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Banks Begin To Use RSA Keys
jnguy writes "According to the New York Times (free bacon required), banks are begining to look into using RSA keys for security. AOL has already begun offering its customers RSA keys at a premium price. Is this the future of security, and is it secure enough? How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?"
I'm rather surprised: Several Norwegian banks have been using these RSA Hardware Tokens for a couple of years.
http://virtuelvis.com/
Ever read your bank's privacy statement? They pretty much share your personal info to every 3rd party out there. Not to mention they offshore data management overseas.
The article is really talking about using hardware tokens for extra security since the private data is stored on an external token and can't be stolen by viruses, trojans, or phishing scams. I don't even see RSA mentioned in the article -- there is an inset picture of an RSA SecurID but that's as close as it gets.
This is the perfect use for a thumb drive, so long as the computer you're using can be trusted. I can see a problem with people keeping all their keys on a thumb drive, and using it at a net cafe or something, but the computer at the cafe could be easily set to download the keys and key log the password to each set of keys. This can only be solved by something like an external device that will let you input a challenge code, and spit out a response code to gain access to the RSA key.
I'll rather register then read through this unformatted text ;) thanks anyhow.
My bank (SEB, www.seb.se) has been using a hardware token system for years. I click the sign in button, enter my birthdate, receive two four-digit numbers, start the little device, enter my password and the two numbers and get a six-digit number that I enter in the login page and then I get logged in.
Is this somehow different?
Oh, and by the way, works like a charm and I feel a lot more secure than I do with static passwords
How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?
How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different physical keys? Let's see... we have the house key, the car key, the shed key, the bike key, the gun case key, the baseball card key...
Banks in Poland have been using physical security tokens for online access for a few years. Yawn...
This sounds like SecureID cards, which are time-synched to a master server which runs the same algorithm/seed. SecureID has a long history in the IT world, and works relatively well (and, as far as I know, no one has ever hacked the algorithm).
Sounds like your device just calculates a response based on two inputs; don't know why that wouldn't be just as easy in software. (You _can't_ turn a SecureID card off, so it can't get out of synch with the server, unlike software.)
Not to say that your device isn't secure - more reverse engineering would be required to determine that - but the two approaches *are* very different.
If you're not living on the edge, you're just taking up space!
At first glance, the external token as described in the article sounds secure, but since the person only types it in once per login, phishing really isn't that much more difficult than before.
...
... sounds like that would blow #1 away, but not if the phisher then logs in via the victims machine.
Two ways off the top of my head a phisher can defeat this
1. Grab login data in real-time from an IRC channel, etc and race to login before the code changes - for extra measure, disable the user's connection for a little while - DoS, etc.
2. Proxy the request - that is don't try to steal the login data itself, but rather hijack their session and go to town.
Some may think, ok "check the person's ISP (IP range, etc) too"
In a nutshell, if the client machine can't be trusted, all bets all off!
Yes, tokens raise the bar, but I fear banks will use this more as an excuse to erode consumer protections for fruadulent transactions; Verify by VISA comes to mind.
Ron
If we are going the route of RSA keys, we need a secure digital wallet, where one key contains all the credit cards and bank info we need. This will keep all the info just as secure but we wont need a billion different keys for all our different accounts.
Moderation Totals: Flamebait=2, Troll=1, Redundant=1, Insightful=6, Overrated=1, Underrated=1, Total=12. (not mine)
To answer the 5 tokens keychain question: there is a software token device also available: http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1313/
That the /. summary would actually reflect the same interpretation, or dare I say it, even the factual content of the article.
You must be new here.
I use an 8 digit PIN and a RSA hardware token to log into work remotely.
The Doormat
If you're not outraged, then you're not paying attention.
How long before everyone needs to carry around 5 different RSA keys just to perform daily task?
It's not like a million keys are harder to carry around than one...
I've been using physical tokens to log on to e-banking for years. Not only that, but tokens that are significantly more secure than securID fobs, in that they support challenge/response and using a PIN to unlock it (two-factor security, and the PIN is only used with the token so it needn't be known at all to the bank).
In fact, most banks are now switching to keypads that you plug your existing bankcard in, so they can piggyback on the tamper-resistant chipcard that's already on there (although it's slightly less advanced than some tokens, since chipcards don't support a clock that's permanently ticking).
Most devices are from Vasco who provide a wide range of tokens (some more secure than others). They even have challenge/response tokens that don't require you to copy the challenge; they have optical sensors that can read out a code that's blipped out by flashing blocks on your screen. Way cooler devices than those RSA securIDs.
SCO employee? Check out the bounty
I have a church key that I carry too.
Putting all of one's eggs into the same basket of crypto is probably a bad idea. If banks all adopt RSA as a standerd way of doing logins at ATM's and or online then there will be a major upheval if anyone cracks RSA.
RSA is based on the idea that prime numbers are very hard to find, and with some of the research that is currentl going into that field I would be very wary of using that idea as an end-all.
If banks are to adopt a universal crypto system, then perhaps AES or some form of elliptic curve crypto would be a better choice?
My UID is prime and so is this number: 09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/24/technology/24onl ine.html?ex=1261544400&en=7cc80182b7687ad9&ei=5090 &partner=rssuserland
(Link created by the NY Times Link Generator: http://nytimes.blogspace.com/genlink )
The distinction really should be made between RSA encryption keys used for crytopgrahic algorithms, and RSA SecureID Tokens, which are what this news item is referring to, but are different from the public/private encryption keys!
Therefore, why are customers expected to pay $10 for these? Certainly, banks will recoup the costs somehow (through higher fees in general), but isn't the net effect of this type of technology supposed to be a savings? Isn't it the bank's responsibility (and liability) to make sure their customers' accounts are secure (assuming a reasonable amount of due diligence by said customers)? Isn't the savings in reduced fraud and security breaches supposed to outweigh the cost of the security devices? If not, why does the technology exist?
It sounds great and all, but unless offered as a free service, I'll sit this one out.
A friend who is studying in sweeden at the moment has basically a scratch card with 40 numbers on it, when she goes to login she enters her username, password and then scratches off a panel to get a 8 digit numeric token to enter.
When she has used about 30/40 the bank send out a new card.
Its a whole lot cheaper than handing out SecureID devices to customers and i'm really suprised that most banks dont have this already, its the size of a credit card and fits nicely in a wallet.
If they *DONT* protect credit(/debit) card charges with this, its somewhat useless, since thats the simplest way for someone to suck the money out of someones account.
If they do require charges to a credit card to be authorized by the SecureID card, it not only protects against outright stealing, but also prevents a merchant from saving your CC# and automatically rebilling you without your permission unless you jump thru their hoops to 'cancel' somne service - their only recourse is to terminate the service, which is as it should be.
All of which is irrelevant. If China (or any other country) wants to get hold of a few hundred PCs to build a clustered supercomputer it's just not that difficult to do. Cripes, if Iraq can get hold of nuclear tech how hard can it be to buy a few commodity computers (or even high-end processors) on the open market? Why is this even a question?
I mean, sure, China has openly ripped off numerous technologies from a number of countries to bootstrap their high-tech economy, but to say that our banking industry is in danger specifically from China because they can (holy CPU chip, Batman!) build a Beowulf cluster is sort of ridiculous. China is a significant threat to the Western world, for a variety of reasons, but I'd say banking fraud is probably not one of the biggest ones. I'd be more concerned about Russia or Nigeria.
The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
"The reality is that the RSA key is a godsend for protecting your accounts. Many Americans are simply unaware of the fact that the Taiwanese have essentially given all the key computer technologies to mainland China. Beijing can now assemble a supercomputer based solely on the technology from Acer, a Taiwanese company with major investments in mainland China. This supercomputer can easily crack the passwords of many accounts at your bank, brokerage, etc.
The RSA will help to protect Western bank/brokerage accounts from Chinese theft. That the majority of stolen credit card numbers end up in the hands of Chinese gangs, aided and abetted by Beijing, in Southeast Asia should surprise no one."
Nice troll. The fact is that the Chinese, as well as *the rest of the world* have had access to computer technology equivilent to that which exists in the US for *years*. There's nothing new.
Moreover, you don't use a "supercomputer" to crack bank accounts. The fact is, you can't brute force the passwords on bank accounts unless you are able to steal the password hashes - and by then you've already broken the system.
Bank accounts are being stolen using phishing, not supercomputers.
Since this is already being moderated up, I want to note that poster is wrong.
The system that the grandparent describes is based on VASCO "Digipass" devices, that work just like the RSA secureid tokens, only that they also support PINs and challenge/response authentication. That means that if everything is done correctly (which I can't swear to) these tokens, which SEB have been using for more than five years, are considerably more secure than the normal RSA SecureID.
Basically (very simplified) your normal SecureID will create a checksum from a secret and the current time, so the server can verify that person logging in is holding the token at this time. The Digipass, on the other hand, creates a checksum of the secret, the time, and the challenge from the server. This verifies that the person logging in has access to the token at this time, and created a checksum for this particular log in. And the fact that it also requires a personalized PIN to access the device means that stealing it will do you little good.
Each customer will need to provide their seed file to each new back. *IF* banks were able to settle on all using the same technology (RSA/ACE), most certainly all of them would have different policies on pins, etc, rendering it a pretty confusing thing for customers. Don't underestimate the problems that would cause.
Jerry
http://www.syslog.org/
RSA dongles seem like a step in the right direction, but it sure is a pain. Just for my work, I need to carry one RSA dongle, two "swipe cards", and remember (best guess) seven passwords, have a list of codes, lock combinations, and several plain old keys. It's a pain.
Biometrics - thumbprints and the like - seem like the best alternative, but the few examples I've used so far have been very finicky, and mostly used as a second layer of authentication with an access card or code.
One thing that is going to make this move quickly is the financial incentive - a few million per month in credit fraud, and some congressman getting ID theft is a pretty strong incentive to be creative.
- RSA has patents on time-based tokens, this allows for a simple sealed hardware token without any buttons.
- No additional hardware or software or drivers are needed to authenticate. Just the token and (optionalyl) a user selected PIN.
While smart cards have their place, they are not so great for handing out to remote users. For example, does anybody actually use the card reader that was distributed in the American Express "Blue" promotion a few years back?I do not deploy Linux. Ever.
Like most other response-only tokens, the authentication is based not on large primes like public-key authentication but rather on a shared secret (one embedded in the token, the other stored on the authentication server.
Much work has been done towards cryptanalysis of response-only tokens, and a well-designed authentication system is very difficult to break blindly, just from observation of a few response pairs. There have been potentially successful attacks proposed against the old SecurID tokens due to a "vanishing differential" problem with certain seed values, but no proof of concept against that has succeeded, and the new AES tokens should not be vulnerable. More on this is available from the SecurID Users group.
As a counter-example, the old X9.9 challenge-response authentication system was based on DES encryption, and was not well-designed, was fatally flawed. Observation of a handful of challenges and responses cojuld allow an attacker to determine the seed value and compromise the authenticator.
I do not deploy Linux. Ever.
First, the consumer pays for every needed cost by a business. That's a fact just like we all pay when a scammer steals someone's credit card or someone gets into an auto accident and all our fees(credit card or insurance) get raised a little. Do you think when you get reimbursed that it's free, that the business has FREE MONEY out there??!! That's crazy. If your bank is NOT losing money because of scammers because of increased security, they save money having to reimburse their customer and they save money not having to man customer support with irate calls from customers who are crying about an account hijack.
Therefore, why are customers expected to pay $10 for these? Certainly, banks will recoup the costs somehow (through higher fees in general), but isn't the net effect of this type of technology supposed to be a savings?
The bank can "bury" the fees & pretend to you that it's free, but you (I hope) and me know that's a load of BS. The customer pays no matter what. Any bank who says it's free is lying. We all pay one way or another.
Isn't it the bank's responsibility (and liability) to make sure their customers' accounts are secure (assuming a reasonable amount of due diligence by said customers)?
True, but the bank doesn't have direct control over every computer in the world who can easily keylog any of their customers and stick their password and username into their bank website. They give warnings, but when the THIRD WORLD has EASY ACCESS to every first world nation customer's account & law enforcement in those countries are corrupt, you expect the bank to still provide security in said countries??!! The bank's response would be: Don't do anymore banking online. Go directly to your bank where they can put a camera on you and talk to you and see your bank account pass book.
Isn't the savings in reduced fraud and security breaches supposed to outweigh the cost of the security devices? If not, why does the technology exist?
In the long run, the costs go down.
It sounds great and all, but unless offered as a free service, I'll sit this one out.
I don't mind if you sit it out and my cousin who works in the bank doesn't mind if you leave for another bank because you pay no matter what. Also, those BANKS with the BEST SECURITY REPUTATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO GAIN THE CUSTOMERS, especially the ones who understand there is a big problem with keeping 3rd world scammers & anonymous computer user scammers away from their accounts and WHO just want to BE COMFORTABLE DOING BUSINESS ONLINE.
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Have you looked at GNU SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer framework)?
An open source implementation of the SecurID time-based authentication algorithm is not possible because RSA holds several patents covering their whole time-based authentication scheme. The closest solution in the open-source world might be OPIE (formerly S/Key). OpenBSD and other operating systems include S/Key support in the base OS.There are OPIE calculators for MD4/MD5 in Java and for most handhelds, but it is tough to find a SHA-1 or RMD-160 implemention, and I have yet to run across any dedicated hardware device that does nothing but handle OPIE authentication. With the uncertainty about SHA-1, You might plan to implement only RMD-160 (160 bit Ripe Message Digest). Tokens would need a bit more CPU power to handle a few hundred rounds, but at least there is a good chance that RMD will still be a viable hash, long after SHA-1 falls.
I do not deploy Linux. Ever.
Lets patent "use of hardware cryptographic device during online banking for additional security"
Online backup with Mozy, sounds like Ozzie, but more!
I know its probably too late for anyone to see this, but here's what my typical day looks like:
Wake up. Power on computer, wash up while booting. authenticate with windows. Launch Outlook, authenticate with Exchange server. Hibernate computer. Grab cell phone, wallet, keys, etc.. Leave apartment, authenticate with locks on apartment door. Walk to car, authenticate with car door locks. Get in car. authenticate with ignition. Drive to work. authenticate with cell phone, call voice mail, authenticate with voicemail, hit speakerphone and listen to messages. Lock phone. Park at work, lock car.
authenticate with front door at work. Greet co-workers. Sit down at desk, turn on monitors, authenticate with computer. Launch Outlook, authenticate with Exchange. Call voice mail from work phone, authenticate with voicemail. Listen to messages, hang up.
Terminal Service to Exchange server, authenticate with server. Launch MMC, check event logs, Exchange logs, IIS logs, backup logs. Check performance monitor. Launch Exchange Anti-Virus. authenticate with Anti-Virus program. Check logs. Minimize terminal service session with Exchange server.
Terminal service to SQL server, authenticate with server. Launch MMC, check event logs, SQL logs, IIS logs, backup logs. Check performance monitor. Minimize terminal service session with SQL server.
Launch firefox, browse to sharepoint, authenticate, read messages. Browse to gmail, authenticate, read messages. Browse to online bank, authenticate, check balance. Browse to credit card, authenticate, check balance. Browse to photography community message board, authenticate, check private messages. Browse to Slashdot, authenticate, check headlines.
Get call from manager, talk about project. Browse to file repository, authenticate, download requirements document. Browse to print server, authenticate, print requirements document. Write notes on project, browse to project worksite, authenticate, upload file.
Get call from user, walk user through troubleshooting steps, walk user through remote assistance request steps. Launch messenger, authenticate, receive remote assistance request. Initiate connection with VPN server, authenticate. Launch remote assistance application, connect to remote user, authenticate. Troubleshoot problem. Maximize Exchange server terminal service window. authenticate with locked screen saver. Open MMC, reset user password. Disconnect from remote assistance request.
Browse to network share, authenticate, copy backup files to removable hard disk. Logoff from terminal service sessions and local machine. Grab hard disk and leave office. Lock office door. authenticate with car door, authenticate with ignition, drive home. authenticate with apartment door, turn on computer, authenticate, launch outlook, authenticate with Exchange, read messages. Grab bike and leave house. authenticate with front door. Ride bike to gym. Lock bike in parking lot. Work out. Leave gym, authenticate with bike lock. Ride home. authenticate with mailbox, get mail, lock mailbox. authenticate with front door.
Its now 6:00 and I've authenticated with something or another 40 times. My day is only half over. I carry 8 keys in my pocket, and about 40 different passwords in my head. I am constantly locking and unlocking various things. My case may be a bit more extreme being a system administrator but trust me you do this too, and its probably just as bad. This was just a quick summary, I'm sure I left off about 100 other authentications. Welcome to Earth.
Im dreaming ofa big bndwdth, That can resist the
I'd like to be able to use just the one key for all the secure sites I go to.
... and I'd like that to be my OpenPGP key.
Surely it must be possible for me to give my public key to a bank (or whatever) and have them authenticate me using that key. e.g. by them sending out a hash, having me sign it using my private key, and then having them check that the signature is good.
German banks use DES and RSA keys on chipcards for years. Together, they developed the Homebanking Computer Interface (HBCI) and the FinTS - Financial Transaction Services: http://www.hbci-zka.de/english/index.htm/
It works like a charm with http://www.gnucash.org/. I just insert my chipcard into my reader and can do as many transactions as I want without the hassle of PIN/TAN crap and have a fully working financial solution for my everyday need.