Launch Command Preserved In Power Failure, But Nuclear Designs Still Risky
With a follow-up to Tuesday's story, Martin Hellman writes "Slashdot reported that a system failure at Warren AFB in Wyoming affected 50 ICBMs and that 'various security protocols built into the missile delivery system, like intrusion alarms and warhead separation alarms, were offline.' Assuaging fears that America's nuclear deterrent might have been compromised during this failure, the source article notes that the missiles still could be launched from airborne command centers. Other reports cite an administration official offering assurances that 'at no time did the president's ability [to launch] decrease.' Given the difficulty of debugging software and hardware that is probably not a good thing. The history of nuclear command and control systems has too many examples of risky designs that favor the ability to launch over the danger of an accidental one."
Exaggerated threats from relatively weak entities. Questionable need in 1950 never mind 2010.
RGdot.com
So a previous president lost the biscuit for months at a time. That is the president would have been unable to authenticate to military command that he was giving a launch order. Why was that not considered a problem? When 50 missiles going into a still usable but wacky state is?
So a previous president lost the biscuit for months at a time. That is the president would have been unable to authenticate to military command that he was giving a launch order. Why was that not considered a problem? When 50 missiles going into a still usable but wacky state is?
The president losing the launch codes is a little harder for the reds to exploit then possibly a systematic failure
As I understand it, the entire point of the system of nuclear launch codes and the enormous system built around the nuclear arsenal is to ensure that accidental or unauthorized launches will not happen. Any failure mode of the system should result in an inability to launch -- how is that not obvious? Any other design seems to run counter to the purpose of the system itself.
Palm trees and 8
It's "Risky." You need to know it's STILL RISKY. Risk we say!
Be worried. Because their is risk. Don't think about the security those nooks have provided since WW2; there was and is absolutely no "risk" that another world wide conflagration might have or will happen without those risky missiles. But those nooks! The nooks are RiSkY you fool. RISKY. Don't worry about the risk to medical capabilities in the US as we legislate someones' idea of justice into medicine, either. No risk there at all. Running up 10% of our GDP as debt every year is also clearly risk free. So you just keep worrying about the nooks! They are Risky!
Once the power was cut, the missiles were supposed to interpret that as an attack, and carry out their last orders (launch toward Russia, North Korea, and David Hasselhof). So why aren't we sitting in a post-apocalyptic wasteland right now? I want an inquiry started immediately!
I need trepanation like I need a hole in the head.
Obviously more fact checking is needed.
And yes, the system is designed to be able to launch even if an attack (or something else) has damaged part of the system. You know, like "the Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it"?
It's called "redundancy". Would you want a weapon system that is disabled by any damage that might occur? Like in a war?
-=Maggie Leber=-
So why aren't we sitting in a post-apocalyptic wasteland right now?
Have you been to Detroit recently?
Logo! (Who knew?)
:size :size > 30 [stop] ; an exit condition :size rt 15 ; many lines of action :size *1.02 ; the tailend recursive call
to spiral
if
fd
spiral
end
'at no time did the president's ability [to launch] decrease.'
That's true. The ability to launch was non-existent before, during, and after this incident.
Does that count as post-apocalyptic?
Who needs an inquiry? Just fire up Fallout: New Vegas :)
How about assuaging fears that an accident, misunderstanding, systems failure (early warning / launch / other), or psycho with access blows us all up for nothing.
Who could possibly think it would be better to be dead (and possibly exterminate most life on this planet) than to be a subject of yet another corrupt government-- with few exceptions, most nations are more free than the U.S. anyway.
Yeah, I want my Fallout perks !
"risky designs that favor the ability to launch"
There are multiple safeguards built into the system that have to be released in order to launch even one missile. None of the safeguards are coupled, meaning that there is no cascading effect. Each one has different inputs and a different means to activate it.
One of the simplest is that it takes the near-simultaneous activation of two mechanical, key-locked switches to send the fire command to the missile, and these are separated by enough distance that one person can't do it alone. And it only gets to that point after a number of other manual steps have been taken to prep the launch.
Even the President's order is not sufficient to start everything rolling. The people in charge of monitoring the threat systems go to him to ask for authorization. He doesn't go to them - they'd never believe him if he did, since there's no way he'd know there was a threat. And they don't make their decision lightly.
At the point where it's necessary to launch a nuke, it will be blindingly clear to everyone that we should have made the process simpler, not that it is too simple.
he didn't play the utility bill.
I've been foloowing this blog/news site over the past months -- it exposes the danger of thenuclear arsenals in qa quite rational way - and the way to address it is just giving more exposure to these rational dangers, sot hat people demand dismantling nuclear weapons over time.
It is certainly worth a look - and an rss feed to follow! http://nuclearrisk.org/
-><- no
Comment removed based on user account deletion
Hmmm.... troll. Just making a comment.
putting the 'B' in LGBTQ+
The entire point of such systems is to ensure that a launch can occur despite a given failure, but only if authorized to do so. The concept of MAD (the most succesfull peace plan in history) is entirely depenant upon the ability to launch even in the advent of other failures. This was a technical failure and the backup processes and systems all worked as designed. No missle somehow got a launch order and no missle lost the ability to launch if needed. The entire story is hyperbole fearmongering.
I am in definitly NO WAY feeling more secure knowing that ICBMs can be launched even with their safeguards down!
bickerdyke
The screen goes black and white letters appear: ? SYNTAX ERROR IN LINE 10240
Isn't it a good thing that the designs don't favor the danger of an accidental launch? Or do you also donate to groups that support cancer?
Clinton never lost the biscuit. Did you see his waistline? ;-)
Seriously though, Clinton didn't lose anything, his aide lost the codes but not the football itself (guess I'm assuming there's more to the football than just a folder of codes). The aide then covered that fact up for months before anyone checking on him bothered to do more than take his word for it.
But Clinton was in no way involved in the loss or cover up of the situation.
People in cars cause accidents....accidents in cars cause people
'various security protocols built into the missile delivery system, like intrusion alarms and warhead separation alarms, were offline.'
'at no time did the president's ability [to launch] decrease.'
Were there any intruders? Were any warheads separated from their launch vehicles? I know, I know. I should RTFA.
From the summary: The history of nuclear command and control systems has too many examples of risky designs that favor the ability to launch over the danger of an accidental one.
[[Citation Needed]]
Seriously - because the claim quoted above is not supported in either of the linked articles. In fact, the citations show precisely the *opposite* - as the PALs were specifically intended to reduce the ability to launch in favor of reducing the risk of accidental launch. That they were improperly used is an operational flaw, not a design flaw. (A difference roughly as subtle as a baseball bat upside the head - and that the writers are unaware of this is a sure and certain sign they aren't qualified to write on the topic.)
The writer of the article cited above further compounds his error by using a situation from over three decades ago as 'proof' that a problem exists today - a situation which his own quote shows to no longer exist.
The president losing the launch codes is a little harder for the reds to exploit then possibly a systematic failure
Unless it was the reds that "founf" the biscuit. They don't actually have to use it, all they have to do is put it into play. The time necessary to disregard, authenticate a new code is longer than a missle launch. Which is why the US nuclear threat is three pronged, land, sea, and air. The only missles that do not need a Permissive Action Link are sea launched, surface or sub-surface.
The mind conceives, the body achieves, the spirit manifests.
I'm sure the receptionist for example uses Windows on its PC. Probably used throughout the facility. Probably also use Exchange for email, because it's better than anything else if cost is not a concern. They probably also use Word and Excel.
What's your point? You can't make a single point here that won't come off as a troll. Hence the mod.
You don't need the code to launch the missiles. You need to codes to tell the people that launch the missiles you are who you say you are.
There's an interesting talk given by Richard Rhodes a couple of months ago discussing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons:
http://foratv.vo.llnwd.net/o33/rss/Long_Now_Podcasts/podcast-2010-09-21-rhodes.mp3
In a nutshell, it probably doesn't matter if they were offline, they're unlikely ever going to get used.
Listen to the talk for some interesting takes on the "mutually assured destruction" situation.
Then they worked, and are continuing to work.
Dog barks at postman. Postman comes and goes away. Dog keeps barking at postman every day. Seems to work.
I guess I now have to be concerned about it spontaneously starting, driving away, and crashing into a bus load of orphaned nuns.
The whole article is based on the premise that EITHER you have risk of accidental launch EX-OR you have risk of failure to launch deliberately. That patently isn't true and you can make trivial example code to show that this is the case.
Whilst in the British system the Prime Minister would give the order for a strike he is not in law the commander in chief of our armed forces the Queen is. In normal day-to-day military operations, this is ignored as the PM's commands are deemed as coming from her. If however the Chief of Defence Staff responsible for passing the order to the troups thought the prime minster issuing the order was "stark raving mad", he would be within his rights to refuse it as contrary to the Queen's wishes. Essentially the PM has positive power of authorisation and the CDS has negative power to veto.
Interesting
1 - Intrusion detection offline
2 - Warhead separation offline
Improbable to the point of impossibility
A.1 - Exchanging warhead(s) with dud replica(s) (including clumps of radioactives inside).
A.2 - All involved being more interested in covering their asses than in discovering the truth.
3 - ... profit ? Doom ? 3rd-worlding empires shouldn't play with knives, let alone nukes ?
Half-bridges. On foggy nights.
No, but I'd buy that for a dollar!
See, thing is, unless the system was taken offline by an enemy for the express purpose of disabling the nukes, when they go down nobody knows about it. So, it doesn't really hurt the deterrent, now does it?