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No Defense Against Windows Rootkits?

An anonymous reader writes "Spyware bad guys (and also phishing people) started using rootkits technology to stay hidden in a system. The problem is that at the moment the technology to defend a Windows system from these things is very poor. In fact antivirus companies have just started adding basic anti-rootkits technology. So the problem is serious, and well outlined by this question: Is the closed source code of Windows preventing us from actively defending our systems?"

58 of 510 comments (clear)

  1. It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by SilverspurG · · Score: 5, Insightful
    The problem is that at the moment the technology to defend a Windows system from this things is really poor.
    While it's less common on our beloved Linux platform it's pretty tough to defend against here, too. If someone can make use of a Firefox hole, couple it with a root exploit, and put a kmod in /lib/modules, it's all over. With the 2.6 kernel seeing an explosion in `lsmod`, I can no longer verify each and every module Debian loads so easily as I could in the 2.4 series.
    does Windows source code unavailability prevent us to actively defend our systems?
    This would be a resounding YES.

    And Butler and Hoglund's recent book on rootkits was pretty nice. :)
    --
    fast as fast can be. you'll never catch me.
    1. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by tomjen · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I was thinking, could you not just recompile the kernel without suport for loadable modules?
      I mean, if i ran a server i would do that.

      --
      Freedom or George Bush
    2. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by Qzukk · · Score: 4, Interesting

      In 2.6 you use the kernel capabilites to load the appropriate modules at boot time, then strip the kernel of the ability to load any others. Adds a little more work for getting that module loaded. Throw in more stuff (verifying the module list from read-only media before loading any modules) and you can get pretty well defended against this kind of thing.

      --
      If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
    3. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by EvilMonkeySlayer · · Score: 5, Informative

      Yep, all servers i've built which use Linux which are accessible from the outside do not have loadable module support enabled at all.
      It prevents a large swathe if not all rootkits from running.
      This is one of the areas where I think Linux (and open source software in general) has closed source software beat, you can easilly customise the kernel to your own particular situation in which the machine will be running. Being able to have your own custom built kernel with stuff like grsecurity etc is invaluable.

    4. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      Yes, you can, and it's even recommended.

      Other steps you can take are :
      -not having dev tools installed on your servers (quite often source root kits require them)
      -keeping copies of /bin and /usr/bin on some ro media (either a CD or on a seperate server mounted ro), and checking them ageinst you're working copies regularly.
      -running chkrootkit :-)
      -Mount / ro. You need to set up seperate space for /tmp and /var (not to mention /home) but this will defeat 99% of the automated root kits, of course, if the attacker gets in personnally, all bets are off...

    5. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by quantum+bit · · Score: 3, Informative

      Or, if you're running BSD, set kern.securelevel to 1 or 2.

      That will prevent loading new kernel modules (so you can still load them early in the boot process), cut off access to things like /dev/mem, and if you set it to 2, disable access to raw disk devices.

    6. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by Malc · · Score: 3, Insightful

      I was going to post my copy of /etc/fstab with comments to follow-up your post, but the stupid /. lameness filter wouldn't let me. It complained of too many "junk" characters, even after I removed all of the comments and forward slashes. I'm sick to death of this /. crap - it's getting in the way of this being a forum where one can actively participate. The other ignorant thing getting on my nerves is the "feature" preventing posting too quickly. Yesterday it told me that it was an hour and 26 minutes since my last post and that I needed to slow down. What a load of BS - after all these years I'm beginning to think about dumping this forum as it's getting more and more crappy.

    7. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by makomk · · Score: 4, Informative

      So when my mother, who uses her computer for playing bridge online and printing e-mail pictures of her granchildren buys a new printer, you think she should have to recompile her kernel.

      On sane operating systems *cough*Linux*cough* printer drivers aren't kernel modules - they don't need that sort of low-level OS/hardware access. Of course, it'd still be an inconvenience adding other hardware, but that's not a good example. With Linux, newbies at least will probably only want to run the kernel modules their distro supplies, so why not have a list of valid modules and their checksums loaded at startup, and refuse to insert a module that's not on the list?

    8. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Its fairly easy to put a module in Linux using /proc/kmem even if modules are disabled.

    9. Re:It works both ways, but it's worse for MS by schon · · Score: 4, Informative

      Great advice... some other things you can do:

      mount /tmp and /var with the noexec option - if you have developers who don't understand security, this can save your bacon. (someone used a hole in a PHP script to upload and execute a file to /var/tmp - the upload happened, the execute didn't. I ended up with a copy of the rootkit (fairly new at the time) as well as how he got in, which was shown to the web developer responsible in an attempt to get him to take security more seriously.)

      use a separate account for each daemon (some distros I've seen run apache as 'nobody', for example - don't use 'nobody', create a separate user for each daemon) This prevents your daemons from overwriting each others data, and allows the following:

      use --uid-owner and/or --gid-owner in iptables to restrict your daemons from opening *outgoing* connections, or listening on random ports. If one of your daemons is compromised, it makes it harder for an attacker to connect to take over complete control.

      Never have executables or data owned by the same user that the daemon runs as. I've seen this done mostly on game servers (the docs recommend running the game as 'unreal', and have all the game files owned by 'unreal') but some others (squidGuard comes to mind) also recommend (or even require!!?!?) having data files owned by the daemon. If there was a hole in the daemon, an attacker could theoretically use it to gain higher priveleges (such as the UID of the account used to start the daemon - frequently root) the next time the daemon is started.

  2. I fear not your rootkits! by tsalaroth · · Score: 5, Funny

    Because Windows has no root!

    1. Re:I fear not your rootkits! by AKAImBatman · · Score: 5, Informative

      Right. We should rename them, "SystemKits".

      (For those who don't get it, "System" is a login with higher privleges than even Administrator. There's nothing that System can't do. Just to brighten up your day, it's also the default user for Windows Services. Feel safe yet?)

    2. Re:I fear not your rootkits! by Tony+Hoyle · · Score: 5, Interesting

      System (more accurately LocalSystem) can't access network resources.

      So there is *something* that they can't do.

      Try

      at (now plus a minute) /interactive cmd.exe

      voila! Interactive system shell!

    3. Re:I fear not your rootkits! by El_Muerte_TDS · · Score: 4, Funny

      Crap, I renamed the user "Administrator" to "root"

    4. Re:I fear not your rootkits! by bheer · · Score: 3, Insightful

      > it's also the default user for Windows Services

      Not true of NT 5.1 and 5.2 (XP, 2003). Most services run as 'Local Service' or 'Network Service' with differently grained privileges. System is still available for services that require it (including NT's crss and lsass processes).

    5. Re:I fear not your rootkits! by kiwimate · · Score: 3, Informative

      And that's why you apply a few simple security measures, such as denying LocalSystem access to CMD.EXE and other powerful utilities via NTFS permissions. You can do this to bring LocalSystem down to a level lower than Administrator, and virtually nothing breaks if you do it with a little bit of forethought. Yes, it takes a little bit of work to do the initial planning, but once it's done you script it and bingo. And there are plenty of examples on websites of sample lockdowns plus the scripts (using XCACLS.EXE, typically). Take those examples and customize them to your environment as needed -- you've saved yourself a whole load of the initial work.

      You can open up these permissions on a system-by-system basis if really necessary, or even better just set applications that support it to use named service accounts. Cuts out a huge number of vulnerabilities.

      You can secure a Windows system, and it's really pretty easy to do a lot of these things. You just have to know a bit of what you're doing and be prepared to put in the work. That's the biggest flaw in most MS administration shops: people who shouldn't be admins get lulled into a false sense of security because there's a pretty GUI and they don't understand what's going on behind the scenes.

    6. Re:I fear not your rootkits! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      > System (more accurately LocalSystem) can't access network resources.

      Hahaha, I see you have little understanding of Windows.

      System can load device drivers, and access ring 0.
      System can do anything it wants, including working with any and all network connections already running, and grabbing any kerberos tokens present on the machine.

      I grant you, it would take writing actual code.

      Maybe you meant, System cannot access network resources as long as System doesn't do anything bad.

      But, of course, if we assume nobody is bad, we don't really need security anymore now do we?

  3. Ask the UNIX folk... by lpangelrob · · Score: 4, Funny
    They've been dealing with rootkits seemingly forever. How did they manage?

    No, seriously, I don't know the answer to this. :-)

    1. Re:Ask the UNIX folk... by Sam+Nitzberg · · Score: 4, Informative

      " They've been dealing with rootkits seemingly forever. How did they manage?"

      tripwire - there's a commercial version available, and I've used the free version. Creates checksums to compare your system against...

      A brief description here... (with download and install instructions)

      http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/implement ations/i002.02.html

      Sam
      http:/// www . iamsam . com

    2. Re:Ask the UNIX folk... by DrSkwid · · Score: 4, Informative

      The Unix folk - Ritchie, Pike et al ditched Unix and root years ago and made a new system plan9 (though Ritchie was, by his own admission, more a famous name than an architect in plan9 - though he did do the compiler)

      Spending years being not-free as in beer, plan9 languished during the Linux FOSS years until belatedly being opened up for version 3

      Then Lucent lost loads of $$ in the dot-com crash and wound down Bell Labs (such as taking out every other light bulb) and the staff retired or left (mostly to Google)

      as Rob Pike said "Not only is UNIX dead, it's starting to smell really bad." - circa 1991

      --
      There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter
    3. Re:Ask the UNIX folk... by SatanicPuppy · · Score: 4, Insightful

      From my experience with windows, my mind boggles at the idea of trying to do something similar on that platform. Seems like every time I run windows update, some critical DLL ends up changed, and applications add their own specialized librarys with registry keys overriding the defaults.

      Hell, half the time windows itself doesn't know what its installed. Every time I have to rollback a box from some semi-major patch, I cringe. I know something is going to break. If it's internal system doesn't keep basic track of what's installed and running (how many broken uninstall apps have you seen, which end up with you crawling through the registry trying to disable the damn software?), how the hell can you even know what to scan for?

      I don't have the faintest idea of how to go about checking for a windows rootkit. What could you do? Take a drive image to compare against? That would never fly. Windows hides so many damn system jobs anyway, how the hell would you be able to spot one more?

      The bulk of my windows security comes from running Snort upstream on the traffic that comes from the damn box, looking for traffic that ought not be there, and denying outbound from every port except ones I allow explicitly.

      --
      ad logicam Claiming a proposition is false because it was presented as the conclusion of a fallacious argument.
  4. You have to wonder... by ellem · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Who has the chops to run through 800,000,000 lines of code to do the fixing of this OS?

    I mean even if you find the problem can you honestly say you'd be sure you wouldn't leave Notepad.exe broken by making your changes?

    Clearly Windows needs to be completely re thought with NO concern for legacy apps. See also OS X.

    --
    This .sig is fake but accurate.
    1. Re:You have to wonder... by Luscious868 · · Score: 3, Insightful
      Clearly Windows needs to be completely re thought with NO concern for legacy apps. See also OS X.

      I wish Microsoft would but it will never happen. See OS X's market share.

  5. The Answer by mysqlrocks · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Is the closed source code of Windows preventing us from actively defending our systems?

    Yes. We are at the mercy of Microsoft to patch the systems for us. At least with Open Source you have potentially thousands of programmers looking for security holes and reporting those security problems.

    1. Re:The Answer by sqlrob · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Potentially != Actually.

      How long was the plain text password in Firebird before it was caught? A year and a half? And that's not even something subtle as some buffer overflows, or that double free in zlib.

    2. Re:The Answer by insomniac8400 · · Score: 3, Interesting

      But the reverse is true, you could have people going through finding exploits and using them without reporting them. Closed source is safer.

    3. Re:The Answer by mysqlrocks · · Score: 3, Insightful

      You make a good point. Yes, it is easier for the "bad" guys to find the security holes in open source software. This comes down to a question of trust. Do you trust that there are more "good" guys looking for security holes then "bad" guys? If so, then the "good" guys will catch the security problems before the "bad" guys the majority of the time. Speaking of trust, do you trust closed source software vendors to find and fix their security holes? If given the choice to fix a security hole that only they know about or add a feature that will help sell their software what decision do you think they will make?

  6. Windows Rootkit detection Tool by republican+gourd · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Shameless plug: I've written a script that should be able to help find any rootkits that are listening on tcp/udp on windows.

    Heres the link

    What it does is attempt to handshake with itself on every available tcp or udp port. If the handshake fails, that is an indicator that somebody else is already camping out on that port.

    Source is GPL, feedback is always welcome.

    1. Re:Windows Rootkit detection Tool by makomk · · Score: 3, Informative

      Wouldn't a firewall (e.g. Zonealarm) pick up and/or block the outgoing traffic?

      Not if the rootkit binds to the network interface at a lower level than the firewall (i.e. traffic between ZoneAlarm and the interface passes through the malicious code, not the other way around). If it does that (which *is* possible IIRC - I think kernel-level/ring 0 code is required though) the firewall won't detect or block the traffic, because it won't see it.

  7. SysInternals' by wumpus188 · · Score: 5, Informative

    .. RootkitRevealer is your friend.

    1. Re:SysInternals' by ZyBex · · Score: 4, Interesting

      I recently cleaned a machine infected with a rootkit that was NOT detected with Rootkit Revealer. The virus loaded itself via the HKLM/Soft/MS/Windows/Run key, as usual, but it didn't show on regedit nor elsewhere, and the Rootkit Revealer did not detect the "missing" key. The only way to see and remove it was to boot with a WinPE CD.

      Fortunately these rootkits can usually be detected by their side-effects, like the slowness and the internet activity... but you have to be suspitious that something's going on.

    2. Re:SysInternals' by EvilMonkeySlayer · · Score: 3, Informative

      I think the best way to detect a rootkit is to simply put something between it and the internet that can log net traffic, say a router or somesuch.. course, you'd have to make sure the router hasn't been exploited too... :)

      Oh, here's a useful tip for people.. there is a cheaper alternative to WinPE.. BartPE, it requires Windows XP to build the bootable cd but in terms of usefulness it's a nice little life saver.
      Can also be extended with Ultimate Boot CD (UBCD).

  8. And now for something completely repetitive... by menorikey · · Score: 3, Interesting

    This topic has been beaten to death a thousand and one times before but the reality still holds true: as long as a company holds the source of their software to their chest, you simply have to rely on them to provide the security for said software. By doing so you create the equivalent of a single point of failure that has to be addressed solely by the holding company, and as a result, you are subject to the "hurry up and wait" syndrome that accompanies it. That's when it comes back to "suck it up or don't use it," which carries all the arguments of "we don't have a choice" or "switching isn't an alternative for us."

    --
    This sig is six words long.
  9. MS(ux) for a few reasons, this is just one of them by jeremy111 · · Score: 5, Informative

    Let us not forget the wonders of ActiveX controls not to mention IE's ability to install items with out authentication. As far as that is concerned ANY installer should have to be authenticated as an ADMINISTRATOR before the install can proceed. I think this small step would curb many of the issues with spyware, adware, toolbars, etc.

  10. Wrong question! by Ingolfke · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Is the closed source code of Windows preventing us from actively defending our systems?

    The right question is what is the vendor (Microsoft) doing about it. You purchased a product from a vendor, you should expect them to solve problems with that product or explain how to properly secure it, or just ignore the issue which says something about their product and commitment to support.

    1. Re:Wrong question! by Jarnis · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Purchased...?

      Warez jokes aside, most common non-corporate windows are OEM copies. OEM = no support from microsoft. You get your pile of bytes that might or might not work, and you get some patches at the whim of MS. You get no support unless you pay thru the nose per incident.

      Sure, you can call your OEM supplier - however, they have no access to the source, and generally just tell you to reinstall the thing and immediately tell your system is unsupported if you actually install something other than the supplied bundled software on your system.

  11. Strider ghostbuster... by nweaver · · Score: 5, Informative

    Strider Ghostbuster,, a Microsoft developed technique for detecting all persistant and stealthy rootkits .

    Just convince Microsoft to make it available.

    There is also SysInternal's Rootkit Revealer, which although not quite as general, is still hard to fool.

    --
    Test your net with Netalyzr
  12. under attack by andrewzx1 · · Score: 4, Informative

    I administer a network with about 50 workstations. We run Windows2000 with Symantec Anti-Virus Corporate (aka Norton). Symantec registered an internal attack by a root kit only two weeks ago. This stuff is in the wild now!

  13. Unacceptable for national defense by keraneuology · · Score: 5, Interesting
    Since Bill Gates became the 2nd largest stockholder in Newport News Shipbuilding and guaranteed that the Ronald Reagan class of aircraft carrier will be Windows 2000 based, how does the Navy deal with this issue? Or have they addressed it at all? The last thing we need is for just one person in that population 5,000 floating city with malicious intentions to pop a rootkit into the mess that is navigation, fire control or general operations.

    So we are left with two options:

    a) Windows 2000 is impervious to rootkits, either off the shelf or through modifications unavailable to the general public

    b) The US Navy is running an unsecurable OS for the most advanced surface ships in the world - with nuclear reactors to boot.

    --
    If the g'vt kept the data on you that google does you'd better believe you'd be calling it "doing evil"
  14. The big picture by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The root of the problem may be the organizational structure of Microsoft. We have the mess that is/was longhorn/vista and the comments that it had to be re-written from the ground up.

    The point made in the 'Cathedral and the Bazaar' may be coming to pass. It is impossible to manage very complex systems effectively. It is a question of distributed control vs. top down management. My favorite example is the Soviet Union vs. the US of A. A bureaucracy can't manage something as complex as a whole economy; maybe it can't manage something as complex as Windows.

    The bottom line would seem to be that we will see a never-ending stream of problems like the one at hand.

    www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathed ral-bazaar/
    www.uq.edu.au/news/index.html?article=6618

  15. Re:Window's source code... by bushidocoder · · Score: 4, Informative

    Yes, Microsoft has a Shared Source program. I'm not 100% sure of the exact requirements to join the Shared Source program (you could look it up on their website I'm sure) but the requirements are fairly hefty. You have to sign some pretty thorough NDAs, of course. To the best of my knowledge, an individual acting by themself rarely gets access, although I'm pretty sure that several book authors got access to Windows source. Companies can gain access, but they normally have to pay for the priveledge (if you recall the Win2k source code getting lose a year or so back, that was on account of a company that had purchased a liscense to the code losing it). A large number of Universities have access to the code, as do governments and government contractors.

  16. Bastille Windows? by Fiver- · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Is there any product for Windows like Bastille Linux that would help a user lock down any vulnerabilities in their system like file shares, unnecessary accounts, open ports, unnecessary services, IE settings, etc?

    If not, there should be.

  17. Easy fixes!! by AnonymousYellowBelly · · Score: 3, Funny

    1. Buy a Mac! and be a little bit paranoid about security.
    2. Use Linux and be paranoid about security.
    3. Buy a tinfoil hat.
    4. Build a beowulf cluster of Linux enabled devices: an iPod, two toasters, one 'smart' fridge, and one spoon -anything runs Linux these days-.
    5. Build your own OS!

    Or you can keep on using Windows and trusting AV companies and its flawed model of "ok, we'll release the fix AFTER enough people have been screwed".

    I don't think that the design of Windows, where changing an int to a float in the library that displays Clippy can crash MSN Messenger, would allow for easy fixes, regardless of closed or open source code.

    You can actively defend your system anyway. It takes time and money (e.g. self-made hardware firewall with parts bought from the tinfoil-hat store, if you want to be /. grade paranoid), but is doable.

    --
    Disclosure: I'm stupid
  18. I'm not sure admin is such a big deal by Dink+Paisy · · Score: 4, Interesting
    The problem is that a lot of this stuff is installed voluntarily. If P2PFreeMovies.exe and BritaneySperesNaked!!!.exe say they need admin access to install, people will just type the password in. Better use of capabilities and code signing would help, and, unlike mainstream Linux, Windows actually has an advanced security model that would allow this.

    But the fundamental problem is that if someone wants to install this garbage, the only way you can really stop them is by taking control of their computer away from them. I'm not sure that even Microsoft is willing to go that far yet, and I'm not sure I would want them to, anyway.

    --

    Whoever corrects a mocker invites insult;
    whoever rebukes a wicked man incurs abuse.
    --Proverbs 9:7
    1. Re:I'm not sure admin is such a big deal by AviLazar · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Here is another potential problem. MS might come out with an add-on to their OS where it prevents unauthorized (or authorized) installation of these malwares....it will do this because they are not digitally signed, and authenticated to the user...the only problem: My friend does not want to use a program (i.e. photoshop) so he deletes it from his computer and gives me the disk. The disk is registered to his windows...now I can't install it....or what if I want to rip my DvD movie to my computer (backup)...it won't let me play it.

      In the end, the best answer is for people to start using their noodle...protection software can also hinder us.

      --

      I mod down so you can mod up. Your welcome.
    2. Re:I'm not sure admin is such a big deal by Durandal64 · · Score: 4, Insightful
      The problem is that a lot of this stuff is installed voluntarily. If P2PFreeMovies.exe and BritaneySperesNaked!!!.exe say they need admin access to install, people will just type the password in. Better use of capabilities and code signing would help, and, unlike mainstream Linux, Windows actually has an advanced security model that would allow this.
      This is true, but there is only so much the operating system can do for the user. Windows, Mac OS X, Linux et al are not psychic. All they can do is warn users of the potential hazards of running untrusted software and create certain reasonable barriers to entry for installation programs. On the former, Windows, when configured properly, does a pretty good job of it. On the latter, it's abysmal. Windows Vista is embracing the idea of lesser privileges and a `sudo'-like authentication model, so things are looking better for it. An XP administrator is completely at the mercy of any malicious executable if he double-clicks it.

      At the end of the day, operating systems can only identify suspicious behavior. It will always be up to the user to make the final call. If your users can't make good decisions, nothing short of a total system lock-down will help.
    3. Re:I'm not sure admin is such a big deal by Antique+Geekmeister · · Score: 3, Informative

      This is already in development. It's the Trusted Computing initiative, formerly known as Palladium, and it's a very big security effort. The benefit of its features are high: on-board high-speed encryption and authentication, easily available to users. The danger is also high: this is supposed to integrate with Dirital Rights Management and provide hardware level control of access to DVD writers, hard drives, boot loaders, system kernels, and secure operations called from withing software. That means that unless you can get the autohrization and the money to buy a highly authorized key from, say, the Microsoft key provisioning service, you will have difficulty writing and especially publishing open source tools that access those features.

    4. Re:I'm not sure admin is such a big deal by eyeball · · Score: 4, Interesting
      Here is another potential problem. MS might come out with an add-on to their OS where it prevents unauthorized (or authorized) installation of these malwares....it will do this because they are not digitally signed, and authenticated to the user...the only problem: My friend does not want to use a program (i.e. photoshop) so he deletes it from his computer and gives me the disk. The disk is registered to his windows...now I can't install it....or what if I want to rip my DvD movie to my computer (backup)...it won't let me play it.


      From everything I've read, it seems MS is working on the goal of windows eventually running only applications signed by them, the same way XBox is supposed to only run games they sign. There are so many things wrong with that besides the examples you mentioned:

      - Who signs the apps? Microsoft?
      - How do they determine which are legit and which arent?
      - Who is held responsible if a legit company
      - How much will they charge?
      - Will the costs of signing push shareware & freeware programmers out of the market?
      - Will the signed applications expire?
      - What happens if I sell my computer? Are the licenses still tied to it?
      - Will they also keep compeditors out of the market too
      - What happens when everyone's guard is down, and someone figures out a way to code-sign a worm.

      Just to scratch the surface. Worst case scenario, future PCs will cease to run Linux or any other alternative OS.

      My real fear is that MS and/or Intel lobbyists convince the government to pass a law mandating that computers only run signed code. As a matter of fact, I'm surprised they've waited this long.

      --

      _______
      2B1ASK1
  19. can't see why closed source should be allowed... by fak3r · · Score: 3, Insightful

    This may be slighty OT, but I don't see ANY reason why a closed source system that's this vulnurable should be allowed in any Medical/Govermental or Military implementation. Sure, lot's of Apps are written ABOVE the OS and thus in control of the branch maintaining them, but damnit, the OS is at the root of the problem here! Makes you understand why trains all across Europe are still kept track of (punny, eh?) by old Digital DEC's running VMS or OpenVMS. The whole idea that mindshare of the mainframe is growing old and retiring is going to be an issue, Windows 2000 server is not a replacement for something like VMS.

  20. Knoppix CD by ArsenneLupin · · Score: 3, Insightful
    ... tripwire ...

    Oh, and don't forget to mention that you should run tripwire from a known-secure system (a Knoppix CD, for instance) at least once in a while. Indeed, if your system is infested by a good rootkit, it could itself so well that it would play back a phony, made to look innocent contents of any files that it had infected.

    Same goes for lsmod, ps and other tools (it is however very rare that a rootkit is so thorough as to hide itself from all tools. Most often an rpm -q --verify -a finds the nasties). But if you're really paranoid, run your tripwire and rpm --verify from an external system, not from within the one you want to examine.

  21. Re:What rootkits? by ThaFooz · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I work with spyware infected systems every day, and I have never found a "rootkit" on one

    The issuse is that they're extremely difficult to detect. What heuristics do you use that that the major AV companies are not aware of?

    The most effective method that I have found to get rid of spyware on an infected system, by the way, is to boot from a live Windows bootable CD to delete all the crappy spyware directories...

    I'm sure that works reasonably well, but once a system is comprimised, you never really know for sure. I find that the only surefire method, which incidentally often takes less time, is to wipe the drive and start fresh. The type of user that is going to get spyware probably doesn't have a complicated setup or do more than write documents and use iTunes, and backing up is as simple as looking for *.doc, *.xls, *.ppt, *.mp*, *.mov, *.wmv, and *.avi.

  22. Rootkit Responsibility by acvh · · Score: 5, Insightful

    "the FU rootkit, which I wrote, is intended to demonstrate. It is not malicious but more proof of a premise."

    "I do know that FU is one of the most widely deployed rootkits in the world. [It] seems to be the rootkit of choice for spyware and bot networks right now"

    He wrote and distributed a rootkit for windows; for educational purposes only (!). It becomes one of the most widely used tools to propagate spyware and trojans. Does he bear any moral responsibilty for this?

    I would answer positively. If I leave a loaded gun lying on the sidewalk and someone picks it up and shoots someone else, I think I may get some bad karma.

  23. They keep flogging this outdated line of reasoning by haruchai · · Score: 5, Insightful

    From http://www.viruslist.com/en/analysis?pubid=1687408 59

    Currently, malicious code for Windows is more common than for UNIX because Windows is the most widely used operating system. However, if UNIX starts to gain popularity, then the situation will naturally change; new rootkits for UNIX will be written, and new methods of combating them will be developed.

    This has been refuted time and again yet the various Windows-friendly analyst continually trot this one out as a rationale for the ( admittedly much improved but still ) relatively weak security design of M$ Windows.

    Newsflash for those who didn't get the memo: Windows leads by a huge margin ON THE DESKTOP. On the server side the disparity, if one exists is a completely different story. Also, since there are many open source versions of Unix, such as Linux, *BSD, and Solaris, some of which have been available for more than a decade, it should have been relatively easy for Windows-loving, Unix-hating programmers to have designed the Unix-slaying, self-propagating daemon years ago. To date, the only thing that has come close was the Morris worm way back in the late '80s.

    So guys, nice try - your explanation ( or rationale ) is leaking badly. If Windows represent a bigger target, it SUPPOSEDLY has the "advantage" of being closed-source but the open source Unices, which are fewer in number SHOULD be an easier target.

    It's time to focus on what the true flaws of each platform are - their relative prevalence is no longer relevant to the discussion ( aka flamefest ).

    --
    Pain is merely failure leaving the body
  24. "Windows for Warships": old old news by toby · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Is the closed source code of Windows preventing us from actively defending our systems?

    Does this question really need to be asked any longer?

    Has this story teleported us all back to the year 2000? Hit the reset button? Is Slashdot's new motto "No hugging, no learning"?

    b) The US Navy is running an unsecurable OS for the most advanced surface ships in the world - with nuclear reactors to boot.

    I thought this was common knowledge. I didn't really expect a "pro-business" administration to do anything about it, did you? It's actually one of the few things that makes the rest of us feel safer.

    Britain has the same problem, by the way:

    The Royal Navy's new, state-of-the-art destroyer has been fitted with combat management software that can be hacked into, crashes easily and is vulnerable to viruses, according to one of the system's designers who was fired after raising his concerns. ... he told Channel 4 news that "the use of Windows For Warships puts the ship and her crew at risk, and the defence of the realm".

    There are also plans to install a similar Microsoft Windows-based computerised command system on Britain's nuclear submarines. Wilson said: "It is inconceivable that we could allow the possible accidental release of nuclear missiles. The people who survived such an exchange, if any, would certainly regard such a thing as a crime against humanity. And I can't help feeling that even planning to deploy such systems on Windows, with its unreliability and lack of security, is itself some sort of crime in international law."

    Also see The Register which quotes an upbeat Armed Forces Minister:

    Fabricant had asked if there had been an external review of the Type 45 decision, and from Ingram's answer we can perhaps infer 'No'. He then asked for a cost comparison between Unix and Windows 2000 as the CMS OS, and Ingram simply said: "The cost of implementing an operating system for the Combat Management System in the Type 45 is a matter for the prime contractor, BAE Systems, and their sub-contractor. The Department does not have, or require, visibility of costs at that level of detail."

    Fabricant also asked what systems had been put in place to cope with a failure, and what steps had been taken to ensure the Win2k CMS in the Type 45 was reliable. Aside from affirming that Win2k was "the lowest risk choice" and that BAE was on top of "residual risks" (Are these cookies? Spyware?), Ingram said: "The system design has built-in redundancy, with automatic, and transparent, switch-over to a back-up system if the primary system has a problem. This would provide continuity of operation and ensure that no data was lost. The system design also ensures that comprehensive hardware mechanisms will be in place to avoid any other safety or technical issues."

    Perhaps the Minister can now explain why his desktop PC doesn't even run properly.

    Les Hatton gives his opinion at IT Week:

    ... the Royal Navy is all set to go to sea with Windows on warships. Am I alone in thinking that this has to be one of the most terminally stupid IT decisions of the century?

    ...this was first attempted in the mid-1990s. There was a wonderful description of the then-latest generation of a US missile cruiser, the USS Yorktown, having to be frequently rebooted because its underlying network of computers running Windows NT crashed somewhat inconveniently. Apparently the design meant that critical systems such as steering could be lost in mid-battle.

    So here we are again. This time the dec

    --
    you had me at #!
  25. Re:MS(ux) for a few reasons, this is just one of t by jacksonj04 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The trouble is that people do not listen. Unless they do not actually have admin access to the system, the chances are if a box pops up going "You need admin access to install this, if you have it then just shove in a username and password here:" people will do so regardless.

    Hell, in XPSP2 it has this big balloon which pops up repeatedly going along the lines of "Listen you pillock, you don't have firewall or automatic updates turned on. You really do need these. Click here and I'll set it all up for you, it's about 3 seconds work!". I know people who, when have this pointed out to them, go "Oh I never read that, it just keeps popping up".

    The only other thing to do with some people is forcibly configure things, which I'm sure we'd all hate. I use Active Directory to force fine-tuned update compliance and firewall settings across my home network, but home users can't even negotiate a simple dialogue going "Here's what you need to do, here's why you need to do it, here's how to do it".

    So when IE pops up a convenient dialogue warning about the fact that HotPornDialer32.exe isn't signed and is in fact coming from a website with an invalid certificate, along with a warning about exactly why it's bad to click 'Install', people will do anyway. Perhaps a Firefox-esque forced delay is in order so people can't just click 'OK' without thinking.

    --
    How many people can read hex if only you and dead people can read hex?
  26. Re:They keep flogging this outdated line of reason by spinkter · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Sorry, but you're just plain wrong.

    "This has been refuted time and again..."

    Really? Got an example?

    Try this one on for size: Firefox didn't have an security issues until it started becoming popular. The Mac had a few recently too.

    Windows SERVERS are not the common target of these root-kits, the DESKTOP is because it IS the most popular.

    If Joe Beerbelly used Linux on the desktop, you'd have to take away his ability to install programs to protect him. How useable is the system at that point?

    "If Windows represent a bigger target, it SUPPOSEDLY has the "advantage" of being closed-source but the open source Unices, which are fewer in number SHOULD be an easier target."

    Hogwash. Why would i target a system that fewer installs? I need an army of machines to get my spam out or to propagate my virus. *nix can't provide that right now.

    I'm not saying that *nix is no good, but the logic that it is a smaller target therefore relatively unchallenged holds true.

  27. That brings a friends tagline to mind..... by 8127972 · · Score: 4, Funny

    ..... My other computer is YOUR computer.

    --
    This is my opinion. To make sure you don't steal it, it's covered by the DMCA.
  28. Re:MS(ux) for a few reasons, this is just one of t by darkfire5252 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    This seems like a symptom of a different problem, not really a problem in and of itself. Users become complacent with dialog boxes, systray warnings, etc, because there are no limits or standards regarding when these warnings are issued.

    In the same session I can recieve the "Take a tour of windows," "Your firewall is not turned on," "Clean up your desktop icons," and "Your hardware could not be installed" messages, all from the same section of the screen with the same look. Starting immediately after Windows installation users are taught those are 'random message bubbles' that could mean anything. Users just get discouraged when they have to acknowledge that they are sending information across the internet unencrypted, then acknowledge they are entering a secure site, then acknowledge they are leaving a secured site.