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Banks Begin To Use RSA Keys

Posted by timothy on from the probably-a-patent-on-this-too dept.

jnguy writes "According to the New York Times (free bacon required), banks are begining to look into using RSA keys for security. AOL has already begun offering its customers RSA keys at a premium price. Is this the future of security, and is it secure enough? How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?"

34 of 208 comments (clear)

  1. Heh? This is old news by zxSpectrum · · Score: 4, Informative

    I'm rather surprised: Several Norwegian banks have been using these RSA Hardware Tokens for a couple of years.

    --
    http://virtuelvis.com/
  2. Banks are the problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Ever read your bank's privacy statement? They pretty much share your personal info to every 3rd party out there. Not to mention they offshore data management overseas.

    1. Re:Banks are the problem by Obiwan+Kenobi · · Score: 4, Informative

      I call FUD. I've worked in banks (and credit unions) as a network admin for over six years, and that is some bullshit.

      Now, understand that banks will use your information any way they can in-house, manipulate numbers and deposit totals and anything else analytical so they can sell a credit card or a loan (its called cross-selling). But what they cannot do is give your information to other 3rd parties without your direct consent unless its under federal mandate and/or decree (read: court order and/or the Patriot act).

      Now this is all fine and good, but when you do something substantial with your money and/or your financial outlook (say, investing or buying a home), you open up yourself to offers from 3rd parties. You sign a document saying so.

      Now the easiest thing is, before you sign something, ask them which companies are going to be behind this new venture. Whether it be an investing house (a lot of banks will farm out investing to a subsidiary and get kickbacks on it) or mortgages (who owns this loan? Can they sell it to a 3rd party mortgage company at a later date?), you need to simply be aware.

      Feel free to google "Bank Privacy" and read up on the hometown banks and the big boys: They all pretty much say the same thing. If they are under FDIC (for banks) or NCUA (for credit unions), they all fall under the same guidelines: Your information cannot be shared unless you say so. The federal privacy statements which are mandatory to be handed out upon opening an account, etc, say the same thing.

      Offshore data management services is simply a scarier way of saying Disaster Recovery. You want your bank to keep running even if the home office (or data center) explodes, right? Then don't start bitching about them backing up data in different places.

    2. Re:Banks are the problem by jasonditz · · Score: 3, Informative

      The bank I used to use actually said the exact opposite: They can share with anybody unless you specifically tell them not to.

      The thing is, every 3 months or so they send a new copy of the (slightly modified) privacy agreement and if you don't send them another letter saying don't share my info, they consider it acceptance of the 'new' policy.

  3. Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware tokens by Steven+Reddie · · Score: 5, Informative

    The article is really talking about using hardware tokens for extra security since the private data is stored on an external token and can't be stolen by viruses, trojans, or phishing scams. I don't even see RSA mentioned in the article -- there is an inset picture of an RSA SecurID but that's as close as it gets.

    1. Re:Article not about "RSA Keys" -- Hardware tokens by HotNeedleOfInquiry · · Score: 4, Informative

      Wells Fargo issues the RSA SecurID devices for security. Not a test, not a trial, My wife and I each have one.

      --
      "Eve of Destruction", it's not just for old hippies anymore...
  4. Thumb drives by Huogo · · Score: 3, Interesting

    This is the perfect use for a thumb drive, so long as the computer you're using can be trusted. I can see a problem with people keeping all their keys on a thumb drive, and using it at a net cafe or something, but the computer at the cafe could be easily set to download the keys and key log the password to each set of keys. This can only be solved by something like an external device that will let you input a challenge code, and spit out a response code to gain access to the RSA key.

    1. Re:Thumb drives by dustman · · Score: 3, Interesting

      This is the perfect use for a thumb drive, so long as the computer you're using can be trusted.

      Although the article talks about a different technology, one of the core features of the technology you are talking about is that the computer does not, in fact, need to be trusted.

      Basically, the computer asks the hardware device to encrypt or decrypt some data. The device stores the key internally and never reveals it.

      It is a core concept of devices such as this that it is impossible to retrieve the key. The chips are designed such that they never reveal the key through the "official" interface (the encode/decode thing), and they're made so that taking the chip apart destroys the key.

    2. Re:Thumb drives by Temporal · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I've always thought that what we really need is devices like this with an LCD display that tells you what, exactly, you are signing.

      For example, imagine paying for some goods with one of these devices vs. credit card or smart card...

      Smart card: You must trust that the card reader will not choose to use your card to sign things you didn't agree to. The reader could, for example, overcharge you, and you would have no way to know that it did until you checked your monthly statement. (And, hey, by that time, do you even remember if that item was $59 or $69?) For that matter, the reader could very easily make the charge under a different name, making it difficult to determine who committed the fraud.

      Credit card: In addition to the smart card caveats, you must trust that the entity reading your card will not distribute your credit card number to any entity whom you don't trust at any time in the future. For that matter, if you use the same credit card with multiple entities, you have no way of knowing which one leaked your number. How can you fight back? Who do you charge with fraud or neglegence? In most cases you just let them go and your credit card company covers the illegal charges, while the FBI spends massive amounts of resources in mostly fruitless efforts to track them down. Why do we use these things?

      The device I described: The LCD screen displays the question "Authorize payment of $59 to Acme Co.? Yes/No". No charge can go through without your device approving it. You only need to trust that your device will ask you to confirm any charge. And you can trust it because the manufacturer knows that if it screws up, they'll get their pants sued off.

      The only thing that could make it more secure would be to implant the device into your body so that people can't steal it. Though, it's probably better to just deal with having to revoke a cert once in awhile rather than have people cutting you open to get to your bank account. :)

  5. This is news? by Nehle · · Score: 5, Informative

    My bank (SEB, www.seb.se) has been using a hardware token system for years. I click the sign in button, enter my birthdate, receive two four-digit numbers, start the little device, enter my password and the two numbers and get a six-digit number that I enter in the login page and then I get logged in.
    Is this somehow different?

    Oh, and by the way, works like a charm and I feel a lot more secure than I do with static passwords

  6. House keys by tepples · · Score: 5, Insightful

    How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?

    How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different physical keys? Let's see... we have the house key, the car key, the shed key, the bike key, the gun case key, the baseball card key...

  7. Yes, it IS different... by wcdw · · Score: 4, Interesting

    This sounds like SecureID cards, which are time-synched to a master server which runs the same algorithm/seed. SecureID has a long history in the IT world, and works relatively well (and, as far as I know, no one has ever hacked the algorithm).

    Sounds like your device just calculates a response based on two inputs; don't know why that wouldn't be just as easy in software. (You _can't_ turn a SecureID card off, so it can't get out of synch with the server, unlike software.)

    Not to say that your device isn't secure - more reverse engineering would be required to determine that - but the two approaches *are* very different.

    --
    If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
    1. Re:Yes, it IS different... by wfberg · · Score: 4, Interesting


      Sounds like your device just calculates a response based on two inputs; don't know why that wouldn't be just as easy in software. (You _can't_ turn a SecureID card off, so it can't get out of synch with the server, unlike software.)

      Not to say that your device isn't secure - more reverse engineering would be required to determine that - but the two approaches *are* very different.

      The approaches are different mostly in the way that securID can't do challenge/response. Note that most hardware tokens that can do challenge/response also use a hardware clock.

      The immideately obvious benefit of challenge/response is that it offers far better protection against replay attacks - securID numbers are valid for 10 seconds, whereas a parallel login session using C/R will use a different challenge (in fact, the resolution is worse than 10 seconds since the server will usually accept the previous and next number as well, in order to resync to correct for clock drift).

      Also, some e-banking authentication schemes require you to enter both a challenge AND the amount (or recipient's bankaccountnumber) you're transferring; this prevents malware on your PC (or a man-in-the-middle) altering the amount without you detecting it. This is obviously impossible to do with a non-C/R scheme like SecurID.

      Example; when I add an account number to my e-banking site's address book, I'm asked for the response to a challenge that's clearly and human-readably derived from the bankaccount# (1 number is dropped) - so malware can't change the acount#s I add to my address book.

      In my mind, even devices without a hardware clock that can do C/R are preferable to securID schemes that do have a clock but no C/R.

      Also note that tokens that do C/R usually need to be unlocked with a PIN before use (they already come with a keypad, so why not?) - this means you get two-factor authentication basically for free, and the PIN only needs to be checked by the token itself, so it's not stored on the server, not even in a hashed form (which is trivial to brute force for 4/5 digit codes anyway).

      While securID might be very well accepted in the IT world, and is easy to roll out, it's certainly not the most secure or well thought-out authentication method by a long shot. And they're damn expensive given how simple their design is! Just a clock and an LCD that shows the hash of the current_date/time_rounded_to_the_closest_10_second s and its secret key..

      --
      SCO employee? Check out the bounty
    2. Re:Yes, it IS different... by dannyp · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Most SecurID implementations will only authenticate a specific token code once within its validity window. A replay attack (even within the time validity window) will fail after the first good authentication.

      There are still man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities, but no worse than with a challenge-response

    3. Re:Yes, it IS different... by wcdw · · Score: 3, Interesting

      One point I wanted to add is that although SecureID may be well accepted in the IT world, it is _NOT_ that easy to roll-out. Or wasn't, the last time I had to play games in that world, anyway; it HAS been a while.

      Note that I never claimed that it was the most *secure* solution, and yes, the lack of challenge/response does limit it's usefulness.

      However, if I can reverse engineer the bank's device and discover the algorithm in use, it becomes worse than useless, in that instills a false sense of security.

      Strong passwords are still less hassle, don't sacrifice much to security concerns (if never expressed in clear text), and just aren't that freaking hard to create. Pre-shared keys are even better, depending on how strong they are, and how they're distributed. And how well keys are guarded/revoked-if-stolen. ;)

      --
      If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
  8. If client can't be trusted, all bets are off! by Ron+Bennett · · Score: 4, Insightful

    At first glance, the external token as described in the article sounds secure, but since the person only types it in once per login, phishing really isn't that much more difficult than before.

    Two ways off the top of my head a phisher can defeat this ...

    1. Grab login data in real-time from an IRC channel, etc and race to login before the code changes - for extra measure, disable the user's connection for a little while - DoS, etc.

    2. Proxy the request - that is don't try to steal the login data itself, but rather hijack their session and go to town.

    Some may think, ok "check the person's ISP (IP range, etc) too" ... sounds like that would blow #1 away, but not if the phisher then logs in via the victims machine.

    In a nutshell, if the client machine can't be trusted, all bets all off!

    Yes, tokens raise the bar, but I fear banks will use this more as an excuse to erode consumer protections for fruadulent transactions; Verify by VISA comes to mind.

    Ron

  9. just need a physical digit wallet by emkman · · Score: 3, Interesting

    If we are going the route of RSA keys, we need a secure digital wallet, where one key contains all the credit cards and bank info we need. This will keep all the info just as secure but we wont need a billion different keys for all our different accounts.

    --
    Moderation Totals: Flamebait=2, Troll=1, Redundant=1, Insightful=6, Overrated=1, Underrated=1, Total=12. (not mine)
  10. Not surprised... by 4alexnyc · · Score: 4, Interesting
    Considering most of my friends in corporations already use these devices to get access to the corporate network, I'm not surprised they're looking to bring it to the general public. I is highly effective.

    To answer the 5 tokens keychain question: there is a software token device also available: http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1313/

  11. What did you expect? by ravenspear · · Score: 3, Funny

    That the /. summary would actually reflect the same interpretation, or dare I say it, even the factual content of the article.

    You must be new here.

  12. Carry around 5 keys by gspr · · Score: 3, Insightful

    How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?

    It's not like a million keys are harder to carry around than one...

  13. This is new? by wfberg · · Score: 4, Informative

    I've been using physical tokens to log on to e-banking for years. Not only that, but tokens that are significantly more secure than securID fobs, in that they support challenge/response and using a PIN to unlock it (two-factor security, and the PIN is only used with the token so it needn't be known at all to the bank).

    In fact, most banks are now switching to keypads that you plug your existing bankcard in, so they can piggyback on the tamper-resistant chipcard that's already on there (although it's slightly less advanced than some tokens, since chipcards don't support a clock that's permanently ticking).

    Most devices are from Vasco who provide a wide range of tokens (some more secure than others). They even have challenge/response tokens that don't require you to copy the challenge; they have optical sensors that can read out a code that's blipped out by flashing blocks on your screen. Way cooler devices than those RSA securIDs.

    --
    SCO employee? Check out the bounty
  14. Re:House keys - forgot one... by AetherBurner · · Score: 3, Funny

    I have a church key that I carry too.

  15. Re:For those who don't want to register: by Xentropy · · Score: 5, Interesting
    A better solution is to use the archive link, which doesn't require registration:

    http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/24/technology/24onl ine.html?ex=1261544400&en=7cc80182b7687ad9&ei=5090 &partner=rssuserland

    (Link created by the NY Times Link Generator: http://nytimes.blogspace.com/genlink )

  16. Customers expected to pay? by Xentropy · · Score: 5, Insightful
    I'm willing to admit up-front that being the victim of a security breach or some kind of fraud is distressing to the customer, but given the fact most banks (and certainly any bank I would do business with) have zero liability fraud policies nowadays, the only party for whom such a device would be saving money is the bank.

    Therefore, why are customers expected to pay $10 for these? Certainly, banks will recoup the costs somehow (through higher fees in general), but isn't the net effect of this type of technology supposed to be a savings? Isn't it the bank's responsibility (and liability) to make sure their customers' accounts are secure (assuming a reasonable amount of due diligence by said customers)? Isn't the savings in reduced fraud and security breaches supposed to outweigh the cost of the security devices? If not, why does the technology exist?

    It sounds great and all, but unless offered as a free service, I'll sit this one out.

    1. Re:Customers expected to pay? by thogard · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I don't know about you, but I like the plausible deniability of the existing system. I fear banks that have very strong online controls because when they make mistakes, they will simply say "the computer proved it was you" and there is far less recourse. Its the same reason that I used credit cards on line and won't ever use a debit card on line. The credit card is their money, the debit card controls my money.

  17. Sweeden uses a similar token system by ScottMacVicar · · Score: 3, Interesting

    A friend who is studying in sweeden at the moment has basically a scratch card with 40 numbers on it, when she goes to login she enters her username, password and then scratches off a panel to get a 8 digit numeric token to enter.
    When she has used about 30/40 the bank send out a new card.

    Its a whole lot cheaper than handing out SecureID devices to customers and i'm really suprised that most banks dont have this already, its the size of a credit card and fits nicely in a wallet.

  18. Re:Put up or Shut up by ScrewMaster · · Score: 4, Insightful

    All of which is irrelevant. If China (or any other country) wants to get hold of a few hundred PCs to build a clustered supercomputer it's just not that difficult to do. Cripes, if Iraq can get hold of nuclear tech how hard can it be to buy a few commodity computers (or even high-end processors) on the open market? Why is this even a question?

    I mean, sure, China has openly ripped off numerous technologies from a number of countries to bootstrap their high-tech economy, but to say that our banking industry is in danger specifically from China because they can (holy CPU chip, Batman!) build a Beowulf cluster is sort of ridiculous. China is a significant threat to the Western world, for a variety of reasons, but I'd say banking fraud is probably not one of the biggest ones. I'd be more concerned about Russia or Nigeria.

    --
    The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
  19. Re:Chinese Supercomputers Crack Normal Passwords by RzUpAnmsCwrds · · Score: 4, Insightful

    "The reality is that the RSA key is a godsend for protecting your accounts. Many Americans are simply unaware of the fact that the Taiwanese have essentially given all the key computer technologies to mainland China. Beijing can now assemble a supercomputer based solely on the technology from Acer, a Taiwanese company with major investments in mainland China. This supercomputer can easily crack the passwords of many accounts at your bank, brokerage, etc.
    The RSA will help to protect Western bank/brokerage accounts from Chinese theft. That the majority of stolen credit card numbers end up in the hands of Chinese gangs, aided and abetted by Beijing, in Southeast Asia should surprise no one."

    Nice troll. The fact is that the Chinese, as well as *the rest of the world* have had access to computer technology equivilent to that which exists in the US for *years*. There's nothing new.

    Moreover, you don't use a "supercomputer" to crack bank accounts. The fact is, you can't brute force the passwords on bank accounts unless you are able to steal the password hashes - and by then you've already broken the system.

    Bank accounts are being stolen using phishing, not supercomputers.

  20. SEB uses VASCO SecureID tokens by hanssprudel · · Score: 3, Informative

    Since this is already being moderated up, I want to note that poster is wrong.

    The system that the grandparent describes is based on VASCO "Digipass" devices, that work just like the RSA secureid tokens, only that they also support PINs and challenge/response authentication. That means that if everything is done correctly (which I can't swear to) these tokens, which SEB have been using for more than five years, are considerably more secure than the normal RSA SecureID.

    Basically (very simplified) your normal SecureID will create a checksum from a secret and the current time, so the server can verify that person logging in is holding the token at this time. The Digipass, on the other hand, creates a checksum of the secret, the time, and the challenge from the server. This verifies that the person logging in has access to the token at this time, and created a checksum for this particular log in. And the fact that it also requires a personalized PIN to access the device means that stealing it will do you little good.

  21. Re:You don't need multiple tokens!! by confusion · · Score: 3, Interesting
    I admin'd an ace server for a long time, in an org that had multiple groups running them. It is true that you can use an RSA token on many ace domains - buuut the problem is largely organizational. Even within the same company, it was sometimes hard to get the seed files back and forth.

    Each customer will need to provide their seed file to each new back. *IF* banks were able to settle on all using the same technology (RSA/ACE), most certainly all of them would have different policies on pins, etc, rendering it a pretty confusing thing for customers. Don't underestimate the problems that would cause.

    Jerry
    http://www.syslog.org/

  22. Security is not free for cheapskates by spyware+scams_suck · · Score: 3, Insightful
    I'm willing to admit up-front that being the victim of a security breach or some kind of fraud is distressing to the customer, but given the fact most banks (and certainly any bank I would do business with) have zero liability fraud policies nowadays, the only party for whom such a device would be saving money is the bank.

    First, the consumer pays for every needed cost by a business. That's a fact just like we all pay when a scammer steals someone's credit card or someone gets into an auto accident and all our fees(credit card or insurance) get raised a little. Do you think when you get reimbursed that it's free, that the business has FREE MONEY out there??!! That's crazy. If your bank is NOT losing money because of scammers because of increased security, they save money having to reimburse their customer and they save money not having to man customer support with irate calls from customers who are crying about an account hijack.

    Therefore, why are customers expected to pay $10 for these? Certainly, banks will recoup the costs somehow (through higher fees in general), but isn't the net effect of this type of technology supposed to be a savings?

    The bank can "bury" the fees & pretend to you that it's free, but you (I hope) and me know that's a load of BS. The customer pays no matter what. Any bank who says it's free is lying. We all pay one way or another.

    Isn't it the bank's responsibility (and liability) to make sure their customers' accounts are secure (assuming a reasonable amount of due diligence by said customers)?

    True, but the bank doesn't have direct control over every computer in the world who can easily keylog any of their customers and stick their password and username into their bank website. They give warnings, but when the THIRD WORLD has EASY ACCESS to every first world nation customer's account & law enforcement in those countries are corrupt, you expect the bank to still provide security in said countries??!! The bank's response would be: Don't do anymore banking online. Go directly to your bank where they can put a camera on you and talk to you and see your bank account pass book.

    Isn't the savings in reduced fraud and security breaches supposed to outweigh the cost of the security devices? If not, why does the technology exist?

    In the long run, the costs go down.

    It sounds great and all, but unless offered as a free service, I'll sit this one out.

    I don't mind if you sit it out and my cousin who works in the bank doesn't mind if you leave for another bank because you pay no matter what. Also, those BANKS with the BEST SECURITY REPUTATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO GAIN THE CUSTOMERS, especially the ones who understand there is a big problem with keeping 3rd world scammers & anonymous computer user scammers away from their accounts and WHO just want to BE COMFORTABLE DOING BUSINESS ONLINE.

    --
    * weedshare.com 50% to artists, webjay.org iuma.com CDBaby.com Epitonic.com ampcast.com
  23. Quick! by Gentlewhisper · · Score: 3, Funny

    Lets patent "use of hardware cryptographic device during online banking for additional security"

    --
    Online backup with Mozy, sounds like Ozzie, but more!
  24. My authenticate authenticate day, 8am - 6pm by aardwolf204 · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I know its probably too late for anyone to see this, but here's what my typical day looks like:

    Wake up. Power on computer, wash up while booting. authenticate with windows. Launch Outlook, authenticate with Exchange server. Hibernate computer. Grab cell phone, wallet, keys, etc.. Leave apartment, authenticate with locks on apartment door. Walk to car, authenticate with car door locks. Get in car. authenticate with ignition. Drive to work. authenticate with cell phone, call voice mail, authenticate with voicemail, hit speakerphone and listen to messages. Lock phone. Park at work, lock car.

    authenticate with front door at work. Greet co-workers. Sit down at desk, turn on monitors, authenticate with computer. Launch Outlook, authenticate with Exchange. Call voice mail from work phone, authenticate with voicemail. Listen to messages, hang up.

    Terminal Service to Exchange server, authenticate with server. Launch MMC, check event logs, Exchange logs, IIS logs, backup logs. Check performance monitor. Launch Exchange Anti-Virus. authenticate with Anti-Virus program. Check logs. Minimize terminal service session with Exchange server.

    Terminal service to SQL server, authenticate with server. Launch MMC, check event logs, SQL logs, IIS logs, backup logs. Check performance monitor. Minimize terminal service session with SQL server.

    Launch firefox, browse to sharepoint, authenticate, read messages. Browse to gmail, authenticate, read messages. Browse to online bank, authenticate, check balance. Browse to credit card, authenticate, check balance. Browse to photography community message board, authenticate, check private messages. Browse to Slashdot, authenticate, check headlines.

    Get call from manager, talk about project. Browse to file repository, authenticate, download requirements document. Browse to print server, authenticate, print requirements document. Write notes on project, browse to project worksite, authenticate, upload file.

    Get call from user, walk user through troubleshooting steps, walk user through remote assistance request steps. Launch messenger, authenticate, receive remote assistance request. Initiate connection with VPN server, authenticate. Launch remote assistance application, connect to remote user, authenticate. Troubleshoot problem. Maximize Exchange server terminal service window. authenticate with locked screen saver. Open MMC, reset user password. Disconnect from remote assistance request.

    Browse to network share, authenticate, copy backup files to removable hard disk. Logoff from terminal service sessions and local machine. Grab hard disk and leave office. Lock office door. authenticate with car door, authenticate with ignition, drive home. authenticate with apartment door, turn on computer, authenticate, launch outlook, authenticate with Exchange, read messages. Grab bike and leave house. authenticate with front door. Ride bike to gym. Lock bike in parking lot. Work out. Leave gym, authenticate with bike lock. Ride home. authenticate with mailbox, get mail, lock mailbox. authenticate with front door.

    Its now 6:00 and I've authenticated with something or another 40 times. My day is only half over. I carry 8 keys in my pocket, and about 40 different passwords in my head. I am constantly locking and unlocking various things. My case may be a bit more extreme being a system administrator but trust me you do this too, and its probably just as bad. This was just a quick summary, I'm sure I left off about 100 other authentications. Welcome to Earth.

    --
    Im dreaming ofa big bndwdth, That can resist the /.crowd.May ur days b merry & bright & may al
  25. OpenPGP by bwbadger · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I'd like to be able to use just the one key for all the secure sites I go to.

    ... and I'd like that to be my OpenPGP key.

    Surely it must be possible for me to give my public key to a bank (or whatever) and have them authenticate me using that key. e.g. by them sending out a hash, having me sign it using my private key, and then having them check that the signature is good.