed-source company (remember, the 9-11 hijackers were here for 3 years learning to fly jumbo jets) and program in their subversions directly. (See my comments about his compny's certifications below).
Some embedded Linux providers even outsource their development to China and Russia.
Unlike all the major proprietray developers who outsource all the work they can to China and Russia, too. How much of Green Hills' code is written overseas? By sweat-shop coders they never even meet?
In fact, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) security vulnerabilities database lists more vulnerabilities for Linux than Windows in the last ten years.
This is such a broad statement it is tough to refute. Are they talking kernel only? The kernel is the only part the military should be interested in as far as security vulnerabilities go. Then how can they get equivalent numbers for Windows which doesn't easily allow you to separate the kernel? And Windows definitely should include all of the apps because any app vulnerability is a potential OS vulnerability. This statement needs a lot of amplification before it even approaches something like "truth".
DO-178B Level A is the highest safety standard for software design, development, documentation, and testing.
From Green Hills' web-site about DO-178B Level A certification:
"The certification package includes Green Hills Software services for all DO-178B Level A compliant verification activities for INTEGRITY-178B operating on processor architecture specified by a customer's requirements. All reviews, analysis and testing of the INTEGRITY-178B real-time operating system is performed by Green Hills Software using the customer's target processor system."
So DO-178B Level A verification is OK as long as you trust Green Hills. Remember my earlier comments about infiltrating proprietary companies? With a couple of fifth-columnists in a couple of key places terrorists can insert whatever code they like and then pass it right along in the certification stage.
If the government truly wants to use Linux in military operations:
1. Freeze the source right now. Fork it into their own private source control tree that nobody in the outside world ever sees.
2. Perform the entire DO-178B procedures (I don't remember what parts of it these are) that do a detailed analysis on the source code for all decision brnches, etc.
3. NEVER use any public patches or source code changes as-is; instead, any changes to the code must be examined at the source level to the same rigor as 2 above and then incorporated directly into their private source tree.
4. etc, etc.
However, this conventional wisdom is unsupported by quantitative data. In fact, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) security vulnerabilities database lists more vulnerabilities for Linux than Windows in the last ten years. In addition, under the internationally recognized Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (ISO 15408), Windows has been certified to Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4), a higher level of security than the EAL 2 that Linux has achieved.
Is this not due to the fact that only people inside M$ can check their own code, and that they will not always disclose vulnerabilities?
Linux on the other hand almost always instantly discloses its bugs.
Isn't a bug inside an open source program much easier (and no doubt faster) to find than one in a 'closed' source application?
I've heard that some government systems that hold classified data are still using NT4, and are preparing to use W2K, because the W2K audit isn't finished yet (or was only finished recently), and they install the systems with their own special NT4 CDs. They don't even use MS CDs to install the systems, and they don't run machines with OSs preinstalled by the manufacturer. They use their own CDs with their own patches applied.
I don't know this for sure, but it seems to me that the government is in a bit of a bind with MS products, because they're bloating and the audit process is falling behind. They're about to jump to W2K, which at least puts them in the Active Directory world, but they're not even thinking about XP at this point. W2K is much bigger than NT4, XP is much bigger than W2K, and Longhorn is massive (from an auditing point of view). It's got to be hard to manage these audits.
I think that from the government's point of view, the real issue is whether the code has been audited, not whether it's open or closed source. If it's audited, they feel they can use it, if it's not, they can't. Keep in mind that the machines themselves are closed off, guarded by men with guns, and are not plugged into public networks.
So it seems to me that a lot of the open vs. closed source would come down to how it affects the auditing process.
I don't know anything about the audit process (or any of the rest of what I'm saying here, really), so take this with a grain of salt, but...
It seems to me that open source would allow them to manage their own distro, with a small number of essential packages. Patches and updates could be audited on a continuous basis, as they come out. That has to be a much more manageable project than simply tearing into Longhorn from scratch when MS finally drops it.
If they have the source, they could make sure that whatever they were using could deal with whatever it needs to deal with -- new hardware, or whatever. I think the pressure of obsolete code (which they're probably feeling with NT4 now) would be less intense.
Lets say the United States uses a contractor, that has a foreign national as part of their staff, but does not know it, and this national is in charge of building some software. The foreign national knows exactly where to place key code segments to crash the program (lets say a missle interception program) when they want too. The foreign national knows exactly what test cases are being done, and knows how to avoid them, therefore hte software looks bullet proof. The software is approved as working, and is shippped. But the U.S. Government does not know, is that one line in tens of millions, checks for an override code. Now, unless an extensive code review is done -- which is supposed to be done, but not always done -- to go over all lines as they are checked in, this bug will make it past the checks. Once the code is delivered, the chances, at lesat from what I can imagine, that it getting caught till the damage is done, is super small.
:)
Now, if the code was open source, it would get reviewed, and looked at constantly. Yes, again, what are the chances of someone finding that bug, but I am sure they are greater than someone trying to find a bug in closed software....
The Austrailan voting system has been open source now for a number of years, and that system has just gotten more secure over time. I think that is a prime example of something that is borderline needing to be secure, and how open source worked. I Think it can work again, and that the US. should adopt it, if our greedy companies do not get in the way first.
By the way, the top paragraph was completely hypothetical -- no one wants CIA agents at their door.
-A
If this is true for open source then it is 10 fold for closed source comercial software with all the outsourcing and visa holders! At least with open source we can find these mythical backdoors. The Outsourcing and visa trends are a much greater risk to National Security than Open Source if you use this lunatics logic.
This is precisely why Brazil, China, and even Germany are moving towards open-source. The US Government cannot insert backdoors into this stuff that would affect anyone not wanting to be affected, unlike Microsoft stuff. Remember the NSA keys in the Windows NT crypto libraries?
The US can continue to run Windows, be our guest, but the point is moot since much of US Government software is developed in India anyways. No back doors there, for sure.
- - - Non Caffeine Drink or Drink Error
I went to Green Hills Software page 1st. Just to see who this is.
/.? Why would this get even a 2nd look by anyone? I might see the somethingawful forums laughing at this but to have a posting here?
And I'm a little upset. Is OSN actually letting these guys astoturf on
This whole thing smells bad. Maybe it's a slow news day but there are better anti-linux rants than what is coming from that lame ass website. Nothing to see here, move along.
Really, I know what I'm doing...Ohhhh, look at the shiny buttons!
The U.S. military and government (For example, Horizontal Fusion, the catalyst for the Net-Centric Transformation of DoD, is heavily leveraging web services, JSR-168, et cetera... ) is increasingly using Open Source with talented people behind the wheel. e.g. Many software programming books following open standards and what not are penned by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) employees... And the government has groups actively focused on Information Assurance (IA).
And I, for one, work in the industry and gee, know what I'm doing and can read other people's code.
Pure FUD.
It's possible, and HAS happened that KNOWN, and TRUSTED engineers have put bits of code that would pass initial scrutiny and still be dangerous.
Wasn't there recently an article about a router with a backdoor shipped out in its code? How about all those darn "easter eggs" floating around in Windows and Office and other programs?
I would challenge you to compile a new Intel C library using a Microsoft C compiler from 6 years ago too. Heck, compile glibc using an IRIX compiler from six years ago.
You can drag out all the scenarios you want and whether it's Linux or it's *nix or BSD or Windows you're going to have the same audit challenges and not even have access to the source code without negotiating with all your suppliers.
--- I wish I could hear the soundtrack to my life. That way I'd know when to duck.
It's as simple as the subject. Open-source software is just another option. Don't like it? Buy the commerical software, or pay for its development by a trusted company or agency.
However, governments DO use closed-source software from companies and people they do not know. Who says Microsoft is not paid by X government that, through mass-adoption of Windows and other MS applications around the planet, now has control over a laaaaaarge number of computers in all countries of this world?
In other words, simply buying commerical software is not any more secure. What's worse, there is not way you will be able to check the sources. With OSS you have that option, and it is up to you, the user of the software, to check it or not check it.
Simpy
As has been said many times before:
Closed source is no guarantee of lack of tainting. Even with security checks its perfectly possible to have a hostile programmer working on the software.
I'd just like to put in a word for the NSA et al. They're perfectly capable of making their own decisions, and are probably far more qualified than anyone here. They know how to minimise risk using whichever development model they like...
It is of course very possible that open source software could be written on behalf of the military. The people who keep the official version for use within the military/government will go through all code submitted with a fine tooth comb being very conservative with what patches they accept from the outside world...
This article is basically written for politicians to try and scare politicians into banning the FOSS competition. I doubt it would work if the military and friends didn't want it that way, they will make up their own minds.
What does this have to do with OpenSource? Specifically, what problem does it present that is not shared with ANY software?
If we're going to compare Linux and Microsoft - have you noticed all the backdoors and trojans and worms out there lately? These security holes that are being used were not (likely) put in there on purpose - they're simple mistakes. Left by coders, in a CLOSED SOURCE company. There's no need to go to open source to get bad code!
Are you a coder? Have you participated, or ran, an open sourced project? In such a thing, you don't just accept code. You read it through, test it, and make sure it will do the job before compiling it.
Sure, you don't do a background check on every person submitting code - but you DO make sure the code does what it needs to, and that it does not have blatent bugs in it. Atleast the code that's submitted this way gets CHECKED AND APPROVED. That's not the case in all closed source companies - they don't all review code changes!
Has there been a background/security check on everyone that submitted code for use in NT4 SP6 that's used in high security defense systems? No. It's just not possible.
Atleast with embedded system, that are OS, the code can be all checked because it's small enough where it's a fully solvable and testable system.
And what does information stealing have to do with even pure source code?? Most "hacks" like that are social enginieering (email attachments, "CoOL CURSoRs! HeRE!"), etc. high security organizations use reverse firewalls to make sure nothing important is going out!
Calling coding an NP problem seems a little odd. It's not a decision problem really and some aspects are trivial whereas others may have no solution (e.g. the halting problem).
Decode these
What a bizarre article.
The statement "Yet, despite the "many eyes," new security vulnerabilities are found in Linux every week in addition to dozens of other bugs." Shouldn't one consider that the "many eyes" are the developers finding those weekly bugs? Wonder how many eyes are looking for Green Hills software bugs?
As long as people are involved, mistakes (bugs) will be made. But saying that malicious code is more likely in a product where someone CAN examine the code verses a product where no one can is just plain stupid. There is obviously an undisclosed agenda here (might that be selling a DO-178B Level A rated real time OS, aka Integrity? Getting a lot of Linux competition, eh?).
As to the standard DO-178B...the first 90% of the article is about security, then you mention DO-178B. DO-178B is not a security standard. DO-178B is a FAA safety related standard for software. Any software certified under DO-178B can still be full of unknown security holes. The standard may be required for software used in flight related applications but it does not mean the software is also secure.
The level A rating doesn't even mean "most secure" as the article seems to imply. It means that if the software crashes, it will not affect other software that is running. In other words, the software is ISOLATED, not secure.It is amazing the things companies will say when they are losing ground to a competitor.
The NSA: The only part of the US government that actually listens.
STUPID ARGUEMENT
The code does not have to be modified by evil people. ALL CODE HAS BUGS So all code should be checked, and not just by the people that write the code. The entire point of Open Source is that LOTS of people check the code for bugs. The difference between an "Evil Easter Egg" and a "bug" is just the intent of the programmer. Open source is MORE likely to catch an "evil Easter Egg/bug" than a closed source technique. Having a Spy try to sneak one is ridiculous because the the same bug detection routine will also detect the evil easter eggs.
But closed source DOES have one advantage over Open Source: secrecy.The problems with Open Source Defense programs are 1) "They" know exactly how good our programs are and 2) "They" can use them themselves.
Because of these two things it is not a good idea for most Defense purposes. We want the bad guy to NOT know how good our stuff is and we do NOT want them to have the same quality stuff.
excitingthingstodo.blogspot.com
...then it's made of nice, transparent Plexiglas.
Nope. Open source is still the best way to go, along with open government. When you let people hide "stuff", and when it's connected to massive political power and heaps 0 money, that's when crimes occur. The best bet is openness, bar none. It is not perfect, but it's the best design yet.
Because Linux has millions of lines of code. GHS's operating system has about 10k, and you get a copy of the source which you can rebuild from scratch when you buy it. And those 10k lines of source code also come pre-documented and certified.
I've worked for defense contractors using GHS's operating system. I'd much rather read and certify just my own application code than 1M lines of Linux _plus_ my own application code.
Sure, there is a threat in the Open Source movement. But, how is that threat compared to offshoring? I don't think they are any different. Yet, when a threat is something that enhances the bottom line, security concerns are not raised.
No, they aren't ignoring, they are denying it. Because it's bunk.
- Accountability has very little to do with preventing problems and everything with placing blame after they happen.
- Open source has more loci of "authority" than closed source, chained in a check-and-ballance system that greatly improves their effectiveness. And the cap stone is, I get to make an informed choice about what I run on my boxes.
- It isn't true that closed source developers don't have to worry about backdoors, but it may well be true that they believe that they don't. There have been many cases of backdoors in popular closed source programs (Remember "Netscape engineers are wennies"?) but can you name one backdoor that made it into a widely used open source product?
- As far as knowing the identity of the person who supplied a patch, this is just plain nuts. I can (and have) easily tracked down the person who wrote/submitted a patch to an open source product, and the person who accepted it--often, I can have an e-mail wigning its way to them in miuntes. But I can't recall ever learning the identity of a programmer who made a change in a closed source product, or even being offered the means to.
-- MarkusQs/countries/Microsoft/g;
Glog!
When one is ranting in a desperate plea to defend one's own methodology & existence, it is often helpful to ignore facts that do not support one's case.
I find it interesting that open source software is considered a risk because individuals from other nations are allowed to participate in the development of the code...
How does this differ from corporations which provide software to the military who outsource their development to individuals from other nations?
The only difference is that the OSS model involves corporations giving up some of their control over the rights of the product and corporations don't like that.
Otherwise, the article makes assumptions of differences between OSS remote participation and outsourcing which has no material relevance.
The idea of outsourcing being more secure because security checks are done can be argued, but even security checks fail and someone who is cleared can decide to sabotage. The problem is that once someone is vetted, they are trusted. This is actually worse than the OSS model where no matter who you are, the code is reviewed with the same level of scrutiny as anyone else's code.
I can think of so many instances of calling support, having to provide my personal identifying information to an individual who was either not in my state or not even in the US.
Sounds more like a double standard of judgement from the corporate viewpoint that is prejudiced against OSS projects.
Winged Power Photography
he is terminally paranoid. I understand that he has a vested interest in FUDing FOSS, but let's attack his argument for a second:
First of all, what truly important piece of software would possibly be part of open public development? I thought this was specialized enough of a field that the only people who had any competence with what you were making were already trusted anyway. Wasn't SELinux developed *inside the NSA* before it was released?
Secondly, assuming a vital piece of software WERE being developed publicly, someone trying to insert malicious code would have to make it past a few barriers, the first being the most complicated. He would have to: 1) Know what his deliberately inferior code would probably do in the finished product versus what a non-ciminal would want it to do. 2) Get it past the critical eye of a few other developers, 3) Slip through some kind of government screening. And all the while NOT make anyone suspicious.
And even then the results are not guaranteed. What is your cyberterrorist counting on? I sincerely doubt that he could have snuck a back door into the code given all those hoops. I don't think the deliberate bug can be both significant and unknown at the same time. Is he hoping that his bug will cause the software to make a slight miscalculation? Whoopty shit. Whatever agency he or she is working against will be annoyed for a little while and then fix the problem.
Even if his deliberate bug caused a catastrophic failure, it can and will be traced back to HIS contribution, and if some terrorist group stands up and says "Ha ha! Look what we did! And here's why!" (and if it's Al-Qaeda we can be almost certain of this) That man is immediately under FBI surveillance and probably arrest.
In any case, inserting a bug would be a lot of work. A lot of work for an uncertain return, and success will mean almost inevitable detection.
Why some terrorist would bother with this approach is beyond me. It's so much easier just to fill a truck with dynamite.
That's a pretty good obscure set of circumstances. Does it mean it can't happen? No. But contrast this with proprietary methodology wherein a coder has (usually) unrestricted access to the code base. Hmmm. Sounds more plausible there!
Of course, the key thing to note here is that anyone who has to dredge the dread forumla that terrorism + open source == Disaster!!! is probably desperate to save his flagging business.
Wood Shavings!
- Godai
To say that the code is Linux code is locked down and tested is to say that the barn door is locked too late in the process for the kinds of things the author of this posting is citing as potentials for happening.
So what's stopping the DoD from taking the source code base and doing their own testing and certification on it? Considering you claim to have had a background in this, I'm surprised you didn't think of this. This may save them some time in the long run, since they don't have to go through the effort of developing the software itself.
If I decide to use a library or module from another developer (OSS or otherwise) in something that I am doing, I always take the time to test it to make sure it at least does what I want and is adequate for the task at hand. Now, my own projects don't require a terrible amount of security, but if they did, I would be certain to do some testing in that area as well.
So I just don't get your point. You don't have to develop the code yourself in order to certify it if you have the full source available to you. And then once you have certified it, after making any corrections that you need on your copy of the source, then you lock THAT down. What came out of the original source base is irrelevant at this point. It only matters what you improved upon and certified.
Karma: Frotzed (mostly due to the Frobozz Magic Karma Company)
A number of postings have done an excellent job of describing why open source is not a security threat and, in fact, can be more secure because the source code itself can be audited, signed, etc...
This is a long discussion and I may have missed it. But I have not seen a mention of why Greenhills might be motivated to make the claim that open source is a security threat.
Greenhills sells proprietary compilers for embedded systems. They also sell real time operating system software. Their business model is under threat by open source. This is especially true in the area of real time embedded operating systems. With their compilers they can at least show that for a given embedded processor their compiler produces better code (this is not that hard to do against GNU for a number of architectures). But with real time operating systems (RTOS) they have less of an edge. Linux is becoming more and more widely adopted. Increasing numbers of people have experience with Linux.
Greenhills, one can speculate, fears a serious erosion of their RTOS business. This business is probably bigger than their compiler business (few people make much money on compilers these days). Taking a page from Microsoft and SCO they are attacking Linux using FUD. If this also helps their compiler business ("Who knows what trojans open source compilers might generate?"), all the better.
If I were a foreign adversary of the United States, and I wanted to exploit software to gain a strategic advantage, I would not go with F/OSS. There would be too many eyes, too many curious geeks with nothing else better to do than inspect my work, and too many other routes for my target to get source code other than what I have tainted. Rather, I would worm my way into a company selling proprietary software to government and industry. There are fewer eyes, so I would have fewer people to "manage". Influence a developer, one person in QA, and perhaps a secretary and I could have almost anything I want put in place and distributed across the planet, with the help of the DMCA to cover my tracks.
The KGB said, go for the secretaries. The secretary holds the keys, the trust of others, and can go where s/he wishes. Monolithic organizations are vulnerable exactly because they have few internal firewalls; if you *can* get in then you become part of the trusted architecture, and then there is no mechanism to get you out.
Embedded systems vendors are moving to Linux to keep up with the changing hardware and needs of their customers.
Does this address the needs of all embedded systems users? Of course not. I can see in really high-security fields you need to have 100% control of things. The critical embedded devices in power plants come to mind in that case where you may be replacing a 10 year old device and need to ensure that you have exact compatability.
However, these are outlying cases and will strain almost ANY OS group to satisfy. (Especially as they still need to move forward with their technology as well.)
I would say that the OSS route in that case may actually provide you better security as long as you archive both the code and the software used to build the code (including the OS and the hardware if necessary too). If your requirements are in fact that strict then you're going to either have to have complete control of the code you're relying on or have escrow agreements that ensure you'll be able to obtain the code if your vendor happens to go out of business.
--- I wish I could hear the soundtrack to my life. That way I'd know when to duck.