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Free SSL Certificate Project

An anonymous reader writes "Do you have a website or run even a web server and want to secure the traffic between your visitors browser and the web site? Did you find out, that in order to make your site SSL aware, you'll need a SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) certificate? Are you also surprised to find out that such a certificate can cost you up to a few hundred dollars, valid for one year only? For what, you might ask yourself? Linuxlookup.com is running a small article on free SSL certificates."

374 comments

  1. sweet by lakerdonald · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Sweet! I've never liked the idea of forking over money so that your site is deemed secure.

    1. Re:sweet by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      yes...you tend question how many people actually notice/care that it is certified as such...not very many...it's too bad you have to pay for all the *attention*

    2. Re:sweet by lakerdonald · · Score: 0
      I also like the idea of "You pay us money, we say your site is trusted!"

      Great scam.

    3. Re:sweet by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sweet. I've always loved using your DSL based "server" to send out all my "email"! And now, I can do it with a worthless SSL cert too!

    4. Re:sweet by lakerdonald · · Score: 0

      and I love bouncing "spam" off of "secure" sites who payed...er..."designed" their server with "security" in mind.

    5. Re:sweet by ejdmoo · · Score: 0, Redundant

      Yeah, this is cool.

    6. Re:sweet by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Shut up, FOSS-fanboi.

      Some of as actually do work once they have left their parents' basement.

    7. Re:sweet by lakerdonald · · Score: 0

      ... okay?

    8. Re:sweet by tim256 · · Score: 2, Insightful
      Certificate companies are also providing a service. Their servers must be involved in each and every SSL connection.

      Although, it seems that many of these server certificates are at least a little overpriced. I guess there's a price to pay for that extra compatibility you get because the client certificate is already installed on popular web browsers.

    9. Re:sweet by lakerdonald · · Score: 0

      They just happen to get paid cos they just happen to be "Trusted", cos they've paid MS enough.

    10. Re:sweet by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Certificate companies are also providing a service. Their servers must be involved in each and every SSL connection.

      This is true only if the client is configured to query for Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), which isn't typically the case.

      The service they're providing is that you are authorized to use your domain name. That's it. Clearly, that has some value.

    11. Re:sweet by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And some of us choose to live in our parents basement. Rent is cheaper that way.

    12. Re:sweet by Abalamahalamatandra · · Score: 2, Informative

      Um, what?

      You seem a bit uninformed. There's no connection made between end-user software and Certificate Authority's systems when an SSL site is accessed - the browser software has the CA's certificate loaded, and the web site's certificate is signed by that certificate.

      There is occasional Certificate Revocation List (CRL) processing on occasion, but certainly not with "each and every SSL connection".

      The CA provides a service in (supposedly, see Verisign) doing due diligence to ensure that a given certificate is only provided to the site that's detailed in the certificate, so you can trust that they're who they say they are. They also maintain CRL distribution points in case they screw that up. That's about it.

    13. Re:sweet by flakac · · Score: 4, Informative

      If you don't feel like forking over money, download OpenSSL and generate your own certs. Here's a good how-to if you're interested. But if you go this route, your users will either have to install your root certificate into their browser's trusted store (I don't recommend this, but hey, it's your computer), or they'll have to click through an annoying dialog warning that the certificate is not trusted.

      What you're paying for when you buy a certificate is not so much the certificate itself, but for the processes surrounding the issuing of said certificate. When getting a certificate, you must prove to the registration authority that you are who you are, and that you have the legal right to obtain a certificate for your organization. Only after this verification has taken place will you be issued a certificate from a trusted authority. But your users can examine the certificate's chain of trust, and verify who they're talking to. Impossible to do with a self-signed or otherwise untrusted certificate.

    14. Re:sweet by lakerdonald · · Score: 0

      It's just that I think that having a free alternative to this is not a bad thing, just so long as these freeee alterenatives are "trusted".

    15. Re:sweet by mwood · · Score: 1

      You've never bought a certificate, I take it? They do actually check whether you actually control the domain you asserted, contact your admin. contact, verify employment of your technical contact, check out your firm with D&B, etc.

    16. Re:sweet by Phisbut · · Score: 1
      They do a little more work than that. When my company got a SSL certificate from Thawte, they requested legal documents for us to prove we owned the domain name that we wanted to protect, and that we also owned the registered name of the company. I think it's a good thing that they do that kind of check, otherwise anybody could claim a certificate in the name of Firefox and spoof their identity.

      I haven't RTFA because it's slashdotted, but I sure hope that the free alternative would provide the same kind of check, else it won't be any more secure.

      --
      After 3 days without programming, life becomes meaningless
      - The Tao of Programming
    17. Re:sweet by Phisbut · · Score: 1
      I also like the idea of "You pay us money, we say your site is trusted!"

      A certificate or a digital signature does not mean it's secure or trusted. All it does is certify that the server you're connected to does belong to a certain company, and it's up to you to decide if you trust that company.

      Anyone with some money to spend can buy a certificate and digitally sign their code or set up a secure server, and use it to spread viruses. Verisign, Thatwe and the others will never check your intents, they'll just check to make sure you are who you say you are.

      --
      After 3 days without programming, life becomes meaningless
      - The Tao of Programming
    18. Re:sweet by cayenne8 · · Score: 1

      I've always just rolled my own certificates. They work just fine...secure the transmission.

      --
      Light travels faster than sound. This is why some people appear bright until you hear them speak.........
    19. Re:sweet by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      This isn't so much a reply to you as a reply in general to all the people sharing your point.

      When getting a certificate, you must prove to the registration authority that you are who you are, and that you have the legal right to obtain a certificate for your organization.
      Why? Why doesn't the CA just check with your domain registrar, find the nameserver(s) registered for the domain, and then issue the certificate for those IP addresses? The point of the damn things isn't to prove that you are who you say you are. It's to prove that your server is who it says it is. That is to say, it's a guarantee that traffic I think comes from slashdot.org truly comes from that server.

    20. Re:sweet by Himring · · Score: 2

      What you're paying for when you buy a certificate is not so much the certificate itself, but for the processes surrounding the issuing of said certificate.

      Which, apparently, was crappy as of 2001 where they issued a cert (a Microsoft cert no less) that turned out to be fraudulent. That is, they first gave the cert and then did this "process" you're speaking of wherein they found the person to have been a fraud -- should have been the other way around....

      So much for process. Hopefully, they've 'fixed' that by now....

      Link to the incident: http://www.pkiforum.com/resources/alert_verisignce rts.html/

      --
      "All great things are simple & expressed in a single word: freedom, justice, honor, duty, mercy, hope." --Churchill
    21. Re:sweet by tim256 · · Score: 1

      You're right. I was getting the certificate company servers mixed up with something else. Although, they are doing more than authorizing use to your domain name.

    22. Re:sweet by Kent+Recal · · Score: 1

      When I purchased a cert from instantssl.com a while back none of all that happened. All communication was by e-mail, payment via CC (belonging to a name different to the one on the certificate).

      Issued within a day, no questions asked. Fine for us but probably not the way it's supposed to be?

    23. Re:sweet by mwood · · Score: 1

      Well, if they did no work that explains why it was so cheap. :-/

      Woah -- InstantSSL is Comodo. I am surprised. What you describe is basically just a public key in a digital baggie. I think that a detailed examination of those cert.s might reveal why others cost more.

      BTW the process I described, I am just now going through with Entrust. One of the others I mentioned (don't recall which) lets you pay for various levels of assurance, from "safe connection to who-knows-who" to "verified business identity".

      Hmmm. I think that maybe we need for browsers to show more than just key/broken-key. We need to display in some fashion a standardized notion of what a given certificate means, something like the trustlevel in OpenPGP keysignatures.

      Huh. It never occurred to me that one could sell cert.s that don't verify identity, since you can use OpenSSL or the Java keytool to make all of those that you want for free. I guess just avoiding the popup is worth a few bucks, but I'd want more than that for my business.

    24. Re:sweet by Kent+Recal · · Score: 1

      What do you mean, "just a public key in a digital baggie"?
      Isn't that what all certs are?

      You pay for avoiding the popup. Encryption can be had for free, SSL works just as well with selfsigned certs. IMHO the whole SSL thing as it is implemented today is not more than a bitter joke (or more bluntly: a license to print money for the so-called cert authorities).

      The whole popup-box approach is the wrong way round.
      The warning box may stay for selfsigned/unknown certs but there should also be an info-box popping up for certs from "trusted" authorities that states clearly which measures were taken to verify that the cert-owner is the one he claims to be. E.g.: CC-Data verified, call-back on number xxx-xxx on 1st Apr 2004, copy of business license received by fax, etc... along these lines.

      Then I (and joe average) can easily decide whether the measures taken justify my trust.

      Today just anyone can get a cert that suppresses the browser warning with
      not much more than a stolen CC-number. Happy phishing, I guess...

    25. Re:sweet by mwood · · Score: 1

      'What do you mean, "just a public key in a digital baggie"? Isn't that what all certs are?'

      No. Some cert.s mean that the entity described therein has been investigated to some level of certainty. As I said, Entrust has checked that my employer exists and that it controls the domain I specified, and is currently checking that I am employed by it. The resulting certificate will mean more than, "you can talk securely with someone, but we have no idea who that might be."

      The work they are doing costs more than just having a robot collect the money and sign the key, and the result is worth more.

      A CA cert. should include a link to the CA's Certification Practice Statement which says what they do when issuing cert.s. The browser could just show that, I suppose. But it would be nice to have as part of the signed data in the non-CA cert. a standardized indicator of just what you can trust about the presenter. I think there is in fact such information, but I don't have the standards in front of me now and can't be sure.

      Or there could be a preference dialog, so that you can go through the cert. store in your browser and mark each CA cert. with the level of trust *you* assign.

    26. Re:sweet by walstib · · Score: 1

      And some of us choose to live in our parents basement. Rent is cheaper that way.

      And chicks dig it!

      --
      The most dangerous strategy is to jump a chasm in two leaps. - Benjamin Disraeli
  2. Well.... by Tyler+Eaves · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I thought the whole point of SSL is that not just anyone could get a cert...

    --
    TODO: Something witty here...
    1. Re:Well.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Dude, get a clue before you post.

    2. Re:Well.... by glwtta · · Score: 4, Informative
      How does that make sense? Anyone can get one, the point is that you should be able to match up the certificate to its owner, with some degree of certainty.

      And getting one isn't the issue at all - you can generate as many as you want yourself - it's getting one that means something that's the issue.

      --
      sic transit gloria mundi
    3. Re:Well.... by MyIS · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I agree. I believe the whole point of Verisign's and others' existence is to make sure that the name/organization that shows up on the cert is actually corresponding to the person they're handing it to. And such verification costs money, or at least should take more than a simple Web form.

      The post on linuxlookup seems like a pretty corny ad for some hosting company anyway. Pfft!

      --
      http://zero-to-enterprise.blogspot.com/
    4. Re:Well.... by FalconZero · · Score: 1

      Anyone can get a certificate, its just that it won't necesseraly be signed by someone thats implicitly trusted by your browser. (or whatever else your ssl-ing).
      Self-signed certificates are definarly not new, you can do this with openssl on linux in about a handfull of commands or in windows on IIS (using the tool on page 2).

      --
      Windows in 6 Bytes (IA-32) : 90 90 90 90 CD 19
    5. Re:Well.... by bendelo · · Score: 2, Informative

      Windows in 6 Bytes (IA-32) : 90 90 90 90 CD 19

      Your sig caught my eye, and my brain translated it as NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, INT 19. From what I remember, interrupt 19 is the disk I/O interrupt. Doesn't it just call the bootstrap loader on drive DL?

    6. Re:Well.... by Best+ID+Ever! · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Well, the point of SSL is to encrypt communications. But the point of a signed certificate is to prevent impersonation. If a trusted authority allows anyone to get a certificate for any domain name, then it becomes easy to impersonate someone's site.

      I'm not sure what the point of this is, if the browsers don't have these folks listed as trusted authorities. You can already sign your own certificate and get the same effect. But if you are asking your customers/users to accept a certificate that is not signed by a trusted authority, you are leaving yourself open to being impersonated.

    7. Re:Well.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      it won't work under NT-stream windows (i.e. anything recent). Back in the DOS days there were some cool ways to reboot though, check out the RE-BOOT program in this package (assembly).

    8. Re:Well.... by Sloppy · · Score: 1

      (That's insightful?) No! That was never the point. The point is to authenticate.

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    9. Re:Well.... by vwjeff · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I thought the whole point of SSL is that not just anyone could get a cert...

      Exactly.

      I would only support a system that had many levels of validation.

      1. You create an account and submit your site.
      2. There would be a required waiting period of 30 days.
      3. You would login to your account and request that your site be reviewed.
      4. You must submit a deposit of $10 which will be returned when your site has been approved. If your site was not approved you must login to your account and request a refund.
      5. Your site would be reviewed by PAID employees. The funds will come from site advertisements and deposits from sites that were not approved and returned.
      6. Profit?

      A free system can exist but it must be HARD to get the certificate.

    10. Re:Well.... by IchBinEinPenguin · · Score: 1

      no, the point of a cert is that you can verify that you're talking to the entity that the cert was issued to.
      The idea is that you can then make trust decisions based on the entity, knowing that that's who you are actually taliking to. You're trusting the certificate rathern than ths DNS, router, ISP and about a squillion ohter points of attack for a man-in-the-middle.
      You can also go bejond simply looking for the pretty padlock icon, I called my bank and got them to read the cert fingerprint over the phone before I used their web-banking site.
      The REAL problem with certs is the amount of money to be made issuing them, and the total lack of care CA's take in doing so. A fake microsoft cert was issued. Certs are issued for blatently evil names (like "virus-free, click OK to continue").

    11. Re:Well.... by cbreaker · · Score: 2, Insightful

      But it doesn't work like that. When verisign is signing certs for companies that call themselves "Click YES to view this web page!!!" in order to get people to install spyware, then what good is it?

      I think the SSL encryption part itself should be good enough, and all this trusted CA crap just needs to go away.

      --
      - It's not the Macs I hate. It's Digg users. -
    12. Re:Well.... by dspeyer · · Score: 1
      I suspect you would have a hard time getting a certificate from Verisign with the name "Microsoft" or "National Security Agency". I admit I haven't dealt with them though.

      What a certificate does provide is traceability. If many people are defrauded by a website, the police can check their certificate and ask Verisign who received it. This gives them a (hopefully) rather traceable trail to follow.

    13. Re:Well.... by ljhiller · · Score: 4, Informative
      I suspect you would have a hard time getting a certificate from Verisign with the name "Microsoft" or "National Security Agency".

      I can't begin to imagine why why you would say this.

    14. Re:Well.... by MightyMartian · · Score: 1

      I don't see why a properly managed free project couldn't do the same. I mean, surely it isn't that hard to set up a database that keeps track of certificate holders, and if bad stuff happens, pass it on to law enforcement or the courts.

      That being said, I have this feeling that if such a project actually tries to turn such a project on in a big way, Verislime, Thawt and whoever else is issuing SSL certificates will probably run to Microsoft and they'll cook up some scheme that will make such certificates difficult or impossible to install on Windows servers, and will break them in some small or large way on IE. This is a big business to these guys.

      --
      The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
    15. Re:Well.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      SSL is fine and dandy - but something is needed to prevent impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks.

      SSL by itself is NOT enough for that.

    16. Re:Well.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      How do you define trust? Do you trust someone like Verisign?

      http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/2001/mar/
      digest26.shtml#news2

    17. Re:Well.... by mwood · · Score: 1

      Exactly. You could print up stacks of papers with fancy scrollwork and serial numbers and pictures of dead people, and tell everyone that it's money, but will anyone believe that it is?

    18. Re:Well.... by mwood · · Score: 1

      The hard part is paying independent auditors, and forking over big bux to the browser vendors for inclusion, when you have no income. A wealthy philanthropist might decide to do everybody a good turn with his money, I suppose....

    19. Re:Well.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why not? It's worked for most of the world's governments.

    20. Re:Well.... by Himring · · Score: 1

      Good eye man:

      March 22, 2001.
      Late today VeriSign admitted that it issued two Class 3 Software Publisher code-signing certificates on Jan. 29 and Jan. 30 to someone posing as a Microsoft employee. VeriSign discovered this approximately two weeks after issuing the certificates while conducting a background check based on the information provided by the imposter.

      VeriSign has revoked the certificates and added them to its certificate revocation list (CRL). However, VeriSign code-signing certificates do not support automatic CRL-checking because they do not contain CRL Distribution Point (CDP) information. This means that unless a user takes the initiative to manually check VeriSign's CRL before installing any software signed with these certificates, the user's computer will trust any program signed with the fraudulent certificates.


      So, I'm confused. Someone help me out. A browser will still identify the fraudulent certs even though they've been revoked? It will only turn up if an end-user runs some sort of manual check on the fraudulent cert?!?

      March, 2001 ... does this have anything to do with the two "Untrusted Publishers" list I'm looking at in my IE certificate's list that expired in January, 2002 issued to "Microsoft Corporation" with a friendly name of "Fraudulent, NOT Microsoft"? (And, no, I don't use IE -- just fired it up to check the certs :)

      --
      "All great things are simple & expressed in a single word: freedom, justice, honor, duty, mercy, hope." --Churchill
    21. Re:Well.... by mutterc · · Score: 1
      In an intranet you can do what we did - create a corporate CA, sign the intranet server's cert(s) with the corporate CA, then get everyone to import the corporate CA's cert into their browsers to get rid of the warnings.

      Public CAs, where you have to pay money to get your identity verified, are useful for services being accessed by the general public, to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. (I did this for the extranet site I put together). But for any service where a limited number of known users are going to access it, either go self-signed and users live with the warnings, or make your own CA that those users choose to "trust" to authenticate sites.

  3. erg by relluf · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Just explain to your customers why you cert isnt registered.

  4. cacert.org by TypoNAM · · Score: 5, Informative

    I've always used cacert.org for free SSL certificate s. :)

    --
    This space is not for rent.
    1. Re:cacert.org by cookd · · Score: 2, Informative

      Or you can roll your own. The only problem is that the cert is signed by you, so your customer's browser can't be certain that you are who you say you are, and will therefore issue a warning to the user.

      For installing a cert on a Windows IIS server:
      Find a recent copy of the makecert tool.
      makecert -r -pe -n "CN=www.yourserver.com" -b 01/01/2000 -e 01/01/2036 -eku 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 -ss my -sr localMachine -sky exchange -sp "Microsoft RSA SChannel Cryptographic Provider" -sy 12
      Then use the IIS management tool to "assign an existing certificate" to the site. The certificate created before should show up as available.

      For installing a cert on Apache:
      ssleay req -out certificate.pem -nodes -new -x509 -days 2000
      Now you have a pair of certificate files you can put in whatever directory your Apache install expects them to be in.

      --
      Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana.
    2. Re:cacert.org by LnxAddct · · Score: 1

      Check cookd@byu.net for your gmail invite.
      Regards,
      Steve

    3. Re:cacert.org by IchBinEinPenguin · · Score: 4, Informative

      This mob will run into the same problems as CaCERT: convincing browser distributeers to include their root certificate.
      (Hello Microsoft, We're a communist OpenSource project trying to educate netizens that they don't have to fork out gazzillions of dollars to big corporations use the Web. Would you mind helping us by including our root certificate with IE? Hello? Did we get cut off?)
      Without that, the cert is not much better than a self-signed one.

    4. Re:cacert.org by Trejkaz · · Score: 2, Informative

      Let's see... With a CAcert certificate, a user only has to add a certificate to their browser once. With a self-signed certificate, they have to add it to their browser once for every single server, and once again every single time the server changes their certificate.

      I'd say that pays off pretty quickly.

      --
      Karma: It's all a bunch of tree-huggin' hippy crap!
    5. Re:cacert.org by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > I'd say that pays off pretty quickly.

      Yeah, for the phishers.

      (Depending how it is done. Bitch about Verisign all you want, but it could be so so so much worse.)

    6. Re:cacert.org by cookd · · Score: 1

      Thanks! I knew I could find one if I went trolling.

      And they say you're not supposed to feed the trolls...

      --
      Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana.
    7. Re:cacert.org by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      With a CAcert certificate, a user only has to add a certificate to their browser once.

      So how do you convince Joe Random User that it's safe to add the CAcert CA? Aren't they going to ask why they have to do it when every other site just works?

      Worse, how do you convince Joe TinFoilHat User that the CAcert CA is safe?

    8. Re:cacert.org by jmt(tm) · · Score: 2, Informative

      StartCom cerificates are much worse than self-signed SnakeOil certificates.

      There is no verification of the user applying for a certificate, so I could easily get a certificate stating I'm PayPal. Would make the job of people trying to make money of the recently discussed IDN weakness even easier, wouldn't it?

      Additionally, the private key is generated on their servers, meaning that it's not private at all. Makes eavesdropping and man in the middle attacks so much easier.

      Nothing to see here. Move on. I don't think the Mozilla Foundation will deliver the StartCom root certificate in their default builds, and if they do, their folks should get spanked and have to write "I will not generate private keys on other machines than my own" a hundred times.

      Import the root certificate yourself, and you are screwed. Use CAcert or FreeSSL instead. Or self-signed certificates if it does not matter.

    9. Re:cacert.org by LnxAddct · · Score: 1

      Heh sure, anytime.
      Regards,
      Steve

  5. Secure certs are a ripoff by Scareduck · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Secure certs are one of the biggest ripoffs known to man. The sad fact is that they really only prove that money was able to change hands. This is way, way overdue.

    --

    Dog is my co-pilot.

  6. And if you call now...... by aussie_a · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Are steak-knives included in the article? Here's a tip for the AC. Don't make your post sound like a cheap advert. This is a news aggregator (well, it claims to be anyway). Articles should have summaries in a manner that most respected news-sources use. Not like some used car salesman. And if this is off-topic. Sorry, but I'm discussing all that I can, the article summary. The site's down so I can't read the article itself.

    1. Re:And if you call now...... by BurntNickel · · Score: 1

      Actually, the way I look at /. is in the same way I used to treat PCWeek and MacWeek. Nothing wrong with that, but just make sure you know what it is that you are reading.

      --
      And the knowledge that they fear is a weapon to be used against them...
    2. Re:And if you call now...... by crankyspice · · Score: 1

      Articles should have summaries in a manner that most respected news-sources use. Not like some used car salesman.

      Say what?! You're new here, aren't you? ;) Slashdot's summaries are almost always deliberately inflammatory and lopsided (anti-DMCA, anti-Microsoft Borgification, pro-Everything For Free Foundation ;), and usually inaccurate. Google for 'site:slashdot.org RTFA!!!'; today's blurb about Australia's regulations on kiddie porn reporting is a perfect case in point. Nothing wrong with that, just don't go thinking Slashdot is any better than FauxNews, 'cause it ain't. And that's why I like it.

      --
      geek. lawyer.
    3. Re:And if you call now...... by rokzy · · Score: 1

      jeez, complaining about unprofessional summaries is fine, but to suggest thhey go and copy the style of news sources!? then we'd end up with the exact same BS, just formatted differently.

      if you want to encourage people to write better summaries you should point them towards abstracts found in peer-reviewed academic journals.

    4. Re:And if you call now...... by MillionthMonkey · · Score: 1

      jeez, complaining about unprofessional summaries is fine, but to suggest thhey go and copy the style of news sources!? then we'd end up with the exact same BS, just formatted differently.

      It could get you sent to jail. Entered into a sex offenders registry. Raped in prison. And it could be on your hard disk right now. What is it? We'll tell you more, at 11!

    5. Re:And if you call now...... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Is it my large collection of kiddie porn?

      (pOzT3d 4n0nym0uzly 2 4v01d d4 ph3dz)

  7. If you want a "real" one by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    And not just a self-signed one, ev1servers sells a type for $10 that'll work in most browsers.

    1. Re:If you want a "real" one by jonfelder · · Score: 5, Informative

      Didn't these people buy SCO linux licenses? Why on earth would I give them money?

    2. Re:If you want a "real" one by Nova1313 · · Score: 1

      they had customers to protect. If you ran a buisness would you want to put what you had built on the line when bullied around? IF you don't have the cash to fight it you just give in for the time being to get around it. I know that sounds dumb and against the cause I hate SCO alot for what they did. But ev1 (who use to host me) had a very valid reason I think for doing it.

      --
      There exists some positive integer N that you are the Nth person to read this signature.
    3. Re:If you want a "real" one by codepunk · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Oh and he was protecting his customers by parading around to the press with his lips attached to Daryl's buttocks right? You do remember him traveling around with Daryl spewing their BS to everyone right? Give me a frigging break I won't buy crap from them, I also refuse to help anyone hosting stuff on their servers.

      --


      Got Code?
    4. Re:If you want a "real" one by jonfelder · · Score: 2, Insightful

      They should've told SCO to stuff it. Their money (ev1's) went to help SCO perpetuate this crap on others. By extension, so did their customers' money. I know if I were an ev1 customer I would've gone balistic and dropped them immediately. I imagine many people did. If everyone stands up to SCO, what they going to do?

      I'm not so certain I believe their excuse that they were protecting customers. Let the customers decide if they want to purchase SCO licenses. EV1 has the resources to fight and that's what they should've done.

      I certainly see no reason to give them more money. I'd choose a different SSL provider that is not verisign (they suck too) that didn't give money to SCO, even if that provider cost more.

    5. Re:If you want a "real" one by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I run a quarter-million a year delivery service and I dropped my ev1 reseller like a hot potato when the SCO story broke.

      Eat shit, troll.

    6. Re:If you want a "real" one by Nova1313 · · Score: 1
      unfortunately not everyone has the same ideals as you. I'm going to say if you had 5000 customers that hosted with them and hated the decisions. Of those 5000... 3000 may have said they were going to switch.. the actual number that did switch is most likely much less.

      Plus it was at the time when servers were scare. So even if they did drop with them. I'm pretty sure someone jumped on the opportunity to use that server when it was put back up for rent.

      --
      There exists some positive integer N that you are the Nth person to read this signature.
  8. Well.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Anyone CAN get one! All you have to do is pay X amount of money.

    Besides, do you really trust people such as Verisign to actively control certs?

    1. Re:Well.. by bigberk · · Score: 3, Insightful

      mod this AC up. That is the reality. Anybody can get a certificate... it might take a simple forged document. These companies are about making money, so they will happily sell a certificate.

    2. Re:Well.. by DickBreath · · Score: 1

      do you really trust people such as Verisign to actively control certs?

      Why shouldn't I trust VeriSlime?

      --

      I'll see your senator, and I'll raise you two judges.
    3. Re:Well.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Not quite that simple, you can break several laws in the process.

    4. Re:Well.. by binaryspiral · · Score: 1

      No doubt. And the legit users get treated like garbage in typical Verisign fashion whenever you need to get a cert reissued. And they take their sweet ass time doing it too.

    5. Re:Well.. by nacturation · · Score: 1

      Why shouldn't I trust VeriSlime?

      Are you hoping to get insightful mods, "DickBreath"?

      --
      Want to improve your Karma? Instead of "Post Anonymously", try the "Post Humously" option.
    6. Re:Well.. by rxmd · · Score: 4, Insightful
      Anyone CAN get one! All you have to do is pay X amount of money.

      Besides, do you really trust people such as Verisign to actively control certs?
      Dead on. After all, Verisign even issued a certificate for a "company" named CLICK YES TO CONTINUE. I don't see how it could get any worse than this with free SSL certificates.
      --
      As a state gets corrupt, its laws multiply; the most corrupt states have the most numerous laws. (Tacitus, Annales 3:27)
    7. Re:Well.. by GreyPoopon · · Score: 1
      mod this AC up. That is the reality. Anybody can get a certificate... it might take a simple forged document. These companies are about making money, so they will happily sell a certificate.

      While this is true, I honestly can't say that I would trust certificates issued "for free", when I also have to import the CA certificate before my browser will recognize them. The fee charged for an SSL certificate is "supposed" to go towards the administration required to verify and record the identity of the host to whom it was issued. While I'm sure that certificate issuers do not really validate applications, at least it gives me a place to start hunting should my trust be violated. The certificate authority will be held at least partly responsible. I can't say the same thing for a "free" issuing authority. Sorry, but I feel that paying for an SSL certificate is just part of the price of doing business. Consider it like a "Business License" for the internet.

      --

      GreyPoopon
      --
      Why is it I can write insightful comments but can't come up with a clever signature?

    8. Re:Well.. by mwood · · Score: 1

      If you don't like Verisign, they aren't the only game in town. Try Entrust, or Betrusted, or GeoTrust, or....

    9. Re:Well.. by binaryspiral · · Score: 1

      I wish I could make that choice - the people in control of things decided verisign had the best recognition and name in secure web traffic...

      too bad most of the sheep out there wouldn't know what a secure website looked like if it was fed to them.

  9. Separate by scrotch · · Score: 4, Interesting

    It has always seemed strange to me that encryption via SSL and verification of your business identity were rolled into the same system.

    I've had a few situations where I wanted to encrypt html and had no need of guaranteeing my server's identity to anyone. It seems like I should be able to encrypt traffic without having to jump through hoops and spend a lot of cash. Or without having a second class certificate.

    I hope this new project succeeds.

    1. Re:Separate by irc.goatse.cx+troll · · Score: 1

      So sign your own certs. Its no more secure than saying 'come on, its me, you can trust me' with nobody vouching for the server, but it will encrypt fine. I've been doing it for years in places where encryption is more important than identifying a server, namely with small devel sites, and ftp servers (though in that instance a man in the middle would be bad, but once you've accepted and saved the self signed cert its not an issie AFAIK)

      --
      Pain lasts, kid. Its how you know you're alive. Sometimes I think this growing up thing is just pain management-TheMaxx
    2. Re:Separate by iantri · · Score: 1
      Eh?

      You don't need to do anything special -- just set up SSL and issue yourself a certificate.

      Any web browser will warn strongly that the certificate is not issued by a trusted organization, but you said you don't need to prove your identity, so this should perfectly suit your needs.

    3. Re:Separate by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The problem is that without authentication, there's no way to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The encryption isn't much good if someone could have replaced your certificate on the way to the client.

    4. Re:Separate by pchan- · · Score: 4, Informative

      Any web browser will warn strongly that the certificate is not issued by a trusted organization, but you said you don't need to prove your identity, so this should perfectly suit your needs.

      You do realize that if you can't prove your identity, your clients are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, right? How's the browser to know if it's your server they're talking to, or to someone else who signed their own cert and is impersonating you (and proxying its transactions to you, logging or modifying them along the way)? Authority signed certificates give you this ability. Self-signed certificates do not provide complete transport-layer security.

      This is not to say that the signing authority can't be free. It's about time someone did it.

    5. Re:Separate by starfishsystems · · Score: 1
      The SSL/TLS protocol supports this directly.

      In OpenSSL, just call SSL_set_verify with a mode of SSL_VERIFY_NONE. The connection will be encrypted without verifying the identity of either the server or the client.

      --
      Parity: What to do when the weekend comes.
    6. Re:Separate by Sentry21 · · Score: 1

      I've had a few situations where I wanted to encrypt html and had no need of guaranteeing my server's identity to anyone.

      I can't think of any reason that would want one but not the other - simply put, SSL encryption and verification are rolled into one because there's no point in encrypting traffic if you don't know where it's going to - i.e. man-in-the-middle attacks.

      Unless, perhaps, you just want to fool casual sniffers about the content, but in that case, just use on-the-fly compression with e.g. mod_gzip and suffice that. It's not much less secure than non-authenticating SSL.

    7. Re:Separate by cortana · · Score: 1

      While you're at it, you can email me your passwords. Thanks! ;)

    8. Re:Separate by John+Hasler · · Score: 1

      Verification isn't the only way to authenticate. You can deliver the fingerprint via some out-of-band channel such as snail-mail.

      --
      Warning: this article may contain humor, sarcasm, parody, and perhaps even irony. Read at your own risk.
    9. Re:Separate by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      Self-signed certificates do not provide complete transport-layer security.

      You mean self-signed certificates delivered over an insecure connection, right?
      Otherwise, why is a certificate that I generate and safely install any less secure (transport-wise) than one delivered with my browser?

    10. Re:Separate by pchan- · · Score: 1

      You mean self-signed certificates delivered over an insecure connection, right?

      No, only delivered over a TRUSTED and SECURE connection. I can establish a secure SSL connection with anyone. How do I know I've established this "secure connection" with the correct host and not the evil man-in-the-middle? Without a third party authentication method, I don't know of one. Yes, there's USB keyrings and key signatures and so on, but they all break down to having a shared secret with the remote host, which does not hold true for every machine you may want to connect to.

      The certificates that came with your browser, for the most part, are trusted. You trust the code, and you trust that it was delivered to you in an untampered form (otherwise, you should not be using this browser for secure transactions). While not impossible, it's much less likely that someone is staging an attack on you by tampering with your browser or operating system delivery path (and if they did, you'd have much bigger problems than just ssl snooping).

      Otherwise, why is a certificate that I generate and safely install any less secure (transport-wise) than one delivered with my browser?
      The one that can be verified with the keys that came with your browser is known to be who it claims to be. There is no way to prove this for the cert you generated.

    11. Re:Separate by statemachine · · Score: 1

      "You do realize that if you can't prove your identity, your clients are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, right?"

      In theory this is true, but in reality most browsers do not present the certificate to the user by default. If it did, most people would turn it off to stop being annoyed. There is a large disconnect between what people SHOULD do, and what people actually do. The certificate, as long as the browser trusts the CA, gets accepted no matter what. Since people don't care, a good fix is to add another "security level" in the browser where it won't care if the cert comes from a trusted CA -- thus if people want to disable that annoying trust dialog, people can. No more extorting money from websites to turn off that overly dramatic dialog box.

    12. Re:Separate by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Fine, you want to say "trusted and secure" instead of "secure" to indicate "complete security."

      You still seem to be insisting that third party verification is secure while first party can't be. Remember that you made the absolute statement that "self-signed certificates do not provide complete transport-layer security."

      Maybe an example would help: I generate a signing certificate and include the appropriate bits in the standard OS image loaded on my organization's computers (or I distribute them via some other trusted and secure mechanism). I then generate self-signed certificates for departments as necessary. Why would this make my employees' connections less secure than if I paid someone to sign my certs? Why can't the signing authority be me?

    13. Re:Separate by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > Why can't the signing authority be me?

      You just can't because you're not paying him $$$$/year to validate your certs.

    14. Re:Separate by R.Caley · · Score: 2, Insightful
      It has always seemed strange to me that encryption via SSL and verification of your business identity were rolled into the same system.

      If you are worried enough to want encryption, then you should be worried about man in the middle attacks. No point telling people their credit card details or email will be encrypted if it just gets sent to a random criminal who can read it, re-encrypt it and send it on to you.

      If users can verify the identity of the far end point some other way, perhaps because they have previously connected to it, or because they are within a trusted environment, you don't need the signing, or can self-sign. This is how ssh works, you're supposed to check the server ID the first time you use it and then at least simple MITM attacks result in a warning.

      But HTTPS is more about reassuring end users than any significant security concern in most situations, and knowing who they are talking to is part of that.

      [imaginge Dilbert cartoon with credit card, waitress and fur coat here]
      --
      _O_
      .|<
      The named which can be named is not the true named
    15. Re:Separate by RupW · · Score: 1

      This is not to say that the signing authority can't be free.

      Why? The CA needs to verify your identity before issuing a cert else it's useless. Carrying out the verification takes time, so they need to pass on the cost of that time - and take a profit.

      Granted once they've verified you once they don't really need to charge you for second and subsequent certs.

    16. Re:Separate by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      except that a main in the middle would intercept the self-signed cert and issue a new self-signed cert during the cert exchange.. that's the whole point of a man in the middle attack!

    17. Re:Separate by irc.goatse.cx+troll · · Score: 1

      Thats why i mentioned once you accept it. If you have the original valid self signed cert its just as secure as trusting verisign. You just need a secure method of obtaining the cert

      --
      Pain lasts, kid. Its how you know you're alive. Sometimes I think this growing up thing is just pain management-TheMaxx
  10. So? by winterdrake · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Like being able to self-issue a certif is new? Used some random tool that came with MS Office to do it last time I had a use for one, of course that was Office 2K or thereabouts but it's probably still there, and there are probably alot of other ways to self-issue one. The entire point of the big expensive ones is that you have a "trusted" authority validating the transaction.

    1. Re:So? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      Straight out of the help file for Office XP

      locate and double-click SelfCert.exe (usually found in the C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office10 folder).

    2. Re:So? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The entire point of the big expensive ones is that you have a "trusted" authority validating the transaction.

      Verisign trusts me to manage my domain through their browser interface as the administrative contact. What more verification do they need? Give me free certs!

  11. Doing it for a while by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    SimulatedLucidity.com has been working on something similar to this for a while...

  12. Free.. Free.. FREE! by humankind · · Score: 4, Informative

    Get OpenSSL and roll your own, any time, any platform... always been that way... and this is news? Some script-kiddy-turned-public-relations-director figured this out? Good for j00. As for everyone else, nothing to see here that we don't already know.

    1. Re:Free.. Free.. FREE! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The point of using a REAL (*cough*) CA is not getting an anoying dialog box saying "click here because you don't trust this person". It's worth the few $$ to get rid of that. If you start giving away free certs to anyone without proving who they are... they become worthless. Can you say PHISHING?????

    2. Re:Free.. Free.. FREE! by Trogre · · Score: 1

      great, except that every time a new customer connects to your site they will be greeted with an error message stating that the certificate has not been signed by a known CA and is not to be trusted.

      In the time it would take to read and understand the warning and select "Accept this certificate permanently" the customer has already moved on.

      --
      "Nine times out of ten, starting a fire is not the best way to solve the problem." - my wife
    3. Re:Free.. Free.. FREE! by gl4ss · · Score: 1

      if you have _customers_ then surely you can afford to pay the blackmail fee from a known ca.

      --
      world was created 5 seconds before this post as it is.
    4. Re:Free.. Free.. FREE! by adrianbaugh · · Score: 2, Informative

      Just like what these guys are offering - a certificate, but not a certified one, according to what the article said. You'll get the same warning dialogue from their certificate as from the OpenSSL one, but you can make an OpenSSL one at home.

      --
      "'I pass the test,' she said. 'I will diminish, and go into the West, and remain Galadriel.'"
      - JRR Tolkien.
    5. Re:Free.. Free.. FREE! by humankind · · Score: 1

      I post a message on areas of my site before switching into SSL mode that explains that the error message is indicative that I didn't pay into the "SSL Mafia" who want to extort money from me, not because I'm less secure, but because I won't pay them. It works well.

  13. Text of linked article from ... linked article... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    Since the linked article is dying, who knows if you'll be able to even get the link to the real article. So here's your text, AC to keep the whoring in Vegas.

    StartCom Free SSL Certificate Project

    StartCom Free SSL Certificate Project The Idea:

    Do you have a website or run even a web server and want to secure the traffic between your visitors browser and the web site? Did you find out, that in order to make your site SSL aware, you'll need a SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) certificate? Are you also surprised to find out that such a certificate can cost you up to a few hundred dollars, valid for one year only? For what, you might ask yourself?

    StartCom Ltd., the vendor and distributor of StartCom Linux Operating Systems, operates also MediaHost(TM), a hosting company specialized in DB and Java web application hosting and offers its clients SSL secured web sites with certificates signed by StartCom Ltd already for years. Here is, where the idea for this project originated: Free SSL certificates!

    How?

    Most web servers, such as Apache, IIS and others are capable of running the 128-bit secured and encrypted SSL protocol. All you need, in most cases, is a SSL certificate to make it work. StartCom is going to provide you with this certificate through a simple web based interface wizard and sign up process free of charge. Together with the installation instructions, you'll have your secured web site running within a few minutes.

    Why?

    Because we believe, that companies like Verisign, Thawte and others, just rip you off your money! Simply as that! Even the so called "Free SSL certificates" offered by some companies aren't free, but can cost you up to a US $ 100 or even more.

    More than that, lets think about, what SSL is supposed to do: Encrypt and secure the traffic between a browser and the server! Point! It is not supposed to give you the impression, that a website is trustworthy or even say anything about its identity...for this you should use your brain and common sence.* Anybody can get a SSL certificate and as such does not give any type of warranty about the intensions, or quality of products, of the website or its owners! We'll prove here, that SSL certificates can cost much less or may be even free of charge! If enough people are using our certificates and stop buying them, well, than the existence of these companies will vanish and we'll all win another piece of freedom!

    * We'll offer in the future, some sort of verified SSL certificates, but on this later...

    Where, when?

    Convinced? We build and tested this web site during February 2005, so you'll be able to get a SSL certificate for free. Use the links below to get your free certificate now! Please spread the word about this project to your friends (by having a link to our web site?). Contact us, if you want to contribute. And....spend your money on better things! There are enough good causes to support!

  14. The problem with free SSL certs... by cortana · · Score: 4, Insightful
    More than that, lets think about, what SSL is supposed to do: Encrypt and secure the traffic between a browser and the server! Point! It is not supposed to give you the impression, that a website is trustworthy or even say anything about its identity...for this you should use your brain and common sence.

    Common sense says, make sure the StartCom CA Certificate is not on any of my machines!

    The entire point of using certificates is so that you know that there is a certified binding between a public key and an identity. If you don't know who will recieve your encrypted information then there's no point encrypting it in the first place!

    1. Re:The problem with free SSL certs... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      There's a point, albeit minor. By accepting to use a website certificate not signed by one of your trusted CA's, you are stating the following: "I don't know who I am talking to, but I'm trying to make sure that nobody else can listen in."


  15. comodo.com by Neil+Blender · · Score: 5, Informative

    $50 per year per certificate. I've had no problems getting them to work with all browsers. Since I can't read the article, are they giving out real authority certs? Ones that your browser won't pop up the window saying it's untrusted?

    If not, here is a recipe for free signed certificates:
    openssl genrsa -des3 -out server.key 1024
    openssl req -new -key server.key -out server.csr
    openssl genrsa -des3 -out ca.key 1024
    openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key ca.key -out ca.crt

    ./sign.sh server.csr

    1. Re:comodo.com by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Forgot to mention you need openssl which is abolutely painless to install and free of course.

      NB

    2. Re:comodo.com by pnaro · · Score: 1

      I've been using comodo for years. Just renewed a couple of certs with them. They have been outstanding and would recommend them in a heartbeat.

      --
      If we can't fix it, we'll fix it so nobody else can!
    3. Re:comodo.com by SiliconEntity · · Score: 1

      I just checked comodo.com and it says "starting from only $249 for a 2 year certificate". That's more than twice the $50 a year you quoted. Do they have some other cert that's cheaper?

    4. Re:comodo.com by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes. They have about 8.

    5. Re:comodo.com by Neil+Blender · · Score: 1
    6. Re:comodo.com by csnydermvpsoft · · Score: 1

      If you click on the "buy now" link, you see that those are actually $90. They provide a $50 warranty, though for what I'm not sure.

    7. Re:comodo.com by Yottabyte84 · · Score: 1

      $89 is for two years. click the radio button to one year, and it's $49

    8. Re:comodo.com by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's easiest to find their cheap certs on their InstantSSL site.

    9. Re:comodo.com by anti-trojan · · Score: 1

      Your $50 certificate is "InstantSSL". Those certificates do not contain your actual contact information, but only your hostname. That is, the visitor knows that he is actually communicating with www.neilblender.com but there is no way he can see who that domain actually belongs to (such as "Blender Ltd").

      More expensive certificates actually verify (or at least they should) your identity, company name, address etc. and include it in the certificate such that the visitor can see them by clicking the padlock icon.

      If it is enough for you to have this kind of certificate, UserTrust certificates are even cheaper. Last time I checked ev1.net was selling them (they call it StarterSSL) for about 10 bucks a year.

    10. Re:comodo.com by Neil+Blender · · Score: 1

      Your $50 certificate is "InstantSSL". Those certificates do not contain your actual contact information, but only your hostname. That is, the visitor knows that he is actually communicating with www.neilblender.com but there is no way he can see who that domain actually belongs to (such as "Blender Ltd").

      More expensive certificates actually verify (or at least they should) your identity, company name, address etc. and include it in the certificate such that the visitor can see them by clicking the padlock icon.


      Sorry, but you are incorrect. These certs do list company name and address. From one of my InstantSSL certs (I have removed the actual info):

      CN = xx.xx.com (domanin name here)
      OU = InstantSSL
      OU = (organizational unit here)
      O = (Our company name listed here)
      Object Identifier (2 5 4 9 ) = (street address here)
      L = Seattle
      ST = Washington
      Object Identifier (2 5 4 17 ) = (zip code here)
      C = US

      This information and more can be seen by anyone who clicks the padlock. This is from an InstantSSL certificate that was purchased for $89 and is valid for two years. One year is $49.

  16. SSL doesn't have to be expensive by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I don't work for them, but I am a customer. ev1servers.net has 128-bit QuickSSL certs for $49. Hardly "hundreds" of dollars.

    1. Re:SSL doesn't have to be expensive by codepunk · · Score: 1

      Any ev1 customer is a slug in my book...

      --


      Got Code?
    2. Re:SSL doesn't have to be expensive by eztiger · · Score: 1

      going off topic but why so? I'm looking to perhaps rent a server from them. Do you know of problems or people offering comparable budget server schemes? Kev

  17. Self signing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative


    you can do it yourself if you want, but the user will be prompted with a scary dialog because your self-signed cert doesnt come built into the browser
    for encryption this doesnt matter but on an ecommerce site transparent http>https is essential, if a user becomes accustomed to warning dialogs they will learn to ignore them (witness activeX spyware installs)

    so signing certs is easy, signing non-prompting certs is why people pay the money

  18. Most tutorials with apache + mod_ssl have had this by Kip+Winger · · Score: 3, Insightful
    Every tutorial I've seen on the internet with apache + mod_ssl has had tutorials on how to generate your own SSL certificate. Most newbies who have followed those step by step tutorials have even done this, since many regular apache tutorials also include mod_ssl as part of it.

    In fact, even mod_ssl has information on how to do so on the site:

    http://www.modssl.org/docs/2.6/ssl_faq.html#ToC27

    --
    - - - - - Fear not the reaper, but my shiny white teeth.
  19. Mr. Anderson, what good is an SSL certificate if . by rkmath · · Score: 1

    your website is slashdotted?

    Want to run a website with secure connections? Or, want to run a website at all? Then don't publicise it on /. till you are *really* ready for the action!

  20. The clickable link: by hot_Karls_bad_cavern · · Score: 1
  21. I sometimes worry about these free services. by the+talented+rmg · · Score: 3, Interesting

    It's nice to be able to get free stuff online. I've been known to grab my share of free movies and music from time to time myself, but when it comes to things that are so critical to the security of my servers, I'm a little more careful.

    That is not to say that the particular people in the article are crooked -- I'm sure they're on the level. I'm just saying that as this kind of thing becomes popular, you can be sure some computer hackers out there will try to co-opt the good name of services like these so they can give out compromised certificates and steal information from you and your customers.

    The bottom line is: When it's free, you just never know. A thousand eyes only get you so far. This is why I tend to stick to software backed by a solid corporate history on my own production servers. It's just not worth the risk to skimp on costs when the fact is your entire business is on the line there.

    You just have to know who you're dealing with when you get into this kind of thing. Are you dealing with someone honest or are you dealing with some sort of shady basement operation that moved to Canada to avoid cryptography laws? When mission critical information is at stake, this stuff counts.

    --


    A Proud Member of the Reality Oriented Community.

    1. Re:I sometimes worry about these free services. by slug359 · · Score: 1

      Except you generate the certificate yourself, they just sign the public bit.

    2. Re:I sometimes worry about these free services. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > The bottom line is: When it's free, you just never know.

      This is what keeps spammers in business -- one of these born every minute, who feels reassured by giving money to something sounding like a company...

    3. Re:I sometimes worry about these free services. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      When it's free, you just never know.

      Verisign knows it's my domain (or that I manage it), because I just logged in as the administrative contact. It costs them nothing to verify this. I can write a simple perl CGI script in an hour for them that will let authenticated administrative contacts upload a CSR to get a free cert. For a small fee of eleventy million dollars, that is.

    4. Re:I sometimes worry about these free services. by Sebastian+Jansson · · Score: 1

      The bottom line is: When it's free, you just never know.

      That's why no one should use Linux for secure servers, Windows is the way to go!
      [/sarcasm]

  22. open source maybe by outcast36 · · Score: 1

    Put an Open in front of your SSL problem
    Voila

    1. Re:open source maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      I saw this in a Hidden Valley Ranch commercial once!!!

      Plain salsa, Ranch Salsa!
      Dijon Dip, Ranch Dijon Dip!
      Cornflakes, Ranch Cornflakes!

      Using your method:
      SSL, OpenSSL
      SSH, OpenSSH
      Office, OpenOffice(dotorg)
      Source, OpenSource
      House, OpenHouse
      Opportunity, OpenOpportunity

      My favorite:
      Decitis, OpenDecitis

    2. Re:open source maybe by hsoft · · Score: 0

      even when you install openssl, you still need a ssl certificate.

      I never installed/used openssl, so I could be wrong...

      --
      perception is reality
    3. Re:open source maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      even when you install openssl, you still need a ssl certificate.

      No, what you pay for is the signing by a certified authority that your browser (and every other browser) trusts, not the certificate. You can generate and sign your own certificates with openssl but they will be 'untrusted' which means browers will pop up a window when you access the site saying as such. You can still access the site using ssl just fine.

      Thees companies go through some checking to make sure you are who you say you are before they will you issue you signed certificates.

    4. Re:open source maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      porno...

      open ranch porno.

  23. Woweee by TheVidiot · · Score: 5, Informative


    When you finally get to the site that is offering the certs (http://cert.startcom.org/) all you find is bad grammar and certs that aren't recognized by any browser (i.e. warnings pop up). It's admirable that the site wants to issue free certificates, but you won't find many surfers willing to trust them. Also, you can create your own certs with minimal effort, and you'll end up with the same thing.

    1. Re:Woweee by BokLM · · Score: 2, Insightful

      So to sum up, this article is completly useless. Anyone can do this at home, without them.

  24. Why not just... by imemyself · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Personally I think the government would be well suited to do this sort of thing. Maybe provide them when you get a drivers license or a business license. Its not like it takes massive amounts of money to see if you really are who you say you are. And why the expiration dates(well, of course, they're another way to screw people out of $$, but what's the certificate providers excuse/reason for them?)

    --
    Every time you post an article on Slashdot, I kill a server. Think of the servers!
    1. Re:Why not just... by Fjornir · · Score: 2, Insightful
      And why the expiration dates(well, of course, they're another way to screw people out of $$, but what's the certificate providers excuse/reason for them?)

      Take the obvious Fight Club quote ...over a long enough time line the survival rate for everyone drops to zero... and apply the same logic to the chances of a certificate being compromised: over a long enough time line the chances of a certificate being compromised approach one....

      Good CAs deal with this in two ways: expiration dates and revocation lists. An expiration date protects your customers from getting something which might've been signed three years ago on the sly, and thinking it's a legitimate offering from the company. A revocation list protects your customers by letting them contact the CA's site to see if your certificate is known to have been compromised.

      --
      I want a new world. I think this one is broken.
    2. Re:Why not just... by bigberk · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I agree with this. Ensuring economic reliability for citizens is the government's job, not the private sector's. There is a major conflict of interest when private companies (e.g. Verisign) are making a business out of selling certificates -- i.e. selling trust. Verisign wants your money; what's their motivation to make sure your paperwork is legit? Verisign regularly accepts forged business reg documents, from what I have heard.

      Let the government issue crypto certificates, I say.

    3. Re:Why not just... by starfishsystems · · Score: 2, Insightful
      I agree completely with your reasoning.

      As you imply, various levels of government are already responsible for issuing the various forms of primary identification which will subsequently be used, by third parties, to sign your certificates.

      It makes perfect sense to issue a companion certificate to each of these primary forms of identification. There are good reasons for expiring many forms of identity, and certificates are no different in this regard. Just make the expiry date of the certificate correspond to the expiry date of the identity document or license. The authority and all of the related procedural infrastructure is already in place. So how hard could it be?

      By the way, Canada Post was registered a few years ago as a Certificate Authority, but no longer. I'd be interested in knowing the politics behind its disappearance.

      --
      Parity: What to do when the weekend comes.
    4. Re:Why not just... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Look what the US government does at:
      https://www.notams.jcs.mil/

      I've always laughed at the warning. You'd think the military could get a legit cert, but I guess they don't want to pay either.

    5. Re:Why not just... by rs79 · · Score: 1

      ersonally I think the government would be well suited to do this sort of thing.

      The government doesn't do anything well. They're the first to admit it. Let me qualify that.

      In the pre-icann era when the government (department of commerce really, the government is far from monolithic) was fishing around trying to figure out what the hell to do with the dns it suddenly fond itself with somebody, Becky Burr I think, told me "We can't do it. The government can't do anything well. What we're good at is is facilitating collaberation, them empowering an entitiy to do the actual privisioning based on stakeholder consensus".

      It sounded great at the time and I suppose is good in theory but then look how icann turned out.

      --
      Need Mercedes parts ?
    6. Re:Why not just... by cortana · · Score: 1

      Somehow I don't think the US military is penny pinching. ;)

      More probably they see the whole browser SSL certificate authority for the worthless scam that it really is. I don't believe they would put themselves in a position where a compromise of say, VeriSign (which is not the most trustworthy organisation in the world; hell, it's a corporation therefore it is amoral by definition) makes their web servers, etc, insecure.

      Here's the big secret VeriSign doesn't want you to know: examine the SHA1 and MD5 hashes of the certificate presented to you by your browser. Now, as long as the values presented to you match what you know to be the correct values (and you trust the computer you are doing this on!), then the connection is every bit as secure as one to https://www.paypal.com/. More so, in fact, because VeriSign et al aren't involved.

      In fact, if you have been given a copy of the certificate from a trusted source, you can install it into your browser's certificate repository and have the browser do the job for you. I wouldn't be surprised if military issue laptops had a bunch of certificates already installed for services like the one you linked to.

    7. Re:Why not just... by Alan+Hicks · · Score: 1
      Let the government issue crypto certificates, I say.

      Let's bypass all the political BS about should the government have more power or less or what and cut to the chase. Do you really want the largest and least effective entity (in democratic countries in general) to handle your certs? Pretty much everything the government does, it does poorly.

      --
      Slackware, what else when it must be secure, stable, and easy?
  25. In theory maybe by Chuck+Chunder · · Score: 5, Informative

    In practice the ID checks that I've seen done are fairly flimsy. And with "hundreds" of dollars being charged by big name certifying authorites there is strong motivation for them to just give you the cert (and take your money) once you've faxed them a couple of vaguely official looking signed bits of paper.

    Anyone paying "hundreds" of bucks for a certificate is being scammed though. Much cheaper ones are available from people like GoDaddy. I can't see why anyone wouldn't just go for the $29 one, your users won't notice any difference between them unless they are particularly inquisitive and enjoy poking around obscure browser dialogues.

    --
    Boffoonery - downloadable Comedy Benefit for Bletchley Park
    1. Re:In theory maybe by FalconZero · · Score: 1

      I took great pleasure waving a 'hundreds of bucks' (close to thousand really) certificate around the office as 10 lines on a piece of paper. The people who choked on their coffee didn't know what 'wildcard' meant.

      --
      Windows in 6 Bytes (IA-32) : 90 90 90 90 CD 19
    2. Re:In theory maybe by tetranitrate · · Score: 2, Funny

      Much cheaper ones are available from people like GoDaddy.

      Thanks for the mental image.

    3. Re:In theory maybe by BoomerSooner · · Score: 1

      Closer to $50
      I used to use Verisign until I started my own company, suddenly InstantSSL was a better choice at 1/10th the price. To my shock and surprise I haven't had a single customer that noticed (or at least mentioned that they noticed).

      I got the Pro License for $149 for 3 years and if you somehow screw up they can invalidate and reissue in minutes (good for when you're new to it or implementing them on a different platform).

      I'm very pleased with InstantSSL and would compare them favorably to Verisign (actually better because getting a cert reissued on Verisign was a bit of a pain).

    4. Re:In theory maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      "... your users won't notice any difference between them unless they are particularly inquisitive and enjoy poking around obscure browser dialogues."

      Well, I definitely see the difference. I'm getting
      Error trying to validate certificate from www.godaddy.com using OCSP- directory lookup error.
      ... and that's just by clicking on "Turbo" certificate on the godaddy's website. Does not seem to work with Firefox 1.0
    5. Re:In theory maybe by mlyle · · Score: 2, Informative

      A wildcard certificate still costs $449 at InstantSSL. Read the parent's post more carefully mmkay? thx.

    6. Re:In theory maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      Perhaps even more appropriate (since we are talking about godaddy anyways) is the fact that godaddy is providing FREE (as in beer) ssl certificates to FREE (as in speech) projects...

      https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/ssl/ssl_opensource. asp

    7. Re:In theory maybe by LurkerXXX · · Score: 1
      Bzzt. It does matter which provider you go with. Some are much better supported by different browsers. Go with a cert provider with bad browser support and a lot of potential customers might avoid your online store because the cert is unrecognised and they arent' sure if they should trust you. It can be well worth the money to buy a cert from one of the major providers.

      http://www.whichssl.com/browser_recognition_table. html

    8. Re:In theory maybe by XorNand · · Score: 2

      As another poster already mentioned, their wildcart certs aren't $50, but I too will vouch for InstantSSL. But it's also much easier to get a cert from them than it is Verisign. (I haven't used Verisign in years, so myabe they've changed, but it used to be a PITA to get cert). To that end, I place more value in Verisign certs: Their certs cost more, in part, because they are in fact more secure. As much as a I detest that company, they would be smart to market this aspect of their product.

      --
      Entrepreneur : (noun), French for "unemployed"
    9. Re:In theory maybe by just_von · · Score: 2, Informative

      We had to do more than just fax documents. They actually called the phone number we gave them, and there were code numbers involved. :)

    10. Re:In theory maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Now if only it was free beer.

    11. Re:In theory maybe by xWakawaka · · Score: 5, Informative

      Speaking of theory... let's clarify how this works.

      Generating a certificate/key-pair is trivial. You can do it yourself for free or have a 3rd party do it free or at mild to great expense.

      In theory, a certificate is only useful in verifying the identity of a resource (server authentication of a web server in this case) so long as you trust the issuing authority, and therefore you take it on the issuing authority's word (cert is signed with the authority's private key) that the server at the end of https://companyA.com really belongs to companyA. You trust the issuing authority to have verified this fact for you. That's all server authentication consists of.

      In theory, then, the critical question is 'what certificate authorities do you trust to make that kind of verification on your behalf?'

      In general practice, however, all this boils down to is 'what certificate authorities are shipped as "trusted" on an out of the box install of the dominant platform/browser?' This, of course, includes Verisign, Thawte, and serveral others that have gone through both a PKI practices certification process and what must surely be an expensive business relationship with Microsoft.

      So, as a server administrator, you either pay up for a cert from one of these widely "trusted" authorities, or explain to your users wy they should either import your CA as a trusted root, or otherwise deal with the warning messages that the browser will issue if your cert comes from anyone "untrusted", including yourself.

      And, as has been alluded to, one you are past the server authentication usage of the PKI, the session key exchange for bulk encryption (SSL) can be handled equally well by any technically correct certificate/key-pair, regardless of the trust chain.

    12. Re:In theory maybe by CmdrWass · · Score: 2, Informative

      I'm glad somebody said this. Oooh wow! Free Certificates... I'll give anybody all the free certificates they want... as you pointed out... while it is true that the certificate is required for Apache's SSL to work, all it is used for is to validate identity. If a person's only concern is encryption, just create your own certificate. It isn't hard.

      Sometimes I wonder about this "technical community" I'm forced to be a part of.

    13. Re:In theory maybe by bahwi · · Score: 1

      Agreed, $29 is not a lot of money, and it is traceable(Hey, that $29 came from someone/somewhere). That's the difference, I think. I could never trust a free SSL cert.

    14. Re:In theory maybe by Poverty+P'uh · · Score: 2, Insightful

      How is one cert more secure than another? Does VeriSign use magic bits that are harder to crack?

      --
      "Never underestimate the power of stupid people in large groups."
    15. Re:In theory maybe by spacecowboy420 · · Score: 1

      Opened fine for me in firefox on both linux and windows...

      --
      ymmv
    16. Re:In theory maybe by nacturation · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I'm a reseller for InstantSSL. If you purchase credits on their system and act as a reseller (not just an affiliate), you get certificate requests coming to you. All you do is go online, approve the request, and it's issued. Customers have done this and apparently they don't go through any extra screening, even for a code signing cert.

      Anyone have a different experience?

      --
      Want to improve your Karma? Instead of "Post Anonymously", try the "Post Humously" option.
    17. Re:In theory maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Beer sucks. Gimme some free vodka. :)

    18. Re:In theory maybe by RupW · · Score: 1

      Generating a certificate/key-pair is trivial. You can do it yourself for free or have a 3rd party do it free or at mild to great expense.

      Uh, just to clear this one up: you *must* generate the key-pair yourself. You want the CA's signature on your public key so you only need send them that. You shouldn't give the private key to anyone else or let them generate one for you.

    19. Re:In theory maybe by BoomerSooner · · Score: 1

      If you'd read his parent post I was replying to both.

    20. Re:In theory maybe by xWakawaka · · Score: 1

      Good point.

      Thank you for clarifying what I had lumped together in an unclear sentence.

    21. Re:In theory maybe by XorNand · · Score: 1

      InstantSSL pretty much seems to use "well, his credit card went through" as a means of authenticating who I said I was. With Verisign, I had to fax them my business records and wait a few days while they verified me and then personally called me.

      Security isn't always about the tech.

      --
      Entrepreneur : (noun), French for "unemployed"
    22. Re:In theory maybe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      you take it on the issuing authority's word...that the server at the end of https://companyA.com really belongs to companyA
      Actually, I take it on the issuing authority's word that the server responding to me when I contact https://companyA.com is the webserver designated by the owner of the domain companyA.com. I don't really care if companyA owns companyA.com as far as SSL certificates go. That's not the CA's job to figure out, IMHO. I see no reason to refuse service to someone who owns a domain with a dfferent company name. Frankly, that's an issue between companyA and companyA.com, and the CA needs to keep their nose out of it. I just want the CA to give me their word that I'm not the victim of a man-in-the-middle type of attack.

  26. For what, you might ask yourself? by sulli · · Score: 1
    Actually, no.

    I ask myself: "How did I get here?" And then I ask myself: "Where is that beautiful house? Where is that beautiful wife?"

    --

    sulli
    RTFJ.
  27. Third party certification not absolutely necessary by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You do not *have* to buy or obtain a certificate from anyone else in order to set up an SSL website. You can be your own certification authority. I think this can be done with OpenSSL. If memory serves me, This may mean users will get more warning messages when they visit your site, however.

  28. Trust chain by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    IIRC, the certificates point to certificate issuing authority whose keys you have configured in your browser. Most browser have keys preinstalled so most people aren't aware of it. You're only supposed to use certificate authorities you trust. If you use roll your own keys everyone will get those popup security warnings from their browser and you will annoy everyone.

  29. ev1 now way by codepunk · · Score: 0, Redundant

    I would not give those sco lovin hussies a penny of my money..

    --


    Got Code?
  30. Price on certs are for the reason ... by who+got+my+name · · Score: 0

    If you will read what you pay for you will find that the company issuing certificate insures your transactions. So if you have someone break the ssl encryption you will get payed. It was just a simplification.

    --
    The only person who is capable of killing my karma, is me, do not even try to help me.
    1. Re:Price on certs are for the reason ... by WolfWithoutAClause · · Score: 2, Interesting

      And have these insurers ever actually paid out? If not, then what's the point? If yes, how come there's no relation between what they charge to get a certificate and the value of the transaction?

      --

      -WolfWithoutAClause

      "Gravity is only a theory, not a fact!"
  31. but it prompts the user by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0



    https://www.cacert.org/
    which makes it about as valuable/useful as the price they charge ($0)
    people/biz pay the money so their customers are NOT prompted, i can sign my own certs (in about 5 lines of bash) if i dont care about the user getting dialogs

    1. Re:but it prompts the user by EnronHaliburton2004 · · Score: 1

      Well it depends on what you want to do.

      If I'm just looking for an SSL-encrypted connection to an Open-source site which is signed by openca, I can deal with popups (or add the OpenCA cert to Firefox), assuming that I already trust the site.

      If I'm buying something over the internet, I'm not so sure that I'd trust my credit card to some entity that was verified through OpenCA.

    2. Re:but it prompts the user by Ice+Station+Zebra · · Score: 3, Interesting

      You don't get it. It is like the Linux vs Windows battle. If everyone starts using cacert and the free browsers (firefox,safari,opera,konqurer) include it as a trusted CA then those prompts GO AWAY. Suddenly the SSL cert market doesn't look so good, prices drop.

      I think cacert has a very good program. You want a real cert then someone local has to verify your ID. It takes the money out and puts the trust back into SSL.

    3. Re:but it prompts the user by iabervon · · Score: 1

      Would you trust your credit card to some entity that was verified by Thawte, like this spoof site? In Firefox, at least, getting a non-najor-CA-issued certificate actually tells you to decide if you think it is valid or not, and if you decide that it is valid, you keep it. That way, if you get a different certificate, it will tell you it is new (unless, of course, it is issued by some CA you trust), so you have a chance of identifying the hoax.

      Certificate Authorities don't actually know anything relevant. Signatures on certificates would actually be useful if they never caused the certificate to be essentially ignored, and if they were applied by organizations that actually check on businesses: localities in which businesses are incorporated, better business bureaus, credit card processing companies, and so forth.

    4. Re:but it prompts the user by Trejkaz · · Score: 1

      I removed Verisign from my browser's root list when the scandal went down.

      Any web site I view now which is signed by Verisign, then, prompts the user.

      So I suppose Verisign are just as bad as CAcert. Except that CAcert have never had a major scandal where they incorrectly signed a certificate for someone who didn't own the domain.

      --
      Karma: It's all a bunch of tree-huggin' hippy crap!
  32. Maybe they should have written about... by turnstyle · · Score: 3, Funny

    hmm, it seems maybe they should have written about MySQL Connections... ;)

    --
    Here's what I do: Bitty Browser & Andromeda
    1. Re:Maybe they should have written about... by lakerdonald · · Score: 2, Funny

      "Secure" MySQL connections of course.

  33. Actually the point is... by bindster · · Score: 1

    The point is that someone gives you a very large prime number, and they stand behind the claim that it's not some string of digits they pulled out of their ass.
    If VeriSign certs are breakable, you have some sort of guarantee/insurance (or at least you should, which is a different issue), but who cares if the guy who gave you a "certificate" turns out to have been an asshat?

    --
    WARNING: DO NOT LET DR. MARIO TOUCH YOUR GENITALS. HE IS NOT A REAL DOCTOR.
    1. Re:Actually the point is... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      The point is that someone gives you a very large prime number, and they stand behind the claim that it's not some string of digits they pulled out of their ass.

      What utter nonsense. The certificate authority does not generate your key pair. You generate your key pair. The certificate authority includes the public key that you generated in a certificate, which they sign. There is nothing even the worst certificate authority could do to comprimise your keys.

      As pointed out elsewhere, though, the issue is why should anyone trust the certificate authority's assertion that your public key belongs to you, if it isn't doing proper authentication of your identity. I sure wouldn't want my browser trusting some low quality free certificate authority that would generate signed certificates for anybody who wanted to claim to be "www.bankone.com". And that authentication isn't going to be free.

  34. Why shouldn't certification be free? by Mr.+Underbridge · · Score: 4, Interesting
    I thought the whole point of SSL is that not just anyone could get a cert...

    Having an internet presence is critical to running a successful business venture. Also, the creation of a truly international digital economy necessitates the development of a trusted method of identity establishment. Especially in these days of questionable computer security and the impossibility of ascertaining identity from IP. Reliable certification is vital to the development of the internet economy.

    However, the centralization of certification among a few organizations and their cost is shutting out smaller enterprises that don't have access to the fees or technology required. In effect, this institutes a kind of "information segregation" or isolationism that has the effect of a barrier to poorer nations - such as Nigeria or Rwanda - to the internet commerce that is so critical to the economy of the future.

    As such, I believe the best scenario is free certification provided by ICANN that can certify pages from poorer nations, so they can compete on an even playing field with the wealthier nations. Giving out free certifications - one per IP address at least - is the best way to accomplish this, and will allow for confident and secure transmission of funds and information.

    1. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by lukewarmfusion · · Score: 5, Insightful

      1. Getting an SSL certificate can require that you fax a copy of your articles of incorporation, public contact information, etc. Someone ends up doing some legwork to ensure that you are who you say you are and that you can be tracked down in the event that there is a complaint.

      2. Virtual hosts often share a single IP among many websites. You can't just authorize a name; SSL requires (from my understanding) a unique IP. That would make the IPv4 system even more strained.

      3. Certification pricing is partly based on trust. Anyone can generate a free certificate. But it won't work with every system because it wasn't created by a "trusted provider."

      If you can't afford a $200US/year fee for conducting "secure" business online, I probably wouldn't want to do business with you anyway.

    2. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by lordkuri · · Score: 2, Informative

      $200 a year my ass...

      $35/year, 99% installed browser base

    3. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by bigberk · · Score: 3, Funny
      Having an internet presence is critical to running a successful business venture...creation of a truly international digital economy necessitates the development... Especially in these days of questionable computer security and the impossibility of ascertaining...
      Dude, wash your mouth out with soap, the marketing speak is vile.
    4. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by XorNand · · Score: 4, Informative
      2. Virtual hosts often share a single IP among many websites. You can't just authorize a name; SSL requires (from my understanding) a unique IP. That would make the IPv4 system even more strained.
      SSL doesn't require a unique IP. The problem is that you can't use SSL with host headers, which is the trick that allows multiple websites to resolve to the same IP. Normally HTTP just serves back whatever content is on port 80 when a browser requests a connection. With HTTP/1.1 host headers were introduced which allowed the client to request a specfic hostname at that IP addresses, in effect allowing you to run multiple domains on a single IP address. This is was is incompatible with SSL.
      --
      Entrepreneur : (noun), French for "unemployed"
    5. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah, but who cares about all this SSL crap? My company DOES DO secure transactions that directly relate to one's bank account all the time... we just use 128-bit browser encryption. It may not be as fancy, but trust me, plenty of people seem quite willing to trust it.

    6. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Qzukk · · Score: 1

      The beauty is that if you buy a "domain" certificate for *.somedomain.com, you CAN serve multiple hostnames off of that (at least on apache 1.3.x) on one IP. When the browser connects, it'll establish the encryption with the domain certificate, then read the headers to find out which subdomain to go to. Just have all the Name-Based Virtual Hosts use the same certificate and ignore the warning.

      Need to have current browsers to get them to accept the certificates without complaint (older ones complained that the hostname of the site wasn't actually "*.somedomain.com"). Also, expect to pay a ton.

      --
      If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
    7. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by ip_fired · · Score: 4, Informative

      2. Virtual hosts often share a single IP among many websites. You can't just authorize a name; SSL requires (from my understanding) a unique IP. That would make the IPv4 system even more strained.

      This is the case if you want to use the default HTTPS port (443) since the hostname is encrypted. However, you can use your certificate on other ports. Just have your webserver listen to port 4443, and then in your links, just put https://yourhost.com:4443/ and it works great.

      When I was running a small webhost business, instead of getting a new IP for each cert, I'd just put them on different ports.

      Also, the IPv4 system isn't as strained as it used to be. With NAT, and creative netmasks, they have been able to spread out the IPs more efficiently. I wish it *were* more strained, because then they might be forced to actually switch over to IPv6.

      --
      Don't count your messages before they ACK.
    8. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by ckaminski · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Which is why I think the post office should get into the SSL cert business.

    9. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      > In effect, this institutes a kind of "information segregation" or isolationism that has the effect of a barrier to poorer nations - such as Nigeria or Rwanda - to the internet commerce that is so critical to the economy of the future.

      I guess you haven't checked out the latest 411 emails - Nigeria's participating in Internet commerce just fine ;-).

    10. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by grozzie2 · · Score: 1
      Having an internet presence is critical to running a successful business venture.

      This reminds me of all the drivel we heard in 99/2000 about how the internet was going to put all traditional businesses out of the game. Funny thing, it's only a few years later, and guess what, I still buy my groceries in a store, one that does not have a website. I still buy gasoline at a small station up the street, also, no website. And even more interesting, my business has survived fine, no website.

      For most real viable businesses, an online presence is an afterthought, simply because it's trendy today. Maybe someday they'll fix it up so i can squeeze a tomatoe online before I buy it online, but, till then, gonna continue to buy them from the store. Can say the same for almost all of the necessities in life. The only time an online presence is important, if you are selling a discretionary product, and you need to reach a wider market than your phyical location has for a catchment area. Then again, i wouldn't call that a 'viable' business to begin with, but, good management and leveraging information systems, it can be made viable.

    11. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by scovetta · · Score: 1

      True, but seeing :8443, :8444, :8080, :8081, etc looks a bit un-professional. My hosting service charges an extra buck or so per extra IP address. Having multiple IPs isn't a problem in most cases. However, it would be nice if they updated SSL to deal with host headers (not sure how they'd do that, since they're encrypted, but whatever.

      --
      Wer mit Ungeheuern kämpft, mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei zum Ungeheuer wird. --Nietzsche
    12. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Sentry21 · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I work as a sysadmin for an unnamed credit-card processor, and when I first interviewed for the job, one of the things my boss mentioned is that people will look for the Verisign logo. Yes, the same people that don't see the 'Help' link right in front of their faces get antsy if the processing website (i.e. us) doesn't have a verisign logo, regardless of whether the connection is encrypted or not (and it is - even going to our homepage redirects to an HTTPS URL, we encrypt everything).

    13. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by dmn · · Score: 1

      If you can't afford a $200US/year fee for conducting "secure" business online, I probably wouldn't want to do business with you anyway.

      SSL is about encryption, integrity and authentication. You must be a really cynical person, to associate the need for these only with business and making money...

    14. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Leebert · · Score: 2, Informative

      True, but seeing :8443, :8444, :8080, :8081, etc looks a bit un-professional.

      Yes, and you also run into those of us who do heavy egress filtering.

    15. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by lukewarmfusion · · Score: 1

      Of course I don't. I personally run sites where I use SSL without any financial incentive. For those kinds of environments, you can either pay for the ability to secure your site without a browser warning or you can suck it up and ask your users to trust you.

      There's a lot more to trusting a website than SSL, but the inconveniences of an unsupported Certificate Authority will do little to gain the trust of your users.

    16. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Giving out free certifications - one per IP address at least...

      Such certificates would be useless, as the IP is not used at all. But, since they are tied to a FQDN, perhaps the registrars should be required to issue them on demand to the administrative contacts of domains. Authentication/authorization is already in place, so there is no need to prove you have control over a domain. Verisign could offer a simple form, requiring only the host name and CSR to generate a spanking new cert in any format you want.

    17. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Step 1: get cert for foo-onlinebanking.com
      Step 2: send official looking SPAM saying please log in, it's secure, blah blah
      Step 3: profit

    18. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You forgot something. It should read: ...
      Step 3: ??
      Step 4: Profit!!

    19. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by jrockway · · Score: 1

      It's your fault for breaking the Internet for yourself. That's not a real solution to whatever problem you're trying to solve.

      I think this quote applies: "I'm not interested in security through obscurity. I want real security mechanisms, solutions that work for _everybody_. Yes, that's a lot more difficult than randomly blowing away ``suspicious'' portions of the Internet ..., but it's the Right Thing To Do." (djb)

      --
      My other car is first.
    20. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by RupW · · Score: 2, Insightful

      This is the case if you want to use the default HTTPS port (443) since the hostname is encrypted.

      More to the point, the certificate exchange identifying the server happens before you ever get to send the HTTP headers. You can only serve one SSL certificate on each port.

      The protocol could be extended to support this, e.g.:

      Client: connect SSL
      Server: hi, I'm www.site1.com
      Client: OK, that cert checks out, but I wanted www.site2.com
      Server: OK, here's the www.site2.com cert
      Client: OK

      but it doesn't currently.

    21. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by HogynCymraeg · · Score: 1
      that has the effect of a barrier to poorer nations - such as Nigeria or Rwanda

      Nigeria isn't poor! I got an email from one dude who's so stinking rich, that if I help him, he'd give me a large sum of money! Thinking about it, I've not heard back from him for a while....
    22. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by TheRaven64 · · Score: 2, Interesting
      The UK post office had plans a few years back to issue everyone in the UK with a digital signature. Not sure what happened to that idea.

      I would rather see encryption integrated into the DNS network. The root DNS servers are already trusted - their IP addresses are distributed with any DNS cache software. It wouldn't be too hard to also distribute their public key. Each DNS lookup could then request a signature as well as an address. Every time authority was delegated to another server, the SOA record and the delegated server's public key would have an accompanying signature, ensuring that the delegated server was returning valid information. Once the final record was returned, the returning server could also request a public key from that DNS and use that for communicating with the server. Since the signatures are static, they could be cached by DNS caches resulting in very little strain on the system. 99% of SSL certificates are used to verify that the remote machine is actually the machine it claims to be, not that it is owned by the company that claims to own it, so this would be a reasonable solution, and would not cost more than a domain registration.

      I believe DNSSEC works something like this, but I've not actually looked at it.

      --
      I am TheRaven on Soylent News
    23. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Proc6 · · Score: 1
      One port is more "professional" than another? What kind of asinine comment is that? What is the % of visitors to a website that says "Well I was just about to finalize my order when I noticed a number after a colon I'd never seen before, and even though I knew it was a legitimate business and the SSL cert details are correct, the number 8420 is just not professional, so I cancelled my order.".

      Drop some more acid.

      --

      I'm Rick James with mod points biatch!

    24. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by AKnightCowboy · · Score: 1
      Yes, and you also run into those of us who do heavy egress filtering.

      That's why God invented web proxies. Jesus later perfected the idea by adding caching to the system to save bandwidth. :-)

    25. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by scovetta · · Score: 1

      How many major companies (eBay, PayPal, BestBuy(sucks), etc) throw you to non-standard ports. Perhaps "professional" isn't the best word, maybe "customary" is better, but in either case, major business walk the walk, getting cheap because you don't want to get another IP suggests (to me, at least) that you're cheap.

      --
      Wer mit Ungeheuern kämpft, mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei zum Ungeheuer wird. --Nietzsche
    26. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by mwood · · Score: 1

      Check the cert. store in Mozilla. The USPS *was* a CA from 1995-97. Dunno who they certified, though, and apparently they quit.

      Hmmm. 1995 was way after the E*COM fiasco, wasn't it? I wonder what they were up to?

    27. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by mwood · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Actually I think that the banks ought to go into the cert. business, at least for their depositors, and demand client cert.s when establishing secure sessions for online banking. They have an interest in establishing identity and keeping things secure.

    28. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by mwood · · Score: 1

      *sigh* Any business that can afford a computer and a T1 but hasn't enough left for a certificate is so undercapitalized that it's going to go foom anyway.

    29. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      or

      Client: connect SSL www.site2.com
      Server: hi, I'm www.site2.com
      Client: OK

      why bother with the default?

    30. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by RupW · · Score: 1

      Client: connect SSL www.site2.com
      Server: hi, I'm www.site2.com
      Client: OK

      why bother with the default?


      Because that way you're leaking information. You send www.site2.com before you negotiate a secure connection so it'd be possible for a man-in-the-middle to read it and discover which site you're connecting to.

      OK, that's no different to the current mechanism - one site per port, they can see which port you're connecting to - but I couldn't bring myself to leave the leak in anyway :-)

    31. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by RupW · · Score: 1

      You send www.site2.com before you negotiate a secure connection so it'd be possible for a man-in-the-middle to read it and discover which site you're connecting to.

      And to shore up my original scheme for the obvious man-in-the-middle attack: as part of negotiating the first connection, the client would have to verify that www.site1.com and www.site2.com resolve to the same IP. Otherwise a man-in-the-middle with a valid cert for www.site1.com could intercept everyone's SSL traffic and learn which site they're connecting to before forwarding the connections on.

    32. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by birdman17 · · Score: 1
      In effect, this institutes a kind of "information segregation" or isolationism that has the effect of a barrier to poorer nations - such as Nigeria or Rwanda - to the internet commerce that is so critical to the economy of the future.

      Barriers to Nigerian internet commerce, you say? Let's see...

      1. Spam wealthy North Americans.
      2. Collect cash from gullible greedy victims.
      3. Profit!

      Nope, don't see any problems related to expensive SSL certificates there at all. There isn't even a ??? step. It seems that Nigerian internet commerce, rather than suffering from "information segregation", is alive and well, and indeed thriving.

      I think if these "poorer nations" you speak of want to participate in the "internet economy" that we use in North America, Europe, and Japan, they will first have to deal with some more serious issues than cheap and trustworthy certificate authorities.

    33. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by DavidHopwood · · Score: 1

      You can use TLS with the equivalent of host headers. See the "server_name" extension in RFC 3546. However I'm not sure this is widely supported yet.

      RFC 2817 "HTTP TLS Upgrade" also works with Host headers.

      (IOW, if virtual servers don't work with SSL/TLS blame the implementors, not the standards writers ;-)

    34. Re:Why shouldn't certification be free? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      All these documentary requirments are for public information, and thus easily produced on demand, on any suitable letterhead, fax coversheet etc.

      They never check the actual 'business unit' requesting the cert actually exists at the company head office egistered address or phone number, however.

  35. Ummmm... Why??? by James+Wells · · Score: 4, Informative

    cacert.org is doing everything these guys are, and then some. cacert.org is free, but with a much higher level of personal confidence than Verisign, Thawt, or any others that I know of.
    Additionally, with cacert.org, you are able to get more than just server certs and keys.

    --
    "Individuals are smart, people are stupid" -- Tommy Lee Jones as "K" from Men In Black
  36. SSL Certificates by osewa77 · · Score: 1

    SSL server certificates usually only need to assure of one thing: that the owner of the certificate is the same as the person in control of the domain. Everything else really is for the purpose of justifying the salaries of people who work with Certificate Authorities, really

    1. Re:SSL Certificates by chris_mahan · · Score: 1

      right, and you can point people to godaddy's and check the registrant on the domain.

      If it's ShadyCorp Domains in the bahamas, then does not matter whether their cert is from an authority or not.
      Likewise if it's "Tom Trusted" in This Town and You're at tomtrusted.com, then I gather the certificate is up to snuff.

      --

      "Piter, too, is dead."

    2. Re:SSL Certificates by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If only there was some way to verify who is really in control of a domain. I was in the registrar's office the other day, and... Oh, wait -- I logged in.

  37. nice ... but to be useful by mxpengin · · Score: 1

    I think this is a nice effort but will be pretty useless. We need a known and trustable organization doing this, or a coordinated effort between many organizations. To be a success we need the certificate of the "Certification Authority" installed by default in all browsers. Without that certificate installed, we will cryptic messages appearing in all our users screens .... and we dont want that. Once a trustable CA is established, Organizations and Companies as Mozilla, Opera or Apple may be ready to install the certificate of this new organization on their browsers . And a the result would be finally a useful CA.

    --
    "We all know Linux is great...it does infinite loops in 5 seconds." -- Linus
    1. Re:nice ... but to be useful by Mr.+BS · · Score: 1

      You ever take a look at some of those CA's? AOL is a trusted CA. I don't trust them as far as I can throw them. What about Equifax? They have the ability to make or break each and every one of our credit histories. Should I trust them because they have me by the cajones?

      Also, do you think it's fair that Versign can get away with charging $500 to $1000 for a 1 year cert? I think most of the people here know's what it takes to sign a cert. It's nothing! Why there's a charge like that I don't know, but yet we give into them because "they're trusted".

      I think this is a welcome endeavor and am glad to see the initiative.

    2. Re:nice ... but to be useful by bigberk · · Score: 2, Insightful
      [Verisign] Why there's a charge like that I don't know, but yet we give into them because "they're trusted".
      Verisign sells trust. If someone came to me with a $1000 bill in their hand, and asked me "do you trust me?" I'd be pretty tempted to just stamp them TRUSTED and take the cash. That's a fundamental problem. I think only the government or government supported nonprofit organization can be an ideal certificate authority.
    3. Re:nice ... but to be useful by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      The only thing you can be sure of is that it will cost more than $1000 to get the government to issue a bogus cert. I don't trust the feds either. However, there's less feds than there are [everyone else] so they are about as good as anyone.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    4. Re:nice ... but to be useful by mxpengin · · Score: 1

      Exactly , I dont trust them either, but this authorities already have their certificates pre-installed in all major web browsers. And that's exactly what any efford needs to be succesful .... And I dont think any organization responsible of a web browser will ever take in consideration this kind of certificates , until they are properly supported by someone they can trust in.

      --
      "We all know Linux is great...it does infinite loops in 5 seconds." -- Linus
  38. WTF?? by fatboy · · Score: 2

    Did you find out, that in order to make your site SSL aware, you'll need a SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) certificate?

    WTF is "SSL aware"?

    I have had no problem creating and using self signed certs with SSL.

    --
    --fatboy
    1. Re:WTF?? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I have had no problem creating and using self signed certs with SSL.

      End-user acceptance? :-p

  39. This is just plain stupid by galvanash · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Think about this for a minute... The purpose of SSL is not to secure data during transport, it is to secure data during transport AND to verify to the sender that the reciever is who they claim to be.

    Without identity verification there is NO POINT in encryption for most usages.

    The point is to make the person who is submitting their credit card number resonably secure in the knowledge that they are sending it to who they think they are. This cannot happen without identity verification.

    --
    - sigs are stupid
    1. Re:This is just plain stupid by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      Without identity verification there is NO POINT in encryption for most usages.

      Glory holes provide encryption without identity verification.

    2. Re:This is just plain stupid by ArtStone · · Score: 1

      Why should I trust an unknown 3rd party to generate the certificate for me? At the end of the process, doesn't that leave them with the information to do bad things, since they chose and potentially recorded the private key?

      --
      Final 2006 "Proof of Global Warming" US Hurricane Count -> 0
    3. Re:This is just plain stupid by galvanash · · Score: 1

      If they are an "unknown" 3rd party than you should not trust them. The whole point is that the 3rd party is KNOWN. Regardless, If YOU are the one operating the server and the information crossing the wire is sensitive to YOU, than YOU would be perfectly well served just running self-signed certificates. However, the majority of websites do not function this way. It is the user of the website that is sending sensitive information over the wire, not the other way around. It is the user who should be concerned about their information, and they have no reason to trust YOU because they have no way to be sure you are who you say you are. That is the purpose of 3rd party identification, because it proves to them that you are who you claim to be, or at least that a KNOWN 3rd party says you are who you say you are. Follow?

      --
      - sigs are stupid
    4. Re:This is just plain stupid by ArtStone · · Score: 1

      That I follow completely.

      I was commenting on the wisdom (or lack thereof) of using a 3rd party service - the one the article is acout - to generate the SSL for you as opposed to generating it yourself.

      --
      Final 2006 "Proof of Global Warming" US Hurricane Count -> 0
    5. Re:This is just plain stupid by galvanash · · Score: 1

      Ah. Sorry, I misunderstood.

      --
      - sigs are stupid
  40. slashdotted! by v3xt0r · · Score: 1

    Warning: Too many connections in /var/www/pnadodb/drivers/adodb-mysql.inc.php on line 108 Warning: MySQL Connection Failed: Too many connections in /var/www/pnadodb/drivers/adodb-mysql.inc.php on line 108 mysql://LinuxLookup:@localhost/Rogue failed to connectToo many connections LOL, classic

    --
    the only permanence in existence, is the impermanence of existence.
  41. Re:Well.... [OT] by FalconZero · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I'm using it as (loosly) 'reboot'
    So thats rougly:
    Windows in 6 Bytes (IA-32): Do nothing then reboot.

    --
    Windows in 6 Bytes (IA-32) : 90 90 90 90 CD 19
  42. How do you figure? by b00m3rang · · Score: 1
    If you don't know who will recieve your encrypted information then there's no point encrypting it in the first place!
    Securing the data from interception and tampering is much more important than verifying the identity of the server. How many people click the padlock each and every time they visit a secured site, anyway?
    1. Re:How do you figure? by cortana · · Score: 1

      Of course the encryption is important; but if you don't authenticate the other end of the connection, you deserve what you get when your bank details or whatever are stolen.

      Take the IDN vulnerabilities in Firefox, Opera et al. If anyone clicked the padlock icon while viewing the bogus Paypal site they would have noticed that the certificate was issued to Schmoo Inc., or whatever the company was called. Certainly it wasn't Paypal, Inc., Palo Alto, California, US.

    2. Re:How do you figure? by enosys · · Score: 2, Informative
      Sure, people don't usually click the padlock but they might notice a warning saying that the certificate doesn't come from a recognized authority or that it doesn't match the name of the site.

      The problem happens if a "trusted" authority issues certificates for sites like these. Then people go to to the site, think everything is okay, and securely give out information to the phishers. This is why automatically trusting these free certs is stupid and why you might as well just make your own certificate.

    3. Re:How do you figure? by starfishsystems · · Score: 1
      Securing the data from interception and tampering is much more important than verifying the identity of the server.

      But haven't you thought about this? The former strictly requires the latter.

      --
      Parity: What to do when the weekend comes.
    4. Re:How do you figure? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The bottom line is that people don't check certs anyway. Yes, you can set up a man-in-the-middle attack, but I'd think sniffing passwords and other sensitive information would be more of a risk. Maybe I'm completely off base.

  43. oh please by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Any host worth their salt lets their users take advantage of their cert for free included in the host cost..if you run your own web server then yeah, you SHOULD pay..they do.

  44. Google cache + other info by boingyzain · · Score: 1, Informative

    Here's google's cache of the front page that we beautifully slashdotted. Also, on a related note, many companies offer free SSL certificates if you do a little business with them. Ever-popular GoDaddy recently joined the ranks of those companies. They started offering free SSL certs to open-source projects.

  45. Blatant ignorance by QuantumG · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Does anyone even know what a man in the middle attack is anymore? Without certificates (or with easy to aquire certificates) we don't have a way to ensure that someone isn't spying on the encrypted traffic. This service will allow me to register a certificate that looks "just like" the one you expect to get from www.usemycreditcard.com and intercept your confidential details by presenting a key signed with that certificate to your browser. This is already happening with Verisign certificates, a case of them not doing their job, and now StartCom want to make it easier? I guess it doesn't really matter as the vast majority of people are too damn stupid to examine a certificate to ensure it is correct anyways.

    --
    How we know is more important than what we know.
    1. Re:Blatant ignorance by Tupper · · Score: 1

      I thought interlock protocols could be used to foil the man-in-the-middle attack. Am I out of date?

  46. Re:Well.... [OT] by bendelo · · Score: 2, Funny

    Ahhh yes, not the preferred method of rebooting =D

  47. Identity Verification by codermarc · · Score: 1

    For what, you might ask yourself?

    A large part of a certificate is having your identity verified with the issuing organization, not just the technical ability to communicate via SSL.

    1. Re:Identity Verification by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      and you believe that is actually happening now?

  48. breaking the monopoly on certs by wayne · · Score: 3, Informative
    Ok, I've seen lots of posts from people saying that certs are a rip off. Getting a cert from someone means that they trust you enough to accept money from you, and that is about it.

    I've also seen a lots of posts from people saying that you can generate a self-signed cert for free. The problem with these self-signed certs is that you get a pop-up from your browser warning you that the cert isn't trusted.

    It appears to me that cert.startcom.org is trying to do something different: They are handing out certs with them as the root authority and giving information about how to install their cert as acceptable by your browser. If enough people do this, then major browsers will "have" to start including startcom.org's certs in their distributions. Until that happens, you still get a reduced number of cert pop-ups because many different websites will be using the same "non standard" cert authority.

    You will get all the cheapness of self-signed certs with all the security of a cert from verislime or thawte. After all, the only real security with regular certs is that the traffic between your broswer and the website is encryptied.

    --
    SPF support for most open source mail servers can be found at libspf2.
    1. Re:breaking the monopoly on certs by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If enough people do this, then major browsers will "have" to start including startcom.org's certs in their distributions.

      Why?

      Really - why? Browser makers have strong financial incentives not to do that. Who's going to make them?

      By the way, using quotation marks for emphasis makes you look illiterate.

    2. Re:breaking the monopoly on certs by js3 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      yes but unless your clients install their root certs they will still get the pop cert warning. Installing their root cert as trusted also compromises you since you have no idea what kind of unscrupulos people they are giving certs to. The trust is not in the certificate, but who is signing the certificate. If I trust verisign, then I trust anyone verisign trusts. Do you trust anyone startcom.org trusts?

      --
      did you forget to take your meds?
    3. Re:breaking the monopoly on certs by wayne · · Score: 1
      If I trust verisign, then I trust anyone verisign trusts. Do you trust anyone startcom.org trusts?

      Given their respective track records, I trust startcom.org far more than verislime. I would probably trust identitythieves.ru more than verislime.

      Really, who do you think verislime would refuse money from and deny giving them a cert?

      --
      SPF support for most open source mail servers can be found at libspf2.
    4. Re:breaking the monopoly on certs by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      Chill out, you stupid raving fuckwit.

      Verislime, as you so cleverly designate them, are certainly a bunch of low life, but why would they compromise their business model by readily giving certificates to just anyone? Before long they would become known as an untrustoiwrthy issuer - and the next step would be begin dropped by browsers as a trusted authority.

      They may be evil but they are probably not totally stupid.

    5. Re:breaking the monopoly on certs by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      They may be evil but they are probably not totally stupid.
      Ahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha.
  49. Re:The problem with all SSL certs... by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 4, Informative
    The entire point of using certificates is so that you know that there is a certified binding between a public key and an identity. If you don't know who will recieve your encrypted information then there's no point encrypting it in the first place!
    Yes, the cheapest and easiest attack against a public-key crypto system is to trick someone into encrypting to the wrong public key. That is the problem that certificates are supposed to solve. Nor is it just a theoretical problem, because already one "Internet marketing" company has been intercepting SSL transactions.

    For a (partial) list of the design and implementation problems that interfere with certificates actually solving the problem, check out Peter Gutman's scathing critique of X.509-based PKI.

  50. Re:Mr. Anderson, what good is an SSL certificate i by MaGGuN · · Score: 1
    Want to run a website with secure connections? Or, want to run a website at all? Then don't publicise it on /. till you are *really* ready for the action!

    But of course, before any website is published, it should be able to cope with the /. effect. How sane! Try to understand that certain links put out on slashdot was not planned by the website owners.

  51. It's about trust by js3 · · Score: 3, Informative

    Anyone can make a certificate, hell you can make one yourself. The whole point of a issuing certificates is about delegating trust. Verisign, Thawte, etc are trusted. Some company that gives it out for free without any sort of checking is not.

    --
    did you forget to take your meds?
    1. Re:It's about trust by Sloppy · · Score: 3, Interesting
      Verisign, Thawte, etc are trusted. Some company that gives it out for free without any sort of checking is not.
      The catch is that they aren't really trusted, or more importantly, trustable. What do you know about Verisign's internal security procedures? Do you have any idea how well they check people's ids? How many people have access to their signing key?

      Unless you work there, Verisign is just a faceless enigma. You know more about your father's brother's nephew's cousin's former roommate, than you know about Verisign.

      If a cert is signed only by Verisign (and the nature of X.509 certs is that they only have one CA) then you have to decide to either trust it completely, or trust it not at all. And if, like 99.999999% of the population, you simply have no clue as to whether or not Verisign can be trusted, best practices are to assume the worst, and the certs are effectively meaningless, whether they are signed by Verisign or by some kid in his basement.

      As it turns out, there's a better way: PGP. PGP uids can be signed by multiple entities, so if you have a clue about some signers and no clue about others, you can throw out the info that means nothing to you, and still take advantage of the info which has meaning. And even for the signatures that you're uncertain about, if you're willing to quantify how uncertain you are, then you can multiply uncertainties, based on the idea that conspiracies are hard to pull off.

      The only problem with PGP, is that use of it in concert with secure connections, hasn't really caught on. But surprisingly, the idea isn't unheard of or completely dead, either. If people ever start to take internet security really seriously, there are projects like GnuTLS. It's a long way off from the mainstream, but just about everything we take for granted these days, was like that at one time. :-)

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    2. Re:It's about trust by kryptkpr · · Score: 1

      It's not about trust.

      It's only about making sure your potential customers don't get a pop-up that even hints at the fact that your site may be insecure.

      The signing authorities that browsers are by default configured to "trust" are the ones that get used.

      --
      DJ kRYPT's Free MP3s!
    3. Re:It's about trust by storem · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Thawte and CAcert have a Web Of Trust (WOT) to deal with the trust issue. I'm a notary myself for both Thawte and CAcert and an ID of a person is not trsuted until mutiple! notaries have physically verified a person with photo ID. I take my notary job very seriously, and I think all notaries do.

    4. Re:It's about trust by jrumney · · Score: 4, Interesting
      The catch is that they aren't really trusted, or more importantly, trustable. What do you know about Verisign's internal security procedures?

      CA's are supposed to make their issuing policies publically available. One day a few years ago when I had too much time on my hands I went through and checked them all. Of the 100 odd root certificates that were originally installed in my browser, I threw out about half for not having their policy publically available in human readable form. I threw out most of the rest (including Verisign and Thawte's low-end certs) because their policy was too lax, but maybe I just have high standards.

    5. Re:It's about trust by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So you trust organizations that issue certificates in one companies name to unrelated third parties as it is known that one of them did witb Microsoft?

      Wow.... Yeah that's an authority I can trust.

  52. FYI... SSL Certificate for IIS, Exchange OWA... by loyukfai · · Score: 1

    http://www.msexchange.org/tutorials/SSL_Enabling_O WA_2003.html

    You can easily create a certificate yourself with other OS and programs too, as others have noted.

  53. Free SSL Certificates by sp3d2orbit · · Score: 2, Informative

    Warning: Too many connections in /var/www/pnadodb/drivers/adodb-mysql.inc.php on line 108

    Really great article...

    Go Daddy.com recently annouced they were offering free SSL certificates for Open Source Projects:

    Go Daddy.com

  54. Pointless by Pan+T.+Hose · · Score: 0, Redundant

    I have been using self-signed SSL certificates for twelve years and I have yet to see any significant (i.e. higher than 0.01%) number of people who reject them when warned by their browsers. So I just stopped paying for them and saved a fortune. And they really costed a fortune back then, now they cost pennies in comparison but even less people bother verifying them today, so it is in fact even more pointless to pay for them (rejected percentage to price ratio is even lower). Let's face it, the whole idea of selling integers was a scam from the beginning. Do we have to pay for our SSH keys? Or GPG keys? Of course not! But HTTPS is an "e-commerce" protocol so it is somehow justified to pay for the privilege of using certain integers. This is just a legacy of dot-com era when everything "e-lectronic" was worth millions and everyone was happy to pay for it because it was a sure way to earn millions. Now it is just silly.

    --
    Sincerely,
    Pan Tarhei Hosé, PhD.
    "Homo sum et cogito ergo odi profanum vulgus et libido."
  55. DomainKeys by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting
    I liked the idea behind Domain Keys:
    Domain Keys

    You post your public key in your DNS record. DNS already maintains an identity system.

    The trick with DK is to get the browser's to fetch the site's public key from the DNS record (it has to do the DNS query anyway) and use that in the handshaking.

    Yes, there is the potential for someone to hijack the site, but that is getting more difficult. And, DK would be a free add-on to the DNS stuff you have to do anyway.

    1. Re:DomainKeys by kbielefe · · Score: 1

      Interesting idea, but still vulnerable to man in the middle attacks unless the DNS is authenticated.

      --
      This space intentionally left blank.
  56. Re:Ummmm... Why??? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The guys who have "Root CA" as the organization name in their cert? They can't even get their own danmn name right; no way in hell am I letting them vouch for mine!

  57. Re:Text of linked article from ... linked article. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    keep the whoring in Vegas.

    man I just got back from my first trip to vegas. I asked tons of people where to find good strippers but nobody on the main strip knew anything. so WHERE ARE THE STRIPPERS in vegas?? i thought the whores were all over the place. what a ripoff

  58. SSL mania by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    SSL is totally overhyped. What would be much more important is a general encryption mechanism for websites. Since HTTP is not a natively encrypted protocol at the moment increased security and anonymity can only be achieved using software like Tor: http://tor.eff.org

  59. Man in the Middle Attack only works first time by dananderson · · Score: 1
    What you say is true, but the "Man in the Middle Attack" only works the first time. Once the certificate is accepted, the "man in the middle" can't send a fake certificate.

    Usually SSL websites are used with people who have continuing relationships, such as businesses, confidential email, and so on. They are used less frequently with one-time visitors. That said, it still leaves a large hole for new visitors to fall into.

    1. Re:Man in the Middle Attack only works first time by QuantumG · · Score: 1
      Ya know I don't even buy that certificates are necessary anymore. Why can't we just have a repository where you store a hash of your site's public key. When I go to your site for the first time I get your public key, calculate the hash and deliver it to the repository for checking. It gives me back a yah or nah and we're secure. Of course, the repository will have to sign it's response, and include the hash that it is accepting, which means the browser will still have to have a repository's public key embedded in it, but that's doable.

      Surely the load on a central repository like this would be minimum if we use UDP for transport. It is a central point of attack though.

      --
      How we know is more important than what we know.
    2. Re:Man in the Middle Attack only works first time by jd · · Score: 1
      In other words, use a Kerberos-like mechanism where the server you are connecting to has to be authenticated by the client.


      Actually, using Kerberos for that (which would work, as it is a recognized standard) wouldn't be that hard, as the token-passing mechanisms have already been written and tested extensively.


      Since it has proven a pain to get users to register for certificates (which means that any attacker can spoof as a legit client), this might help. Why? Because Kerberos can be used to authenticate any traffic flow and not just browser traffic, sites that provide multiple services could reasonably Kerberize the lot. Doing the same with SSL certificates would be extremely difficult.


      The last benefit is actually the inverse of the so-called benefit of using these free certs. It splits the authentication from the encryption. You still have both, but they aren't intertwined. Then, you can use any encryption method you liked, not just SSL or TLS.


      (I'm not even sure -- will SSL certs work with TLS, given that TLS does not require SSL to function? It's a different mechanism.)

      --
      It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
    3. Re:Man in the Middle Attack only works first time by asdfghjklqwertyuiop · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The whole point of certificates is to associate other pieces of information with a private key, like a legal name, an official company name, an address and location, the domain name... the CA isn't just supposed to sign certs that associates those types of information at random, they're supposed to make sure that the information in the certificate they sign reflects the actual entity which holds the private key. Well that's what a CA is supposed to do in theory at least....

      If the CA is just signing everything that gets sent to them or simply not including enough identifying information as in your idea then there is no point in the CA's existance... I can't use the certificates they sign to help get an idea of who I'm talking to...

  60. Re:Well.... [OT] by jeffy210 · · Score: 4, Funny

    Reminds me of one time back in HS. We didn't like our CS teacher and for our final project in C every student put a call to INT 19 at the end of their code, so when she was through running and grading our program it'd reset her computer. I don't think she ever figured it out.

    --
    ------
    "And may your days be long upon the earth."
  61. As low as $9.95 by AGTiny · · Score: 1

    I just got a browser-accepted 1 year cert for $9.95. It was a deal through my server host (The Planet), it's $49 retail. This is still peanuts compared to the $349 my employer insists on paying for certs from Verisign.

  62. Re:Text of linked article from ... linked article. by sparkz · · Score: 1
    for this you should use your brain and common sence.*

    It's worth staying away from people who put asterisks by their own spelling mistakes!

    --
    Author, Shell Scripting : Expert Re
  63. GoDaddy will give you a *real* free SSL cert... by bigtangringo · · Score: 5, Informative

    ...If you are doing it for an OpenSource project:
    https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/ssl/ssl_o pensource. asp

    Not to mention, it's the cheapest SSL cert I know of at $30/year.

    --
    Yes, I am a smart ass; it's better than the alternative.
    1. Re:GoDaddy will give you a *real* free SSL cert... by ticktockticktock · · Score: 1
      Here is a clickable link for those of us that are too lazy to copy/paste the URL.

      https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/ssl/ssl_opensource. asp

    2. Re:GoDaddy will give you a *real* free SSL cert... by ChaosDiscord · · Score: 1

      Strictly speaking, these free SSL certs are real. They're just relatively unrecognized. What GoDaddy provides isn't "more real", it's "more widely trusted." If you chose to trust StartCom by importing their CA cert then their certs will be practically identical to GoDaddy's. The question is: do you want to trust StartCom in this way? In theory you should decide which CAs to trust based on how much validation they do of their users. It's not a "real vs not-real" test, it's a gradiant. Some CAs do extensive checks. Some do middlin' checks. StartCom does basically nothing. Of course, in practice each browser manufacturer sets its own rules and automatically trusts CAs that pass those rules.

    3. Re:GoDaddy will give you a *real* free SSL cert... by ChaosDiscord · · Score: 1

      Indeed, on the matter of "real" certs, you can't get much more real than VeriSign. And VeriSign is apparently willing to issue "microsoft.com" certificates to strangers and issue certificates that claim to be owned by PRESS YES TO CONTINUE. If that's the sort of security we get from the "real" CAs, I'm not terribly impressed.

    4. Re:GoDaddy will give you a *real* free SSL cert... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
  64. And another by nihilogos · · Score: 1

    Warning: Too many connections in /var/www/pnadodb/drivers/adodb-mysql.inc.php on line 108

    Once again someone decides to use mysql_pconnect without really understanding what it does. That function should have red flashing warning light all over it in the PHP docs.

    --
    :wq
  65. I'm more than willing... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'm more than happy to pay a few hundred dollars to protect hundreds of thousands going through my web site. When you're protecting a large sum of money, it's probably not the best idea to base a decision simply on what is cheapest. A few hundred to protect hundreds of thousands is worth it in my book.

  66. Comment removed by account_deleted · · Score: 1

    Comment removed based on user account deletion

  67. article by 545fun · · Score: 1

    if you speak german, there is an interesting article about the consequences of giving a certificate without authenticating the requesting person: http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/56750/

    basically they say - since "starcom.org" gives ssl certs even for 3rd party websites - any user installing their CA certificate is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. this could be interesting for pishing websites; with this kind of certificates they would look even more authentic to the victims.

    therefore - if you don't want to spend the money for a versign/thawte/...cert,- i see no point in _not_ using a (openssl) self signed cert

  68. Do we really want free SSL certificates? by freelock · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Many fine, relevant comments have already been made in this thread. But I didn't see anyone point out the downside of free SSL certificates: free phishing sites!

    Yes, it's possible to freely self-sign certificates to get encryption. I run my own certificate authority for encrypting traffic among my clients, if they aren't conducting e-commerce. These self-signed certificates work fine without triggering a browser warning--if you import the certificate authority certificate.

    For my public/e-commerce sites, I use FreeSSL, at $35/year. This buys me a blessing from a CA that is pre-installed in over 95% of all browsers in use. What's not covered? Konqueror. Curl. I think Safari, though I haven't checked recently. For my clients who want those to work, I suggest spending the ~$120 or so for a Geotrust cert.

    Now, imagine if every spammer in the world could get an SSL certificate for free... Already domains are cheap enough that they can set them up to easily spoof real web sites--banks, etc. Imagine if every one of those had an SSL certificate, and didn't trigger a browser warning? Most people I know look for the lock. If the lock is there, they trust the site. They don't actually look at the certificate, or even the URL much.

    For this reason alone, I'm glad certs aren't free. You can do encryption for free, but I'd prefer my browser to at least let me know the site I'm visiting is too cheap to buy a real cert. (that's not meant as a slam, since I'm too cheap to buy one for most of my sites...).

    Cheers,
    Freelock Computing

    --
    Open Source Solutions for Small Business Problems
    Freelock Computing
  69. "Certified" by kg4gyt · · Score: 2, Insightful

    You can create your own SSL Certificate, however whoever visits your server must chose to accept it. Just because it isn't "Certified" doesn't mean that your site is insecure.

  70. Welcome to Last Week by Terragen · · Score: 1

    CA Cert has been doing this for a while now as mentioned in this slashdot article.

  71. "much better" - pfft. by Chuck+Chunder · · Score: 2, Informative

    The GoDaddy certs are compatible with pretty much every browser in use today....

    Internet Explorer 5.01 and higher
    AOL 5 and higher
    Netscape 4.7 and higher
    Opera 7.5 and higher.
    Safari on Mac OS X 10.3.4 or higher
    Mozilla (all versions)
    Firefox (all versions)

    --
    Boffoonery - downloadable Comedy Benefit for Bletchley Park
  72. Re:Well.... [OT] by andreyw · · Score: 1

    Anyone, who can't figure out that "asm("int 19");" doesn't belong at the end main(...), shouldn't be teaching CS. lol.

  73. MakeCert.exe - more info by kiddailey · · Score: 1
  74. Blurb by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The whole (except for the last sentence) blurb from this story was taken word for word from StartCom...

  75. Try that in Oracle, with their Jinitiator by papaia · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Are people really so childish to believe that there is no relationship between big software manufacturers, and the big profit-producing cert authorities? Try to use even a mid-tier (I am not even getting to the free ones) authority, like Thawte, and let me know if you will ever get the Jinitiator client in Oracle 9i working, without manually redistibuting a new cert file to all clients ... what you end up doing is paying Verisign a few more thousands, for all the servers, to avoid paying the admins tens of thousands, to customize clients, distributions and updates ...

    --
    == With enough Will Power, one could move mountains. With enough Brains, one would just leave them where they are ==
  76. What does it do? by Mustang+Matt · · Score: 1

    Well if you're going to bash them at least explain why they shouldn't be using pconnect!

    --
    The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. - Benjamin Franklin
  77. Soley for encryption it would be worth it... by Mustang+Matt · · Score: 1

    I wish SSL would be broken into two seperate entities... Encryption and Verification.

    I would absolutely love to have every single domain's web and email encrypted with SSL but I don't because of the cost involved. (Even at cheap rates it adds up with enough quantity.)

    The advantage being that passwords wouldn't be sent across the internet or the lan on either side in plain text.

    I would just self-sign everything but I haven't figured out how to permanently keep IE and OE from popping up warnings every single time.

    --
    The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. - Benjamin Franklin
  78. Re:Ummmm... Why??? by Sloppy · · Score: 1

    Yep, cacert.org is probably the best there is, for ssl certs. Not only do they check two ids, but even if you can fake a driver's license and passport, you'd have to slip your forged credentials by multiple people in order to get enough points. It's hard to imagine that some nameless drone who handles a hundred certs a day at a faceless corporation, would be as careful as people who meet you face-to-face and whose personal reputations are on the line.

    --
    As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
  79. Gone with the wind by adeydas · · Score: 1

    I told ya there is nothing called free lunch. They wanted to offer free SSL certificates, now they are having 'Too many SQL connections'. May be they should reconsider their decision and make it paid after all to buy more bandwidth.

    1. Re:Gone with the wind by /dev/trash · · Score: 1

      they could have ALL the bandwidth they wanted and mySQL would still crash. PostGRES. That's the FOSS way to go.

  80. site was running linux by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    went down like a kamikaze.

  81. Re:Text of linked article from ... linked article. by ckaminski · · Score: 1

    AFAIK, prostitution is illegal in Vegas. Have to hit the burbs.

  82. SSL Certificates can be had quite a bit cheaper by ddent · · Score: 3, Informative

    We issue SSL Certificates with prices a good deal less than hundreds upon hundreds of dollars. Our certificates are issued with a root that already exists in browsers, and we do ID verification (but remain flexible - we will issue certificates to both corporations and natural persons, i.e. people). In terms of keeping the encryption meaningful, using a self-signed certificate doesn't cut it - it makes it trivial for the right person to perform a man-in-the-middle attack.

    As much as I'd love to say otherwise, the SSL business is actually quite competitive these days -- the days of a 128-bit certificate costing at least $895 are long gone.

    1. Re:SSL Certificates can be had quite a bit cheaper by jrumney · · Score: 1
      As much as I'd love to say otherwise, the SSL business is actually quite competitive these days

      The server certificate business has always been competitive, you'd have to go back to the days of Netscape 3.0 to find a browser that had less than 50 root certificates preinstalled.

      Client certificates (for authentication and email) are slightly less competitive, but there are still reasonable deals around.

      Code signing certificates on the other hand are hundreds upon hundreds of dollars, and last time I checked only two companies were offering them. Both companies required you to purchase separate certificates at full price (despite only having to do the identity check once) for MSJVM, Java 2 plugins and Netscape 4.7, and if you want one for signing ActiveX controls, thats an entirely different product again. Of course suckers that we aren't, we only bought the one certificate and used openssl to convert it.

      So is your company planning to branch out beyond server certs at any stage?

    2. Re:SSL Certificates can be had quite a bit cheaper by ddent · · Score: 1

      We've been looking at doing code signing certificates for a little bit now, no firm dates though...

      There have always been lots of certificate roots in browsers, but there have been far fewer companies actually issuing them. And fewer still who have their certificate in almost all the browsers (which is the real issue IMHO).

  83. The Meaning Of All This For Mere Mortals... by smug_lisp_weenie · · Score: 5, Informative

    Let's suppose you take your PC to a coffee shop and want to read your stock-r-us.com stock portfolio...

    ...even though there are already PLENTY of free certificate providers out there today, stocks-r-us has to pay big big bucks to one of a few certificate agencies- There's absolutely, positively, no way around this currently, for complex reasons that are hard to explain briefly, but I'll give it a shot...

    First of all, there are two things, at the minimum, you need to talk to stocks-r-us over the internet securely from a coffee shop:

    1. An encrypted communication channel (this is handled by public key and symmetric key encryption protocols)
    2. A guarantee that the person you are talking to over the 'net really is stocks-r-us and not an impostor.

    All this fancy talk in this slashdot story involves this second step in this process... so how can you get this no-impostor guarantee? Well, the most basic way would be to ask stocks-r-us a secret question only they could answer, sort of like a "secret handshake". An SSL certificate is simply a "secret handshake". (well, not so simply, but just accept this idea for now...) So in order to make sure the company you're talking to over the 'net is your stocks-r-us, you check to see if they know the stocks-r-us secret handshake. Problem solved...

    ...or not: This works fine if YOU know how to recognize the stocks-r-us secret handshake, but, for technical reasons, this is only possible if your computer and stocks-r-us have chatted in the past (i.e. you've used your computer before to sheck your stocks) if not, there's no way you can get the jimmy on how to tell a genuine stocks-r-us secret handshake.

    This is where a certificate authority comes in: You can get a third person (whose handshake you do know) to give you stocks-r-us' secret handshake. There are many many organizations that offer free (or not free) services to act as this third person (i.e. as a "CA") So stocks-r-us can just sign up with one of these companies to give them the secret handshake info- Problem solved...

    ...or not: The user of their has to already know the handshake of the CA for this to work ahead of time, or the proverbial "house of cards" will just fall apart anyway... How can they be sure you already have the "secret hanshake" of this third person/CA?

    Well, the answer is pretty goofy... the "handshake" of the CA has to be "hardwired" into every copy of Firefox/Internetexplorer/Safari/etc when it is installed. If you go to the settings of your browser, you'll see a list of CAs already placed in by Microsoft/Apple/Mozilla/etc right out of the box! That's the only way this could work...

    ...so you might be wondering: Don't the CA companies in this initial list of built-in handshakes have some kind of monopoly/oligopoly? The answer, of course, is YES: These special CAs charge monopoly-style prices for their services for this very reason. The point of this slashdot article is that an non-profit group wants to somehow make Microsoft/Apple/Mozilla/etc to put it in this super-duper "handshake" list, but it promises it won't charge everyone big bucks who wants to use them as their third party.

    (I'm no expert on this, so any experts are welcome to reply to my post to make any corrections if there are any errors of substance...)

    1. Re:The Meaning Of All This For Mere Mortals... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting
      Let's suppose you take your PC to a coffee shop and want to read your stock-r-us.com stock portfolio...

      This is followed by an excellent explanation of how the whole thing works. But I can't get past this opening sentence. If I run your wireless access point, I pretty much control your DNS. It would be trivial to point yahoo.com to my own web server, and deliver a complete mockup of their site, including the login page. After you log in, I return a "We're sorry, our mail system is temporarily unavailable." message. Now I have your login information, and it will never occur to you that an SSL session was never initiated because you simply clicked a few buttons or links that used regular HTTP, and the rest of the Internet was accessible as usual.

      With major municipalities considering citywide deployment of wireless access points, this could easily be the phishing of the future. Hell, I could set this up on a windowsill and collect login information for any number of domains. Nobody checks how they've connected once they have a signal.

    2. Re:The Meaning Of All This For Mere Mortals... by DarkRecluse · · Score: 2, Funny

      I don't know, but if I walk into a retail store and the salesperson expects me to complete "the secret handshake" I think I will either call the cops, or wait for the store's walls to fold up around me and be quickly loaded into a black van.

      --
      --"It's Bradford Company, slash your last name, dot your first name"
    3. Re:The Meaning Of All This For Mere Mortals... by smug_lisp_weenie · · Score: 1

      If you point www.yahoo.com at another site, the program would notice that the certificate of the new site (if it WAS generated by a 1st tier DA) does not have the proper yahoo url- I don't think this could be done without getting at least a couple of warning messages from the browser- That's how I understand it, at least.

    4. Re:The Meaning Of All This For Mere Mortals... by tyler_larson · · Score: 1
      even though there are already PLENTY of free certificate providers out there today, stocks-r-us has to pay big big bucks to one of a few certificate agencies- There's absolutely, positively, no way around this currently

      Actually...

      GoDaddy has a signing cert that is signed by one of the universally-trusted CAs that is shipped with all the web browsers (including IE).

      That means that GoDaddy has the authority to sign stocks-r-us's cert and it will be trusted by all browsers. And GoDaddy has a long-standing tradition of not overcharging for their services.

      They're currently running a special, $30/year (normally $50). Obviously they can't offer the service for free*, they have to pay for their signing cert--which isn't cheap. However, considering everything that goes into the vetting process and all that, I think $30/year is very reasonable.

      * GoDaddy does offer free certificate signing for open-source software projects. Sounds like a "do no evil" company to me.

      --
      "With sufficient thrust, pigs fly just fine. However, this is not necessarily a good idea...."
      RFC 1925
  84. Issuing authorities by initialE · · Score: 2, Informative

    Speaking on behalf of a company forced to purchase a certificate from a recognized issuing authority, I can say that the main issue involved was the need to have the certificate automatically trusted w/o needing to install additional trusted roots. Sure, in a windows domain we can deploy our own root to our clients, but we were looking at problems outside our organization.
    1) Exchange RPC over HTTPS - outlook 2003 does have this support, but it won't work if it does not trust the certificate of the server. And if you don't have admin rights, you can't add that trust. Specifically, RPC over HTTP was designed for use outside of the organization, so it does make things harder if you need admin access over a box in a partners organization (it's either that or use OWA, which we all hate in general).
    2) Mobile devices and Handhelds. Windows isn't the only system that comes preconfigured with certain trusted root authorities. Mobile devices are a pain in that some of them can't even be configured with additional trusted roots.
    3) We experience a significant slowdown when we require our users to temporarily accept certificates for a web session. I'm not sure why myself, actually.
    In the end, we just bit the bullet and bought ourselves one from Entrust.

    --
    Starbucks, Harbuckle of Breath.
  85. Fun with MySQL by DeAgua · · Score: 1

    This is either a really lame site that displays various error conditions or another reason to use MySQL; Verbose Exceptions: Warning: Too many connections in /var/www/pnadodb/drivers/adodb-mysql.inc.php on line 108 Warning: MySQL Connection Failed: Too many connections in /var/www/pnadodb/drivers/adodb-mysql.inc.php on line 108 mysql://LinuxLookup:@localhost/Rogue failed to connectToo many connections

    1. Re:Fun with MySQL by MrPink2U · · Score: 1

      Another reason TO use MySQL? Maybe NOT TO is what you meant to say, but I disagree. Their site is seeing the effect of /. so give 'em a break. They obviously didn't size their server to handle the load brought on by the onslaught of slashdot users.

      Maybe they actually set the MAX_USER_CONNECTIONS variable in the database server to prevent MySQL from running the machine into the ground.

  86. I Need Help with Free SSL Cert -- by Spy+Handler · · Score: 0, Offtopic
    Ok so once I obtain a free SSL cert, how do I install it on my website? I have a shared hosting plan on Valuweb.... it's not like I have root access to the box or Apache.

    I guess I could ask Valueweb to install it for me, but they sell their own Thawte or Geotrust SSL certs. For $160 a year. Think they'll install my free cert for free? (I honestly don't know)

    1. Re:I Need Help with Free SSL Cert -- by pe1chl · · Score: 2, Informative

      SSL is not working with shared hosting.
      You need a dedicated server with a separate IP address to realistically use SSL.

      Why? With shared hosting, the virtual host is selected based on the Host: header of the HTTP request. But the request is sent over the SSL connection!
      So the sequence is:
      1. establish secure connection based on certificate (which is attached to sitename)
      2. send request over secure connection

      But in shared hosting the situation is:
      1. connect to shared host
      2. decide which site to serve based on hostname sent with request

      Unfortunately, those two sequences are conflicting.

    2. Re:I Need Help with Free SSL Cert -- by Spy+Handler · · Score: 1

      Well, I understand what you're saying, but I think there must be a workaround because Valueweb (hosting provider) offers SSL certificates for $160 a month to shared host customers.

    3. Re:I Need Help with Free SSL Cert -- by pe1chl · · Score: 1

      Maybe when you buy such a certificate they move you over to a dedicated server and this is part of the reason they charge more.

    4. Re:I Need Help with Free SSL Cert -- by sloth+jr · · Score: 1

      You describe one possible scenario.

      Shared hosting usually accomplishes this by terminating the SSL connection at a load balancer, then dispatching the request unencrypted (behind a firewall and in private IP space) to one of a series of webservers, and re-encrypting the response. The vhosts on the webserver are as you describe, but can serve thousands and thousands of hosts.

      Practically, you do need a dedicated VIP (not necessarily server) to support non-wildcard SSL. Wildcard SSL is difficult for many hosting providers to mandate, as customers will want to use their own domainname to reinforce their branding.

  87. Not free but awfully darn cheap! by mr_zorg · · Score: 1

    Try InstantSSL. We use these across our medium sized server farm at work with no issues.

  88. Re:Text of linked article from ... linked article. by Spy+Hunter · · Score: 1
    lets think about, what SSL is supposed to do: Encrypt and secure the traffic between a browser and the server! Point! It is not supposed to give you the impression, that a website is trustworthy or even say anything about its identity.

    Um, no. Let's *really* think about what SSL is supposed to do: it is supposed to allow you to communicate to (for example) PayPal through routers controlled by (for example) an evil mastermind, but ensure that the evil mastermind can't read or modify your data, even though he is the one delivering it back and forth. The evil mastermind ends up with a complete transcript of your conversation (including the part where you send encryption keys back and forth), but he can't read any of it. Pretty cool actually. It is rather surprising (to me at least) that this is even possible.

    However, without verification of identity, the whole scheme falls apart. Sure, you can still establish an encrypted connection, to somebody. But you don't know who! You could have just established an encrypted connection with the evil mastermind, who has programmed his routers to deliver your packets to him instead of PayPal. The encryption doesn't help so much when you send your enemies the key! If the evil mastermind is really clever, he will then establish a second encrypted connection to PayPal, and send your data through it. Now he can read your entire conversation with PayPal, just as if you weren't using any encryption at all, and you are no better off.

    This is your basic "man-in-the-middle" attack, which everybody who has ever learned anything about security should know. I feel stupid even explaining it here (you knew this right? good), but apparently these guys haven't heard of it.

    That's why SSL's identity verification is critical, not useless, and why VeriSign gets paid the money they do. Sure you can get your certs signed by Joe Blow for free. But if anybody can get a cert signed by Joe Blow (perhaps after a little bribe, say $1,000,000; chump change compared to how much organized crime could steal with a key to a large commerce site) then your cert is basically worthless, even for "only" encrypting traffic.

    --
    main(c,r){for(r=32;r;) printf(++c>31?c=!r--,"\n":c<r?" ":~c&r?" `":" #");}
  89. The 1 place government is useful and..... by AKosygin · · Score: 2, Insightful

    they do nothing. For once, if the government had a CA authority and actually issue SSLs to companies that are registered with them, it would help. When you register for DBA (Doing Business As) or file articles of incorporation, they should be the ones to issue the certificates as they are the most qualified to judge authenticity and do ID checks. Isn't that the reason why we file these things with the government and NOT Verisign?

    This is the one place the government DOES need to be a part of, and yet they do not. Government in all the wrong places.... go figures.

    Or when people WANT to be verified online, then the government should be the ones issuing the certificates. When a person say they are Joe Smith, which type of ID do you believe more? An ID issued by some company or a government issued driver's license/ID?

    The government actually should have a Certification Authority freely (or some nominal fee) available to its citizens.

    See, proper government involvement: http://www.hongkongpost.gov.hk/product/ecert/type/ personal/index.html

    1. Re:The 1 place government is useful and..... by AKnightCowboy · · Score: 1
      The government actually should have a Certification Authority freely (or some nominal fee) available to its citizens.

      Hell, I'd be happy if the government just had a trusted CA available freely to government agencies! We spend tens of thousands of dollars a year on Verisign certificates. What a waste of taxpayer dollars when it would be trivial to get Microsoft and Mozilla to add a federal government CA certificate into their trusted list.

  90. Congratulations! You won a clue, or two by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    > If you can't afford a $200US/year fee for conducting "secure" business online, I probably wouldn't want to do business with you anyway.

    It's not the money. Learn something about the issue before making idiotic remarks.

    "Ten Risks of PKI: What You're not Being Told about Public Key Infrastructure" By Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier
    http://www.schneier.com/paper-pki.html

    Peter Gutmann's PKI Tutorial: "Everything you Never Wanted to Know about PKI but were Forced to Find Out"
    http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/
    pkitutorial.pdf

  91. This is old news on this side of the pond by Dasch · · Score: 2, Interesting

    We've had free certificates (OCES, SSL, whatever) here in Denmark for years. It's a project initiated by the government and the largest telecom here, TDC.

    We can even use it to pay our taxes! Yay!

  92. Certificate generation by mikrorechner · · Score: 2, Interesting

    According to this article on heise.de, StartCom generates the SSL certificate you order on their server, sign it, and send it to you.

    How do I know that they don't keep a copy of the cert for their own use? They could impersonate my server any time with this.

    --
    "Oh, a lesson in not changing history from Mr I'm-my-own-Grandpa." - Dr Hubert Farnsworth
    1. Re:Certificate generation by gedhrel · · Score: 1

      A CA can _always_ impersonate you, whether or not they have a copy of your certificate. How? Well, they just create a new one that claims to be yours and sign it.

      Incidentally something along these lines hit the news recently: more conflict of interest with Verisign, who as well as holding root certificates AND managing a large swathe of the DNS have just gotten into the interception business. Since they have all the pieces to grab "secure" traffic to sites in .com, this is obviously cause for concern.

      Google can find you an explanation (I believe Bruce Schneier's newsletter contained pointers to this recently).

    2. Re:Certificate generation by Jacco+de+Leeuw · · Score: 1

      Certificates are public information so anyone can make a copy. The corresponding private keys on the other hand are not supposed to be copied.

      A copy of your certificate cannot be used to impersonate your server because the certificate is linked to the hostname of your server. Clients will see a warning that the name in the certificate does not agree with the hostname of the server (unless the attacker has also control over the client's DNS).

      --
      -------
      Warning: Slashdot may contain traces of nuts.
    3. Re:Certificate generation by mikrorechner · · Score: 1


      Sorry for not being clear here - the article from heise.de says that the private key itself is created on their server. I have not verified this, but it seems like a one-click-shop to me:

      You click on "Yes, I want an SSL certificate!", they generate the key and the certificate, sign it, and send it to you via mail.

      Really convenient, isn't it?

      --
      "Oh, a lesson in not changing history from Mr I'm-my-own-Grandpa." - Dr Hubert Farnsworth
  93. Re:Well.... [OT] by jrockway · · Score: 1

    Any OS that lets any random user interrupt the CPU shouldn't... uh... be teaching CS. lol.

    --
    My other car is first.
  94. Yes, but is their root known? by The+Cisco+Kid · · Score: 1

    Eg, do the most common browsers trust this cert issuers CA cert? If not, then you might as well just go with a self-signed cert - either way your visitors are going to get a 'big scary warning' from their browser. For securing your *own* access, to your *own* server/site, then a self-signed works just fine, you just have to add it to your browsers trust list the first time.

    1. Re:Yes, but is their root known? by The+Cisco+Kid · · Score: 3, Informative

      To answer my own post, after reading thru their site, it apepars that no, they are an unknown root. Chicken-and-egg. Until they get their CA auth in the major browsers, no one will be able to use certs from them for anything the public will be accessing. And until lots of people are using them, they wont be able to get in the browsers.

      Also, they don't seem to permit you to provide your own CSR, which as someone else noted somewhat vaguley, is a MAJOR security problem. A cert signer should *never* have access to your private key - you make the key on your system, use it to make a CSR, then they sign the CSR. The resulting signed cert is only then usable if you have both it and the private key.

  95. That's not as secure as you think by Jamie+Lokier · · Score: 1

    If you're in some random coffee shop, you have no idea what CAs they've installed in the browser. You can't check them either: fakes can look exactly like real ones on somebody else's computer.

    Maybe you trust the coffee shop owner?

    Fine, but are you sure they don't have a virus or malware on there changing the browser CAs?

    If you want a real secret handshake, you need to take some piece of your own key-verification hardware in which contains the CAs that you trust.

    -- Jamie

    1. Re:That's not as secure as you think by smug_lisp_weenie · · Score: 1

      The moment you use the coffee shop's pc, all bets are off, for the reasons you outlined. Note, I said in my post that you take your own PC to the coffee shop (one of the "free wifi" places). From what I understand, in this process can be done securely, at least theoretically.

    2. Re:That's not as secure as you think by Jamie+Lokier · · Score: 1

      Good point, you're right. -- Jamie

  96. What nobody realizes is this by CastrTroy · · Score: 2, Insightful

    What nobody realizes is that certificates only actually solve a very small problem. They prove that a person is who they say they are. It's like picking up a hitchhiker because they've shown you their driver's license. The fact that they can prove who the are says nothing about the safety of actually letting the person into your car. Certificates provide a false sense of security, but making people think it's ok to install such-and-such active-x control, because it's signed. It doesn't matter if you can track down the person who created it once your data is all gone. Tracking the person down isn't going to get your data back.

    --

    Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
  97. Certificate Authority? by GreyPoopon · · Score: 1

    Under which certificate authority are GoDaddy certs issued? I don't see any GoDaddy listing in the default CA entries in Firefox or IE 6.x.

    --

    GreyPoopon
    --
    Why is it I can write insightful comments but can't come up with a clever signature?

    1. Re:Certificate Authority? by Chuck+Chunder · · Score: 1

      Godaddy certs are actually issued by "Starfield Secure Certification Authority" which is in turn signed by Valicert I think.

      Godaddy (unsurprisingly) use one of their own certs so you can go to their site over https and see one.

      --
      Boffoonery - downloadable Comedy Benefit for Bletchley Park
    2. Re:Certificate Authority? by sofar · · Score: 1

      neither firefox-1.0.1 nor mozilla-1.7.5 have those entries. The godaddy certs are useless without entries in those two browsers IMO. Just cheap commercials.

      I should have sticked to my self-signed certs. That is a lot clearer to everyone. BAH.

  98. So, what do you really get for free? by mwood · · Score: 1

    I was going to actually RTFA, but TFWS is slashdotted....

    What I always wonder about, when free CAs are discussed, is: where does the CA get the myriabucks it costs to get a CA certificate distributed with a popular browser? A cert. signed by no one my browser ever heard of does not inspire a whole lotta confidence. I can go to the CA's site and get its cert., but...a self-signed cert. tells you *nothing*.

    Having said that, I should also say that I have my own little CA here on my desktop, and I use it to coin cert.s for internal use. That sort of use makes sense, because anybody who needs to can come ask me about my CA and receive a hand-delivered copy of its cert. if he (wisely) so wishes.

    But how does a CA become trusted when most of the world will never find it practical to visit in person? The browser vendors are the primary trusted introducers for the vast majority of users.

  99. StartCom doesn't even check any identity by stiebing.ja · · Score: 1

    Well, like the german IT magazin Heise reports the new StartCom are really unsecure because of the point that Heise was able to get certicicates for any desired site with falsified owner 'information'.
    And StartCom doesn't let you generate your private key by yourself - they generate it for you and send it via SSL web to you, so one doesn't know if they perhaps keep a copy of your private key.

    After having read this I surely will not accept any SSL certificate from StartCom - I would rather accept a certificate from a private person.

    --
    I lag
  100. Rebooting nt and nt- (98, 95,3.11...) by da5idnetlimit.com · · Score: 1

    create directory "con"
    create zero-byte-file "con.exe" in directory "con" /con/con.exe

    You WILL have to reboot...8p

    Not the best way, true, but in IT it's the result that counts 8)

    --
    It takes 40+ muscles to frown, but only four to extend your arm and bitchslap the motherfucker
    1. Re:Rebooting nt and nt- (98, 95,3.11...) by sylvandb · · Score: 1

      create directory "con"
      create zero-byte-file "con.exe" in directory "con" /con/con.exe


      Huh? Why?

      Created and removed.
      ---------------
      PsUptime v1.1 - system uptime utility for Windows NT/2K
      by Mark Russinovich
      Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

      This computer has been up for 170 days, 8 hours, 26 minutes, 47 seconds.
      ------------

      I fail to see any problem with NT4 (above) or XP Pro.

      You do know about \\.\c:\ don't you?

      sdb

  101. email encryption by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What I wanna to know is, how can I encrypt my email without paying for a certificate?
    (Of course without having to do encryption/decryption manually. It should be seamless and automatic)

  102. $$$ Warranty offered with Verisign certs by ozzy_cow · · Score: 1

    What you pay for with Verisign is the legal protection in case of theft, fraud etc up to $250K

    Check http://www.verisign.com/repository/netsure/

    I read most of the comments in this thread I think that everyone is missing the point why people get Verisign certificates. It's not just a string of automatically generated random characters, there's a huge insurance company and an army of lawyers behind it.

    The cheap certificates do not have that kind of legal protection, and last time I checked CAcert.org does not offer any kind of protection at all :-)

  103. Lowest-Cost SSL Certificate that I've found so far by Astastrafal · · Score: 1

    It's at ev1ervers.net.



    $10/year (limited time, was $5 ~3 months ago), issued by freessl.com. Browser recognition is fairly good: IE >= 5.01, Netscape >= 7, Opera >= 7.53, Konqueror too (and thus Safari I assume, versions unknown).

  104. Re:Well.... [OT] by runderwo · · Score: 1

    It'd be asm("int 0x19"), and anyway, you can just replace the RETF opcode at the end of the main function with CD19 and you're good to go.

  105. Re:Congratulations! You won a clue, or two by lukewarmfusion · · Score: 1

    Before you start criticizing, you should really read the posts and understand the point.

    I said that because:

    1. By using a self-generated SSL certificate, your users will see a browser warning.

    2. Using a certificate from a "Trusted CA" - that is, one that is already approved by your OS/browser by default, will not display a warning.

    3. If you have a site without SSL, I won't send you an sensitive information. I understand the other weaknesses in the system, but this is such a basic step to take.

    4. There are many steps to take in creating a secure e-commerce transaction. Unfortunately, we can't see or check most of those steps. We definitely can check if the connection is secure via SSL. I believe a company that's willing to take that step is more likely to be concerned about security and privacy than a company that doesn't.

    I expect SSL to do one thing - encrypt the communication between my computer and the server. After that, I have to trust the receiving site owner to be smart and ethical enough to provide security measures on their side. I have to trust the credit card company to protect my account from fraud. I have to trust the CA to have checked out the certificate holder and verified that they are, indeed, a legal entity that can be held accountable. All of these things add up to trust - if you don't trust the other party, then you shouldn't be doing business with them.

    Which brings me back to my original statement - if the company doesn't have an SSL certificate, can you really trust them to provide security on any level?

  106. Secure vs. Dephase by b100dian · · Score: 1

    If you want to secure your traffic sign the certificate yourself. Once the first-time-visitor adds it to his repository, it's as good as signed. And it's secure communication
    OTOH, if you want to prevent dephasing and other attaks, yes, you may want an official CA.
    But nobody can guarantee me what kind of man is the owner of the signed certificate. No CA in the world He can be evil but more likely he can be plain stupid and allow the private key to be copied by some means.

    --
    gtkaml.org
  107. PhpBB by xlibre · · Score: 1

    The version they are running is vulnerable to serveral phpBB vuln's including the ability to read arbitrary files. Funny for a site that is supposed to be secure and issue certs.

  108. The other way around by cowboy76Spain · · Score: 1

    You can also see it from Microsoft's point of view: "Hello, Microsoft, we are some people that want to authenticate other people and we need you to authenticate you. You may have not heard about us, or maybe you have and you know we have no real money that could be used to pay for liabilities if we do the things wrong, but wouldn't it be good for you to have that new security hole on your OS? And yes, we may be good guys today, but tomorrow maybe we'll have left the project and the certificates will be in who knows what hands."

    I do not mean that some money doesn't help, but there are other reasons here too...

    --
    Why can't /. have a rich-text editor? Editing your own HTML is so XXth century.
    1. Re:The other way around by IchBinEinPenguin · · Score: 1

      Good thing the 'real' CA's don't make mistakes.

      It's a 2-step process: How likely is this cert to be real? (i.e. how diligent is the CA in making sure the entity is who they claim to be), and how trustworthy is the entity?
      Personally I don't like the fact that my browser is pre-configred with a bunch of big commercial CAs. What business is it of someone else to decide who I should trust or not?

  109. Re:Well.... [OT] by andreyw · · Score: 1

    main:
    pushl %ebp
    movl %esp, %ebp
    subl $8, %esp
    andl $-16, %esp
    movl $0, %eax
    subl %eax, %esp
    leave
    ret

    Retf? Get with the aughts :-). Same goes for int $0x19, unless you like segfaults :-).

    ABBRACADDABRA THE SLASHDOT LAMENESS FILTER SUCKS ABBRACADDABRA

  110. Trivial rebuttal by Trejkaz · · Score: 1

    How do you convince Joe TinFoilHat User that the Thawte/Verisign CA is safe?

    --
    Karma: It's all a bunch of tree-huggin' hippy crap!
  111. Free SSL certs for non-profit orgs by Matt_Joyce · · Score: 1


    IPSCA issue certs free to educational and non-profit orgs.

    I've used tham and they seem ok.
    Not the best browser support though.

  112. OpenSSL can generate certs...? by BubbaJonBoy · · Score: 1

    I seem to recall that the OpenSSL toolkit has the tools necessary to create certificates. Or did I miss something about making and using certs?
    Hmmmm

  113. Re:Well.... [OT] by runderwo · · Score: 1

    We were talking about DOS programming. Where else would you use INT 19? :) Well, I guess you could use the GNU assembler under DOS, but ....

  114. CACert.org by Treyvan · · Score: 1

    CACert.org has been providing free ssl certificates for well over a year. The one problem I perpetually find in the "free" and "open source" community, is that everyone want to reinvent the wheel, over and over and over again.

    --
    If things get better with age, then I am approaching magnificence.
  115. Bullshit by Chuck+Chunder · · Score: 1

    Valicert certificates are in Firefox 1.0.1 (and I'd bet in Mozilla too). I just looked and also tested at https://www.godaddy.com/

    --
    Boffoonery - downloadable Comedy Benefit for Bletchley Park